



# Information security manual

## Guidelines for system hardening

Last updated: September 2025

### Operating system hardening

#### Operating system selection

When selecting operating systems, it is important that an organisation preferences vendors that have demonstrated a commitment to Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices, including secure programming practices and either memory-safe programming languages (such as C#, Go, Java, Ruby, Rust and Swift) or less preferably memory-safe programming practices. This will assist not only with reducing the potential number of vulnerabilities in operating systems, but also increasing the likelihood that timely patches, updates or vendor mitigations will be released to remediate any vulnerabilities that are found.

**Control: ISM-1743; Revision: 2; Updated: Mar-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Vendors that have demonstrated a commitment to Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices, including secure programming practices and either memory-safe programming languages or less preferably memory-safe programming practices, are used for operating systems.*

#### Operating system releases and versions

Newer releases of operating systems often introduce improvements in security functionality. This can make it more difficult for malicious actors to craft reliable exploits for vulnerabilities they discover. Using older releases of operating systems, especially those no longer supported by vendors, may expose an organisation to vulnerabilities or exploitation techniques that have since been mitigated. In addition, 64-bit versions of operating systems support additional security functionality that 32-bit versions do not.

**Control: ISM-1407; Revision: 5; Updated: Dec-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

*The latest release, or the previous release, of operating systems are used.*

**Control: ISM-1408; Revision: 5; Updated: Dec-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Where supported, 64-bit versions of operating systems are used.*

#### Standard Operating Environments

Allowing users to setup, configure and maintain their own workstations and servers can result in an inconsistent operating environment. Such operating environments may assist malicious actors in gaining an initial foothold on networks due to the higher likelihood of poorly configured or maintained workstations

and servers. Conversely, a Standard Operating Environment (SOE), provided via an automated build process or a golden image, is designed to facilitate a standardised and consistent operating environment within an organisation.

When SOEs are obtained from third parties, such as service providers, there are additional cyber supply chain risks that should be considered, such as the accidental or deliberate inclusion of malicious code or configurations. To reduce the likelihood of such occurrences, an organisation should endeavour to obtain their SOEs from trustworthy third parties while also scanning them for malicious code and configurations.

As operating environments naturally change over time, such as patches or updates are applied, configurations are changed, and applications are added or removed, it is essential that SOEs are reviewed and updated at least annually to ensure that an up-to-date baseline is maintained.

**Control: ISM-1406; Revision: 2; Updated: Aug-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*SOEs are used for workstations and servers.*

**Control: ISM-1608; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*SOEs provided by third parties are scanned for malicious code and configurations.*

**Control: ISM-1588; Revision: 0; Updated: Aug-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*SOEs are reviewed and updated at least annually.*

## Hardening operating system configurations

When operating systems are deployed in their default state, or with an unapproved configuration, it can lead to an insecure operating environment that may allow malicious actors to gain an initial foothold on networks. Many settings exist within operating systems to allow them to be configured in an approved secure state in order to minimise this security risk. As such, the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and vendors often produce hardening guidance to assist in hardening the configuration of operating systems. Note, however, in situations where ASD and vendor hardening guidance conflicts, precedence should be given to implementing the most restrictive guidance.

**Control: ISM-1914; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Approved configurations for operating systems are developed, implemented and maintained.*

**Control: ISM-1409; Revision: 4; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Operating systems are hardened using ASD and vendor hardening guidance, with the most restrictive guidance taking precedence when conflicts occur.*

**Control: ISM-0383; Revision: 11; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Default user accounts or credentials for operating systems, including for any pre-configured user accounts, are changed, disabled or removed during initial setup.*

**Control: ISM-0380; Revision: 10; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Unneeded user accounts, components, services and functionality of operating systems are disabled or removed.*

**Control: ISM-0341; Revision: 4; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Automatic execution features for removable media are disabled.*

**Control: ISM-1654; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Internet Explorer 11 is disabled or removed.*

**Control: ISM-1655; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**  
.NET Framework 3.5 (includes .NET 2.0 and 3.0) is disabled or removed.

**Control: ISM-1492; Revision: 2; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Operating system exploit protection functionality is enabled.

**Control: ISM-1745; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Early Launch Antimalware, Secure Boot, Trusted Boot and Measured Boot functionality is enabled.

**Control: ISM-1584; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Unprivileged users are prevented from bypassing, disabling or modifying security functionality of operating systems.

**Control: ISM-1491; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Unprivileged users are prevented from running script execution engines, including:

- Windows Script Host (cscript.exe and wscript.exe)
- PowerShell (powershell.exe, powershell\_ise.exe and pwsh.exe)
- Command Prompt (cmd.exe)
- Windows Management Instrumentation (wmic.exe)
- Microsoft Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) Application Host (mshta.exe).

## Application management

Unprivileged users' ability to install any application can be exploited by malicious actors using social engineering in order to convince them to install malicious applications. One way to mitigate this security risk, while also removing burden from system administrators, is to allow unprivileged users the ability to install approved applications from organisation-managed application repositories or from trustworthy application marketplaces. Furthermore, to prevent unprivileged users from removing security functionality, or breaking system functionality, unprivileged users should not have the ability to uninstall or disable approved applications.

**Control: ISM-1592; Revision: 2; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Unprivileged users do not have the ability to install unapproved applications.

**Control: ISM-0382; Revision: 8; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Unprivileged users do not have the ability to uninstall or disable approved applications.

## Application control

Application control can be an effective way to not only prevent malicious code from executing on workstations and servers, but also to ensure only approved applications can execute. When developing application control rulesets, determining approved executables (e.g. .exe and .com files), libraries (e.g. .dll and .ocx files), scripts (e.g. .ps1, .bat, .cmd, .vbs and .js files), installers (e.g. .msi, .msp and .mst files), compiled HTML (e.g. .chm files), HTML applications (e.g. .hta files), control panel applets (e.g. .cpl files) and drivers based on business requirements is a more secure method than simply approving those already residing on a workstation or server. Furthermore, it is preferable that an organisation defines their own application control rulesets, rather than relying on those from application control vendors, and validate them on an annual or more frequent basis.

In implementing application control, an organisation should use a reliable method, or combination of methods, such as cryptographic hash rules, publisher certificate rules or path rules. Depending on the method chosen, further hardening may be required to ensure that application control mechanisms and application control rulesets cannot be bypassed by malicious actors.

Finally, centrally logging and analysing application control events can assist in monitoring the security posture of systems, detecting malicious behaviour and contributing to investigations following cybersecurity incidents.

