

# Onion Routing: A Quest for Internet Anonymity, and Perhaps a Quest for Unparalleled Brilliance

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December 6, 2017

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# 1. Introduction and Background

Suppose it is desired to communicate sensitive information across the Internet to a trusted source. Of course, it should not be possible for an arbitrary observer to read this information. The problem of hiding information can be solved by encrypting data, taking advantage of the advances in the field of cryptography, so that only the trusted source may be able to unscramble (and thus effectively read) the message that was sent. But what if this communication was so sensitive that it is even desired that no arbitrary observer should even know that the source and trusted destination are communicating with each other? This presents another interesting problem that goes beyond cryptography – in fact, it may only be solved by the design of a clever communication protocol.

The desire to participate in anonymous communication over the Internet is quite popular nowadays, and many choose to accomplish this by communicating through a Virtual Private Network (VPN). This works by sending all messages through an intermediate server, so that observers can only see that the sender is sending messages to the VPN server, and therefore cannot tell where the sender's desired destination is. Moreover, the destination itself is receiving messages from the VPN server, so observers monitoring the destination cannot tell who the sender is. On the surface, it may seem like this method does, in fact, provide a means of anonymous communication. Since no observer can know the source and destination of a message sent through a VPN, does that not imply that anonymity was achieved? Unfortunately, although arbitrary observers cannot discern the source and destination of a message, there is one party that may retain this information, and that is the VPN server itself. Users of VPN services must trust that the owner of the VPN server has no malicious intentions, and does not, for example, keep logs of the packets it receives. Although many users may trust the VPN servers they use, it is important to note that the VPN service does not, in fact, provide complete anonymity.

This report will explore and provide details of the implementation of the Onion Routing protocol, a method of communication that was shown to provide complete anonymity [1]. Onion Routing may be seen as an extension of the VPN scheme described above, which makes creative use of several intermediate servers to hide the endpoints of a communication channel from any potential observer. An Onion Routing network consists of a set of *onion routers*, denoted by  $\mathcal{O}$ , and a *directory node*. The directory node is responsible for knowing the details of all onion

routers and selecting a random path of  $n$  onion routers,  $\mathcal{P} \triangleq \{o_1, \dots, o_n\} \subset \mathcal{O}$  for a user to communicate through. Given  $\mathcal{P}$ , the sender sends his message to  $o_1$ , who relays the message to  $o_2$ , and so on, until  $o_n$  receives the message and forwards it to the destination. Therefore, no intermediate node in  $\mathcal{P}$  communicates with both the sender and the receiver of a given message, assuming  $n > 1$  (note that, for  $n = 1$ , the scheme collapses to the VPN paradigm described above). However, so far, this scheme *does not* provide complete anonymity. Although no router in  $\mathcal{P}$  directly communicates with the sender and destination, the routers in  $\mathcal{P}$  must still know how to route a message across  $\mathcal{P}$ , meaning its messages must contain the addresses of all routers in  $\mathcal{P}$ . If a router knows  $\mathcal{P}$ , the owner of the router may trace the messages it forwards to the destination! Thankfully, Onion Routing solves this issue by layering encryption on messages in such a way that all routers in  $\mathcal{P}$  can only know the address of the server before it and the server after it in the message's path. This prevents any router or observer from gaining full knowledge of  $\mathcal{P}$ , which effectively hides the endpoints of a communication channel.

It is up to the designer of the Onion Routing Protocol to come up with a way of designing the encryption scheme that hides  $\mathcal{P}$  from observers. Ultimately, this scheme will be the backbone of the security of the protocol. In the implementation described in this report, this was accomplished by an elegant virtual circuit establishment procedure, which was inspired by a establishment process suggested by Reed, Syverson, and Goldschlag [2] but heavily modified, as will be described later on in the report. Reed, Syverson, and Goldschlag suggested a separate Onion Routing process for establishing the connections between all routers involves in a communication channel [2, 3], which was a very practical implementation idea that drastically simplified the routing of data messages and elegantly streamlined the implementation that will be shown. A *mélange* of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography (see Appendix A) was used to securely establish virtual circuits. The virtual circuit establishment process consisted of generating symmetric keys  $\{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$  and sending them to their respective onion routers encrypted with the desired onion router's public key, so that only the desired onion router may know its symmetric key. When an onion router receives its symmetric key, it maintains the connection through which the symmetric key was sent. The sender therefore sends  $n$  successive public-key-encrypted symmetric keys, and sends them all through  $o_1$  to avoid the scenario of an observer deducing  $\mathcal{P}$  by watching where the sender is sending messages. The sender sends the public-key-encrypted  $s_i$  keys encrypted successively with  $s_{i-1}, s_{i-2}, \dots, s_2, s_1$ , and each node in  $\mathcal{P}$  decrypts with its symmetric key before forwarding the establishment message. This hides the location of  $o_i$  until  $o_{i-1}$  receives the establishment message, at which point  $o_{i-1}$  decrypts the last layer of symmetric encryption and makes a connection with  $o_i$ . Once all connections are made, there is no longer any need to send addressing information for data messages. Therefore, the suggested implementation does, in fact, provide secrecy of the path  $\mathcal{P}$ .

