

# Hardware CWE™ Special Interest Group (SIG)

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**Chair:** Bob Heinemann (MITRE)

**Co-Chair:** “Manna” Parbati Kumar Manna (Intel)

**MITRE Team:** Steve Christey Coley, Alec Summers

**MITRE**

**November 8, 2024**



# Agenda

REMINDER: This meeting is being recorded.

|   |   |                   |        |
|---|---|-------------------|--------|
| 1 | Security Issues Arising from Hardware Design<br><i>Continuation from October Meeting</i>          | Joerg Bormann     | 40 min |
| 2 | CWE Entry in Development:<br>Lack of Feedback for Unexecuted Operations Across System Interfaces. | Amisha Srivastava | 15 min |



# Housekeeping

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- **Schedule:**
  - **Next Meeting: Dec 13**
    - 12:30 – 1:30 PM EST (16:30 – 17:30 UTC)
    - Microsoft Teams
- **Contact: [cwe@mitre.org](mailto:cwe@mitre.org)**
- **Mailing List: [hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org](mailto:hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org)**
- **Minutes from previous meetings available on our GitHub site:**
  - <https://github.com/CWE-CAPEC/hw-cwe-sig>



# Announcements

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- **CWE Content Development Repository (CDR) pilot now on GitHub! Open to anyone by request. Public access in the next few months.**
- **CWE 4.16 release is planned for November.**
- **CWE 5.0 is planned for early 2025.**



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# Call for Topics

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# What topics should we cover next time?

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- Anything to share today or topics for consideration for next meeting?



# Security Issues Arising from Hardware Design

Joerg Bormann



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# CWE Entry in Development: Lack of Feedback for Unexecuted Operations Across System Interfaces.

Amisha Srivastava





# **CWE Entry:** **Lack of Feedback for Unexecuted Operations Across System Interfaces.**

**Presented by:**

**Amisha Srivastava**  
PhD Candidate

**The University of Texas at Dallas**



# Weakness Description

- **Brief Description**

- Systems fail to notify or log the non-execution or disregard of operations due to various reasons including system constraints, design decisions, or errors.

- **Intended Behavior**

- Systems should be designed to securely manage unauthorized attempts and provide comprehensive feedback about each action.

- **Scope:** Occurs across various hardware interfaces, applicable to both software and hardware systems.

- **Example Systems:**

- SoCs like OpenTitan.
- Microcontroller interrupt systems: Silent handling of interrupt conflicts.
- Network interface controllers: Dropped packets due to buffer overflow without notification.

# Modes of Introduction & Applicable Platforms

- **Phases:**
  - Architecture & Design: Weakness introduced by inadequate error-reporting mechanisms.
  - Implementation: Lack of logging for critical operations by developers leading to silent failures.
- **Languages:** Common in C, C++, Verilog.
- **Operating Systems:**
  - Especially prevalent in embedded and general OS-agnostic environments.
- **Hardware:**
  - Frequently affects embedded systems, SoCs, and microcontrollers.

# Consequences

- **Confidentiality:**
  - Possible exposure of data when operations silently fail.
  - Allowing attackers to exploit the lack of feedback.
- **Integrity:**
  - Data corruption due to unacknowledged operational failures.
  - Operations may proceed based on incorrect assumptions.
- **Availability:**
  - Resource exhaustion can cause system crashes or denial of service.
  - Unhandled discarded operations can lead to resource exhaustion.



# Demonstrative Example

- This example demonstrates how network packets can be lost without notification when a buffer overflows.
- Bad Code: Packets are discarded when the buffer is full without any indication.
- Good Code: Structured logging provides visibility, helping in troubleshooting.

```
#define BUFFER_SIZE 1024
int buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
int buffer_index = 0;

void receive_packet(int packet) {
    if (buffer_index >= BUFFER_SIZE) {
        return; // Packet silently discarded
    }
    buffer[buffer_index++] = packet;
}
```