**Control: ISM-0843; Revision: 9; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Application control is implemented on workstations.*

**Control: ISM-1490; Revision: 3; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**  
*Application control is implemented on internet-facing servers.*

**Control: ISM-1656; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**  
*Application control is implemented on non-internet-facing servers.*

**Control: ISM-1870; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Application control is applied to user profiles and temporary folders used by operating systems, web browsers and email clients.*

**Control: ISM-1871; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**  
*Application control is applied to all locations other than user profiles and temporary folders used by operating systems, web browsers and email clients.*

**Control: ISM-1657; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Application control restricts the execution of executables, libraries, scripts, installers, compiled HTML, HTML applications and control panel applets to an organisation-approved set.*

**Control: ISM-1658; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**  
*Application control restricts the execution of drivers to an organisation-approved set.*

**Control: ISM-0955; Revision: 6; Updated: Apr-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Application control is implemented using cryptographic hash rules, publisher certificate rules or path rules.*

**Control: ISM-1471; Revision: 3; Updated: Jun-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*When implementing application control using publisher certificate rules, publisher names and product names are used.*

**Control: ISM-1392; Revision: 4; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*When implementing application control using path rules, only approved users can modify approved files and write to approved folders.*

**Control: ISM-1746; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*When implementing application control using path rules, only approved users can change file system permissions for approved files and folders.*

**Control: ISM-1544; Revision: 3; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**  
*Microsoft's recommended application blacklist is implemented.*

**Control: ISM-1659; Revision: 1; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**  
*Microsoft's vulnerable driver blacklist is implemented.*

**Control: ISM-1582; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Application control rulesets are validated on an annual or more frequent basis.*

**Control: ISM-0846; Revision: 8; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*All users (with the exception of local administrator accounts and break glass accounts) cannot disable, bypass or be exempted from application control.*

**Control: ISM-1660; Revision: 2; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Allowed and blocked application control events are centrally logged.*

## Command Shell

The Command shell was the first shell developed by Microsoft to assist with the automation of routine system administration tasks, such as running Windows Commands via batch scripts. However, the Command shell can also be used by malicious actors to run Windows Commands on compromised systems. As such, centrally logging and analysing command line process creation events can assist in monitoring the security posture of systems, detecting malicious behaviour and contributing to investigations following cybersecurity incidents.

**Control: ISM-1889; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Command line process creation events are centrally logged.*

## PowerShell

PowerShell is a powerful scripting language developed by Microsoft and, due to its ubiquity and ease with which it can be used to fully control operating systems, is an important part of system administrator toolkits. However, PowerShell can also be a dangerous exploitation tool in the hands of malicious actors.

In order to prevent attacks leveraging vulnerabilities in earlier PowerShell versions, Windows PowerShell 2.0 should be disabled or removed from operating systems. Additionally, PowerShell's language mode should be set to Constrained Language Mode to achieve a balance between security and functionality.

Finally, centrally logging and analysing PowerShell events can assist in monitoring the security posture of systems, detecting malicious behaviour and contributing to investigations following cybersecurity incidents.

**Control: ISM-1621; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

*Windows PowerShell 2.0 is disabled or removed.*

**Control: ISM-1622; Revision: 0; Updated: Oct-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

*PowerShell is configured to use Constrained Language Mode.*

**Control: ISM-1623; Revision: 1; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*PowerShell module logging, script block logging and transcription events are centrally logged.*

**Control: ISM-1624; Revision: 0; Updated: Oct-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*PowerShell script block logs are protected by Protected Event Logging functionality.*

## Host-based intrusion detection and response solution

Many security products rely on signatures to detect malicious code. This approach is only effective when malicious code has already been profiled and signatures are available from security vendors. Unfortunately, malicious actors can easily create variants of known malicious code in order to bypass traditional signature-based detection. A Host-based Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) or Endpoint Detection and Response

(EDR) solution can use behaviour-based detection to assist in identifying and blocking anomalous behaviour as well as detecting malicious code that has yet to be identified by security vendors. As such, it is important that either a HIPS or EDR solution is implemented on workstations, critical servers and high-value servers.

**Control: ISM-1341; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*A HIPS or EDR solution is implemented on workstations.*

**Control: ISM-1034; Revision: 8; Updated: Mar-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*A HIPS or EDR solution is implemented on critical servers and high-value servers.*

## Software firewall

Traditional network firewalls often fail to prevent the propagation of malicious code on networks, or malicious actors from exfiltrating data from networks, as they only control which ports or protocols can be used between different network segments. Many forms of malicious code are designed specifically to take advantage of this by using common protocols, such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol, Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol or Domain Name System. Software firewalls are more effective than traditional network firewalls as they can control which applications and services can communicate to and from workstations and servers. As such, a software firewall should be implemented on workstations and servers to restrict inbound and outbound network connections to an organisation-approved set of applications and services.

**Control: ISM-1416; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*A software firewall is implemented on workstations and servers to restrict inbound and outbound network connections to an organisation-approved set of applications and services.*

## Antivirus application

When vendors develop operating systems and applications, they may make coding mistakes that lead to vulnerabilities. Malicious actors can take advantage of this by developing malicious code to exploit any vulnerabilities that have not been detected and remedied by vendors. As significant time and effort is often involved in developing functioning and reliable exploits, malicious actors will often attempt to reuse their exploits as much as possible. While exploits may have been previously identified by security vendors, they often remain viable against an organisation that does not have an antivirus application in place.

**Control: ISM-1417; Revision: 5; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*An antivirus application is implemented on workstations and servers with:*

- *signature-based detection functionality enabled and set to a high level*
- *heuristic-based detection functionality enabled and set to a high level*
- *reputation rating functionality enabled*
- *ransomware protection functionality enabled*
- *detection signatures configured to update on at least a daily basis*
- *regular scanning configured for all fixed disks and removable media.*

## Device access control

A device access control application, or disabling external communication interfaces, can be used to prevent removable media and mobile devices from being connected to workstations and servers via external communication interfaces. This can assist in preventing the introduction of malicious code or the exfiltration of data by malicious actors.

In addition, malicious actors can connect to locked workstations and servers via external communication interfaces that allow Direct Memory Access (DMA). In doing so, malicious actors can gain access to encryption keys in memory or write malicious code to memory. The best defence against this security risk is to disable access to external communication interfaces that allow DMA, such as FireWire, ExpressCard and Thunderbolt.

**Control: ISM-1418; Revision: 5; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*If there is no business requirement for reading from removable media and devices, such functionality is disabled via the use of a device access control application or by disabling external communication interfaces.*

**Control: ISM-0343; Revision: 7; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*If there is no business requirement for writing to removable media and devices, such functionality is disabled via the use of a device access control application or by disabling external communication interfaces.*

**Control: ISM-0345; Revision: 6; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*External communication interfaces that allow DMA are disabled.*

## Operating system event logging

Centrally logging and analysing security-relevant events, including configuration changes, for operating systems can assist in monitoring the security posture of systems, detecting malicious behaviour and contributing to investigations following cybersecurity incidents.

Typical security-relevant events for operating systems that can be logged include:

- changes to security policies
- failed user logons and account lockouts
- failures, restarts and changes to important processes, services and scheduled tasks
- operating system and application crashes and error messages
- security product-related events
- successful process creations and terminations
- successful user logons and logoffs
- system startups and shutdowns.

**Control: ISM-1976; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Security-relevant events for Apple macOS operating systems are centrally logged.*

**Control: ISM-1977; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Security-relevant events for Linux operating systems are centrally logged.*



**Control: ISM-0582; Revision: 10; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Security-relevant events for Microsoft Windows operating systems are centrally logged.*

## Further information

Further information on cyber supply chain risk management can be found in the cyber supply chain risk management section of the [Guidelines for procurement and outsourcing](#).

Further information on vendors that have made a pledge to implement Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices can be found on the United States' Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency's [Secure by Design Pledge](#) website.

Further information on patching or updating operating systems can be found in the system patching section of the [Guidelines for system management](#).

Further information on hardening Microsoft Windows operating systems can be found in ASD's [Hardening Microsoft Windows 10 workstations](#) and [Hardening Microsoft Windows 11 workstations](#) publications.

Further information on hardening Microsoft Windows operating systems can also be found in Microsoft's [Windows 11 Security Book](#) and on the [Microsoft Security Baselines Blog](#) website.

