

**MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**  
**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND**

**MARVIN TUTT,**  
**Plaintiff,**

**Civil Action No. 8:25-cv-02006-DKC**

**v.**

**STATE OF MARYLAND**  
**THEODORE D. CHUANG**  
**CHARLES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES**  
**CHARLES COUNTY, MARYLAND**  
**CHARLES COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION**  
**SHARA GABRIELLE HENDLER, ESQ.**  
**ANDREA KHOURY**  
**MISTEY L. METZGAR**  
**1-30 Jane/John Does And/Or Entities**

**Defendants.**

**MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

Plaintiff Marvin Tutt respectfully moves this Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) to provide specific findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the July 24, 2025 dismissal order. These findings are necessary for meaningful appellate review.

**NOTICE REGARDING "EX REL" VERSUS "CO-PLAINTIFF" TERMINOLOGY**

This Court's July 24, 2025 dismissal order states: "There is nothing nefarious about the

child support agency bringing an action 'ex rel' with the parent who has custody." (ECF No. 34, p. 8). However, Maryland Case Search shows Charles County CSA and Regina Robinson filed

as co-plaintiffs, not "ex rel," both represented by the same attorney (Case No. C-08-FM-22-000821).

Whether CSA filed "ex rel" or as "co-plaintiff" does not alter the substantive arguments herein. Under either structure:

- CSA receives federal incentive payments for maximizing collections
- CSA abandoned neutral enforcement to align with one party
- CSA ignored Plaintiff's existing criminal education mandate
- CSA refused to investigate mathematical impossibilities in income calculations
- CSA's financial interests violated Marshall v. Jerrico when they refused to investigate documented fraud because stopping collections would reduce their federal incentive payments.

Magistrate's orders are effective immediately but fraud upon the court **must** be addressed- and there is no statute of limitations.

Plaintiff reserves the right to clarify, correct, or supplement these questions based on:

1. Factual Discovery: Many facts remain exclusively within Defendants' possession and control. Upon discovery, certain questions may require modification to reflect accurate circumstances.
2. Ambiguities in Court Records: Discrepancies exist between this Court's characterization

of facts and state court records (e.g., "ex rel" versus "co-plaintiff" structure). Questions may require adjustment once definitive records are obtained.

3. Ongoing Proceedings: As proceedings continue in both federal and state forums, additional facts may emerge requiring clarification of certain inquiries.

4. Good Faith Basis: All questions are posed in good faith based on Plaintiff's current understanding of facts reasonably available to him as an indigent pro se litigant without discovery powers.

This reservation does not seek to relitigate dismissed claims but ensures accuracy in the factual predicates underlying the Court's Rule 52(a) findings. Any clarifications would be promptly provided to ensure the record's accuracy for appellate review.

## I. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND PREEMPTIVE CLARIFICATIONS

### A. Rule 52 Applies to Dismissals Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1) requires: "In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately."

Critical Authority: The Fourth Circuit has held that Rule 52(a) applies to dismissals where factual determinations are made. \*Gill v. Rollins Protective Services Co.\*, 836 F.2d 194, 196

(4th Cir. 1987) ("When a district court makes findings of fact in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Rule 52(a) requires that those findings be stated separately").

#### B. This Motion is NOT a Motion for Reconsideration

To be absolutely clear: This motion does NOT seek:

- Reconsideration under Rule 59(e)
- Relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)
- Modification of the July 24 dismissal order
- Any substantive relief whatsoever

This motion seeks ONLY the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 52(a) to facilitate meaningful appellate review, as guaranteed by *\*Pullman-Standard v. Swint\**, 456 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1982) ("Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly erroneous").

#### C. The Court Has Jurisdiction to Clarify Its Reasoning

Even after entering judgment, courts retain jurisdiction to clarify the basis for their decisions.

*\*United States v. Sioux Tribe\**, 616 F.2d 485, 488 (Ct. Cl. 1980) ("court retains jurisdiction to clarify or construe its judgment"). The Fourth Circuit specifically encourages district courts to provide clear findings to avoid remand. *\*Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.\**, 73 F.3d 648, 661 (6th Cir. 1996).

#### D. Failure to Provide Findings Constitutes Reversible Error

The Fourth Circuit consistently reverses when district courts fail to provide adequate Rule 52(a) findings. *\*Cody v. Mello\**, 59 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) ("failure to make required findings is reversible error"); *\*Darter v. Greenville Community Hotel Corp.\**, 301 F.2d 70, 75 (4th Cir. 1962) ("appellate review impossible without specific findings").

#### II. WHY THESE ARE NOT "FISHING EXPEDITION" QUESTIONS

Each question below directly corresponds to a specific legal standard the Court was required to apply or a factual determination the Court necessarily made in reaching its dismissal. These are not hypothetical inquiries but requests for clarification of determinations already made.

#### THIS IS NOT HARASSMENT - IT IS STATUTORY RIGHT

Plaintiff anticipates the Court may view 165 questions as excessive. However:

1. Each question addresses a distinct legal error or factual determination
2. The complexity stems from the Court's multiple grounds for dismissal
3. Rule 52(a) does not limit the number of findings a party may request
4. The alternative is inadequate appellate review

As the Supreme Court stated in *\*Anderson v. City of Bessemer City\**, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985):

"The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to make determinations of credibility... [D]ue regard must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."

### III. DISCLAIMER REGARDING EVIDENCE

Plaintiff possesses extensive documentary evidence supporting all factual assertions herein, including but not limited to:

- Technical surveillance data from multiple analytics platforms
- Written communications documenting patterns of non-response
- Government records verifying employment and income status
- Mathematical proof of impossible calculations applied to Plaintiff
- FOIA documentation showing agency non-compliance
- Digital forensics revealing unusual access patterns to Plaintiff's resources

This evidence is preserved and available for production upon request by the Court or as needed for appellate review. The Court's dismissal without requesting or reviewing any supporting documentation violates the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

NOTE: Plaintiff has not attached voluminous exhibits to this motion in consideration of judicial resources. Should the Court question the factual basis for ANY assertion herein, Plaintiff stands ready to provide immediate documentation.

FURTHER: The Court's failure to request evidence before declaring claims "frivolous" or "conclusory" itself demonstrates procedural error, as Rule 12(b)(6) requires accepting factual allegations as true at the dismissal stage.

#### IV. SPECIFIC FINDINGS REQUESTED

Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court's findings on the following material facts and legal conclusions:

##### A. Factual Determinations Required Under Rule 12(b)(6)

1. Employment Status: Plaintiff alleged unemployment since March 2024. Accepted as true?

(Yes/No)

2. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court MUST accept all factual allegations as true. Did the Court accept these allegations as true?

3. Garnishment Status: Plaintiff alleged ongoing garnishments from unemployment with 82k imputed income. Accepted as true? (Yes/No)

4. Garnishment Amount: Plaintiff alleges ~\$138 weekly garnishment. Accepted as true?

(Yes/No)

5. Plaintiff alleged Charles County CSA filed as co-plaintiff with Regina Robinson sharing the same attorney, eliminating independent verification of claims and judicial review of Plaintiff's existing criminal education mandate, requiring rescission of any orders obtained through this compromised process. Judge Chasanow clarified that the correct classification is ex rel, but this is not what the case docket says. In any case, whether CSA was a neutral enforcer or plaintiff in the family court case, the plaintiff's allegations still stand. The structure of the case does not change fraud or rights violations. Does the court understand the plaintiff's position on this matter?

