

## CORPORATE HEGEMONY

### A Critical Assessment of the *Globe and Mail's* News Coverage of Near-Genocide in Occupied East Timor 1975-80

**Jeffery Klaehn**

**Abstract** / The study asks whether the news coverage accorded the near-genocide in East Timor by the *Globe and Mail* (*G&M*) followed the predictions of the 'propaganda model' (PM) of media operations laid out and applied by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky in *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. The research asks whether the *G&M's* news coverage of the near-genocide in East Timor and of Canada's 'aiding and abetting' of 'war crimes' and 'crimes against humanity' in occupied East Timor was hegemonic or ideologically serviceable given Canada's (geo)political-economic interests in Indonesia throughout the invasion and occupation periods. Did the news coverage provide a political and historical benchmark by which to inform the Canadian public (or not) and influence (or not) Canadian government policy on Indonesia and East Timor?

**Keywords** / Canadian foreign policy / democracy / East Timor / media / power and hegemony / propaganda model

## Introduction

Most Canadians are unaware of the genocide or near-genocide in East Timor. Amnesty International (1985, 1994) has thoroughly documented the extent of the human rights violations and state-sponsored atrocities perpetrated by Indonesia following its 7 December 1975 invasion of East Timor. In his book *Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor*, Taylor (1991: 78) writes that Indonesia's occupation violated 'almost every human rights provision in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Bill of Rights'. There is a range of secondary literature documenting the extent to which the USA participated in and contributed towards the near-genocide (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Chomsky, 1987: 303-11; Budiardjo, 1991; Jardine, 1995). In contrast, Canada's role has received only scant attention from Canadian scholars.<sup>1</sup>

This research asks whether the *Globe and Mail's* (*G&M*) coverage of the historical events in East Timor was hegemonic or ideologically serviceable to the extent that it provided a political and historical benchmark by which to inform the public (or not) and influence (or not) Canadian government policy

on Indonesia and East Timor. The question is a crucial one given that the government of Canada was in a position to wield significant diplomatic influence over the 'Question of East Timor' at the United Nations during the period of 1975 through until 1991.

*Canada had enormous leverage over the slaughters in East Timor and never used it. The media were never concerned and the intellectual community was never concerned. In this respect, Canada has contributed materially to the slaughters. (Noam Chomsky, cited in Briere, 1991)*

This research focuses on the *G&M* coverage of East Timor throughout the 'invasion period', that is from the time of the 7 December 1975 Indonesian invasion through to the end of 1980. This was when news coverage of the historical events in East Timor would have been most crucial in terms of (1) organizing public awareness of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, the occupation and subsequent atrocities and (2) influencing Canadian government policy towards East Timor and Indonesia.

How did Canada's news agenda-setter and self-declared national newspaper cover the news story of the invasion and occupation of East Timor? Moreover, how did it cover Canada's connections to and participation in the story?

Secondary sources contend that the media played a propagandistic role (Briere, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1997; Maitland, 1992; Eglin, 1995, forthcoming; Eglin et al., 1994; Scharfe, 1996; Klaehn, 1993, 1995, 1999; McMurtry, 1990, 1992). Implicit in these arguments are accusations of deception, cover-up and political propaganda.

## **East Timor – The Background**

East Timor was invaded by Indonesia on 7 December 1975. On 12 December 1975 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3845 (XXX) recognizing that the invasion had breached the principle of self-determination as laid out in Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter and in UN Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) (see Scharfe, 1996: 82–3).

On 22 December 1975, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 384 which called upon Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor 'without delay' and called upon 'all states to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination' (see Kreiger, 1997: xxiii). The Security Council reaffirmed East Timor's right to self-determination on 22 April 1976, voting in favour of Resolution 389, which once again denounced integration. By this time, approximately 60,000 East Timorese had already been killed (Budiardjo, 1991: 199; Scharfe, 1996: 83). Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, the General Assembly adopted eight additional resolutions reaffirming General Assembly Resolution 3845, rejecting Indonesia's position that East Timor had been lawfully integrated, reaffirming East Timor's right to self-determination and calling for an immediate military withdrawal.

Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor was one of the most brutal in postwar history (Carey, 1999: 29). According to Noam Chomsky, the death

toll, relative to the population, is the worst case of mass slaughter since the Holocaust (Chomsky, 1992: 204).

Amnesty International (1994) tells us that at least 200,000 East Timorese perished as a result of Indonesia's invasion and occupation, between a quarter and a third of the territory's pre-1975 population.

Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor constituted an act of aggression (Dunn, 1983; Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984; Scharfe, 1996: Ch. 2), included war crimes and/or 'crimes against humanity' under international and Canadian criminal law (McMurtry, 1990; Eglin, 1999), and 'violated almost every human rights provision in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Bill of Rights' (Taylor, 1991: 178). The record of repression, state-sponsored atrocities and human rights violations is well documented (see Amnesty International, 1980, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1994; Asia Watch, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1994).

Indonesia enacted programmes of forced relocation causing starvation and disease (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990: 411; Taylor, 1990: 17-20; Scharfe, 1996: 55; Selby, 1987: 43), initiated programmes of forced sterilization and birth control (Scharfe, 1996: 52; Sissons, 1997: 34), and undertook psychological programmes within East Timor oriented towards pacification and social engineering (Gunn, 1994: 232).

## **East Timor in Canadian Foreign Policy<sup>2</sup>**

Following Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, Canada could not bring itself to support the 10 UN resolutions that expressed 'grave concern at the loss of life', called upon 'all States to respect the inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination, freedom and independence', rejected 'the claim that East Timor had been integrated into Indonesia', drew 'the attention of the Security Council to the critical situation in East Timor' and called upon the Indonesian military to 'withdraw without delay'. Canada was the largest western investor in Indonesia at the time of the invasion.

In September 1987, Canada's representative on the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission voted against putting East Timor back on the UN Human Rights Commission agenda. Not until 1992, in the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November 1991, did Canada's official stance at the UN change as the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned, for the first time, Indonesia's human rights record in East Timor. In 1993, Canada co-sponsored a resolution critical of Indonesia, and supported a similar statement in 1994.<sup>3</sup>

Canada was in a position to wield significant diplomatic influence at the UN during the crucial invasion years. A range of secondary sources suggest that Canada's opportunistic foreign policy was motivated by political and economic self-interest. Sorenson (1990) writes that,

*In short, the case of East Timor serves as a grim lesson in political realities. Canada's profitable relations with Indonesia have ensured that violations of international law and extensive human rights abuses are ignored.*

Given that the government of Canada was implicated in the near-genocide by virtue of its pro-Indonesian voting record on East Timor resolutions at the UN, the story was not quite so remote as Canada's geographic proximity to East Timor would suggest. Foreign policy is one way in which the government of Canada is implicated in the East Timor near-genocide.

## **Canadian Aid to Indonesia and East Timor**

Canadian Overseas Developmental Assistance (CODA) to Indonesia nearly doubled after Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 – from Can.\$19.52 million in 1974–5 to Can.\$36.7 million in 1975–6. Canada 'has continually been among the top 10 [donors] since its 1975 invasion of East Timor' (Scharfe, 1996: 157–8). Further, 'the bulk of CODA to Indonesia is bilateral, that is government-to-government aid', 'designed as welfare to support Canadian business (or business-like institutions like universities) by requiring the "aided" country to buy the donor's goods' (Eglin, 1999: 67). The 'goods' have entailed material and intellectual capital, and academics across the spectrum of disciplines have participated in joint development projects.