Further information on hardening Linux workstations and servers can be found in ASD's [Hardening Linux workstations and servers](#) publication.

Further information on [exploit protection functionality](#) within Microsoft Windows is available from Microsoft.

Further information on implementing application control can be found in ASD's [Implementing application control](#) publication.

Further information on Microsoft's [recommended application blocklist](#) and [vulnerable driver blocklist](#) are available from Microsoft.

Further information on [command line process logging](#) is available from Microsoft.

Further information on the use of PowerShell can be found in ASD's [Securing PowerShell in the enterprise](#) publication.

Further information on [the use of PowerShell by blue teams](#) is available from Microsoft.

Further information on obtaining [greater visibility through PowerShell logging](#) is available from Google.

Further information on independent testing of security products' ability to [detect or prevent various stages of network intrusions](#) is available from MITRE.

Further information on independent testing of antivirus applications is available from [AV-Comparatives](#) and [AV-TEST](#).

Further information on the use of removable media can be found in the media usage section of the [Guidelines for media](#).

Further information on event logging can be found in the event logging and monitoring section of the [Guidelines for system monitoring](#).

Further information on security-relevant events to monitor for Apple macOS, Linux and Microsoft Windows operating systems can be found in the following ASD publications:



- [Hardening Microsoft Windows 10 workstations](#)
- [Hardening Microsoft Windows 11 workstations](#)
- [Priority logs for SIEM ingestion: Practitioner guidance](#)
- [Windows event logging and forwarding.](#)

## User application hardening

### User applications

This section is applicable to user applications typically installed on user workstations, such as office productivity suites, web browsers and their extensions, email clients, Portable Document Format (PDF) applications, and security products (e.g. antivirus applications, device access control applications, HIPS and software firewalls). Information on server applications can be found in the server application hardening section of these guidelines.

### User application selection

When selecting user applications, it is important that an organisation preferences vendors that have demonstrated a commitment to Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices, including secure programming practices and either memory-safe programming languages (such as C#, Go, Java, Ruby, Rust and Swift) or less preferably memory-safe programming practices. This will assist not only with reducing the potential number of vulnerabilities in user applications, but also increasing the likelihood that timely patches, updates or vendor mitigations will be released to remediate any vulnerabilities that are found.

**Control: ISM-0938; Revision: 7; Updated: Mar-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Vendors that have demonstrated a commitment to Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices, including secure programming practices and either memory-safe programming languages or less preferably memory-safe programming practices, are used for user applications.*

### User application releases

Newer releases of user applications often introduce improvements in security functionality. This can make it more difficult for malicious actors to craft reliable exploits for vulnerabilities they discover. Using older releases of user applications, especially those no longer supported by vendors, may expose an organisation to vulnerabilities or exploitation techniques that have since been mitigated. This is particularly important for office productivity suites, web browsers and their extensions, email clients, PDF applications, and security products.

**Control: ISM-1467; Revision: 4; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*The latest release of office productivity suites, web browsers and their extensions, email clients, PDF applications, and security products are used.*

### Hardening user application configurations

When user applications are deployed in their default state, or with an unapproved configuration, it can lead to an insecure operating environment that may allow malicious actors to gain an initial foothold on

networks. This can be especially risky for office productivity suites, web browsers and their extensions, email clients, PDF applications, and security products as such applications are routinely targeted for exploitation. Many settings exist within such applications to allow them to be configured in an approved secure state in order to minimise this security risk. As such, ASD and vendors often produce hardening guidance to assist in hardening the configuration of these applications. Note, however, in situations where ASD and vendor hardening guidance conflicts, precedence should be given to implementing the most restrictive guidance.

**Control: ISM-1915; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Approved configurations for user applications are developed, implemented and maintained.*

**Control: ISM-1806; Revision: 4; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Default user accounts or credentials for user applications, including for any pre-configured user accounts, are changed, disabled or removed during initial setup.*

**Control: ISM-1470; Revision: 6; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Unneeded components, services and functionality of office productivity suites, web browsers, email clients, PDF applications and security products are disabled or removed.*

**Control: ISM-1235; Revision: 5; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Add-ons, extensions and plug-ins for office productivity suites, web browsers, email clients, PDF applications and security products are restricted to an organisation-approved set.*

**Control: ISM-1667; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Microsoft Office is blocked from creating child processes.*

**Control: ISM-1668; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Microsoft Office is blocked from creating executable content.*

**Control: ISM-1669; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Microsoft Office is blocked from injecting code into other processes.*

**Control: ISM-1542; Revision: 0; Updated: Jan-19; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Microsoft Office is configured to prevent activation of Object Linking and Embedding packages.*

**Control: ISM-1859; Revision: 2; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Office productivity suites are hardened using ASD and vendor hardening guidance, with the most restrictive guidance taking precedence when conflicts occur.*

**Control: ISM-1823; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Office productivity suite security settings cannot be changed by users.*

**Control: ISM-1486; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**

*Web browsers do not process Java from the internet.*

**Control: ISM-1485; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**

*Web browsers do not process web advertisements from the internet.*

**Control: ISM-1412; Revision: 6; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Web browsers are hardened using ASD and vendor hardening guidance, with the most restrictive guidance taking precedence when conflicts occur.*

**Control: ISM-1585; Revision: 2; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**

*Web browser security settings cannot be changed by users.*

**Control: ISM-1670; Revision: 1; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*PDF applications are blocked from creating child processes.*

**Control: ISM-1860; Revision: 3; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*PDF applications are hardened using ASD and vendor hardening guidance, with the most restrictive guidance taking precedence when conflicts occur.*

**Control: ISM-1824; Revision: 1; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*PDF application security settings cannot be changed by users.*

**Control: ISM-1601; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Microsoft's attack surface reduction rules are implemented.*

**Control: ISM-1748; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Email client security settings cannot be changed by users.*

**Control: ISM-1825; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Security product security settings cannot be changed by users.*

## Microsoft Office macros

Microsoft Office files can contain embedded code, known as a macro, written in the Visual Basic for Applications programming language. A macro can contain a series of commands that can be coded or recorded and replayed at a later time to automate repetitive tasks. Macros are powerful tools that can be easily created by users to greatly improve their productivity. However, malicious actors can also create macros to perform a variety of malicious activities, such as assisting to compromise workstations in order to exfiltrate or deny access to data. To reduce this security risk, an organisation should disable Microsoft Office macros for users that do not have a demonstrated business requirement and secure their use for the remaining users that do.

**Control: ISM-1671; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**

*Microsoft Office macros are disabled for users that do not have a demonstrated business requirement.*

**Control: ISM-1488; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**

*Microsoft Office macros in files originating from the internet are blocked.*

**Control: ISM-1672; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**

*Microsoft Office macro antivirus scanning is enabled.*

**Control: ISM-1673; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Microsoft Office macros are blocked from making Win32 API calls.*

**Control: ISM-1674; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

*Only Microsoft Office macros running from within a sandboxed environment, a Trusted Location or that are digitally signed by a trusted publisher are allowed to execute.*

**Control: ISM-1890; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

*Microsoft Office macros are checked to ensure they are free of malicious code before being digitally signed or placed within Trusted Locations.*

**Control: ISM-1487; Revision: 2; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

*Only privileged users responsible for checking that Microsoft Office macros are free of malicious code can write to and modify content within Trusted Locations.*

**Control: ISM-1675; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

Microsoft Office macros digitally signed by an untrusted publisher cannot be enabled via the Message Bar or Backstage View.

