


# Games and Multiplicative Weight Updates

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
# Two-player zero-sum games

Two players  $A$  and  $B$  play the following game. Each of the players has a set of possible moves (strategies)  $A$  and  $B$ .  $A$  and  $B$  choose:  $a \in A, b \in B$ .




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
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
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# Two-player zero-sum games

*A*



payoff function  
 $f(a, b)$



*B*

Is it better to move first or second?

$$\max_{a \in A} \min_{b \in B} f(a, b)$$


vs

$$\min_{b \in B} \max_{a \in A} f(a, b)$$

Thoughts?

# Rock – Paper – Scissors

B \ A	R	P	S
	0	1	-1
	-1	0	1
	1	-1	0



How do people play RPS in real life?

# Randomization

A **mixed** strategy is probability distribution over **pure** strategies.

The payout for a mixed strategies  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  is

$$\mathbb{E}_{\substack{a \sim \alpha \\ b \sim \beta}} [f(a, b)]$$

Von Neumann Minimax Theorem

$$\max_{\alpha} \min_{\beta} \mathbb{E}[f(a, b)] = \min_{\beta} \max_{\alpha} \mathbb{E}[f(a, b)]$$

! The order of moves doesn't matter.



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# Second player

**Q:** Does the second player need to randomize?


**A** plays mixed strategy  $\alpha$ .

To minimize  $f$ , can  $B$  play a pure strategy  $b$ ?

Or does  $B$  have to play a mixed strategy  $\beta$ ?

# Geometric view

Let  $a_1, \dots, a_m$  be pure strategies of  $A$ .



A mixed strategy is  $\alpha = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha_1 \\ \alpha_2 \\ \vdots \\ \alpha_m \end{pmatrix} \in \Delta_m$ , where  $\Delta_m$  is the unit simplex

$$f(\alpha, \beta) \equiv \mathbb{E}f(a, b) = \sum_{i,j} \alpha_i \beta_j f(a_i, b_j) = \alpha^T F \beta$$

where  $F_{ij} = f(a_i, b_j)$

# Geometric view

Mixed strategies:  $\Delta_m$  and  $\Delta_n$ , which are convex and compact sets.


The objective  $f(\alpha, \beta) = \alpha^T F \beta$  is linear in each argument.

Von Neumann Minimax Theorem (general)

Assume that  $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$  and  $B \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$  are convex and compact.

- $f$  is continuous
- $a \mapsto f(a, b)$  is **concave** for every  $b$
- $b \mapsto f(a, b)$  is **convex** for every  $a$

Then  $\max_{a \in A} \min_{b \in B} f(a, b) = \min_{b \in B} \max_{a \in A} f(a, b)$



# Finding optimal strategies using LP

Player **A**:

LP variables:  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m$

maximize  $p$

s.t.

$$(\beta^T F^T) \alpha \geq p \quad \text{for every } \beta \in \Delta_n$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i = 1$$

$$\alpha_i \geq 0$$

There are infinitely many  $\beta$ .

Can we consider only some of them?



# Finding optimal strategies using LP

Player **A**:

LP variables:  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m$

maximize  $p$

s.t.

$$F^T \alpha \geq \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \cdot p$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i = 1$$

$$\alpha_i \geq 0$$

# Finding optimal strategies using LP

Player **A**:

LP variables:  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m$

maximize  $p$

s.t.

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \cdot p - F^T \alpha \leq 0$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i = 1$$

$$\alpha_i \geq 0$$

Player **B**:

LP variables:  $\beta_1, \dots, \beta_m$

minimize  $c$

s.t.

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \cdot c - F \beta \geq 0$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^m \beta_j = 1$$

$$\beta_j \geq 0$$

# Multiplicative weights update

- Suppose that  $\alpha \in \Delta_n$
- $B$  is a convex and closed set
- $f$  is linear in  $\alpha$

$$f(\alpha, b) = \sum_i \alpha_i f(a_i, b)$$

- $f$  is concave in  $b$



# Idea

- Start with some  $\alpha \in \Delta_n$
- Find the best response  $b \in B$

How should we augment our strategy  $\alpha$  in response to  $b$ ?