## **Canadian Investment in Indonesia**

When considering the importance of Canada's business ties to Indonesia, total foreign trade is less significant than direct Canadian investment in Indonesia. Economic incentives for Canadian-based multinationals have included reparations of profits, exemptions from import duties, generous tax holidays and availability of cheap, non-unionized domestic labour, mostly women (Briere, 1988a: 21–3, 1988b, 1988c, 1997; also see McMurtry, 1990; Klaehn, 1995, 1999; Scharfe, 1996). As already mentioned, Canada was the largest western investor in Indonesia at the time of the 1975 invasion of East Timor. Historically, the largest Canadian-based investor in Indonesia has been PT INCO.

## **The Case of PT INCO in Indonesia**

Since first locating in Indonesia in 1968, INCO has invested more than Can.\$1.5 billion in its nickel-mining operations there. In the initial stages of these operations, the Crown's Economic Development Corporation (EDC) approved two loans totalling Can.\$57.25 million (see Scharfe, 1996: 169, 189). Additional funding was provided by credit agencies in the US, Japan, Norway, Britain and Australia (see Briere and Gage, 1993: 37; Swift, 1977: 81).

Expansion in the Indonesian market allowed INCO to limit its reliance on a far less cost-effective Canadian workforce. Downsizing its Canadian operations resulted in a more favourable wage/benefit ratio. Indonesian mining laws allowed the state to seize large tracts of land belonging to the local peoples, who were forced to sacrifice their land, lifestyle and traditional means of subsistence (Eglin et al., 1994). Like the majority of its foreign aid, taxes paid by corporations such as INCO have traditionally been diverted to Indonesia's

military elite, in addition to invisible money involved in private security and bribes (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979: 212).

## **Canadian Military Exports to Indonesia**

Although Indonesia is able to acquire the bulk of its military arsenal from other countries, predominantly the US, successive Canadian governments have authorized military export permits that have allowed Canadian arms manufacturers to export dual-purpose (civilian and military) military goods to Indonesia.<sup>4</sup> Not all export licences result in actual exports. According to External Affairs and International Trade Canada (1995) the ratio 'is often as low as 10%'. Hence, the value of export licences is normally only a fraction of the value of actual permits issued. However, Canada's willingness to authorize permits stands in direct opposition to Canada's own Import/Export Act, which prohibits the sale of Canadian-made military goods to 'countries engaged in hostilities' and/or to 'countries whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of human rights'. There is a burden of proof indicating that Indonesia meets both these criteria. Canada has also hosted several military trade fairs and bazaars, promoting Canadian military exports to Indonesia.<sup>5</sup>

## **A Critical Review of Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model of Media Operations<sup>6</sup>**

Herman and Chomsky's 'propaganda model' of media operations (PM) argues that elite media interlock with other institutional sectors in ownership, management and social circles, effectively circumventing their ability to remain analytically detached from the power structure of society, of which they themselves are presumed to be integral parts.<sup>7</sup> The net result of this, the PM contends, is self-censorship without significant coercion. The PM constitutes an institutional critique of media performance and theorizes media performance as an outcome of market forces. It concedes that the powerful have individual objectives but presumes that dominant elites share common political, economic and social interests.<sup>8</sup> The PM presumes that media behaviour will reflect these interests in such ways that are 'functional' for dominant elites and social institutions.<sup>9</sup>

The PM theorizes that media serve 'political interests', 'mobilize' (or not) sympathetic emotion for victims and outrage against victimizers, and routinely 'divert' public attention away from some stories and news items while concurrently directing attention towards others (see Chomsky, 1989: 153).<sup>10</sup> The model postulates that media routinely make selection choices that establish and define 'worthy' and 'unworthy' causes. It predicts there will be qualitative and quantitative differences in the treatment accorded 'unworthy victims' (victims of oppression and/or state terrorism that is perpetrated by the capitalist democracies), and 'worthy victims' (victims of oppression and/or state terrorism perpetrated by official enemy states). Disparities in treatment will be observable in sourcing and evaluation, such that 'worthy victims' will be accorded more coverage, more prominent coverage and more humanistic treatment than unworthy victims (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 35).

In sum, then, the PM predicts that news discourse will feature (1) the promotion of ideologically serviceable themes and system-supportive disinformation; (2) a low volume of news coverage devoted to reporting on 'unworthy victims'; (3) dominance of official discourse; and (4) a very tight, controlled range of 'permitted opinion' and debate on central topics.

The PM emphasizes that media personnel internalize beliefs and attitudes which in turn influence media performance. This is a social psychological argument that is presumed but not directly tested by the PM.<sup>11</sup> It was echoed by one of the journalists I interviewed in my research for this article:

*A lot of journalists are genuinely clueless about the forces to which they are responding. Some are malleable, others try to act with integrity and are perpetually surprised at the blocks they encounter. Others suss out the system and either get out or act in concert with it. Those are the ones who often move up in the system. I've had journalists and editors tell me about the way things work very straightforwardly. Some combine both. There are a surprising number of higher up editors and producers who know they must accommodate the interests of ownership and other powers (in the case of public broadcasting) but within these constrictions, are still committed to as much muckraising as possible.<sup>12</sup>*

The PM can be seen to presume various 'self-interested' or ideological motives from structural patterns in news coverage.<sup>13</sup> The phrase 'ideologically serviceable' is defined as the extent to which news discourse can be seen to reflect the (geo)political-economic and ideological interests of dominant elites, by mobilizing bias, patterning news choices and marginalizing dissent, and by allowing 'the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public' (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 2).

Gramsci utilized the concept of hegemony to refer to ways in which the consent of subordinate classes to capitalist consensus is achieved. As a critical concept within sociology, hegemony is first and foremost about mobilizing and securing consent and legitimation of dominant values, interests and institutions, via intellectual and cultural leadership. Whereas some coercion is inevitable, Gramsci distinguished between hegemony and overt physical domination exercised by the state. The latter implies direct coercion whereas hegemony in its basic sense highlights the importance of persuasion. The term itself is often contested. Many US scholars often use the terms 'ideology' and 'hegemony' interchangeably. The PM implies a logic of mediation – or 'filtering' – in the sense that ideological sectors secure – or 'manufacture' – consent via legitimation, manufactured consent and imposed apathy or ignorance. The PM suggests that because 'thought control' is virtually transparent in democratic societies, the propaganda system is actually more effective and efficient here than it is in totalitarian states.<sup>14</sup>

The PM, because it is a structural model, focuses exclusively on media content and does not 'test' actual beliefs and motivations of individual media personnel.<sup>15</sup> There is, however, a range of literature on the sociology of news and the social construction of reality which addresses and attempts to provide explanations for these intervening processes (Gans, 1979; Ericson et al., 1989; Tuchman, 1978). Although the PM does not focus on micro-level analysis of the beliefs and motivations of individual editors and news journalists, there are

a range of other empirical studies and discussions of professionalism as ideology (see Hackett, 1991; Bennett, 1988) and of intervening processes that consider ways in which ownership, advertising values and corporate influence impact news production (see Eyal et al., 1986; Desbarats, 1990; Isaacs, 1986; Nelson, 1989; Bagdikian, 1987; McChesney, 1997; Herman, 1995, 1999; Solomon and Cohen, 1997; McMurtry, 1998; Winter, 1992, 2002).