**Control: ISM-1891; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

Microsoft Office macros digitally signed by signatures other than V3 signatures cannot be enabled via the Message Bar or Backstage View.

**Control: ISM-1676; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

Microsoft Office's list of trusted publishers is validated on an annual or more frequent basis.

**Control: ISM-1489; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-18; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**

Microsoft Office macro security settings cannot be changed by users.

## Further information

Further information on cyber supply chain risk management can be found in the cyber supply chain risk management section of the [Guidelines for procurement and outsourcing](#).

Further information on vendors that have made a pledge to implement Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices can be found on the United States' Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency's [Secure by Design Pledge](#) website.

Further information on patching or updating user applications can be found in the system patching section of the [Guidelines for system management](#).

Further information on the implementation and configuration of security products can be found in the operating system hardening section of these guidelines.

Further information on hardening Microsoft Office can be found in ASD's [Hardening Microsoft 365, Office 2021, Office 2019 and Office 2016](#) publication.

Further information on hardening Microsoft Office can also be found on the [Microsoft Security Baselines Blog](#) website.

Further information on hardening Microsoft Edge can be found on the [Microsoft Security Baselines Blog](#) website.

Further information on hardening Google Chrome can be found in Google's [Chrome Browser Enterprise Security Configuration Guide \(Windows\)](#).

Further information on hardening Adobe Reader and Adobe Acrobat can be found in Adobe's [Security Configuration Guide for Acrobat](#) publication.

Further information on Microsoft's attack surface reduction rules can be found on Microsoft's [attack surface reduction rules overview](#) website.

Further information on configuring Microsoft Office macro settings can be found in ASD's [Restricting Microsoft Office macros](#) publication.

## Server application hardening

### Server applications

This section is applicable to server applications associated with specific server functionality, such as Microsoft Active Directory services, database management system applications, email server applications and web hosting applications. Information on user applications can be found in the user application hardening section of these guidelines.

### Server application selection

When selecting server applications, it is important that an organisation preferences vendors that have demonstrated a commitment to Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices, including secure programming practices and either memory-safe programming languages (such as C#, Go, Java, Ruby, Rust and Swift) or less preferably memory-safe programming practices. This will assist not only with reducing the potential number of vulnerabilities in server applications, but also increasing the likelihood that timely patches, updates or vendor mitigations will be released to remediate any vulnerabilities that are found.

**Control: ISM-1826; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Vendors that have demonstrated a commitment to Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices, including secure programming practices and either memory-safe programming languages or less preferably memory-safe programming practices, are used for server applications.*

### Server application releases

Newer releases of server applications often introduce improvements in security functionality. This can make it more difficult for malicious actors to craft reliable exploits for vulnerabilities they discover. Using older releases of server applications, especially those no longer supported by vendors, may expose an organisation to vulnerabilities or exploitation techniques that have since been mitigated. This is particularly important for internet-facing server applications, such as web hosting applications.

**Control: ISM-1483; Revision: 2; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*The latest release of internet-facing server applications are used.*

### Hardening server application configurations

When server applications are deployed in their default state, or with an unapproved configuration, it can lead to an insecure operating environment that may allow malicious actors to gain an initial foothold on networks. This can be especially risky for server applications as such applications are routinely targeted for exploitation. Many settings exist within server applications to allow them to be configured in an approved secure state in order to minimise this security risk. As such, ASD and vendors often produce hardening guidance to assist in hardening the configuration of server applications. Note, however, in situations where ASD and vendor hardening guidance conflicts, precedence should be given to implementing the most restrictive guidance.

**Control: ISM-1916; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Approved configurations for server applications are developed, implemented and maintained.*

**Control: ISM-1246; Revision: 6; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Server applications are hardened using ASD and vendor hardening guidance, with the most restrictive guidance taking precedence when conflicts occur.*

**Control: ISM-1260; Revision: 7; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Default user accounts or credentials for server applications, including for any pre-configured user accounts, are changed, disabled or removed during initial setup.*

**Control: ISM-1247; Revision: 5; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Unneeded user accounts, components, services and functionality of server applications are disabled or removed.*

**Control: ISM-1245; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*All temporary installation files and logs created during server application installation processes are removed after server applications have been installed.*

## Restricting privileges for server applications

If a server application operating as a local administrator or root account is compromised by malicious actors, it can present a significant security risk to the underlying server. In addition, server applications by default are often capable of widely accessing their underlying server's file system. Therefore, restricting the ability of server applications to access their underlying server's file system can limit damage should malicious actors compromise the server application.

**Control: ISM-1249; Revision: 4; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Server applications are configured to run as a separate user account with the minimum privileges needed to perform their functions.*

**Control: ISM-1250; Revision: 3; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*The user accounts under which server applications run have limited access to their underlying server's file system.*

## Microsoft Active Directory services

Due to the critical role that Microsoft Active Directory services perform for domain services, certification services, federated services and identity services within networks, it is crucial that servers performing these services are hardened and access to them is strictly limited, including to their backups. Specifically, this includes servers for Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS), Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Microsoft Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) and Microsoft Entra Connect.

In addition, centrally logging and analysing security-relevant events, including configuration changes, for Microsoft Active Directory services can assist in monitoring the security posture of systems, detecting malicious behaviour and contributing to investigations following cybersecurity incidents.

**Control: ISM-1926; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Microsoft AD DS domain controllers, Microsoft AD CS CA servers, Microsoft AD FS servers and Microsoft Entra Connect servers are only used for their designed role and no other applications or services are installed, unless they are security related.*



**Control: ISM-1927; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

Access to Microsoft AD DS domain controllers, Microsoft AD CS CA servers, Microsoft AD FS servers and Microsoft Entra Connect servers is limited to privileged users that require access.

**Control: ISM-1928; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

Backups of Microsoft AD DS domain controllers, Microsoft AD CS CA servers, Microsoft AD FS servers and Microsoft Entra Connect servers are encrypted, stored securely and only accessible to backup administrator accounts.

**Control: ISM-1830; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

Security-relevant events for Microsoft AD DS domain controllers, Microsoft AD CS CA servers, Microsoft AD FS servers and Microsoft Entra Connect servers are centrally logged.

## Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services domain controllers

Microsoft AD DS domain controllers hold sensitive data for systems, such as hashed credentials for all user accounts. As such, particular care should be taken to secure these servers. This can be achieved by hardening their configuration while using dedicated domain administrator user accounts exclusively for their administration. In doing so, technical controls should ensure these dedicated domain administrator user accounts cannot be used to connect to or administer other systems.

**Control: ISM-1827; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

Microsoft AD DS domain controllers are administered using dedicated domain administrator user accounts that are not used to administer other systems.

**Control: ISM-1929; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

Lightweight Directory Access Protocol signing is enabled on Microsoft AD DS domain controllers.

**Control: ISM-1828; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

The Print Spooler service is disabled on Microsoft AD DS domain controllers.

**Control: ISM-1829; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

Passwords are not stored in Group Policy Preferences.

**Control: ISM-1930; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

Passwords are prevented from being stored in Group Policy Preferences.

**Control: ISM-1931; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

SID Filtering is enabled for domain and forest trusts.

## Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services account hardening

Misconfigured user accounts and computer accounts within Microsoft AD DS can pose a significant threat to the security of a system. For example, when malicious actors are able to obtain credentials for a user account, along with associated system access, they may further compromise the system by querying Microsoft AD DS in order to assist with gaining an understanding of the environment, moving laterally through the network and escalating privileges by compromising privileged user accounts. Furthermore, malicious actors with this level of access can become difficult to detect and remove, as they may not need to use exploits for vulnerabilities to achieve their goals. Malicious activities performed by compromised user accounts or computer accounts may also appear very similar to legitimate system activities.

**Control: ISM-1832; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

Only service accounts and computer accounts are configured with Service Principal Names (SPNs).



**Control: ISM-1932; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*The number of service accounts configured with an SPN is minimised.*

**Control: ISM-1933; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Service accounts configured with an SPN do not have DCSync permissions.*

**Control: ISM-2010; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Service accounts configured with an SPN use the Advanced Encryption Standard for encryption.*

**Control: ISM-1834; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Duplicate SPNs do not exist within the domain.*

**Control: ISM-1833; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*User accounts are provisioned with the minimum privileges required.*

**Control: ISM-1934; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*User accounts with DCSync permissions are reviewed at least annually, and those without an ongoing requirement for the permissions have them removed.*

**Control: ISM-1835; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Privileged user accounts are configured as sensitive and cannot be delegated.*

**Control: ISM-1935; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Computer accounts are not configured for unconstrained delegation.*

**Control: ISM-1836; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*User accounts require Kerberos pre-authentication.*

**Control: ISM-1837; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*User accounts are not configured with password never expires or password not required.*

**Control: ISM-1838; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*The UserPassword attribute for user accounts is not used.*

**Control: ISM-1936; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*The sIDHistory attribute for user accounts is not used.*

**Control: ISM-1937; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*User accounts are checked at least weekly for the presence of the sIDHistory attribute.*

**Control: ISM-1839; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Account properties accessible by unprivileged users are not used to store passwords.*

**Control: ISM-1840; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*User account passwords do not use reversible encryption.*

**Control: ISM-1841; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Unprivileged user accounts cannot add machines to the domain.*

**Control: ISM-1842; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Dedicated privileged service accounts are used to add machines to the domain.*

**Control: ISM-1843; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*User accounts with unconstrained delegation are reviewed at least annually, and those without an SPN or demonstrated business requirement are removed.*

**Control: ISM-1844; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Computer accounts that are not Microsoft AD DS domain controllers are not trusted for delegation to services.*

**Control: ISM-1938; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*The Domain Computers security group does not have write or modify permissions to any Microsoft Active Directory objects.*

## Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services security group memberships

Microsoft AD DS contains a number of built-in security groups that have elevated permissions or deliberately relaxed security policies. These security groups are often required for a specific purpose, however, overuse or inappropriate use may allow malicious actors to more easily move laterally throughout a network or escalate their privileges. Highly-privileged security groups in particular, such as the Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins security groups, should have their membership limited to the smallest set of possible user accounts to limit malicious actors' opportunities for privilege escalation. In doing so, such highly-privileged security groups should exclude service accounts and computer accounts. In addition, the Domain Computers security group should be excluded from belonging to any privileged or highly-privileged security groups.

**Control: ISM-1620; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Privileged user accounts are members of the Protected Users security group.*

**Control: ISM-1939; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*The number of user accounts that are members of the Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins or other highly-privileged security groups is minimised.*

**Control: ISM-1940; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Service accounts are not members of the Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins or other highly-privileged security groups.*

**Control: ISM-1941; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Computer accounts are not members of the Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins or other highly-privileged security groups.*

**Control: ISM-1942; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*The Domain Computers security group is not a member of any privileged or highly-privileged security groups.*

**Control: ISM-1845; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When a user account is disabled, it is removed from all security group memberships.*

**Control: ISM-1846; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*The Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access security group does not contain user accounts.*

## Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services

Microsoft AD CS is responsible for the management of Public Key Infrastructure certificates used to secure authentication and communication protocols for systems. As such, particular care should be taken to secure servers that perform this role, such as Certification Authorities (CAs).

**Control: ISM-1943; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Strong mapping between certificates and users is enforced.*

**Control: ISM-1944; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
The EDITF\_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag is removed from Microsoft AD CS CA configurations.

**Control: ISM-1945; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
The CT\_FLAG\_ENROLLEE\_SUPPLIES\_SUBJECT flag is removed from certificate templates.

**Control: ISM-1946; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Unprivileged user accounts do not have write access to certificate templates.

**Control: ISM-1947; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Extended Key Usages that enable user authentication are removed.

**Control: ISM-1948; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
CA Certificate Manager approval is required for certificate templates that allow a Subject Alternative Name to be supplied.

## Microsoft Active Directory Federation Services

Microsoft AD FS is responsible for the sharing of identity and access management rights across security boundaries. As such, particular care should be taken to secure servers that perform this role.

**Control: ISM-1949; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Microsoft AD FS servers are administered using a dedicated service account that is not used to administer other systems.

## Microsoft Entra Connect

Microsoft Entra Connect is responsible for synchronising identity information between Microsoft AD DS and Microsoft Entra ID services within hybrid on-premises and cloud-based environments. As such, particular care should be taken to secure servers that perform this role.

**Control: ISM-1950; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Soft matching between Microsoft AD DS and Microsoft Entra ID is disabled following initial synchronisation activities.

**Control: ISM-1951; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Hard match takeover is disabled for Microsoft Entra Connect servers.

**Control: ISM-1952; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Privileged user accounts are not synchronised between Microsoft AD DS and Microsoft Entra ID.

## Server application event logging

Centrally logging and analysing security-relevant events, including configuration changes, for server applications can assist in monitoring the security posture of systems, detecting malicious behaviour and contributing to investigations following cybersecurity incidents.

**Control: ISM-1978; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Security-relevant events for server applications on internet-facing servers are centrally logged.

**Control: ISM-1979; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
Security-relevant events for server applications on non-internet-facing servers are centrally logged.

## Further information

Further information on cyber supply chain risk management can be found in the cyber supply chain risk management section of the [Guidelines for procurement and outsourcing](#).

Further information on vendors that have made a pledge to implement Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices can be found on the United States' Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency's [Secure by Design Pledge](#) website.

Further information on patching or updating server applications can be found in the system patching section of the [Guidelines for system management](#).

Further information on the use of privileged user accounts can be found in the access to systems and their resources section of the [Guidelines for personnel security](#).

Further information on administering Microsoft Active Directory services can be found in the system administration section of the [Guidelines for system management](#).

Further information on hardening Microsoft Active Directory services can be found in ASD's [Detecting and mitigating Active Directory compromises](#) publication.

Further information on hardening Microsoft Active Directory services can also be found in Microsoft's [Best practices for securing Active Directory](#) publication.

Further information on hardening Microsoft Entra Connect can be found in Microsoft's [Prerequisites for Microsoft Entra Connect](#) publication.

Further information on event logging can be found in the event logging and monitoring section of the [Guidelines for system monitoring](#).

Further information on security-relevant events to monitor for Microsoft Active Directory can be found in ASD's [Detecting and mitigating Active Directory compromises](#) and [Priority logs for SIEM ingestion: Practitioner guidance](#) publications.

Further information on security-relevant events to monitor for Microsoft Active Directory can also be found in Microsoft's [Events to monitor](#) publication.

Further information on database servers can be found in the database servers section of the [Guidelines for database systems](#).

Further information on email servers can be found in the email gateways and servers section of the [Guidelines for email](#).