Bad Code

```
#define BUFFER_SIZE 1024
int buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
int buffer_index = 0;

// Logs error and returns false if the packet is dropped
bool receive_packet(int packet) {
    if (buffer_index >= BUFFER_SIZE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Error: Packet %d dropped (Buffer Full)\n", packet);
        return false; // Indicate that the packet was not received
    }
    buffer[buffer_index++] = packet;
    return true; // Indicate successful packet reception
}
```


Good Code

# Example: OpenTitan SoC

- The weakness was found in the handling of write requests to reserved addresses in the mailbox implementation in the OpenTitan SoC.
- When a write request is made to a reserved address, the system correctly identifies this as an error and discards the write operation.
- However, the system fails to provide feedback when a write operation to a reserved address is discarded.
- This lack of feedback could potentially be exploited by an attacker to induce unpredictable behavior by inserting malicious writes into the code.


# Potential Mitigations

- Architecture & Design:
  - Incorporate logging/feedback mechanisms to handle discarded operations.
  - Effectiveness: High
- Implementation:
  - Ensure logging and error reporting for critical functions.
  - Effectiveness: Moderate
- Implementation-level checks complement design-phase measures.



# Detection Methods

- Automated Static Analysis:
  - Scans code for missing error handling or feedback mechanisms.
  - High effectiveness for identifying missing feedback mechanisms.
- Manual Code Review:
  - Experts manually inspect the code for unhandled operations.
  - Moderate effectiveness, identifies design-level issues.







**THANK YOU**

## Next Meeting (Dec 13)

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**CWE@MITRE.ORG**

- **Mailing List:** [hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org](mailto:hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org)
  - **NOTE: All mailing list items are archived publicly at:**
    - <https://www.mail-archive.com/hw-cwe-special-interest-group-sig-list@mitre.org/>
- **What would members of this body like to see for the next HW SIG agenda?**
- **Questions, Requests to present? Please let us know.**



# Backup Slides



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# Most Important Hardware Weaknesses Refresh

**Bob H**

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## Current MIHW

|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| <a href="#">CWE-1189</a> | Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-a-Chip (SoC)      |
| <a href="#">CWE-1191</a> | On-Chip Debug and Test Interface With Improper Access Control         |
| <a href="#">CWE-1231</a> | Improper Prevention of Lock Bit Modification                          |
| <a href="#">CWE-1233</a> | Security-Sensitive Hardware Controls with Missing Lock Bit Protection |
| <a href="#">CWE-1240</a> | Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation          |
| <a href="#">CWE-1244</a> | Internal Asset Exposed to Unsafe Debug Access Level or State          |
| <a href="#">CWE-1256</a> | Improper Restriction of Software Interfaces to Hardware Features      |
| <a href="#">CWE-1260</a> | Improper Handling of Overlap Between Protected Memory Ranges          |
| <a href="#">CWE-1272</a> | Sensitive Information Uncleared Before Debug/Power State Transition   |
| <a href="#">CWE-1274</a> | Improper Access Control for Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code      |
| <a href="#">CWE-1277</a> | Firmware Not Updateable   |
| <a href="#">CWE-1300</a> | Improper Protection of Physical Side Channels                         |



## New HW CWEs Since MIHW

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- **CWE-1342: Information Exposure through Microarchitectural State after Transient Execution**
- **CWE-1357: Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component**
- **CWE-1384: Improper Handling of Physical or Environmental Conditions**
- **CWE-1388: Physical Access Issues and Concerns**



# Most Important Hardware Weaknesses (MIHW)

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- Is this something worth revisiting?
- Part of CWE 4.6 Release, October 28, 2021
- Have there been substantial developments since the last release of MIHW?
- Would those affect the rankings and inclusions of the list in any meaningful way?
- Is there any data available that we could utilize to generate the list? Or should we use the delphi method again?
- Are there observational trends that would change the current list in any significant and meaningful way?



## Formation of Ad-Hoc Committee

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- **Will be putting a call out of the mailing list for members to join an ad-hoc committee to study.**
- **We will be looking for committee members to study the feasibility of a new list and making a decision to proceed.**
- **Also, members will develop an approach to develop the list with the community.**