There are two central methodological techniques associated with the PM. The first is to study 'paired examples' of co-occurring historical events. Disparities in treatment can lend insight into interpreting media behaviour. The second, favoured by Chomsky in his polemical writings, is to explore the 'boundaries of the expressible' or range of 'permitted opinion' on crucial topics.

*One appropriate method is to consider the spectrum of opinion allowed expression. According to the PM, one would expect the spectrum to be bounded by the consensus of powerful elites while encouraging tactical debate within it. (Chomsky, 1989: 59)*

This research utilizes both methodological approaches. The *G&M* was selected because it is Canada's key 'national medium' and influences the tone and direction of lower-tier media (see Desbarats, 1990: 227; Heinricks, 1989; Hackett, 1991: 95).<sup>16</sup> In this context, the *G&M* has been described as Canada's news 'agenda-setter'.<sup>17</sup>

If the data conform with the predictions of the PM, the coverage will feature propagandistic elements observable in choices of story selection and in the quantity and quality of the news coverage accorded the near-genocide in East Timor.

## **Covering the Invasion: The Distribution of the *G&M* Coverage of East Timor, 1975–91**

The distribution of the coverage in the year 1975 was as follows: prior to the 7 December invasion, the *G&M* published 29 articles on East Timor up to and including 6 December 1975. Following Indonesia's invasion, the coverage declined significantly.

The distribution of its coverage of the invasion itself, during the month of December 1975, is as follows: one article on the day after the invasion (8 December), one article on each of the following three days (8, 9 and 10 December), and one article on each of 15, 20, 23 and 30 December.

During 1976, the *G&M* published a one-paragraph article on 5 January and a two-paragraph piece on 16 January reporting on the invasion. This was the extent of its coverage of the invasion throughout the entire year of 1976.

Four additional articles on East Timor were published during 1976, three of which reported on its annexation.

It published one article on East Timor in 1977 – a single-paragraph article on 1 March, which was headlined 'Australians Charge 100,000 Killings'.

Throughout the next 16 months there was no additional coverage of East Timor published in the *G&M*.

On 9 October 1978, the newspaper published an investigative piece by Mick Lowe, headlined '60,000 Have Died in Unseen War'.

Throughout 1979, it published three small articles on East Timor.

This was the extent of the *G&M* news coverage of the crucial invasion period. The coverage included no discussion whatsoever of Canada's diplomatic or material contributions to the near-genocide. In fact, the coverage makes no mention of Canada in relation to Indonesia or the unfolding near-genocide in East Timor.

Canada is effectively *omitted* or 'edited out' of the unfolding news story at this stage. This evident omission can be seen to conform with the hypotheses advanced by the PM.

Table 1 provides a summation of the quantity of the *G&M's* East Timor coverage from 1975 to 1991 and provides a summation of the distribution of the coverage.

The quantity and distribution of the *G&M* East Timor coverage support the hypotheses advanced by the PM. The coverage reduced significantly after Indonesia invaded and dropped to almost nil as the atrocities reached their

**TABLE 1**

**Search of *Globe and Mail* Articles Relating to East Timor (7 December 1975–31 December 1991)**

Year	Total Articles	East Timor Mentioned in Passing	Articles about East Timor	Editorials	Letters to Editor re East Timor
1975	36				
Feb. 1975	1		1		
Aug.–Sept.	22	1	21		
Oct.– 6 Dec.	6	1	5		
7–31 Dec.	7		7		
1976	6		6		
1977	1		1		
1978	1		1		
1979	3		3		
1980	5	1	3		1
1981	5	3	2		
1982	9	5	3		1
1983	10	5	5		
1984	18	6	2		10
1985	7	3	2		2
1986	4	3	1		
1987	13	3	1	1	8
1988	9	4	2		3
1989	19	2	8		9
1990	12	4	3		5
1991	28	12	12		4

Source: Scharfe (1996: 117).



**TABLE 2**

***Globe and Mail Coverage of East Timor and Cambodia 1 November 1977–31 December 1991***

Year	Major Articles on East Timor	Major Articles on Cambodia
Nov.–Dec. 1977	1	0
1978	1	0
1979	3	6
1980	3	22
1981	2	65
1982	3	34
1983	5	47
1984	2	31
1985	2	74
1986	1	34
1987	1	28
1988	2	68
1989	8	90
1990	3	71
1991	12	53
Total	49	623

Source: Scharfe (1996: 114).

peak throughout 1978/9. The absolute low volume of news coverage effectively concealed (1) Indonesia's *near-genocidal* aggression and (2) Canada's diplomatic and material contributions from public view.

### **Analysis of Paired Examples: Comparing and Contrasting the Quantity of News Coverage Accorded East Timor to that Accorded to Cambodia<sup>18</sup>**

Following the PM's methodological assumption of seeking paired examples, this section provides a detailed comparison of the quantity of coverage accorded East Timor and Cambodia by both the *G&M* and the *New York Times*. As Eglin notes, the two cases are well suited for the purposes of such a comparison given that (1) the 'genocide' in Cambodia was comparable in relative scale to the mass killings or near-genocide in East Timor and (2) it coincided with the period (1975–79) of the worst atrocities, killings and deaths (Eglin, 1992: 5).

Table 2 provides a summation of the number of major articles accorded East Timor and Cambodia by the *G&M* during the period 1977–91. The sharp contrast and observable disparity in treatment conform with the PM.

## Ruling Out Possible Explanations for the Low Volume of News Coverage

To argue that the *G&M* coverage is biased or ideologically inflected because it omits legitimately relevant information raises the question of whether information was available to the media at the time of the coverage. Omissions may only be evident in retrospect. However, there is ample evidence indicating this was not the case here.

*Extremely high casualty figures were already becoming available in 1976. In February 1976, an Indonesian client, Lopez da Cruz, who had been appointed deputy chair of the 'Provisional Government of East Timor' set up by the forces of occupation, asserted that 60,000 Timorese had already died. (Budiardjo, 1991: 199)*

There are several possible explanations for the initial poor coverage accorded the unfolding East Timor story. Indonesia imposed tight information controls that prevented journalists from entering the territory after the invasion. Lack of access to the territory is a reasonable explanation for the low volume of coverage. Moreover, the *G&M* had only three full-time staff foreign correspondents (based in Beijing, London and Washington) at the time of the invasion and relied upon the wire services (principally Reuters and AP), travelling Canadian-based staff correspondents, and freelance writers for its foreign news coverage. Lack of resources is another possible explanation for the low volume of news coverage. Lack of interest among the Canadian public could be offered as a third possible explanation.

Each of these possible alternative explanations is problematic for a variety of different reasons.

While lack of access to the territory is undeniable, Carey observes that despite the restrictions on access and information blackout imposed by the government of Indonesia, East Timor was given fitful attention by the Australian and British media after the invasion.