## Authentication hardening

### User accounts and authentication types

The guidance within this section is equally applicable to all user accounts unless specified otherwise. This includes unprivileged user accounts and privileged user accounts, which includes break glass accounts and service accounts. In addition, the guidance is equally applicable to interactive authentication and non-interactive authentication.

## Authenticating to systems

Before access to a system and its resources is granted to a user, it is essential that they are authenticated. This can be achieved via multi-factor authentication, such as a username along with a passphrase and security key, or less preferably via single-factor authentication, such as a username and a passphrase.

**Control: ISM-1546; Revision: 0; Updated: Aug-19; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Users are authenticated before they are granted access to a system and its resources.*

## Insecure authentication methods

Authentication methods need to resist theft, interception, duplication, forgery, unauthorised access and unauthorised modification. For example, Local Area Network (LAN) Manager and NT LAN Manager authentication methods use weak hashing algorithms. As such, credentials used as part of LAN Manager authentication and NT LAN Manager authentication (i.e. NTLMv1, NTLMv2 and NTLM2) can easily be compromised. Instead, an organisation should use Kerberos for authentication within Microsoft Windows environments.

**Control: ISM-1603; Revision: 0; Updated: Aug-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Authentication methods susceptible to replay attacks are disabled.*

**Control: ISM-1055; Revision: 4; Updated: Oct-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*LAN Manager and NT LAN Manager authentication methods are disabled.*

## Multi-factor authentication

Multi-factor authentication uses two or more different authentication factors. This may include:

- something users know, such as a memorised secret (i.e. personal identification number, password or passphrase)
- something users have, such as a security key, smart card, passkey, smartphone or one-time password token
- something users are, such as a fingerprint pattern or their facial geometry.

Users of online services, privileged users of systems and users with access to data repositories are more likely to be targeted by malicious actors due to their access. For this reason, it is especially important that multi-factor authentication is used for these user accounts. In addition, multi-factor authentication is vital to any administrative activities as it can limit the consequences of a compromise by preventing or slowing malicious actors' ability to gain unrestricted access to assets. In this regard, multi-factor authentication can be implemented as part of jump server authentication where assets being administered do not support multi-factor authentication themselves.

When implementing multi-factor authentication, several different authentication factors can be implemented. Unfortunately, some authentication factors, such as biometrics or codes sent via Short Message Service, Voice over Internet Protocol or email, are more susceptible to compromise than others. For this reason, authentication factors that involve something users have should be used with something users know. Alternatively, something users have that is unlocked by something users know or are (often known as passwordless multi-factor authentication) can be used. Furthermore, for increased security, the use of phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication is recommended to protect against real-time phishing attacks.

Finally, centrally logging and analysing multi-factor authentication events can assist in monitoring the security posture of systems, detecting malicious behaviour and contributing to investigations following cybersecurity incidents.

**Control: ISM-1504; Revision: 3; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate users to their organisation's online services that process, store or communicate their organisation's sensitive data.*

**Control: ISM-1679; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate users to third-party online services that process, store or communicate their organisation's sensitive data.*

**Control: ISM-1680; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication (where available) is used to authenticate users to third-party online services that process, store or communicate their organisation's non-sensitive data.*

**Control: ISM-1892; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate users to their organisation's online customer services that process, store or communicate their organisation's sensitive customer data.*

**Control: ISM-1893; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate users to third-party online customer services that process, store or communicate their organisation's sensitive customer data.*

**Control: ISM-1681; Revision: 3; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate customers to online customer services that process, store or communicate sensitive customer data.*

**Control: ISM-1919; Revision: 0; Updated: Jun-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*When multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate users or customers to online services or online customer services, all other authentication protocols that do not support multi-factor authentication are disabled.*

**Control: ISM-1173; Revision: 4; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate privileged users of systems.*

**Control: ISM-0974; Revision: 6; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate unprivileged users of systems.*

**Control: ISM-1505; Revision: 3; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate users of data repositories.*

**Control: ISM-1401; Revision: 5; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML1, ML2, ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication uses either: something users have and something users know, or something users have that is unlocked by something users know or are.*

**Control: ISM-1872; Revision: 1; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**  
*Multi-factor authentication used for authenticating users of online services is phishing-resistant.*

**Control: ISM-1873; Revision: 1; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2**  
*Multi-factor authentication used for authenticating customers of online customer services provides a phishing-resistant option.*

**Control: ISM-1874; Revision: 1; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

*Multi-factor authentication used for authenticating customers of online customer services is phishing-resistant.*

**Control: ISM-1682; Revision: 3; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Multi-factor authentication used for authenticating users of systems is phishing-resistant.*

**Control: ISM-1894; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**

*Multi-factor authentication used for authenticating users of data repositories is phishing-resistant.*

**Control: ISM-1559; Revision: 3; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P; Essential 8: N/A**

*Memorised secrets used for multi-factor authentication on non-classified, OFFICIAL: Sensitive and PROTECTED systems are a minimum of 6 characters.*

**Control: ISM-1560; Revision: 2; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: S; Essential 8: N/A**

*Memorised secrets used for multi-factor authentication on SECRET systems are a minimum of 8 characters.*

**Control: ISM-1561; Revision: 2; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Memorised secrets used for multi-factor authentication on TOP SECRET systems are a minimum of 10 characters.*

**Control: ISM-2011; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication is used by user accounts, other non-phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication options are disabled for such user accounts.*

**Control: ISM-1920; Revision: 0; Updated: Jun-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When multi-factor authentication is used to authenticate users to online services, online customer services, systems or data repositories – that process, store or communicate their organisation's sensitive data or sensitive customer data – users are prevented from self-enrolling into multi-factor authentication from untrustworthy devices.*

**Control: ISM-1683; Revision: 2; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Successful and unsuccessful multi-factor authentication events are centrally logged.*

## Single-factor authentication

A significant threat to the compromise of user accounts is credential cracking tools. When malicious actors gain access to a list of usernames and hashed credentials from a system, they can attempt to recover username and credential pairs by comparing the hashes of known credentials with the hashed credentials they have gained access to. By finding a match malicious actors will know the credential associated with a given username.

In order to reduce this security risk, an organisation should implement multi-factor authentication. Note, while single-factor authentication is no longer considered suitable for protecting sensitive or classified systems, it may not be possible to implement multi-factor authentication on some systems. In such cases, an organisation will need to increase the time on average it takes malicious actors to compromise a credential by continuing to increase its length over time. Such increases in length can be balanced against usability through the use of passphrases rather than passwords. In cases where systems do not support passphrases, and as an absolute last resort, the strongest password length and password complexity supported by a system will need to be implemented.



Finally, centrally logging and analysing single-factor authentication events can assist in monitoring the security posture of systems, detecting malicious behaviour and contributing to investigations following cybersecurity incidents.