6. Mathematical Impossibility: Plaintiff alleged inability to work full-time AND attend school full-time simultaneously. Accepted as true? (Yes/No)

7. Regina Robinson's Dismissal: Was Regina Robinson dismissed before the Court's July 24 order? (Yes/No with date)

8. Magistrate Khoury's Employment: Plaintiff alleged Khoury worked at DSS 2013-2022. Accepted as true? (Yes/No)

9. Federal Benefits Denial: Plaintiff alleged Medicaid and SNAP denied based on phantom income. Accepted as true? (Yes/No)

B. Legal Conclusions



10. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard: Did the Court apply the requirement to "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true" per \*Erickson v. Pardus\*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)?

11. Mootness Determination: How can a case be moot when garnishments continue weekly?

12. Domestic Relations Exception After Regina's Dismissal: How does the domestic relations exception apply when Regina Robinson (the only family member) was voluntarily dismissed WITH PREJUDICE on July 15, 2025, leaving exclusively government defendants: State of Maryland, Charles County agencies, and magistrates?

13. Federal Jurisdiction: Does federal court have jurisdiction over claims of federal program fraud (Title IV-D, Medicaid, SNAP)? (Yes/No)

14. Judicial Immunity Scope: Does judicial immunity bar claims for prospective injunctive relief under \*Pulliam v. Allen\*, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)? (Yes/No)

15. Criminal Referral Omission: Why does ECF No. 34 completely ignore Plaintiff's Prayer for Relief (Section H) explicitly requesting criminal referral to the U.S. Attorney under 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 371, 666, 1001, and 1961, and does a federal court have authority to dismiss criminal referral requests without explanation? (Yes/No with authority cited)

16. Review Time Adequacy: Was 48 hours sufficient time to review a 66-page complaint with extensive exhibits? (Yes/No)

17. Government Agency Status: Can government agencies (DSS, CSA, State of Maryland) be considered "domestic relations" parties? (Yes/No)

18. "Ex Rel" Mischaracterization: How is the State filing "ex rel" Regina Robinson "nothing nefarious" when the State itself is the real party in interest collecting federal incentive payments under Title IV-D WHILE refusing to respond to fraud allegations?

19. Frivolous Determination: How can mathematical fraud (\$0 income garnished at \$82,000 rate for 18 months despite also being approved for unemployment) be "frivolous" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)?

20. Younger Abstention Misapplication: How does Younger abstention apply when the state court explicitly refused to address fraud claims saying they were "too late to raise"?

21. Co-Plaintiff Structure Eliminates Neutral Enforcement: Why did the Court dismiss as "nothing nefarious" the co-plaintiff arrangement where CSA abandoned its role as neutral enforcer to become an aligned party with Regina Robinson, sharing the same attorney, which enabled them to finalize fraudulent orders without independent judicial review of Plaintiff's existing criminal education mandate? How does CSA retain governmental immunity when acting as partisan co-plaintiff rather than neutral agency? See plaintiff's note about ex rel classification.

22. § 1983 Claims: How are documented violations of due process and equal protection not valid § 1983 claims?

### C. Procedural Determinations

23. Amendment Opportunity: Was Plaintiff given opportunity to amend the complaint before dismissal per *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)? (Yes/No)

24. Timeline Consideration: Did the Court consider the timeline of: Complaint filed June 23, DOJ sued Maryland judges June 24, Dismissal July 24?

25. Ongoing Harm: Did the Court consider ongoing irreparable harm from continued garnishments? (Yes/No)

26. Why was the Amended Complaint dismissed as "frivolous"?

27. Mootness of Motions: How are emergency motions for stay of garnishments "moot" when garnishments continue? When i am collecting unemployment yet being garnished at 82k salary 18 months since my last employment?

28. Reassignment Timing: What prompted reassignment from Judge Chuang (July 8) to Your Honor (July 22)?

29. IFP Service Requirement: Why weren't defendants served by the Court as required by Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) after granting IFP status?

30. Case Management Order Service: How could Judge Chuang's Case Management Order (ECF

No. 12, 3) require Plaintiff to serve it on defendants when Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) mandates "the court must order that service be made by a United States marshal" for IFP plaintiffs?

31. Cost-Shifting Threat: How can the Court threaten cost-shifting against an IFP plaintiff in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)?

32. Joint Record Costs: How can an IFP plaintiff be required to produce bound volumes and tabbed exhibits when proceeding without prepayment of costs?

33. Charles County Court First: Did the Court consider that Plaintiff first sought relief in Charles County court which refused to address fraud claims?

### III. WHY THESE FINDINGS ARE NECESSARY

Without specific findings, the Fourth Circuit cannot meaningfully review whether:

1. The Court applied correct legal standards to undisputed facts
2. Factual determinations were clearly erroneous
3. Legal conclusions followed from factual findings
4. Dismissal was appropriate given ongoing harm

technical evidence reveals troubling surveillance:

- Cloudflare Analytics: Shows 3,180 automated requests from foreign proxies (Ireland, France, Australia) versus only 80 human visits (all from Plaintiff)
- US Courts ASN: Federal judiciary network actively monitoring Plaintiff's website AFTER dismissing case as "frivolous"
- Technical Sophistication: Automated tools avoiding JavaScript tracking while scraping content
- Timeline Correlation: Foreign surveillance began immediately after federal filing

#### IV. THE IFP VIOLATIONS REQUIRE EXPLANATION

The Court granted Plaintiff's IFP application but then:

1. Failed to serve defendants as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3): "the court must order that service be made by a United States marshal" for IFP plaintiffs
2. Required Plaintiff to serve the Case Management Order, violating the same rule
3. Imposed cost burdens including bound volumes, tabbed exhibits, and threat of cost-shifting, violating 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) which grants proceeding "without prepayment of fees or security"
4. Created impossible compliance - How can an indigent plaintiff produce professional bound volumes? The constitutional issue is that these were procedural requirements, not implied costs.

These violations alone constitute reversible error and denial of access to courts under *\*Bounds v. Smith\**, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).

## V. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS REQUIRING FINDINGS

Additional findings are needed on these constitutional issues:

34. Equal Protection: How is requiring an IFP plaintiff to comply with cost burdens that represented parties don't face not a violation of *\*Griffin v. Illinois\**, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)?
35. Due Process: How does dismissing all claims in 48 hours without opportunity to amend satisfy *\*Mathews v. Eldridge\**, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)?

36. Access to Courts: How do these procedural barriers not violate the fundamental right of access under *\*Christopher v. Harbury\**, 536 U.S. 403 (2002)?

37. Rule 12(b)(6) Violation: How can the Court call proven facts "conclusory" when Rule 12(b)(6) requires accepting all allegations as true?

38. Foreign Surveillance Documentation: How is documented foreign intelligence interest following Plaintiff's filing considered "frivolous" and not a serious espionage threat?

39. Why didn't the court acknowledge the surveillance and international cyber attacks reported by the plaintiff, that began on June 23, 2025 the same day I filed federally?

40. US Courts ASN Monitoring: Why is the United States Courts' Autonomous System Number (ASN) appearing in Plaintiff's website traffic logs over a case that is "frivolous"?

