

EMT: Extended Merkle Tree Structure for Inserted Data Redaction in Permissioned Blockchain

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Abstract—**Inserted data redaction** is an important and hot security topic for permissioned blockchain. However, existing redactable schemes have two problems: (i) *Uncaptured Change*: Transaction-level redaction schemes modify both user-inserted data and system-generated transaction data, making it difficult to capture the changes in system-generated transactions data; (ii) *Unexpected Spread*: When the redaction process deletes harmful data, the consensus process may take a long time, resulting in unexpected spread of harmful data. Instead of eliminating the influence of the harmful data, it promotes its spread. To tackle these problems, we propose an Extended Merkle Tree (EMT) structure for inserted data redaction in permissioned blockchain. EMT separates the system-generated transaction data from user-inserted data, ensuring that only the inserted data can be modified during redaction. Furthermore, we design an EMT-based blockchain ledger and develop a smart contract to implement the inserted data redaction. We prove that our redaction scheme preserves the core security features of blockchain and implements redaction operations in Hyperledger Fabric. The experimental results show that our EMT-based blockchain scheme is capable of redacting the harmful inserted data while incurring less than 5% overhead compared to current permissioned blockchains.

Index Terms—Blockchain, blockchain redaction, Merkle tree.

I. INTRODUCTION

LOCKCHAIN immutability ensures that the ledger data cannot be modified. However, malicious users can exploit this feature to insert harmful data [1]. For instance, the Bitcoin blockchain has been found to store cross-site scripting (XSS) codes and child pornography information [2]. Meanwhile, legislations for data regulation, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [3], require “the right to be forgotten”. Under GDPR, users can request data controllers to immediately delete personal data that contains sensitive or private information. Like normal databases, there is an urgent need to make

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blockchain redactable to cater for diverse update needs of users and to prevent illegal information spread to the public [4].

There has been an increasing number of research devoted to blockchain redaction. Initial blockchain redaction schemes focus on pruning local ledgers, which includes local erasure [5], historical data snapshot [6], and genesis block reconstruction [7]. These schemes aim to reduce the storage overhead for full nodes in the blockchain network. Subsequent research focuses on modifying ledger data by utilizing voting-based and chameleon-based redaction, such as double hash chains [8] or chameleon hashes [9], [10].

However, these redaction schemes still encounter two crucial problems: *uncaptured change* and *unexpected spread*. On the one hand, blockchain transactions include system-generated transactional information (e.g., Alice transfers 10 tokens to Bob, referred to as core transaction data) as well as user-inserted transactional information (e.g., “buy a cup of coffee”, referred to as inserted data). Blockchain redaction only needs to handle harmful information found in inserted data. It is possible that existing transaction-level redaction schemes may modify core transaction data when redacting inserted data. The modified core transaction data is uncaptured by other users. On the other hand, users must publish their redaction request to the network while waiting for redaction authorization, which is equivalent to spreading the target data. Due to consensus delay, the published redaction request may not be processed immediately. It could lead to the *unexpected spread* of harmful data and amplify its negative impact. As a result, the redaction process would reduce user trust in the blockchain network.

In this paper, to tackle these problems, we design an Extended Merkle Tree (EMT) structure for inserted data redaction in permissioned blockchain. EMT separates the core transaction data and inserted data into independent leaf nodes. As a result, during the data redaction process, the core transaction data is locked to ensure its immutability, while the inserted data can be redacted using predefined redaction policies. Besides, the redacted data could be validated using transactions generated by redaction smart contracts. Specifically, our contributions can be summarized as follows:

- We propose an Extended Merkle Tree (EMT) structure to solve the *uncaptured change* problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first publicly available scheme that utilizes Merkle tree to preserve the immutability of core transaction data. EMT requires validators to construct an

additional layer of Merkle tree, which allows the processing of both core transaction data and inserted data in distinct leaf nodes during redaction.

- In response to the *unexpected spread* problem, we propose an EMT-based inserted data redaction scheme. Specifically, we design a redaction smart contract that authorizes and publishes redaction data. This smart contract collects votes from the elected authorized nodes and creates new transactions with new redacted data. Our scheme allows nodes to redact data without regenerating the block, thereby enabling instant redaction and reducing the spread of inserted harmful data.
- We prove that EMT ensures the integrity and consistency of system-generated data and our redaction scheme does not compromise the core security features of blockchain [11]. We also demonstrate a chaincode implementation of our inserted data redaction scheme in Hyperledger Fabric. Experiments show that the redaction operations add less than 5% overhead to the original permissioned blockchain. Our scheme outperforms existing transaction-level redaction schemes in terms of latency and throughput due to its integrated EMT structure.

II. RELATED WORKS

A. Pruning-Based Redaction Schemes

Florian et al. [5] proposed ledger pruning for redaction, which allows full nodes to remove harmful data while ensuring pruned transactions remain verifiable and nodes stay synchronized. This method allows subsequent blocks to be validated through the pruned transactions. CoinPrune [6] enhanced this by using periodic snapshots to reduce storage overhead and speed up synchronization for new nodes. However, the reliability depends on nodes honestly pruning data. Similarly, Hillmann et al. [7] proposed periodic summary blocks for historical data, similar to genesis blocks. This enables extensive pruning while maintaining blockchain integrity and improving scalability without modifying existing blockchain structures. Despite the advantages, pruning-based redactions present challenges. Nodes autonomously decide what data to prune, potentially leading to incomplete ledgers and increasing risks of network centralization and functional constraints.

Beyond traditional pruning, Puddu et al. [12] proposed *μchain*, where senders encrypt multiple transaction versions with redaction policies. Miners verify redaction requests against policies and use multi-party computation to derive decryption keys for alternative transactions. Moreover, Hyperledger Fabric [13] uses data hiding as pruning alternative in permissioned blockchains. It marks key-value pairs as deleted using “is-Delete”, restricting access but not physically removing data. While pruning-based redaction schemes offer scalability, they come at the cost of decentralization and historical data retention.

B. Voting-Based Redaction Schemes

For voting-based redaction schemes, Deuber et al. [8] proposed the first voting-based redactable blockchain protocol for

permissioned blockchains. Built on a double hash chain, it uses consensus-based voting for transparent, verifiable, and accountable ledger redactions. Building upon this, Marsalek et al. [14] enhanced Deuber’s scheme [8] by using voting consensus to store redacted blocks on a new blockchain. This newly created blockchain is linked to the original, ensuring both integrity and validity of the updated blockchain.

Several researchers have optimized the voting mechanism for redaction. Reparo et al. [15] proposed a public verification layer for permissionless blockchains to “repair” vulnerable smart contracts and harmful data, rather than direct redaction. Consensus voting ensures integrity and validity while preventing double-spending and DDoS attacks. However, voting-based approaches generally require more bandwidth and network resources, and multiple redaction requests can lead to increased consensus delays, limiting scalability.