**Control: ISM-0417; Revision: 5; Updated: Oct-19; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When systems cannot support multi-factor authentication, single-factor authentication using passphrases is implemented instead.*

**Control: ISM-0421; Revision: 10; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P; Essential 8: N/A**

*Passphrases used for single-factor authentication on non-classified, OFFICIAL: Sensitive and PROTECTED systems are at least 4 random words with a total minimum length of 15 characters.*

**Control: ISM-1557; Revision: 2; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: S; Essential 8: N/A**

*Passphrases used for single-factor authentication on SECRET systems are at least 5 random words with a total minimum length of 17 characters.*

**Control: ISM-0422; Revision: 8; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Passphrases used for single-factor authentication on TOP SECRET systems are at least 6 random words with a total minimum length of 20 characters.*

**Control: ISM-1558; Revision: 2; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Passphrases used for single-factor authentication are not a list of categorised words; do not form a real sentence in a natural language; and are not constructed from song lyrics, movies, literature or any other publicly available material.*

**Control: ISM-1895; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Successful and unsuccessful single-factor authentication events are centrally logged.*

## Setting credentials for user accounts

Before credentials are set for user accounts, including setting credentials following any reset requests, it is important that users provide sufficient evidence to verify their identity, such as by physically presenting themselves and their pass to a service desk, answering a set of challenge-response questions, or by demonstrating control of a linked mobile device. Following the verification of user identity, credentials should be randomly generated and provided to users via a secure communications channel or, if not possible, split into two parts with one part provided to users and the other part provided to supervisors. Subsequently, users should reset their credentials on first use to ensure that they are not known by other parties.

**Control: ISM-1593; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Users provide sufficient evidence to verify their identity when requesting new credentials.*

**Control: ISM-1227; Revision: 5; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Credentials set for user accounts are randomly generated.*

**Control: ISM-1594; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Credentials are provided to users via a secure communications channel or, if not possible, split into two parts with one part provided to users and the other part provided to supervisors.*

**Control: ISM-1595; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Credentials provided to users are changed on first use.*

**Control: ISM-1596; Revision: 2; Updated: Dec-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Credentials, in the form of memorised secrets, are not reused by users across different systems.*

## Setting credentials for built-in Administrator accounts, break glass accounts, local administrator accounts and service accounts

When built-in Administrator accounts, break glass accounts, local administrator accounts and service accounts use common usernames or weak credentials, it may allow malicious actors that compromise credentials on one workstation or server to easily compromise other workstations and servers. As such, it is critical that credentials for the built-in Administrator account, break glass accounts, local administrator accounts and service accounts in each domain are long, unique, unpredictable and managed.

To provide additional security and credential management functionality for service accounts, Microsoft introduced group Managed Service Accounts to Microsoft Windows Server. In doing so, service accounts that are created as group Managed Service Accounts do not require manual credential management by system administrators, as the operating system automatically ensures that they are long, unique, unpredictable and managed. This ensures that service account credentials are secure, not misplaced or forgotten, and that they are automatically changed on a regular basis. However, in cases where the use of group Managed Service Accounts is not possible, credentials for service accounts should still be unique, unpredictable and random with a minimum length of 30 characters.

**Control: ISM-1953; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Credentials for the built-in Administrator account in each domain are long, unique, unpredictable and managed.*

**Control: ISM-1685; Revision: 2; Updated: Jun-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML2, ML3**

*Credentials for break glass accounts, local administrator accounts and service accounts are long, unique, unpredictable and managed.*

**Control: ISM-1795; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Credentials for built-in Administrator accounts, break glass accounts, local administrator accounts and service accounts are a minimum of 30 characters.*

**Control: ISM-1954; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Credentials for built-in Administrator accounts, break glass accounts, local administrator accounts and service accounts are randomly generated.*

**Control: ISM-1619; Revision: 0; Updated: Oct-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Service accounts are created as group Managed Service Accounts.*

## Changing credentials

Generally, credentials should not need to be changed on a frequent basis. However, some events may necessitate the requirement for individual user accounts, or groups of user accounts, to change their credentials. This can include credentials being compromised (such as appearing in an online data breach database), being suspected of being compromised (such as when malicious actors gain access to a network), being discovered stored on networks in the clear, being transferred across networks in the clear, when membership of shared user accounts change and if they have not been changed in the past 12 months.

**Control: ISM-1590; Revision: 3; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Credentials for user accounts are changed if:*

- *they are compromised*
- *they are suspected of being compromised*
- *they are discovered stored on networks in the clear*
- *they are discovered being transferred across networks in the clear*
- *membership of a shared user account changes*
- *they have not been changed in the past 12 months.*

**Control: ISM-1955; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Credentials for computer accounts are changed if:*

- *they are compromised*
- *they are suspected of being compromised*
- *they have not been changed in the past 30 days.*

**Control: ISM-1847; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Credentials for the Kerberos Key Distribution Center's service account (KRBTGT) are changed twice, allowing for replication to all Microsoft AD DS domain controllers in-between each change, if:*

- *the domain has been directly compromised*
- *the domain is suspected of being compromised*
- *they have not been changed in the past 12 months.*

**Control: ISM-1956; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Microsoft AD FS token-signing and encryption certificates are changed twice in quick succession if:*

- *they are compromised*
- *they are suspected of being compromised*
- *they have not been changed in the past 12 months.*

## Protecting credentials

Obscuring credentials as they are entered into systems can assist in protecting them against screen scrapers and shoulder surfers. In addition, physical credentials, such as written down credentials (e.g. memorised secrets) and dedicated devices that store or generate credentials (e.g. security keys, smart cards and one-time password tokens), when kept together with systems they are used to authenticate to, can increase the likelihood of malicious actors gaining unauthorised access to systems. For example, when smart cards are left on card readers, one-time password tokens are left in laptop computer bags, security keys are left connected to computers or passphrases are written down and stuck to computer monitors. To reduce this security risk, physical credentials should be kept separate from systems they are used to authenticate to, except for when performing authentication activities.

If storing credentials on systems, sufficient protection should be implemented to prevent them from being compromised. For example, credentials can be stored in a password manager or hardware security module, while credentials stored in a database should be hashed, salted and stretched.

When using Microsoft Windows systems, memory integrity, Local Security Authority protection, Credential Guard and Remote Credential Guard functionality, all preferably with a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) lock, can be enabled to provide additional protection for credentials. In addition, malicious actors that have access to systems may attempt to steal cached credentials. To reduce this security risk, cached credentials should be limited to only one previous logon.

Finally, an organisation should regularly scan their systems to detect and remediate any credentials that are being stored in an unprotected manner, such as in the clear in documents, on network file shares or in other data repositories.

**Control: ISM-1597; Revision: 0; Updated: Aug-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Credentials are obscured as they are entered into systems.*

**Control: ISM-1980; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Credential hint functionality is not used for systems.*

**Control: ISM-0418; Revision: 7; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Physical credentials are kept separate from systems they are used to authenticate to, except for when performing authentication activities.*

**Control: ISM-1402; Revision: 6; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Credentials stored on systems are protected by a password manager; a hardware security module; or by salting, hashing and stretching them before storage within a database.*

**Control: ISM-1957; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Private keys for Microsoft AD CS CA servers are protected by a hardware security module.*

**Control: ISM-1896; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**  
*Memory integrity functionality is enabled.*

**Control: ISM-1861; Revision: 2; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**  
*Local Security Authority protection functionality is enabled.*

**Control: ISM-1686; Revision: 1; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**  
*Credential Guard functionality is enabled.*

**Control: ISM-1897; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: ML3**  
*Remote Credential Guard functionality is enabled.*

**Control: ISM-1749; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Cached credentials are limited to one previous logon.*

**Control: ISM-1875; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**  
*Networks are scanned at least monthly to identify any credentials that are being stored in the clear.*

## User account lockouts

Locking a user account after a specified number of failed logon attempts reduces the likelihood of successful forms of brute-force attacks, such as credential guessing attacks, credential spraying attacks and credential stuffing attacks by malicious actors. However, care should be taken as implementing account

lockout functionality can increase the likelihood of a denial of service. Alternatively, some systems can be configured to automatically slowdown repeated failed logon attempts (known as rate limiting) rather than locking user accounts. Implementing multi-factor authentication is also an effective way of reducing the likelihood of successful credential spraying attacks.