*A form of collusion existed between Western governments, international corporations and the Indonesian Government to keep East Timor off the agenda given the very lucrative business contracts which existed with Jakarta at this time. (Carey, 1999: 46)*

Noam Chomsky argues that the elite American media ignored and suppressed the East Timor story precisely because doing so served broader US (geo)political-economic interests. Chomsky (1982: 337–48) recalls that the *Columbia Journalism Review* asked him to contribute a piece in 1978. Chomsky then suggested an essay discussing the lack of coverage accorded East Timor by the American media. His proposal was rejected on the grounds that the topic of 'East Timor' was 'too remote'. Chomsky remarks, 'the circle is complete', when 'first, the media suppress a major story, then a journal dedicated to the performance of the media is unwilling to investigate the suppression because it has been so effective' (Chomsky, 1982: 471, fn. 3).<sup>19</sup>

Eight months after the invasion Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs and International Trade, Allan J. MacEachen, delivered a speech in

Jakarta, where he spoke at length about Indonesia's natural resources, large population and strategic importance, all of which, MacEachen stressed at the time, had placed Indonesia 'in a key position to play a role in international affairs' (MacEachen, 1976a). MacEachen then stressed a 'reorientation of Canada's foreign policy' towards increased economic development, shared objectives and cooperation between Canada and Indonesia, declaring that the government of Canada had been 'impressed by Indonesia's pragmatic leadership . . . which has resulted in steady economic progress' (MacEachen, 1976a).

Two years later, in 1978, Canadian ambassador to Indonesia, Glen Shortliffe, visited illegally occupied East Timor as part of the international delegation of parliamentarians and news correspondents granted supervised access. Although the Canadian news personnel that accompanied Shortliffe were able to view (first-hand) the Biafra-like conditions of the starving, diseased Timorese who were then residing in the Indonesian military-controlled strategic hamlets after having been forcibly relocated by the occupying military forces, there was no media coverage of the diplomatic visit, or of the abject 'victimization' of the East Timorese.<sup>20</sup>

Given that Canadian news journalists undeniably had direct (albeit supervised) access to the territory during this diplomatic visit, there is reason to seriously question the argument that lack of access explains the low volume of coverage accorded the events in East Timor throughout the crucial invasion period and Canada's role in 'aiding and abetting' the near-genocide.

Lastly, that information was available on what was taking place in East Timor throughout the invasion and occupation periods is undeniable. Chomsky and Herman, for instance, devoted an entire section of their book *The Political Economy of Human Rights, Vol. One: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, published in 1979, to the near-genocide in East Timor.<sup>21</sup> Beyond this, however, East Timor was accorded coverage in a range of alternative media throughout the invasion period. At least 22 articles on East Timor were published in alternative media in 1978 alone (at least 16 articles in 1979, and at least 19 articles in 1980). If lack of access is in fact a credible explanation for the low volume of coverage accorded the East Timor story by Canada's self-declared 'national newspaper' and news agenda-setter, then how does one possibly account for the simple fact that alternative media, with far fewer resources available to them, were able to generate so many stories devoted to reporting on and speaking directly of the events taking place there during this time period? The second possible explanation is also seriously compromised given that, by definition, alternative media can avail themselves of far fewer resources than can the corporate, mainstream media.

The last possible explanation for the absolute low volume of coverage accorded the story of East Timor is lack of interest among (1) the *G&M's* readership and (2) among the Canadian public generally. This explanation is problematic for the simple reason that the East Timor story can be seen to have been both sensationalistic and dramatic.<sup>22</sup> As an unfolding news story, its dimensions entailed 'invasion', years of bombing and thousands of confirmed cases of systematic gross human rights violations. The East Timor story included other dramatic elements: forced relocation, induced starvation and disease,

pacification, sterilization and (western-backed) near-genocide. And, as highlighted earlier, there were myriad ways in which Canada was directly connected to the near-genocide. If one takes the suggestion that public interest in the story simply was not there, then it raises the question, why not.

On logical grounds, the quantity and distribution of the coverage of the coverage can be seen to have been ideologically motivated, virtually ensuring that Canada's pro-business agenda would not be challenged.

## Exploring the Range of 'Permitted Opinion' in the *G&M* Coverage

The findings indicate that throughout the crucial invasion period of 1975–80, the *G&M* diverted public attention away from two important considerations: (1) the *international* nature of the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor and (2) Canada's own diplomatic and material contributions to the slaughters. Two levels of omission are evident in the *G&M*'s East Timor coverage during the crucial invasion period. At the referential level, omission is evidenced by the absence of context, criticism and humanization from the whole process of representation. At the signifiatory level, it is evidenced by the absence of alternative ways of signifying actors, action and events, which are framed in particular ways. The sources cited in the *G&M*'s East Timor news coverage published throughout the invasion period were all official (Indonesian-approved) sources.

Indonesian representations of major events, actors and substantive issues are presented not as claims but rather as *facts*, even in the face of evidence proving the contrary (see Scharfe, 1996).

Since the 1975 invasion Indonesia has consistently claimed that it did not *invade* East Timor but rather *intervened* in the civil war in East Timor. This representation creates context in which Indonesia's actions in East Timor may be characterized as 'intervention' as opposed to 'invasion', 'illegal aggression' and 'occupation'.

Various scholarly sources indicate that the brief civil war in East Timor had ended by November 1975, and that between 2000 and 3000 Timorese had died in the fighting (see Scharfe, 1996: 45; Selby, 1987: 42).<sup>23</sup>

Indonesia commenced cross-border armed incursions from West Timor in November 1975. On 28 November 1975, the *de facto* Fretilin government declared unilateral independence for East Timor in order to defend its territorial integrity at the UN (Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984: 1–8). Indonesia then invaded outright on 7 December. The *G&M*'s chronology mirrors the government of Indonesia's both in terms of both what it declares to be fact and what it excludes.<sup>24</sup>

The *G&M* coverage established context within which Indonesia's 1975 *invasion* of East Timor was not an act of *aggression* but rather 'intervention' and later 'war' with Fretilin. Within this contextual framework, ensuing events may be explained away, justified, and *blamed upon* the resistance movement (Fretilin) within East Timor.<sup>25</sup> By promoting this representation, the *G&M* can be seen to have facilitated Canada's (geo)political-economic interests.<sup>26</sup>

Ideologically serviceable context is established. Concurrently, the government of Canada, together with Canada's corporate and intellectual communities, are not cast as active partners in the near-genocide (see Eglin, forthcoming).

The *G&M's* endorsement of the official chronology can be traced back to the pre-invasion period. On 11 November 1975 it published a report, headlined 'Civil Wars that Bleed the Third World', stating that the civil war had yet to end. A smaller article, headlined 'East Timor Official Seeks Help', published on 26 November 1975, reported (again) that the civil war in East Timor was still ongoing at the time. Articles by-lined out of Jakarta prior to the invasion reported that the civil war in East Timor was still ongoing in late November and early December 1975. The political disinformation, coupled with the low volume of coverage accorded the events in East Timor, can be seen to strongly support the PM.

Themes of atrocities, vested interests, political and institutional alliances, while not entirely absent from the discourse, are present in only a cursory way in the coverage published throughout the invasion period.