To address efficiency, Li et al. [16] proposed an instantaneous redaction blockchain protocol, which separates voting from the consensus layer to improve voting efficiency and reduce consensus time for redaction requests. Additionally, Dai et al. [17] proposed PRBFPT, a framework integrating smart contract-based voting and chameleon hashes for redactable blockchains. PRBFPT enables all nodes to participate in redaction using contract-based locked voting to improve security and fairness. Duan et al. [18] proposed Chainknot, featuring mandatory synchronization for accepting redacted content and incentives for reviewing proposals. It uses an autonomous community for evaluating redaction validity, promoting a decentralized yet structured approach. Similarly, Sun et al. [19] proposed an evolutionary game-theoretic incentive mechanism for redactable blockchain governance, encouraging community participation in voting.

Beyond permissionless settings, Zhao et al. [20] proposed Concordit, a credit-based incentive mechanism for permissioned redactable blockchains. Concordit uses a reward-and-punishment system to incentivize submission, verification, and redaction, encouraging honest participation and mitigating malicious redactions. In addition to these optimizations, Wang et al. [21] proposed a redactable blockchain using decentralized trapdoor verifiable delay functions (VDFs). Leveraging VDF properties enhances security and efficiency while reducing reliance on trusted parties and mitigating redaction abuse. Overall, while voting-based redaction mechanisms offer transparency and accountability, they face efficiency and scalability challenges.

C. Chameleon-Based Redaction Schemes

Chameleon-based redaction enables blockchain data modifications while preserving its integrity [42]. It relies on chameleon hash functions, which are special hash functions that allow the party with the trapdoor key to find collisions that produce the same hash value [10]. Ateniese et al. [9] were the first to incorporate chameleon hashes into permissioned blockchains. Certificate authorities and other trusted third parties manage trapdoor keys to redact blocks while preserving blockchain consistency.




Fig. 1. System model of the proposed scheme.

Derler et al. [22] proposed the Policy-based Chameleon Hash (PCH), which allows ledger updates using policy-based trapdoor keys. Building on this, Jia et al. [23] proposed Decentralized Chameleon Hash (DCH), requiring multiple node approvals for each redaction and encoding redacted blocks into an RSA accumulator for blockchain consistency verification. Later, Ma et al. [24] developed Decentralized Policy-based Chameleon Hash (DPCH), which integrate multi-authority attribute-based encryption to achieve fine-grained access control in decentralized redactions. By granting redaction permissions to multiple entities in the blockchain network, DPCH reduces centralization risks and improves system robustness.

To address accountability, Xu et al. [29] proposed Policy-based Chameleon Hash with Blackbox Accountability (PCHA). PCHA connects redacted objects to their originators, allowing permissioned blockchain institutions to identify trapdoor key holders involved in redactions. To further enhance redaction efficiency, SeRedact [30] presented a verifiable redactable blockchain protocol using a Merkle tree-based mechanism for dynamic redactions, including fast version checks and mandatory redactions. Shen et al. [31] later proposed a dual-trapdoor chameleon hash for full editability of ledger objects while ensuring efficient and key-exposure-resistant ledger redaction.

Researchers also explored advanced chameleon hash designs for cross-chain and fine-grained redactions. Hu et al. [35] presented IvyRedaction for cross-chain redaction, ensuring atomic, consistent, and accountable modifications across multiple blockchains. This solution uses a decentralized intermediary to manage a global cross-chain revision state and enforce rollback rules. Similarly, Huang et al. [36] proposed a multi-granularity redaction scheme for Monero, which integrates the RingCT protocol with security techniques to enhance user identity traceability and enable redactions at various levels.

Beyond these, researchers improve redaction security and efficiency through innovative cryptography. Li et al. [37] proposed a lattice-based tagged chameleon hash (tCH), achieving post-quantum security. Duan et al. [38] proposed T-times Chameleon Hash (t-CH) and t-Chameleon Signature (t-CS), where exceeding redaction limits exposes the trapdoor key. Meanwhile, Zhao et al. [39] developed Tiger Tally, a redactable blockchain for IoT data, integrating targeted policy-based chameleon hash (TPBCh) with tokenized redaction permissions for predefined scopes and abuse prevention.

In addition, Wu et al. [25] proposed a verifiable distributed chameleon hash-based redactable consortium blockchain. This design distributes trapdoor key shares among nodes, requiring a threshold for redactions and enabling honest nodes to

verify collision shares, enhancing security. Huang et al. [26] further presented a dynamic, decentralized chameleon hash-based redactable blockchain (DRBC) leveraging identity-based chameleon hash (IDCH) and verifiable transactions (VT) for secure and dynamic redactions, allowing flexible network participation.

Recently, studies have transitioned chameleon hashes to permissionless blockchains. Li et al. [40] developed Non-interactive Chameleon Hash (NITCH) for permissionless blockchains, enhancing scalability, consistency, and accountability. NITCH dynamically assigns trapdoor keys, which allows participants to independently calculate shares for generating hash collisions for redaction. Similarly, Zhang et al. [27] proposed Dynamic and Decentralized Attribute-based Chameleon Hash (DACH), which addresses centralized permissions and security limitations to enhance flexibility in permissionless environments.

To improve security and verification, Tian et al. [32] proposed Verifiable Redactable Blockchain (VRBC). VRBC proposed the Blockchain Authentication Tree (BAT), which enables lightweight nodes to efficiently query and verify chain data and validate ledger integrity before synchronization. Li et al. [33] proposed a practical and secure policy-based chameleon hash scheme, which enhances both security and usability with robust policy enforcement. Zhang et al. [28] proposed a dynamic trust-based redactable blockchain supporting updates and traceability by dynamically evaluating user trust levels to prevent malicious modifications. Li et al. [34] explored message control mechanisms for blockchain rewriting, using chameleon hashes for controlled modifications and integrity. Additionally, Zhang et al. [41] proposed NANO for readability and editability governance in blockchain databases. NANO uses Newton interpolation-based secret sharing to manage key distribution, enabling fine-grained access control and policy privacy in permissioned blockchains.

Overall, chameleon-based redaction schemes face challenges with trapdoor key management and redaction authorization. Furthermore, the redaction process may result in the incorrect modification of core transaction data, which could lead to security risks. For instance, the leakage of trapdoor keys could potentially be exploited to abuse the redaction privilege. We provide a detailed comparison of all the above schemes in Table I.

III. OVERVIEW

In this section, we present an overview of our EMT-based inserted data redaction scheme, including the system model, threat model and design goals. The notations used in this paper are listed in Table II.