**Control: ISM-1403; Revision: 4; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*User accounts, except for break glass accounts, are locked out after a maximum of five failed logon attempts.*

## Session termination

Implementing measures to terminate user sessions and restart workstations on a daily basis, outside of business hours and after an appropriate period of inactivity, can assist in system maintenance activities and removing malicious actors that may have compromised a system but failed to gain persistence.

**Control: ISM-0853; Revision: 3; Updated: Sep-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*On a daily basis, outside of business hours and after an appropriate period of inactivity, user sessions are terminated and workstations are restarted.*

## Session locking

Session locking prevents unauthorised access to services which a user has already authenticated to.

**Control: ISM-0428; Revision: 10; Updated: Mar-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Services are configured with a session lock that:*

- *activates after a maximum of 15 minutes of user inactivity, a maximum of 12 hours of overall session time or when manually activated by users*
- *blocks access to all session content*
- *requires users to re-authenticate using all authentication factors to unlock the session*
- *denies users the ability to disable the session locking mechanism.*

## Screen locking

Screen locking prevents unauthorised access to a system which a user has already authenticated to.

**Control: ISM-2012; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Systems are configured with a screen lock that:*

- *activates after a maximum of 15 minutes of user inactivity, or when manually activated by users*
- *conceals all content on the screen*
- *ensures that the screen does not enter a power saving state before the screen lock is activated*
- *requires users to re-authenticate using all authentication factors to unlock the system*
- *denies users the ability to disable the screen locking mechanism.*

## Logon banner

Displaying a logon banner to users each time they logon to systems can act as a way of reminding users of their security responsibilities. Logon banners may cover topics such as:

- the sensitivity or classification of the system
- access requirements for the system
- usage policies for the system and its resources
- details of any monitoring activities for the system.

**Control: ISM-0408; Revision: 5; Updated: Sep-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*Systems have a logon banner that reminds users of their security responsibilities when accessing the system and its resources.*

## Further information

Further information on implementing multi-factor authentication can be found in ASD's [Implementing multi-factor authentication](#) publication.

Further information on event logging can be found in the event logging and monitoring section of the [Guidelines for system monitoring](#).

Further information on [randomly generating passphrases](#) (preferably using five dice rolls and a long word list) is available from the Electronic Frontier Foundation while a [random dice roller](#) is available from RANDOM.ORG.

Further information on how to [secure group Managed Service Accounts](#) in Microsoft Windows Server is available from Microsoft.

Further information on changing credentials for the Kerberos Key Distribution Center's service account can be found in Microsoft's [Active Directory accounts](#) and [Active Directory Forest Recovery - Reset the krbtgt password](#) publications. A script for [changing credentials for this service account](#) is also available from Microsoft.

Further information [memory integrity functionality](#) is available from Microsoft.

Further information on [Local Security Authority protection functionality](#) is available from Microsoft.

Further information on [Credential Guard functionality](#) and [Remote Credential Guard functionality](#) is available from Microsoft.

## Virtualisation hardening

### Hypervisors

This section is applicable to Type 1 hypervisors (those that run on bare metal) and Type 2 hypervisors (those that run on top of a general-purpose operating system). In doing so, Type 1 hypervisors should be treated as operating systems while Type 2 hypervisors should be treated as applications. Note, as Type 1 hypervisors are themselves lightweight operating systems, they can be treated as a combination of a software-based isolation mechanism and an underlying operating system. Conversely, Type 2 hypervisors



will run on top of a general-purpose operating system that may be provided by a different vendor to that of the software-based isolation mechanism.

## Containerisation

Containers allow for versatile deployment of systems and, in doing so, should be treated the same as any other system. However, controls in a containerised environment may take a different form when compared to other types of systems. For example, patching the operating system of a workstation may be performed differently to ensuring that a patched image is used for a container, however, the principle is the same. In general, the same security risks that apply to non-containerised systems will likely apply to containerised systems.

## Functional separation between computing environments

Physical servers often use a software-based isolation mechanism to share their hardware among multiple computing environments. In doing so, a computing environment could consist of an entire operating system installed in a virtual machine where the isolation mechanism is a hypervisor, such as cloud services providing Infrastructure as a Service, or alternatively, a computing environment could consist of an application which uses the shared kernel of the underlying operating system of the physical server where the isolation mechanism is an application container or application sandbox, such as cloud services providing Platform as a Service. Note, however, the logical separation of data within a single application, such as cloud services providing Software as a Service, is not considered to be the same as multiple computing environments.

Malicious actors who have compromised a single computing environment, or who legitimately control a single computing environment, might exploit a misconfiguration or vulnerability in the isolation mechanism to compromise other computing environments on the same physical server or compromise the underlying operating system of the physical server. As such, it is important that additional controls are implemented when a software-based isolation mechanism is used to share a physical server's hardware.

**Control: ISM-1460; Revision: 5; Updated: Mar-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server's hardware, the isolation mechanism is from a vendor that has demonstrated a commitment to Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices, including secure programming practices and either memory-safe programming languages or less preferably memory-safe programming practices.*

**Control: ISM-1604; Revision: 0; Updated: Aug-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server's hardware, the configuration of the isolation mechanism is hardened by removing unneeded functionality and restricting access to the administrative interface used to manage the isolation mechanism.*

**Control: ISM-1605; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server's hardware, the underlying operating system is hardened.*

**Control: ISM-1606; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server's hardware, patches, updates or vendor mitigations for vulnerabilities are applied to the isolation mechanism and underlying operating system in a timely manner.*



**Control: ISM-1848; Revision: 0; Updated: Mar-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server's hardware, the isolation mechanism or underlying operating system is replaced when it is no longer supported by a vendor.*

**Control: ISM-1607; Revision: 1; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server's hardware, integrity monitoring and centralised event logging is performed for the isolation mechanism and underlying operating system.*

**Control: ISM-1461; Revision: 5; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: S, TS; Essential 8: N/A**

*When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server's hardware for SECRET or TOP SECRET computing environments, the physical server and all computing environments are of the same classification and belong to the same security domain.*

## Further information

Further information on container security can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-190, [Application Container Security Guide](#).

Further information on cyber supply chain risk management can be found in the cyber supply chain risk management section of the [Guidelines for procurement and outsourcing](#).

Further information on vendors that have made a pledge to implement Secure by Design and Secure by Default principles and practices can be found on the United States' Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency's [Secure by Design Pledge](#) website.

Further information on the use of cloud services can be found in the managed services and cloud services section of the [Guidelines for procurement and outsourcing](#).

Further information on hardening operating systems can be found in the operating system hardening section of these guidelines.

Further information on patching or updating operating systems and applications can be found in the system patching section of the [Guidelines for system management](#).

Further information on event logging can be found in the event logging and monitoring section of the [Guidelines for system monitoring](#).

Further information on hypervisor security can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-125A Rev. 1, [Security Recommendations for Server-based Hypervisor Platforms](#).

## Disclaimer

The material in this guide is of a general nature and should not be regarded as legal advice or relied on for assistance in any particular circumstance or emergency situation. In any important matter, you should seek appropriate independent professional advice in relation to your own circumstances.

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