Stealthy User Mode Backdoors Via The HTTP.sys API




IIS Windows Server
Not secure
leet.haxx/
Windows Server
Internet Information Services
C:\Users\malwaretech\Documents\HTTPBackdoor.exe
[HTTPBackdoor] starting HTTP.sys server
[HTTPBackdoor] binding: http://0.0.0.0:80/super_secret_endpoint
[HTTPBackdoor] received command: whoami
[HTTPBackdoor] sent response: leet\malwaretech
Tervetuloa
Bienvenido
Hoş geldiniz
ברוכים הבאים
Καλώς ορίσατε
Välkommen
환영합니다
Добро пожаловать
مرحبا
欢迎
Microsoft
Command Prompt
C:\Users\malwaretech>curl http://leet.haxx:80/super_secret_endpoint?cmd=whoami
leet\malwaretech
C:\Users\malwaretech>
System Informer [LEET\malwaretech]
System View Tools Users Help
Refresh Options Find handles or DLLs System information
Search Network (Ctrl+K)
Processes Services Network Disk Firewall Devices
Name PID Local hostname Local... Remote hostname Rem... Prot... State Owner
dns.exe 3168 dc.leet.haxx 53 TCP Listen DNS
dns.exe 3168 dc.leet.haxx 53 TCP Listen DNS
dns.exe 3168 dc.leet.haxx 53 TCP6 Listen DNS
dns.exe 3168 dc.leet.haxx 53 TCP6 Listen DNS
dns.exe 3168 dc.leet.haxx 53 TCP6 Listen DNS
dns.exe 3168 dc.leet.haxx 53 UDP DNS
dns.exe 3168 dc.leet.haxx 53 UDP DNS
dns.exe 3168 dc.leet.haxx 53 UDP6 DNS
dns.exe 3168 dc.leet.haxx 53 UDP6 DNS
dns.exe 3168 dc.leet.haxx 53 UDP6 DNS
System 4 80 TCP Listen
System 4 80 TCP6 Listen
System 4 dc.leet.haxx 80 dc.leet.haxx 64373 TCP6 Establish...
Waiting co... 4 dc.leet.haxx 80 dc.leet.haxx 64405 TCP6 Time wait
Waiting co... 4 dc.leet.haxx 80 dc.leet.haxx 64414 TCP6 Time wait
Waiting co... 4 dc.leet.haxx 80 dc.leet.haxx 64417 TCP6 Time wait
Waiting co... 4 dc.leet.haxx 80 dc.leet.haxx 64472 TCP6 Time wait
lsass.exe 724 88 TCP Listen Kdc
lsass.exe 724 88 TCP6 Listen Kdc
lsass.exe 724 dc.leet.haxx 88 UDP Kdc
lsass.exe 724 dc.leet.haxx 88 UDP6 Kdc
lsass.exe 724 dc.leet.haxx 88 UDP6 Kdc
svchost.exe 1056 123 UDP W32Tim
svchost.exe 1056 123 UDP6 W32Tim
svchost.exe 976 135 TCP Listen RpcSs
976 135 TCP6 Listen RpcSs
4 dc.leet.haxx 137 UDP
4 dc.leet.haxx 138 UDP
4 dc.leet.haxx 139 TCP Listen
724 389 TCP Listen
724 389 TCP6 Listen
724 dc.leet.haxx 389 dc.leet.haxx 63995 TCP6 Establish...
724 dc.leet.haxx 389 dc.leet.haxx 63996 TCP6 Establish...
724 dc.leet.haxx 389 dc.leet.haxx 63998 TCP6 Establish...
724 dc.leet.haxx 389 dc.leet.haxx 64029 TCP6 Establish...
724 dc.leet.haxx 389 dc.leet.haxx 63885 TCP6 Establish...
724 dc.leet.haxx 389 dc.leet.haxx 64001 TCP6 Establish...
724 dc.leet.haxx 389 dc.leet.haxx 64065 TCP6 Establish...
724 389 UDP
724 389 UDP6
4 445 TCP Listen
4 445 TCP6 Listen
724 464 TCP Listen Kdc
724 464 TCP6 Listen Kdc
lsass.exe 724 dc.leet.haxx 464 UDP Kdc
lsass.exe 724 dc.leet.haxx 464 UDP6 Kdc
CPU usage: 7.12%
Physical memory: 2.04 GB (51.54%)
Free memory: 1.91 GB (48.46%)
Type here to search
5:28 AM
9/26/2024

http.sys allows us to launch http servers in the kernel from user mode



The Windows Kernel binds the port for us and handles the http processing



Name	PID	Local hostname	Local port	Remote hostname	Remote port	Prot...	State	Owner
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			TCP	Listen	DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			TCP	Listen	DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			TCP6	Listen	DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			TCP6	Listen	DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			TCP6	Listen	DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			UDP		DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			UDP		DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			UDP6		DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			UDP6		DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			UDP6		DNS
System	4		80			TCP	Listen	
System	4		80			TCP6	Listen	
Waiting co...	4	dc.leet.haxx	80		65168	TCP	Time wait	
Waiting co...	4	dc.leet.haxx	80		65160	TCP	Time wait	
System	4	dc.leet.haxx	80	dc.leet.haxx	65187	TCP6	Establish...	
System	4	dc.leet.haxx	80	dc.leet.haxx	65190	TCP6	Establish...	
Waiting co...	4	dc.leet.haxx	80	dc.leet.haxx	65193	TCP6	Time wait	
lsass.exe	724		88			TCP	Listen	Kdc

Since the kernel is responsible for many ports, this isn't unusual



But It makes it hard to figure out who is really using the port :D



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dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			TCP6	Listen	DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			TCP6	Listen	DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			UDP		DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			UDP		DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			UDP6		DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			UDP6		DNS
dns.exe	3168	dc.leet.haxx	53			UDP6		DNS
System	4		80			TCP	Listen	
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Waiting co...	4	dc.leet.haxx	80		65168	TCP	Time wait	
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System	4	dc.leet.haxx	80	dc.leet.haxx	65190	TCP6	Establish...	
Waiting co...	4	dc.leet.haxx	80	dc.leet.haxx	65193	TCP6	Time wait	
lsass.exe	724		88			TCP	Listen	Kdc

We don’t even need to be admin! Some endpoints can be bound by regular users

Usable by any user, even guest accounts:

- http://0.0.0.0:80/Temporary_Listen_Addresses/*

Usable by standard users:

- http://0.0.0.0:5357/*
  http://0.0.0.0:5358/*

Usable by any domain user:

- http://0.0.0.0:10247/apps/*

The default domain firewall profile exposes some of the unprivileged ports

- Port 10247 (open to world)
- Port 5357 (open to world if network discovery is enabled)
- Port 5358 (open to world if network discovery is enabled)

With Admin privileges, things get even more fun

- We can bind almost any port we want via the System process
- we can also piggyback on certain ports that are already in use by other apps
- If an app is using http://0.0.0.0:80/app/api, we could bind a different endpoint on the same port if port sharing is enabled.
- The app won't see any request sent to our endpoint, and we won't see requests sent to theirs!

IIS uses port sharing, so we can add endpoints to IIS and Outlook Servers



All Communication with http.sys can be done via IOCTL

- No sockets
- No named pipes
- No DLLs
- Just a nice stealthy backdoor

This method is used by several Chinese and Iranian APTs to backdoor servers

- https://securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer-a-high-profile-supply-chain-attack/90380/
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc1860-iran-middle-eastern-networks

You can investigate endpoints using "netsh http show servicestate"