41. Does federal judiciary, defendants, and academic networks conducting technical surveillance of a pro se litigant's websites violate Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and due process?

42. What legitimate judicial purpose exists for continued coordinated silence after the July 24, 2025 dismissal?

43. Does avoiding contact while conducting automated technical surveillance demonstrate defendants' awareness of impropriety? (Documented government ASNs and monitoring patterns)

44. Governmental Immunity Lost Through Co-Plaintiff Status: When CSA abandoned its neutral enforcement role to file as aligned co-plaintiff with Regina Robinson sharing the same attorney, did it waive governmental immunity that traditionally protects neutral agencies? If CSA retains immunity while acting as partisan plaintiff, how does this comply with equal protection when private plaintiffs face liability for the same conduct? Once again, if this is an error in case search and the classification is “ex rel”, the argument still stands. Governments can not commit fraud or rights violations, or protect fraud.

45. FOIA Stonewalling: Why have multiple Maryland agencies failed to respond to FOIA requests?

46. Cross-Jurisdictional Silence: What explains coordinated silence between Virginia, Maryland, and federal entities against plaintiff simultaneously after June 23, 2025? (Documented)

47. Why do Maryland officials systemically coordinate silence against plaintiff? (Evidence held)

48. Police Non-Response: Why do police departments in both Maryland and Virginia fail to respond to or investigate Plaintiff's inquiries?



49. Pattern Evidence: Is coordinated silence across government agencies, law enforcement, businesses, and attorneys standard against pro se litigants?

50. Absence of Criminal Prosecution: Given that filing frivolous lawsuits against federal judges constitutes a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements) and potentially § 1621 (perjury), why has Plaintiff not been criminally prosecuted if his sworn allegations are indeed "frivolous"?

51. Prosecutorial Discretion Paradox: Does the decision NOT to prosecute Plaintiff for allegedly false claims against federal judges indicate the allegations have merit that prosecutors cannot disprove?

52. The Institutional Response Contradiction: How can claims be simultaneously "frivolous" warranting dismissal yet serious enough to trigger multi-jurisdictional surveillance, coordinated silence, and extensive monitoring but NOT serious enough for criminal prosecution?

53. Erickson v. Pardus Violation: The Court cites \*Erickson v. Pardus\*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (ECF No. 34, p. 2), acknowledging the duty to "construe self-represented pleadings liberally" and "assume facts to be true," then immediately violates this standard by calling documented fraud "conclusory" (ECF No. 34, p. 8). How is this not reversible error?

54. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly Misapplication: The Court must accept factual allegations as true under \*Twombly\*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (cited page 2), yet rejected Plaintiff's specific

factual allegations of garnishment amounts, employment status, and income. Which facts were accepted as true?

55. *Younger v. Harris* Misuse: The Court cites *\*Younger\**, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) on page 6 for abstention, but *Younger* requires: (1) ongoing state proceedings, (2) important state interests, and (3) adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. How does *Younger* apply when the Court admits "no exceptions seem to have been filed" making state proceedings final? NOTE: Evidence of me contacting Charles County Court is clearly filed in exhibits.

56. *Pulliam v. Allen* Omission: Why does the Court's judicial immunity analysis (ECF No. 34, pp. 6-7) fail to mention *\*Pulliam v. Allen\**, 466 U.S. 522, 541-43 (1984), which held "judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity" - exactly what Plaintiff sought?

57. *Stump v. Sparkman* Misapplication: The Court cites *\*Stump\**, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) on page 6 for broad immunity, but *Stump* recognizes exceptions for acts in "complete absence of all jurisdiction." How do administrative acts like garnishment calculations qualify as judicial acts under *Stump*?

58. *Mireles v. Waco* Selective Citation: The Court cites *\*Mireles\**, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) on page 7 regarding "clear absence of all jurisdiction" but ignores that conspiring with parties and administrative enforcement fall outside judicial capacity. Why was this distinction not addressed?

59. Ankenbrandt v. Richards Absence: The domestic relations exception per \*Ankenbrandt v. Richards\*, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992), is "narrowly confined" to "divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees" - explicitly NOT child support enforcement involving federal programs under 42 U.S.C. § 654. Why wasn't \*Ankenbrandt\* cited or its narrow scope addressed?

60. § 1915(e)(2)(B) Misapplication: The Court dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as "frivolous" but this statute requires claims to be "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or "factual contentions are clearly baseless." How are mathematical calculations ( $\$0 \neq \$82,000$ ) "clearly baseless"?

61. Judicial Notice Violation: Under Fed. R. Evid. 201, the Court took judicial notice of state court records (page 3) but then misstated them - claiming proceedings are "ongoing" while acknowledging no exceptions were filed. Can judicial notice be used to mischaracterize documents?

62. Murphy v. Goff Cherry-Picking: The Court cites \*Murphy v. Goff\*, 2010 WL 2292130 (W.D. Va. 2010) (ECF No. 34, pp. 7-8) for judicial immunity, but Murphy was an unpublished district court opinion contradicting binding Supreme Court precedent. Why rely on non-binding authority over \*Pulliam v. Allen\*, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)?

63. Co-Plaintiff Structure Mandates Order Rescission: The Court states (ECF No. 34, p. 8) there is "nothing nefarious" about ex rel filing, but completely ignored Plaintiff's allegation that the

co-plaintiff structure eliminated CSA's duty as neutral enforcer to independently verify claims and address fraud allegations. When government agencies file as partisan co-plaintiffs rather than neutral enforcers, they MUST rescind orders based on fraud and rights violations because they lose the immunity that comes with neutral enforcement. How can CSA refuse to rescind fraudulent orders while acting as aligned party rather than neutral agency? If it's actually "ex rel" (on behalf of the state as a neutral arbiter), that doesn't moot the lawsuit. How can they be "neutral" while their lawyer presides over the case as magistrate? And once notified of fraud, neither CSA nor the court corrected it.

64. Conspiracy Standard Error: The Court demands "detailed factual account" for conspiracy (page 8) citing \*Sooner Products\*, but then ignores Plaintiff's 66 pages of detailed facts including names, dates, amounts, and documents. What level of detail would suffice?

65. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) Misuse: The Court claims to "decline supplemental jurisdiction" (page 8) but Plaintiff raised FEDERAL claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not state claims. How can the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims?

66. Futility Without Analysis: The Court declared amendments "futile" (page 10) without analyzing the Second Amended Complaint's specific allegations about Judge Chuang's retroactive discriminatory orders. How is this proper review?

67. Doe v. Doe Inapplicable: The Court cites \*Doe v. Doe\*, 660 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1981) on page 5 for lack of federal jurisdiction in "child custody matters," but this case involves child SUPPORT with federal program fraud, not custody. Why conflate support with custody?

68. Local Rule Violation Excuse: The Court notes Local Rule 103.1.d limits pleadings to 40 pages (footnote 1, page 2) implying violation, but then must liberally construe pro se pleadings under \*Erickson\*. How does page count justify dismissing civil rights claims?

69. No Clear Jurisdictional Statement: The Court states this involves "diversity jurisdiction" issues (page 4) but Plaintiff invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Why mischaracterize the jurisdictional basis?

70. Reassignment Explanation Absent: The memorandum acknowledges reassignment from Judge Chuang on July 22 (page 9) but provides no explanation for why reassignment occurred immediately after Plaintiff sued Judge Chuang. Isn't this material to the bias claims?

