



Recent Lightweight cryptography (LWC) based security advances for resource-constrained IoT networks

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Published online: 25 March 2024

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Abstract

In today's world, the Internet of Things (IoT) plays a major role to interconnect all the devices and improve the overall Quality of Life (QoL) for people. The main concern among IoT systems revolve around three pillars namely security, confidentiality, and privacy owing to the sensitive nature of the data being transmitted and processed by IoT devices. Traditional cryptographic approaches address these concerns by ensuring the authenticity and confidentiality of IoT systems. However, the majority of IoT devices are resource-constrained, which implies that they operate under significant resource constraints such as limited computational power, constrained battery life, physical compactness, and restricted memory capacity. To this end, Lightweight cryptography (LWC) offers methods specifically designed to accommodate the limitations of resource-constrained IoT devices. This work establishes the role of light weight cryptography for such resource constrained IoT networks in terms of security perspectives. In this work, we explore the security vulnerabilities of IoT systems and the associated lightweight cryptographic methods highlighting four components namely lightweight block ciphers, lightweight stream ciphers, hash functions, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography. The work further discusses the role of LWC and reviews the recent advancements in different sectors of IoT such as smart city, industries, healthcare, smart grids, and agriculture. Finally, several open research directions are highlighted in order to guide future LWC and IoT researchers.

Keywords Internet of things · Cryptography · Lightweight · Security · Networks

1 Introduction

Internet of Things (IoT) [1] is the term for ordinary objects which are managed over the Internet and are relevant, reachable, trackable, and evident via data-collecting devices. Along with mobile devices, technological advances have expanded the Internet to smart gadgets known as IoT, which are capable of detecting, actuating, computing, storing, and communicating. IoT can be viewed as a pervasive collection of uniquely identified real or virtual entities that transmit large amount of information to be employed for smart decision-making. RFID, wireless, wired, and other forms of connectivity are used to connect IoT devices [2, 3]. The

primary goal of IoT is for all physical objects to function as computers linked to the Internet, and to advance the way of life by placing as many smart gadgets as possible around people to execute everyday tasks and duties [4, 5]. Various security challenges have been explored over the years, including perceptions of security to gather data, transmission of data which needs to be trusted and safe, and its implementation security. Given all this, it is impossible to deny that the widespread usage of IoT systems need powerful protection from all conceivable attacks of vulnerability, and hence security is necessary at every possible layer that exposes the IoT system.

Providing security, confidentiality, and privacy in IoT devices present a number of issues for a number of reasons. Firstly, constructing as few devices which are feasible enough to make sure that the security algorithm is cost effective [6–10]. Secondly, the basic sensors are linked together to establish a vast virtual network [11, 12]. Thirdly, because the majority of IoT devices are battery-operated, the security methods' power consumption must be minimal [13, 14]. Finally, the central processing unit (CPU) in IoT devices is

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limited and incapable of running complicated algorithms [15, 16]. To address the challenges of security, confidentiality, and privacy in IoT-based systems, cryptographic approaches are required. Security procedures that make good use of cryptographic technologies while adhering to resource constraints are more suitable [17, 18]. As a result, compared to traditional cryptographic approaches, Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) algorithms are better suited to provide solutions to the issues presented in IoT devices.

LWC is an approach that is being explored and researched to address the challenges and specifications of devices with the limited computational power and resources [19]. LWC offers methods that are capable of being used in various IoT applications. Their hardware architectures are often used for IoT devices and are appropriate for a variety of applications which concentrate on either minimal-area or high-throughput performance [20]. There have been recent advancements in the improvement of cipher's security, new ciphers resilient to fault attacks, improved performance in ciphers, optimization in ciphers, new ciphers strictly for resource-constrained IoT devices, enhancement in Quantum Noise Stream Ciphers, and extended version of previous ciphers. Due to the reduction in computational complexity, one disadvantage of hardware implementation of lightweight algorithms is the reduction in security when compared to traditional heavier cryptographic methods. This is a hardware restriction in the IoT setting, since the absence of high-level security is entangled with the effectiveness and architectural qualities of the implemented resource-constrained IoT devices [21]. Nonetheless, in spite of the hardware restrictions, such lightweight solutions remain capable of offering adequate safety and meets, to some extent, the specifications for a reliable IoT system.

Despite the evolution of IoT over the previous year, there is still lack of comprehensive studies that focus on security mechanisms and methods to address the security concerns of IoT systems. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is one of the first works that thoroughly covers the different lightweight cryptographic methods to protect the private data in IoT and offer protection from various cyberattacks that take place in the IoT system. The major contribution of this work is a presentation of four different appropriate lightweight cryptographic methods: lightweight block cipher [22], lightweight stream cipher [23], hash functions [24], and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [25]; which have all been discussed and various implementations of the methods have been explored in detail to resolve the concerns related to security, confidentiality, and privacy of the IoT systems. A summary of the major contribution of this work is mentioned below.

- This work provides a detailed 4-layer architecture of IoT that includes the Application layer, Middleware layer,

Network layer, and Perception layer. It demonstrates the functionality of each layer, and working of the entire IoT system.

- This work explores the various cyberattacks that occur in different layers of IoT, and enumerate the objective of each attack along with the severity of the attack as well.
- This work presents lightweight block cipher, lightweight stream cipher, hash functions, and ECC as the four lightweight cryptographic methods to protect the data in the IoT systems; and it explores the different implementations of each method, along with a comparison between them.
- This work classifies the lightweight cryptographic ciphers based on three parameters with an IoT related practical implication along with providing specific use cases and advantages of ECC
- This work highlights the significance of LWC in IoT through the representation of diverse applications of LWC in different sectors of IoT such as Smart Cities, Healthcare, IIoT (Industrial Internet of Things), Agriculture, Smart Home Automation, and Smart Energy Grids.
- This work emphasizes the addition of several recent advancements in the academia related to LWC in the diverse sectors of IoT
- This work throws light on the major recent advancements in LWC with respect to improvements in different areas such as security, performance, optimization, resilience to attacks, and compatibility with resource constrained devices and IoT networks and nodes.
- This work presents several future research directions in terms of specific improvements for each lightweight cryptographic method, integration of LWC in IoT systems, and the hardware implementation for LWC methods.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes an overview of IoT which includes its background, layers involved in the architecture, its reference model, and the various attacks that occur in each layer. Section 3 presents different implementations of the four lightweight cryptographic methods along with a comparison between them. Section 4 explores the diverse applications of LWC in different sectors of IoT. Section 5 presents a list of recent advancements in LWC which highlights improvements in different functionalities of ciphers and other schemes. Section 6 mentions the future research directions to direct future LWC and IoT researchers, followed by a conclusion in Sect. 7.

2 IoT

Everyday things that are identifiable, readable, locatable, and addressable through sensors and are modifiable with the help of Internet can be referred to as IoT [26, 27]. Radio

Frequency Identification (RFID), wired, or wireless techniques can be used to easily access IoT devices. IoT devices are not only subjected to high-tech things, but also waste bins, animals, clothing, food items, water, etc. To allow for all physical things to act in a computerized way which is connected to the internet is the core purpose of IoT. Similarly, by generating smart devices to perform daily tasks and change the living style of an individual is the core purpose of IoT. IoT is a domain that adds connectivity to different concepts already in place. From the background of IoT, to its current architecture holds the essential information to evaluate the security measures and concerns of the various sectors in IoT. The IoT Reference Model incorporates the entire structure of the IoT and explains the working of it. Each layer in the IoT has a specific purpose and attackers inevitably attempt to break through the various layers to get into the IoT system and perform malicious activities. The subsections below discuss the emersion of IoT into the real world, along with its architecture that entails the working of each layer and the attacks associated with them.

2.1 Background of IoT

The computer scientist Kevin Ashton [28], originated the term ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) back in 1999. However, previously in the 1980s some university students had already discussed the idea of implementing intelligence into physical objects by adding sensors while modifying a vending machine of Coca Cola [29]. Therefore, the concept of Internet of Things was introduced way before Kevin Ashton stamped out the term. To track products via a supply chain, he proposed the idea to put radio frequency identification chips on them. Eventually, as IoT based devices progressively started to come into the market, the public’s interest in IoT technology sky rocketed over the next decade. In addition, business sectors and medicine sectors inclined towards the use of IoT Technology over time. To improve customer experience, optimize supply chains, and manage inventory, businesses started to opt for enterprise IoT, which incorporated of precision agriculture, and smart factories [30]. On the other hand, medicine sectors began to implement the use of IoT connected devices such as smart inhalers, and robotic surgery to significantly improve the healthcare.

2.2 Layers of the IoT architecture

Layers of the IoT architecture can be visualized from bottom to top. At the bottom, the perception layer has the duty to collect all sorts of data from hardware equipment. Above the perception layer, to transmit the collected data from perception layer, network layer is responsible. Network layer relies on wireless network, basic networks, satellites, etc. for transmitting data between IoT devices. Through network


grid and cloud computing, the computing powers will be set up in the middleware layer. At the very top and at last, to provide services which can be modified with respect to users’ requirements, the application layer is responsible. Overall, four different essential layers make up the IoT architecture [31]: (i) the application layer, (ii) middleware layer, (iii) network layer, and (iv) perception layer. Furthermore, each layer of the IoT architecture is discussed below. The four layers are illustrated in Fig. 1.

2.2.1 Application layer

The IoT architecture’s upper tier is the application layer. In order to handle various apps, the middleware layer sends data to this layer. The application component displays the IoT data as a grid, diagram, and operating model. Automation at the application layer can be seen in smart towns, smart homes, and smart vehicles, among other things [32]. In fact, a major building block of the IoT is smart object and IoT is referred as a collection of smart objects which are all interconnected via a network. IoT consists of both software and hardware modules. Such modules can have wired or wireless based connectivity. To sense physical movements, sensors in the smart objects capture that movements and collect it [33]. Since the data is captured and collected by the sensors, it can be shared among various devices and allow them to communicate with each other. However, to process the collected information, smart objects are not extremely rich in resource and computational abilities. Therefore, the information is sent to external platforms for computing and processing.

2.2.2 Middleware layer

The vendor-specific services for different IoT node details are operated by the middleware layer, which connects the application tier and network tier. According to the third-party vendor and node requirements, this connection makes it easier to process, pre-process, and store IoT node details [34]. Both the middleware and application tiers make use of resource-intensive hardware that can protect IoT networks with conventional cryptography. Cloud computing plays a major role in the Middleware layer. It is leverage for tasks such as data computation and storage. The benefit of integrating smart devices in IoT is directed towards the improvement in different fields such as energy, health, defense, waste management, etc. [35]. To configure computing resources, on-demand access is provided by a large-scale distributed platform which is known as cloud computing. Through default access mechanism, cloud computing offers the users to do computations on data [36]. Since cloud computing provides storage and computation for smart devices in IoT, it plays a vital role in systems of IoT. The data processed

Fig. 1 Layered IoT architecture

by systems in IoT has significantly increased due to the higher number of smart devices on the network [37]. Cloud computing provides scalability since computation and storage of data are limited for smart devices. Apart from scalability, cloud computing also offers elasticity and convenience. Though, there's also a few downsides such as physical distance. For end devices to be offered cloud services, the physical distance is an issue that forms a bottleneck. Precise user location, land local network conditions are also among the few downsides of cloud computing [38].

