

# UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

Faculty of Physical Engineering and Science  
School of Electronics and Computer Science

A project report submitted for the award of  
MEng Computer Science

Supervisor: Dr Tim Norman

**Auctions for online elastic resource  
allocation in cloud computing**

*by* **Mark Towers**

March 30, 2020



University of Southampton

Abstract

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Edge clouds enable computational tasks to be completed at the edge of the network, without relying on access to remote data centres. A key challenge in these settings is that limited computational resources often need to be allocated to many self-interested users. Here, existing resource allocation approaches usually assume that tasks have inelastic resource requirements (i.e., a fixed amount of compute time, bandwidth and storage), which may result in inefficient resource use. In this paper, we expand previous work to an online setting such that job will arrive over time with the task prices and resource allocation determined through training an agent using reinforcement learning.



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# Listings



## List of Additional Material



## Declaration of Authorship

I declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. Parts of this work have been published as: S.R. Gunn. Pdflatex instructions, 2001. URL <http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~srg/softwaretools/document/>  
C. J. Lovell. Updated templates, 2011  
S.R. Gunn and C. J. Lovell. Updated templates reference 2, 2011

Signed:.....

Date:.....





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Also to Professor Tim Norman for this constant guidance over the project and the wisdom to know that to investigate and implement.



# Chapter 1

## Project problem

Cloud computing is a rapidly growing service with competition from Google, Amazon, Microsoft and more that aim to allow users to run computer programs that are too large, difficult or time consuming for users to run locally. These services provide the computational resources, e.g. cpu cores, RAM, hard drive space, bandwidth, etc to be able to run such programs. However, as these resources are limited, bottlenecks can occur when numerous users all require large amounts of these resources, which limits the number of tasks <sup>1</sup> that can be run on the cloud services simultaneously.

For Google and the like, their cloud computing facilities contain vast server nodes limiting the probability of such bottlenecking occurring and if such an event does occur, users have a range of data centres across the global to use instead. Therefore this work considers still a developing paradigm ( [Mao et al., 2017](#)) called Edge/Mobile cloud computing. Edge cloud computing is believed to have a wide range of application where using cloud computing would traditionally be impractical. This could be due to tasks being highly delay-sensitive, intermittent internet connectivity or high operational security that prevent or limit the effectiveness of traditional cloud computing.

Currently: disaster response, smart cities and internet-of-things (IoT) are all popular technologies that utilise edge cloud computing due to its ability to process programs locally with low latency. For smart cities, this allows for the possibly of smart intersections with the use of road-side sensors or smart traffic lights based on cameras to minimise the waiting times ([Mustapha et al., 2018](#)).

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<sup>1</sup>Tasks, Programs and Jobs will be used interchangeably to refer to the same idea of a computer programs that has a fixed amount of resources required to compute the program.

Or for the police to analysis CCTV footage to spot suspicious behaviour or to track people between cameras (Sreenu and Saleem Durai, 2019). In the case of disaster response, maps can be produced using autonomous vehicles sensors to be used in the search for potential victims and support responders (Alazawi et al., 2014).

However the problem of bottlenecking is of particular relevant in edge cloud computing, as instead of large server farms that can be geographically distant from the users. Edge cloud computing server are significantly smaller than Google style data centers and can be just high powered desktop computers. This results in the demand on resources to be much greater, requiring that servers try to allocate their resources was efficiently as possible. Because of this, resource allocation in edge cloud computing is an important and interesting research area.

However it is believed that there is a shortcoming of existing work in resource allocation within edge cloud computing ( Farhadi et al., 2019; Bi et al., 2019) due to the nature of task resource requirements. Traditional, to compute these task, several types of resource are required including communication bandwidth, computational power and data storage resources ( Farhadi et al., 2019) that a user would request a fixed amount of each of these resources. This thus requires the server to allocate such resources to the user however anyone user from accessing the resources till the user is finished with them. However this has the disadvantage bottlenecking occurring due to the inflexible nature of resources that cant allow balancing of resources between users. The reason for the continued use of such methods is that in traditional cloud computing such bottlenecking is rare and it allows for simpler pricing mechanism as the price can be proportional to the quantity of resources required.

Previous work by this author (Towers et al., 2020) proposed a novel resource allocation method to allow for significantly more flexibility aims that this would reduce bottlenecking of resources. This was done by requesting that users provide a total resource usage over a tasks lifetime instead of the required resource usage. With this change how much of each resource to be allocated could be decided by the server instead of the user. This is possible as the time taken for data to be send and received is proportional to the allocated bandwidth. This sort of flexibility is similarly true for computing a task as well. Therefore using a deadline, provided by the user, it is possible to reallocate resources around

to reduce the overall strain on certain resources. Therefore Using this alternative resource allocation procedure, bottlenecks can be prevent through proper balancing of resources that in turn will allow more tasks to run simultaneously and to reduce the price for user to run a task.

However this work only considered a static or one-shot approach where all tasks were presented at the first time step. At which point tasks would be auctioned and resource allocated. As a result while tasks would be processed in batches such that tasks would bid on all tasks submitted every 5 minutes or so. Therefore previous work could also not dynamically change the resources allocated between batches, this work aims to address these problems in previous work.

These problems are addressed by introducing time into the optimisation problem (outlined in section 3.1) but due to this additional all previous mechanism used are incompatible with the new optimisation problem. Therefore using a standard auction mechanism, this project investigates different methods of learning how to bid on tasks based on their resource requirements and to efficiently allocate resources to tasks by a server.

This report is set out is following chapters. Chapter 3 proposed a solution to the project outline in this chapter with chapter 4 justifying why this approach as taken over alternative. Chapter 2 investigates the previous research that this project builds upon within both resource allocation in cloud computing and reinforcement learning methods. The proposed solution is then implemented in chapter 5 with testing and evaluation in chapters 6 and 7 respectively.



# Chapter 2

## Related Work

There is a considerable amount of research in the area of pricing and resource allocation in cloud computing, of which some use auction mechanisms to deal with competition (Kumar et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017; Bingqian Du, 2019; Bi et al., 2019) as this project does. Therefore section 2.1 presents the related approaches to resource allocation in cloud computing and edge cloud computing to the one taken in this project.

The proposed solution of the project (presented in chapter 3) uses a form of machine learning, called reinforcement learning. Section 2.2 explores the research and the current state of the art algorithms of deep Q learning and policy gradient that are used in this project.

### 2.1 Related Work in Cloud Computing

A majority of approaches for pricing and resource allocation in cloud computing use a fixed resource allocation mechanism such that user request a fixed amount of certain resource from the cloud provider. However this mechanism provides no control over the resources quantity allocated, only to which server these resources are allocated to. Therefore a majority of this resources is focusing on designing efficient and incentive compatible auction mechanism. A survey of these approaches has been investigated by Kumar et al. (2017) and that found ....

Other closely related work on resource allocation in edge clouds Farhadi et al. (2019) considers both the placement of code/data needed to run a specific task,

as well as the scheduling of tasks to different edge clouds. The goal there is to maximize the expected rate of successfully accomplished tasks over time. Our work is different both in the setup and the objective function. Our objective is to maximize the value over all tasks. In terms of the setup, they assume that data/code can be shared and they do not consider the elasticity of resources.