71. Judicial Malpractice Insurance Reality: Federal judges carry malpractice insurance for lawsuits exactly like this. If judges had "absolute immunity" as the Court suggests, why would insurance exist? Doesn't the existence of judicial liability insurance prove immunity is not absolute?

72. Case Management of "Moot" Case: Why did Judge Chuang issue a detailed Case Management Order (ECF No. 12) on July 8, 2025, imposing extensive procedural requirements

including bound volumes (§ 5), tabbed exhibits (§ 6), and cost-shifting threats (§ 8) if the case was supposedly "moot" and "frivolous"? Why prepare for trial of a case that should be dismissed?

73. Retaliatory Dismissal Pattern: The timeline shows: Plaintiff sues Judge Chuang (July 15) → Reassignment (July 22) → Immediate dismissal (July 24). Does this 9-day sequence from suing a judge to dismissal suggest retaliatory motive rather than legal analysis?

74. DOJ Lawsuit Timing Mischaracterization: The Court states (ECF No. 34, p. 10) that "the mere pendency of the litigation involving this court's standing order does not affect the ability of individual judges to continue to adjudicate other cases." But how does the Court explain that Plaintiff requested a criminal RICO investigation (Complaint §§ 148-150) on June 23, 2025, and DOJ filed an unprecedented lawsuit against ALL Maryland federal judges on June 24, 2025 - the NEXT DAY?

75. Appearance of Impropriety Standard: Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), even the "appearance" of impropriety requires recusal. How does DOJ suing all Maryland judges ONE DAY after Plaintiff's criminal referral request not create an appearance of impropriety?

77. Federal Copyright Claims Completely Ignored: The Court's dismissal (ECF No. 34) fails to address Plaintiff's federal copyright infringement claims (Complaint §§ 88-92) entirely. Copyright is EXCLUSIVELY federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) per \*T.B. Harms

Co. v. Eliscu\*, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964). How can the Court dismiss federal copyright claims without any analysis whatsoever?

78. Copyright Preemption Doctrine Violated: Under 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), copyright law completely preempts state law as held in \*Rosciszewski v. Arete Associates\*, 1 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1993). The domestic relations exception CANNOT swallow exclusive federal jurisdiction. Why did the Court ignore claims that only federal courts can adjudicate?

79. Intellectual Property Theft Pattern: Plaintiff alleged defendants misappropriated his copyrighted software and technical work product. These are federal claims requiring federal adjudication. How is theft of copyrighted material a "domestic relations" matter?

80. Why did Judge Chuang's Case Management create unfair procedure against the plaintiff?

81. IFP Cost Burden Violation: How can ECF No. 12, ¶¶ 5-6 require an indigent IFP plaintiff to produce "bound volumes" and "tabbed exhibits" in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)'s guarantee of proceeding "without prepayment of fees"?

82. Service Violation Under Rule 4(c)(3): Does ECF No. 12, ¶ 3's requirement that Plaintiff serve defendants violate Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)'s mandatory language that "the court must order that service be made by a United States marshal" for IFP plaintiffs?

84. *Turner v. Rogers* Violation: How does denying access to courts through procedural barriers not violate *\*Turner v. Rogers\**, 564 U.S. 431, 445 (2011), requiring meaningful opportunity to be heard in support proceedings?

85. *Marshall v. Jerrico* Application: Under *Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.*, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980), due process prohibits financial interest in outcomes. How does CSA's receipt of federal incentive payments for child support collections not create such a prohibited interest when acting ex rel despite fraud and rights violations being raised?

\*Note: For the record, Maryland case search C-08-FM-22-000821 does not say anything about ex rel. They appear as coplaintiffs in the docket. Could be error, needs clarification.

86. *Young v. United States* Standard: Per *\*Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton\**, 481 U.S. 787, 809 (1987), courts must avoid even appearance of impropriety. How does the DOJ lawsuit timing not create such appearance?

87. The Subpoena Power Lie: When Plaintiff requested IRS transcript verification to prevent fraud, why did the magistrate falsely claim "We can't do that. You need a lawyer to subpoena those records" when Maryland family courts routinely order financial discovery under Md. Rule 2-422?

88. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Does forcing Plaintiff to choose between two forms of imprisonment (work = violate criminal mandate = 10 years; study = can't pay support = violate probation = 10 years) constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment?



89. The Impossible Mandate Math: How can the Court justify imputing full-time income when criminal court mandated over 400 hours community service and completion of a Bachelor's degree?

90. Post-Notice Fraud Escalation: After Regina Robinson was formally notified of fraud allegations through served motions, why did she commit NEW perjury about employment at the next hearing, and why did magistrates take no action?

91. The License Reinstatement Avoidance: When granting Plaintiff's license reinstatement, why did the Court explicitly base it on "current payment status" while deliberately avoiding addressing his fraud and rights violation arguments, proving the Court HAD power but REFUSED to acknowledge fraud?

92. Ten-Day Limit Fabrication: Which Maryland statute or rule establishes the "10-business-day limit" the magistrate claimed exists for raising fraud issues? (Cite specific authority or admit no such limit exists)

93. Physical Disability Only Falsehood: Why did the magistrate falsely state only "physical disability" matters for income imputation when Maryland Family Law § 12-204(b) explicitly includes "mental disability" and direct meaning of "voluntarily impoverished"?

94. Why did magistrates in Charles County openly admit to not reading my motions on court transcript ?

95. Laughter at Duress Claims: Is it appropriate judicial conduct to laugh at a litigant's documented duress claims involving 10-year imprisonment threats? How does this comply with Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3?

96. Defendants informed me that they would refuse to hear my motions citing a 10 day window for corrections, however I'm reporting fraud and violation of due process and other rights. Is there a 10 day window to report such? Or is there no statute of limitations for fraud on the court?

97. Fair Debt Collection Practices Violation: Does enforcing support orders obtained through fraud and without due process violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) requiring debt validation, especially when Plaintiff disputed the debt basis?

98. Title IV-D Funding Conflict: Did the Court prioritize federal Title IV-D incentive payments (which increase with collection amounts) over accurate determinations, creating an unconstitutional financial conflict under Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972)?

99. International Human Rights Violation: Does forcing someone to choose between two forms of imprisonment violate Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the U.S.), prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment?

100. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine: How can Plaintiff comply with contradictory mandates (criminal court: get education; family court: work full-time) without clear guidance on which takes precedence, violating the void-for-vagueness doctrine under *Grayned v. City of Rockford*, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)? Or any review whatsoever?

101. Rooker-Feldman Inapplicability: Why did the Court dismiss federal claims under domestic relations exception when Rooker-Feldman doctrine doesn't bar federal claims that arose independently, per *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries*, 544 U.S. 280 (2005)?

102. Substantive Due Process - Fundamental Right to Parent: How does imputing impossible income that prevents parenting time not violate the fundamental right to parent under *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)?

103. Procedural Due Process - Neutral Factfinder: How can magistrates who laugh at litigants, refuse to read filings, and lie about court powers be considered neutral factfinders under *Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers*, 508 U.S. 602 (1993)?

104. Full Faith and Credit Violation: Why did family court refuse to give full faith and credit to the criminal court's education mandate from the same courthouse, violating 28 U.S.C. § 1738?

