

Hardware CWE™ Special Interest Group (SIG)

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Agenda

REMINDER: This meeting is being recorded.

- Housekeeping and Announcements
- Working Items for this meeting:

1	CWE Nit Bits	Bob H	5 min
2	Call For Help: <i>HW CWE's Missing DEMOXs, OBEXs and Mitigations</i>	Bob H	5 min
3	Resonant and Harmonic Based Weaknesses	Gage H	20 min
4	Weaknesses dealing with HW initialization <i>(Nordic APPROTECT)</i>	Bob H	20 min



Housekeeping

- **Schedule:**

- **Next Meeting:**

- **October 13th**

- **12:30 – 1:30 PM EST (16:30 – 17:30 UTC)**

- **Microsoft Teams**

- **Contact: cwe@mitre.org**

- **Mailing List: hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org**

- **Minutes from previous meetings available on our GitHub site:**

- <https://github.com/CWE-CAPEC/hw-cwe-sig>



Announcements

- **Tentative: CISA strategy around Secure By Design/Secure By Default for October SIG**
- **HW CWE Spotlight: SIG Member to present internal tool developed that utilizes HW CWE.**



CWE Nit Bits

*Bite-sized knowledge
that will enhance your CWE proficiency!*



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Custom Filtering

- **4.11 added a new “Custom” filter**
- **Allows users to choose any subset of fields for an entry**
- **Show weakness details that are most relevant to you**
- **Filters persist as you navigate through CWE content**
- **Works with all CWE weakness entries**



Filter Demo

Edit Custom Filter

Conceptual

Operational

Mapping Friendly

Select All

- ☒ Related Weaknesses
- ☒ Weakness Ordinalities
- ☒ Applicable Platforms
- ☒ Background Details
- ☒ Alternate Terms
- ☒ Relationships
- ☒ Modes Of Introduction
- ☒ Exploitation Factors
- ☒ Likelihood Of Exploit
- ☒ Common Consequences
- ☒ Detection Methods

- ☒ Potential Mitigations
- ☒ Demonstrative Examples
- ☒ Observed Examples
- ☒ Functional Areas
- ☒ Affected Resources
- ☒ Memberships
- ☒ Taxonomy Mappings
- ☒ Related Attack Patterns
- ☒ References
- ☒ Notes
- ☒ Content History

Reset

Clear

Submit

Cancel



Call for Help

HW CWE's Missing DEMOXs, OBEXs and Mitigations



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HW CWE's With Missing: DEMOX's, OBEX's and Mitigations

- **96% of HW CWE entries have mitigations**
 - 4 CWEs are missing mitigations
- **84% of HW CWE entries have demonstrative examples**
 - 17 CWEs do not have any demonstrative examples
 - Intel and Technische Universität Darmstadt are working this. Will be providing 10 this for this upcoming release.
- **36% of HW CWE entries have observed examples**
 - 67 CWEs do not have any observed examples
- **We will be posting the CWE's with missing elements on the public GitHub. If you have suggestions to fill out these missing elements, we welcome your contributions.**



CWE Labs

Resonant and Harmonic Based Weaknesses



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Discussion Item

- **Use cases and studies around resonant frequencies and their effects on analog components**
- **Questions and opinions regarding resonant frequencies in CWE:**
 - Are resonant frequencies a topic that should be covered by CWE?
 - What would we consider the weakness to be?
 - Is this research pointing to security, safety, or resiliency concerns?
 - Is there a particular parent CWE that fits?
 - CWE-1384: Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions?



Resonant Frequency Research Item

- It was discovered that playing Janet Jackson's *Rhythm Nation* music video on certain laptop model speakers could cause them to crash or cause laptops in the vicinity to crash ^{[1][2]} - CVE-2022-38392
- *Rhythm Nation* contained a resonant frequency for a 5400 rpm model laptop that was disrupting the laptop's HDD functionality long enough to cause the OS to crash ^{[1][2]}
- A resonant frequency is defined as "the natural frequency of an object where it tends to vibrate at a higher amplitude" ^[3]
- A 2014 study found that resonant frequencies could cause the HDD platter to vibrate significantly ^[4] and a 2018 study noted increase in seek errors due to platter dislocation after applying resonant frequencies ^[5]

1. <https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20220816-00/?p=106994>

2. <https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20220920-00/?p=107201>

