

# Identification and Scoping

## Introduction

Welcome to the Identification and Scoping phase of the TryHackMe Incident Response module. Just as you've joined us at SwiftSpend Financial (SSF), we've already received notifications about a potential security compromise. There's no time to lose - we must promptly identify the nature of the breach and the scope of its extent!

In this room, we will introduce you to a crucial tool for incident response - the Spreadsheet of Doom (SoD), a comprehensive directory of malicious indicators that can streamline our investigation process.

## Learning Objectives

This room covers how we identify and scope security incidents, interpret security alerts and logs, gather additional evidence, and effectively use the Asset Inventory and Spreadsheet of Doom to identify and scope the extent of a security incident.

Identify the nature of security alerts.

Understand the process of gathering additional evidence.

Learn the importance of having an Asset Inventory and the Spreadsheet of Doom in incident response.

Discover how to scope the extent of a security compromise.

Understand the feedback loop between Identification and Scoping in incident response.

## Room Prerequisites

Before starting with this room, we recommend you clear the [Preparation room](#), the first part of our Incident Response module.

Join us in this immersive module, where you will develop the expertise needed to promptly identify security compromises and scope their extent, fortifying the security posture of assets across diverse platforms.

## Identification: Unearthing the Existence of a Security Incident

### Connecting to the machine

Start the virtual machine in split-screen view by clicking the green Start Machine button on the upper right section of this task. If the VM is not visible, use the blue Show Split

View button at the top-right of the page. Alternatively, you can connect to the VM via RDP using the credentials below if Split View does not work.

#### THM Key Credentials

- Username analyst
- Password DFIR321!
- IP MACHINE\_IP

IMPORTANT: The attached VM contains artefacts to help us better understand a Security Incident from detection to resolution. Work on the subsequent tasks and experiment with the VM through a case example. Microsoft Outlook will start on its own. Kindly ignore the activation key window by pressing Back, and then proceed by clicking Skip sign in for now ▶ Use as view only. When asked for a license, click X, for optional data, click Next ▶ Don't send optional data ▶ Done in the subsequent pop-up windows.

The Identification phase forms the bedrock of the Incident Response Process. This critical phase combines the technical detection of potential security incidents with the inherent human capacity to recognise and report them.

The speed at which an organisation can spot an incident directly correlates with the pace of response, potentially limiting the damage and shortening recovery time.

#### **The Triad of Identification: People, Process, and Technology**

Identification is a harmonious concert between people, processes, and technology.

While technology offers the tools to detect potential incidents through alerts, people must interpret these alerts and adhere to established procedures to ensure incidents are correctly identified and managed.

Moreover, all, not solely the IT or Security teams, must report any anomalies and ensure that the relevant parties are alerted by following the appropriate procedures.

Consequently, the success of the identification phase rests on a well-coordinated collaboration among these three elements.

#### **Understanding Security Alerts and Event Notifications**

Security Alerts, also referred to as Event Notifications, are crucial signals that may hint at the presence of a potential threat or the occurrence of an actual security incident.

These are pivotal in triggering the Incident Response Process and ensuring security and safety.

Understanding the nature of these alerts, including their type and severity, is vital in guiding the incident response process. This understanding is nurtured through technical expertise, effective use of security tools, and a culture of continuous learning and vigilance.

Following the proper procedures when handling these alerts ensures that the right individuals are alerted, bolstering incident response effectiveness.

### **Leveraging Technical Expertise and Security Tools**

Effective incident response relies on timely reporting, staff proficiency, and strategic use of security technologies.

Therefore, it's crucial that all employees of an organisation, technical or otherwise, stay alert and promptly report any suspicious activities or anomalies through the appropriate communication channels.

Employing robust security technologies can significantly enhance the detection and deterrence of potential threats, ensuring rapid recognition and response to situations that may escalate into actual security incidents.

It is why TryHackMe is dedicated to supporting those pursuing a career in Blue teaming to master security tools by offering a platform that can aid individuals in developing proficiency in areas specific to Security Operations and Incident Response tooling, such as the following:

- Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)
  - [Intro to Endpoint Security](#)
  - [Aurora EDR](#)
  - [Wazuh](#)
- Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)
  - [Snort](#)
  - [Snort Challenge - The Basics](#)
  - [Snort Challenge - Live Attacks](#)
- Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
  - [Investigating with ELK 101](#)
  - [Splunk: Basics](#)

- [Incident handling with Splunk](#)

Recognising that these security tools truly flourish in the hands of skilled individuals with the necessary information and technical expertise to combat potential threats and manage security incidents is vital.