Narrowness of debate is evidenced by the extent to which the news coverage featured no information and/or debate on (1) the illegality of Indonesia's invasion and subsequent occupation of East Timor; (2) Canada's diplomatic courtship of Indonesia; (3) ethical issues relating to Canadian investment in and aid to Indonesia during the same time period when Indonesia was carrying out 'extermination campaigns' and near-genocide in East Timor; (4) Canada's 'hypocritical' foreign policy towards Indonesia; (5) the involvement of virtually every Canadian university (and Canadian academics) in administering numerous 'aid projects' to Indonesia in unison with CIDA throughout the invasion and occupation periods; and (6) the 'complicity' of the major mass media in 'covering' East Timor as an unfolding news story.

## Coverage of the East Timor Story in Other Canadian Dailies

Examination of the news coverage accorded the story by other newspapers throughout the crucial invasion period (1975–80) enabled additional insight into how the story was treated by the Canadian media and also afforded an opportunity to test the assumption that the *G&M* is the premier agenda-setting newspaper in Canada with respect to this particular news story. The Canadian News Index (CNI) was consulted in order to delineate how much coverage other Canadian dailies accorded the East Timor story throughout the crucial invasion period (1975–80).

The CNI listed a total of zero (0) news articles published on East Timor throughout the entire invasion period (1975–80) by any of the Canadian newspapers considered, including *Calgary Herald*, *Montreal Gazette* and the *Winnipeg Free Press*. According to the CNI, there was only one (single) news article on East Timor published in the *Toronto Star* throughout the entire period.<sup>27</sup> The *Toronto Star* article was published one day after the invasion, on 8 December 1975. By-lined out of Jakarta, the (Reuter–UPI) article stresses, in its second full paragraph, Indonesian foreign minister Malik's claim 'that the Indonesian troops [had] stormed the capital of Dili [sic] at the invitation of

pro-Indonesian elements' within East Timor. Its one-line fifth paragraph notes that China had called Indonesia's takeover a 'flagrant invasion'. The sixth paragraph cites Malik and recounts the official Indonesian chronology.

*Malik claimed Indonesia, which immediately declared Dili part of its territory, acted to 'prevent bloodshed' in a civil war which had broken out there between pro-Indonesian forces, members of the People's Democratic Association of Timor (Apodeti), and leftist forces belonging to the Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin).*

According to the CNI, the *Toronto Star* did not publish another news article on East Timor for the next 14 years.

The absolute low volume accorded the invasion, occupation and near-genocide in the Canadian print media can be seen to confirm the PM with considerable strong evidence.

## **The Findings: Re-Assessing the Propaganda Model**

The central hypothesis of this research was that if the data conformed to the PM, there would be a tendency for official discourse to feature prominently in the data, if not dominate them. If debate did find expression in the data, it would be limited. The framing of events would demonstrate a pervasive presence of official representations. Victims would not be humanized by the data, which would be closed rather than open and inclusive. Throughout the invasion period, official representations of the major actions, actors and substantive issues featured prominently in the *G&M* news coverage. Thematic content, sources, framing, evident disinformation and propaganda proper are evidenced by the data, strongly supporting the substantive hypotheses advanced by the PM.

The *G&M* East Timor coverage throughout the 1980s was sporadic. Official, dominant representations of major events continued to feature prominently in the news discourse but marginal changes in the thematic content and range of sources represented throughout the 1980s are evidenced by the data. Where a marginal voice of criticism is most evident in the *G&M* news coverage of East Timor was in its Letters to the Editor section. It afforded a *space* in which official representations of major actions, actors and substantive issues are questioned, scrutinized and challenged. Within this space, parameters of debate are evidenced (McMurtry, 1990, 1992; Klaehn, forthcoming). The news reporting, which features minimal debate and omission of substantive information, contrasts sharply in this regard, and, by virtue of placement, was accorded greater prominence within the newspaper than were letters to the editor.

## **Concluding Remarks**

In assessing the extent to which the *G&M*'s East Timor news coverage conforms with the hypotheses advanced by the PM, this research suggests that the *G&M* affirmed rather than challenged Canada's actions and policies during the period in which the coverage appeared. The promotion of ideologically serviceable disinformation is systematic in the *G&M*'s East Timor news coverage, and is observable in terms of both individual story headlines and story content.

The *G&M* failed in its public responsibility to provide adequate news coverage, first of the major events, actions and actors involved in the East Timor 'story' and, second, of the (myriad) relevant Canadian connections. More extensive coverage can be seen to have been warranted given the horrific and sensational nature of the near-genocide, and given the involvement of the international community, Canada in particular.

The vital role of Canada's key national medium is of particular importance given that its news coverage throughout the late 1970s and 1980s can be seen (1) to have served as a conduit for official, established truths and (2) to have facilitated Canadian's pro-business foreign policy towards Indonesia.

Insofar as the coverage provided a benchmark by which to influence Canadian government policy on Indonesia and East Timor, the *G&M* can be seen to have performed a significant hegemonic function, one oriented towards legitimization and political accommodation. The significance of political legitimacy is marginal given that assent was achieved simply by keeping the Canadian public relatively ignorant of the near-genocide. However, the data indicate that legitimacy was virtually ensured, via the suppression of dissenting voices and promotion of ideologically serviceable themes, disinformation and political propaganda proper. Eglin (forthcoming) provides additional evidence that the *G&M* acted as a conveyor of state and corporate propaganda. Throughout this time period, the government of Canada's actions and policies towards Indonesia and East Timor can be seen to have been oriented towards the accommodation of Canada's own (geo)political-economic interests. The absolute low volume of news coverage virtually ensured that decision-making would be unchallenged. It can be concluded that the interrelations of state and corporate capitalism and the corporate media effectively circumvented fundamental democratic processes.

## Notes

This article is dedicated to the memory of Suzanne Kondratenko (3 March 1974–11 September 2001). The author wishes to extend thanks to Sharyn and Louis Klaehn.

1. On the surface, the lack of scholarship is puzzling given that virtually every Canadian university has participated in Indonesian development projects administered through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
2. Selections from this section first appeared in Eglin et al. (1994).
3. Canada has facilitated direct investment in Indonesia and bilateral trade since the invasion (see Scharfe, 1996: 190–2).
4. For details on Canadian trade in military goods, see Scharfe (1996: 194–206).
5. Scharfe (1996: 197–204) provides detailed analysis of Canadian military exports to Indonesia and notes that Foreign Affairs does not trace the end use or user of Canadian military export products.
6. It bears mentioning that Edward S. Herman was the principal author of the first chapter of *Manufacturing Consent*, in which the filter mechanisms are laid out. A new edition of the book, with a new introduction, has recently been published.
7. This view echoes Miliband, who wrote that

*There is nothing particularly surprising about the character and role of the major mass media in advanced capitalist society. Given the economic and political context in which they*

*function, they cannot fail to be, predominantly, agencies for the dissemination of ideas and values which affirm rather than challenge existing patterns of power and privilege, and thus to be weapons in the arsenal of class domination. (Miliband, cited in Clement, 1975: 278)*