3. <https://resources.pcb.cadence.com/blog/2021-what-is-resonant-frequency>

4. <https://docslib.org/doc/9967064/vibration-of-main-components-of-hard-disk-drive-and-the-vibrational-energy-transmission-in-hard-disk-drive>

5. <https://www.princeton.edu/~pmittal/publications/acoustic-ashes18.pdf>



Resonant Frequency Research

- In 2022, a study showed how data could be transmitted to an infected smartphone from an air-gapped computer by using sound waves in the resonant frequencies of the smartphone's MEMS gyroscope [1]
- In 2009, a study was able to disrupt and lock the ring oscillator used for entropy in a TRNG by injecting resonant frequencies [2]
- In 2017, a study showed how playing resonant frequencies near a MEMS accelerometer could disrupt valid results or fabricate false results [3]

1. <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2208.09764.pdf>
2. <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~atm26/papers/markettos-ches2009-inject-trng.pdf>
3. <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7961948>



Discussion

- Are resonant frequencies a topic that should be covered by CWE?
- What would we consider the weakness to be?
- Is this research pointing to security, safety, or resiliency concerns?
- Is there a particular parent CWE that fits?
 - CWE-1384: Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions?
- **NOTE:** A ***Weakness*** is a condition in a software, firmware, hardware, or service component that, under certain circumstances, could contribute to the introduction of vulnerabilities.



Weaknesses dealing with HW initialization (Nordic APPROTECT)



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Nordic RF Debug and Incorrect Initializations

- **Would like to discuss if we have adequate coverage for incorrect initializations in the HW View.**
- **A motivating example is taken from CVE-2020-27211**
 - “Nordic Semiconductor nRF52840 devices through 2020-10-19 have improper protection against physical side channels. The flash read-out protection (APPROTECT) can be bypassed by injecting a fault during the boot phase.”
- **This refers to physical side channels and is mapped to CWE-203, but that isn't the best mapping.**



Nordic RF Debug Disable Details

- **Security feature is called Access Port Protection (APPROTECT).**
- **When APPROTECT is enabled, the debugger is blocked from read and write access to all CPU registers and memory mapped addresses.**
 - SWD is disabled.
- **APPROTECT is enabled by setting some fields in a Non-volatile memory location.**
- **Once set, only a full erase of RAM and flash will disable APPROTECT.**
- **In Rev F of the silicon, APPROTECT is disabled by default.**



Nordic RF Debug Disable Bypass Details

- Sometime during the boot process the non-volatile memory is read to configure APPROTECT
- There is a time window during the boot process where a power fault can be injected that will cause the APPROTECT enable setting to be ignored, thus allow SWD to continue to be enabled.
- The next revision (G) of the chip “by default the, access port protection is enabled”.

<https://limitedresults.com/2020/06/nrf52-debug-resurrection-appprotect-bypass/>



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Mapping to a CWE

- **CVE-2020-27211 maps to CWE-203 Observable Discrepancy.**
- **The CVE description uses the phrase “improper protection against physical side channels” which would lead one to map to CWE-1300: Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels.**
- **In this case the side channel of power monitoring is an attacker perquisite to perform the attack.**
- **The root of the issue here is that APPROTECT is disabled by default.**
- **After looking through many different CWEs there are a couple that seem relevant.**



Potential CWEs

- **CWE-1188: Insecure Default Initialization of Resource**
 - This is a software focused CWE.
- **CWE-1221: Incorrect Register Defaults or Module Parameters**
 - This may fit and it is in the HW View.
 - However, we do not have enough details about the design or how the mitigation was applied to know if this was a change to a register or module parameter.
- **We most likely would have to map to CWE-665: Improper Initialization, which is very abstract and discouraged for mapping.**



Discussion

This has highlighted a gap.

- **(P) CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime**
 - (C) CWE-665: Improper Initialization
 - *(C) CWE-TBD: Incorrect Initialization of Resource*
 - (B) CWE-1188: Insecure Default Initialization of Resource
 - (B) CWE-1221: Incorrect Register Defaults or Module Parameters
- **Would this be useful for you?**
- **Are there other scenarios in HW design where there are initialization mistakes that aren't registers or module parameters?**
- **Is this something we should add to the HW View?**



Next Meeting (**Oct 13th**)

CWE@MITRE.ORG

- **Mailing List:** hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org
 - **NOTE:** All mailing list items are archived publicly at:
 - <https://www.mail-archive.com/hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org/>
- **What would members of this body like to see for the next HW SIG agenda?**
- **Questions, Requests to present? Please let us know.**



Backup



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