Previous work by this author in [Towers et al. \(2020\)](#) proposed the novel resource allocation (explained in chapter 1) along with an optimisation problem mathematically describing the resource allocation. This work then continued and presents three solutions for the problem case, a greedy algorithm to quickly approximate a solution in order to maximise the social welfare and two auction mechanisms as server are normally paid for usage of their resources. The greedy algorithm is a polynomial time algorithm that will find solution within  $\frac{1}{n}$  of the optimal social welfare. This is done through the use of modular heuristics for ordering the task by density then for each task, select a server based on available resource on each servers then to allocate resources that minimises a resource heuristics. Using certain heuristics, the greedy algorithm achieves at least 90% of the optimal solution and 20% more than optimal solution for fixed resource equivalent problems. The first of the auction mechanisms is a novel distributed iterative auction developed using a reverse vcg principle to calculate a task price. That meant that a task doesnt need to reveal its private value also that the auction could be run in a decentralised way. This means that the auction is budget balanced however it is not economically efficient or incentive compatible. The third algorithm is an implementation of a single parameter auctions ([Nisan et al., 2007](#)) using the greedy algorithm to find the critical value of a task. Using this mechanism with a monotonic value density heuristic results in the auction being incentive compatible.

## 2.2 Related Work in Reinforcement learning

Computer scientists have always been interested in testing computers against humans (cite turing test) and a key part is the ability to learn. For computers this ability is much more complex and researchers have found a variety of ways to allow computers to do this. These methods are broadly grouped into three categories of supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement learning. Supervised learning uses pairs of inputs to true outputs like in case of image classifications



where each image has a correct category for the image to be mapped to. Unsupervised learning instead doesn't have a true output meaning that algorithms tries to find links between similar data.

However both of these methods are not effective for real world interactions as agents must make a series of actions that result in rewards. Algorithms designed for these problems with a series of actions fall into the category of reinforcement learning which aims to maximise the reward over time. This is the area of machine learning that this project utilises as the problem can be modelled as a markov decision process (in section 3.3) that allows agents to interact with the environment to learn over time. Reinforcement learning is a rapidly growing field of research within AI due to its real world applications like driving a car, playing games, etc.

Q-learning algorithm [Watkins and Dayan \(1992\)](#) is a learning method used for estimating the action-value function that is one of the bases on for modern reinforcement learning. As the series of actions can be formed into a tree of actions, an agent is interested in which actions will result in the largest reward in the future. This is formulated as in equation (2.1).

$$Q(s_t, a_t) = Q(s_t, a_t) + \alpha \cdot (r_t + \lambda \cdot \max_a Q(s_{t+1}, a) - Q(s_t, a_t)) \quad (2.1)$$

However the curse of dimensionality was found to be a major problem as to use Q learning required forming a table of state-actions in order to calculate and as the number of dimensions increase, the number of state-actions will increase exponentially. Therefore making the method impractical for problem that had large state space. Therefore use of a function approximate is used to circumvent this problem, traditionally done using a neural network. Work by [Mnih et al. \(2013\)](#) using a deep convolution neural network was able to achieve state of the art in six of seven games tried on atari with three of these scores being superhuman. This work was followed up by [Mnih et al. \(2015\)](#) and found that with no modifications to the hyperparameters, neural network and training method; state of the art results were achieved in almost all 49 atari games and superhuman results in 29 of these games. Additional heuristics have been proposed for deep Q learning: double DQN ([van Hasselt et al., 2015](#)), prioritized experience replay ([Schaul et al., 2015](#)), dueling network architecture ([Wang et al., 2015](#)), multi-step bootstrap targets ([Sutton, 1988](#); [Sutton and Barto, 2018](#)), A3C [Mnih et al. \(2016\)](#), distributional Q-learning ([Bellemare et al., 2017](#)) and noisy DQN ([Fortunato et al., 2017](#)). These methods were combined

together Hessel et al. (2017), called rainbow DQN, achieving over 200% of the original DQN algorithm and over 50% than any optimisation on its own in a quarter of the observations.

Using the base of Q-learning, policy gradient separate the action selection policy to the q-value policy. In Q-learning, the selection the action is based on the maximum Q-value of the actions however policy gradient separates. This has the advantages of being able to deal with both discrete and continuous action spaces where Q-learning can only deal with discrete action space. Also the learning method doesn't require  $\epsilon$  – greedy action selection that can for Q – learning cause the resulting po

## Chapter 3

# Proposed solution to problem

In chapter 1, the problem that this project address was outlined along with the reasoning for the project. This chapter builds upon that giving a format mathematical model of the problem (section 3.1). While the overall problem is on resource allocation, we believe that cloud provider would wish to be paid for the use of their services so this additional problem is addressed in section 3.2. Using these two sub-problems from the two sections before, section 3.3 proposed agents who can learn how to maximise the problems identified.

### 3.1 Resource Allocation Optimisation problem

Using the flexible resource allocation principle presented in [Towers et al. \(2020\)](#), a format mathematical description of the model can developed. The principle is that for certain resources, the time taken for a operation to occur, e.g. loading of a program, computing the program and sending of results, etc, is proportional to the amount of resources allocated to completed the operation.<sup>1</sup> Therefore instead of allowing the user to requesting a fixed amount of resources for loading, computing and sending back the results of a program, the user would instead inform the server the total amount of bandwidth required, computational power, etc for the task to be completed. Then the server can dynamically allocate its available resources to all of its allocated tasks. This is believed to

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<sup>1</sup>This principle is not always true, for example, video decompression is a generally a single thread operation and cannot be effectively multi-threaded. However for this project we only consider tasks that can be parallelised effectively.




FIGURE 3.1: System model

be effective compared to standard resource allocation mechanism is that bottleneck can occur on certain resource preventing additional tasks from being allocated due not the server not having the requested resources available for the task. Therefore using this principle, a modified version of a standard resource allocation formulation can be described to maximise social welfare.

A sketch of the system is shown in Fig. 3.1. We assume that in the system there is a set of  $I = \{1, 2, \dots, |I|\}$  servers are heterogeneous in all characters. Each server has a fixed availability of resources: storage for the code/data needed to run a task (e.g., measured in GB), computation capacity in terms of CPU cycles per time interval (e.g., measured in FLOP/s), and communication bandwidth to receive the data and to send back the results of the task after execution (e.g., measured in Mbit/s). We denote these resources for server  $i$ : the storage capacity as  $S_i$ , computation capacity as  $W_i$ , and the communication capacity as  $R_i$ .

There is a set  $J = \{1, 2, \dots, |J|\}$  of different tasks that require service from one of the servers in set  $I = \{1, 2, \dots, |I|\}$ . To run any of these tasks on a server requires storing the appropriate code/data on the same server. These could be, for example, a set of images, videos or CNN layers in identification tasks. The storage size of task  $j$  is denoted as  $s_j$  with the rate at which the program is transferred to the server  $i$  at time  $t$  being  $s'_{i,j,t}$ . For a task to be computed successfully, it must fetch and execute instructions on a CPU. We consider the total number of CPU cycles required for the program to be  $w_j$ , where the rate at which the CPU cycles are assigned to the task on server  $i$  at time  $t$  is  $w'_{i,j,t}$ . Finally, after the task is run and the results obtained, the latter need to be sent back to the user. The size of the results for task  $j$  is denoted with  $r_j$ , and the rate at which

they are sent back to the user is  $r'_{i,j,t}$  on server  $i$  at time  $t$ . Every task has a beginning time, denoted by  $b_j$  and a deadline, denoted by  $d_j$ . This is the maximum time for the task to be completed in order for the user to derive its value. This time includes: the time required to send the data/code to the server, run it on the server, and get back the results. Therefore for the task to be successfully completed, it must completed fulfill the constraint in equation (3.1). These operations must occur in order (loading, computing then sending of results) as a server couldn't compute a task that was not fully loaded on the machine.

$$\frac{s_j}{\sum_{t=b_j}^{d_j} s'_{i,j,t}} + \frac{w_j}{\sum_{t=b_j}^{d_j} w'_{i,j,t}} + \frac{r_j}{\sum_{t=b_j}^{d_j} r'_{i,j,t}} \leq d_j \quad \forall j \in J \quad (3.1)$$

