

Where Are We?

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Covered dictionary and related approaches to document **classifications**



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Continue this idea,



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Continue this idea, but in a more **formal** modeling way: **Naive Bayes**



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also consider ways to estimate **proportions** of documents in different categories.

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Continue this idea, but in a more **formal** modeling way: **Naive Bayes**

and look at ways to classify/scale specifically **political** texts.

also consider ways to estimate **proportions** of documents in different categories.

plus opportunities for fast, reliable coding of **training** set.

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
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
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


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


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
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
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CRITIC REVIEWS FOR STAR WARS: EPISODE VII - THE FORCE AWAKENS

All Critics (313) | Top Critics (48) | My Critics | Fresh (293) | Rotten (20)


 The new movie, as an act of pure storytelling, streams by with fluency and zip.


[Full Review...](#) | December 21, 2015

 **Anthony Lane**
New Yorker
★ Top Critic


 At the end The Force Awakens looks more like a nostalgic film that will work as a transition to the new Star Wars' age. [Full Review in Spanish]


[Full Review...](#) | December 29, 2015

 **Salvador Franco Reyes**


 While Star Wars: The Force Awakens gets temporarily bogged down taking us back to the world that we left in 1983, it introduces us to the new and exciting torch-bearers of the franchise.

[Full Review...](#) | December 30, 2015

 **Blake Howard**
Graffiti With Punctuation

 This film is a well-planned product that balances nostalgia with the capacity to attract new generations into the Star Wars universe. [Full Review in Spanish]

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→ fast, simple, accurate, efficient and therefore **popular**.

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$$\Pr(A|B) \propto \Pr(A) \Pr(B|A)$$

Here, $\Pr(A)$ is our **prior** for A , while $\Pr(B|A)$ will be the **likelihood** for the data we saw.

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where $\Pr(c)$ is the **prior probability** of a document occurring in class c ; and $\Pr(t_k|c)$ is interpreted as “measure of the how much evidence t_k contributes that c is the correct class”

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and denominator is the total number all terms in the training documents in c .

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	5	prince william news	ham
test	6	prince prince money	?

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Can assign a *Jihad Score* to each document: basically the logged likelihood ratio, $\sum_i \log \frac{\Pr(t_k | \text{Jihad})}{\Pr(t_k | \neg \text{Jihad})}$ (note: doesn't know what 'real world' priors are, so drops them here)

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Then for each cleric, **concatenate all works** into **one** and give this 'document'/cleric a score.

Discriminating Words

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Apostasy

Jihad


Word Frequency

a = 1/250

a = 1/500

a = 1/1000

a = 1/2000



← Jihadi Not Jihadi →

Validation: *Exoneration*

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


Figure 4.9: *Jihad Scores Predict Inclusion in The Exoneration*

Scoring and Scaling Political Texts

Wordscores (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 2003)

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- e.g. are parties moving together over time, such that manifestos are converging?
- e.g. do members of parliament speak in line with their constituency's ideology (roll calls typically uninformative)?

→ LBG suggest a way of scoring documents in a NB style, so that we can answer such questions.

- 1 Begin with a **reference set** (training set) of texts that have **known positions**.

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- 2 Generate **word scores** from these reference texts
- 3 Score the **virgin texts** (test set) of texts using those word scores, possibly transform virgin scores to original metric.

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NB any **new** words in the virgin document that were *not* in the reference texts are **ignored**: the sum is only over the words we've seen in the reference texts.

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
→ can rescale these back to original $(-1, 1)$ dimension.

New Labour Moderates its Economic Policy

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
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Compared to Expert Surveys

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(a) Economic Scale



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while Beauchamp (2011) provides comparison and extension to more purely **Bayesian** approach.

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Actual	J	a TP	b FN	$a + b$
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Total		$a + c$	$b + d$	N

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


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- 2 We may be skeptical of using **accuracy** as a performance indicator in this case. Explain why.


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
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Makes sense in terms of historical record!

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
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if we had a large number of 'experts', we could (depending on the size of the problem) have everything as a 'training' set and **avoid modeling** at all.

Galton and the Wisdom of Crowds

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average of 800 guesses = 1,197
actual weight of the ox = 1,198

9b

Crowdsourcing as Concept

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

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

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



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Note that this method allows replication of [the data](#) used in an analysis,


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
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
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
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
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