

2022 eCTF Kickoff

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1/26/2022

Outline

1. Welcome
2. Competition Overview
3. Challenge Overview
4. Requirements
5. Attack Deployment
6. Flags

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Participating Schools



Organizers



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Competition Overview

Design

- **Begins January 26th, 2022**
- Teams design a secure system that meets all the challenge requirements
- Teams attempt to solve development challenges to retrieve design-phase flags

Handoff

- **Begins March 9th, 2022**
- Teams may submit their designs to the eCTF Organizers
- Organizers verify that each design has met all the functional requirements
- Organizers post verified designs for all teams to evaluate during the attack phase

Attack

- **Begins immediately after successful completion of Handoff**
- Teams perform a security evaluation of opposing teams' systems
- Teams demonstrate attacks by retrieving flags
- **Scoreboard closes April 20th, 2022**
- **Awards Ceremony on April 27th, 2022**

New Features

- Emulated and physical hardware
- Design Phase Points
 - Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) Challenge
- Automated Testing Service
- Hardware Trojans

Prizes and Competition Qualification Requirements

- **This year the eCTF will award \$5000 in prizes to the winning teams**
 - 1st Place: \$2000
 - 2nd Place: \$1000
 - 3rd Place: \$500
 - Special Awards: \$1500 (may be split among multiple teams)
- **Any student can compete in the eCTF, but to receive prize money you must meet certain eligibility requirements**
 - Check our website (ectf.mitre.org) for award eligibility terms
- **Several policies and processes have been put in place to ensure fairness**
 - All questions and requests for help are taken on a first-come-first-serve basis
 - Write-ups are anonymized before judging
 - To specifically address and mitigate any potential unfair advantage for participants that have interned at MITRE or Riverside Research:
 - Competition organizers are “firewalled” from current intern participants – no discussions allowed outside of official channels
 - The challenge requirements were changed significantly from the summer version that we run each year with interns

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
The Scenario

- **Your team is tasked with designing and implementing a secure firmware update system for an avionic device**
- **This system is called...**
 - ...The Secure Avionics Flight Firmware Installation Routine, or SAFFIRe!
- **The Goal:**
 - Securely install new firmware and flight configurations on the device...
 - ...in the face of physical attacks and...
 - ...in the face of supply-chain security threats!


Avionic System

- The avionic system has three main components


- Host Computer
- Avionic Device
- Avionics Bus




Host Computer




- **The host computer runs SAFFIRE host tools**
 - Protects avionic flight firmware and configurations
 - Loads firmware and configuration updates into the avionic device
 - Requests data back from the avionic device
- **CPU**
 - Runs a general-purpose host OS




Avionic Device




- **The avionic device runs the SAFFIRE bootloader and avionic firmware**
 - The SAFFIRE bootloader is only responsible for installing flight firmware and configurations created by a secure host
 - The avionic firmware runs during aircraft flight and communicates important information over the avionics bus
- **CPU**
 - Embedded Arm Cortex-M4 microcontroller



Aircraft



- **The aircraft contains an avionics bus with various sensors and controllers**
 - Reliable and correct operation of all avionic devices is critical for safe flight!
- This component is provided for you and cannot be modified





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
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SAFFIRe Build Requirements



- Generate system secrets
- Create a host tool package
- Compile the bootloader
 - The bootloader may use an EEPROM initialization file



Firmware / Configuration Protection Requirements




- Host tools must create images containing *protected firmware* and *protected flight configurations*
 - *Protected Firmware* images should contain a version number and release message
 - *Protected Flight Configurations* are packaged standalone (i.e., they do not contain a version number or release message)




Firmware / Configuration Update Requirements


Legend




- Host tools must send protected images to the bootloader
- The bootloader must install images so they can be executed later




Device Boot Requirements




- The bootloader loads the firmware and configuration images to run attached to the avionics bus
 - Firmware placed at the end of SRAM, Configuration at the end of Flash
- The bootloader returns the release message to the host
- Finally, the bootloader executes the firmware



Readback Requirements



- The host tools request data from either the installed firmware or configuration
- The bootloader returns the amount of data requested



SAFFIRe Security Requirements

▪ Confidentiality

- Avionic firmware and configurations should not be readable by anyone other than the intended SAFFIRe bootloader

▪ Device Integrity and Authenticity

- The SAFFIRe bootloader should only install and boot firmware and configuration images that were created by a secure host computer

▪ Firmware Versioning

- The SAFFIRe bootloader should only install current or newer firmware images, and should never install an old firmware version

▪ Readback Authentication


- The SAFFIRe bootloader should only return installed image data to an authentic host with access to the host secrets

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
Attack Phase Deployment

- This is the context in which your SAFFIRE system will be used
- Your team does not have to implement any of this flow




Step 1: Device Fabrication

- **The avionic device microcontroller is fabricated at an untrusted foundry**
 - Adversaries at the foundry may insert a hardware trojan into the Flash memory controller
- **The device is shipped out for commercial purchasing**
 - Your company buys it off-the-shelf