As server have limited capacity, the total resource usages for all tasks running on a server must be capped. The storage constraint (equation (3.2)) is unique as the previous amount loaded in kept till the end of a program on server. While the computation capacity (equation (3.3)) is the sum of compute used by all of the tasks on a server  $i$  at time  $t$  and the bandwidth capacity (equation (3.4)) is the sum of loading and sending usages by tasks.

$$\sum_{j \in J} \left( \sum_{t=b_j}^{d_j} s'_{i,j,t} \right) \leq S_i, \quad \forall i \in I \quad (3.2)$$

$$\sum_{j \in J} w'_{i,j,t} \leq W_i, \quad \forall i \in I, t \in T \quad (3.3)$$

$$\sum_{j \in J} s'_{i,j,t} + r'_{i,j,t} \leq R_i, \quad \forall i \in I, t \in T \quad (3.4)$$

$$(3.5)$$

## 3.2 Auctioning of Tasks

While the mathematically description of the problem presented above doesn't contain any auctioning properties, in real life, cloud providers wish to be paid to the use of their services. However due to the modifications that this project has to make to the optimisation problems compared to a traditional cloud computing optimisation problem. All traditional auction mechanisms that have been discussed in section 2.1 means that a novel or modified auction mechanism

must be used to deal with these changes. Due to the complexities of devising new auction mechanism and the large corpus of research on auctions already, this project has chosen to use the Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961).

This is as the modification required for an auction mechanism to be used is not to the auction itself but to the way that server price tasks. In traditional cloud computing, it was possible to create combinations of resources that means that users just buy the minimum amount of resources for their task with the price determined by the amount of resources requested. But due to the flexible resource allocation mechanism this style of linear pricing strategy is not effective as the demand on resources is not easy to calculate and the resource usage by other tasks is difficult to predict in the future. If an user wishes to run on task on the cloud, the task can be put forward with its requirements of required storage, computation, results data and deadline.

In order for fast and truthful, a reverse Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961) will be implemented where servers all submit their bid for the task with the winner being the server with the lowest price but actually only gains second lowest price. The Vickrey auction is incentive compatible meaning that the dominant strategy for bidding on a task is to bid your truthful value for a task. This should help server as they dont need to learn how to outbid another agent as it only needs to consider its own evaluation. As there is also only a single round of bidding compared to alternative auctions like English or Dutch auctions, this makes auctioning fast no matter the number of servers and it also allows for a reserve price to be used.

### 3.3 Proposed Agents

In order to calculate the price of the task for a server requires a understanding the resource requirements of the task, the future supply and demand for tasks and the resource requirements of currently allocated tasks. Due to the complexity in creating a heuristic that can accurately use this information and the amount of memory required for a table based approach. Because of this, a long/short term memory (LSTM) will be implemented (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) for evaluating the price of a task. The justified for the use of this network over other neural network models is explained in Section 4.1. The network would take as input, the currently allocated tasks requirements, the

FIGURE 3.2

possible task requirements and the server resource capacity, outputting just a single value representing the price of the task, normalised between 0 and 100.

In previous work ([Towers et al., 2020](#)), that utilised a single shot problem case where jobs wouldn't arrive over time, the resource speeds set were fixed and assumed that a task loading, computing and sending result occurred concurrently. With the addition of time, results in these assumptions not to hold anymore as tasks contain stages for the loading, computing and sending of results thus requiring allocated resource speeds to change over time. Therefore at each time step, a server needs to reallocate all of its resource to its currently allocated tasks as some tasks will have completely one of its stages.

In order to select how to allocate resource to tasks, this problem doesn't seem as complex as the pricing in section ?? therefore simple heuristic and long/short term memory neural network will be implemented and compared. This is justified in section 4.1. The LSTM will take as input, all of the currently allocated tasks that are at a particular stages resource requirements and the task's resource requirement returning a single value between 1 to 100. Once this is completed for each job, the percentage of the total values will be assigned to each task.

Markov decision process ([Bellman, 1957](#)) is a mathematical framework that is used in reinforcement learning to model actions, states and rewards.

But because of the way that the problem must be formulated with the two sub-problems of auctioning and resource allocation that means that a straight forward implementation of this framework is difficult. This is the system works in batches with new tasks arriving over time that is then auctioned which could occur multiple times till all tasks are auctioned. Then server redistributes their resources which means that the overall markov decision process has two separate sub-environment within the overall larger environment. Because this problem of this, multiple





## Chapter 4

### Justification of the solution

The proposed solution in Chapter 3 as two parts explained in section 3.2 of the auctioning of tasks and 3.3 with the proposed agents. This chapter explains the reason for why each section is being solved in its particular way.

As the approaches to pricing and resource allocation heuristics are using neural networks to find the optimal function, table 4.1 has a description of how the networks architectures differ.

Neural Network	Description
Artificial neural networks (ANN) <a href="#">McCulloch and Pitts (1943)</a>	Originally developed as a theoretically approximation for the brain, it was found that for networks with at least one hidden layer that a neural network could approximate any function ( <a href="#">Csáji, 2001</a> ). This made neural networks extremely helpful for cases where a function would normally to difficult to find the exact function, an ANN could be trained through supervised learning to be a close approximation to the true function.
Recurrent neural network (RNN) <a href="#">Elman (1990)</a>	A major weakness of ANN's is that it must use a fixed input and output making it unusable with text, sound or video where the previous data in important in understanding an input. RNN's extend ANN's to allow for connections to neurons again so that the network is not stateless compared to ANN. This means that individual letters of a words can be passed in with the network "remembering" the previous letter.

Long/Short Term Memory (LSTM) <a href="#">Hochreiter and Schmidhuber (1997)</a>	While RNN's can "remember" previous inputs to the network, it also struggles from the vanishing or exploding gradient problem where gradient tends to zero or infinity making it unusable. LSTM aims to prevent this by using forget gates that determines how much information the next state will get, allowing for more complexity information to be learnt compared to RNN's
Gated Recurrent unit (GRU) <a href="#">Chung et al. (2014)</a>	GRU are very similar to LSTM, except that they use different wiring and a single less gate, using an update gate instead of a forgot gate. These additional mean that the they run faster and are easier to code than LSTM however are not as expressive allowing for less complex functions to be encoded.
Neural Turing Machine (NTM) <a href="#">Graves et al. (2014)</a>	Inspired by computers, neural turing machines build on LSTM by using an external memory module that instead of memory being inbuild in a neuron. This allows for external observers to understand what is going on much better than LSTM due to its black-box nature.
Differentiable neural computer (DNC) <a href="#">Graves et al. (2016)</a>	An expansion to the NTM where the memory module is scalable in size allowing for additional memory to be added if needed.

TABLE 4.1: Neural network descriptions

## 4.1 Justification for Task Auctioning

The auction stage (discussed in Section 3.2) has two considerations, the auction type and the pricing method.

In auction theory, there are numerous types of auctions that have different properties and uses in different areas. The area in which this project is interested in is single indivisible items as while the item has multiple resource requires, a server is required to buy the task as a single unit. Table 4.2 outlines a description of possible auctions while table 4.3 outline the most important properties that an auction has.