A. System Model

The system model, as shown in Fig. 1, consists of four parties: certificate authority (CA), normal nodes, authorized nodes, and redaction smart contracts. Normal nodes retrieve the redaction policies from the CA and generate redaction smart contracts waiting for authorized voting. Then, authorized nodes send votes to redaction smart contracts. Finally, redaction smart contracts

TABLE I
COMPARISON OF BLOCKCHAIN REDACTION SCHEMES

Schemes	Technology	Accountability	Consistency	Authorization	Efficiency	Data Protection*
[5]–[7]	Pruning	Limited	No	N/A	High	No
[12], [13]	Pruning	Limited	No	CA	Medium to High	No
[8], [14]–[21]	Voting	Yes	Yes	All Miners	Low	No
[9], [22]	Chameleon Hash	No	No	CA	Medium	No
[23]–[28]	Chameleon Hash	Limited	Limited	Authorized Parties	Low to Medium	No
[29]–[34]	Chameleon Hash	Yes	Yes	Authorized Parties	Low to Medium	Limited
[35]–[41]	Chameleon Hash	Yes	Yes	Authorized Parties	Medium to High	Limited
Ours	Pruning+Voting	Yes	Yes	Authorized Parties	High	Yes

* Data Protection indicates whether the scheme preserve the immutability of the core transaction data.

TABLE II
NOTATIONS

Notation	Description
B_i	The i-th block in the blockchain.
$H(\cdot)$	The hash function.
\mathcal{C}	The blockchain ledger.
tx_i	The i-th transaction.
H_c	Hash value of the core transaction data.
d_c	Core transaction data.
H_w	Hash value of the inserted data.
d_w	Inserted data (e.g., transaction remarks).
req	Redaction request.
tx_id	Unique identifier of the transaction.
d_{new}	The new data content submitted for redaction.
$P_{\mathcal{C}}$	Redaction policy of the blockchain \mathcal{C} .
con_k	The k-th redaction smart contract.
N_{auth}	The set of authorized nodes.
tx_rdt	The redaction transaction.
Σ	Aggregate signatures of the authorized nodes.

generate redaction transactions in response to the approved redaction, which initiate local redaction in blockchain nodes.

- *Certificate Authority:* CA is a trusted third party that generates system parameters and redaction policies to assist normal nodes in creating redaction requests. Once completed, CA would not participate in the subsequent redaction process in the permissioned blockchain.
- *Normal Nodes:* Normal nodes are semi-trust blockchain users that can generate redaction request through redaction smart contracts.
- *Authorized Nodes:* Authorized nodes are selected from the normal nodes in the permissioned blockchain. They interact with redaction smart contracts to vote for the authorized redaction requests.
- *Redaction Smart Contracts:* Redaction smart contract is an entity generated by normal nodes with redaction requests. It would generate the necessary redaction transactions to initiate local redaction.

B. Threat Model

In our permissioned blockchain setting, we consider probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries \mathcal{A} that may attempt to initiate unauthorized redaction requests or manipulate redaction transactions. Adversaries \mathcal{A} can be either normal nodes that submit illegal redaction requests or authorized nodes that exploit their voting privileges for personal benefits. We assume

that the end-to-end communication channels are secure and that adversaries \mathcal{A} cannot break standard cryptographic primitives.

A key component is the CA, which generates system parameters and defines redaction policies that manage the redaction process. Importantly, the role of CA is limited to this initial setup. Once configured, the CA does not participate in subsequent redaction operations, such as voting or transaction execution. Therefore, even if the CA were compromised, the blockchain system would continue to operate normally. Existing redaction policies would remain in effect, which allows authorized nodes to process redaction requests. While future policy updates might be affected, the core blockchain functionality and previously executed transactions would remain secure. This minimizes the potential impact of any compromise at this level, which mitigates the risk of a single-point failure.

C. Design Goals

The proposed EMT-based data redaction scheme aims to address the critical challenges of secure and efficient redaction in permissioned blockchains. The key design goals of our proposed scheme are as follows:

- *Integrity and Immutability of Core Transaction Data:* The proposed scheme ensures that core transaction data remains immutable while allowing for the redaction of inserted data. It maintains the integrity of critical transaction details and prevents unauthorized modifications to essential blockchain records.
- *Instant Inserted Data Redaction with Minimal Overhead:* The proposed scheme enables instant redaction of inserted data through the EMT structure. The redaction process does not require block regeneration to update redacted data, which minimizes delays and improving blockchain redaction performance.
- *Controlled and Authorized Redaction:* Redaction operations must be authorized through a smart contract-based voting mechanism. It ensures that only designated authorized nodes can approve and execute redactions, which prevent unauthorized redaction attempts.
- *Scalability and Flexibility:* The proposed scheme supports efficient validation and redaction as the blockchain grows. It ensures that the redaction process remains feasible without compromising blockchain performance.

IV. EMT: THE EXTENDED MERKLE TREE STRUCTURE

In this section, we demonstrate the proposed Extended Merkle Tree (EMT) structure. Existing blockchain redaction schemes usually employ a Merkle tree (also known as a hash tree) to ensure data integrity and consistency. However, this approach lacks flexibility and efficiency in terms of verifying redacted transactions. EMT enhances the ability to manage and redact the inserted data while preserving the fundamental features of a Merkle tree.

A. Blockchain Basics

In this paper, we propose an EMT structure based on Deuber's paper [8], which describes and defines blocks and transactions in blockchain. The blockchain ledger comprises multiple blocks linked in a chain, with each block B_i consisting of a block header $B.\text{head}$ and block body $B.\text{body}$. The $B.\text{head}$ is a tuple:

$$B.\text{head} = \langle s, s', mRoot, ctr, x \rangle \quad (1)$$

where, s and s' represent the hash of the current block and the hash of the previous block respectively. $mRoot$ represents the root of the Merkle tree in the block, ctr stores the verification information generated by the consensus block (for example, in the Bitcoin network, ctr represents the random number $nonce$ calculated by the miner in the PoW process). x denotes information related to the generation of B_i , including block version, block height, and timestamp.

According to the above definition, a valid B_i satisfies the following conditions:

$$(H(ctr, G(s', mRoot, x)) = s) \wedge ctr = 1 \quad (2)$$

where H and G are hash functions. Based on this, the blockchain within the ledger is represented as:

$$\mathcal{C} = B_1 \parallel B_2 \parallel \dots \parallel B_n \quad (3)$$

Additionally, let $\text{head}(\mathcal{C})$ and $\text{len}(\mathcal{C})$ denote the current block header and the length of the blockchain respectively. $\text{height}(B_i)$ denotes the height of block B_i . To describe a segment of the chain in blockchain data redaction, we utilize ${}^q|\mathcal{C}$ and $\mathcal{C}^{\lceil q}$ to represent blocks before and after height q , respectively, where ${}^q|\mathcal{C} \prec \mathcal{C}$ implies that ${}^q|\mathcal{C}$ and \mathcal{C} share the same prefix.