As in the virtual circuit establishment, the sender encrypts the desired data message successively with the intermediate onion routers' symmetric keys when sending messages, and onion routers always decrypt forward-propagating

messages (message towards the destination) with their symmetric keys, so that the intermediate routers cannot read the message that is being sent, and observers cannot trace a given message across the onion network. When the message's receiver sends back a response, all intermediate nodes encrypt the backward-propagating message with their symmetric keys before sending the message back towards the sender, which similarly hides the data in the response message.

In a favorable scenario,  $|\mathcal{O}|$  is very large, and the amount of communication channels throughout the onion network is also very large. This provides even more security, as it makes things extremely difficult for observers to deduce the path of a message in the network. As the traffic in the network gets greater, it becomes practically infeasible for an observer to try to do this.

All in all, the Onion Routing scheme ideally provides some drastic improvements to the VPN scheme with respect to security:

1. The virtual circuit establishment phase eliminates the possibility of any router or observer directly knowing both the sender and destination of a message
2. A large amount of available onion routers on the network provides severe difficulty of guessing a message path
3. If there is lots of traffic in the network, it is infeasible for an observer to try to trace the path of a message

Therefore, Onion Routing is a very promising technique for providing complete anonymity of a communication channel. However, it is also a drastically more complex protocol than communicating through a VPN, for example. The added complexity may cause many considerable design challenges, performance reductions, and practical limitations, which may ultimately affect its feasibility.

The remainder of this report will describe the implementation details of such a protocol, and will discuss the design challenges that were faced. Furthermore, a thorough *exposé* of the limitations of the protocol, as well as the costs of mitigating these limitations, will be given. Moreover, performance details such as the added delay imposed by multiple intermediate routers and encryption or decryption will be observed. Although the Onion Routing protocol is promising, it remains to be seen if it is powerful enough for practical use. This report aims to determine if the proposed Onion Routing scheme can be used in practice, and will provide discussion concerning the cost of improving its practicality and the practicality of anonymous communication altogether.

# Appendices

# A. A Brief Conspectus of Cryptography

The Onion Routing protocol described in this report makes extensive use of cryptography for encrypting and decrypting sensitive data. Encryption is the process of obscuring data in such a way that only the intended recipient of the data may read the data, via decryption. In order for this to be accomplished, the sender and the receiver of the data use calculated *keys*, which are similar in purpose to passwords, to compute the scrambled data and to retrieve the unscrambled data. Two main paradigms for achieving encryption and decryption are used in this implementation, and will be described below.

## A.1 Terminology

The list below describes some terms related to cryptography that may be used sporadically in the report.

- **Plaintext:** Regular text that has not been encrypted.
- **Ciphertext:** Scrambled, incomprehensible text that is the product of encryption. Must be *decrypted* to be understood.
- **Encryption:** The calculated process of scrambling data to create ciphertext in such a way that it can be unscrambled only by a desired party.
- **Decryption:** The process of unscrambling ciphertext into plaintext.
- **Key:** A byte string that ultimately cryptographically identifies a communicating party, which is used to encrypt and/or decrypt data.