Auction type	Description
English auction	A traditional auction where all participant can bid on a single item with the price slowly ascending till only a single participant is left who pays the final bid price. Due to the number of rounds, this requires a large amount of communication and requires tasks to be auctioned in series.
Dutch auction	The reverse of the English auction where the starting price is higher than anyone is willing to pay with the price slowly dropping till the first participant "jumps in". This can result in sub-optimal pricing if the starting price is not highest enough and the latency can have a large effect on the winner.
Japanese auction	Similar to the English auction except that the auction occurs over a set period of time with the last highest bid being the winner. This means that it has the same disadvantages as the English auction except that there is no guarantee that the price will converge to the maximum. Plus additional factors like latency can have a large effect on the winner that will have a larger affect in the application of this project, edge cloud computing. But this time limit results in the auction taking a fixed amount of time unlike the English or Dutch auctions.
Blind auction	Also known as a First-price sealed-bid auction, all participants submit a single secret bid for an item with the highest bid winning and pays their bid value. As a result there is no dominant strategy (not incentive compatible) as an agent would not wish to bid higher than their task evaluation but if all other agents bid significantly lower then it would have been beneficial for the agent to bid much lower than their true evaluation. Due there being a single round of bidding, latency doesn't affect an agent and many more auctions could occur within the same time a English, Dutch or Japanese auction would take to run.

Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961)	Also known as a second-price sealed bid auction, all participants submit a single secret bid for an item with the highest bid winning but it only pays the price of the second highest bid. Because of this, it is a dominant strategy for an agent to bid its true value as even if the bid is much higher than all other participants its doesn't matter.
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TABLE 4.2: Descriptions of auctions

Auction	Incentive compatible	Iterative	Fixed time length
English	False	True	False
Japanese	False	True	True
Dutch	False	True	False
Blind	False	False	True
Vickrey	True	False	True

TABLE 4.3: Properties of the auctions described in Table 4.2

Due to the properties of the Vickrey auction (table 4.3), I believe that it is the best auction to be used. The greatest advantage of the auction is that it is strategyproof meaning the dominant strategy is to truthfully bid its price. This means that agents don't have to learn a strategy as with the blind auction where the agent must learn to bid only just lower than other agents. Another advantage of the auction is that it is not iterative, making the auction fast with only a single round and can give a fixed time limit from the task being published to all server bids to be submitted.

However, the standard Vickrey auction will not be used as the task is buying the resources from a server not a server buying the task. But due to resource allocation, the server must bid on the task so the Vickrey auction implemented will work in reverse so the lowest bid will win and the task must pay the second-lowest bid. In the final report, a proof will be provided to show that a reverse Vickrey auction is still incentive compatible.

The second part of the auction solution is the pricing heuristic. I believe that the pricing heuristic would be too complex to be encoded into an algorithm if by hand due to its need to understand: future resource allocation of currently allocated jobs and the resource requirements of the task. Therefore due to neural networks being able to approximate any function (Csáji, 2001) and reinforcement learning

methods to training without truth data (Section 2.2). I have outlined in Table 4.1 the properties of popular neural network architectures that would allow for a variable amount of inputs (except for ANN). This is due to having to input to the network the currently allocated tasks to a server that till compute time is of unknown length. Of the available architecture, I predict the Long/Short term memory model is the simplest model that will require the least training but still with the complexity to encode the heuristic. With the Neural Turing Machine and Differentiable Neural Network, these networks are extremely complex and require a large amount of data to train the networks. Also the ability of these networks to be able to store data in external storage is not important as the data doesn't need to be store for future inputs. The opposite problem exists for the Recurrent neural network or the Gated Recurrent unit that they are possibly not complex enough for the pricing heuristic.

## 4.2 Justification for Resource allocation

The justification for the resource allocation neural network choice is very similar justification to the previous section (section 4.1). Long/short term memory architecture should be complex enough for the resource allocation but it is possible that the ability to use external storage of Neural Turing machine and Differentiable Neural network to store the allocation of resource to previous tasks. But I don't believe that this additional complexity will allow for the heuristic to do later better but it could be investigated in future work.

The reason that the output of the neural network is normalised is done as it would require the network to learn less compared to if the network has output the amount of the available resources for a task. Whereas in a normalised value, the network can output how "important" allocation of resources are for a task not the exact amount of resources allocated.



## Chapter 5

# Implementation of the solution

Using the proposed solution in chapter 3, we can simulate edge cloud computing environment and then train agents to bid on tasks and allocate resources. This has three sections to it, first the simulation that is referred to as the environment (section 5.1), second to define the agents (section 5.2) and three to train the agents on the environment (section 5.3).

The implementation discussed below as written in Python and available to download on Github at <https://github.com/stringtheorys/Online-Flexible-Resource-A>

### 5.1 Simulating the Problem

As the aim of the environment is to train agents to learn how to action optimally then the way that agents interact with the environments matters. OpenAI have create a large number of open source popular reinforcement learning environment using the python module gym [Brockman et al. \(2016\)](#). Due to the wide scale use and developing of agents to interact with environment using the OpenAI environment specification, I have likewise programmed this environment to follow the same specification.

Therefore each server is forced to have a individual agents for both of the sub-problems making the overall problem particularly interesting for multi-agent reinforcement learning environment.

This is because the overall aim of the environment is cooperative (to maximise the social welfare) but the servers in competition during the auctions in order to maximise their profit. But then the server must be cooperative in allocating

Policy Type	Explanation
Dqn ( <a href="#">Mnih et al., 2015</a> )	
Distributional Dqn ( <a href="#">Bellemare et al., 2017</a> )	
Rainbow Dqn ( <a href="#">Hessel et al., 2017</a> )	
Deep deterministic policy gradient ( <a href="#">Silver et al., 2014</a> )	

TABLE 5.1: Table of policy types

Hyperparameter	Value
----------------	-------

TABLE 5.2: Table of Deep Q Networks training hyperparameters

of resources to each task as the server wish to complete as many tasks as they can.

## 5.2 Task pricing and resource weighting policy

Using the problem definition from chapter 1, the overall problem of flexible resource allocation is be separated into two subproblems: the auctioning of tasks and the allocating of resources to tasks that each server must do. Because of this, each server has to have a unique policy for bidding on tasks and allocating resources. Even those the state space and action space are exactly the same, the optimal policies for task pricing and resource allocation are completely different.

These policies are referred to as the task pricing agent, for bidding on tasks and the resource weighting agent, for allocating of resources. However determining these policies is a difficult due to the complexity and the interaction of task attributes and the server resources. Because of this, the ability of reinforcement learning to interact an environment and learn a policy in order to maximise its reward over time. Therefore a range of different policies have been implemented as Table 5.1 in order to evaluate the performance of different policies learning methods.

## 5.3 Training of agents

In order to train the agents certain hyperparameters were used.



Hyperparameter	Value
----------------	-------

TABLE 5.3: Table of Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient hyperparameters



# Chapter 6

## Testing

To test the effectiveness of the implemented policies from chapter 5, a range of tests are proposed in order to compare the solutions. These tests aim to compare the effectiveness of training techniques, policy hyperparameters and to fixed heuristics.

These tests fall into several distinct sections that are explained in Table 6.1.

Test Name	Explanation
Multi vs Single environment training settings	
Multi vs Single agent environment training settings	
Reinforcement Learning Policy testing	
Policy Environment generalisation	
Fixed policies testing	
Hyperparameter testing	

TABLE 6.1: Table of Testing Areas



## **Chapter 7**

### **Evaluation of the implementation**



## **Chapter 8**

### **Conclusion and future work**





# Appendices

## Appendix A: Paper

This paper has been submitted to the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) 2020 at the University of Auckland. The paper is under peer-review with the authors being myself, Dr Sebastian Stein, Professor Tim Norman from Southampton Univeristy, Dr Fidan Mehmeti, Professor Tom La Porta, Caroline Rubein from Penn State University and Dr Geeth Demel from IBM and within this project is referred to as [Towers et al. \(2020\)](#). A copy of the paper is found below.