However, effective communication channels are just as essential to ensure that the right people are quickly alerted with accurate and precise information, which enables them to conduct an investigation and initiate the incident response process, made possible only by well-designed procedures that both technical and non-technical staff can swiftly and seamlessly follow.

### **Promoting a Culture of Learning and Vigilance**

Cultivating a culture of learning and vigilance is a top-down initiative. Executive management must prioritise and invest in cyber security, setting clear expectations for following the correct procedures.

Regular education and awareness campaigns can equip personnel to identify and report suspicious activity or technical anomalies they may encounter, contributing to the overall effectiveness of the incident response process.

Moreover, comprehensive policies and procedures related to incident response and reporting, guided by legal counsel, can underscore the importance of following the right procedures in identifying security incidents and communicating them effectively, thereby alerting the relevant people with the necessary information that will enable them to address issues.

### **Transitioning from Identification to Scoping**

Once an incident has been identified, the subsequent step is determining its scope.

Scoping involves grasping the extent of the incident, including which systems are affected, what data is at risk, and how the incident impacts the organisation.

The transition from identification to scoping is crucial in the Incident Response Process, demanding clear communication, effective collaboration, and a well-defined process. The insights gained from the identification phase will prove instrumental in facilitating this transition and strengthening the effectiveness of the incident response process.

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**Answer the questions below:**

## What is the Subject of Ticket#2023012398704232?

The screenshot shows an Outlook inbox on the left with several emails. The selected email is from 'NoReply: SupportMe Workflow' with subject 'Ticket#2023012398704232 - WKSTN-02.swiftspend.thm - IP 172.16.1.151'. The main pane displays the details of this ticket. It includes a header for the 'SWIFTSPEND SECURITY OPERATIONS TEAM' and a table with the following information:

OTRS Ticket Number:	2023012398704232
Hostname of affected computer:	WKSTN-02.swiftspend.thm - IP 172.16.1.151
Ticket Subject:	Weird Error in Outlook
Detailed description of the incident:	I sent an email to Alex and got this error. Ideas?

Below the table, it states: 'Need help with Security-related Incidents? Click [here](#) to create a ticket.'

Answer: **Weird Error in Outlook**

## According to your colleague John, the issue outlined on Ticket#2023012398704232 could be related to what?

The screenshot shows an email thread from Johnathon Sterling to Emily Taylor and Oliver Bennett. The subject is 'Re: Re: Proposal from United Trust Company Limited'. The email body asks if the issue could be related to missing email security records (SPF, DKIM & DMARC) and requests a follow-up. Below the email, there is a screenshot of a domain security check from dmrcian.com for the domain 'swiftspend.finance'. The result is displayed in a red box:

**Your domain is not protected against abuse by phishers and spammers!**

Wasn't found directly in the email thread pertaining to the ticket but searching through all the emails the answer was found.

Answer: **SPF, DKIM & DMARC records**

## Your colleague requested what kind of data pertaining to the machine WKSTN-02?



Johnathon Sterling

IT Operations and Support Team; Security Operations Team ▾

Fw: Ticket#2023012398704232 - WKSTN-02.swiftspend.thm - IP 172.16.1.151

Cc Security Operations Team

#### Action Items

Hi [@IT Operations and Support Team](#),

We are currently investigating the activity as per Ticket#2023012398704232

Requesting Exchange Server logs and Message Trace pertaining to the following emails:

- Ascot, Michael <[michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance](mailto:michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance)>
- Swift, Alex <[alex.swift@swiftspend.finance](mailto:alex.swift@swiftspend.finance)>

Additionally, can you retrieve the Web Proxy logs for the following machine:

- WKSTN-02 (172.16.1.151)

Thanks!

Answer: **Web Proxy logs**

## Scoping: Understanding the Extent of a Security Incident

After identification, the next critical step in the Incident Response Process is Scoping, which involves determining the extent of a security incident, including identifying the affected systems, the type of data at risk, and the potential impact on the organisation.

Scoping is essential as it guides the subsequent steps of the response process and helps formulate an effective mitigation strategy.

### The Asset Inventory: A Quick Reference for Incident Response

The Asset Inventory is a crucial tool in the incident response process. It provides a comprehensive list of all the organisation's assets, aiding in identifying and scoping potential threats. Let's look at a simple representation of the Asset Inventory.

