

**Author:** Zijun Ping

**Created by:** Typora

**Owned by:** Zijun Ping

[11.Crypto-格密码](#)

[12.Crypto-签名算法](#)

[13.Crypto-RSA](#)

[14.Crypto-分组密码工作模式](#)

[15.Crypto-Hill密码](#)

## 11.Crypto-格密码

用python脚本构造格lattice：，然后求解

$$\begin{bmatrix} k & a \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} P & 0 \\ h & 1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} g & a \end{bmatrix}$$

```
1 from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes
2 from Crypto.Util.number import *
3 from gmpy2 import invert
4 h=
31197036442579936699848975881635196461489816459701596239052285876008933121026950776
94083302457458885417050598823967223407746819354436158884034949014152266512952011325
56613291289590900246992553502513664561058230713840616052310750850144077552701142563
87283766378963630496842391946470754548200864708731206394902474419531816033565207440
78746347422734931081122121101236919093468466121154790239501192867162436046306642356
33831784083300431161225131883065150778501178458601885263943907964612851841356128492
28375940112934965526336049641860653463783106556405462712454526613014658501256894801
80834200268677914836249879518763299683154106127489894526284103318135401434258734813
51220499681815979569479285905651270208308396719282247586008816711527598915797885618
86265416862300201274668410224573375742882851727795267544129026305161898712195664667
19013573705857844096336971653391824063417643202936309836804160555849477723822822599
66044517683538433409836256995980804901093405108581243143413703339657071622279140236
36946515422036399392308558304972051238338457715997513491044946590322755541955249260
64391491530156746030476953457003098702060347433173617863337320709623625724274115972
66252707397451423195512449103367120235737550650354427690243524900449675
```

```


5 p=
95839660644812096134448182189130252913123457151920554007253392900712044748264493802
78390698552259849095980171156016873210930371383706236893663023994727552216667209982
04960391688686871213784218139146955110040572010513513710257471193690475085340782434
13475776789437019578954655128206012354016728574870611000406165618124708702599338981
26716589069121453846795663720379151795237060233096668261916296348515985094486753407
58156737530185937223948687001934035933966720541257653562031308634592003639145311246
14766492809438199726465266945790488666626285169156592007636403443360006225301437752
25589726687656176314676650853247903120919279171993336428047314904526862307149467075
20153374983386856748968281865500447110447064499127304576389450231449458997253721401
39807478899719273567393929653142032920726449027277418648476280470840599530703214171
59530802540985067685858994541198528520025782522913103292009594766186607655568611125
58404254680356703540148703891793429589128285327230398620737214653509556883409293525
13243365563954638294876066618830813521617443475610064698193890094075786932957915036
08365059926164590666329386053352055697670078635917478114682814907524484115214314303
02168214014717351186242150709061058943921599462022604009950194741903607

6 c=
76715816867236213629123822390537853854544431582968140366066866503791778854725051043
16807623249895043378869111298728112833994231824927130856213408504666207754167127326
14020830060267436728824312319343522189998875569791210615658554329492772575522352284
89477886490068304308747594938276760352880780959600421319494668758374927785173154512
13017999094435493676471885382912944939001185145851493014044153651073751485021633452
29200555520367376148986792681776613941685900525114359918025093194374564154918465789
09803968827326083119688045304878788169222058869931382440744304961047056661189183012
04556068653045144981419183702502000603337761154716073698615677140615712486343662269
01360555240991881037749649258353302128601187117945261098036478588953880956746052307
50814072168384877036977142720065401068674545908473764948318211622392890851158637258
73128451738053330616116286276990564440602108666899089258574136939140883848015905391
18419817748706914585535977225375257595014121709225398146804929559026288825337416874
18775787699316439515589984580788079909166070149190213185535105407966178286704653137
66239927426616045845304037949336407359432982545249846238083637728728368757505540221
38997087590785362832339405833456398277842368920260448389099114876068641


7 # 构造格
8 v1 = vector(ZZ, [1, h])
9 v2 = vector(ZZ, [0, p])
10 m = matrix([v1,v2]);
11 # 解svp
12 shortest_vector = m.LLL()[0]
13 f, g = shortest_vector
14 if f < 0:
15     f = -f
16 if g < 0:
17     g = -g
18 # 解密
19 a = f * c % p % g
20 m = a * inverse_mod(f, g) * inverse_mod(f, g) % g
21 print(hex(m).replace('0x', '')) #
766d637b4c3474746963655f49355f7072657474795f656173795f4630725f552121217d