# Auction-based Mechanisms for Allocating Elastic Resources in Edge Clouds

Paper #1263

## ABSTRACT

Edge clouds enable computational tasks to be completed at the edge of the network, without relying on access to remote data centres. A key challenge in these settings is the limited computational resources that need to be allocated to many self-interested users. Here, existing resource allocation approaches usually assume that tasks have inelastic resource requirements (i.e., a fixed amount of compute time, bandwidth and storage), that may result in inefficient resource use due to unbalanced requirements. To address this, we propose a novel approach that takes advantage of the elastic nature of some of the resources, e.g., to trade-off computation speed with bandwidth allowing a server to execute more tasks by their deadlines. We describe this problem formally, show that it is NP-hard and then propose a scalable approximation algorithm. To deal with the self-interested nature of users, we show how to design a centralized auction that incentivises truthful reporting of task requirements and values. Moreover, we propose novel auction-based decentralized approaches that are not always truthful, but that limit the information required from users and that can be adjusted to trade off convergence speed with solution quality. In extensive simulations, we show that considering the elasticity of resources leads to a gain in utility of around 20% compared to existing fixed approaches and that our novel auction-based approaches typically achieve 95% of the theoretical optimal.

## KEYWORDS

Edge clouds; elastic resources; auctions

## 1 INTRODUCTION

In the last few years, cloud computing [2] has become a popular solution to run data-intensive applications remotely. However, in some application domains, it is not feasible to rely a remote cloud, for example when running highly delay-sensitive and computationally-intensive tasks, or when connectivity to the cloud is intermittent. To deal with such domains, *mobile edge computing* [13] has emerged as a complementary paradigm, where computational tasks are executed at the edge of mobile networks at small data-centers, known as *edge clouds*.

Mobile edge computing is a key enabling technology for the Internet-of-Things (IoT) [6] and in particular applications in smart cities [19] and disaster response scenarios [9]. In these applications, low-powered devices generate computational tasks and data that have to be processed quickly on local edge cloud servers. More

specifically, in smart cities, these devices could be smart intersections that collect data from road-side sensors and vehicles to produce an efficient traffic light sequence to minimize waiting times [14]; or it could be CCTV cameras that analyse video feeds for suspicious behaviour, e.g., to detect a stabbing or other crime in progress [20]. In disaster response, sensor data from autonomous vehicles (including video, sonar and LIDAR) can be aggregated in real time to produce maps of a devastated area, search for potential victims and help first responders in focusing their efforts to save lives [1].

To accomplish these tasks, there are typically several types of resources that are needed, including communication bandwidth, computational power and data storage resources [7], and tasks are generally delay-sensitive, i.e., have a specific completion deadline. When accomplished, different tasks carry different values for their owners (e.g., the users of IoT devices or other stakeholders such as the police or traffic authority). This value will depend on the importance of the task, e.g., analysing current levels of air pollution may be less important than preventing a large-scale traffic jam at peak times or tracking a terrorist on the run. Given that edge clouds are often highly constrained in their resources [12], we are interested in allocating tasks to edge cloud servers to maximize the overall social welfare achieved (i.e., the sum of completed task values). This is particularly challenging, because users in edge clouds are typically self-interested and may behave strategically [3] or may prefer not to reveal private information about their values to a central allocation mechanism [18].

An important shortcoming of existing work of resource allocation in edge clouds, e.g., [3, 7], is that it assumes tasks have strict resource requirements — that is, each task consumes a fixed amount of computation (CPU cycles per time), takes up a fixed amount of bandwidth to transfer data and uses up a fixed amount of storage on the server. However, in practice, edge cloud servers have some flexibility in how they allocate limited resources to each task. In more detail, to execute a task, the corresponding data and/or code first has to be transferred to the server it is assigned to, requiring some bandwidth. This then takes up storage on the server. Next, the task needs computing power from the server in terms of CPU cycles per time. Once computation is complete, the results have to be transferred back to the user, requiring further bandwidth. Now, while the the storage capacity at the server for every task is *strict*, since the task cannot be run unless all the data is stored, the bandwidth and compute speed allocated to the task can be *elastic*. This allows flexibility in the resource allocation process enabling resources to be shared evenly, prevent resource self-interested users and for more task to receive service simultaneously.

Against this background, we make the following novel contributions to the state of the art:

- We formulate an optimization problem for assigning the tasks to the servers, whose objective is to maximize total

social welfare, taking into account resource limitations and elastic allocation of resources.

- We prove that the problem is NP-hard and propose an approximation algorithm with a performance guarantee of  $\frac{1}{n}$ , where  $n$  is the number of tasks, and a linearithmic computational complexity, i.e.,  $O(n \log(n))$ .
- We propose a range of auction-based mechanisms to deal with the self-interested nature of users. These offer various trade-offs regarding truthfulness, optimality, scalability, information requirements from users, communication overheads and decentralization.
- Using extensive realistic simulations, we compare the performance of our algorithm against other benchmark algorithms, and show that our algorithm outperforms all of them, while at the same time being within 95% to the optimal solution.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss related work. This is followed by the problem formulation in Section 3. Our novel resource allocation mechanisms are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we evaluate the performance of our mechanisms and compare them against the optimal solution and other benchmarks. Finally, Section 6 concludes the work.

## 2 RELATED WORK

There is a considerable amount of research in the area of resource allocation and pricing in cloud computing, some of which use auction mechanisms to deal with competition [3, 4, 11, 22]. However, these approaches assume that users request a fixed amount of resources system resources and processing rates, with the cloud provider having no control over the speeds, only the servers that the task was allocated to. In our work, tasks' owners report deadlines and overall data and computation requirements, allowing the edge cloud server to distribute its resources more efficiently based on each task's requirements.

Our problem is related to multidimensional knapsack problems. In particular, Nip et al. [15] consider flexibility in the allocation, with linear constraints that are used for elastic weights. The paper provides a pseudo-polynomial time complexity algorithm for solving this problem to maximize the values in the knapsack. Our problem case is similar to their problem, but our problem has non-linear constraints due to the deadline constraint, so their algorithm cannot be applied here.

Other closely related work on resource allocation in edge clouds [7] considers both the placement of code/data needed to run a specific task, as well as the scheduling of tasks to different edge clouds. The goal there is to maximize the expected rate of successfully accomplished tasks over time. Our work is different both in the setup and the objective function. Our objective is to maximize the value over all tasks. In terms of the setup, they assume that data/code can be shared and they do not consider the elasticity of resources.

## 3 PROBLEM FORMULATION

In this section we first describe the system model. Then, we present the optimization problem and prove its NP-hardness.




Figure 1: System Model

### 3.1 System model

A sketch of the system is shown in Fig. 1. We assume that in the system there is a set of servers  $I = \{1, 2, \dots, |I|\}$  servers, which could be edge clouds that can be accessed either through cellular base stations or WiFi access points (APs). Servers have different types of resources: storage for the code/data needed to run a task (e.g., measured in GB), computation capacity in terms of CPU cycles per time interval (e.g., measured in FLOP/s), and communication bandwidth to receive the data and to send back the results of the task after execution (e.g., measured in Mbit/s). We assume that the servers are heterogeneous in all their characteristics. More formally, we denote the storage capacity of server  $i$  with  $S_i$ , computation capacity with  $W_i$ , and the communication capacity with  $R_i$ .