Asset Type	Asset Name	IP Address	Operating System	Owner
Domain Controller	DC-01	172.16.1.10	Windows Server 2019	Derick Marshall

Mail Server	MAILSVR-01	172.16.1.15	Windows Server 2019	Stan Simon
Web Server	WEBSVR-01	172.16.1.110	Ubuntu Server 20.04	Damian Hall
Proxy Server	PROXY-01	172.16.1.119	Windows Server 2019	Stan Simon
Workstation	WKSTN-02	172.16.1.151	Windows 10 Pro	Michael Ascot
Laptop	LPTP-01	172.16.1.153	Windows 10 Pro	Derick Marshall

### **The Spreadsheet of Doom (SoD): Enriching Artefacts for Effective Incident Response**

Identifying, understanding, and responding to potential threats within the known scope of a security incident as swiftly as possible is critical.

The Spreadsheet of Doom (SoD) is designed to aid in these processes, acting as a consolidated, organised source of information about known threats.

It serves as a single reference point, accelerating the incident response procedure. Each row in this spreadsheet is representative of a unique threat identifier or an Indicator of Compromise (IoC).

<b>Indicator Type</b>	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Threat Type</b>	<b>Source</b>
IP Address	188.40.75.132	Malware Hosting	AlienVault OTX
Domain	b24b-158-62-19-6.ngr ok-free.app	Phishing Domain	Ticket#2023012398 704232
Email Address	alex.swift@swiftspend .finance	Spoofed Email	Ticket#2023012398 704232
Email Address	mike.ascot@swiftspend .finance	Spoofed Email	Ticket#2023012398 704232
Domain	groupmarketingonline .icu	Phishing Domain	VirusTotal
File Hash(SHA 1)	75ec7d0d1b6b2b4c8 16cbc1b71cd0f8f06bd 8c1b	Malware	ThreatCrowd

The SoD is essentially a structured list of IoCs, including IP addresses, domain names, URLs, file hashes, and more associated with malicious activity. The data in this spreadsheet is enriched with additional information about each IoC, such as its source, the type of threat it is linked to, and more.

This additional context can aid incident responders in quickly understanding the nature of a security incident and potential threats. Moreover, it provides a historical reference that can be used for tracking recurring threats and observing patterns in cyberattacks.

The SoD is more than just a list - it's a dynamic, comprehensive resource that centralises crucial information, streamlines communication among incident response teams, and ultimately empowers faster, more effective responses to potential threats.

The Asset Inventory and Spreadsheet of Doom are indispensable tools in Scoping the extent of a security incident. These tools can be used as quick references and fact sheets, enabling efficient correlation and enrichment of artefacts by providing a comprehensive overview of relevant information about an incident at a glance. By continually updating and referring to both tools, incident response teams can stay one step ahead and take a more proactive approach to incident response.

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**Answer the questions below:**

**Based on Ticket#2023012398704231 and Asset Inventory shown in this task, who owns the computer that needs Endpoint Protection definitions updated?**





A user opened a security-related incident ticket. Please see details below.

#### SWIFTSPEND SECURITY OPERATIONS TEAM

OTRS Ticket Number:	2023012398704231
Hostname of affected computer:	LPTP-01.swiftspend.thm - IP 172.16.1.153
Ticket Subject:	Outdated Endpoint Protection definitions
Detailed description of the incident:	Outdated Endpoint Protection definitions. Definitions are from 01.01.2023. Please install actual definitions and investigate why updates are not installed automatically.

Need help with Security-related Incidents? Click [here](#) to create a ticket.

Laptop	LPTP-01	172.16.1.153	Windows 10 Pro	Derick Marshall
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Answer: **Derick Marshall**

Based on the email exchanges and SoD shown in this task, what was the phishing domain where the compromised credentials in Ticket#2023012398704232 were submitted?

Domain	b24b-158-62-19-6.ngrok-free.app	Phishing domain	Ticket#2023012398704232
Email address	alex.swift@swiftspend.finance	Spoofed email	Ticket#2023012398704232
Email address	mike.ascot@swiftspend.finance	Spoofed email	Ticket#2023012398704232

Answer: **b24b-158-62-19-6.ngrok-free.app**

Based on Ticket#2023012398704233, what phishing domain should be added to the SoD?



A user opened a security-related incident ticket. Please see details below.

#### SWIFTSPEND SECURITY OPERATIONS TEAM

OTRS Ticket Number:	2023012398704233
Hostname of affected computer:	WKSTN-01.swiftspend.thm - IP 172.16.1.150
Ticket Subject:	Suspicious Email
Detailed description of the incident:	I received an email that redirects me to <a href="https://kennaroads.buzz/data/Update365/office365/40e7baa2f826a57fc04e5202526f8bd/?email=zoe.duncan@swiftspend.finance&amp;error">https://kennaroads.buzz/data/Update365/office365/40e7baa2f826a57fc04e5202526f8bd/?email=zoe.duncan@swiftspend.finance&amp;error</a> and asks me to login to Office 365.