```

用<https://cocalc.com/>在线运行sagemath解密上面脚本




再用cyberchef解码得flag vmc{L4ttice\_I5\_pretty\_easy\_F0r\_U!!!}



## 12.Crypto-签名算法

发现r不变，是共享k



如果在两次签名的过程中共享了  $k$ ，我们就可以进行攻击。

假设签名的消息为  $m_1, m_2$ ，显然，两者的  $r$  的值一样，此外

$$s_1 \equiv (H(m_1) + xr)k^{-1} \bmod q$$

$$s_2 \equiv (H(m_2) + xr)k^{-1} \bmod q$$

这里我们除了  $x$  和  $k$  不知道剩下的均知道，那么

$$s_1 k \equiv H(m_1) + xr$$

$$s_2 k \equiv H(m_2) + xr$$

两式相减

$$k(s_1 - s_2) \equiv H(m_1) - H(m_2) \bmod q$$

此时即可解出  $k$ ，进一步我们可以解出  $x$ 。

若  $k$  被泄露，DSA 签名算法也会被完全破解。可以计算出私钥  $x$ ：

$$x = (sk - h(m)) * r^{-1} \bmod q$$

但是  $p$  和  $q$  还是未知的，查看代码中使用给的 `ecdsa.generator_192`，猜测使用的 NIST P-192 椭圆曲线，其参数固定。故有解密脚本：

```
1 import random
2 from ecdsa import ecdsa as ec
3 from datetime import datetime
4 import hashlib
5 import gmpy2
6 p = 6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279
7 q = 6277101735386680763835789423176059013767194773182842284081
8 str1 = "34705452163096362550088533735564930085489802406439052255,
9       5575093540335095931762919420534746169532440392768986557355,
10      1053674520760038124359502110783630886"
11 str2 = "34705452163096362550088533735564930085489802406439052255,
12       1543509685086703115590790680094992130950572761005237727533,
13      237478124173899114110326705808973799422"
14 msg = "18:28:48:get_flag"
15 r1, s1, m1 = (int(k) for k in str1.split(", "))
16 r2, s2, m2 = (int(k) for k in str2.split(", "))
17 r = r1
18 ds = s2 - s1
19 dm = m2 - m1
20 k = gmpy2.mul(dm, gmpy2.invert(ds, q))
21 k = gmpy2.f_mod(k, q)
22 tmp = gmpy2.mul(k, s1) - m1
23 x = tmp * gmpy2.invert(r, q)
24 x = gmpy2.f_mod(x, q)
25 RNG = random.Random()
26 g = ec.generator_192
27 N = g.order()
28 secret = x
29 PUBKEY = ec.Public_key(g, g * secret)
30 PRIVKEY = ec.Private_key(PUBKEY, secret)
31 hash = int(hashlib.md5(msg.encode()).hexdigest(), 16)
32 nonce = RNG.randrange(1, N)
```

```
29 signature = PRIVKEY.sign(hash, nonce)
30 print(f'{signature.r}, {signature.s}')
```

```
(pingzai@kali)-[~/Desktop/tmp/24-06-17]
$ nc 10.12.153.8 32239

Welcome to Hust Signer.
What do you want to do?
1) Make signature
2) Get the flag
>2
Get signature for md5("06:16:51:get_flag")
731068159329242351098641310447018125047823951069208437045, 3239895669199212000782886318118283300127840373857664056524
Congratulation! Here is your flag:vmc{00yEUykgFRYedHQdYnleQVcet4IK07xM}

(pingzai@kali)-[~/Desktop/tmp/24-06-17]
$
```

## 13.Crypto-RSA

正常RS的加密过程，p1和p2是相邻素数，且差值小于1000，secret.txt中的N1和N2也很接近

```
p1 = getStrongPrime(1152)
p2 = nextprime(p1)
try:
    if p2 - p1 > 1000:
        raise Exception("Error")
except:
    exit()
```

参考[https://blog.csdn.net/jcbx\\_/article/details/109306542](https://blog.csdn.net/jcbx_/article/details/109306542)利用连分数破解比例接近的p1和p2

那怎么通过 $\frac{k}{edg}$ 得到p和q呢?