Different from $B.\text{head}$, $B.\text{body}$ contains the packaged transactions. The packaged transactions form a Merkle tree. As a type of binary tree, the Merkle tree is widely adopted in blockchain systems, usually for verifying the integrity of ledger data (such as the Simple Payment Verification, SPV, in Bitcoin). Through the Merkle tree, nodes in the blockchain can quickly detect inconsistencies in transactions within a block and verify whether a transaction has been tampered with, even without knowing all the ledger data. Typically, a Merkle tree in a block can be described as $MT(\langle tx_1, \dots, tx_m \rangle)$, where each leaf node represents the hash of a transaction packaged in a block $H(tx_1)$, and each branch node is the hash value of two child nodes. Given a leaf node and the path from the leaf node to the root, nodes in the blockchain can quickly determine whether the hash value $H(tx_m)$ of a given transaction tx_m is a leaf node of the Merkle tree.




Fig. 2. The Merkle tree design in the EMT Structure.

B. The EMT Design

As shown in Fig. 2, the EMT proposed in this paper expands the traditional Merkle tree with two independent branches: the core transaction data branch and the inserted data branch. The core transaction data branch is responsible for storing key information of the transaction, such as the addresses of the sender and receiver, and transaction amount. The integrity and consistency of the above data are crucial for the security of the blockchain system. Correspondingly, the inserted data branch is used to store inserted information, such as transaction remarks or postscripts, which may require redaction after the transaction is completed. The stored information does not affect the functionality of the transaction.

The generation of EMT is executed by validators or miners in the network, with the aim of ensuring data integrity and consistency of each transaction. EMT can be described as:

$$EMT(\langle tx_1.H_c, tx_1.H_w, \dots, tx_m.H_c, tx_m.H_w \rangle). \quad (4)$$

For each transaction tx , validators first calculate the hash value H_c of its core transaction data d_c and the hash value H_w of the inserted data d_w . Subsequently, they combine H_c and H_w to form the transaction's hash value $H_{tx} = H(H_c \parallel H_w)$, where \parallel represents concatenation.

In the proposed EMT, transaction verification targets two types of transactions: redacted transactions and unredacted transactions.

- For unredacted transactions, both the core transaction data and inserted data remain unchanged, so the verification process follows the original process: if tx is a redacted transaction, its core transaction data hash value is H_c , and the inserted data hash value is H_w ; validators calculate the total hash value of tx , $H_{tx} = H(H_c \parallel H_w)$, and if tx is unredacted, H_{tx} should match the hash value recorded in B_i , passing the transaction verification.
- For redacted transactions, only the inserted data is modified, while the core transaction data remains unchanged. The verification process is as follows: if tx' is a redacted transaction, its core transaction data hash value H_c remains the same, but the inserted data hash value H'_w represents the new hash value after redacting; validators first confirm that the core transaction data is unchanged, ensuring that H_c matches the hash value recorded in the block header.