- Increase the probability of those  $a_i$  that are good responses to  $b$
- Decrease the probability of those  $a_i$  that are bad responses to  $b$
- Repeat

We will assume that  $|f(\alpha, b)| \leq 1$  for now.

# Algorithm

- Start with some  $\alpha^{(1)} = \left(\frac{1}{n}, \dots, \frac{1}{n}\right)^T$
- For  $t = 1$  to  $T$ 
  - Find the best response  $b^{(t)} \in B$  to  $\alpha^{(t)}$
  - $\alpha_i^{(t+1)} = \left(1 + \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)})\right) \alpha_i^{(t)}$
  - normalize:  $\alpha^{(t+1)} = \alpha^{(t+1)} / \|\alpha^{(t+1)}\|_1$
- Return

$$\alpha_{\text{ALG}} = \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{\alpha^{(t)}}{T} \quad \text{and} \quad b_{\text{ALG}} = \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{b^{(t)}}{T}$$

$$\alpha_i^{(t+1)} = \left(1 + \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)})\right) \alpha_i^{(t)}$$

# Analysis

Define potential

$$\begin{aligned} w_i^{(1)} &= \frac{1}{n} \quad \text{for all } i \in \{1, \dots, m\} \\ w_i^{(t+1)} &= \left(1 + \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)})\right) w_i^{(t)} \\ W^{(t)} &= \sum_i w_i^{(t)} \end{aligned}$$


! The update formula for  $w_i$  is the same as for  $\alpha_i$  but we don't normalize  $w_i$ .

$$\Rightarrow \alpha_i^{(t)} = w_i^{(t)} / W^{(t)}$$

$$w_i^{(t+1)} = \left(1 + \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)})\right) w_i^{(t)}$$

# Analysis

$$W^{(1)} = w_1^{(1)} + \dots + w_n^{(1)} = \frac{1}{n} + \dots + \frac{1}{n} = 1$$

$$W^{(t+1)} = \sum_i \left(1 + \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)})\right) w_i^{(t)} = \sum_i w_i^{(t)} + \sum_i \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)}) w_i^{(t)}$$


$$w_i^{(t+1)} = \left(1 + \varepsilon f(\textcolor{red}{a}_i, \textcolor{blue}{b}^{(t)})\right) w_i^{(t)}$$

# Analysis

$$W^{(1)} = w_1^{(1)} + \dots + w_n^{(1)} = \frac{1}{n} + \dots + \frac{1}{n} = 1$$

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# Analysis

$$W^{(1)} = w_1^{(1)} + \dots + w_n^{(1)} = \frac{1}{n} + \dots + \frac{1}{n} = 1$$

$$W^{(t+1)} = \sum_i w_i^{(t)} + \sum_i \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)}) w_i^{(t)} = W^{(t)} + \varepsilon \sum_i f(a_i, b^{(t)}) W^{(t)} \alpha_i^{(t)}$$

$$= \left(1 + \varepsilon \sum_i f(a_i, b^{(t)}) \alpha_i^{(t)}\right) W^{(t)}$$

$$= \left(1 + \varepsilon f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)})\right) W^{(t)}$$

# Analysis

$$W^{(1)} = w_1^{(1)} + \dots + w_n^{(1)} = \frac{1}{n} + \dots + \frac{1}{n} = 1$$
$$W^{(t+1)} = \left(1 + \varepsilon f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)})\right) W^{(t)}$$

$$W^{(T+1)} = \prod_{t=1}^T \left(1 + \varepsilon f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)})\right)$$

Use:  $e^{x-O(x^2)} \leq 1 + x \leq e^x$  if  $x \in \left(-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)$

$$e^{x-O(x^2)} \leq 1 + x$$

# Analysis

$$W^{(1)} = w_1^{(1)} + \dots + w_n^{(1)} = \frac{1}{n} + \dots + \frac{1}{n} = 1$$
$$W^{(t+1)} = \left(1 + \varepsilon f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)})\right) W^{(t)}$$

$$W^{(T+1)} = \prod_{t=1}^T \left(1 + \varepsilon f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)})\right) \leq \exp\left(\sum_{t=1}^T \varepsilon f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)})\right)$$

$$\text{Use: } e^{x-O(x^2)} \leq 1 + x \leq e^x \text{ if } x \in \left(-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)$$