我们已知:

$$edg = k(p-1)(q-1) + g, \quad k > g$$

所以

$$\lfloor \frac{edg}{k} \rfloor = (p-1)(q-1)$$

又因为

$$\frac{pq - (p-1)(q-1) + 1}{2} = \frac{p+q}{2}$$

$$(\frac{p+q}{2})^2 - pq = (\frac{p-q}{2})^2$$

所以可以通过判断 $(\frac{p-q}{2})^2$ 是否为平方数来确定我们找到的连分数是否正确，然后再算出p和q就行了。

```
1 from Crypto.Util.number import *
2 import gmpy2, sympy
3 N1=27682578737141139764880192910976946263355689816882797515059917479242862799083599
74559495688025824411286755972243585073281202318966258105251128786755330831826802002
23863068204248298988580299861934129226459443594092485681310573773806972362384807248
83073062491532254626363468032145049953168789073328812076794158602028961853986034378
14474965622854155264120739347383071515645247343213004036047156609616514608720283603
67833046405791830823018585298185980323398212378412197741247107897619126750440562657
35587753304064079484844965820681168729776560497921764083742448045654891113500035063
47431844207803653181395755108623174707915569169000143312718738263604987122827951946
67357197687985747763536870496671253841465661077397055535806939849188162159403088840
07192621418304753551998125658993859095063641090798574130161651257890916914325076137
436869018454577522833
```

```

4 C1=14360977893873474578201937159000122429359790977572665232657843468076201963407780
01513185719262155073733880588051439335739057642373132887186724102926029405104571014
44829898018570541588169988975461247098027301986902441285450736344861457867632946340
81834588146373913232490890078533918320777534358739106486350300547206365723045306767
03821492341203263383325574296395470147540170438504501906988373462525143640985158804
42413368354527289628602808655040001033615596888611490864699399401137481746100196203
09023214292662384279070127090992947332945432141695583191136521301940116585610033790
34812511447198028533201191835557883912889207505869888531924359334509673477649781746
12516433819899583268104785000266843893589203420218365725116887964500727001420339524
03561408907486022094802237175920044147084170050294965826258250618675638343726352907
476393474128674488943
5 E1=13890651822147152152440433003961663329775276553417657086890003923713341985748541
56394231966360683972372962244420832137686304881007179778844153421042392809504247351
29147986053115335928783190377695248250926374734988108972136349625965753649992146322
810352768246041575396721661142246729747572832017510241749082431
6
7 N2=27682578737141139764880192910976946263355689816882797515059917479242862799083599
74559495688025824411286755972243585073281202318966258105251128786755330857625423270
69532905190599761592392055592959651101487344496502099772359531632554948080567071885
51192674128213090005439928085856216617642935948961573449294338310127166077195263402
93984886168621448511568679903290114731475934848106241810912041866130258541386878260
22824631651711290631979614557791936650419028229489630325800540670502276128383358282
01043413949164885293325493829570131849345344856137656453666135670724974184749115550
72082649755876332012721825197057614475031978212119448356354537115732316696898317601
31452678568988654371017999585883427412574574720363114904022799822863499290501163503
94664561659857216725849236910894778018502118673902399095646487808462155207034764432
342699549109080808769
8 C2=11293777290569693972360166961981727494638218221438571150393361751316389824613571
82022937091519150076661941059711767123244345269163473411265228552180682428495907355
80106612047309549288472609464038672979328626877704496325060878831879201077660506734
62588812979708792790888354008526054467620780053118019643408427959406056087370960170
99283404789008026966374787714327068306957531839714484448126238246346908075542309752
70071614494119339366694514764673520492644552036327299091646660066882940564059559400
41007137719228484035343153943155100892867641033645111253109951972003798413524003505
57400078439945870534726235315536341351334179786894208513697754811665081533600062735
39337089132374388419093249200700134981536277678916749695860348721045693449238327612
39959420543717354211689339868787331074579605476477152218068810732089913023456240425
720821047030224659918
9 E2=13890651822147152152440433003961663329775276553417657086890003923713341985748541
56394231966360683972372962244420832137686304881007179778844153421042392809504247351
29147986053115335928783190377695248250926374734988108972136349625965753649992146322
810352768246041575396721661142246729747572832017510241749082619
10 def exgcd(x,y):
11     mult = []
12     if y > x:
13         x,y = y,x
14     while y:
15         mult.append(x//y)
16         x,y = y,x % y
17     return mult
18
19 mult = exgcd(N2,N1) # N1<N2
20
21 for n in range(len(mult)):
22     temp = mult[:n]
23     num = 0 # 分子
24     deno = 1 # 分母
25     for x in temp[::-1]:
26         num,deno = deno, deno * x + num
27     if N2 % deno == 0 and deno != 1:
28         Q2 = deno