Algorithm 1: EMT Verification Algorithm.

```

Input: Transaction  $tx$ ; Block  $B_i$ .
Output: Verification result: True or False.
1:  $H_c \leftarrow$  Hash of core transaction data of  $tx$ .
2:  $H_w \leftarrow$  Hash of inserted data of  $tx$ .
3:  $H_{tx} \leftarrow H(H_c \| H_w)$   $\triangleright$  Calculate the hash of  $tx$ .
4:  $H_{B,tx} \leftarrow$  Corresponding hash value in  $B$  for  $tx$ .
5: if  $tx$  is unredacted then
6:   if  $H_{tx} = H_{B,tx}$  then
7:     return True  $\triangleright$  The transaction is valid.
8:   else
9:     return False  $\triangleright$  The transaction is invalid.
10:  end if
11: else  $\triangleright$  For redacted transactions.
12:    $H'_w \leftarrow$  New hash of redacted inserted data of  $tx$ .
13:    $H'_{tx} \leftarrow H(H_c \| H'_w)$   $\triangleright$  Calculate the new hash of  $tx$ .
14:   if Redaction Verification for  $H'_{tx}$  is valid then
15:     return True  $\triangleright$  The redacted transaction is valid.
16:   else
17:     return False  $\triangleright$  The redacted transaction is invalid.
18:   end if
19: end if

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block; then, they calculate the new total hash value $H'_{tx'} = H(H_c \| H'_w)$; finally, they verify $H'_{tx'}$. Since the inserted data is redactable, $H'_{tx'}$ may differ from the original hash value, thus it must meet the specific redaction policies or have corresponding authorization proof.

The detailed process is outlined in Algorithm 1. In the proposed scheme, a new transaction containing verification information is employed to provide redaction information for branch verification after local redaction. The detailed process of redaction policies and authorized voting design is discussed in Section V.

V. THE PROPOSED INSERTED DATA REDACTION SCHEME

In this section, we demonstrate the inserted data redaction scheme based on the EMT structure. The scheme allows for instant redaction of inserted data in the blockchain ledger, while preserving the integrity and consistency of blockchain.

A. Main Phases

As shown in Fig. 3, the inserted data redaction process mainly consists of three phases.

1) *Phase 1 (Redaction Request):* A normal node submits a redaction request to the CA of the permissioned chain, including detailed information about the data to be redacted and the reasons for redaction. CA verifies the identity of the normal node. Upon successful verification, CA generates a signed message containing the redaction policy of the current blockchain network and returns it to the normal node. The normal node then creates a redaction smart contract based on the signed message and publishes the contract to the network.




Fig. 3. Main phases in the inserted data redaction process.

2) *Phase 2 (Redaction Authorization):* The authorized nodes in the permissioned blockchain conduct a consensus voting on this redaction, which includes the following steps:

- *2a. Authorized Node Selection:* Blockchain validators review the submitted redaction smart contract, confirming its legitimacy and compliance with redaction policies. Qualified smart contracts trigger the selection of authorized nodes based on redaction policies, resulting in the formation of a committee to vote on the redactions.
- *2b. Redaction Voting:* Authorized nodes vote on the redaction smart contract, determining its validity based on contract information and redaction policies. The smart contract assesses the voting results within a set time window to determine if the submitted redaction request has received sufficient consent from the authorized nodes.
- *2c. Smart Contract Activation:* If the redaction votes of the authorized nodes pass, the redaction smart contract initiates a redaction transaction that includes the redacted data, the related transaction identifier, and the smart contract's address.

3) *Phase 3 (Local Redaction):* Nodes perform local redaction operations when synchronizing new blocks; if the new block contains a redaction transaction, they remove the inserted data in the specified transaction, replacing the data content with the new redaction transaction id, pointing to the redacted content.

B. Redaction Algorithms and Smart Contract Design

In this section, we provide a detailed explanation to the redaction algorithms and smart contract design implemented in the proposed scheme. The sequence diagram of the redaction process is shown in Fig. 4, and the redaction algorithms and contract designs are as follows:

1) *Redaction Request Algorithm:* As shown in Algorithm 2, the redaction request algorithm is used for the CA to receive and process redaction requests. Specifically, node n_i submits a redaction request $req = \{tx_id, d_{new}, r_{just}\}$ to the CA, where




Fig. 4. The sequence diagram of the inserted data redaction process.

tx_id represents the unique identifier of the redacted transaction, d_{new} is the new data content submitted by n_i , and r_{just} is the reason for the redaction request. Subsequently, upon receiving the request, the CA performs $V(n_i, \mathcal{C})$ to verify whether the node n_i is legitimate in the permissioned blockchain \mathcal{C} , ensuring the validity of the request.

After identity verification, the CA returns the redaction policy of the current network, which can be described as:

$$P_{\mathcal{C}} = \{tx_id \in T_{rdbl}, n_i \models A_r\}. \quad (5)$$

The redaction policy is divided into two parts: T_{rdbl} and A_r , in which T_{rdbl} represents the transactions that can be redacted, described as:

$$T_{rdbl} = T_{all} \setminus (T_{gen} \cup T_{rdt} \cup T_{con}). \quad (6)$$

Here, T_{all} represents the set of all transactions on the permissioned blockchain, T_{gen} denotes the set of transactions in the genesis block, T_{rdt} represents the set of transactions with modified content after redaction, and T_{con} is the set of transactions containing the redaction smart contract; A_r represents the authorized node selection strategy in the permissioned blockchain \mathcal{C} , which is based on the strategy designed by Derler et al. [13]. Specifically, the nodes in the network are typically divided into three categories: the set of transaction senders S , the set of transaction receivers R , and the validators V in the network. These nodes can be represented as a set of attributes $\{S, R, V\}$, and the redaction contract can select authorized nodes based on the attributes of the strategy returned by the CA. For example, a transaction initiator with the attribute set $\{V\}$ can be selected as an authorized node to participate in the redaction voting process related to the strategy $\{S \vee V\}$, but cannot participate in the redaction voting process related to the strategy $\{S \wedge V\}$. Typically, the redaction strategy is set to $\{S \vee R \vee V\}$, indicating that only nodes related to the transaction and validators in the network can become authorized nodes for the related transaction.

Algorithm 2: Redaction Request Algorithm.

Input: Redaction request $req = \{tx_id, d_{new}, r_{just}\}$ from n_i

Output: Redaction smart contract con_j

- 1: $V(n_i, \mathcal{C}) \leftarrow$ Verify if n_i is a valid node in \mathcal{C}
- 2: **if** $V(n_i, \mathcal{C})$ **then**
- 3: $P_c \leftarrow \{tx_id \in T_{rdbl}, n_i \models A_r\}$
- 4: $T_{rdbl} \leftarrow T_{all} \setminus (T_{gen} \cup T_{rdt} \cup T_{con})$
- 5: $msg \leftarrow \{P_c, \sigma\}$ \triangleright CA returns signed message
- 6: $con_j \leftarrow$ Generate contract based on msg
- 7: Deploy con_j to blockchain network
- 8: **else**
- 9: Reject req
- 10: **end if**

Algorithm 3: Redaction Smart Contract Functions.

- 1: **Function:** $init$ (Smart contract instance con_k)
- 2: $N_{all} \leftarrow RequestNodes()$ \triangleright Request all nodes
- 3: $N_{auth} \leftarrow RS_{SHA256}(\text{addr}(con_k), N_{all}, A_r)$
- 4: Store N_{auth} in con_k
- 5: **return** Authorized nodes N_{auth} stored in con_k
- 6:
- 7: **Function:** $query$ (Smart contract instance con_k)
- 8: Generate $\{req, \sigma\}$ \triangleright Redaction voting preparation
- 9: **return** Redaction Information $\{req, \sigma\}$
- 10:
- 11: **Function:** $vote$ (Node \hat{n}_j , contract con_k , time window t)
- 12: Initialize count of yes votes $yesVotes = 0$
- 13: **while** time window t not elapsed **do**
- 14: Receive vote $\{vote, \xi_j\}$ from \hat{n}_j
- 15: Verify signature ξ_j of \hat{n}_j
- 16: **if** signature is valid and $vote = yes$ **then**
- 17: Increment $yesVotes$
- 18: **end if**
- 19: **end while**
- 20: $Threshold \leftarrow$ Predefined redaction threshold
- 21: **if** $yesVotes \geq Threshold$ **then**
- 22: Generate $\Sigma = \{\xi_1, \xi_2, \dots, \xi_j\}$
- 23: Broadcast $tx_{rdt} = \{req, \Sigma\}$ to the network
- 24: **else**
- 25: Reject redaction transaction
- 26: **end if**
- 27: **return** Broadcast decision based on voting result