2.2.3 Network layer

In the IoT architecture, data is processed, routed, and transmitted safely via the Network layer, also known as the Transit layer. For data transfer, this layer makes use of a variety of protocols, including Bluetooth, Infrared, Zigbee, and 6LowPan [39–41]. The network layer relies on the middleware layer for additional processing and activity. Since cloud

computing is the core task in the middleware layer, following it fog computing, which takes place in the network layer. It sets cloud services and computational tools at the network's edge to reduce latency issues. Between the edge and cloud computing, fog computing itself forms a layer that includes various devices such as switches, controllers, etc. Such devices can be placed at different locations, either dynamic or stationary. To gain higher computational power, the nodes in the devices are interconnected to centers of cloud data. Server load, bandwidth of the network, and speed are factors that affect the processing of data [42, 43]. Due to low-wireless bandwidth, there are delays in smartphone devices. With computing and storage abilities, a fog computing node is an easier and suitable solution when resource-constrained devices have to be offloaded as compared to the cloud. Since the resource-constrained devices lack the storage and computation abilities, the fog computing provides such features for utilization to the devices which reduces network transmission as well as provide higher system performance.

However, edge computing in the perception layer provides higher performance statistics even after fog computing adds performance in various applications [44]. To resolve issues related to reliability, power consumption, trust and privacy, edge computing performs the computational tasks at the edge nodes which results into utilization of energy consumption.

2.2.4 Perception layer

Information collection and transmission from the actual world are both essential functions of IoT devices. As a result, the perception layer is equipped with a variety of data collection, processing, and transmission tools, including pressure and temperature monitors, Bluetooth, Zigbee, and others. Two components make up the perception layer: the perception node (sensors, actuators, etc.) and the perception network, which connects to the IoT architecture's higher layer [45]. Information is gathered and controlled by perception nodes, such as motors and sensors. However, the perception network sends the data gathered to the portal. Zigbee, GPS, RFID, and Long-Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN) technology are all utilized by the perception layer [46]. By providing computational and storage features at the perception layer, issues related to latency and mobility are addressed. Smart device's mobility is supported by the edge devices. Multiaccess edge computing is another term used for edge computing since it is quite similar to fog computing. Data being passed between fog nodes and smart devices is controlled by the smartphones that are the edge nodes. Between a computing platform and smartwatch, an edge device such as smartphone performs as an edge. A network is formed of multiple edges, where such edge devices can communicate with each other and be interconnected. Communication on the network can be bottlenecked through the edge network. However as compared to cloud computing, it offers lower processing power. To provide higher efficiency and faster response time, the data processing is done at the edges as compared to the cloud since data has to be sent to cloud first and then processed [47]. When data is processed close to the smart devices before it is sent to the cloud, it reduces the usage of internet bandwidth. Between

the edge and fog layers, the classification of devices can be done easily in terms of computational power with the use of edge-fog cloud architecture [48].


Table 1 displays the IoT layers along with a detailed breakdown of each layer's purpose and elements.

2.3 IoT reference model

The scope for any IoT design is set by the sub-models in the IoT Reference Model. The IoT Reference Model consists of 5 sub-models that provide certain functionalities for various scenarios [49, 50]. An illustration of the IoT Reference Model in terms of its sub-models is presented in Fig. 2. Among these sub-models, the Domain Model is one of the key models and the foundation that provides a description of relevant concepts in IoT. The IoT Domain Model is compulsory for all actions of the IoT ARM, whereas other sub-models such as IoT Security, and Privacy Model, IoT Communication Model are not that important. The IoT Information Model is developed based on the IoT Domain Model. Independent of various technologies, IoT Domain model is developed in a proper way to provide great abstraction. On a conceptual level, the IoT Information Model defines the structure of information that is related to IoT of an IoT system. The IoT Information Model holds the information related to the aspects of IoT Domain Model. Functionalities found in the foundation of IoT Domain Model's key concepts are identified by the IoT Functional Model. Information model provides the information to the functional model that is appropriately handled by its functional components. Following the various connections observed in the IoT Domain model, a number of Functionality Groups (FG) are built on one another. Such groups offer a method for interacting with the instances of different aspects. In heterogeneous environments, communication becomes a difficult task, which is the case in an IoT system. Therefore, the IoT Communication model provides methods for handling the communication. To handle the security, privacy, and trust issues within the IoT system, the IoT Trust, Security & Privacy Model were introduced to provide relevant methods, its interdependencies and relationships [51].

Table 1 Element and purpose of each layer in IoT architecture

| Layer | Elements | Purpose |
|----------------------------|--|---|
| Application layer [32, 33] | Touch panel, consoles, third-party application, websites | Flowcharts, business model, machine learning |
| Middleware layer [34–38] | Third-party application which is vendor-specific | Real-time action, processing, machine learning |
| Network layer [39–44] | Firmware, gateways, nodes | Secure and process routing, transmit and process data |
| Perception layer [45–48] | Sensors, and actuators | Action, monitor, identification, transfer data |

Fig. 2 IoT reference model

2.3.1 IoT domain model

The explanation of the various aspects that relate to a particular interest area is provided by the IoT Domain Model. It distinguishes between what does and does not fluctuate significantly to provide great level of detail within the IoT Domain Model. The significance of providing this general understanding is crucial not only for scientific disclosure but also for internal communication within the project. Due to the IoT Model's resultant of general comprehension, the solutions are evaluated and analyzed for architectural issues and problems that arise in the project. IoT Domain Model is the most important model within the IoT Reference model due to its properties. It withholds primary abstractions along with its duties and relationships [52].

2.3.2 IoT information model

All the various aspects of the Domain Model which are presented in the digital world are modeled by the Information Model [53]. It also models the connections among the various aspects. It offers an infrastructure for data being used by systems. The IoT Information model is also known as meta-model. The infrastructure that it offers includes all the concepts of the system which is related with the retrieval, representation, processing, and collection of data.

2.3.3 IoT functional model

To help comprehend, the primary Functionality Groups (FG) and its relations among other ones is the goal of Functional model. The Functionality Groups consist of Functional Components (FC) which are identified and analyzed in terms of relation with other components by Functional Decomposition (FD) [54]. The Functional Model works as a framework that describes similar output of the primary functionalities. It entails three different aspects: abstract, functionality groups, and functional views. Firstly, the abstract describes the Functional model as a concept rather than implementation through a certain technology. Secondly, functionality groups itself are not enough, instead the relations between one another are required as well. Lastly, to provide the functions at runtime of the system and its overall description is the job of the functional view. To address the privacy and security challenges of IoT devices at the cloud computing layers, edge, fog, and smart objects layer, the conceptual architecture is built with the help of IoT security and communication model [55]. The IoT communication and IoT security models are discussed below.

2.3.4 IoT communication model

Smart objects and the cloud devices define the IoT communication model. To bridge communication protocols, the IoT gateway is used for instances such as Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Z-Wave, NFC, ZigBee, and RFID [50]. In the IoT

communication model, IoT gateway bridges constrained and unconstrained networks. Furthermore, IoT gateway also contributes in the translation of different protocols, such as constrained application protocol, and transformation of informational data among constrained networks of unconstrained networks and IoT devices. The unconstrained network includes high-speed bandwidth and high resource devices. On the other hand, constrained network consists of less resource and low bandwidth IoT devices. IoT devices that are rich in resource and have high-speed bandwidth come under the unconstrained networks, and devices that have relatively fewer resources and a lower communication bandwidth come under the constrained network. For instance, an IoT device that provides a communication bandwidth of less than 1 Mb/s is associated to a constrained network, but ones that provide much higher bandwidth are associated to an unconstrained network [56].

2.3.5 IoT security model

IoT Security model describes the security methods and regulations which the security of IoT devices and information shared between them is based upon. The IoT security model consists of 3 layers [47]: (i) service security layer, (ii) communication security layer, (iii) application security layer. Cryptographic schemes, risk assessment, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), and blockchain-based solutions are all different security techniques introduced to detect cyber security attacks and provide security in IoT. CISCO proposed a model that consists of 7 different layers: physical devices and controllers, connectivity, edge (fog) computing, data accumulation, data abstraction, application, and collaboration and processes [57]. The CISCO 7-layer model was adapted to implement lightweight cryptographic solutions in the IoT systems for security purposes. Earlier, a 4-layer reference model was used, that consisted of cloud computing, fog computing, edge computing, and smart objects. Each and every layer of the 4-layer reference model corresponds to layers in the CISCO model, whose intrinsic capabilities are served by different devices operating on these layers. Each device is associated with a layer, that fits accordingly by the constrained resources to support the different tasks in different layers. The security mechanism depends on the hardware specifications of such devices.

2.4 Classification of IoT devices

Due to the computational power and capability, low memory, and internal storage, the IoT connected devices are displayed in the layers of the architecture within restrained proficiency. The IoT ecosystem uses a variety of service structures, protocols, and network designs to handle the billions of IoT devices that communicate with one another. Class 2, Class

1, and Class 0 are the three categories that IoT devices can be divided into [58]. The devices are differentiated in terms of required Random Access Memory (RAM) and Read-Only Memory (ROM) to operate.

2.4.1 Class 0

IoT devices that are restricted to the resources such as computational capability, memory, and power fall under the Class 0 category of IoT devices. Such devices are available at the perception layer of the IoT architecture, therefore communicates and sense data through protocols for lightweight communication [59]. Low-end nodes are present in the low-end IoT devices, fall under Class 0. Such node's security is the main concern as they more inclined to be vulnerable for threats. Mostly the devices under this category are sensors and actuators such as temperature sensors, light sensors, motion sensors, proximity sensors, humidity sensors, actuators, magnetic sensors, etc.

2.4.2 Class 1

In comparison to low-end nodes, Class 1 IoT devices contain a higher number of resources. These devices, rest over low-end IoT devices in order to enhance the capabilities of class 0 node devices, basically simple microcontrollers [60, 61]. To secure data, such devices can implement data encryption technology. Few examples of such devices that are associated to Class 1 are different types of gateways and hubs such as industrial gateways, cellular gateways, smart home hubs, etc.

2.4.3 Class 2

Devices with a mass number of resources in terms of flash memory, CPU, and RAM are considered to be in the Class 2 IoT devices. A great example for a Class 2 IoT device is Single-board computer such as LINUX and UNIX that implement traditional operating systems [62]. Security is not the main concern for such devices due to having a higher number of resources compared to other category IoT devices. Devices that fall under the Class 2 category are different servers such as cloud servers, IoT platform servers, cloud storage servers, application servers, edge cloud servers, data analytics servers etc.

Table 2 presents the hardware-based comparison of various classes of IoT devices.

2.5 Security attacks in different layers

This subsection lists the various different security attacks involved in each layer. However, since network layer and perception layer are more prone and vulnerable to attacks

from intruders, they are discussed in more detail compared to the application layer and middleware layer.

2.5.1 Application layer security attacks

Buffer overflow attacks [63, 64] overwrite memory off-limits and out of bounds so that a buffer overflow occurs in the system. Cross-site scripting attacks [65] include injecting malicious code to perform malicious activities on the web pages. SQL injection attacks [66] manipulate database through given input which is malicious in behavior. Phishing attacks [67] use deceptive tactics to steal private data from the users.

2.5.2 Middleware layer security attacks

Malware and Ransom [68] attacks include the use of malicious software that compromises the system or data in the database. Sleep deprivation attacks [69] include disrupting system or human performance through sleep deprivation.

2.5.3 Network layer security attacks

Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [70] focus on overwhelming the system to render it inaccessible for authorized users to enter into the system. Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS)

attacks [70] coordinate DoS attack from different sources enabling higher impact on the system to become overwhelmed and inaccessible. Therefore, the DDoS increases the chances of no functionality from the system due to the DoS attacks being sent from multiple sources. Man-in-the-middle attacks [71], also known as the eavesdropping attack, that includes eavesdropping of data between two parties and manipulating the data for malicious activities. Sinkhole attacks [72] divert the network traffic to unauthorized users. Traffic analysis attacks [73] includes monitoring and analyzing network traffic to extract information between parties.

