

Hardware CWE™ Special Interest Group (SIG)

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Agenda

REMINDER: This meeting is being recorded.

- **Housekeeping and Announcements**
- **Working Items for this meeting:**

1	CWE Nit Bits	Bob H	5 min
2	Discussion: Covert Channels and CWE	Bob H	10 min
3	Discussion: Most Important Hardware Weaknesses Refresh	Bob H	10 min
4	AOB (Any Other Business)		



Housekeeping

- **Schedule:**

- **Next Meeting:**

- **September 8th**

- **12:30 – 1:30 PM EST (16:30 – 17:30 UTC)**

- **Microsoft Teams**

- **Contact: cwe@mitre.org**

- **Mailing List: hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org**

- **Minutes from previous meetings available on our GitHub site:**

- <https://github.com/CWE-CAPEC/hw-cwe-sig>



Announcements

- **Tentative: CISA strategy around Secure By Design/Secure By Default for Sep SIG**



CWE Nit Bits

*Bite-sized knowledge
that will enhance your CWE proficiency!*



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Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Provides guidance for when or whether to map an issue to a particular CWE entry or to suggest alternatives.

- **Usage:** describes whether the CWE should be used for mapping vulnerabilities to their underlying weaknesses as part of root cause analysis.
- **Reason:** uses a limited vocabulary to summarize the Usage.
 - Allowed, Allowed-with-Review, Discouraged, etc.
- **Rationale:** provides context for the Usage.
- **Comments:** provides further clarification to the reader.
- **Suggestions:** includes suggestions for additional CWEs that might be more appropriate for the mapping task.



Examples

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

▼ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: Discouraged *(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)*

Reason: Frequent Misuse

Rationale:

[CWE-20](#) is commonly misused in low-information vulnerability reports when lower-level CWEs could be used instead about the vulnerability are available [[REF-1287](#)]. It is not useful for trend analysis. It is also a level-1 Class (i.e., a

CWE-514: Covert Channel

▼ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: Allowed-with-Review *(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring*

Reason: Abstraction

Rationale:

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate



Example 2

CWE-1277: Firmware Not Updateable

▼ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: Allowed *(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)*

Reason: Acceptable-Use

Rationale:

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments:

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.



Covert Channel Coverage in CWE



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COVID-Bit Research Item^{[1][2]}

- In 2022, researchers at Ben Gurion University in Israel developed a new data exfiltration method for air-gapped systems called COVID-bit.
- Malware generates electromagnetic radiation in the 0-60 kHz frequency band (assumes Malware got there somehow).
- EM emissions are generated by manipulating the workload of the CPU. Claims of indirect control SMPS.
- The electromagnetic radiation generated by this intentional process can be received from a distance using appropriate antennas.

1. <https://thehackernews.com/2022/12/covid-bit-new-covert-channel-to.html?m=1>
2. <https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.03520>



Covert Channels and Side Channels

- Initial thought was that COVID-Bit could be a DEMOX for CWE-1300: Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels
- As HW SIG Members had correctly pointed out, COVID-Bit is about Covert Channels and NOT Side Channels
- Covert Channel (CC) / Side Channel (SC)
 - Intentional transmission (CC). Accidental transmission (SC) – *Ross Anderson* ^[1]
 - Adversary controls input and output (CC). Adversary can only read output (SC) – *Intel* ^[2]
 - Not an intended resource but exists due the application's behaviors. – *CWE-514 Notes* ^[3]
- If not CWE-1300 (SC), where would something like this map to in HW view?
- Closest we have is CWE-514: Covert Channels

1. <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SEv3-ch19-7sep.pdf>

2. <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/best-practices/refined-speculative-execution-terminology.html>

3. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/514.html>



CWE-514: Covert Channel

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/514.html>

Abstraction: Class

Description: A covert channel is a path that can be used to transfer information in a way not intended by the system's designers.

Extended Description: Typically the system has not given authorization for the transmission and has no knowledge of its occurrence.

Relationships:

ChildOf CWE-1229:Creation of Emergent Resource

ParentOf CWE-385:Covert Timing Channel

ParentOf CWE-515: Covert Storage Channel

CanFollow CWE-205: Observable Behavioral Discrepancy

Vulnerability Mapping Notes:

Usage: Allowed-with-Review; **Reason:** Abstraction

Rationale: This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate; **Comments:** Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit.

NOTE: Nothing about EM based Covert Channels, nor HW cause, e.g., SMPS



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Discussion

Questions:

- Should we place CWE-514 in the HW View?
- Do we need to modify CWE-514 to be less software centric?
- Or create a base of CWE-514 and put that into the HW view?

Previous HW SIG Member Comments:

- Covert Channels should have coverage in the hardware view –*Jason Oberg*
- Covert Channels should be in the HW categories Security Flow Issues, General Circuit and Logic Design Concerns, or Debug and Test Problems. –*Paul Wortman*



Most Important Hardware Weaknesses Refresh

Bob H



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Most Important Hardware Weaknesses (MIHW)

- **Is this something worth revisiting?**
- **Part of CWE 4.6 Release, October 28, 2021**
- **Have there been substantial developments since the last release of MIHW?**
- **Would those affect the rankings and inclusions of the list in any meaningful way?**



Current MIHW

CWE-1189	Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)
CWE-1191	On-Chip Debug and Test Interface With Improper Access Control
CWE-1231	Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification
CWE-1233	Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection
CWE-1240	Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation
CWE-1244	Internal Asset Exposed to Unsafe Debug Access Level or State
CWE-1256	Improper Restriction of Software Interfaces to Hardware Features
CWE-1260	Improper Handling of Overlap Between Protected Memory Ranges
CWE-1272	Sensitive Information Uncleared Before Debug/Power State Transition
CWE-1274	Improper Access Control for Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code
CWE-1277	Firmware Not Updateable
CWE-1300	Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels



New HW CWEs Since MIHW

- **CWE-1342: Information Exposure through Microarchitectural State after Transient Execution**
- **CWE-1357: Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component**
- **CWE-1384: Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions**
- **CWE-1388: Physical Access Issues and Concerns**



Discussion

- **Have there been substantial developments since the last release of MIHW?**
- **Would those affect the rankings and inclusions of the list in any meaningful way?**
- **Are there observational trends that would change the current list in any significant and meaningful way?**



Next Meeting (**Sep 8th**)

CWE@MITRE.ORG

- **Mailing List:** hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org
 - **NOTE:** All mailing list items are archived publicly at:
 - <https://www.mail-archive.com/hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org/>
- **What would members of this body like to see for the next HW SIG agenda?**
- **Questions, Requests to present? Please let us know.**



Backup



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