Need help with Security-related Incidents? Click [here](#) to create a ticket.

Answer: **kennaroads.buzz**

## Identification and Scoping Feedback Loop: An Intelligence-Driven Incident Response Process

The Identification and Scoping phase of the Incident Response Process is not a linear progression but a feedback loop continually refining our understanding of the incident and its scope.

This loop becomes intelligence-driven when it leverages current investigation data, enriching it with information from past incidents, correlated logs from various data sources, advanced analytics and machine learning to enhance awareness by adding more context to a developing situation.

1. Event Notification: The loop begins when an issue has been reported. It triggers the incident response process and sets the stage for the subsequent steps.
2. Documentation: The underlying issue is documented in detail, including information about the nature of the incident, the systems affected, and any potential threats or vulnerabilities. Documentation is a critical step that provides a foundation for the rest of the process.
3. Evidence Collection: Evidence of the incident is collected, including log files, network traffic data, and other relevant information. The collected evidence provides valuable insights into the incident and helps identify potential threats.

4. Artefact Identification: The collected evidence is analysed to identify artefacts related to the incident. These artefacts can provide clues about the threat's nature and the damage's extent.
5. Pivot Point Discovery: Based on the identified artefacts, new areas of investigation may be discovered. These pivot points can lead to new insights and help further refine the incident's scope. After this step, the process loops back to the documentation phase, incorporating the new findings.

### **The Power of an Intelligence-Driven Feedback Loop**

A feedback loop driven by intelligence in the Identification and Scoping phase encourages a proactive and dynamic method towards incident response.

This proactive approach facilitates an ongoing education and exchange of information, enabling organisations to respond to security incidents and safeguard their systems efficiently.

It also ensures compliance with legal obligations for privacy and data protection.

Organisations can boost their incident response prowess and efficiently counteract security incidents by capitalising on real-time data concerning emerging threats, cultivating an environment of ongoing education and exchange of information, and guaranteeing privacy and data protection.

\*\*\*\*\*

**Answer the questions below:**

**Concerning Ticket#2023012398704232 and according to your colleague John, what domain should be added to the SoD since it was used for email spoofing?**



Johnathon Sterling

Emily Taylor; Oliver Bennett ▾

Re: Re: Proposal from United Trust Company Limited

Cc Oliver Bennett

As Oliver and I suspected, Mike received a spoofed email and this is indeed related to our mail server's security.

Received: from **emkei.cz (89.187.129.25)** by MAILSRV-01.swiftspendfinancial.thm (172.16.1.15) with Microsoft SMTP Server id 15.2.1118.7 via Frontend Transport; Thu, 13 Jul 2023 13:57:02 +0000  
Received: by **emkei.cz (Postfix, from userid 33)** id 09B1554DA7B; Thu, 13 Jul 2023 15:56:21 +0200 (CEST)  
To: <[michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance](mailto:michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance)>  
Subject: Proposal from United Trust Company Limited  
From: Alex Swift <[alex.swift@swiftspend.finance](mailto:alex.swift@swiftspend.finance)>

Answer: **emkei.cz**

Concerning the available artefacts gathered for analysis of Ticket#2023012398704232, who is the other user that received a similar phishing email but did not open a ticket nor report the issue?

← Back to message

Last changed: Thursday, July 13, 2023



MessageTraceSearchResult\_2023-07-13T16\_49\_53.csv  
877 bytes



WKSTN-02.swiftspend.thm - 172.16.1.151 - michael.ascot.csv  
8 KB

Received,SenderAddress,RecipientAddress,Subject,Status  
2023-07-12T16:04:59.23145827Z,sales.tal0nix@gmail.com,alexander.swift@swiftspend.finance,(No subject),Delivered  
2023-07-12T16:04:59.23145827Z,sales.tal0nix@gmail.com,michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance,(No subject),Delivered  
2023-07-13T13:57:02.58642720Z,alex.swift@swiftspend.finance,michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance,Proposal From United Trust Company Limited,Delivered  
2023-07-13T13:57:02.58642720Z,mike.ascot@swiftspend.finance,[alexander.swift@swiftspend.finance](mailto:alexander.swift@swiftspend.finance),Proposal From United Trust Company Limited,Delivered

Answer: **alexander.swift@swiftspend.finance**

Concerning Ticket#2023012398704232, what additional IoC could be added to the SoD and be used as a pivot point for discovery?