2.5.4 Perception layer security attacks

Jamming attacks [74] disrupt the wireless communication through the interference signals between two parties. Physical capture or damage attacks [74] includes physical damage being done to IoT devices that result in either non-functional IoT device or unrepairable state of the IoT device. Battery draining attacks [75] drain as much of the power source as possible from IoT devices to shut down the device on its own. Device cloning attacks [76] involves creating unauthorized copies of IoT devices to use for malicious activities. These are only a few cyberattacks mentioned above to highlight the attacks in each layer. Table 3 presents the summary of various attacks launched in different IoT layers.

Table 2 Categories of IoT devices

| Category | RAM | Flash | Description | IoT Devices |
|------------------|----------------|------------------|--|---|
| Class 0 [59] | Less than 1 KB | Less than 100 KB | Communicate and sense data through protocols for light-weight communication | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Temperature sensors • Light sensors • Motion sensors • Proximity sensors • Humidity sensors • Accelerometers • Pressure sensors • Gas sensors • Magnetic sensors • Actuators |
| Class 1 [60, 61] | About 10 KB | About 100 KB | Rest over low-end IoT devices in order to enhance the capabilities of class 0 node devices | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smart home hubs • Industrial gateways • Edge computing devices • Cellular gateways • Data concentrators • Protocol converters |
| Class 2 [62] | About 50 KB | About 250 KB | Devices with a mass number of resources in terms of flash memory, CPU, and RAM | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cloud servers • IoT platform servers • Data storage servers • Application servers • Edge cloud servers • Data analytics servers |

3 Need for securing the IoT system

There are primarily three reasons that summarize the importance of security within IoT. Firstly, uncontrolled IoT systems not only imperil user's privacy, but can also result into massive damage physically when interconnected devices are used negatively. Secondly, producers are at large risk because they can lose sensitive and important information when intruders gain access to database via the IoT system that withholds confidential information. Lastly, the effect of an attack extends outside a network or single device due to the IoT systems being largely interconnected. Therefore, protecting customer privacy, vital infrastructure and database, and websites from large-scale cyberattacks requires the security of linked IoT devices. About 70% of technologies in IoT include some security issues, stated in a study that was guided by Hewlett-Packard [77, 78]. Even though security in IoT systems is a fundamental aspect, many vendors introduce products into the market with minimal emphasis on its security [79]. Such vulnerability within it can result into various issues regarding integrity, confidentiality, and privacy. Therefore, the security in IoT systems is not highly prioritized, even though it should be. This is due to requirements of the consumers that contradict with providing high level security in IoT systems. For example, battery-efficiency, restriction to size for compatibility, physical appearance, user-friendly, etc. and to be able to provide all these features in a restricted time and low budget. Of course, some features vary between one IoT device to another, but majority of the devices focus on these consumer requirements that leads to developing a

device with low security measurements. Each layer within the IoT Architecture requires some security features. A list of requirements within each layer of the IoT Architecture is shown in Fig. 3.

4 Lightweight cryptographic methods for IoT


Lightweight cryptography, a protocol or cryptographic algorithm, is created to be implemented in constrained environments such as health-care devices, sensors, RFID tags, and contactless cards. ISO/IEC 29192 is a standardization document that contains and discusses the properties of lightweight cryptography [80, 81]. Lightweight properties are explained in terms of target platforms in ISO/IEC 29192. The implementations are broken into two parts -software and hardware. A smaller program in terms of line of code and a smaller RAM size are preferred for software implementations in lightweight applications. To evaluate the lightweight properties, the energy consumption and chip size are crucial for hardware implementation [82]. Regarding implementation characteristics, the lightweight methods offer sufficient security and outperform traditional cryptographic ones, which are currently implemented in Internet security protocols.

There are primarily four types of lightweight cryptographic methods accessible for use. The four methods are Lightweight Block Cipher (LWBC), Lightweight Stream Cipher (LWSC), Hash Functions, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) as shown in Fig. 4 [83]. Structure of each method, block and key size, and number of rounds are the

Table 3 Summary of attacks in various IoT Layers

| Layer | Attack | Severity of attack | Objective of attack |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--|
| Application layer | Buffer overflow [63, 64] | H | Overwriting memory beyond allocated bounds |
| | Cross site scripting [65] | N | Injecting malicious code into web pages |
| | SQL Injection [66] | H | Manipulating database queries through malicious input |
| | Phishing [67] | N | Deceptive tactics to steal personal information |
| Middleware layer | Malware and Ransom [68] | H | Malicious software compromising systems or data |
| | Sleep deprivation [69] | N | Disrupting system or human performance through sleep deprivation |
| Network layer | DoS [70] | H | Overwhelming a system to render it inaccessible |
| | DDoS [70] | H | Simultaneous, coordinated DoS attacks from multiple sources |
| | Man-in-the-middle [71] | H | Manipulating communication between parties |
| | Sinkhole [72] | N | Diverting network traffic to unauthorized destination |
| | Traffic analysis [73] | N | Monitoring and analyzing network traffic to extract information |
| Perception layer | Jamming [74] | N | Disrupting wireless communication through interference signals |
| | Physical capture or damage [74] | H | Physically compromising or damaging IoT devices |
| | Battery draining [75] | N | Draining the power source of IoT devices |
| | Device cloning [76] | H | Creating unauthorized copies of IoT devices |

Fig. 3 Security requirements in each layer of the IoT architecture



factors that the four methods can be analyzed by. LWBC, LWSC and Hash functions are classified as symmetric lightweight cryptography, but ECC is classified as asymmetric lightweight cryptography. ECC can provide non-repudiation, and authentication due to its asymmetric cipher functionalities [84].

Ultra-lightweight, lightweight, and low-cost are three classifications of cryptographic algorithms [85]. Software and hardware implementation along with the capabilities of the device are three parameters that classify each cryptographic algorithm. Read-Only memory (ROM) and Random-Access memory (RAM) needs for the implementation of the

cipher is specified by the software implementation, the first parameter. The second parameter, device capability, refers to the restriction of resources in the device or whether the device is resource-constrained or not. Resource-constrained devices are constrained in terms of resources; therefore, they lack in the rich resource naturistic. Lastly, hardware implementation offers the information related to Gate Equivalence (GE) or chip area that is necessary for algorithm's implementation. All three parameters help in the classification of cryptographic algorithms. To decide the requirements of a security mechanism for an IoT system, the IoT architecture is a very crucial factor in that decision [86]. Since IoT




Fig. 4 Lightweight cryptographic methods for IoT

system is built off of the IoT architecture, each layer in the IoT architecture has its own security requirements. Lightweight secure routing protocols, lightweight cryptographic algorithms, lightweight antimalware solutions, etc. can be implemented in IoT systems for security purposes [87].

ECC is mainly used as a method at the application layer, physical, and network layer [88]. In IPv6, both Digital Encryption Standard (DES), and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) could be utilized. Due to the requirement of higher resources in traditional cryptographic techniques, the devices at the physical layer in IoT use lightweight cryptographic techniques which relatively don't require utilization of a lot more resources. Lightweight cryptographic techniques don't require devices to have higher resources, therefore they are suited for the devices in IoT. Table 4 presents the three parameters in its classification of cryptographic algorithms.

4.1 Lightweight block cipher

Symmetric ciphers that process a complete block at once are known as block ciphers. Feistel network (FN) and Substitution-permutation network (SPN) are two primary types of structures that lightweight block ciphers are based on [105]. Round function is used on half of the state for Feistel structures. Since the same code is used for encryption and decryption process in Feistel structures, it results into low memory usage. On the other hand, SPN doesn't require a key schedule, therefore it foresees attacks. SPN is more compatible due to its requirement of fewer rounds of execution. Thus, it works better in resource constrained devices. The main purpose of lightweight cipher is to overcome difficulties related to security, memory footprint and power consumption. Compared to 64-bits and 128-bits block size in traditional algorithms, the block size must be of 32–64 bits for the algorithm to be considered a lightweight algorithm [106]. Rivest developed a symmetric block cipher that was extremely fast as of the time, known as RC5 [107]. The cipher provided variable key length along with variable word size. RC5 is appropriate for the two parameters mentioned previously for lightweight algorithms, software and hardware implementation. Another lightweight algorithm introduced in 1994 was Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) [108]. Rather than focusing on software and hardware implementation, the TEA is more focused on being suitable for wireless communication.

Overall, TEA was great and secure since it provided provide non-linearity with the implementation of ADD and XOR operations alternatively, however, the issues came down to its key size of 126 bits instead of 128 bits, and possibility of related-key attacks. While the disparity in key size may not appear significant, its impact on cryptographic strength is substantial. The notable distinction is

in the considerably greater number of possible key combinations offered by the 128-bit key compared to its 126-bit counterpart. Later on, in 1996, to surmount the issues faced in TEA, XTEA was introduced. XTEA overcame the issues in TEA by introducing key material and modifying the schedule of the key [109]. And then came in 1998, one of the popular block ciphers still used in IoT systems today, AES [110]. AES was designed by Daemen and Rijmen. AES goes under 10 rounds for key sizes of 128 bits, 12 rounds for 192 bits, and 14 rounds for 256 bits. A list of various lightweight block ciphers along with their attributes is presented in Table 5.

4.2 Lightweight stream cipher

Stream cipher is next on the list of lightweight cryptographic methods. At the time of encryption and decryption, 'r' bits are present in stream cipher. The main differentiating attributes among various ciphers are the key size, chip area, IV, and throughput. List of famous lightweight ciphers during the first generation of lightweight cryptography included Trivium, A5/1, Grain and Rabbit [125–128]. Trivium [125] is a block cipher-inspired stream cipher. A5/1 [126] was used for Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM). Rabbit was one of the stream ciphers introduced at an early stage of lightweight cryptography development [127]. Grain [128] is a two-register stream cipher with a non-linear output function. Grain uses an 80-bit key size to work optimally for energy usage, restricted memory, and gate count. However, the most crucial stream ciphers in the second generation of linear cryptography are Trivium and Grain. Popular stream ciphers during the second generation of lightweight cryptography are Lizard, WG-8, Espresso, Fruit and Plantnet. Lizard is one of the latest stream ciphers that works on IV of 64 bits, and key size of 120 bits to provide minimal cost implementation [129]. WG-8 consumes low energy and is immune to attacks compared to different lightweight stream ciphers. Built for 5G applications and based on the Galois Non-Linear feedback Shift Register (NLFSR) structure, Espresso is used among many applications [130]. Based on Sprout cipher, Fruit cipher was introduced with improved security by designers compared to the sprout cipher [131]. Comparison among various lightweight stream ciphers is presented in Table 6.