## A.2 Symmetric Cryptography

The simpler form of cryptography that will be used is called “Symmetric Cryptography”, and is characterized by the notion of the sender and receiver sharing a secret key, called a symmetric key. The scheme is defined by the tuple (KGen, Enc, Dec). The KGen parameter is pseudorandom generator that generates a key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  with uniform probability over  $\mathcal{K}$ , where  $\mathcal{K}$  is the keyspace, or the set of all keys. Enc, Dec are families of functions,

where  $\text{Enc}_k : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$  and  $\text{Dec}_k : \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$  are encryption and decryption functions for some key  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ ,  $\mathcal{M}$  is the message space (set of all possible messages), and  $\mathcal{C}$  is the ciphertext space (set of all possible ciphertexts). Symmetric schemes are called symmetric because encryption and decryption are both done using the same key, so for all messages  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ ,

$$\text{Dec}_k(\text{Enc}_k(m)) = m \quad (\text{A.1})$$

This property is crucial for providing bidirectional encrypted communication without revealing the message's route, so symmetric encryption and decryption is a primary function of the onion routers. Furthermore, symmetric key encryption and decryption are asymptotically much faster than their asymmetric counterparts [4] (described in the next section). The downside, of course, is that establishing a shared secret key and keeping it secret may be difficult.

The symmetric cryptography scheme that will be used in the Onion Routing implementation described in this report is called Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [5]. The 128-bit key variant is used for ease of development, especially in the testing phase, but the `stealth` library developed for this implementation provides accommodations for easily changing the key size to 192- or 256-bit keys. It is generally frowned-upon to manually implement cryptographic schemes, as it is always preferable to use libraries that have been thoroughly tested and validated. The `PyCrypto` library was used to provide primitive AES encryption and decryption, as well as cryptographically-secure random key generation, in this implementation.

### A.3 Asymmetric Cryptography

Although symmetric cryptography certainly has its benefits, it requires two parties to share a secret key, which may not be easily done, especially if the key must be communicated over a network. Asymmetric cryptography solves this issue, though it has issues of its own which will be described soon.

Instead of two parties sharing a shared secret key as in symmetric cryptography, asymmetric cryptography schemes give each party both a *private key* and a *public key*. As the names suggest, the public key can be known by anyone, but the private key should be kept secret. Note however that although the private key must remain secret, it is not shared by anyone, which removes the main drawback of symmetric encryption. Like symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption schemes are defined by  $(\text{KGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ , with  $\text{Enc}_{\text{pub}} : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$  and  $\text{Dec}_{\text{priv}} : \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ . The encryption/decryption process has the following property:

$$\text{Dec}_{f(k)}(\text{Enc}_k(m)) = m \quad (\text{A.2})$$



In equation (A.2),  $k$  is the public key, and  $f(k)$  yields the private key. Asymmetric cryptography is only effective if computing  $f(k)$  is an NP problem – that is to say, computing  $f(k)$  is computationally infeasible. Given this property, if user  $\mathcal{A}$  wants to send an encrypted message to  $\mathcal{B}$ , user  $\mathcal{A}$  encrypts the message with user  $\mathcal{B}$ 's public key (which is publicly-known), and then  $\mathcal{B}$  may decrypt the message using its private key. Since  $f(k)$  is computationally intractable, the probability of someone other than  $\mathcal{B}$  decrypting the message is negligible.

In the implementation of Onion Routing discussed in this report, asymmetric cryptography is used to communicate symmetric keys. Since public keys are publicly-known, the sender knows how to send encrypted messages to any onion router without needing a shared secret key. Therefore, asymmetric cryptography allows the sender to share symmetric keys without anyone aside from the desired router being able to see the symmetric key.

Although asymmetric cryptography does provide some incredible benefits, it also has its drawbacks. Firstly, asymmetric encryption and decryption is relatively slow [4], so it is beneficial to reduce the frequency of its use as much as possible without compromising the security of the system. Furthermore, in some applications, such as the main purpose of onion routers, for example, it may be necessary to send encrypted *and* decrypted messages over the network. In this scenario, asymmetric cryptography cannot be used. In the case of the onion routers, they must encrypt response messages before forwarding them back towards the sender. Since the sender does not know the onion routers' private keys, the sender cannot decrypt the response! Therefore, clearly asymmetric encryption cannot be used in some scenarios.

The cryptographic scheme that is used in the Onion Routing implementation presented in this report is called RSA [6]. As in the case of symmetric cryptography, it is always preferred to use trusted libraries for implementing asymmetric cryptography. The **PyCrypto** library also implements the RSA cryptosystem, and it was used in the implementation described in this report.

## B. List of External Resources

Several external, third party resources were used in the implementation described in this report. Below is a list of these resources, as well as references to where they can be found/downloaded and descriptions of what they were used for.

Resource	Origin	Reason for Use
PyCrypto python library	<a href="https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/">https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/</a>	AES encryption/decryption, RSA encryption/decryption, importing and exporting of RSA keys, random byte string generation, pseudorandom number generators

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