8. The debate here effectively mirrors the Marxist response to the liberal-bourgeois thesis within Canadian sociology.
9. For discussion of the criticisms that have been levelled against the PM, see Herman (1996, 2000); see Klaehn (2002) for a summation of the debate on the PM and critical reflection on the PM, in connection with the broader news studies literature.
10. As Cohen (1963: 13) put it, media 'may not be successful in telling people what to think' but there is much evidence that they are 'stunningly successful in telling people what to think about'.
11. Dr Peter Archibald, Department of Sociology, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. Personal correspondence, autumn 2001.
12. Personal correspondence, 19 October 2001, as cited in Klaehn (2002: 151).
13. Dr Peter Archibald, Department of Sociology, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. Personal correspondence, autumn 2001.
14. See Herman (1996, 2000), Chomsky (1989), Winter (1992, 2002), McMurtry (1998) and Klaehn (2002).
15. Dr Peter Archibald, Department of Sociology, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. Personal correspondence, autumn 2001.
16. Other Canadian media, such as television and radio, reach a greater proportion of the Canadian population, and can also generate public interest in foreign policy issues.
17. Hackett (1991: 95) notes that the *G&M* is 'disproportionately read by the affluent and powerful' and observes that 'Globe reports often fuel debate in the House of Commons'. The *G&M* can thus be seen to be both politically and ideologically influential within Canada.
18. Selections of this section first appeared in Eglin et al. (1994).
19. As noted, Canada's close economic ties to and diplomatic courtship of Indonesia are two logical reasons why the unfolding events in East Timor can be seen to have warranted significant news coverage in the Canadian media.
20. As noted, the *G&M* coverage reduced significantly in 1978 with only one article published throughout the entire year.
21. 'East Timor: Genocide on the Sly' (Chomsky and Herman, 1979: 4.1).
22. Galtung and Ruge (1973) emphasize that an international news story has a greater chance of being accorded significant news coverage if the news item in question is dramatic, unexpected, unique.
23. Jardine (1997: 16) maintains that the civil war ended even earlier, on 24 September 1975.
24. See Eglin's forthcoming book, *Getting A Life: A Story of Studies in Pursuit of Intellectual Responsibility* for detailed comparison and analysis.
25. This representation conforms with the 'chronology' of the major actions, issues and events laid out by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (July 1992) in their document titled 'East Timor: Building for the Future'. This document was sent to me upon request by the Indonesian embassy.
26. The *G&M* can also be seen to have accepted, endorsed and legitimized Indonesia's illegal annexation of East Timor vis-a-vis its by-lines.
27. 'Indonesia Takes Over Portuguese Timor', 8 December 1975: 1.

## Bibliography

- Amnesty International (1980) *East Timor: Statement of Amnesty International Concerns in East Timor*, 29 April. London: Amnesty International.
- Amnesty International (1985) *East Timor: Violations of Human Rights, Extrajudicial Executions, 'Disappearances', Torture and Political Imprisonment*, 14 May. London: Amnesty International.
- Amnesty International (1987) *Indonesia/East Timor: Summary of Amnesty International Concerns in Indonesia and East Timor*, April. London: Amnesty International.



- Amnesty International (1988) *Indonesia/East Timor: Summary of Amnesty International Concerns in Indonesia and East Timor*, 1988. London: Amnesty International.
- Amnesty International (1990) *Indonesia/East Timor: A Summary of AI's Concerns*. London: Amnesty International.
- Amnesty International (1991) *East Timor: The Santa Cruz Massacre*. London: Amnesty International.
- Amnesty International (1994) *Indonesia and East Timor. Power and Impunity: Human Rights Under the New Order*, 28 September. London: Amnesty International.
- Anderson, B. (1995) 'East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications', in Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (eds) *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Andrews, P. (1989) 'Looking at What the Media Don't Say: Controversial Noam Chomsky Sees Subtle US Thought Control', *Seattle Times* 29 June: D4.
- Asia Watch (1989) *Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor*, March. New York: Asia Watch.
- Asia Watch (1991) *East Timor: The November 12 Massacre and its Aftermath*, December. New York: Asia Watch.
- Asia Watch (1992) *East Timor: Asia Watch Criticizes Commission Report*, January. New York: Asia Watch.
- Asia Watch (1994) *The Limits of Openness: Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor*, September. New York: Asia Watch.
- Bagdikian, Ben (1987) *Media Monopoly*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Ballinger, J. (1992) 'The New Free Trade Heel: Nike's Profits Jump on the Backs of Asian Workers', *Harper's* August.
- Bennett, Lance (1988) *News: The Politics of Illusion*, 2nd edn. New York: Longman.
- Bottomore, Tom (1993) *Elites and Society*, 2nd edn. New York: Routledge.
- Branegan, J. (1992) 'Empire of the Sons – and Daughter', *Time* 3 February: 24–7.
- Briere, Elaine (1988a) 'Tribulations of a Tribal Nation: Why does Canada Condone the Subjugation of East Timor?', *Globe and Mail* 6 December: A7.
- Briere, Elaine (1988b) 'Feeding the Cyclops', *Briarpatch* May: 20–3.
- Briere, Elaine (1988c) 'East Timor: Genocide Continues', *Briarpatch* October: 35.
- Briere, Elaine (1991) 'A Country Now Forgotten', *This Magazine* 25(1): 22–4.
- Briere, Elaine (1997) *Bitter Paradise: The Sell-Out of East Timor*, video documentary. Mission, BC: Snapshot Productions.
- Briere, Elaine and Dan Devaney (1990) 'East Timor: The Slaughter of a Tribal Nation', *Canadian Dimension* 24(7): 31–5.
- Briere, Elaine and S. Gage (1993) *The Indonesian Kit*, 2nd edn. Vancouver: East Timor Alert Network.
- Brooks, Daniel and Guillermo Verdecchia (1991) *The Noam Chomsky Lectures: A Play*. Toronto: Couch House.
- Brownstone, M. and C. Demers (1994) *External Review of the University of Guelph's Involvement in the Sulawesi Regional Development Project*. Guelph, ON: University of Guelph.
- Budiardjo, C. (1991) 'Indonesia: Mass Extermination and the Consolidation of Authoritarian Power', in A. George (ed.) *Western State Terrorism*. New York: Routledge.
- Budiardjo, Carmel and Liem Soei Liong (1984) *The War Against East Timor*. London: Zed Books.
- Carey, W. (1999) 'East Timor: The Making of an International Issue 1974–99', *The Brock Review* 7(1/2).
- Carter, R. (1958) 'Newspaper Gatekeepers and their Sources of News', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 22: 133–44.
- Chalk, Frank and Kurt Jonassohn (1990) *The History and Sociology of Genocide*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (in cooperation with the Montreal Institute for Genocide Studies).
- Chomsky, Noam (1973) *For Reasons of State*. London: Collins.
- Chomsky, Noam (1982) *Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There*. London: Sinclair Browne.
- Chomsky, Noam (1985) *Turning the Tide: US Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace*. London: Pluto.
- Chomsky, Noam (1987) *The Chomsky Reader*, ed. James Peck. New York: Pantheon.