4.3 Hash functions

Another method is hash functions that generate a fixed-length string or 'message digest' from a message of some length. There are various purposes of hash functions. Firstly, hash functions can be used to assure the data integrity within the system by determining whether any format of data has been modified or tampered with. Secondly, digital signatures

Table 4 Cryptographic algorithms classification

| Classification | ROM/RAM | Device capability | GE | Ciphers | Description | IoT-based example |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|--|--|
| Lightweight cryptographic algorithms [88] | 32 KB ROM 8 KB RAM | Rest below | Up to 3000 Gates | SOSEMA-NUK [91] | Software-oriented stream cipher designed for efficient implementation on various platforms | Remote sensor nodes transmit environmental data with minimal battery usage, aligning with SOSEMA-NUK's lightweight design |
| | | | | CLEFIA [92] | Block cipher designed for efficient hardware and software implementations | Smart meters encrypt energy consumption of the data transmission efficiently, keeping meter functionality due to CLEFIA's optimized design |
| | | | | DEXL [93] | Lightweight stream cipher with high performance and low hardware resource requirements | Wearable health monitors encrypt biometric data transmission efficiently, ensuring real-time monitoring capabilities with minimal energy usage |

Table 4 (continued)

| Classification | ROM/RAM | Device capability | GE | Ciphers | Description | IoT-based example |
|--|----------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------|---|---|
| Low-cost cryptographic algorithms [89] | 4 KB ROM 8 KB RAM | ATmega 128 | Up to 2000 Gates | Lizard [94] | Extremely lightweight and efficient hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) algorithm | Smart home devices authenticate and verify data integrity during communication with a central hub, ensuring secure home automation with minimal resource consumption |
| | | | | | Stream cipher with minimal hardware requirements and high performance | Wireless sensor nodes encrypt soil moisture data transmission, ensuring data confidentiality and integrity in agricultural IoT networks with minimal resource usage |
| | | | | | Block cipher optimized for both hardware and software implementations | Smart locks encrypt access control messages, ensuring secure communication with minimal impact on device performance due to TWINE's lightweight design |
| | | | | SIMON [97] | Lightweight block cipher optimized for hardware and software implementations | Industrial sensors encrypt equipment performance data transmission efficiently, ensuring data security without compromising device performance, leveraging SIMON's optimized design |
| | | | | | Stream cipher designed for low-power, low-latency applications | Low-power IoT devices in smart city networks securely transmit environmental data, conserving energy usage due to MIBS's lightweight implementation |
| | | | | PRESENT [99] | Block cipher designed for low-resource devices and applications | IoT devices in smart grid networks transmit power consumption data securely, maintaining system efficiency with PRESENT's lightweight encryption |

Table 4 (continued)

| Classification | ROM/RAM | Device capability | GE | Ciphers | Description | IoT-based example |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|---------------|--|--|
| Ultra-lightweight cryptographic algorithms [90] | 4 KB ROM 256 B RAM | 8051 microcontroller, ATiny 45 | Up to 1000 Gates | Sprout [100] | Lightweight and compact cryptographic algorithm suitable for IoT devices | Healthcare devices transmit health data securely, preserving battery life and ensuring data privacy with Sprout's lightweight encryption |
| | | | | | Lightweight block cipher with extremely small memory footprint | IoT devices in smart transportation systems encrypt vehicle telemetry data, ensuring secure communication with minimal energy consumption due to KATAN's lightweight design |
| | | | | QTL [102] | Stream cipher with minimal computational overhead and low memory requirements | IoT devices in smart building networks securely transmit occupancy data, ensuring data privacy with minimal computational overhead using QTL's lightweight encryption |
| | | | | | Lightweight block cipher with minimal memory requirements and low computational overhead | Environmental sensors in climate monitoring IoT networks encrypt data transmission efficiently, ensuring data security without resource strain with HUMMINGBIRD's lightweight encryption |
| | | | | Piccolo [104] | Lightweight block cipher designed for constrained environments | IoT devices in smart retail environments transmit inventory data securely, preserving data confidentiality with Piccolo's lightweight encryption without impacting device performance |

Table 5 Design characteristics of various block ciphers

| Block cipher | Structure | Device | Key size (bit) | Block size (bit) | Rounds | Output (Mbps) |
|--------------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|--------|-----------------|
| SAND [111] | FN | Virtex-5 | 64/128 | 64/128 | 48/54 | 1465.2/1550.4 |
| SAND-2 [112] | FN | Virtex-5 | 128 | – | 47 | 1705.4 |
| SHADOW [113] | Generalized FN | Virtex-5 | 64/128 | 32/64 | 16/32 | 226.81 |
| SKINNY [114] | SPN | Virtex-7 | 64/128 | 64/96 | 32/36 | 49,150/71,680 |
| PRESENT [115] | SPN | Kintex-7 | 80/128 | 64 | 31 | 1319.22/1529.80 |
| CLEFIA [116, 117] | FN | Artix-7 | 128/192/256 | 39/128/128 | 2488 | 990/818/696 |
| AES-128 [110, 118] | SPN | Virtex-5 | 128 | 128 | 10 | 4342/3485 |
| AES-256 [119] | SPN | Virtex-7 | 256 | 128 | 14 | 278 |
| RC5 [120, 121] | FN | Xilinx Vertex-2 | 0–2040 | 32/64/128 | 0–255 | 533 |
| TEA [122, 123] | FN | Spartan-7 | 128 | – | 64 | 19.52 |
| XTEA [124] | FN | Spartan-7 | 128 | 64 | 64 | 312 |

Table 6 Design characteristics of various stream ciphers

| Stream cipher | Key size | IV | Chip area | Type | Output (Mbps) |
|------------------|----------|-------|------------|----------------------------|---------------|
| Plantlet [132] | 80 | 90 | 928 | LFSR + NLFSR + Counter | – |
| Fruit-v2 [131] | 64/80 | 64 | 990 | LFSR + NLFSR | 0.100 |
| Espresso [130] | 128 | 96 | 1500 | Galois structure NLFSR | – |
| WG-8 [133] | 80 | 80 | 1786/3942 | 4 Trivium like SHR | 500/6710 |
| Grain-128a [134] | 128 | 96 | 1857/4617 | LFSR + NLFSR | 925.9/14479.6 |
| Salsa-20/r [135] | 128/256 | 128 | 12,126 | ARX | 990 |
| Trivium [128] | 80 | 80 | 2580/4921 | 3SHR | 327.9/22299.6 |
| Grain [127] | 80, 128 | 64/96 | 1294/3239 | LFSR, NLFSR | 724.6/9876.5 |
| Rabbit [126] | 128 | 64 | 3800, 4100 | Chaotic Table + arithmetic | 0.080 |
| A5/1 [125] | 64 | 22 | 923 | LFSR | 0.050 |

are used to achieve non-repudiation and authenticity of a property, and to optimize the digital signature schemes, the message digest is signed rather than generating the signature for a whole message and signing it using a signature generation algorithm. Thirdly, hash functions may be implemented at the time of login for authentication of users by generating a message digest for a password and then compare it to the message digest of authorized password that is stored in the database to approve authentication and provide user the access to the system. Lastly, to generate both a series of sessions keys and pseudo random number, the hash functions can be used as one-way functions.

The size of the logic and number of state bits determines the footprint of a hash function. Inspired by Grain, a stream cipher, and KATAN, a block cipher, similar modified and improved version of a hash called Quark was presented in 2010 [136]. There are three different versions of Quark: s-Quark, U-Quark, and d-Quark. This hash family includes one of the most important hash functions in the industry. Yalcin and Kavun [137] introduced Keccak. With the 160-bit message digest, Keccak was a game changer. However, the only down side was due to its larger chip area compared to traditional standard for being lightweight. On the contrary,

the lightest lightweight family of hash functions is PHOTON [138]. It requires the smallest chip area compared to any other. For internal permutation and domain extension, the creators have implemented sponge functions. To achieve a compact design, the SPONGENT [139] uses one of the simplest round functions.

Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), Message Digest (MD), and RIPEMD (RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest) are one of the popular families of hash functions used in modern cryptography [142–148]. SHA is a family of hash functions that includes variants such as SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-3. Though, the initial version of SHA was SHA-0, and it is not considered a secure hash function anymore due to its vulnerabilities [142]. However, the other variants of SHA are widely implemented which offer different output sizes and adequate security levels [143, 144]. RIPEMD is another family of hash functions, though it may not be as popular compared to SHA and MD, but is known for its resistance against certain types of cryptographic attacks and its ability to generate shorter hash outputs. It has two variants, RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160, where the 128 and 160 are the size of the message digest generated by the hash functions in bits [145, 146]. The MD family of

hash functions includes variants such as MD2, MD4, and MD5 are known for their simplicity and efficiency. MD2 was the first hash function in the MD family which generated a message digest of 128-bits. However, it could only operate on a 128-bit message block, whereas future variants such as MD4, and MD5 are able to operate on 512-bit message blocks [147, 148]. Table 7 represents various essential lightweight hash functions with respect to their message digest size, message block size, and possibility of collision.

4.4 Elliptic curve cryptography

In 1985, Neal and Miller Koblitz introduced the concept of ECC [149]. ECC and RSA are two of the most important and widely used asymmetric ciphers that provide security in IoT. Like RSA, ECC is also a public-key cryptosystem, however ECC provides the same security strength or level even with a smaller key size. Asymmetric ciphers such as ECC and RSA are not preferred for only two reasons: the consumption of higher memory and a larger key size. Since ECC has a higher computational complexity of the algorithm, it results into a higher execution time on 8-bit microcontrollers compared to algorithms like AES [150]. The concept of ECC is dependent on elliptic curves. The concept of ECC is implemented among other concepts like key exchange mechanism and encryption scheme, for example, the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Exchanging Mechanism, and Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES), respectively [151, 152].

ECC has several attributes including robust and efficient that offers several advantages in every layer of the IoT. Firstly, ECC offers advanced security measures and provides enhanced protection compared to traditional encryption

[153]. ECC's effectiveness in preventing potential attacks contribute to its role in enhanced mobile Internet security. Secondly, elliptic curve cryptography proves advantageous for mobile Internet security. With a relatively compact key size of 256 bits, ECC requires less storage space compared to other encryption methods [154]. As mobile devices increasingly dominate online interactions, ECC's streamlined approach enhances user experiences and strengthens security measures for mobile Internet activities [155]. Lastly, Elliptic Curve Cryptography demonstrates superior properties. Despite employing shorter key lengths, ECC delivers robust security comparable to longer key lengths in traditional encryption algorithms. For example, a 256-bit ECC key offers similar security strength to a 3072-bit RSA key, which exceeds the standard RSA key length of 2048 bits [156]. Further, additional advantages in relation to each layer of IoT along with several specific use cases are presented in Table 8 below.

To implement cryptographic schemes, a group structure is provided by elliptic curves defined over a finite-field. The point at infinity, point O , is included in the set of rational points on the elliptic curve which are the elements of the group. Elliptic curves are defined by some mathematical functions. A general Elliptic curve is described below:

$$E(G) : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \quad (1)$$

Here, a and b belong to G .

The graph of the general function is symmetric to the X-axis. And if a line were to be drawn on the coordinate, the elliptic curve will have a maximum of 3 intersections with the line. Figure 5 provides an overall understanding of the elliptic curve by illustrating the three-intersection points P ,

Table 7 Comparison of various hashing algorithms

| Hashing algorithm | Message digest (bit) | Message block (bit) | Collision |
|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| Quark [136] | 128–224 | 256 | Yes |
| KECCAK [137] | 160 | 224–512 | Yes |
| PHOTON [138] | 80–256 | 128 | Very unlikely |
| SPONGENET [139] | 88–256 | 128 | Very unlikely |
| HMNT [140] | 128/256/512 | 824 | Yes |
| Whirlpool [141] | 512 | 512 | No |
| SHA-0 [142] | 160 | 512 | Yes |
| SHA-1 [142] | 160 | 512 | Very unlikely |
| SHA-256/224 [143] | 256/224 | 512 | No |
| SHA-512/384 [143] | 512/384 | 1024 | No |
| SHA-3 [144] | 224/256/384/512 | 1600 | No |
| RIPEMD-128 [145] | 128 | 512 | No |
| RIPEMD-160 [146] | 160 | 512 | No |
| MD2 [147] | 128 | 128 | Yes |
| MD4 [148] | 128 | 512 | Yes |
| MD5 [148] | 128 | 512 | Very unlikely |

Table 8 Advantages and use cases of ECC

| Layer | Advantages | Use cases |
|-------------------|--|--|
| Application layer | ECC traditionally offers compact key sizes that provides more secure data exchange in the application layer [156] | ECC-based ciphers provide a secure communication between IoT devices and applications along with authentication of IoT devices and users |
| Middleware layer | In the middleware layer, ECC helps with computational overhead and compatibility with constrained devices. [154] | The data exchange between middleware components is secured through ECC |
| Network layer | ECC uses bandwidth-efficient encryption and robust security against attacks to offer enhanced protection in the network layer [158] | The storage and retrieval of sensitive data between devices is handled by ECC |
| Perception layer | ECC offers small memory footprint and fast key generation suitable for resource-constrained sensor nodes at the perception layer of IoT systems. [157] | At the network layer, ECC provides a secure communication over wireless and wired networks in IoT environments that ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data transmitted between IoT devices, gateways, and backend servers |
| | | In the perception layer, ECC helps with the authentication and authorization of sensor nodes within IoT networks |
| | | It also enables secure collection and transmission of sensor data to higher layers of the IoT architecture |

Q, and R on the coordinate between the line A and general elliptic curve B.