# Analysis

$$W^{(T+1)} = \sum w_i^{(T+1)} \leq \exp \left( \sum_{t=1}^T \varepsilon f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)}) \right)$$

Also,

$$w_i^{(T+1)} = \frac{1}{n} \cdot \prod_{t=1}^T \left( 1 + \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)}) \right) \geq \frac{1}{n} \exp \left( \sum_{t=1}^T \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)}) - O(\varepsilon^2 T) \right)$$

# Analysis

$$\frac{1}{n} \exp \left( \sum_{t=1}^T \varepsilon f(\textcolor{red}{a}_i, \textcolor{blue}{b}^{(t)}) - O(\varepsilon^2 T) \right) \leq \exp \left( \sum_{t=1}^T \varepsilon f(\textcolor{red}{\alpha}^{(t)}, \textcolor{blue}{b}^{(t)}) \right)$$


# Analysis

$$\sum_{t=1}^T \varepsilon f(\textcolor{red}{a}_i, \textcolor{blue}{b}^{(t)}) - O(\varepsilon^2 T) - \log n \leq \sum_{t=1}^T \varepsilon f(\textcolor{red}{\alpha}^{(t)}, \textcolor{blue}{b}^{(t)})$$

# Analysis

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T f(\textcolor{red}{a}_i, \textcolor{blue}{b}^{(t)}) \leq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T f(\textcolor{red}{\alpha}^{(t)}, \textcolor{blue}{b}^{(t)}) + O\left(\varepsilon + \frac{\log n}{\varepsilon T}\right)$$

# Analysis



$$f(\mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{b}_{ALG}) \leq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T f(\mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{b}^{(t)}) \leq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T f(\mathbf{a}^{(t)}, \mathbf{b}^{(t)}) + \delta$$

where  $\delta = O\left(\varepsilon + \frac{\log n}{\varepsilon T}\right)$

# Analysis

$$f(a_i, b_{ALG}) \leq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)}) + \delta \quad \text{where } \delta = O\left(\varepsilon + \frac{\log n}{\varepsilon T}\right)$$

- Proving near optimality of  $b_{ALG}$

$$f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)}) \leq val$$

Thus,

$$f(a_i, b_{ALG}) \leq val + \delta$$

$b_{ALG}$  is nearly optimal for pure strategies and thus for mixed strategies as well.

# Analysis

$$f(a_i, b_{ALG}) \leq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)}) + \delta \quad \text{where } \delta = O\left(\varepsilon + \frac{\log n}{\varepsilon T}\right)$$

- Proving near optimality of  $\alpha_{ALG}$ . Consider a strategy  $b \in B$ .

$$f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)}) \leq f(\alpha^{(t)}, b)$$

Thus,

$$f(a_i, b_{ALG}) \leq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T f(\alpha^{(t)}, b) + \delta = f(\alpha_{ALG}, b) + \delta$$

# Analysis

$$f(a_i, b_{ALG}) \leq f(\alpha_{ALG}, b) + \delta$$

Average with weights  $\alpha_i^*$ :

$$val \leq f(\alpha^*, b_{ALG}) \leq f(\alpha_{ALG}, b) + \delta$$



# Summary

- $f(a_i, b_{ALG}) \leq val + \delta$
- $f(\alpha_{ALG}, b) \geq val - \delta$

$$\delta = O\left(\varepsilon + \frac{\log n}{T\varepsilon}\right)$$

**Q:** What  $T$  should we choose to get an  $O(\varepsilon)$  additive approximation?

# Summary

- $f(a_i, b_{ALG}) \leq val + \delta$
- $f(\alpha_{ALG}, b) \geq val - \delta$

$$\delta = O\left(\varepsilon + \frac{\log n}{T\varepsilon}\right)$$

**Q:** What  $T$  should we choose to get an  $O(\varepsilon)$  additive approximation?

**A:**  $T = c\varepsilon^{-2} \log n$

Running time:  $O(T(M + nP))$ , where  $M$  is the time for computing the optimal response  $b^{(t)}$  and  $P$  is the time for computing  $f(a_i, b^{(t)})$ .

