# Recap

```
DMU
    - Probabilistic Models
- MDPs
- Reinforcement Learning
- POMDPs
- Games
```

### **Probabilistic Models**

# P(A) P(A,B) P(AIB)

#### 3 Rules

$$1.~0 \leq P(X \mid Y) \leq 1 \ \sum_{x \in X} P(x \mid Y) = 1$$

2. 
$$P(X) = \sum_{y \in Y} P(X, y)$$

3. 
$$P(X \mid Y) = \frac{P(X,Y)}{P(Y)}$$


#### **Bayes Rule**

$$P(A \mid B) = \frac{P(B \mid A)P(A)}{P(B)}$$

#### **Independence**

$$A \bot B \iff P(A,B) = P(A)P(B)$$
 
$$A \bot B \mid C \iff P(A,B \mid C) = P(A \mid C)P(B \mid C)$$

### **Bayesian Networks**



#### **Chain Rule**

$$P(X_{1:n}) = \prod_i P(X_i \mid Pa(X_i))$$

#### **Conditional Independence**

 $X \perp Y \mid \mathcal{C}$  if all paths between X and Y are d-separated by  $\mathcal{C}$ 

### **Markov Decision Processes**

$$(S, A, R, T, \gamma)$$

Examples: 
$$S=\{1,2,3\}$$
 or  $S=\mathbb{R}^2$ 

$$s=(x,\dot{x})\in S=\mathbb{R}^2$$

$$Q^{\pi}(s,a) = E[\sum_{r=0}^{\infty} r^r R(s_{r,a+}) | s=s, a_0=a, a_r=\pi(s_+)]$$

$$V^{\pi}(5) = Q^{\pi}(5,\pi(5))$$

$$V^\pi(s) = R(s,a) + \gamma E[V^\pi(s')]$$

**Policy Evaluation** 

$$V^*(s) = \max_a \left\{ R(s,a) + \gamma E[V^*(s')] 
ight\}$$

Bellman's Equation: Certificate of Optimality

$$B[V](s) = \max_a \left\{ R(s,a) + \gamma E[V(s')] 
ight\}$$

Bellman's Operator

### Offline MDP Algorithms

#### **Policy Iteration**

**Value Iteration** 

loop

**Evaluate Policy** 

Improve Policy

loop

$$V \leftarrow B[V]$$


Converges because policy always improves and there are a finite number of policies

Converges because B is a contraction mapping


## Online MDP Planning

#### **Monte Carlo Tree Search**

Search Expand Rollout Backup




#### **Sparse Sampling**



Guarantees *independent* of |S|!!

## Reinforcement Learning




#### Challenges:

- 1. Exploration and Exploitation
- 2. Credit Assignment
- 3. Generalization

### **Exploration**

#### **Bandits**


- $\epsilon$ -greedy
- softmax
- UCB
- Thompson Sampling
- Optimal DP Solution (solving a POMDP!)



Montezuma's Revenge!

- Pseudocounts
- Curiosity: extra reward for bad prediction
- Random network distillation

### **RL Algorithms**




## **Policy Gradient**

- Likelihood ratio trick
- Causality
- Baseline Subtraction

$$\nabla_{\theta} p_{\theta}(\tau) = p_{\theta}(\tau) \nabla_{\theta} \log p_{\theta}(\tau)$$

$$\nabla U(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau} \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{d} \nabla_{\theta} \log \pi_{\theta}(a^{(k)} \mid s^{(k)}) \gamma^{k-1} \left( r_{\text{to-go}}^{(k)} - r_{\text{base}}(s^{(k)}) \right) \right]$$

Natural Gradient



### **Q-Learning**

#### **SARSA**

$$Q(s,a) \leftarrow Q(s,a) + \alpha(r_t + \gamma Q(s',a') - Q(s,a))$$


**Eligibility Traces** 

#### **Q-learning**

$$Q(s,a) \leftarrow Q(s,a) + lpha(r_t + \gamma \max_{a'} Q(s',a') - Q(s,a))$$


Double Q Learning

### Neural Networks and DQN



$$f_{ heta}(x) = \sigma(W_2\sigma(W_1x+b_1)+b_2)$$

Backprop



### **Actor-Critic**

• Actor:  $\pi_{\theta}$ 


• Critic:  $Q_{\phi}$ 

#### **Soft Actor Critic**

$$J(\pi) = E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t \left(r_t + lpha \mathcal{H}(\pi(\cdot \mid s_t))
ight)
ight]$$

### **POMDPs**

 $(S, A, T, R, O, Z, \gamma)$ 




- Each alpha vector corresponds to a conditional plan
- You can prune alpha vectors by solving an LP

#### **Belief Updates**

- Discrete Bayesian Filter
- Particle Filter

#### **Alpha Vectors**



## **POMDP** Approximations


#### **Formulation**

- Certainty Equivalence
- QMDP

#### **Numerical**


#### Offline

- Point-Based Value Iteration
- SARSOP




#### **Online**

- POMCP
- DESPOT




### Simple Games

- Optimal Solutions No.
- Equilibria (e.g. Nash Equilibria)



- Every finite game has at least 1 Nash Equilibrium
- Might be pure or mixed
- Algorithms like fictitious play converge in special cases

### **Turn Taking Games**



- Value Function Backup
- $\alpha\beta$  Pruning
- Incomplete Information Extensive Form


### **Markov Games and POMGS**

#### **Markov Games**

- All players play simultaneously
- Transitions are stochastic
- Best response involves solving an MDP
- Can be reduced to a simple game with policies as actions

#### **Partially Observable Markov Games**

- Each player receives a noisy observation at each step
- Beliefs not practical to compute
- Can be reduced to simple game with policies as actions



## Fictitious Play in Markov Games

### Recap

# After DMU you have basic tools to deal with 4 Big Problems:

- 1. Immediate and Future Rewards
- 2. Unknown Models
- 3. Partial Observability
- 4. Other Agents