# Measurements, Analysis and Modeling of Hyperledger Fabric

Abstract—Bitcoin network

Index Terms—Bitcoin Network, Mining Pools, Malthusian Trap, Incentive Mechanism

#### 1 Introduction

ITCOIN [1] is a decentralized peer to peer (P2P) Dcryptocurrency that was first proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008. Without resorting to any trusted third party, Bitcoin adapts a cryptographic proof mechanism that enables anonymous peers to complete transactions through the P2P network. Blockchain is the core mechanism of the Bitcoin system. It not only records historical transactions from Bitcoin clients, but also prevents the Bitcoin network from double spending attacks [2]. The Bitcoin network participants, who maintain and update the ongoing chain of blocks, are called miners. These miners compete in a mining race driven by an incentive mechanism [3], [4], where the one who first solves the Bitcoin cryptographic puzzle [5] has the right to collect unconfirmed transactions into a new block, append the new block to the main chain, i.e., the longest chain of blocks, and gain some BTCs [6] as a mining reward.

# 2 PRELIMINARY

## 2.1 Cluster Configuration

This is about cluster configuration

# 2.2 MSP

Certificates

## 2.3 TLS

TLS secure protocol descrition

#### 3 **ENVIRONMENT**

Hyperledger Fabric version 1.4 Fabric SDK v1.0.0 Jmeter

## 4 BLOCKTIME SOLO ORDERER MODE

#### 4.1 Model Definition

# 4.2 Model of Orderer's Configuration

The configuration file, i.e., configtx.yaml, configures the orderer service as follows.

TABLE 1 Configuration Notations

Notations	Descriptions
$N_{msg}$	MaxMessageCount
$S_{max}$	AbsoluteMaxBytes
$S_{pref}$	PreferredMaxBytes
T	Time to generate a block when MaxMessageCount
$T_{batch}$	is not satisfied

TABLE 2 Customized Notations

Notations	Descriptions
T	Time to generate a block when MaxMessageCount
$T_{\sigma}$	is satisfied
TAR	Transaction arrival rate
BlockTime	Time it takes to generate a block
TxDelay	Time it takes to issue a transaction
$S_{payload}$	Size of transaction payload
Throughput	Throughput of transactions

BatchTimeout: 2s

2 BatchSize:

MaxMessageCount: 10
AbsoluteMaxBytes: 98 MB
PreferredMaxBytes: 512 KB

Case Study 1 without considering block size, we have the following model, Given a TAR of which  $\Delta t=1$ , the time it costs is given as follows,

$$Time = \begin{cases} \infty & TAR = 0\\ T_{batch} & 0 < Tar \leq \frac{N_{msg}}{T_{batch}}\\ \left\lfloor \frac{TAR}{N_{msg}} - 1 \right\rfloor \cdot T_{\sigma} & \frac{N_{msg}}{T_{batch}} < TAR, TAR \mid N_{msg}\\ \left\lfloor \frac{TAR}{N_{msg}} - 1 \right\rfloor \cdot T_{\sigma} + T_{batch} & otherwise \end{cases}$$
(1)

If TAR=0, then  $BlockTime=\infty$ . It means that if there are no transactions, there are no blocks.

If  $0 < TAR \le \frac{MaxMessageCount}{BatchTimeout}$ . It means that the number of transactions are less than MaxMessageCount

given a BatchTimeout. Therefore, blocks are created for each BatchTimeout.

If  $\frac{MaxMessageCount}{BatchTimeout} < TAR$ . It means that the number of transactions are larger than MaxMessageCount in each BatchTimeout. Therefore, blocks are created as soon as possible and  $\sigma$  is a small value.

$$\begin{array}{c|c} \text{Jmeter:} & \boxed{10\text{Txs}} & \boxed{10\text{Txs}} \\ (TAR = 30 & \boxed{\phantom{+}} \\ \Delta t = 1) & \boxed{\phantom{+}} \\ T_{\sigma} & \boxed{\phantom{+}} \\ T_{\sigma} & \boxed{\phantom{+}} \end{array}$$




Fig. 1. The TAR Configurations

#### 4.2.1 Experiment 1: Uniform Random Distribution of TAR

TABLE 3
Different Configuration of BatchTimeout

BatchTimeout (s)	0.1	0.5	1	2	5	10	30
BlockTime (s)	a	a	a	a	a	a	a

Table shows how different configuration of BatchTimeout affect BlockTime. Following our model, and the experiments, we can have a comparison results as follows,

Here we need a figure with a comparison of the model result and the experimental results.

See more about Uniform Random Timer http  $//2min2code.com/articles/jmeter_intro/random_timer$ 

## 4.2.2 Experiment 2: Poisson Distribution of TAR

TABLE 4
Different Configuration of BatchTimeout

BatchTimeout (s)	0.1	0.5	1	2	5	10	30
BlockTime (s)	a	a	a	a	a	a	a

Table shows how different configuration of BatchTimeout affect BlockTime. Following our model, and the experiments, we can have a comparison results as follows,

Jmeter Poisson Distribution of TAR: https: //www.blazemeter.com/blog/comprehensive - guide - using - jmeter - timers/

# 4.2.3 Experiment 3: Constant Distribution of TAR

Jmeter Constant Distribution of TAR: https: //www.blazemeter.com/blog/comprehensive - guide - using - jmeter - timers/

Table shows how different configuration of BatchTimeout affect BlockTime. Following our model, and the experiments, we can have a comparison results as follows,

TABLE 5
Different Configuration of BatchTimeout

BatchTimeout (s)	0.1	0.5	1	2	5	10	30
BlockTime (s)	a	a	a	a	a	a	a

# 4.3 Transaction Delay (For Peer)

Here we need to discuss something about transaction delay in this section.

#### 4.3.1 Transaction Size

How transaction size affects transaction delay, transaction loss

- 4.3.2 Experiment 1: Transaction Size 1 byte
- 4.3.3 Experiment 2: Transaction Size 300 byte
- 4.3.4 Experiment 3: Transaction Size 10 Mbyte
- 4.3.5 Endorsement Policy
- 4.3.6 Experiment 1: Policy a
- 4.3.7 Experiment 2: Policy b
- 4.3.8 Experiment 3: Policy c

Here we need to know how endorsement policy affect transaction delay

## 5 KAFKA ORDERER MODE

## 5.1 Model of Kafka Orderer's Configuration

The configuration file of Kafka

# REFERENCES

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