# CAIRO SECURITY CLAN

# VESU PERIPHERY

## SECURITY ASSESMENT REPORT

DECEMBER 2024

Prepared for

VESU

# Contents

# 1   About Cairo Security Clan

Cairo Security Clan is a leading force in the realm of blockchain security, dedicated to fortifying the foundations of the digital age. As pioneers in the field, we specialize in conducting meticulous smart contract security audits, ensuring the integrity and reliability of decentralized applications built on blockchain technology.

At Cairo Security Clan, we boast a multidisciplinary team of seasoned professionals proficient in blockchain security, cryptography, and software engineering. With a firm commitment to excellence, our experts delve into every aspect of the Web3 ecosystem, from foundational layer protocols to application-layer development. Our comprehensive suite of services encompasses smart contract audits, formal verification, and real-time monitoring, offering unparalleled protection against potential vulnerabilities.

Our team comprises industry veterans and scholars with extensive academic backgrounds and practical experience. Armed with advanced methodologies and cutting-edge tools, we scrutinize and analyze complex smart contracts with precision and rigor. Our track record speaks volumes, with a plethora of published research papers and citations, demonstrating our unwavering dedication to advancing the field of blockchain security.

At Cairo Security Clan, we prioritize collaboration and transparency, fostering meaningful partnerships with our clients. We believe in a customer-oriented approach, engaging stakeholders at every stage of the auditing process. By maintaining open lines of communication and soliciting client feedback, we ensure that our solutions are tailored to meet the unique needs and objectives of each project.

Beyond our core services, Cairo Security Clan is committed to driving innovation and shaping the future of blockchain technology. As active contributors to the ecosystem, we participate in the development of emerging technologies such as Starknet, leveraging our expertise to build robust infrastructure and tools. Through strategic guidance and support, we empower our partners to navigate the complexities of the blockchain landscape with confidence and clarity.

In summary, Cairo Security Clan stands at the forefront of blockchain security, blending technical prowess with a client-centric ethos to deliver unparalleled protection and peace of mind in an ever-evolving digital landscape. Join us in safeguarding the future of decentralized finance and digital assets with confidence and conviction.

# 2   Disclaimer

Disclaimer Limitations of this Audit:

This report is based solely on the materials and documentation provided by you to Cairo Security Clan for the specific purpose of conducting the security review outlined in the Summary of Audit and Scoped Files. The findings presented here may not be exhaustive and may not identify all potential vulnerabilities. Cairo Security Clan provides this review and report on an "as-is" and "as-available" basis. You acknowledge that your use of this report, including any associated services, products, protocols, platforms, content, and materials, occurs entirely at your own risk.

Inherent Risks of Blockchain Technology:

Blockchain technology remains in its developmental stage and is inherently susceptible to unknown risks and vulnerabilities. This review is specifically focused on the smart contract code and does not extend to the compiler layer, programming language elements beyond the reviewed code, or other potential security risks outside the code itself.

Report Purpose and Reliance:

This report should not be construed as an endorsement of any specific project or team, nor does it guarantee the absolute security of the audited smart contracts. No third party should rely on this report for any purpose, including making investment or purchasing decisions.

Liability Disclaimer:

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# 3   Executive Summary

This document presents the security review performed by Cairo Security Clan on the Vesu protocol.

Vesu, DeFi's latest progression in the on-chain lending space, is a pioneering platform designed to facilitate fully permissionless, over-collateralized lending agreements. With its ambitious design, Vesu looks to combine the best aspects of both worlds: a liquidity monolith with permissionless, multi-asset lending compartments aka lending pools. Learn more from docs.

**The audit was performed using**

- manual analysis of the codebase,

- automated analysis tools,

- simulation of the smart contract,

- analysis of edge test cases

1 points of attention, where 0 is classified as Critical, 1 is classified as High, 0 is classified as Medium,0 is classified as Low,0 is classified as Informational and 0 is classified as Best Practices. The issues are summarized in Fig. 1.

**This document is organized as follows.** Section 1 About Cairo Security Clan. Section 2 Disclaimer. Section 3 Executive Summary. Section 4 Summary of Audit. Section 5 Risk Classification. Section 6 Issues by Severity Levels. Section 7 Test Evaluation.



**Fig 1: Distribution of issues: Critical** (0), **High** (1), **Medium** (0), **Low** (0), **Informational** (0), **Best Practices** (0).
**Distribution of status: Fixed** (0), **Acknowledged** (0), **Mitigated** (1), **Unresolved** (0).

# 4    Summary of Audit

| Audit Type | Security Review |
|---|---|
| Cairo Version | 2.6.3 |
| Final Report | 18/12/2024 |
| Repository | vesuxyz/vesu-v1 |
| Initial Commit Hash | 820d90b2fc1a86a791a48633330a1722401f3299 |
| Final Commit Hash | e9559b0bdba3088a856783cc8dd922372a0c94e3 |
| Documentation | Website documentation |
| Test Suite Assessment | High |

## 4.1    Scoped Files

|  | Contracts |
|---|---|
| 1 | src/rebalance.cairo |

## 4.2    Issues

|  | Findings | Severity | Update |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Permissionless rebalancing vulnerable to sandwich attacks | High | Mitigated |

# 5   Risk Classification

The risk rating methodology used by Cairo Security Clan follows the principles established by the CVSS risk rating methodology. The severity of each finding is determined by two factors: **Likelihood** and **Impact**.

**Likelihood** measures how likely an attacker will uncover and exploit the finding. This factor will be one of the following values:

    a) **High**: The issue is trivial to exploit and has no specific conditions that need to be met;

    b) **Medium**: The issue is moderately complex and may have some conditions that need to be met;

    c) **Low**: The issue is very complex and requires very specific conditions to be met.