There is a set  $J = \{1, 2, \dots, |J|\}$  of different tasks that require service from one of the servers.<sup>1</sup> Every task  $j \in J$  has a value  $v_j$  that represents the value of running the task to its owner. To run any of these tasks on a server requires storing the appropriate code/data on the same server. These could be, for example, a set of images, videos or CNN layers in identification tasks. The storage size of task  $j$  is denoted as  $s_j$  with the rate at which the program is transferred to the server being  $s'_j$ . For a task to be computed successfully, it must fetch and execute instructions on a CPU. We consider the total number of CPU cycles required for the program to be  $w_j$ , where the rate at which the CPU cycles are assigned to the task per unit of time is  $w'_j$ . Finally, after the task is run and the results obtained, the latter need to be sent back to the user. The size of the results for task  $j$  is denoted with  $r_j$ , and the rate at which they are sent back to the user is  $r'_j$ . Every task has its deadline, denoted by  $d_j$ . This is the maximum time for the task to be completed in order for the user to derive its value. This time includes: the time required to send the data/code to the server, run it on the server, and get back the results. We assume that there is an *all* or *nothing* task execution reward scheme, meaning that for the task value to be awarded the entire task must be run and the results sent back within the deadline.

<sup>1</sup>We focus on a single-shot setting in this paper. In practice, an allocation mechanism would repeat the allocation decisions described here over regular time intervals, with longer-running tasks re-appearing on consecutive time intervals. We leave a detailed study of this to future work.

### 3.2 Optimization problem

Given the aforementioned assumptions, the optimal assignment of tasks to servers and optimal allocation of resources in a server to the tasks assigned to that server is obtained as a solution to the following optimization problem. Here, the decision variables are  $x_{i,j} \in \{0, 1\}$  (whether to run task  $j$  on server  $i$ ) as well as  $s'_j$ ,  $r'_j$  and  $w'_j$  (indicating the bandwidth rates for transferring the code, for returning the results and the CPU cycles per unit of time, respectively).

$$\max \sum_{j \in J} v_j \left( \sum_{i \in I} x_{i,j} \right) \quad (1)$$

s.t.

$$\sum_{j \in J} s_j x_{i,j} \leq S_i, \quad \forall i \in I, \quad (2)$$

$$\sum_{j \in J} w'_j x_{i,j} \leq W_i, \quad \forall i \in I, \quad (3)$$

$$\sum_{j \in J} (r'_j + s'_j) \cdot x_{i,j} \leq R_i, \quad \forall i \in I, \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{s_j}{r'_j} + \frac{w_j}{w'_j} + \frac{r_j}{r'_j} \leq d_j, \quad \forall j \in J, \quad (5)$$

$$0 \leq s'_j \leq \infty, \quad \forall j \in J, \quad (6)$$

$$0 \leq w'_j \leq \infty, \quad \forall j \in J, \quad (7)$$

$$0 \leq r'_j \leq \infty, \quad \forall j \in J, \quad (8)$$

$$\sum_{i \in I} x_{i,j} \leq 1, \quad \forall j \in J, \quad (9)$$

$$x_{i,j} \in \{0, 1\}, \quad \forall i \in I, \forall j \in J. \quad (10)$$

The objective (Eq.(1)) is to maximize the total value over all tasks (i.e., the social welfare). Task  $j$  will receive the full value  $v_j$  only if it is executed entirely and the results are obtained within the deadline for that task. Constraint (Eq.(2)) relates to the finite storage capacity of every server to store code/data for the tasks that are to be run. The finite computation capacity of every server is expressed through Eq.(3), whereas Eq.(4) denotes the constraint on the communication capacity of the servers. As can be seen, the communication bandwidth comprises two parts: one part to send the data/code or request to the server, and the other part to get the results back to the user.<sup>2</sup> Constraint Eq.(5) is the deadline associated with every task, where the total time of the task in the system is the sum of the time to send the request and code/data to the server, time to run the task, and the time it takes the server to send all the results to the user. Note that if a task is not run on any server, this constraint can be satisfied by choosing arbitrarily high bandwidth and CPU rates (without being constrained by the resource limits of any server). The rates at which the code is sent, run and the results are sent back are all positive and finite (Eqs. (6), (7), (8)). Further, every task is served by at most one server (Eq.(9)). Finally, a task is either served or not (Eq.(10)).

<sup>2</sup>Not that sending and receiving data will not always overlap, but for tractability we assume they deplete a common limited bandwidth resource per time step. This ensures that the bandwidth constraint is always satisfied in practice.

**Complexity:** In the following we show that this optimization problem is NP-hard.

**THEOREM 3.1.** *The optimization problem (1)-(10) is NP-hard.*


**PROOF.** The optimization problem without constraint (5) is a 0-1 multidimensional knapsack problem [10], which is a generalization of a simple 0-1 knapsack problem. The latter is an NP-hard problem [10]. Given this, it follows that the 0-1 multidimensional knapsack problem is also NP-hard. Since optimization problem (1)-(10) is a generalization of a 0-1 multidimensional knapsack problem, it follows that it is NP-hard as well.  $\square$

Before we propose our novel allocation mechanisms for the allocation problem with elastic resources, we briefly outline an example that illustrates why considering this elasticity is important. In this example, there are 12 potential tasks and 3 servers (the exact settings can be found in table 2 for the tasks and table 1 for the servers).


Figure 2 shows the best possible allocation if tasks have fixed resource requirements. The resource speeds were chosen such to the minimum total resource usage that the task would require from the deadline. Here, 9 of the tasks are run, resulting in a total social welfare of 980 due to the limitation of the server's computation and the task requirement not being balanced.

In contrast to this, Figure 3 depicts the optimal allocation if elastic resources are considered. Here, it is evident that all of the resources are used by the servers whereas the fixed (in figure 2) cant do this. In total, the elastic approach manages to schedule all 12 tasks within the resource constraints, achieving a total social welfare of 1200 (an 19% improvement over the fixed approach).

The figures represent resource usage of the servers by the three bars relating to each of this resources (storage, CPU and bandwidth). For each task that is allocated to the server, the percentage of the resource's used is bar size. Then, for the tasks that are assigned to corresponding servers, the percentage of used resources are also depicted.



**Figure 2: Optimal solution with fixed resources. Due to not being able to balance out the resources, bottlenecks on the server 1 and 2's computation have occurred**



**Figure 3: Optimal solution with elastic resources. Compared to the fixed allocation, the elastic allocation is able to fully use all of its resources**

Name	$S_i$	$W_i$	$R_i$
Server 1	400	100	220
Server 2	450	100	210
Server 3	375	90	250

**Table 1: Servers - Table of server attributes**

Name	$v_j$	$s_j$	$w_j$	$r_j$	$d_j$	$s'_j$	$w'_j$	$r'_j$
Task 1	100	100	100	50	10	30	27	17
Task 2	90	75	125	40	10	22	32	15
Task 3	110	125	110	45	10	34	30	17
Task 4	75	100	75	35	10	27	21	13
Task 5	125	85	90	55	10	24	28	17
Task 6	100	75	120	40	10	20	32	16
Task 7	80	125	100	50	10	31	30	19
Task 8	110	115	75	55	10	30	22	20
Task 9	120	100	110	60	10	27	29	24
Task 10	90	90	120	40	10	25	30	17
Task 11	100	110	90	45	10	30	26	16
Task 12	100	100	80	55	10	24	24	22

**Table 2: Tasks - Table of task attributes, the columns for resource speeds ( $s'_j, w'_j, r'_j$ ) is for fixed speeds which the flexible allocation does not take into account. The fixed speeds is the minimum required resources to complete the task within the deadline constraint.**

#### 4 FLEXIBLE RESOURCE ALLOCATION MECHANISMS

In this section, we propose several mechanisms for solving the resource allocation problem with elastic resources. First, we discuss a centralized greedy algorithm (detailed in Section 4.1) with a  $\frac{1}{|J|}$  performance guarantee and polynomial run-time. Then, we consider settings where task users are self-interested and may either report their task values and requirements strategically or may

wish to limit the information they reveal to the mechanism. To deal with such cases, we propose two auction-based mechanisms, one of which can be executed in a decentralized manner (in Sections 4.2 and 4.3).