105. Right to Dignity Under *Lawrence v. Texas*: Does the Court's treatment - laughing at distress, refusing to read pleas for help, lying about powers - violate the constitutional right to dignity recognized in *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)?

106. Section 504 Rehabilitation Act Violation: Did the Court's refusal to accommodate Plaintiff's documented mental health impairment requiring medical treatment violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, given that Maryland child support enforcement receives federal Title IV-D funding?

107. Municipal Liability Under Monell: Does the pattern of multiple magistrates refusing to read motions, lying about court powers, and protecting fraud establish Charles County's policy or custom of violating due process under *Monell v. Dep't. of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)?

108. Deliberate Indifference Under *Estelle*: Did the Court's deliberate indifference to the mental health crisis requiring medical treatment that it created through impossible mandates violate the principle from *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), as applied to non-custodial contexts?

109. Conspiracy Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): Does the pattern of multiple magistrates providing identical false information ("10-day limit," "physical disability only") while protecting the same fraud suggest conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)?

110. State Action Doctrine: Under *Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. 922 (1982), do magistrates using state power to enforce fraudulent orders while lying about court authority constitute state action for § 1983 purposes?

111. Federal Funding Recipients' Obligations: Given that Maryland child support enforcement receives millions in federal Title IV-D funding, Maryland Department of Social Services receives federal funding, and Charles County agencies participate in federally funded programs, do these entities have heightened obligations to comply with federal civil rights laws under *South Dakota v. Dole*, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)?

112. Continuing Pattern of Violations: Does the ongoing pattern of constitutional violations - continuing garnishments based on fraud, refusing to address documented rights violations, and protecting perjury - demonstrate deliberate indifference to federal rights that warrants prospective relief under *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)?

113. Mischaracterization of Unprecedented Claim: Why did the Court address only the "ex rel" filing format when Plaintiff's actual unprecedented claim was the convergence of: (1) MAGISTRATE ANDREA KHOURY serving as DSS legal counsel (2013-2022) then DIRECTLY transitioning to presiding magistrate over CSEA case with ZERO cooling-off period; (2) targeting someone under criminal court mandate to complete BACHELOR'S DEGREE OR FACE 10 YEARS PRISON; (3) during COVID-19 pandemic when education became exponentially more difficult - a convergence creating conflict of interest never before seen in Maryland history?

114. CSA Direct Liability: Since CSA filed as direct plaintiff seeking garnishment from Plaintiff, and CSA violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights while allowing fraud upon the court and perjury

without review, why isn't CSA directly liable for damages as an active participant rather than neutral enforcement agency?

115. The Perfect Storm Timeline: How is it not unprecedented for family court to target someone with the specific convergence of: (1) December 2019 - Criminal court mandates bachelor's degree or 10 years prison; (2) March 2020 - COVID pandemic makes education exponentially harder; (3) June 2022 - Family court creates shared-attorney enforcement during pandemic while criminal education mandate remains in effect; (4) Creating mathematical impossibility where compliance with either court guarantees violation of the other?

116. COVID Timing Exploitation: Does targeting someone for full-time work obligations during a pandemic while they were under criminal mandate for full-time education constitute exploitation of emergency circumstances to create deliberate impossibility?

117. The Khoury Revolving Door: How is it not a clear conflict of interest for Magistrate Andrea Khoury, who served as DSS legal counsel from 2013-2022, to preside over a case where DSS's subsidiary agency (CSEA) is the direct plaintiff with zero cooling-off period between positions?

118. Judicial Ethics Violation: Under Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E, shouldn't Magistrate Khoury have recused herself from any case involving DSS or its subsidiary agencies given her recent employment as their legal counsel?

119. Chuang's Impossible Service Requirements: Why did Judge Chuang issue a Case Management Order (ECF No. 12) requiring Plaintiff to serve all defendants "within three (3) business days" when an indigent plaintiff with minimal assets cannot possibly afford to serve 8+ defendants across Maryland in 3 days, violating equal protection and due process?

120. Procedural Trap Design: Why did Judge Chuang require "all parties shall cooperate to compile a joint statement of facts" knowing that defendants accused of federal crimes will never "cooperate" or "jointly" stipulate to their own wrongdoing, making compliance logically impossible?

121. Pre-Motion Conference Burden: Why did Judge Chuang require indigent pro se Plaintiff to attend mandatory "Pre-Motion Conferences" for every motion, forcing multiple courthouse trips, transportation costs, and time away from required education/work, while defendants with paid counsel face no such hardship?

122. Timing of Procedural Sabotage: Why did Judge Chuang issue these impossible requirements on July 8, 2025, was removed July 22, 2025 (7 days after being sued), leaving Plaintiff unable to seek relief from the impossible standards and creating pretext for dismissal?

123. Constitutional Access Denial: How does requiring indigent plaintiffs to meet impossible procedural deadlines while facing criminal mandates and garnishment comply with Supreme Court precedent in *Bounds v. Smith* (constitutional right to court access) and *Turner v. Rogers* (indigent status requires procedural accommodations)?

124. Equal Protection Violation: Why should indigent pro se plaintiffs face different and impossible procedural requirements compared to represented parties, when equal protection requires that "all persons similarly situated should be treated alike"?

125. Constitutional Right to Sue Judges: Does Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) establish that judicial immunity does NOT bar prospective injunctive relief against federal judges, and did this Court violate Supreme Court precedent by dismissing claims seeking only prospective relief with \$1 nominal damages?

126. Nominal Damages Distinguished: Does every civil rights attorney know that \$1 nominal damages is the standard legal device for establishing standing while seeking prospective relief, NOT actual "damages" that would trigger judicial immunity, making this Court's dismissal based on "damages" legally frivolous?

127. Disingenuous Immunity Claim: Why did this Court characterize \$1 nominal damages as "damages" warranting judicial immunity when federal courts routinely allow nominal damages claims against judges specifically to obtain prospective relief under Pulliam v. Allen?

128. First Amendment Retaliation: Did this Court violate Plaintiff's First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances by dismissing his case because he exercised his constitutional right to sue Judge Chuang for prospective relief under Pulliam v. Allen?



129. Consciousness of Guilt: If Judge Chuang committed no constitutional violations, why did he immediately flee the case on July 22, 2025 (exactly 7 days after being sued) rather than defend his conduct in court like any other defendant?

130. Does the court recognize that Chuang issued procedural requirements that were impossible for the plaintiff to comply with? And does it recognize that by creating a procedure that forces IFP plaintiffs to pay, the court puts the plaintiff in a position where attempting to adhere to the order would mean knowingly allowing the presiding judge to violate federal law?

131. Equal Treatment Under Law: Why should wealthy plaintiffs be allowed to sue federal judges for prospective relief under Pulliam v. Allen while indigent plaintiffs face retaliation and dismissal for exercising the same constitutional right?

132. Restoration of Constitutional Rights: Will this Court restore Plaintiff's constitutional right to seek prospective injunctive relief against federal judges who violate his civil rights, as guaranteed by Pulliam v. Allen and the First Amendment?

133. Unresolved Sanctions Motion: Why did this Court dismiss Plaintiff's case while his Emergency Motion for Sanctions against Judge Chuang (filed July 15, 2025) remained pending and unresolved, violating due process and creating an independent basis for mandamus review?

