Applications of Factor Graphs in Security Modeling Mini Project 3 – In Class Lab


Ravi K. Iyer, Yuming Wu with Phuong Cao





Announcements

- HW3 grades have been released
 - Regrade requests to be submitted within 1 week 25
- MP3 released
 - Checkpoint 1 due on April 10



Mean	Std	Median	Max	Min
17.95	2.11	18.50	20.00	5.50



Outline

Overview of security incidents at NCSA

- Case studies
 - A credential-stealing attack at NCSA
 - An emulation of a real-world data breach at Equifax
- Characterization of attacks


 Probabilistic modeling of attacks using Naïve Bayes, Bayesian Networks, and Factor Graphs


Measurements from NCSA@Illinois: Five minute Snap Shot

• Goals:

- Provide a system-level characterization of incidents and evaluate the intricacies of real-time diagnosis
- Design protection strategies to reduce missed incidents and false positives
- Experimentally Demonstrate new techniques in a sandbox

Challenges






Five-Minute
Snapshot
of In-and-Out
Traffic
at NCSA



Five-Minute Snapshot of In-and-Out Traffic within NCSA@Illinois





An attack in the wild: the Equifax data breach (2017)

Background: Equifax portal has a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638) in its Apache Struts server since March 2017, but the vulnerability has only been patched in July 2017

What happened?

- Attackers executed malicious commands to gain an initial access to the vulnerable server
- Attackers accessed database and extract 143M sensitive records
- Attackers injected malware on Equifax website after the breach

Very few details of the attacks are released to the public

(watch Equifax CEO describes the attack for the Senate Banking Committee)





A fake Flashplayer that links to a malware displayed on Equifax website after the breach



CVE-2017-5638

- The Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts 2 2.3.x before 2.3.32 and 2.5.x before 2.5.10.1 has incorrect exception handling and errormessage generation during file-upload attempts, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted Content-Type, Content-Disposition, or Content-Length HTTP header, as exploited in the wild in March 2017 with a Content-Type header containing a #cmd= string.
- Ref: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5638

Reproducing the Equifax Attack Scenario in our testbed

- 1. Exploit CVE-2017-5638 (container-based environment for MP3 you only need to analyze the traces)
 - Attach an arbitrary length command to the specifically crafted HTTP request.
 - Send the malformed HTTP request to the vulnerable Apache Struts server.
 - Example: if the command is 'whoami', and the server is vulnerable, the server responds with the output of the command, e.g., 'root'. That means the attacker has the superuser (root) privilege.
 - Attacker has the root privilege
- 2. HTTP sensitive request
 - Attacker downloads a rootkit (backdoor) via HTTP sensitive request
- 3. Insert a new system service
 - Attacker compiles and install the rootkit as a system service (i.e., a kernel module)
- 4. Read the secret key
 - Attacker opens the private RSA key in the ~/.ssh/folder
- 5. Extract the secret key via DNS tunnel (because the backdoor only receives basic commands)
 - Attacker encodes the secret key as legitimate DNS requests to extract a significant amount of data
 - (uses the secret key to move laterally in the system)

Attacker can use the secret key to move laterally to other servers in the internal network.



Reproducing the Equifax attack

Goal. To understand how such attack will progress when legitimate user activities are underway.


Attack traces were collected from security monitors and fed into an intrusion detection system (a machine learning model) to detect the attack.

At the end of the project, students would have built a factor graphbased detection system to detect each attack stages in the provided traces.

How we obtained the attack traces

- Model 7 attack stages, e.g., discovery, access, privilege escalation, ..., execution, using the MITRE ATTCK framework.
- Define attacker action at each stage using publicly available exploit
 - Scan for vulnerability, login, get privilege escalation code, collect ssh keys, build a DNS tunnel, and extract logs.
- Execute the exploits targeting vulnerable servers
- Collect traces of the exploits, e.g., network flows or system logs