##### 4.1 Greedy Mechanism

As solving the allocation problem with elastic resources is NP-hard, we here propose a greedy algorithm (Algorithm 1) that considers tasks individually, based on an appropriate prioritisation function.


More specifically, the greedy algorithm does this in two stages; the first sorts the tasks and the second allocates them to servers. A value density function is applied to each of the task based on its attributes: value, required resources and deadlines. Stage one uses this function to sort the list of tasks. The second stage then iterates through the tasks in the given order, applying two heuristics to each task: one to select the server and another to allocate resources. The first of these heuristics, called the server selection heuristic, works by checking if a server could run the task if all of its resources were to be used for meeting the deadline constraint (eq 5) then calculating how good it would be for the job to be allocated to the server. The second heuristic, called the resource allocation heuristic, finds the best permutations of resources to minimise a formula, i.e., the total percentage of server resources used by the task.

In this paper we prove that the lower bound of the algorithm is  $\frac{1}{|J|}$  (where  $|J|$  is the number of jobs) using the value of a task as the value density function and using any feasible server selection and resource allocation heuristic. However we found that the task value heuristic is not the best heuristic as it does not consider the effect of the deadline or resources used for a job. In practice, the following heuristic often works better:  $\frac{v_j \cdot (s_j + w_j + r_j)}{d_j}$ . For the server selection heuristic we use  $\arg\min_{i \in I} S'_i + W'_i + R'_i$ , where  $S'_i, W'_i, R'_i$  are the server's available storage, computation and bandwidth resources respectively. While for the resource allocation heuristic we use  $\min \frac{W'_j}{w_j} + \frac{R'_j}{r_j}$ .

**THEOREM 4.1.** *The lower bound of the greedy mechanism is  $\frac{1}{n}$  of the optimal social welfare*

**PROOF.** Taking the value of a task as the value density function, the first task allocated will have a value of at least  $\frac{1}{n}$  total values of all jobs. As the allocation of resources for a task is not optimal, allocation of subsequent tasks is not guaranteed. Therefore, as the optimal social welfare must be the total values of all jobs or lower then the lower bound of the mechanism must be  $\frac{1}{n}$  of the optimal social welfare.  $\square$

In figure 4, an example allocation using the algorithm is shown using the model from tables 1 and 2. The algorithm uses the recommend heuristic proposed above and allows for all tasks to be allocated achieving 100% of the flexible optimal in figure 3.



**Figure 4: Example Greedy allocation using model from table 2 and 1**

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**Algorithm 1** Greedy Mechanism

---

**Require:**  $J$  is the set of tasks and  $I$  is the set of servers  
**Require:**  $S'_i$ ,  $W'_i$  and  $R'_i$  is the available resources (storage, computation and bandwidth respectively) for server  $i$ .  
**Require:**  $\alpha(j)$  is the value density function of a task  
**Require:**  $\beta(j, I)$  is the server selection function of a task and set of servers returning the best server, or  $\emptyset$  if the task is not able to be run on any server  
**Require:**  $\gamma(j, i)$  is the resource allocation function of a task and server returning the loading, compute and sending speeds  
**Require:**  $\text{sort}(X, f)$  is a function that returns a sorted list of elements in descending order, based on a set of elements and a function for comparing elements

```

 $J' \leftarrow \text{sort}(J, \alpha)$ 
for all  $j \in J'$  do
   $i \leftarrow \beta(j, I)$ 
  if  $i \neq \emptyset$  then
     $s'_j, w'_j, r'_j \leftarrow \gamma(j, i)$ 
     $x_{i,j} \leftarrow 1$ 
  end if
end for

```

---

**THEOREM 4.2.** *The time complexity of the greedy algorithm is  $O(|J| |I|)$ , where  $|J|$  is the number of tasks and  $|I|$  is the number of servers. Assuming that the value density and resource allocation heuristics have constant time complexity and the server selection function is  $O(|I|)$ .*

**PROOF.** The time complexity of the stage 1 of the mechanism is  $O(|J| \log(|J|))$  due to sorting the tasks and stage 2 has complexity  $O(|J| |I|)$  due to looping over all of the tasks and applying the server selection and resource allocation heuristics. Therefore the overall time complexity is  $O(|J| |I| + |J| \log(|J|)) = O(|J| |I|)$ .  $\square$

## 4.2 Critical Value Auction

Due to the problem case being non-cooperative, if the greedy mechanism was used to allocate resources such that the value is the

price paid. This is open to manipulation and misreporting of task attributes like the value, deadline or resource requirements. Therefore in this section we propose an auction that is weakly-dominant for tasks to truthfully report it attributes.

Single-Parameter domain auctions are extensively studied in mechanism design [16] and are used where an agent's valuation function can be represented as single value. The task price is calculated by finding the task's value such that if the value were any smaller, the task could not be allocated. This value is called the critical value. This has been shown to be a strategyproof [17] (weakly-dominant incentive compatible) auction so it is a weakly-dominant strategy for a task to honestly reveal its value.

The auction is implemented using the greedy mechanism from section 4.1 to find an allocation of tasks using the reported value. Then for each task allocated, the last position in the ordered the task list such that the task would still allocated is found. The critical value of the task is then equal to the inverse of the value density function where the density is the density of the next task in the list after that position.

In order that the auction is strategyproof, the value density function is required to be monotonic so that misreporting of any task attributes will result in the value density decreasing. Therefore a value density function of the form  $\frac{v_j d_j}{\alpha(s_j, w_j, r_j)}$  must be used so that the auction is strategyproof.

**THEOREM 4.3.** *The value density function  $\frac{v_j d_j}{\alpha(s_j, w_j, r_j)}$  is monotonic for task  $j$  assuming the function  $\alpha(s_j, w_j, r_j)$  is monotonic decreasing.*

**PROOF.** In order to misreport the task private value and deadline must be less than the true value. The opposite is true for the required resources (storage, compute and result data) with the misreported value being greater than the true value. Therefore the  $\alpha$  function will increase as the resource requirements increase as well, meaning that density will decrease.  $\square$

## 4.3 Decentralised Iterative Auction

VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Grove) auction [21] [5] [8] is proven to be economically efficient, budget balanced and incentive compatible. A task's price is found by the difference of the social welfare for when the task exists compared to the social welfare when the task doesn't exist. Our auction uses the same principle for pricing by finding the difference between the current server revenue and the revenue when the task is allocated (at  $\epsilon_0$ ).

The auction iteratively lets a task advertise its requirements to all of the servers who respond with their price for the task. This price is equal to the server's current revenue minus the solution to the the problem in section 4.3.1 plus a small value called the price change variable. Being the reverse of the VCG mechanism, such that the price is found for when the task exists rather than when it doesn't exist. The price change variable allows for the increase in the revenue of the server and is can be chosen by the server. Once all of the server have responded, the task can compare the minimum server price to its private value. If the price is less then the task will accept the servers with the minimum price offer, otherwise the task will stop looking as the price for the task to run on any server is greater than its reserve price.

To find the optimal revenue for a server  $m$  given a new task  $p$  and set of currently allocated tasks  $N$  has a similar formulation to section 3.2. With an additional variable is considered, a task's price being  $p_n$  for task  $n$ .