- Chomsky, Noam (1988) *Language and Politics*, ed. Carlos Peregrin Otero. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Chomsky, Noam (1989) *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*. Toronto: CBC Enterprises.
- Chomsky, Noam (1991a) 'The Gulf Crisis', *Z Magazine* February (footnoted version).
- Chomsky, Noam (1991b) 'Letter from Lexington', *Lies of Our Times* August.
- Chomsky, Noam (1991c) 'What We Say Goes: The Middle East and the New World Order', *Z Magazine* May (footnoted version).
- Chomsky, Noam (1991d) 'Aftermath', *Z Magazine* October (footnoted version).
- Chomsky, Noam (1991e) 'International Terrorism: Image and Reality', pp. 12–38 in Alexander George (ed.) *Western State Terrorism*. New York: Routledge.
- Chomsky, Noam (1992) *Deterring Democracy*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Chomsky, Noam (1993a) *Letters from Lexington: Reflections on Propaganda*. Toronto: Between the Lines.
- Chomsky, Noam (1993b) *The Prosperous Few and the Restless Many*, interviews with David Barsamian. Berkeley, CA: Odonian.
- Chomsky, Noam (1993c) *Year 501: The Conquest Continues*. Boston, MA: South End.
- Chomsky, Noam (1997) *Class Warfare*, interviews with David Barsamian. Vancouver: New Star.
- Chomsky, Noam (1998) *The Common Good*, interviews with David Barsamian. Berkeley, CA: Odonian.
- Chomsky, Noam and Edward S. Herman (1979) 'East Timor: Genocide on the Sly', *The Political Economy of Human Rights, Vol. One: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, Section 4.1. Montreal: Black Rose.
- CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1975/6) *Canada and Development Cooperation, Annual Review, 1975–1976*. Ottawa: CIDA.
- CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1976) *Annual Report*. Ottawa: CIDA.
- CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1992) *CIDA Programs in Asia: Indonesia*, June. Ottawa: CIDA.
- CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1993a) *CIDA Programs in Asia*. Ottawa: CIDA.
- CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1993b) *CIDA in East Timor*. Ottawa: CIDA.
- CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1993c) *Indonesia Country Policy Framework, Canada-Indonesia Cooperation Program*. Ottawa: CIDA.
- Clement, W. (1975) *Canadian Corporate Elite: Analysis of Economic Power*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Cohen, Bernard C. (1963) *The Press and Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Desbarats, P. (1990) *Guide to Canadian News Media*. Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Dunn, James (1983) *Timor: A People Betrayed*. Milton, Queensland: Jacaranda Press.
- Eglin, Peter (1992) 'Proposal for Four Small Research Projects on the Relationship of Canadian Intellectuals to the "Genocide" in East Timor', submitted to the East Timor Alert Network, 4 August 1992.
- Eglin, Peter (1995) 'Complicity in Genocide', *Ontarion* 21–7 February: 12.
- Eglin, Peter (1999) 'Partnership in an Evil Action: Canadian Universities, Indonesia and Genocide in East Timor', *Brock Review* 7(1/2): 58–100.
- Eglin, Peter (forthcoming) *Getting A Life: A Story of Studies in Pursuit of Intellectual Responsibility*.
- Eglin, Peter, Jeffery Klaehn, Bill Ripley and Sharon Scharfe (1994) 'Canada, Canadian Corporations, Canadian Universities, Canadian News Media and Complicity in Genocide in East Timor', paper presented at the joint session of the Canadian Law and Society Association with the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association on 'State Terrorism/State Violence in the Good and Peaceable Kingdom', Learned, Calgary, 12–14 June.
- Ericson, Richard V., Patricia Baranek and Janet Chan (1989) *Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- ETAN (East Timor Alert Network) (1989) 'East Timor and Canadian Investment in Indonesia' and 'The War in East Timor', Vancouver: ETAN.
- ETAN (East Timor Alert Network) (1991) 'East Timor and the Gulf War', Vancouver: ETAN.
- ETAN (East Timor Alert Network) (1992a) 'New Study Reveals 273 Killed in Dili Massacre', Press release issued in Lisbon by Jose Ramos-Horta, official spokesperson for the East Timorese resistance, 3 September 1992.

- ETAN (East Timor Alert Network) (1992b) *East Timor Newsletter*, September. Toronto: ETAN.
- ETAN (East Timor Alert Network) (1993) *East Timor Newsletter* July. Toronto: ETAN.
- External Affairs and International Trade Canada (1992) *Survey of Bilateral Economic Relations Between Canada and Indonesia*. Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada.
- External Affairs and International Trade Canada (1995) *Program for Export Market Development*. Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada.
- Eyal, Cham, Jim Winter and Maxwell McCombs (1986) 'The Agenda-Setting Role in Mass Communication', pp. 169–74 in Michael Emery and Ted Curtin Smythe (eds) *Readings in Mass Communication: Concepts and Issues in the Mass Media*, 6th edn. New York: William C. Brown.
- Fishman, Mark (1980) *Manufacturing the News*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Foreign Affairs Canada (1999) *Fact Sheet – Indonesia, April 1999*. Ottawa: Foreign Affairs Canada.
- Galtung, Johan and Mari Ruge (1973) 'Structuring and Selecting News', pp. 62–72 in Stanley Cohen and Jack Young (eds) *The Manufacture of News: A Reader*. London: Sage.
- Gans, H. (1979) *Deciding What's News*. New York: Pantheon.
- Gunn, G.C. (1994) *A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor*. Sydney: Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies.
- Hackett, R. (1991) *News and Dissent: The Press and the Politics of Peace in Canada*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Heinricks, G. (1989) 'Whose News? Business Circles the Globe', *This Magazine* 23(3 September): 14–21.
- Herman, Edward S. (1982) *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*. Boston, MA: South End Press.
- Herman, Edward S. (1995) *Triumph of the Image: Essays on Economics, Politics and the Media*. Boston, MA: South End Press.
- Herman, Edward S. (1996) 'The Propaganda Model Revisited', *Monthly Review* July; available at: [musictravel.free.fr/political/political7.htm](http://musictravel.free.fr/political/political7.htm)
- Herman, Edward S. (1999) *The Myth of the Liberal Media: An Edward Herman Reader*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Herman, Edward S. (2000) 'The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective', *Journalism Studies* 1(1): 101–12.
- Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon.
- Herman, Edward S. and Gerry O'Sullivan (1991) '“Terrorism” as Ideology and Cultural Industry', pp. 39–75 in Alexander George (ed.) *Western State Terrorism*. New York: Routledge.
- Hughes, P. (1993) 'Quiet Complicity', *Briarpatch* March: 22.
- Isaacs, Norman E. (1986) *Unintended Gates: The Mismanaged Press*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jacoby, Russell (1987) *The Last Intellectuals*. New York: Noonday.
- Jamieson, Don (Secretary of State, External Affairs Canada) (1976) 'Canada Pledges Continued for the World Organization', Statement by Secretary of State Don Jamieson, at the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 29 September.
- Jardine, Matthew (1993) 'Weapons for Genocide', *San Francisco Examiner* 31 May: A17.
- Jardine, Matthew (1995) 'International Report: APEC, the US and East Timor', *Z Magazine* January: 34–9.
- Jardine, Matthew (1996) 'Pacification, Resistance, and Territoriality: Prospects for a Space of Peace in East Timor', *GeoJournal* 39(4): 397–404.
- Jardine, Matthew (1997) *East Timor: Genocide in Paradise*. Berkeley, CA: Odonian.
- Jolliffe, Jill (1978) *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
- Kadine, K. (1990) 'The CIA Supplied Suharto with Death Lists in 1965', *Inside Indonesia* June: 12–13.
- Klaehn, Jeff (1993) 'East Timor Concealed', *The Cord* 15 October.
- Klaehn, Jeff (1994) 'Hypocrisy Prevails over International Human Rights Politics', *The Ontarion* 1 February.
- Klaehn, Jeff (1995) 'Corporate Hegemony: The Institutional Nature of Canadian Complicity in the East Timor Genocide', University of Guelph, unpublished MA thesis.