The RSA algorithm's security relies on the computational difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem. On the other hand, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is used in ECC, which replaces the multiplicative groups with different groups while maintaining the computational difficulty. Addition and doubling operations replace multiplication and squaring in these groups, allowing for faster execution. Moreover, selecting appropriate curve models can result in efficient implementation of scalar multiplications. The NIST and Safe curves website [159] provide the specifications and models of such curves. Table 9 depicts the process of encryption and decryption in ECC.


4.4.1 ECDH

For the encryption of bulk data, symmetric key cryptography is a better option since the dependency of security is on its key agreement protocol and it provides voice packets. Deciding factor for the leaking of keys shared between two users is the security level of the key agreement protocol. However, the weak key in Diffie Hellman key agreement mechanism is an issue. Therefore, an improved key exchanging mechanism is required. ECDH on the other hand, is also a key agreement protocol which provides generation of a secret key shared between two parties [160]. In ECDH, public key, domain value, and elliptic curve are exchanged between both parties. Through the help of the information exchanged between both parties, a shared secret value is computed. And, even if a third party tries to calculate the secret value from gaining the public information, it will be unsuccessful until and unless the third party has the private data value. The diagram for ECDH key exchanging mechanism is shown in Fig. 6.

4.4.2 ECIES

Rogaway and Bellare presented ECIES in 1997, which is also known as DHIES [128]. It resulted from improvements in the ElGamal encryption protocol. It entails a security system that consists of calculations of MAC Code hash and algorithms based on symmetric-key cryptography. It is an integrated encryption system. The functions for ECIES are discussed below [131]. Firstly, Key Agreement (KA) is performed, which is a function for the key generation process done by both sender and recipient of a shared secret key. Secondly, Key Derivation Function (KDF) is executed, where a set of keys are produced from the chosen parameters and keying material. Thirdly, Encryption (ENC), which is the cryptographic algorithm based on symmetric key cryptography and utilizes only one key. Fourthly, Message Authentication Code (MAC), which is the data used to message authentication. Lastly, Hash (HASH), also known as the

Fig. 5 Elliptic curve on coordinate geometry



digest function. The ECIES encryption-decryption process between User A (sender) and User B (receiver) is depicted in Figs. 7 and 8 respectively.

5 Role of LWC in IoT

LWC handles the unique security demands of the various IoT applications. It considers the dynamic features of IoT devices, including their compact form size, limited memory, and restricted power supply. LWC algorithms are designed to provide appropriate security while reducing computational cost. LWC also improves the power consumption and the lifespan of IoT devices. Conserving power is an important concern for IoT devices, which frequently use restricted sources of power or depend on renewable energy techniques. LWC algorithms are intended to be computationally light, with the goal of reducing the computational overhead necessary for cryptographic operations. This guarantees that IoT devices can employ encryption, digital signatures, secure key exchange, and other cryptographic services required for securing sensitive data and assuring the integrity of IoT connections in an efficient manner.

Another essential feature of LWC in IoT is that it allows for real-time and low-latency operations. Many IoT

applications need rapid analysis of information and short reaction times. LWC methods are intended to offer quick encryption and decryption, permitting real-time protected communication and data processing [161]. LWC enables IoT devices to satisfy the strict time requirements of many IoT applications, such as manufacturing automation, energy management systems, and healthcare tracking, by minimizing computational complexity and reducing the delay induced by cryptographic processes [162]. And, LWC also encourages compatibility and uniformity within the IoT ecosystem. The centralization of lightweight cryptographic methods promotes interoperability across various IoT devices and systems. This enables easy integration, secure communication, and data sharing among diverse IoT components, independent of implementation. Overall, LWC plays a major role in various sectors of IoT such as Smart cities, IIoT, Healthcare, Smart Home Automation, Agriculture, and Smart Energy grids. The major role played by LWC in the different sectors of IoT is discussed in the subsections below [163–196].

5.1 LWC in smart cities

It is critical to protect the enormous group of linked devices and networks in smart cities, assuring data and services

Table 9 Encryption decryption in ECC

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>The Global Public elements are</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> $E_q(a, b)$ – Elliptic curve with parameters a, b, and q, where q is a prime number or integer of the form 2 G – Point on the elliptic curve whose value is large order of n (i) <p>User A Key Generation</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Select Private Key n_A, where $n_A < n$ Calculate Public Key $P_A, P_A = n_A \times G$ <p>User B Key Generation</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Select Private Key n_B where $n_B < n$ Calculate Public Key $P_B, P_B = n_B \times G$ (ii) <p>Calculation of Secret Key by User A</p> $k = n_A \times P_B$ <p>Calculation of Secret Key by User B</p> $k = n_B \times P_A$ | |
| <p>Algorithm: ECC Encryption</p> <p>Input: 1. $M \leftarrow$ Message</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> $G \leftarrow$ (i) $P_B \leftarrow$ (ii) <p>Output: Cipher point “c_m”</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Start $int\ k \leftarrow$ random integer $P_m \leftarrow$ Encoded point for Monelliptic curve (iii) $c_m = \{kG, P_m + kP_B\}$ End | |
| <p>Algorithm: ECC Decryption</p> <p>Input: 1. $n_B \leftarrow$ Private Key of User B</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> $G \leftarrow$ (i) $P_B \leftarrow$ (ii) $P_m \leftarrow$ (iii) <p>Output: $M \leftarrow$ Original Message</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Start $kG * n_B$ $P_m + kP_B - (kG * n_B)$ $P_m + kP_B - (kG * n_B)$ (iv) Substitute (ii) for $G * n_B$ in (iv) $P_m + kP_B - (kP_B)$ P_m Simplify P_m Result $\leftarrow M$ End | |

Fig. 6 ECDH key exchanging mechanism






Fig. 7 Encryption in ECIES



safety, reliability, and accessibility. LWC algorithms provide a safe connection among smart city components such as public facilities and amenities, transportation systems, sensors, and smart grids preventing unauthorized use and data breaches [134]. Vital facilities and amenities such as smart lighting, traffic control, security systems, garbage disposal, and ecological monitoring benefit from LWC [164]. It enables safe data interchange among local administration, suppliers, and people while preserving personal information and maintaining privacy. It is a major task to protect smart city systems from various cyber threats and maintain the

urban infrastructure security. LWC algorithms help in identifying and mitigating possible cyber threats on smart city systems, preventing interruptions to maintain the security of the urban infrastructure [165]. Such algorithms are essential for the security of applications and services based on IoT.

Pandey et al. [166] delves into the complexities surrounding data protection in smart cities and examines lightweight cryptographic algorithms as potential solutions. Yu et al. [165] introduced a secure and lightweight authentication protocol, SLAP-IoD, leveraging a physical unclonable function (PUF) for Internet of Devices (IoD) applications

Fig. 8 Decryption in ECIES

in smart city environments. Bajwa et al. [167] utilizes Blockchain technology and the Iterative Filtering (IF) Algorithm to address data privacy concerns and mitigate collusion attacks. Othman et al. [168] proposed a physically secure privacy-preserving message authentication protocol incorporating Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) and Secret Sharing mechanisms.

5.2 LWC in IIoT

LWC plays an important part in protecting the information transmission inside industrial systems, as well as protecting important components and assuring continuous operation. To prevent any data breaches and unlawful access, LWC provides various cryptographic methods that have strong encryption to preserve sensitive data being exchanged between industrial gadgets, controllers, and corporate systems. LWC provides reliable authentication of devices along with access control, and prohibit unauthorized devices or organizations from gaining access to vital systems [169]. It also offers the detection and prevention of breaches inside commercial networks, assuring data integrity and the dependability of automation systems in industries [170].

Kharghani et al. [171] presents a new non-inclusive ROM and MTP function CLS scheme based on pairing. Gupta et al. [172] developed a forward privacy based searchable lightweight public-key encryption. Karati et al. [170] used the concept of lattice cryptography to propose key exchange protocol based on novel identify that offers several security attributes in the IoT. Chen et al. [173] incorporated hash

functions, physically unclonable function, and lightweight cryptographic functions to develop a new authentication scheme.

5.3 LWC in healthcare

In the Healthcare sector, the electronic medical records (EMR) must be kept private and secure. Integrity of data must be secured and valuable data must be safeguarded from unauthorized use or disclosure. LWC facilitates encrypted interaction between medical equipment, sensors on clothing, EMR systems, and healthcare professionals, maintaining data integrity and avoiding manipulation [174]. LWC methods provide a secure connection between patients during video consultations and secure transmission of information between the two, ensuring the privacy of private health data [175].

John et al. [176] developed a Real-Time Distant Healthcare Monitoring IoT System (RTDHMS) to safeguard patient data that utilizes a lightweight block cipher BEST-1 (Better Encryption Security Technique-1) for encryption purposes. Maram et al. [177] highlights the challenges associated with securing private healthcare data transmitted through IoT networks and offering a solution that integrates deep learning algorithms with straightforward encryption techniques. Patwari et al. [178] presents a Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) technique tailored for healthcare Wearable IoT device data protection. Padmashree et al. [179] proposed a framework that allows patients to directly supply

the encryption key to healthcare providers as part of routine access procedures.

5.4 LWC in smart home automation

To ensure anonymity and security of private details and user actions, LWC methods provide end-to-end encryption for data transmitted between smart home appliances [180]. The methods offer safe identification and access control techniques to prevent unauthorized people from taking control of or manipulating with smart home devices. Communication must be encrypted between devices, ports of entry, and cloud-based services. LWC encrypts the communication which prevents any data breaches and guarantees smart home network integrity [181]. It provides smart device secure over-the-air (OTA) upgrades, guaranteeing that software modifications and updates are validated and sent securely to avoid unapproved changes [182].

Nimmy et al. [180] proposed a smart home application protocol that implements a lightweight remote user authentication and offers privacy. An et al. [183] developed a scheme for online/offline sign crypton that is certificateless. Verma et al. [184] highlights the secure automation offered by a smart automation system using ESP32-CAM and ESP32 modules.

5.5 LWC in agriculture

It is essential to safeguard the interaction and transmission of data in IoT applications for agricultural to preserve private data linked to crop management, meteorological conditions, and irrigation systems [185]. The algorithms protect the integrity and security of data exchanged between agricultural monitoring devices, automated machinery, and farm administration systems, which prevents unauthorized access or manipulation [186]. Similar to the role of LWC in IoT, it offers detection of possible hazards to crop health, which allows for quick action and optimization of resource allocation for increased yield and sustainability [187]. It enables a secure connection between agricultural IoT equipment and cloud-based analytics systems, allowing farmers to make data-driven choices while protecting the confidentiality and safety of their agricultural data.