```

```

29         print(Q2)
30         break
31     Q1 = sympy.prevprime(Q2)
32     P1 = gmpy2.iroot(N1 // Q1, 2)[0]
33     P2 = gmpy2.iroot(N2 // Q2, 2)[0]
34     fai_n1 = (P1-1)*P1*(Q1-1)
35     fai_n2 = (P2-1)*P2*(Q2-1)
36     d1 = gmpy2.invert(E1, fai_n1)
37     d2 = gmpy2.invert(E2, fai_n2)
38     m1 = pow(C1, d1, N1)
39     m2 = pow(C2, d2, N2)
40     print(bytes.decode(long_to_bytes(m1)), end="")
41     print(bytes.decode(long_to_bytes(m2)))

```

用<https://cocalc.com/>在线运行sagemath解密上面脚本



## 14.Crypto-分组密码工作模式

AES,CBC 16位明文，已知初始向量IV 和 密文，破解密钥。


```

s.send("Enter your token > \n".encode())
try:
    authcode = read_line(s).decode()
    user_key = bytes.fromhex(authcode)[:16]
    code = bytes.fromhex(authcode)[16:]
    cipher = AES.new(user_key, AES.MODE_CBC, user_key) #
    token = cipher.decrypt(code) # AdminAdmin!_____

```

使用CBC反转攻击

### 三、CBC字节反转攻击原理



#### 字节反转攻击原理文字描述:

我们从上述图片可以看出，如果猜测出明文分组 $P_n$ ，那么可以通过修改密文分组 $C_{i-1}$ 为 $C_{i-1} \oplus P_n \oplus A$ ，那么解密出来的 $P_n$ 的结果是 $A$ 。当然我们一般是不可能直接猜出来整个明文分组 $P_n$ ，我们更多遇到的是上述图片描述的那样，仅知道 $P_n$ 中部分明文。同样地，我们依旧可以发动字节反转攻击，仅需要针对正确的位置进行修改密文内容即可。

这种攻击的精髓在于：通过CBC的加密特点改变明文内容，但是这种改变并不会引起其它明文块儿对应位的改变。这种攻击常用来绕过过滤器，提权（比如从guest变为admin）等。

```
1 token = "8ed436b2c20f007a7b524ea36cb8cefb5797aead0a922ed6f46276c941205c42 "
2 iv = bytes.fromhex(token[:32])
3 token1 = b'HUSTCTFer!_____'
4 token2 = b'AdminAdmin!_____'
5 iv2 = b''
6 for i in range(16):
7     k = token1[i]^token2[i]^iv[i] # 先异或原来的明文抵消掉原文本，再异或替换的明文
8     iv2 += k.to_bytes()
9 iv = iv2
10 token = iv.hex() + token[32:]
11 print(token)
```

```
(pingzai@kali)-[~/Desktop/tmp/24-06-17]~$ nc 10.12.153.8 32243
Only admin can get the flag! /tmp/24-06-17/_FakeZip.zip.extracted

Enter your choice: 1) Create HUSTCTFer Account
2) Create Admin Account
3) Login
4) Exit
1
here is your token: 8ed436b2c20f007a7b524ea36cb8cefb5797aead0a922ed6f46276c941205c42

Enter your choice:
1) Create HUSTCTFer Account
2) Create Admin Account
3) Login
4) Exit
87e5088fef1a2272601d30a36cb8cefb5797aead0a922ed6f46276c941205c42
WTF

Enter your choice:
1) Create HUSTCTFer Account
2) Create Admin Account
3) Login
4) Exit
3
Enter your token >
87e5088fef1a2272601d30a36cb8cefb5797aead0a922ed6f46276c941205c42
Hello Admin! Here is your FLAG: vmc{P9bvW00sBocAcJz7mRZ2dU0GPCTDsJlR}
```



# 15.Crypto-Hill密码

密文

```
1 >u\x1019\npI,0\x04^J\x00ib\x03\x0c\x158d\x1f\x08Irk\nF\x19fz\x14PT\x04\x03>R~
```