When defining the likelihood of a finding, other factors are also considered. These can include but are not limited to Motive, opportunity, exploit accessibility, ease of discovery, and ease of exploit.

**Impact** is a measure of the damage that may be caused if an attacker exploits the finding. This factor will be one of the following values:

    a) **High**: The issue can cause significant damage such as loss of funds or the protocol entering an unrecoverable state;

    b) **Medium**: The issue can cause moderate damage such as impacts that only affect a small group of users or only a particular part of the protocol;

    c) **Low**: The issue can cause little to no damage such as bugs that are easily recoverable or cause unexpected interactions that cause minor inconveniences.

When defining the impact of a finding other factors are also considered. These can include but are not limited to Data/state integrity, loss of availability, financial loss, and reputation damage. After defining the likelihood and impact of an issue, the severity can be determined according to the table below.

| | | Likelihood | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **High** | **Medium** | **Low** |
| **Impact** | **High** | Critical | High | Medium |
| | **Medium** | High | Medium | Low |
| | **Low** | Medium | Low | Info/Best Practices |

To address issues that do not fit a High/Medium/Low severity, Cairo Security Clan also uses three more finding severities: **Informational**, **Best Practices** and **Gas**

    a) **Informational** findings do not pose any risk to the application, but they carry some information that the audit team intends to formally pass to the client;

    b) **Best Practice** findings are used when some piece of code does not conform with smart contract development best practices;

    c) **Gas** findings are used when some piece of code uses more gas than it should be or have some functions that can be removed to save gas.

# 6   Issues by Severity Levels

## 6.1   High

### 6.1.1   Permissionless rebalancing vulnerable to sandwich attacks

File(s): src/rebalance.cairo

**Description:** The Rebalance contract allows anyone to rebalance a position if its Loan-To-Value (LTV) deviates by `target_ltv_min_-
delta` from the target LTV. Users supply rebalancing parameters, including swap routes for exchanging collateral and debt assets on the
EKUBO DEX.

Consider a USDC/ETH position with an initial LTV of 46% and a target LTV of 25%. Since the position holds excess debt, collateral
(USDC) is sold to reduce debt (ETH). This process triggers the `decrease_lever(...)` function, as shown below:

```
fn decrease_lever(
    ref self: ContractState, rebalance_params: RebalanceParams
) -> (i257, i257) {
    let RebalanceParams {
        pool_id,
        collateral_asset,
        debt_asset,
        user,
        mut rebalance_swap,
        rebalance_swap_limit_amount,
        .. } = rebalance_params;

    let core = self.core.read();
    assert!(rebalance_swap.len() != 0, "invalid-rebalance-swap");
    let (collateral_amount, debt_amount) = swap(
        core, rebalance_swap.clone(), rebalance_swap_limit_amount
    );
    // ...
}
```

This snippet shows that the swap is executed based on user-provided parameters. For USDC/ETH, USDC is swapped on EKUBO to
acquire ETH for debt repayment, targeting an LTV of 25

The rebalancing parameters are arbitrary, enabling attackers to exploit the DEX price through sandwich attacks. For example:

- **Initial State:** The position has 10K USDC as collateral and 1.46 ETH as debt.

- **Oracle Price:** 1 ETH = $3,197 (current LTV $\approx 46.6\%$).

- **Attack:** The attacker manipulates the DEX price, increasing the ETH/USDC price to $4,284.93. The attacker then rebalances
  the position by selling 5,000 USDC, leaving the position with 5,000 USDC collateral and ETH worth 1,250 USDC (resulting in an
  LTV of 25

The attacker profits by exploiting the collateral's value through price manipulation, while the position suffers a loss in total value.

**Recommendation(s):** Consider restriction of the input amount for swaps to match `collateral_delta` or `debt_delta`, as determined
by the `delta(...)` function. Furthermore, introducing access control mechanisms could potentially minimise the overall risk of such
functionality.

**Status:** Mitigated

**Update from the client:** Fixed in commit.

**Update from CSC:** The current mitigation reduces the immediate risk but introduces trust assumptions regarding the rebalancer to
perform the rebalancing without prior price manipulation. While acknowledged by the Vesu team, further security enhancements could
improve the protocol's resilience.

# 7   Test Evaluation

## 7.1   Compilation Output

```
1  scarb build
2     Compiling vesu_periphery v0.1.0 (/vesu-periphery/Scarb.toml)
3      Finished release target(s) in 19 seconds
```

## 7.2   Tests Output

```
1   Collected 6 test(s) from vesu_periphery package
2   Running 0 test(s) from src/
3   Running 6 test(s) from tests/
4   [PASS] tests::test_rebalance::TestRebalance::test_rebalance_increase_target_ltv_min_delta (gas: ~5533)
5   [PASS] tests::test_rebalance::TestRebalance::test_rebalance_increase_target_ltv_tolerance (gas: ~8546)
6   [PASS] tests::test_rebalance::TestRebalance::test_rebalance_decrease (gas: ~11209)
7   [PASS] tests::test_rebalance::TestRebalance::test_rebalance_decrease_split_swap (gas: ~16809)
8   [PASS] tests::test_rebalance::TestRebalance::test_rebalance_increase_with_fee_split_swap (gas: ~15034)
9   [PASS] tests::test_rebalance::TestRebalance::test_rebalance_increase_with_fee (gas: ~11702)
10  Tests: 6 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped, 0 ignored, 0 filtered out
```