Prvulović et al. [188] develops a layered wireless sensor networks architecture that is energy efficient and used to estimate several lightweight cryptographic. Itoo et al. [189] introduces an agreement framework that is efficient and preserves privacy within smart agriculture monitoring systems. Saini et al. [190] presents a system for key negotiation using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography that offers support to smart agricultural monitoring systems.

5.6 LWC in smart energy grids

Unlawful access, manipulation, and cyber threats are issues in data sharing and smart energy grid communication which can be resolved by LWC. It provides secure communication between smart meters, energy management systems, and utility companies, assuring accurate metering and billing data while preventing any sort of manipulation on data which is unauthorized [191]. LWC algorithms offer detection and mitigation of cyber assaults on crucial energy infrastructure, preventing interruptions or unapproved control [192]. It maintains the smart grid's stability and resilience by securing the communication between renewable energy sources, grid monitoring devices, and energy distribution networks [193].

You et al. [194] presents a scheme for mutual authentication which is lightweight in nature for Smartt Energy Grids. Wang et al. [195] proposed a blockchain based technology called BlockSLAP that lowers the process of interaction to two steps and decentralizes the authority of registration. Jyoti et al. [196] analyzed the problems in the existing schemes and suggested an Anonymous Lightweight Key Agreement Framework (ALKAF) for the SG network. Table 10 highlights the several major advancements within the diverse sectors of IoT below.

6 Recent advancements

The fast rise of the IoT in recent years has resulted in the demand for the development of lightweight cryptographic algorithms to protect the enormous collection of interconnected devices [197]. Such lightweight cryptographic algorithms offer to deliver effective and resilient security solutions while taking into account of resource limitations on IoT devices. As a result, tremendous progress has been achieved in numerous areas of lightweight cryptography. This section discusses the recent advancements in lightweight cryptography methods for IoT, focusing on certain areas that have seen significant improvement. Such certain areas of recent advancements include improvement in the security of ciphers, new ciphers resilient to fault attacks, ciphers with improved performance, more optimized ciphers, ciphers for resource-constrained IoT devices, enhancements in noise stream ciphers, and extended versions of previous ciphers which are discussed in the subsections below and presented in Table 10 [187–197].

6.1 Improvement in the security of ciphers

Improving cipher security is critical for protecting private information in a modern interrelated and data-driven society. The growth of technologies such as IoT and cloud

Table 10 Major advancements in the diverse sectors of IoT

| IoT sector | Reference | Major contribution |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Smart City | Pandey et al. [166] | Delves into the complexities surrounding data protection in smart cities and examines lightweight cryptographic algorithms as potential solutions |
| | Yu et al. [165] | Introduced a secure and lightweight authentication protocol, SLAP-IoD, leveraging a physical unclonable function (PUF) for Internet of Devices (IoD) applications in smart city environments |
| | Bajwa et al. [167] | Utilizes Blockchain technology and the Iterative Filtering (IF) Algorithm to address data privacy concerns and mitigate collusion attacks |
| | Othman et al. [168] | Proposed a physically secure privacy-preserving message authentication protocol incorporating Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) and Secret Sharing mechanisms |
| IIoT | Kharghani et al. [171] | Presents a new non-inclusive ROM and MTP function CLS scheme based on pairing |
| | Gupta et al. [172] | Developed a forward privacy based searchable lightweight public-key encryption |
| | Karati et al. [170] | Used the concept of lattice cryptography to propose key exchange protocol based on novel identify that offers several security attributes in the IIoT |
| | Chen et al. [173] | Incorporated hash functions, physically unclonable function, and lightweight cryptographic functions to develop a new authentication scheme |
| Healthcare | John et al. [176] | Developed a Real-Time Distant Healthcare Monitoring IoT System (RTDHMIS) to safeguard patient data that utilizes a lightweight block cipher BEST-1 (Better Encryption Security Technique-1) for encryption purposes |
| | Maram et al. [177] | Highlights the challenges associated with securing private healthcare data transmitted through IoT networks and offering a solution that integrates deep learning algorithms with straightforward encryption techniques |
| | Patwari et al. [178] | Presented a Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) technique tailored for healthcare Wearable IoT device data protection |
| | Padmashree et al. [179] | Proposed a framework that allows patients to directly supply the encryption key to healthcare providers as part of routine access procedures |
| Smart Home Automation | Nimmy et al. [180] | Proposed a smart home application protocol that implements a lightweight remote user authentication and offers privacy |
| | An et al. [183] | Developed a scheme for online/offline signcryption that is certificateless |
| | Verma et al. [184] | Highlights the secure automation offered by a smart automation system using ESP32-CAM and ESP32 modules |
| Agriculture | Prvulović et al. [188] | Developed a layered wireless sensor networks architecture that is energy efficient and used to estimate several lightweight cryptographic |
| | Ito et al. [189] | Introduced an agreement framework that is efficient and preserves privacy within smart agriculture monitoring systems |
| | Saini et al. [190] | Presented a system for key negotiation using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography that offers support to smart agricultural monitoring systems |
| Smart Energy Grids | You et al. [194] | Presented a scheme for mutual authentication which is lightweight in nature for Smartt Energy Grids |
| | Wang et al. [195] | Proposed a blockchain based technology called BlockSLAP that lowers the process of interaction to two steps and decentralizes the authority of registration |
| | Jyoti et al. [196] | Analyzed the problems in the existing schemes and suggested an Anonymous Lightweight Key Agreement Framework (ALKAF) for the SG network |

computing, and greater amounts data transfer has called for the development of secure and efficient encryption methods. This section looks at important breakthroughs in cipher security advancements. Researchers have developed unique algorithms, methods, and encryption approaches to improve cypher security and handle different data protection concerns. In one of the latest works, Liu et al. [198] presented uBlock, a lightweight cipher algorithm for devices in IoT that improved the performance of encryption and decryption using sequential circuits. An improvement of

two-fold can be seen in performance if better hardware and nanotechnology is implemented.

Kundu et al. [199] introduced a user independent multi-variate group signature scheme that focused on providing anonymity of the user, no connection between users, and traceability using a protocol of 5-pass identification. Panchami et al. [200] presented Feather S-Box of 4-bit that enabled confusion in lightweight ciphers. Feather S-Box provides improved security in terms of balanced, nonlinearity, linear and differential cryptanalysis resistant, and

algebraic attack resistant. Thabit et al. [201] presented a new cryptographic algorithm that is lightweight in nature to provide security for cloud computing applications. The algorithm has improved encryption due to its higher complexity influenced by substitution permutation method and Feistel network structure. Devi et al. [202] presented an approach for malware detection and prevention using deep learning to provide security for transmission of data in IoT devices.

6.2 Ciphers resilient to fault attacks

The susceptibility of cryptographic algorithms to fault attacks creates substantial danger to sensitive data security. These attacks take use of cipher's vulnerability to purposeful or accidental faults introduced during execution, with the goal of compromising their integrity and threatening the confidentiality of the private data. Recognizing the importance of the situation, researchers have created viable solutions to improve ciphers resilience to fault attacks. This section explores into the most recent advances in the subject of fault attack-resistant ciphers, highlighting the novel ideas and techniques. Dofe et al. [203] proposed to prevent fault attacks in SIMON cipher by implementing a new micro-architecture that integrates different masking methods and operand permutation techniques. Roy et al. [204] presented SAFARI, a framework that outputs a C code which is fault attack protected for block ciphers based on the security requirements provided and its specifications of the cipher. The framework compounds various implementations of fault attack resistance in block ciphers automatically.

Potes-Ordez et al. [205] highlighted the need to protect trivium stream cipher from fault injection attacks and introduced various fault detection schemes to resolve the issue. Song et al. [206] presented a new variant of PIPO block cipher for a secure communication that is fast with optimized techniques implemented with ARM/NEON processor. Cnudde et al. [207] presented a new implementation of the block cipher, PRESENT, that provides security against not only fault attacks but also side-channel attacks. Liu et al. [208] proposed a countermeasure towards fault attacks based on a method that quantitatively analyzes the protection of SPN structure block ciphers. Wang et al. [209] proposed the use of existing Benes network to resist fault attacks in crypto-processors with high performance.

6.3 High performance ciphers

It is critical to achieve faster performance in cryptographic algorithms in order to satisfy the rising needs of contemporary computer systems. This section examines important advances in enhancing the performance of cryptographic algorithms, with the goal of increasing efficiency and throughput. Researchers have developed novel

methodologies and architectures for optimizing different ciphers, achieving major improvements in performance. Xu et al. [210] presented the use of pipelined design scheme in ZUC-256 to implement a high-throughput hardware for the cryptographic algorithm. To significantly shorten the algorithm's critical path and increase the operating frequency, the pipelined design scheme is implemented.

Pandey et al. [211] proposed an architecture for PRESENT cipher based on 8-bit data path to process key of 128-bits and plaintext of 64-bits that included 48 clock cycles. The architecture is integrated with a system-on-chip (SoC) environment to provide high performance and power efficiency in the cipher. Gupta et al. [212] presented such an architecture for RC4 Stream cipher that combined loop unrolling and hardware pipeline which per clock cycle generated 2 RC4 keystream bytes. The architecture was the fastest known for RC4 as of the time. Amdouni et al. [213] developed a robust block cipher hardware architecture that provided high performance to encrypt and decrypt images. It was developed using DNA sequence coding and various chaotic maps. Kumar et al. [214] proposed to improve security in the PRINCE block cipher with an optimized hardware implementation. The proposed architecture in the block cipher not only improved security but also maximized resource efficiency.

6.4 Optimized ciphers

The optimization of ciphers is critical in maintaining safe and efficient communication in the field of data security. Experts have focused their efforts on creating more optimized ciphers. These advancements strive to improve several elements of the design of the cipher, such as area optimization, resource usage, performance enhancement, and vulnerability mitigation. Researchers have made great progress in developing ciphers that give enhanced efficiency while preserving solid security measures by introducing new methods, structures, and techniques. In a recent scholarly work, Manoj et al. [215] proposed an architecture on S box circuit for SMS4 cipher to optimally utilize Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). Area optimization was the resultant in the reveal of simulation results. Ashaq et al. [216] presented the use of Substitution Box in the architecture that acquired a hardware design for area efficiency in the PRESENT block cipher to improve resource consumption. Tang et al. [217] proposed WBMatrix, that is a matrix library used to optimize the implementation of White-Box block cipher. The matrix library produces pairwise invertible matrices along with reducing multiplication steps. Kim et al. [218] optimized the S-Layer's performance with the help of masking technique and scheduling of registers in PIPO Block cipher on RISC-V Processors and 32-bit ARM to achieve significant

improvement in performance. Chen et al. [111] highlighted the issue of slow diffusion for the first plaintext when all keys are 0 and proposed SAND-2, a new architecture that provided high-diffusion to address the issue.

6.5 Ciphers for resource constrained devices

As IoT expands, resource-constrained devices play an increasingly important role in providing secure connection. However, due to these devices' limited processing power, memory capacity, and communication resources, creating safe cryptographic methods poses unique challenges. This section highlights the recent advancements in ciphers that are especially designed to handle the restrictions of resource-constrained devices. A variety of solutions have evolved, ranging from decreasing computing complexity using Fast Hartley Transform (FHT)-based approaches to establishing lightweight authentication systems and quantum-resistant encryption. In one of the recent academic works, Nakhate et al. [219] proposed the reduction of complexity during scalar multiplication with the help of Fast Hartley Transform (FHT) based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography. They et al. [220] developed a prototype of Cryptography Process Off-loading Proxy (CPOP) and justified feasibility of the prototype with its results to provide security services for resource constrained IoT devices.