a) Attack stages of the "port-knocking" attack




b) Security events and raw logs corresponding to the attack stages

ID	Name	Raw logs from host and network security monitors		
4	VULN_SCAN	11:57:49 hotcluster bro::scan::struts		
1		(#container=#context[opensymp		
	LOGIN	11:57:49 hotcluster bro::http::struts		
-2		(#cmd =/bin/bash 200 OK		
- 3	SENSITIVE_	11:59:02 hotcluster bro::http::get		
3	URI	http://srvx[redacted]/knockd.c 200 OK		
4	COMPILE	00:01:05 osquery::compile in volatile		
4		directory /dev/shm		
	NEW_KMOD	00:02:22 hotcluster osquery::new kernel		
7 5		module (knockd.ko) loaded size 16384		
9	SSH_PRIV_	00:03:14 hotcluster osquery::inotify fopen		
О	KEY_ACCESS	\$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa		
DNS_TUNNEL 00:03:		00:03:59 hotcluster bro::dns::oversized		
7		answer TXT record length: 1054 bytes		
60	CAPTURE_	00:06:22 hotcluster bro::capture loss		
ϵ_8	LOSS	script detected a loss rate above 86.92%		



An example of legitimate type A DNS query for IPv4 address




158 Standard query 0x1973 TXT 02bbs82\3122hb\276\356\360\326gh\313\311Fb\336\3365\335j\332Udb\302\340dF4\357\30 DNS

An example of using TXT records for DNS tunneling




Taxonomy of graphical models (cont.)



Machine Learning, A Probabilistic Perspective, Kevin Murphy, MIT Press



Taxonomy of graphical models




Conditional probabilities and statistical dependencies can be represented by a general type of graph: Factor Graph


Definition of a Factor Graph

A factor graph is a bipartite, undirected graph of random variables and factor functions. [Frey et. al. 01].


G (graph) = (X,f,E); E denotes the edges

FG can represent both causal and non-causal relations.







Bayesian Network (BN)



Undirected Graph



Factor Graph equivalent of BN



Factor Graph equivalent of UG



Applications of Factor Graphs in Security Domain

Problem statement. Given a set of security events, infer whether an attack is in progress?

Modeling Approach.

Each security event is a known variable **e**, each takes value from a discrete set of events **E**.

An attack happens in a chain of exploits, thus we have a sequence of events in time dimension.

Each event is associated with a corresponding attack state \mathbf{s} , which is unknown. The simplest approach is to classify \mathbf{s} as a binary $\{0,1\}$. However, when we can infer \mathbf{s} it is often too late (the attacker is already in the system)

Thus, we want to discretize **s** to smaller attack stages and provide update on such stages as soon as an event is observed.



Applications of Factor Graphs in Security Domain (cont.)

Problem statement. Given a set of security events, infer whether an attack is in progress?

Formally, the problem becomes

1. Define a joint probability distribution function (joint pdf)

$$P(e_1,e_2,...,e_n,s_1,s_2,...,s_n)$$

2. Derive a conditional probability

$$P(e_1,e_2,...,e_n | s_1,s_2,...,s_n)$$

However, the search space is exponentially large (by the order of the number of observed stages and events) and the joint pdf is sophisticated.

We want to break the joint pdf into smaller components that are easier to compute, i.e., factorize the joint pdf.


Modeling the credential stealing attack using Factor Graphs - Data

State space of variables

Attack stage: $X = \{\sigma_0, \sigma_1, ..., \sigma_7\}$ (Observed) Events: $E = \{\epsilon_1, ..., \epsilon_5\}$

OFFLINE ANNOTATION ON PAST ATTACKS

 a) Annotated events and attack stages in a pair of attacks



b) Event-stage annotation table for the attack pair (Attack 1 and Attack 2)

Event	Attack stage	
$\{\epsilon_1\}$	$\{\sigma_0 \sigma_1\}$	
$\{\epsilon_2\}$	$\{\sigma_0\}$	
$\{\epsilon_3\}$	$\{\sigma_4\}$	
$\{\epsilon_4\}$	$\{\sigma_5\}$	
$\{\epsilon_{\mathtt{S}}\}$	$\{\sigma_7\}$	

- Multi-stage credential stealing attack where the attack stage is not observed;
 however events which are related to the attack stage are observed
- Goal is to detect and pre-empt the attack
- Model assumptions
 - There are multivariate relationships among the events
 - There is no restriction on order of the relationships (can be non-causal or correlation based)
- Markov Model and Bayesian Networks cannot be used in this scenarios
- Factor graphs can be used for modeling highly complex attacks, where the causal relations among the events are not immediately clear.