Based on the generated redaction policy, the CA returns a signed message $msg = \{P_c, \sigma\}$, where σ represents the redaction policy. After receiving the signed message msg , node n_i generates a transaction request to deploy the redaction smart contract con_k , which is deployed to the network after verification by validators in the permissioned blockchain.

2) *Redaction Smart Contract:* As shown in Algorithm 3, the redaction smart contract is responsible for implementing and managing the redaction process. Once the redaction smart contract con_k is verified and deployed into \mathcal{C} , n_i calls the

Algorithm 4: Redaction Voting Algorithm.

Input: Authorized node \hat{n}_j , Contract con_k , Redaction information $\{req, \sigma\}$
Output: Vote submission to the contract

- 1: Verify the validity of $\{req, \sigma\}$ against P_c from CA
- 2: Extract $tx_{id}, d_{new}, r_{just}$ from req
- 3: **if** tx_{rdt} is valid **then**
- 4: Determine vote decision based on r_{just}
- 5: Generate vote result $\{yes/no\}$
- 6: Generate Schnorr signature $\{\xi_j\}$
- 7: Submit vote $\{yes/no, \xi_j\}$ to con_k
- 8: **else**
- 9: Reject tx_{rdt}
- 10: **end if**

initialization function $init()$ to select the authorized node committee. During initialization, con_k first requests a list of all nodes N_{all} in the current network from the CA. Then con_k selects the authorized node committee N_{auth} based on the strategy A_r , ensuring that only nodes with specific attribute sets can participate in the redaction voting process. The process can be described as:

$$RS_{SHA256}(addr(con_k), N_{all}, A_r) \rightarrow N_{auth}. \quad (7)$$

Here, RS_{SHA256} is a function that selects authorized nodes based on a hash value generated by SHA-256, and $addr(con_k)$ is the address of the current redaction smart contract con_k . After the selection of N_{auth} , the public keys pk_j of the authorized nodes $\hat{n}_j \in N_{auth}$ are stored in the contract con_k .

Once N_{auth} is determined, authorized nodes can access the redaction request information $\{req, \sigma\}$ by calling the $query()$ function in con_k . After the redaction voting starts, con_k waits for the voting results from the authorized node \hat{n}_j within a certain time window t . \hat{n}_j uploads their voting result $\{yes/no, \xi_j\}$ by calling the $vote()$ function in con_k , where ξ_j is the signature of the authorized node \hat{n}_j . If the voting results meet the predetermined requirements within the specified time, the redaction consensus has been reached.

At this point, con_k generates a redaction transaction $tx_{rdt} = \{req, \Sigma\}$, which includes the redaction request of the normal node req and the aggregate signatures of the authorized nodes $\Sigma = \{\xi_1, \xi_2, \dots, \xi_j\}$. The redaction transaction is a special type of transaction used to trigger local redaction in nodes within the network with the redaction-related information. It ensures the clarity of the redacted data and the legitimacy of the transaction. Subsequently, the redaction transaction tx_{rdt} is broadcast to the entire network.

3) *Redaction Voting Algorithm:* As shown in Algorithm 4, the redaction voting algorithm enables authorized nodes to vote on the redaction transaction tx_{rdt} in the redaction smart contract con_k . After obtaining the relevant information of the redaction request, each authorized node $\hat{n}_j \in N_{auth}$ obtains the redaction policy P_c from the CA to verify the validity of tx_{rdt} . Once validated, \hat{n}_j generates a redaction decision based on the reason for the redaction request r_{just} and produces the corresponding

Algorithm 5: Local Redaction Algorithm.

Input: Node n_j , Blockchain \mathcal{C} , Contract con_k , Redaction transaction tx_{rdt}
Output: Updated local ledger at node n_j

- 1: Sync the latest block head(\mathcal{C})
- 2: **if** $tx_{rdt} \in \text{head}(\mathcal{C})$ **then**
- 3: Extract tx_{id}, d_{new}, Σ from tx_{rdt}
- 4: Verify the legality and correctness of tx_{rdt} against Σ
- 5: Confirm that tx_{rdt} has consensus from authorized nodes in con_k
- 6: **if** tx_{rdt} is valid **then**
- 7: Locate the block B_m in \mathcal{C} with tx_{id}
- 8: Find the transaction tx_n in B_m
- 9: Replace $tx_n.d_w$ with reference to tx_{rdt}
- 10: Update local ledger with redacted tx_n
- 11: **end if**
- 12: **end if**

voting result according to their approval or disapproval decision. Using the Schnorr signature [23], \hat{n}_j signs their decision to generate ξ_j . Subsequently, \hat{n}_j calls $con_k.vote()$ to submit both the voting result and signature $yes/no, \xi_j$ to the smart contract.

4) *Local Redaction Algorithm:* As shown in Algorithm 5, after the redaction smart contract con_k reaches the voting threshold, the local redaction algorithm is responsible for executing local ledger redaction operations on the nodes within the network. When node n_j synchronizes with the latest block head(\mathcal{C}) in the network, if it contains the redaction transaction tx_{rdt} broadcast by con_k , it verifies the legality and correctness of tx_{rdt} through the aggregate signature Σ . con_k confirms that tx_{rdt} has obtained the voting consensus of authorized nodes. After confirming the validity of tx_{rdt} , n_j extracts the redaction request req from tx_{rdt} , including the identifier of the data to be redacted tx_{id} and the new data d_{new} . Based on the redaction content in tx_{rdt} , n_j first searches the $\text{len}(\mathcal{C})$ blocks $\text{len}(\mathcal{C}) \mathcal{C}$ in the current local ledger to locate the transaction tx_n in a block B_i pointed by tx_{id} . Then, n_j deletes the written data $tx_n.d_w$ in tx_n and replaces it with a corresponding tx_{rdt} , thereby updating the local ledger. Both authorized and regular nodes are required to perform this local redaction operation.

For new nodes joining the network, since the redaction operation records the redaction transaction tx_{rdt} into the redaction smart contract, if the synchronized local ledger does not execute the local redaction in time, the new node can correctly generate the latest local ledger through the verification local ledger verification. In this way, the local redaction algorithm ensures that each node can correctly and effectively update its local ledger according to the voting results in the smart contract, thereby maintaining the integrity and consistency of the entire network.

C. Consistency on the Redacted Ledger

In the proposed scheme, we use the pruning technology to delete target data from the local ledger. Since each node prunes the ledger locally, inconsistencies across blockchain nodes are inevitable. Unlike Chainknot [18], which provides a method for

forced synchronization of redactable blockchain, our solution offers a more flexible approach. Each node can recover to the latest version based on records stored in the ledger without requiring centralized enforcement.

For instance, when two authorized nodes submit redaction requests for overlapping data segments, the system resolves potential conflicts through a structured sequence of operations. Each request triggers a separate instance of the redaction smart contract, which operates independently. Due to the inherent sequential processing of blockchain, these requests are executed in a deterministic order. Each redaction smart contract processes an independent voting process by authorized nodes as shown in Algorithm 3. If conflicting redactions arise, the voting mechanism determines which request is approved based on predefined policies and consensus rules. Once a redaction request is authorized, the corresponding transaction is recorded on the blockchain, as shown in Algorithm 2. Nodes then synchronize with the updated blocks and apply redactions locally in the specified order. If a later redaction transaction targets the same data segment as an earlier one, it overwrites the previous redaction to ensure consistency across all nodes. In future research, we will focus on the issue of consistency verification when there are conflicts in overlapping redactions.

Similarly, when multiple redaction requests target unrelated parts of the blockchain, the system processes them efficiently. Since these redactions do not interfere with one another, independent smart contracts can execute in parallel. Each contract processes a separate voting process without dependencies on other redactions, which maintains system throughput. Once approved, each redaction request generates a distinct transaction. Even if multiple transactions are created concurrently, they are incorporated into the blockchain according to standard block creation procedures. Nodes apply redactions in the recorded order. It ensures consistency while maintaining high efficiency in handling concurrent requests.

VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS

A. The Integrity and Consistency of Core Transaction Data

The immutability of data within a permissioned blockchain is a key characteristic that ensures its security. It is particularly vital for core transaction data, such as transaction amounts, and the addresses of senders and receivers. In this subsection, we demonstrate that, despite permitting redactions to inserted data, these redactions do not compromise the integrity and consistency of the core transaction data.

Theorem 1 (Unredacted Core Transaction Data): In Algorithm 5, redacting the inserted data d_w does not alter the core transaction data d_c .

Proof: In our proposed scheme for permissioned blockchains, each transaction tx includes immutable core transaction data d_c (like transaction amount, sender and receiver addresses) and redactable inserted data d_w (e.g., transaction comments). Validators use the cryptographic hash function H to maintain data integrity in transactions during block construction. The hash $H(tx)$ is derived from both $H(d_c)$ and $H(d_w)$. Due to the one-wayness, collision resistance,

and input sensitivity of the hash function, any alteration in d_c significantly changes $H(tx)$. Redacting d_w locally only affects d_w , not d_c . Even though $H(tx)$ changes after d_w is modified, EMT ensures that any change in $H(d_w)$, even after a redaction transaction tx_{rdt} , does not affect the integrity of d_c . A change in $H(d_c)$ would result in failed transaction verification. Hence, we conclude that the core transaction data d_c remains unredacted after any redaction operation on d_w . \square

B. The Legitimacy of Inserted Data Redaction

In permissioned blockchains, verifying the legitimacy of data redaction is crucial for system security. The security of the proposed blockchain system depends on the robustness of digital signatures. In this subsection, we demonstrate that the redaction operations in our proposed blockchain are legitimate and cannot be executed by unauthorized entities. Our scheme employs the Schnorr signature for voting in the redaction voting phase. The Schnorr signature scheme $\Gamma = (Gen, Sign, Verify)$ is known to be existential unforgeable under chosen plaintext attacks (EUF-CMA). Here, Gen creates a key pair, $Sign$ generates a signature ξ for message m using the private key sk , and $Verify$ checks the match of message m and signature ξ with the public key pk . It is assumed that no PPT (probabilistic polynomial-time) adversary \mathcal{A} can forge a valid signature under a chosen plaintext attack with non-negligible probability.

Theorem 2 (Authorized Inserted Data Redaction): If the Schnorr signature used by authorized node \hat{n}_j in voting is EUF-CMA secure, then in Algorithm 4, no PPT adversary \mathcal{A} can generate and execute the redaction transaction tx_{rdt} without authorized voting, with non-negligible probability.

Proof: A proof by contradiction is described as follows. we assume that PPT adversary \mathcal{A} can generate and execute unauthorized redaction transactions, breaching Schnorr's EUF-CMA security. This contradicts Schnorr's definition. Specifically, if \mathcal{A} could create a valid tx_{rdt} without authorized node consent and broadcast it, this implies forging or mimicking an authorized node's signature to make tx_{rdt} appear approved by most authorized nodes. But, Schnorr's EUF-CMA security implies \mathcal{A} cannot forge a valid signature within polynomial time. Hence, \mathcal{A} 's tx_{rdt} would fail the signature check in the permissioned blockchain, i.e., $Verify(pk, tx_{rdt}, \xi) = 0$. It contradicts the assumption of \mathcal{A} successfully generating and executing tx_{rdt} , rendering the assumption invalid. Therefore, under the EUF-CMA security of Schnorr signatures, no PPT adversary can generate and execute a redaction transaction without authorized voting. \square

C. Blockchain Core Security Features

Studies in paper [8], [43] state that for security, a redactable blockchain II must satisfy three core blockchain security features: Chain Growth, Chain Quality, and Redactable Common Prefix. In this subsection, we evaluate if the blockchain II' in our inserted data redaction scheme maintains these features, thus ensuring its security.

Theorem 3 (Chain Growth): Suppose two honest parties in the network store blockchains \mathcal{C}_1 and \mathcal{C}_2 in time slots sl_1 and

sl_2 , with sl_2 being s slots ahead of sl_1 , if Π' maintains the Chain Growth property, then for $s \in \mathbb{N}$ and $0 < \tau < 1$, it satisfies:

$$\text{len}(\mathcal{C}_1) - \text{len}(\mathcal{C}_2) \geq \tau \cdot s \quad (8)$$

where τ is the chain growth rate coefficient.

Proof: Our proposed scheme redacts only transaction data and does not remove blocks from the chain, thus not reducing the chain length. Therefore, redaction operations do not change the chain length, and Π' upholds Chain Growth. \square

Theorem 4 (Chain Quality): Assume a honest party in the blockchain stores a chain \mathcal{C} of length l , where $l \in \mathbb{N}$, if Π' upholds Chain Quality, the proportion of erroneous blocks by malicious nodes in \mathcal{C} will not exceed μ , where $0 < \mu \leq 1$ is the chain quality coefficient.

Proof: In our scheme, all redactions require authorized node voting and adhere to strict redaction policies. Malicious nodes may locally redact blocks, but the transaction tx_{rdt} ensures that each redaction is recorded on the chain. Even if new nodes synchronize to a ledger with erroneous blocks, they can correct these by verifying tx_{rdt} . Thus, if Π meets the (μ, l) Chain Quality property, Π' does as well. \square

Theorem 5 (Redactable Common Prefix): Suppose two honest parties store blockchains \mathcal{C}_1 and \mathcal{C}_2 in time slots $sl_1 \leq sl_2$, if Π' upholds the Redactable Common Prefix characteristic, then $\mathcal{C}_1 \prec^{\theta} \mathcal{C}_2$, with $\text{len}(\mathcal{C}_1) \leq \theta \leq \text{len}(\mathcal{C}_2)$, where $\theta \in \mathbb{N}$ is the redactable common prefix coefficient.

Proof: Each redaction in Π' requires authorized nodes voting and local node verification. Without new redaction transactions tx_{rdt} between sl_1 and sl_2 , any transaction $tx_i \in B_j \in \mathcal{C}_1$ passes verification in Algorithm 1, ensuring $tx_i \in B_j \in^{\theta} \mathcal{C}_2$. With new redaction tx_{rdt} , transactions involving tx_{rdt} could be validated according to Algorithm 1 as $tx'_i \in B_j \in^{\theta} \mathcal{C}_2$. Therefore, if Π satisfies the Redactable Common Prefix, so does Π' . \square

VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

In this section, we implemented our proposed EMT-based inserted data redaction scheme on a simulation platform and conducted a series of experiments with existing blockchain redaction schemes. The results show that while maintaining security as described in Section VI, our scheme presents robust performance.

A. Experiment Settings

Our experiments are based on Hyperledger Fabric [13] (hereafter referred to as Fabric). In this environment, leveraging the built-in consensus mechanism of Fabric, we achieved blockchain transaction creation, transfer, and data inserting operations. We utilized the modular design of Fabric chaincode functions to construct a complete UTXO blockchain protocol. Additionally, Fabric supports the customization of transaction data structures. We first defined a standard UTXO transaction structure and extended it to implement EMT-based inserted data redaction operations. All experiments were conducted on the Proxmox virtual environment running Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, equipped with a 2.0 GHz AMD EPYC 7713 CPU, 32 cores, and 64 GB of memory.

For our Fabric simulation environment, we conducted experiments under three different network configurations: 10 organizations with 10 peer nodes each, 5 organizations with 10 peer nodes each, and 20 organizations with 10 peer nodes each. These configurations resulted in a total of 100, 50, and 200 nodes, respectively. All these networks use the inherent Raft consensus of Fabric for transaction endorsement. For performance evaluation, we employed Hyperledger Caliper, an open-source testing tool, to gather experimental data. We set up 10 Caliper workloads, randomly sending transaction requests at 100 transactions per second (tps) to invoke functions in the chaincode. In the comparative scheme section, we constructed a standard UTXO blockchain that does not contain redaction operations as a baseline. We also implemented existing blockchain redaction schemes for comparison. These include the local pruning scheme [5], the double hash chain data redaction scheme [8], and the chameleon hash-based data redaction scheme [9], referred to hereafter as Pruning, 2HashChain, and ChameleonHash, respectively.

B. Result Analysis