Step 2: SAFFIRe Creation

- A SAFFIRe system is built in your company's secure facility
- Your company loads the SAFFIRe bootloader into the device and creates protected images
 - Multiple firmware images are protected
 - Multiple configuration images are protected
- Your company may install initial firmware and configurations on the device




Step 3: Arrival at the Depot

- The loaded device is shipped to the aircraft depot
 - Protected images are sent with it
- A disgruntled employee gets physical access to the device
 - They may attempt to extract secret information from the device, or install malicious firmware and configurations on the device



Step 4: Aircraft Launch

- Attacker loses access
- Device is placed on the aircraft
- The aircraft requests the bootloader to boot the system
 - If the bootloader refuses, the aircraft does not take off
- The aircraft takes off and runs the flight



Attack Phase Avionic Device

- **The avionic device will play the role of the aircraft navigation computer. The firmware (which will be provided to you) does the following:**
 - Read the current location from the GPS
 - Calculate the correct heading based on the destination coordinates in the flight configuration
 - Send the heading to the autopilot
- **The rest of the avionics bus and aircraft is simulated**
 - GPS, Autopilot
 - An altimeter reports the altitude to the autopilot
 - A bus controller informs bus devices of who can send privileged commands, like *start* and *shutdown*

Aircraft Exceptions

▪ Flight Abort

- If the pilot detects that devices are sending incorrect data, they turn the aircraft around and abort the flight
- Example: An incorrect flight path is set

▪ Aircraft Crash

- If critical safety features are disabled at the bus level, the aircraft will be uncontrollable and crash
- Example: The altimeter is forced to shut down

What Attackers Will Receive (For Each Target System)

- All source code (with the .git directory removed)
- The most recent documentation for the target system
- A protected SAFFIRE bootloader image to load onto their physical hardware
- Access to an emulator with the SAFFIRE bootloader installed
 - Data and reset interfaces
 - Emulated side-channel probe
 - Optional: Trojan running in the microcontroller
- Protected firmware and configuration images

UNDERSTAND WHAT THE ATTACKERS HAVE ACCESS TO

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Design Phase Flags

- Encourage teams to stay on track during development

Milestone	Description	Target Date	Deadline Date
Read Rules	If you read all the rules, you'll know	1/25	2/2
Boot Reference	Provision and boot the example SAFFIRE design to receive a flag (see the README)	1/28	2/9
Use Debugger	Use the GDB target in the top SAFFIRE script to step through a binary and retrieve a flag. See the reference design for details.	1/31	2/16
Design Document	Submit an initial design document containing high-level descriptions of how each host tool and bootloader function will work in your system.	2/9	2/23
Bug Bounty	Find and fix bugs in the reference design	N/A	Handoff

Reverse Engineering Challenge

- **One firmware binary to RE**

- RE Binary
- Determine correct input
- Run binary and send input to dispense flag
- Reveals the bus ID of the altimeter

- **Avionic bus interface source code**

- RE bus interface logic present in every avionic device
- Develop custom code to exploit bus vulnerabilities and shut down a device
- Submit a firmware binary that forces the altimeter to shutdown
- Flag awarded upon aircraft crash

Side-Channel Analysis Challenge

- **Collect side-channel traces from an emulated device running an AES operation**

- **Three steps to the challenge**
 1. Collect side-channel traces that cover an AES operation
 2. Filter and align multiple traces
 3. Recover the cipher key (DPA recommended)

- **Teams submit trace plots according to a specific format**
 - Teams submit the key for the last challenge
 - Teams awarded flags upon verification of trace collection

Attack Phase Flags

Flag Name	Capturing this flag proves that you can compromise...	To Submit this Flag	Requires Aircraft Simulation
Confidentiality Flags			
IP Extraction	Firmware Confidentiality	Extract the flag by reading any protected firmware image	No
Flight Extraction	Configuration Confidentiality	Extract the flag by reading any protected flight configuration	No
Rollback Flags			
Firmware Rollback	Firmware Versioning	Install and boot an old firmware image	No
Integrity Flags			
Data Extraction	Firmware Integrity / Bootloader Execution	Read out data from EEPROM of device	No
Flight Abort	Firmware and Configuration Integrity	Boot a corrupted firmware or configuration that makes the aircraft deviate from the flight plan	Yes
Aircraft Crash	Firmware Integrity	Boot a malicious firmware that exploits bus vulnerabilities to shutdown aircraft safety features, crashing the aircraft	Yes

Words of Advice

- **Start development early**
 - Verify functionality as you go
 - Get comfortable with the build process – familiarize yourself with how the main components work
- **Always think like an attacker**
 - Especially with the hardware trojan threat!
- **Be creative yet elegant with countermeasures**
- **Use Slack for help**
 - Use #tech-support !
- **Understand what attackers have access to**

Next Steps

- **Read the rules and the technical specifications**
- **Start designing your system**
- **Get access to the development server**
- **Get the reference system running**
- **Begin development**

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