- Klaehn, Jeff (1999) 'For Gain ... for Shame: For 24 Years Canada Has Been Too Reluctant to Criticize Indonesia's Brutal Treatment of East Timor', *The Record* 25 September: D3.
- Klaehn, Jeff (2002) 'A Critical Review and Assessment of Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model of Media Operations', *European Journal of Communication* 17(2): 147-82.
- Klaehn, Jeff (forthcoming) 'Taking Note of Genocide on the Sly: Analysis of Letters to the Editor on East Timor in the *G&M*'.
- Kreiger, Heike (ed.) (1997) *East Timor and the International Community: Basic Documents*, Cambridge International Series, Vol. 10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lee, M. and N. Solomon (1990) *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in the News Media*. New York: Carol.
- McChesney, Robert (1997) *Corporate Media and the Threat to Democracy*, Open Media Pamphlet Series. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- MacEachen, Allan (Secretary of State, External Affairs Canada) (1976a) 'Canada and Indonesia - The Dialogue Has Begun Well', speech by Allan MacEachen to Jakarta Press Club, Jakarta, 25 August.
- MacEachen, Allan (Secretary of State, External Affairs Canada) (1976b) 'Canada and Australia Expand Their Untroubled Relationship', remarks by Allan MacEachen to Australian National Press Club, Canberra, 3 September.
- McLeod, B. (1991) 'Cut Off Arms to Indonesia', *Toronto Star* 13 December.
- McMurtry, J. (1990) 'Why Does Canada Aid the Oppressors?', *Globe and Mail* 20 February: A7.
- McMurtry, J. (1992) 'Stop Aid to Indonesia' (Letter to the Editor), *Globe and Mail* 15 April.
- McMurtry, J. (1994) 'Money is King: Unfortunately, the Idea That This is a Democratic Society is Pure Hogwash', *The KW Record* 10 December.
- McMurtry, J. (1998) *Unequal Freedoms: The Global System as an Ethical Market*. Toronto: Garamond Press.
- Maitland, D. (1992) 'Remember Them' (Letter to the Editor), *The KW Record* 6 November.
- Masse, B. (1992) 'Why Won't Canada Follow its Own Human Rights Rules?', *Peace Magazine* May/June: 12-13.
- Moody, R. (1992) *The Gulliver File, Mines, People and Land: A Global Background*. London: Minewatch.
- Nairn, Allan (1992) Testimony of Allan Nairn before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Crisis in East Timor and US Policy Towards Indonesia, 17 February.
- Nelson, J. (1989) *Sultans of Sleaze: Public Relations and the Mass Media*. Toronto: Between the Lines.
- Rai, Milan (1995) *Chomsky's Politics*. New York: Verso.
- Regehr, Ernie (1988) 'Military Sales', pp. 209-20 in Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt (eds) *Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy*. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press.
- Republic of Indonesia (Foreign Affairs) (1992) 'East Timor: Building for the Future'.
- Said, Edward (1981) *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. New York: Pantheon.
- Said, Edward (1994) *The Pen and the Sword*, conversations with David Barsamian. Toronto: Between the Lines.
- Saunders, Doug (2002) 'Manufacturing Media Bias', *Canadian Communications: Issues in Contemporary Media and Culture*, 2nd edn. Toronto: Prentice-Hall.
- Scharfe, Sharon (1994) 'Blood on their Hands: Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy', A Case Study of the Canada-Indonesia Relationship (with specific emphasis on East Timor), unpublished MA thesis, Faculty of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa.
- Scharfe, Sharon (1996) *Complicity: Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of East Timor*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Schlesinger, Philip (1992) 'From Production to Propaganda', in *Media, Culture and Society: A Reader*. London: Sage.
- Selby, D. (1987) 'Indonesian Expansionism: The Case of East Timor', Ch. 6 in *Human Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sissons, Miranda E. (1997) *From One Day to Another: Violations of Women's Reproductive and Sexual Rights in East Timor*. Fitzroy, Victoria: East Timor Human Rights Centre.

- Smythe, D. (1978) 'The Political Character of Science (Including Communication Science), Or Science is not Ecumenical', pp. 171–6 in Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelau (eds) *Communication and Class Struggle*. New York: International General.
- Solomon, Norman and Peter Cohen (1997) *Wizards of Oz: Behind the Curtain of Mainstream News*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Sorenson, John (1990) 'Canadian Role in Indonesia Opportunistic', *Winnipeg Free Press* 12 December.
- Stackhouse, John (1996) 'PM Defends Cautious Stand on Indonesian Abuses', *Globe and Mail* 18 January: A16.
- Stone, G. (1975) 'A Strange War of Inside Shelling and Outside Lies', *Globe and Mail* 13 September.
- Swift, J. (1977) *The Big Nickel: INCO at Home and Abroad*. Toronto: Between the Lines.
- Taylor, John (1990) *The Indonesian Occupation of East Timor, 1974–1979: A Chronology*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations.
- Taylor, John (1991) *Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor*. London: Zed Books.
- Tuchman, Gaye (1978) *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality*. New York: Free Press.
- United States Department of State (c. 1948) 'Bureau of Foreign Affairs: Military Assistance on Reimbursable Basis: Map Country Indonesia', Southeast Asia Series, University Publications of America.
- Webster, David (1992) 'Canada Chooses Profits over Rights,' *Toronto Star* 12 November: A25.
- Winter, J. (1992) *Common Cents*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Winter, J. (2002) 'Media Think: The Role of the Media in Supporting the Establishment', in *Canadian Communications: Issues in Contemporary Media and Culture*, 2nd edn. Toronto: Prentice-Hall.
- Wintonick, Peter and Mark Achbar (1994) *Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Zachary, A. (1987) 'As the Trade Winds Blow, Canada Looks on Benignly at Indonesia's Genocidal Occupation of East Timor', *This Magazine* March/April: 23–7.

**Jeffery Klahn** is part-time instructor with the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada. His areas of interest include media, popular culture, intellectuals, political-economy and theory. In 2001 he was nominated for the WLU Teaching Excellence Award. Recent publications include a major article on the propaganda model (*European Journal of Communication*, 17[2]). He is currently writing a major paper on intellectuals and intellectual culture, and is co-writing a book titled *Project Restore Democracy*. He is a frequent contributor of analytical and commentary pieces to the local media.

**Address** Department of Sociology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5, Canada. [email: [hipnsavvy@hotmail.com](mailto:hipnsavvy@hotmail.com)]