The result analysis in this section is divided into two major parts to compare the proposed scheme with others. The first part involves a comparison with the traditional UTXO scheme, and the second part is a comparison with existing blockchain redaction schemes.

1) Compared With UTXO-Based Scheme: This subsection aims to compare the performance of our scheme with that of the traditional UTXO scheme. Across all experimental scenarios in Fig. 5, we observed that the additional overhead caused by our scheme remained stable and did not increase with the number of nodes. The experiment includes block generation, unredacted block verification and redacted block verification based on our scheme and the traditional UTXO scheme. We will dive into the specific results for each of these scenarios.

Block Generation: In this part, we generated 1,000 to 8,000 blocks. We assessed the additional computational overhead induced in our scheme in the blockchain generation phase by comparing network latency and transaction throughput. As shown in Fig. 5(a), even with the increasing scale of blockchain, the additional computational overhead incurred by the EMT did not significantly increase. This is because the EMT only requires two additional hash operations in contrast to existing operations during its construction.

Unredacted Block Verification: Next, we compared the efficiency of verifying generated blocks without redacting operations between the two schemes. In this process, our scheme needs to recalculate the core data's hash values and insert data into the EMT. As Fig. 5(b) shows, the results indicate that our scheme, when performing blockchain verification, requires more computational overhead compared to the non-redactable UTXO blockchain. However, this verification process does not increase linearly with block height, indicating good scalability of our scheme.

Redacted Block Verification: Finally, assuming a blockchain height of 4,000, we analyzed the impact on verification time when the proportion of redacted blocks in the network increased




Fig. 5. Performance Overhead of Block Operations Compared to UTXO-based Scheme.




Fig. 6. Block Operation Performance with 50 Nodes (5 organizations with 10 peer nodes each): Throughput and Latency Comparison.

from 5% to 40%. In this scenario, the traditional UTXO scheme ignores the verification of redacted blocks, while our approach verifies redacted blocks by retrieving newly generated redaction transactions. As Fig. 5(c) demonstrates, although the additional retrieval and verification steps cause extra computational overhead, this overhead increases linearly with the proportion of redacted blocks and does not exhibit exponential growth. It indicates that our scheme maintains high efficiency under block redaction operations.

2) *Compared With Existing Redaction Schemes:* In the comparison with existing blockchain schemes, we evaluate and demonstrate the performance of our proposed schemes compared to existing schemes (local pruning scheme Pruning [5], double hash chain scheme 2HashChain [8], chameleon hash-based scheme ChameleonHash [9]). The experiments include the following four parts:

Block Generation: Figs. 6(a), 7(a) and 8(a) compare the performance of different schemes in generating blocks of varying heights. The latency and throughput comparisons indicate that blockchains with redaction abilities need additional operations

during block generation. Specifically, our proposed scheme requires the construction of an EMT during block generation, the 2HashChain scheme maintains two hash chains, and the ChameleonHash scheme implements chameleon hash construction, which has the most significant impact on performance among all the schemes. Nevertheless, as shown in the throughput evaluation, these operations have a minimal impact on the overall transaction processing capacity, which indicates that the system throughput remains stable even with new structures and operations. Moreover, as the number of nodes increases, the block generation performance is less affected.

Block Redaction: Figs. 6(b), 7(b) and 8(b) compare the performance of different schemes when the proportion of redacted blocks is at varying proportions. In this part, the focus is on assessing the performance of the redaction operation itself. Due to limitations of the experimental platform, the consensus mechanism for redaction operations was not included. The results show that as the proportion of redacted blocks increases, blockchains with redaction functions must perform additional operations to modify specified data. The Pruning scheme achieves redaction




Fig. 7. Block Operation Performance with 100 Nodes (10 organizations with 10 peer nodes each): Throughput and Latency Comparison.




Fig. 8. Block Operation Performance with 200 Nodes (20 organizations with 10 peer nodes each): Throughput and Latency Comparison.

through local pruning operations, which avoids the need for on-chain operations. The 2HashChain scheme only requires updating one hash chain after modification, thus limiting the number of needed on-chain operations. In contrast, our scheme and the ChameleonHash scheme both require generating new transaction for redaction or computing hash collisions during redaction, resulting in higher latency. As shown in Fig. 8(b), due to the complexity of on-chain operations, the transaction processing throughput of our scheme and the ChameleonHash scheme are significantly impacted. However, it should be noted that in application scenarios, a dynamic blockchain network could further influence redaction performance. Furthermore, because our scheme uses pruning-based redaction, it achieves better latency and throughput as the number of nodes increases.

Block Query: Figs. 6(c), 7(c) and 8(c) compare the performance when querying blocks at varying proportions. From the latency comparison, it is observed that other schemes generally maintain a high query efficiency when redacted data is inserted into the original transactions. Since our scheme updates the redacted data into new transactions, there may be a decline in query efficiency. Correspondingly, as shown in throughput comparison, the performance of transaction processing throughput also confirms this. However, it is important to note that in blockchain systems, full nodes often perform ledger query operations locally. Therefore, the reduction in query performance in our scheme does not directly affect the efficiency of block generation in the network. Like block generation, the performance of block query is almost unaffected as the number of nodes increases.

Block Verification: Figs. 6(d), 7(d) and 8(d) compare the performance of verifying blocks under different proportions of redacted blocks. Unlike the query process, verification involves checking the integrity and validity of transactions. In this scenario, the Pruning scheme represents only the query operation and serves as a control group for the verification process of redaction schemes. According to the results in the latency comparison, our scheme and the 2HashChain scheme are similar in performance, both involving the recalculation and verification of transaction hash values. In contrast, the ChameleonHash scheme involves a more complex process when verifying chameleon hashes, which results in higher latency. Correspondingly, the throughput results show how these complex on-chain operations lead to a reduction in the transaction throughput in the network, with the ChameleonHash scheme being the most significantly affected. As the number of nodes increases, our scheme, which locates both the redacted transaction and its new content, achieve better performance compared to the 2HashChain scheme in Fig. 8(d).

VIII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we focus on two distinct problems in existing blockchain redaction schemes: the *uncaptured change* and the *unexpected spread* of harmful data. To address these problems, we propose an EMT-based inserted data redaction scheme. Specifically, EMT separates core transaction data from inserted data, enabling nodes to precisely redact inserted data in local ledgers. It effectively resolves the issue of *uncaptured change*. Additionally, regarding the *unexpected spread* of harmful data, we designed a redaction scheme that allows authorized nodes to vote on redaction requests, thus reducing the network overhead associated with full network consensus. Redacted data is then immediately published via new transactions, which facilitates instant redaction without the need to recreate transactions and blocks. Security analysis proves that our scheme preserves the security features of the permissioned blockchain. Experimental results show that our redaction schemes offer efficient redaction performance with acceptable overhead compared to immutable blockchains.

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