#### 4.3.1 Server problem case.

$$\max \sum_{n \in N} p_n x_n \quad (11)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad (12)$$

$$\sum_{n \in N} s_n x_n + s_p \leq S_m, \quad (13)$$

$$\sum_{n \in N} w'_n x_n + w_p \leq W_m, \quad (14)$$

$$\sum_{n \in N} (r'_n + s'_n) \cdot x_n + (r'_p + s'_p) \leq R_m, \quad (15)$$

$$\frac{s_n}{s_n} + \frac{w_n}{w_n} + \frac{r_n}{r_n} \leq d_n, \quad \forall n \in N \cup \{p\}, \quad (16)$$

$$0 \leq s'_n \leq \infty, \quad \forall n \in N \cup \{p\} \quad (17)$$

$$0 \leq w'_n \leq \infty, \quad \forall n \in N \cup \{p\} \quad (18)$$

$$0 \leq r'_n \leq \infty, \quad \forall n \in N \cup \{p\} \quad (19)$$

$$x_n \in \{0, 1\}, \quad \forall n \in N \quad (20)$$

The objective (Eq.(11)) is to maximize the price of all tasks (not including the new task as the price is zero). The server resource capacity constraints are similar to the constraints in the standard model set out in section 3.2 however with the assumption that the task  $k$  is running so there is no need to consider if the task is running or not. The deadline and non-negative resource speeds constraints (5, 6, 7 and 8) are all the same equation with the new task included with all of the other tasks. The equation to check that a task is only allocated to a single server is not included as only server  $i$  considers the task  $k$ 's price.

In auction theory, four properties are considered: Incentive compatible, budget balanced, economically efficient and individual rationality.

- Budget balanced - Since the auction is run without an auctioneer, this allows for the auction to be run in a decentralised way resulting in no "middlemen" taking some money so all revenue goes straight to the servers from the tasks
- Individually Rational - As the server need to confirm with the task if it is willing to pay an amount to be allocated, the task can check this against its secret reserved price preventing the task from ever paying more than it is willing
- Incentive Compatible - Misreporting can give a task as if the task can predict the allocation of resources from server to tasks then tasks can misreport so to be allocate to a certain server that otherwise would result in the task being unallocated.
- Economic efficiency - At the begin then task are almost randomly assigned in till server become full and require kicking tasks off, this means that allocation can fall into a local price maxima meaning that the server will sometime not be 100% economically efficient.

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#### Algorithm 2 Decentralised Iterative Auction

---

**Require:**  $I$  is the set of servers

**Require:**  $J$  is the set of unallocated tasks, which initial is the set of all tasks to be allocated

**Require:**  $P(i, k)$  is solution to the problem in section 4.3.1 using the server  $i$  and new task  $k$ . The server's current tasks is known to itself and its current revenue from tasks so not passed as arguments.

**Require:**  $R(i, k)$  is a function returning the list of tasks not able to run if task  $k$  is allocated to server  $i$

**Require:**  $\leftarrow_R$  will randomly select an element from a set

```

while  $|J| > 0$  do
   $j \leftarrow_R J$ 
   $p, i \leftarrow \text{argmin}_{i \in I} P(i, j)$ 
  if  $p \leq v_j$  then
     $p_j \leftarrow p$ 
     $x_{i,j} \leftarrow 1$ 
    for all  $j' \in R(i, j)$  do
       $x_{i,j'} \leftarrow 0$ 
       $p_{j'} \leftarrow 0$ 
       $J \leftarrow J \cup j'$ 
    end for
  end if
   $J \leftarrow J \setminus \{j\}$ 
end while

```

---

The algorithm 2 is a centralised version of the decentralised iterative auction. It works through iteratively checking a currently unallocated job to find the price if the job was currently allocated on a server. This is done through first solving the program in section 4.3.1 which calculates the new revenue if the task was forced to be allocated with a price of zero. The task price is equal to the current server revenue - new revenue with the task allocated + a price change variable to increase the revenue of the server. The minimum price returned by  $P(i, k)$  is then compared to the job's maximum reserve price (that would be private in the equivalent decentralised algorithm) to confirm if the job is willing to pay at that price. If the job is willing then the job is allocated to the minimum price server and the job price set to the agreed price. However in the process of allocating a job then the currently allocated jobs on the server could be unallocated so these jobs allocation's and price's are reset then appended to the set of unallocated jobs.

#### 4.4 Attributes of proposed algorithms

In table 3, the important attributes for the proposed algorithm



Attribute	GM	CVA	DIA
Truthfulness		Yes	No
Optimality	No	No	No
Scalability	Yes	Yes	No
Information requirements from users	All	All	Not the reserve value
Communication over heads	Low	Low	High
Decentralisation	No	No	Yes


**Table 3: Attributes of the proposed algorithms: Greedy mechanism (GM), Critical Value auction(CVA) and Decentralised Iterative auction (DIA)**

## 5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION

To test the algorithms presented in section 4, synthetic models have been used to generate a list of tasks and servers.

The synthetic models have been handcrafted with each attribute being generated from a gaussian distribution with a mean and standard deviation.


To compare the greedy algorithm to the optimal elastic allocation, a branch and bound was implemented to solve the problem in section 3.2. In order to compare to fixed speed equivalent models, the minimum total resource required to run the job is found and set as the resource speeds for all of the tasks, with the optimal solution for running the job with the fixed speeds is found as well. To implement the greedy mechanism, the value density function was  $\frac{v_j}{s_j + w_j + r_j}$ , server selection was  $\text{argmin}_{i \in I} S'_i + W'_i + R'_i$  and the resource allocation was  $\text{mins}'_j + w'_j + r'_j$  for job  $j$  and servers  $I$ .



**Figure 5: Comparison of the social welfare for the greedy mechanism, optimal, relaxed problem, time limited branch and bound**


As figure 5 shows, the greedy mechanism achieves 98% of the optimal solution for the small models, the mechanism achieves within 95% for larger models. In comparison, the fixed allocation achieves 80% of the optimal solution and always does worse than the social welfare of the greedy mechanism.

Figure 6 compares the social welfare of the auction mechanisms: vcg, fixed resource speed vcg, critical value auction and the decentralised iterative auction with different price change variables.



**Figure 6: Comparison of the social welfare for the auction mechanisms**

VCG is an economically efficient auction that requires the optimal solution to the problem in section 3.2.




**Figure 7: Average number of rounds with a price change variables and task initial cost**

Within the context of edge cloud computing, the number of rounds for the decentralised iterative auction is important to making it a feasible auction as it is proportional to the time required to run. We investigated the effect of two heuristic on the number of rounds and social welfare of the auction; the price change variable and initial cost heuristic. With an auction using as minimum heuristic values for the price change and initial cost, figure 7, on average 400 rounds were required for the price to converge while an auction using a price change of 10 and initial cost of 20 means that only on average 80 rounds are required, 5x less. But by using high initial cost and price change heuristics, this can prevent tasks from being allocated, figure 8, shows that the difference in social welfare is only 2% from minimum to maximum heuristics.

## 6 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we studied a resource allocation problem in edge clouds, where resources are elastic and can be allocated to tasks at varying speeds to satisfy heterogeneous requirements and deadlines.





**Figure 8: Average social welfare with a price change variables and task initial cost**

To solve the problem, we proposed a centralized greedy mechanism with a guaranteed performance bound, and a number of auction-based mechanisms that also consider the elasticity of resources and limit the potential for strategic manipulation. We show that explicitly taking advantage of resource elasticity leads to significantly better performance than current approaches that assume fixed resources.

In future work, we plan to consider the dynamic scenario where tasks arrive and depart from the system over time, and to also consider the case where task preemption is allowed.

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## **Appendix B: Progress Report**

# UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

Faculty of Physical Engineering and Science  
School of Electronics and Computer Science

A project report submitted for the award of  
MEng Electronic Engineering

Supervisor: Dr Tim Norman

**Auctions for online elastic resource  
allocation in cloud computing**

*by* **Mark Towers**

March 21, 2020



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tocchapterAppendix References

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