39个字符，即我们可以得到13组  $3 \times 3$  矩阵 乘 3个字节向量的式子

我们又已知开头是 `vmc{}` 末尾一点有空格

最后一位一定是空格，未知的只有4个数，sagemath爆破启动！

```
1 from Crypto.Util.number import *
2 def is_printable(s):
3     for char in s:
4         if not char == ' ' and not char.isprintable() :
5             return False
6     return True
7 raw =
8 b'>u\x1019\npI,0\x04^J\x00ib\x03\x0c\x158d\x1f\x08Irk\nF\x19fz\x14PT\x04\x03>R~'
9 rawi = [int(x) for x in raw]
10 print(rawi)
11 print([ord('v'),ord('m'),ord('c'),ord('{'),ord('}')]])
12 # print(rawi)
13 c = matrix(Zmod(127), 3, 3 , [118,109,99,123,0,0,125,32,32])
14 # 118 109 99
15 # 123 xx  xx
16 # 125 32  32
17 p = matrix(Zmod(127), 3, 3 , [62,117,16,108,57,10,62,82,126])
18 # 62 117 16
19 # 108  57 10
20 # 62  82 126
21 for i in range(0,127):
22     print(i)
23     for j in range(127):
24         #         for a in range(127):
25         #             c[0,1] = a
26         #             # print(c[1,2])
27         c[1,1] = j
28         c[1,2] = i
29         #
30         flag = True
31         if c.is_invertible() is True:
32             K = c.solve_right(p) # 解AK = B
33             # K = matrix(Zmod(127), 3, 3 , [1,0,1,7,1,2,2,3])
34             # print(f'{i},{j},{a}| {K} ')
35             decode = ''
36             # tmp = matrix(Zmod(127), 3, 1 ,rawi[36:39])
37             # A = K.solve_right(tmp)
38             for k in range(13):
39                 tmp = matrix(Zmod(127), 1, 3 ,rawi[k*3:(k+1)*3])
40                 A = K.solve_left(tmp) # [1*3]
41                 for l in range(3):
42                     char = chr(A[0,l])
43                     if not char == ' ' and not char.isprintable() :
44                         flag = False
45                         break
46                     decode += char
47             if flag is False:
48                 break
```

```

48 |         if flag is True:
49 |             print(f'{i},{j}|{decode}')

```

先测试倒数三位全是空格的情况，但是没有爆破出可打印的flag

```

60
60, 56 | vmc {<8e3EDJua&47mUIde3ouIzWeR01_dK9D}
60, 69 | vmc {<Ee3. DJ6a&$7myID (3oeIz2eRV1_`K9m}
60, 108 | vmc {<1e3hDJwa&s7mfIDo3o5IzBeRI1_TK9i}
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
78, 56 | vmc {N8eDEDhua`47nUI[e3(uI=WeL01mdKhD}
78, 69 | vmc {NEeD. Dh6a`$7nyI[(3(eI=2eLV1m`Khm}
78, 108 | vmc {N1eDhDhwa`s7nfI[o3(5I=BeLI1mTKhi}
79

```

以上是倒数第二位是空格的情况，看起来不太乐观，应该没有flag

**但其实是有的**，原来这题的flag不是有语义的一句话了，这害得我纠结了半天..... `vmc{d8euED8uaj47SUIie34uI9weo01pdkiD}`

```

+ Insert Cell Type Format Toolbars Run Validate Stop Kernel
SageMath 10.3 Trusted Kernel is idle (halt...) CPU
break
decode += char
if flag is False:
    break
if flag is True:
    print(f'{i},{j}|{decode}')

Out[4]: 56
56, 60 | vmc {<8e3EDJua&47mUIde3ouIzWeR01_dK9D}
56, 78 | vmc {N8eDEDhua`47nUI[e3(uI=WeL01mdKhD}
56, 94 | vmc {`8eEED. ua-47) UI7e3vuI#Weg01AdK/D}
56, 100 | vmc {d8euED8uaj47SUIie34uI9weo01pdkiD}
56, 112 | vmc {p8eVEDLuae47`UINe3/uIeWek010dK`D}
56, 117 | vmc {u8e`ED*ua. 47[U1#e3wuIMWe?01adKdD}
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
69, 60 | vmc {<Ee3. DJ6a&$7myID (3oeIz2eRV1_`K9m}
69, 78 | vmc {NEeD. Dh6a`$7nyI[(3(eI=2eLV1m`Khm}
69, 94 | vmc {`EeE. D. 6a-$7)yI7(3veI#2eqV1A`K/m}
69, 100 | vmc {dEeu. D86aj$7SyIi (34eI92eoV1p`Kim}
69, 112 | vmc {pEeV. DL6ae$7`yIN(3/eIe2ekV10`K`m}
69, 117 | vmc {uEa` D86a`$7[yI#(3waIM2e2V1e`Kdm}

```