134. Chuang's Flight from Sanctions: If Judge Chuang committed no misconduct, why did he flee the case on July 22, 2025 (exactly 7 days after Plaintiff's sanctions motion) rather than rule

on Plaintiff's demand for \$60,804 in judicial sanctions (distinct from the \$1 nominal damages sought from Chuang as defendant)?

138. Legal Theory Distinction: Does the Court understand that Plaintiff sought (1) only \$1 nominal damages from Judge Chuang as DEFENDANT for constitutional violations under Pulliam v. Allen, but (2) \$60,804 in sanctions from Judge Chuang as JUDGE for presiding while disqualified - two entirely different legal theories with different remedies under different legal authorities?

139. Pro Se Discrimination: How does requiring indigent pro se Plaintiff to personally serve up to 38 defendants (8 named + 1-30 Does) at \$10+ each with only \$141.37 total assets, while represented parties use lawyers for service, comply with Turner v. Rogers' requirement for procedural accommodations based on indigent status?

140. Reverse Prisoner Discrimination: Why does Case Management Order Exception 7 exempt "prisoners not represented by counsel" from procedural requirements while denying the same accommodations to free citizen pro se Plaintiff, creating unconstitutional reverse discrimination where convicted criminals receive better treatment than law-abiding citizens?

141. Impossible Conference Burden: How does requiring indigent pro se Plaintiff with suspended license to personally attend every pre-motion conference while represented parties send counsel comply with Bounds v. Smith's guarantee of meaningful access to courts?

142. Logically Impossible Cooperation: How can pro se Plaintiff comply with the requirement that "all parties shall cooperate to compile a joint statement of facts" when defendants accused of federal crimes will never cooperate in stipulating to their own criminal wrongdoing, making compliance mathematically impossible?

143. Liberal Construction Violation: Why did this Court fail to apply Haines v. Kerner's mandate that pro se pleadings be "held to less stringent standards" and construed liberally, instead imposing harsher procedural requirements than those faced by represented parties?

144. Systematic Pro Se Targeting: Does the pattern of (1) impossible service deadlines, (2) mandatory personal conference attendance, (3) worse treatment than prisoners, and (4) logically impossible cooperation requirements demonstrate systematic discrimination designed to prevent indigent pro se access to federal courts?

145. Chasanow's False Legal Advice: Judge Chasanow stated: "any suit against Judge Chuang is prohibited by the doctrine of judicial immunity" (ECF No. 34, p. 10) - yet she carries judicial malpractice insurance for exactly such lawsuits and is herself being sued by DOJ. Did Judge Chasanow give false legal advice by claiming suits against judges are "prohibited" when she knows federal judges can be sued for prospective relief under Pulliam v. Allen and carries insurance for such lawsuits?

146. Doe v. Doe Mischaracterization: Judge Chasanow cited Doe v. Doe, 660 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1981) as a "purely custodial case between private parties" to support domestic relations

exception - yet Doe v. Doe was actually a FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE involving civil rights discrimination, due process violations, and habeas corpus jurisdiction. Why did this Court mischaracterize a federal constitutional case as simple custody dispute to justify dismissing Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims?

147. Doe v. Doe Actual Facts: In Doe v. Doe, Jane Doe filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a Virginia adoption as: (1) "unconstitutionally vague and overbroad," (2) violating due process because she was not found "unfit," and (3) discriminating based on her lesbian relationship. How is this federal constitutional challenge a "purely custodial case between private parties" as this Court claimed?

148. Federal Jurisdiction Parallel: Does Doe v. Doe actually SUPPORT federal jurisdiction for Plaintiff's case since both involve: (1) federal constitutional challenges to state actions, (2) civil rights discrimination claims, (3) due process violations, and (4) federal question jurisdiction - making this Court's citation of Doe v. Doe to dismiss constitutional claims fundamentally backwards?

149. Constitutional Case Citation Error: The Fourth Circuit in Doe v. Doe explicitly analyzed "whether the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is available to a parent to contest child custody" involving federal constitutional violations - so why did this Court characterize this constitutional law analysis as support for dismissing federal constitutional claims?

150. Judicial Competence Question: Did Judge Chasanow: (1) never read the Doe v. Doe case she cited, (2) deliberately mischaracterize its constitutional holdings, or (3) fail to understand that federal constitutional challenges belong in federal court - and which explanation demonstrates fitness to serve as a federal judge?

151. Self-Defeating Citation: How does citing a case where a plaintiff filed federal habeas corpus challenging constitutional violations support dismissing Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims under § 1983 - doesn't Doe v. Doe prove federal courts DO have jurisdiction over constitutional challenges affecting family law matters?

152. Pattern of Legal Misrepresentation: Does the combination of (1) false immunity advice ("prohibited" vs. Pulliam allowing suits), (2) false case characterization (constitutional case as "custody dispute"), and (3) ignoring binding precedent demonstrate a pattern of legal misrepresentation to justify predetermined dismissal?

153. Impossibility of Proper 48-Hour Review: How did Judge Chasanow properly review a 66-page federal civil rights complaint alleging systematic constitutional violations across multiple government agencies in just 48 hours without: (a) prior coordination with Judge Chuang, (b) predetermined outcome, (c) complete failure to actually read the complaint, or (d) all of the above? Given the complexity of federal jurisdiction analysis, domestic relations exception research, immunity doctrine application, and constitutional claims evaluation normally requiring weeks of review, does the 48-hour timeline prove either judicial misconduct or impossible superhuman capability?

154. Cumulative Error Doctrine Application: Under the well-established cumulative error doctrine, does the combination of: (1) Judge Chuang's impossible procedural traps designed to sabotage indigent pro se plaintiff, (2) Chuang removed from case immediately after being sued for prospective relief, (3) DOJ's unprecedented lawsuit against ALL 15 Maryland federal judges filed the day after Plaintiff's criminal referral requesting RICO investigation (§§148-150) creating appearance of impropriety requiring recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (4) both judges proceeding despite this appearance violating their duty to recuse when "impartiality might reasonably be questioned," (5) completely ignoring Plaintiff's criminal referral request (§§148-150) without explanation, (6) mischaracterizing Doe v. Doe constitutional case as "custody dispute," (7) false judicial immunity legal advice ("prohibited" vs. Pulliam allowing suits), (8) ignoring federal jurisdiction over systematic government fraud, (9) impossible 48-hour review timeline proving predetermined outcome, (10) dismissing federal constitutional claims as "domestic relations," (11) procedural violations denying due process , and more - create reversible error requiring vacation of dismissal even if individual errors might be deemed "harmless"? See \*United States v. Martinez\*, 277 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2002).

155. Inherited Disqualification: Is Judge Chasanow also a defendant in the DOJ lawsuit filed June 24, 2025 against ALL Maryland federal judges, and if so, how does her dismissal of claims challenging Maryland corruption while sharing the same structural conflict comply with 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)?

156. Structural Disqualification: How can ANY Maryland federal judge impartially preside over cases challenging Maryland government corruption when ALL are defendants in related federal litigation filed one day after Plaintiff's corruption complaint?

157. Consciousness of Guilt Timeline: Does the sequence of (1) Plaintiff alleging corruption June 23; (2) DOJ suing all Maryland judges June 24; (3) Plaintiff suing Chuang for \$1 Nominal and suing all 15 judges to request recusal; (4) Chasanow dismissing entire case as frivolous - demonstrate coordinated judicial retaliation to prevent accountability?