← Back to message

Last changed: Thursday, July 13, 2023



MessageTraceSearchResult\_2023-07-13T16\_49\_53.csv  
877 bytes



WKSTN-02.swiftspend.thm - 172.16.1.151 - michael.ascot.csv  
8 KB

Received,SenderAddress,RecipientAddress,Subject,Status  
2023-07-12T16:04:59.23145827Z,[sales.tal0nix@gmail.com](mailto:sales.tal0nix@gmail.com),alexander.swift@swiftspend.finance,(No subject),Delivered  
2023-07-12T16:04:59.23145827Z,sales.tal0nix@gmail.com,michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance,(No subject),Delivered  
2023-07-13T13:57:02.58642720Z,alex.swift@swiftspend.finance,michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance,Proposal From United Trust Company Limited,Delivered  
2023-07-13T13:57:02.58642720Z,mike.ascot@swiftspend.finance,[alexander.swift@swiftspend.finance](mailto:alexander.swift@swiftspend.finance),Proposal From United Trust Company Limited,Delivered

Answer: **sales.tal0nix@gmail.com**

Based on the email exchanges and attachments in those exchanges, what is the password of the compromised user?

b24b-158-62-19-6.ngrok-free.app/submit-login?username=michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance&password=Passw0rd!																											
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W				
1	Administra					stan.simon@swiftspend.finance																					
2	Report Cr					July 13, 2023 4:57:02 PM UTC																					
3	User					michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance																					
4	No.	Event Tim	Logged Ti	User	SSL Inspec	URL	Policy Act	Request	Response	Agent	Client IP	Client Ext	Server IP	Location	Cloud App	Cloud Apr	URL Class	URL Super	URL Categ	Threat Su	Threat Cat	MD5	Threat Na	S			
5	1	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	fe2.ws.mi	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
6	2	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	Yes	fe2.ws.mi	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
7	3	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	fe2.ws.mi	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
8	4	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	Yes	fe2.ws.mi	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
9	5	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	fe2.ws.mi	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
10	6	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	Yes	fe2.ws.mi	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
11	7	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	ctidl.wind	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
12	8	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	ctidl.wind	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
13	9	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	sls.update	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
14	10	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	ieonline.w	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
15	11	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	google.co	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
16	12	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	b24b-158-	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
17	13	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	b24b-158-	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
18	14	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	b24b-158-	Allowed	Post	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
19	15	July 13, 20	July 13, 20	michael.a	No	google.co	Allowed	Get	200 - OK	Mozilla/5.172.16.1.1	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	ZZZ.ZZZ.Zi	United Kir	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	General B	
20																											

Opening the excel spreadsheet related to WKSTN-02 we see a lot of Get requests but one Post request. Clicking on the cell for the URL of the Post request we can see a username and password saved by the ngrok server.

b24b-158-62-19-6.ngrok-free.app/submit-login?username=michael.ascot@swiftspend.finance&password=Passw0rd!

Domain	b24b-158-62-19-6.ngrok-free.app	Phishing domain	Ticket#2023012398704232
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That specific ngrok server is also logged as a phishing domain in our Spreadsheet of Doom.

Answer: **Passw0rd!**

## Conclusion

The Identification and Scoping phase of the Incident Response Process is a critical juncture that requires a well-coordinated effort between people, processes, and technology. Here, the nature of security alerts is discerned, and the extent of the incident is determined.

This phase is a balancing act, requiring technical expertise, effective use of security tools, and a culture of continuous learning and vigilance.

We've explored the importance of understanding security alerts, the role of technical expertise and security tools, and cultivating a culture of learning and vigilance. We've also delved into the significance of following proper procedures to ensure that incidents are accurately identified and managed, ensuring that the appropriate individuals capable of addressing them are notified.

Remember, the success of the identification phase hinges on a well-orchestrated collaboration between these elements. You can significantly enhance your

organisation's incident response capabilities by fostering a culture of awareness and vigilance and leveraging the right tools and processes.

### **Next Steps**

Now that you've comprehensively understood the Identification and Scoping phase, it's time to proceed to the next room, [Intel Creation and Containment](#).

Here, you'll delve deeper into the Incident Response Process, exploring the subsequent phases and honing your skills further. Remember, continuous learning and practice are essential to mastering incident response. Onwards!