# Arbitrary Width $\rho$

**Q:** What if  $\max|f(a, b)| > 1$ ? Can we use the algorithm as is?

**A:** No! In particular, this step may be problematic:

$$\alpha_i^{(t+1)} = \left(1 + \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)})\right) \alpha_i^{(t)}$$

# Arbitrary Width $\rho$

**Q:** What if  $\max|f(a, b)| > 1$ ? Can we use the algorithm as is?

**A:** No! In particular, this step may be problematic:


$$\alpha_i^{(t+1)} = \left(1 + \varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)})\right) \alpha_i^{(t)}$$

Solution: rescale  $f$ . Assume  $f \in [-\rho, \rho]$ .  $\rho$  is the *width* of the game.

Apply our algorithm to  $f' = \frac{f}{\rho} \in [-1, 1]$ .

# Algorithm for arbitrary $\rho$

- Start with some  $\alpha^{(1)} = \left(\frac{1}{n}, \dots, \frac{1}{n}\right)^T$
- For  $t = 1$  to  $T$ 
  - Find the best response  $b^{(t)} \in B$  to  $\alpha^{(t)}$

$$\alpha_i^{(t+1)} = \left(1 + \frac{\varepsilon f(a_i, b^{(t)})}{\rho}\right) \alpha_i^{(t)}$$


- normalize:  $\alpha^{(t+1)} = \alpha^{(t+1)} / \|\alpha^{(t+1)}\|_1$
- Return  $\alpha_{ALG} = \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{\alpha^{(t)}}{T}$  and  $b_{ALG} = \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{b^{(t)}}{T}$

# Algorithm

The algorithm will find an additive  $O(\varepsilon)$  approximation for  $f'$   
 $\Rightarrow$  an additive  $O(\varepsilon\rho)$  approximation for  $f$ .

Need  $\varepsilon' = \varepsilon/\rho$  to get an  $O(\varepsilon)$  approximation. Then, the number of iterations

$$T = O\left(\varepsilon'^{-2} \log n\right) = O\left(\varepsilon^{-2} \rho^2 \log n\right)$$

Can we improve the dependence on  $\rho$ ? If  $f \in [0, \rho]$  or  $f \in [-O(1), \rho]$

! Get  $(1 \pm \varepsilon)val \pm \varepsilon$  guarantee when  $T = c\varepsilon^{-2} \rho \log n$ .

# Revised analysis

Instead of using

$$e^{x-O(x^2)} \leq 1 + x \leq e^x$$

Use

$$e^{(1-\varepsilon)x} \leq 1 + x \leq e^x$$

for  $x \in (0, \varepsilon)$ .

Exercise: finish the analysis.

# Oracles

- The procedure that computes the optimal response  $b^{(t)}$  is called an oracle.
- We can use an approximate procedure that computes  $b^{(t)}$  s.t.

$$f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)}) \leq (1 + \varepsilon) \min_{b \in B} f(a^{(t)}, b) + \varepsilon$$

We will get nearly optimal strategies  $\alpha_{ALG}$  and  $b_{ALG}$  with a  $1 + O(\varepsilon)$  multiplicative and  $O(\varepsilon)$  additive error.



# Oracles

- Assume that  $val \leq 1$  but we only want to find a strategy  $b_{ALG}$  s.t.

$$f(\alpha, b_{ALG}) \leq 1 + \varepsilon$$

(even if  $val \ll 1$ )

Then it is sufficient to use an oracle that finds a response  $b^{(t)}$  with

$$f(\alpha^{(t)}, b^{(t)}) \leq 1 + \varepsilon$$

The width of the oracle is  $\rho = \max_{i, b} |f(a_i, b)|$ , where the maximum is over all possible responses  $b$  provided by the oracle.