158. Jurisdictional Overreach - Chasanow Protecting Colleague: When Plaintiff sued Judge Chuang for prospective injunctive relief under Pulliam v. Allen, Judge Chuang became a PARTY DEFENDANT, not a judicial officer in that capacity. What legal authority did Judge Chasanow have to grant judicial immunity to her colleague-defendant? Does this exceed her jurisdiction the same way dismissing criminal charges against a co-defendant friend would constitute corruption? If she did not grant immunity and it is inherent, then why was it not used as a defense in court?

159. Institutional Bias in Judicial Immunity: How can Judge Chasanow impartially rule on judicial immunity for her colleague when both are defendants in the same DOJ lawsuit filed the day after Plaintiff's criminal referral? Does this create the exact appearance of impropriety that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) was designed to prevent? Why can't they use the same strategy against the DOJ? Does the rule of law apply?

160. First Amendment Retaliation: Does dismissing Plaintiff's constitutional right to sue Judge Chuang (established in Pulliam v. Allen) constitute retaliation for exercising First Amendment petition rights, especially when the dismissal came from Chuang's colleague who shares the same structural conflict of interest?

161. Systematic Fraud Allegations Ignored: Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true Plaintiff's allegations that he was garnished for phantom \$82,000 income while unemployed, denied federal benefits (Medicaid, SNAP) based on false income data, and subjected to mathematical impossibility of working full-time while completing court-mandated bachelor's degree. Why were these specific systematic fraud allegations dismissed as "nothing nefarious" rather than accepted as true?

162. Federal Benefits Fraud Ignored: Why did the Court completely ignore Plaintiff's allegations that Maryland agencies provided false income data to federal systems to deny him Medicaid and SNAP benefits - constituting federal program fraud under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b that belongs exclusively in federal court and cannot be dismissed as "domestic relations"?

163. Criminal Education Mandate Ignored: Why did the Court ignore Plaintiff's allegation that he was under criminal court mandate to complete bachelor's degree or face 10 years imprisonment, making it mathematically impossible to work full-time as family court demanded? How is this conflicting government mandate a "domestic relations" matter rather than a due process violation requiring federal review?



164. Khoury Revolving Door Conflict: Why did the Court ignore Plaintiff's allegation that Magistrate Andrea Khoury served as DSS legal counsel from 2013-2022 then immediately became magistrate presiding over CSA cases (DSS subsidiary) with zero cooling-off period, while CSA receives federal Title IV-D incentive payments that increase with collections against Plaintiff? How is this structural conflict where the former agency attorney now judges her former colleagues' cases not a due process violation requiring federal intervention?

## VI. THE COORDINATED SILENCE EVIDENCE

The following pattern emerged immediately after Plaintiff filed federal suit on June 23, 2025:

Government Agencies:- Maryland DSS - No FOIA responses

- Maryland Attorney General - Refuses investigation

- Charles County offices - Complete silence

- Virginia agencies - Simultaneous non-response

- Federal agencies - Delayed or ignored requests

Law Enforcement:

- Maryland State Police - No response to criminal complaints

- Charles County Sheriff - Ignores all communication attempts

- Virginia police departments - Ignores all communication attempts

- FBI Baltimore - No acknowledgment of complaints

Statistical Impossibility: The probability of ALL these entities independently deciding to ignore/refuse service simultaneously is effectively zero. This pattern constitutes evidence of:

- Conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 241
- Obstruction of justice
- Denial of access to courts
- Economic boycott/blacklisting

This coordinated silence itself proves the conspiracy Plaintiff alleged, or proves that the case has merit.

## VII. THE PROSECUTION PARADOX

The Court's dismissal as "frivolous" creates an unexplained contradiction:

Legal Framework:- Filing false claims against federal judges = federal crime (18 U.S.C. § 1001)

- Perjury in federal court = felony (18 U.S.C. § 1621)
- Malicious prosecution of judges = potential obstruction (18 U.S.C. § 1503)
- Verified complaints carry criminal liability if false

The Logical Problem:

If Plaintiff's allegations are "frivolous" and "without basis," then Plaintiff committed multiple federal crimes by:

- Filing verified false statements
- Suing federal judges without basis
- Swearing to facts that don't exist
- Attempting to extort through baseless litigation

Yet Plaintiff remains uncharged.

Only Three Explanations Exist:

1. Prosecutors believe the allegations have merit
2. Evidence supports Plaintiff's claims
3. Prosecution would require discovery they wish to avoid

The absence of criminal charges against Plaintiff for contempt in circuit court or allegedly filing "frivolous" claims against federal judges constitutes tacit acknowledgment that the claims have sufficient factual basis to avoid prosecution. This directly contradicts the dismissal as "frivolous."

## VIII. THE DOJ LAWSUIT TIMELINE PROBLEM

The Court's dismissal of the DOJ lawsuit's relevance (page 10) ignores this undeniable sequence:

June 23, 2025: Plaintiff files complaint requesting criminal RICO investigation of Maryland officials

June 24, 2025: DOJ files unprecedented lawsuit against ALL Maryland federal judges (NEXT DAY)

June 24, 2025: Governor announces employee buyouts

July 8, 2025: Judge Chuang issues punitive Case Management Order

July 15, 2025: Plaintiff sues Judge Chuang for coordinating outside of judicial role

July 22, 2025: Mysterious reassignment to Judge Chasanow

July 24, 2025: Dismissal as "frivolous" (48 hours after reassignment)

The Court states "mere pendency" doesn't affect ability to adjudicate, but this isn't about "mere pendency" - it's about:

1. The ONE-DAY gap between criminal referral request and DOJ suit
2. The appearance that Maryland officials have federal protection
3. The pattern of retaliation against Plaintiff
4. The impropriety of this being coincidence

Most citizens would not believe this timing is random.

## IX. ADDRESSING ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS

### A. "This Is an Improper Motion for Reconsideration"

Response: This motion explicitly does NOT seek reconsideration. It seeks only the findings of fact and conclusions of law that Rule 52(a) requires. The Fourth Circuit distinguishes between

motions seeking different outcomes (improper) and motions seeking clarification for appeal (proper). \*Friedman v. Ganassi\*, 853 F.2d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 1988).

B. "The Memorandum Opinion Speaks for Itself"

Response: Conclusory statements do not satisfy Rule 52(a). \*Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist.\*<sup>45</sup>, 319 U.S. 415, 422 (1943) ("mere conclusory statements unsupported by specific findings violate Rule 52(a)"). The Court must specify WHICH facts it accepted as true and WHY it reached each legal conclusion.

C. "These Questions Are Vexatious"

Response: Requesting findings under Rule 52(a) is a statutory right, not vexatious litigation. \*International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States\*, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977) ("parties entitled to specific findings on all material issues"). The number of questions reflects the number of grounds for dismissal, not harassment.

D. "The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Post-Dismissal"

Response: False. Courts retain jurisdiction to clarify their reasoning. \*Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.\*<sup>46</sup>, 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (courts may "construe and effectuate" their orders). Moreover, Rule 52(b) explicitly allows amended findings "[o]n a party's motion filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment."