Li et al. [221] proposed to combine certificateless cryptography (CLC) and ECC to result a lightweight authentication scheme that offers a secure session key for resource constrained devices in IoT. The scheme offers low communication and computation costs with mutual authentication. Ding et al. [222] proposed a signcryption and elliptic curve based anonymous authentication protocol that provides adequate security strength along with reduction in computational and communication cost for devices in IoT. The reduction of computation and communication costs in the protocol results into a suitable protocol for resource constrained devices. Farha et al. [223] proposed an authentication scheme based on SRAM-PUF which guarantees the authenticity of end devices and offers small capacity of memory and low computational overhead for resource constrained devices in IoT. Xu et al. [224] introduced Ring-ExpLWE, an encryption scheme that is quantum-resistant and provides high performance and reduces lightweight hardware implementation for resource constrained IoT devices. Shahbazi et al. [225] presented an implementation of AES based on FGPA called Nano-AES for resource constrained IoT devices that results efficiency in area and still provides high security. Periasamy et al. [226] presented the utilization of an 8-bit manipulation principle (E3LCM) in a lightweight cryptography method to provide improved energy efficiency for resource constrained devices in IoT.

6.6 Ciphers developed for IoT network and nodes

It has become more critical to ensure the information within IoT networks and nodes of the IoT networks due to the fast expansion of IoT. This subsection discusses cipher developed particularly for IoT networks and nodes such as SLIM, Shadow, modified MD5 and HSA5/1. Such advancements enhance the performance, efficiency, and security within the IoT environmental challenges. Healthcare-focused and secured data collection systems have been discussed in this subsection that address the data privacy and integrity concerns. Such solutions being developed highlight the current efforts to develop ciphers that secure the confidentiality and integrity of data in the IoT networks and nodes. In a recent scholarly work, Asare et al. [227] proposed the combination of MD5 and Feistel cipher for a cryptographic scheme to provide higher security for data in the IoT node. Chatterjee et al. [228] presented a modified version of PRESENT cipher that modified the technique to update Key Register and included a new layer in between the P-layer and Substitution-box with reduction of encryption round.

Muzaffar et al. [229] proposed to combine HSA5/1 symmetric block cipher with high-speed and an Edge-Coded Signaling (ECS) protocol to generate a secured transceiver design for a multilayer, lightweight, and high-speed cipher implemented in IoT communication for Single-channel. Tao et al. [230] presented SecureData, which is a secured data collection healthcare system for IoT with primary goal to resolve issues related to data collusion, data breach, and data integrity in IoT nodes of Healthcare. Guo et al. [112] presented a lightweight block cipher called Shadow for IoT nodes to enhance the speed of diffusion in ARX ciphers that operate on ARX operations and are implemented with generalized Feistel structures. Aboushousha et al. [231] presented a lightweight block cipher called SLIM which is highly immune against most cryptanalysis attacks and provides high performance along with attributes such as area efficiency, and energy-sufficiency.

6.7 Enhancement in quantum stream ciphers

This section discusses the improvements in quantum stream ciphers, concentrating on strategies for improving performance and security. Researchers have developed novel approaches for improving encryption and decryption operations, allowing for higher phase levels and optimized modulation algorithms. Variants of current quantum stream cyphers, such as Y-00 and PSK quantum noise randomized cypher (QNRC), that provide increased performance and effective deciphering capabilities, are among these innovations. In addition, to construct extremely safe optical communication systems, the combination of intensity modulation signals, quadrature amplitude modulation

(QAM), and quantum key distribution (QKD) technologies has been researched. In one of the recent academic works,

Tanizawa et al. [232] proposed a variant for the Y-00 quantum stream cipher that implements a coarse-to-fine modulations which enables 2^{17} phase levels during encryption. Li et al. [233] presented a PSK quantum noise randomized cipher (QNRC) that implemented a new method for decryption which has the capability of providing great performance in successfully deciphering the QNRC signal. Futami et al. [234] presented the intensity modulation signals and operation principle in data encryption and decryption for the Y-00 quantum noise randomized stream cipher. The analytical solution of implementing a transmission system of 1000 km results in the deduction of high-secrecy for the whole transmission system. Lei et al. [235] presented a quantum noise stream cipher (QNSC) with 16 quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) to provide an improved coherent transmission without intermediate amplifiers over 300 km fiber. Nakazawa et al. [236] proposed a combination of the technology with quantum key distribution (QKD) and the technology with QNSC or QAM for an optical communication system that is highly secured. Yang et al. [237] proposed to combine the attributes of Discrete-Fourier-transform spread orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (DFTs-OFDM) into the Quantum Noise Stream Cipher to achieve better performance in security and improved transmission.

6.8 Extended version of ciphers

Cryptographic advancements are always striving to improve the security and performance of current ciphers. This section focuses on the extended versions of prior ciphers, which were created to overcome shortcomings and improve different features of these cryptographic methods. Researchers have improved well-known ciphers like RECTANGLE, Type-1 Generalized Feistel Networks (GFNs), and Light-Weight Syncryption Protocol (LiSP) through proposed modifications that try to solve obstacles and increase their efficacy. In one of the latest works, Zakaria et al. [238] proposed an extension of the RECTANGLE algorithm to improve the diffusion and confusion attributes and overall enhance the security within the existing RECTANGLE algorithm using 3D cipher. Cheng et al. [22] proposed an extended version of the Type-1 Generalized Feistel Networks (Type-1 GFNs) called extended Type-1 Generalized Feistel Networks (Type-1 EGFNs) and implemented Type-1 EGFNs into a lightweight block cipher to provide improved performance and security. Kim et al. [239] designed an extended version of Light-Weight Syncryption Protocol (LiSP), called LiSP-XK. The extended version focused on the issues found previously in LiSP regarding resource constrained environments. LiSP-XK was designed and customized to become

more suitable for resource constrained environments in IIoT. Table 11 presents the summary of various cryptographic advances discussed in the above subsections.

7 Future research directions

Various concerns requiring active research attention related to the hardware implementation, integration, security, privacy, and resilience of lightweight cryptographic methods in the IoT environment are discussed in the subsections below.

7.1 Hardware implementation for LWC methods

For IoT devices, energy consumption is a critical constraint and since hardware-based cryptography solutions are not be optimized for energy consumption, it becomes very difficult to implement such solutions. New methods including low-power designs, and energy efficient ciphers are a viable solution to the massive energy consumption problem. Such hardware designs should be optimized for resource-constrained devices in IoT. However, the methods should reduce power consumption as well as ensuring sufficient security levels, otherwise it becomes easier for intruders to execute malicious attacks on these devices.

7.2 Integration of LWC methods in IoT systems

Various challenges related to efficiency, security, and key management occur in the integration and interoperability of lightweight block ciphers, lightweight stream ciphers, Elliptic Curve Cryptographic methods, and hash functions. Seamless integration and synergies among different lightweight cryptographic methods can solve such challenges and provide efficient key management and effective security. Developing key management schemes, optimized protocols capitalize on the power of each method as well as fulfilling the IoT network's specific requirements can offer effective interoperability solutions.

7.3 Improvement in LWBC

Developing basic key schedules, reducing the size of the block, key size reduction without security compromise, and simpler rounds are different improvements in lightweight block ciphers. Reducing the size of the block can offer optimization in the encryption and decryption for resource constrained IoT devices. Basic key schedules can reduce the overhead and enhance the efficiency for IoT environments with resource constraints. A reduced key size will accommodate the IoT device's limited storage and computation capabilities. Simpler rounds reduce computational power needed

Table 11 Major advancements in cryptographic algorithms

| References | Major contribution | Cipher/scheme | Results | Limitations |
|-----------------------|---|---------------|--|---|
| Panchami et al. [200] | Feather S-Box of 4-bit that enabled confusion in lightweight ciphers | Feather S-Box | A 23 and 19% improvement in terms of less Area Delay-Product and Power-Delay Product compared to PRESENT cipher | SKINNY cipher provides higher immunity linear and differential cryptanalysis |
| Devi et al. [202] | Approach for malware detection and prevention using deep learning to provide security for transmission of data | N/A | Found precision of 92%, accuracy of 95% and error value of 5% | N/A |
| Kumar et al. [214] | Improvement in PRINCE block cipher's security with an optimized hardware implementation | PRINCE | 13.057% performance improvement, and 8.109% efficiency improvement in Virtex-6-FF784 implementation, and a 113% performance and 113.734% efficiency improvement in Virtex-4-FF668 FGPA | The proposed architecture evaluates only gray-scale images, which is not a representation of all IoT devices applications |
| Chen et al. [111] | SAND-2, a new architecture that provided high-diffusion to address the issue 0 in the previous version, SAND | SAND-2 | The throughput achieved in SAND-2 is 10% higher, and full diffusion speed is 63.7% higher in comparison to SAND | N/A |
| Li et al. [221] | Combined certificateless cryptography (CLC) and ECC to result a lightweight authentication scheme that offers a secure session key for resource constrained devices | CLC & ECC | The effectiveness of the authentication scheme along with the feasibility of it is confirmed via the results | System's security is not scalable due to higher computational costs of real-time key update strategy compared to existing fixed cycle key update strategies |
| Liu et al. [198] | uBlock, a lightweight cipher algorithm for devices in IoT that improved the performance of encryption and decryption | uBlock | Throughput can achieve 1 Gb/s level with technology of 90 nm for encryption and decryption | Increase in FPGA resources |
| Xu et al. [210] | Pipelined design scheme in ZUC-256 to implement a high-throughput hardware | ZUC-256 | FPGA implementation is increased by 1.06 times, while the area efficiency of ASIC implementation is increased by 1.61 time | Requires a significant amount of resource for hardware implementation |
| Amdouni et al. [213] | A robust block cipher hardware architecture that provided high performance to encrypt and decrypt images | N/A | Achieves a high-performance throughput of 24,576.153 Mbps | N/A |
| Ashaq et al. [216] | Substitution Box in the architecture that acquired a hardware design for area efficiency in the PRESENT block cipher | PRESENT | An improvement of 13.67% is obtained in resource consumption | N/A |
| Tang et al. [217] | WMatrix, that is a matrix library used to optimize the implementation of White-Box block cipher | White-Box | Improvement in the construction of table and faster encryption | The encryption and table construction phases are improved only on ARMv8 and Intel x86 platforms |
| Kim et al. [218] | Optimized the S-Layer's performance with the help of masking technique and scheduling of registers in PIPO Block cipher on RISC-V Processors and 32-bit ARM | PIPO | When 4 different plaintext was encrypted, the performance was improved by 370% and 229% in ARM Cortex-M4 and RISC-V platforms, respectively | Performance can be improved with the implementation of on-the-fly key scheduling technique |
| Ding et al. [222] | A signcryption and elliptic curve based anonymous authentication protocol that provides adequate security strength | N/A | Effective reduction in the requirement of resources is verified in the protocol via results | N/A |