ϵ_1	vulnerability scan	σ_0	benign
ϵ_2	login	σ_1	discovery
ϵ_3	sensitive_uri		privilege escalation
ϵ_{4}	new_library	σ_5	persistence

Modeling the credential stealing attack using Factor Graphs

OFFLINE LEARNING OF FACTOR FUNCTIONS

Example patterns, stages, probabilities, and significance learned from the attack pair

Pattern	Attack stages	Probability in past attacks	Significance (p-value)
$[\epsilon_1, \epsilon_3, \epsilon_4]$	$[\sigma_1, \sigma_4, \sigma_5]$	q_a	p_a
$[\epsilon_1]$	$[\sigma_0 \sigma_1]$	$q_{\mathbf{b}}$	p_b


...

$$f(E) = \exp\{q_E(1 - p_E)\}\$$

A factor function defined on the learned pattern, stages, and its significance

DETECTION OF UNSEEN ATTACKS

Factor Graph



Problem statement of MP3

The goal of this project is to understand the progression of a multistage attack that aims to leak secret keys from target system. In this project, you will perform analysis of a multi-stage attack recreated from publicly available information on the Equifax breach. You will explore the use of signature-based, anomaly-based, and factor graph-based techniques.



Task description

- Task 0 (Wireshark, Pyshark, Pandas, etc.)
 - In this task, you will familiarize yourself with networking and operating system (OS) concepts
 - Data pre-processing of network traffic and OS event logs (Pyshark, pandas)
 - Differentiate between malicious and benign network activity given the CVE (vulnerability) in HTTP and HTTPS traffic (Wireshark)
- Task 1
 - HTTP, TCP, IP, and DNS traffic analysis (Pyshark, Wireshark)
 - Host level OS activity
- Mainly use Pyshark and pandas for project task deliverables in a Jupyter Notebook;
- Only use Wireshark as a supplementary tool for intuitive visual inspection
 - Provide screenshot if the evidence to task solutions is from Wireshark



Wireshark

- A network packet analyzer
- Packet is layered (MAC address, IP address, port numbers, etc.)
- ▶ Frame 17: 459 bytes on wire (3672 bits), 459 bytes captured (3672 bits)

Physical layer

- Ethernet II, Src: 02:42:ac:11:00:02 (02:42:ac:11:00:02), Dst: 02:42:63:79:49:dd (02:42:63:79:49:dd) Data Link layer

 Media access control address (MAC address)
 - ► Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.17.0.2 Dst: 10.0.2.2 Network layer

 Internet Protocol address (IP address)
- ▶ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 8080, Dst Port: 55952, Seq: 9472, Ack: 713, Len: 405 Transportlayer
 - ► Hypertext Transfer Protocol

Application layer



Wireshark

- HTTP traffic: GET request, hostname, data, etc.
 - GET request: retrieval of information from the server

```
▼ GET /struts/utils.js HTTP/1.1\r\n
  ▶ [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): GET /struts/utils.js HTTP/1.1\r\n]
    Request Method: GET
    Request URI: /struts/utils.js
    Request Version: HTTP/1.1
  Host: localhost:60080\r\n
  Connection: keep-alive\r\n
  User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_13_3) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3373.0 Safari/537.36\r\n
  DNT: 1\r\n
  Accept: */*\r\n
  Referer: http://localhost:60080/showcase.action\r\n
  Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\r\n
  Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,vi;q=0.8\r\n
   [truncated]Cookie: username-localhost-8889="2|1:0|10:1520220538|23:username-localhost-8889|44:0DcxYmJhMGM0NjVjNDZkYjhmZDJkZWVlNWUyZGJjYWI=|
  \r\n
  [Full request URI: http://localhost:60080/struts/utils.js]
  [HTTP request 5/18]
  [Prev request in frame: 31]
  [Response in frame: 49]
  [Next request in frame: 53]
```



Hypertext Transfer Protocol

Wireshark

Display filters

- | ip.dst==172.17.0.2
- Filter expressions:

https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChWorkBuildDisplayFilterSection.html

 more display filter examples: https://wiki.wireshark.org/DisplayFilters)

Pyshark

- Python wrapper for tshark (Wireshark command-line utility)
- Allow for parsing from a capture file or live capture (pcap files in mp3)
- Capture files can be used
 - as an iterator to get their packets
 - to receive various filters to save some of the incoming packets
- Tutorial available on course website: <u>https://courses.engr.illinois.edu/ece498dsu/sp2019/secure/MP/MP3/</u>
 pyshark tutorial.zip