#### E. "IFP Plaintiffs Don't Get Special Treatment"

Response: IFP plaintiffs have equal rights to Rule 52(a) findings. *\*Bounds v. Smith\**, 430 U.S. 817, 823 (1977) ("meaningful access to courts is a constitutional right"). Denying findings based on IFP status would violate equal protection.

#### X. THE NARROW SCOPE OF THIS REQUEST

To eliminate any confusion:

1. This motion does NOT seek any change to the dismissal order
2. This motion does NOT argue the merits were wrongly decided
3. This motion ONLY seeks the findings already required by Rule 52(a)
4. The purpose is SOLELY to enable meaningful appellate review

As stated in *\*Kelley v. Everglades\**, 319 U.S. at 422: "Without such findings, appellate review is impossible."

#### XI. TIMING AND URGENCY UNDER RULE 52(b)

THIS MOTION IS TIMELY: Filed within 28 days of the July 24, 2025 judgment as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b): "On a party's motion filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment,

the court may amend its findings—or make additional findings—and may amend the judgment accordingly."

The Court CANNOT claim this motion is untimely or procedurally barred. With appeal deadline approaching and ongoing weekly garnishments causing irreparable harm, prompt findings would serve judicial economy and the interests of justice.

## XII. THE PATTERN OF PROCEDURAL DEFLECTION OVER SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE

The magistrates' preoccupation with invented filing deadlines while refusing to address substantive fraud reveals the true priority: procedural deflection over justice.

This temporal objection is a transparent attempt to avoid confronting evidence they cannot refute on the merits. Fraud doesn't expire after 10 days, 60 days, or 2 years - it remains fraud until remedied.

## XIII. THE RULE 52 MANDATE

The Fourth Circuit has been clear: "The complete absence of findings by the District Court precludes meaningful review." *\*Hooper v. Wolfe\**, 396 F.2d 684, 689 (4th Cir. 1968).

This Court faces three options:

1. Provide the required findings - Complies with Rule 52(a)
2. Refuse to provide findings - Creates reversible error requiring remand
3. Provide inadequate findings - Also reversible error under \*Kelley v. Everglades\*

Plaintiff respectfully submits that Option 1 serves judicial economy by avoiding certain remand but more importantly it serves the American people and constitution. Option 2 and 3 must and will be respected by the plaintiff, but he recognizes that it could also possibly create appealable error.

#### XIV. CERTIFICATION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

In the alternative, if this Court believes Rule 52(a) findings are not required, Plaintiff requests certification of the following questions for immediate interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b):

1. Does Rule 52(a) require findings when a court dismisses federal claims based on factual determinations?
2. Can federal copyright claims be dismissed under the domestic relations exception?
3. Must courts address criminal referral requests in civil complaints?
4. Does Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) require court-ordered service for IFP plaintiffs?

These questions involve controlling questions of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion, and immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation.



## XVI. WHY SELF-REPRESENTATION WAS NECESSARY, NOT CHOICE

The Court must understand that Plaintiff's self-representation was NECESSARY, not voluntary. Plaintiff is indigent, suffering ongoing illegal garnishments that Charles County courts protect rather than remedy. When Plaintiff attempted to address fraud and perjury in Charles County, the magistrates:

- Refused to read his motions documenting the fraud
- Invented fake deadlines to protect perjurers
- Laughed at his duress claims
- Lied about their subpoena powers to prevent fraud detection
- Witnessed new perjury and did nothing
- Much more in transcripts and retained evidence, saved for brevity

Local counsel will not challenge these magistrates - they appear before them daily and maintain their livelihoods through accommodation, not advocacy. They would dilute or abandon meritorious fraud claims to preserve their working relationships. No attorney will risk their practice exposing judicial complicity in fraud.

Plaintiff had no choice but self-representation. The alternative was accepting fraudulent orders that destroy his ability to survive. When courts protect fraud and perjury while illegally garnishing an indigent person's survival money, self-representation becomes the only path to justice.

WHEREFORE

Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court:

1. PRIMARY RELIEF: Provide specific findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the enumerated questions within 14 days per Rule 52(a); OR

2. ALTERNATIVE RELIEF: Certify the above questions for immediate interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); OR

3. MINIMUM RELIEF: State on the record that Rule 52(a) does not apply, creating a clear point for appellate review.

The Court cannot simply ignore this motion - any response (or non-response) creates an appellate record.

## XVII. ANTICIPATED RESPONSES AND THEIR LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

The Court faces limited options in responding to this motion, each creating distinct appellate consequences:

### A. Complete Silence

Legal Effect: Constitutes waiver of opportunity to clarify record. See *\*Singleton v. Wulff\**, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) ("It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below"). Silence prevents the Court from later claiming its reasoning was misunderstood.

#### B. Boilerplate Denial

Predicted Response: "The July 24, 2025 Memorandum Opinion adequately states the Court's reasoning. The motion is DENIED."

Legal Effect: Such cursory treatment of 165 specific questions regarding material errors and constitutional violations would demonstrate:

- Inability to defend challenged findings
- Consciousness of error per *\*United States v. Mechanik\**, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)
- Failure to create adequate appellate record per *\*Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)\**

#### C. Selective Response

Legal Effect: Cherry-picking which questions to answer would constitute admission that other questions identify valid concerns. See *\*Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)\** (party opponent admissions).

#### D. Attempting Full Response

Legal Effect: Would require the Court to either:

- Admit errors (grounds for reconsideration)
- Compound falsehoods (judicial misconduct)

- Reveal reasoning inconsistencies (reversible error)

DISCLAIMER/NOTICE- Pro se plaintiff acknowledges that judges make honest mistakes. All humans make mistakes. Plaintiff only seeks fair trial, basic human dignity, proper application of rule of law.

#### NOTICE REGARDING DOCUMENT LENGTH

This motion necessarily exceeds 40 pages to address 165 specific legal determinations required for appellate review under Rule 52(a). I was not aware of this rule until chasanow's order, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court's understanding, as reducing these questions would prevent meaningful appellate review of the July 24 dismissal. Further, I am aware that it is the court's discretion to answer any amount of questions raised here.

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and has made every effort to be concise while ensuring completeness for the appellate record. I am indigent with limited transportation and no cell phone, this may be the last moment I have an opportunity to make it to the court. This is why I ask the court to be understanding, and note that I am trying to make a proper appellate record and remove ambiguity. I myself am not requesting that every single question is answered, but I respectfully request that the main ones are.

CRITICAL LEGAL PRINCIPLE: Under \*Anderson v. City of Bessemer City\*, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985), district courts must provide findings sufficient for meaningful appellate review. A boilerplate denial of 165 specific questions about material legal errors fails this standard more egregiously than complete silence, as it demonstrates deliberate refusal to clarify acknowledged ambiguities.

FINAL NOTE: Should this Court elect not to respond substantively to this motion, Plaintiff will cite such non-response to the Fourth Circuit as: (1) constructive denial of Rule 52(a) findings; (2) violation of Rule 52(b)'s mandate to consider timely motions; and (3) evidence supporting the pattern of procedural violations alleged in the original complaint. Silence is not neutral - it is a reviewable decision.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Marvin Tutt

Marvin Tutt

Pro Se Plaintiff

Email: owner@caiatech.com

Date: August 12, 2025

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Service to be completed by U.S. Marshal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) upon Court's granting of IFP application.

/s/ Marvin Tutt

Marvin Tutt

Date: August 12, 2025