Table 11 (continued)

| References | Major contribution | Cipher/scheme | Results | Limitations |
|-------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|--|--|
| Xu et al. [224] | Ring-ExplWE, an encryption scheme that is quantum-resistant and provides high performance and reduces lightweight hardware implementation | Ring-ExplWE | 35.6 ms is required for encryption and 17.8 ms is required for decryption with implemented software based on Cortex-M3 microprocessor | The Area×Time (AT) of our high-performance and lightweight hardware implementations is reduced by 49.2% and 49.5%, respectively, |
| Cheng et al. [22] | Extended version of the Type-1 GFNs called extended Type-1 EGFNs and implemented Type-1 EGFNS into a lightweight block cipher | Type-1 EGFNs | The cipher outperforms other existing lightweight ciphers in terms of processing speed, resource utilization, and power consumption | N/A |
| Kundu et al. [199] | User independent multivariate group signature scheme that focused on providing anonymity of the user, no connection between users, and traceability | Multivariate group signature scheme | N/A | N/A |
| Thabit et al. [201] | New lightweight cryptographic algorithm that is lightweight in nature to provide security for cloud computing applications | NLCA | Improvement in terms of execution time of the cipher and security forces in comparison to widely used cryptographic systems | Provides faster processing time at the cost of a smaller key size of 128-bit compared to 256-bit key size of DES algorithm |
| Potestad-Ordóñez et al. [205] | Presented various fault detection schemes to protect trivium stream cipher from fault injection attacks | N/A | Counter measures provide 79% higher fault coverage and 99.9% is reached from one of the counter measures | There is approximately 33% area overhead in the trivium stream cipher countermeasure |
| Song et al. [206] | A new variant of PIPO block cipher for a secure communication that is fast with optimized techniques | PIPO | 301% improvement in performance is seen compared to HIGHT, and 463% compared to revise CHAM | N/A |
| Farha et al. [223] | An authentication scheme based on SRAM-PUF which guarantees the authenticity of end devices and offers small capacity of memory | SRAM-PUF | Effective authentication with a low memory capacity and computational overhead is obtained via results | Difficult to ensure consistent performance since the algorithm cannot predict which SRAM cells are more likely to become unstable under different conditions |
| Periasamy et al. [226] | Utilized an 8-bit manipulation principle (E3LCM) in a lightweight cryptography method | E3LCM | Results provide the proposed method consumes only 0.9 Kbytes of RAM and 202mW of power | N/A |
| Muzaffar et al. [229] | Combined HSA5/1 symmetric block cipher with high-speed and an Edge-Coded Signaling (ECS) protocol | HSA5/1 | Only clock cycle is required for encryption and decryption of 148-bit key at 25 MHz of clock frequency that consumes power of 27 μ W | The generation of all keystreams must occur within a single clock cycle, as using more than one cycle would result in a lower data rate transmission |
| Guo et al. [112] | A lightweight block cipher called Shadow for IoT nodes to enhance the speed of diffusion in ARX ciphers | Shadow | N/A | Round based architecture is implemented to prioritize higher throughput over lower resource consumption |
| Li et al. [233] | A PSK quantum noise randomized cipher (QNRC) that implemented a new method for decryption | QNRC | The QNRC signal is successfully deciphered with the proposed decryption technique that provides improved performance | The method is only tested under a 50 km transmission system which is relatively small length |
| Lei et al. [235] | A quantum noise stream cipher (QNSC) with 16 quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM | QNSC | The system has the capacity to transmit data at a rate of 10.2 Tbit/s-km | Results only show the performance of the QNSC with a single polarization and single wavelength |

Table 11 (continued)

| References | Major contribution | Cipher/scheme | Results | Limitations |
|--------------------------|--|---------------|--|---|
| Kim et al. [239] | Extended version of LiSP, called LiSP-XK which focused on the issues found previously in LiSP regarding resource constrained environments | LiSP-XK | Compared to other signcryption methods, LiSP-XK demonstrates an overall efficiency improvement of 35% | The authentication scheme is not particularly preferred for extreme security due to its lesser complexity |
| Chatterjee et al. [179] | PRESENT cipher with modified technique to update Key Register and included a new layer in between the P-layer and Substitution-box | PRESENT | The number of rounds is reduced from 31 to 25 for the encryption process in the PRESENT cipher | Number of rounds are reduced; therefore, security is compromised for greater efficiency |
| Roy et al. [204] | SAFARI, a framework that outputs a C code which is fault attack protected for block ciphers | SAFARI | N/A | Safari is not compatible with ciphers such as Blowfish and Twofish |
| Nakhate et al. [219] | Reduced complexity during scalar multiplication with the help of Fast Hartley Transform (FHT) | N/A | Improvement of 4%–8% in encryption and decryption time has been observed using FHT in ECC over FFT based ECC | Proposed work doesn't provide precision of calculation due to the lack of a multiprecision library |
| Shahbazi et al. [225] | Implementation of AES based on FPGA called Nano-AES for resource constrained IoT devices | AES | Compared to previous works similar to this, there is an improvement from 35 to 2.4% using application specified integrated circuit (ASIC) | The proposed design is not suitable for IoT devices that are particularly large in size and acquire significant resource consumption |
| Asare et al. [227] | Combined MD5 and Feistel cipher for a cryptographic scheme to provide higher security | MD5 | Fast and improved encryption of data between the sink node and IoT edge devices is obtained through the results | Since MD5 is considered a weak hashing algorithm and Feistel cipher implements symmetric cryptography the security can be improved with stronger algorithms |
| Aboushousha et al. [231] | A lightweight block cipher called SLIM which is highly immune against most cryptanalysis attacks and provides high performance | SLIM | The results display high immunity towards strong differential and linear cryptanalysis attacks | Implementation of symmetric cryptography, and Feistel network structure is not suitable for devices which require extreme security |
| Futami et al. [234] | Presented the intensity modulation signals and operation principle in data encryption and decryption for the Y-00 quantum noise randomized stream cipher | QNRSC | Demonstrates 1,000-km transmission system secrecy experimentally, using the analytical solution to achieve a 1.5-Gb/s data rate | Cipher relies heavily on the physical layer characteristics, therefore if physical layer is compromised, it will result in failure of entire system |
| Zakaria et al. [238] | Extension of the RECTANGLE algorithm to improve the diffusion and confusion attributes and overall enhance the security | RECTANGLE | Algorithm achieves a competitive performance, with an execution speed of 0.9516 ms and a throughput of 67.26 bit/ms, compared to existing algorithms | N/A |
| Liu et al. [208] | Countermeasure towards fault attacks based on a method that quantitatively analyzes the protection of SPN structure block ciphers | N/A | Within 10 microseconds, 2000 fault injections are enough to finish the assessment under the analyzed fault models | The quantitatively evaluation method is not extendable or compatible with ciphers that implement symmetric Feistel network |
| Tao et al. [230] | SecureData, which is a secured data collection healthcare system for IoT with primary goal to resolve data security issues | SecureData | When SecureData is applied in IoT-based healthcare, the results display efficient security from various risks | N/A |

Table 11 (continued)

| References | Major contribution | Cipher/scheme | Results | Limitations |
|-----------------------|--|---------------|---|---|
| Yang et al. [237] | Combined the attributes of DFTs-OFDM into the Quantum Noise Stream Cipher to achieve faster transmission | QNSC | Results demonstrate transmission of PSK/QNSC and QAM/QNSC signals based on DFTs-OFDM at a rate of 10-Gbit/s over a 200-km fiber link span | The cipher has not been put under other potential sources of noise that could affect the system's performance |
| Pandey et al. [211] | An architecture for PRESENT cipher based on 8-bit datapath to process key of 128-bits and plaintext of 64-bits that included 48 clock cycles | PRESENT | The fluctuating usage of power is 36.57 mW, the amount of energy usage is 57.95 nJ, and the energy/bit is 0.91 nJ/bit | Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA and SCL 180 nm technology is outdated in today's date, therefore, optimization is not as sufficient for all technologies |
| Manoj et al. [215] | An architecture on S box circuit for SMS4 cipher to optimally utilize Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) | SMS4 | N/A | N/A |
| Tanizawa et al. [232] | Variant for the Y-00 quantum stream cipher that implements a coarse-to-fine modulations | Y-00 QNSC | 2^{17} phase levels are enabled with the help of coarse-to-fine modulations | N/A |
| Cnudde et al. [207] | New implementation of the block cipher, PRESENT, that provides security against not only fault attacks | PRESENT | N/A | A magnitude of 8.75 rise in area is needed when transitioning from a first-order SCA resistant TI to a first-order SCA resistant PC-II implementation |
| Wang et al. [209] | Used existing Benes network to resist fault attacks in crypto-processors | N/A | Enhances fault resistance by more than four orders of magnitude above the exposed instance | The network module is ineffective in the FPGA case compared to direct cross wires case since only one algorithm is employed |
| Nakazawa et al. [236] | Combined the technology with quantum key distribution (QKD) and the technology with QNSC or QAM | QKD and QNSC | An elevated spectral efficiency of 10.3 bits/s/Hz was achieved by executing a single-channel transmission of 70-Gbit/s, utilizing 128 QAM over a distance of 100 km | N/A |
| Dofe et al. [203] | Integrated different masking methods and operand permutation techniques in a new microarchitecture to prevent fault attacks in SIMON cipher | SIMON | Outperforms the existing fault-detection methods in multiple fault attack conditions | Requires 5% more overhead than most hardware-efficient fault detection methods |
| Gupta et al. [212] | An architecture for RC4 Stream cipher that combined loop unrolling and hardware pipeline | RC4 | The rate of data transfer is 10, 21.92, and 30.72 Gbps | Performance cannot be improved further due to heavy increase in area |

for the execution of encryption and decryption operations in the resource constrained IoT devices.

7.4 Improvement in LWSC

Improvements in stream ciphers can be observed by reducing key length, reducing chip area, offering minimal internal state, and reducing the setup cycles of the key. A smaller key length can conserve computational and memory resources; however, reduction should be only to an extent to make sure the stream cipher provides acceptable level of security. On the other hand, a smaller chip area offers better utilization of hardware resources, which is effective for resource-constrained IoT devices. Minimal internal state and fewer number of setup cycles will minimize computational overhead, and optimize performance.

7.5 Improvement in hash functions

Various hash functions can be improved if developers reduce the message size, and/or reduce the message digest/output size. Those are primarily the two parameters that determine the security and overall efficiency of hash functions. A smaller message size will reduce the network overhead, enhance the efficiency of computations, and optimize the memory usage. Whereas due to the smaller hash digest, a smaller output size will offer faster computations, however the extent to reduction should be kept in mind since smaller message digest has higher chances of collision that can lead to compromise of integrity.

7.6 Improvement in ECC

Improvement in the execution speed of ECC operations, and reduction in energy consumption and memory requirement can offer improvements in the various implementations of ECC. More specifically, improvement in the execution speed facilitates quicker cryptographic computations resulting in real-time communications and efficiently processing of data. By reducing both the energy consumption and the memory requirements, it becomes more feasible to implement ECC in resource constrained IoT devices and help improve the battery life of IoT devices.

8 Conclusion

IoT has become a critical component in today's interconnected world, enhancing the quality of life for individuals. However, despite undergoing significant evolution, a persistent issue remains in the form of a dearth of security mechanisms that effectively leverage limited resources while providing sufficiently robust protection to IoT systems. Security,

confidentiality, and privacy are vital concerns within IoT systems due to the sensitivity of the data involved. Traditional cryptographic approaches are helpful in addressing these concerns, ensuring the protection and integrity of IoT systems. However, the resource limitations of most IoT devices, including computational power, battery life, size, and memory, pose challenges to the traditional approaches. To resolve these challenges, lightweight cryptography offers methods designed to accommodate these constraints, providing effective security solutions for resource-constrained IoT devices. This work presents lightweight block ciphers, lightweight stream ciphers, hash functions, and ECC as cryptographic methods suitable for securing IoT systems. The study has also examined various attacks that pose threats to IoT security and explored different ciphers or implementations for each method. Furthermore, the role of LWC in different sectors of IoT has been explored, as well as highlighting recent advancements in different areas. Future research directions are focused primarily on the improvements in each method of LWC along with the implementation and integration of the methods. This preliminary study aims to lay the groundwork for future research endeavors in the field of lightweight cryptography methods specifically tailored for IoT systems.

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