

The Employability Theorem

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Abstract

In this document, the Employability Theorem is demonstrated from a set of fairly tautological axioms, which are presupposed in quantitative career choice and career development methods.

Keywords: Employability theorem; Career choice; Career development; Vocational choice; Occupational Information Network; O*NET.

1. Proof Plan

1. basic presuppositions
2. basic lemmas
3. complex tasks
4. occupations are but tasks
5. occupations' tasks are complex
6. occupations' tasks are holistic (operation)
 - 6.1. more difficult tasks presuppose the easier tasks have been accomplished
 - 6.2. i.e. $l \in [0, 1]$ is a “progress bar” of an occupation's operation
 - 6.3. strongly holistic: each task $l \geq \bar{l}$ requires all the previous $l \in [0, \bar{l}]$, $\bar{l} \in [0, 1]$ difficulty levels to be accomplished. in addition, if all $l \in [0, 1]$ levels are not all accomplished, the whole effort is vain and the operation is not completed (i.e. round down \mathcal{U}_q when calculating operational output). furthermore, each and every $l \in [0, 1]$ difficulty level cannot be outsourced (i.e. only a perfectly qualified worker can output a unit of the occupation's operation).
 - 6.3.1. individual's time constraint is spent entirely on trying to accomplish the complex holistic task by themselves. therefore, there is no optimization to be done.

6.3.2.

$$\mathcal{U}_q = \sum_{k=1}^n [k \in \Lambda_q] \times \mathcal{U}_q^k = \sum_{k=1}^n \left[[k \in \Lambda_q] \times \int_0^1 T_q(l, l_q^k) dl \right]$$

6.4. moderately holistic: each task $l \geq \bar{l}$ requires all the previous $l \in [0, \bar{l}]$, $\bar{l} \in [0, 1]$ difficulty levels to be accomplished. in addition, if all $l \in [0, 1]$ levels are not all accomplished, the whole effort is vain and the operation is not completed (i.e. round down \mathcal{U}_q when calculating operational output). however, each and every $l \in [0, 1]$ difficulty level can be outsourced (i.e. workers can output partial units of the occupation's operation, which contribute to the operation's completion).

6.4.1. because of outsourcing, individual's time constraint is spent working from where another worker "left off", so that even if a worker cannot accomplish the entire operation by themselves, they can still contribute to the operation's completion by reducing the time highly skilled workers will have to spend on relatively more trivial tasks.

The first worker spends their entire unitary time allowance trying their hardest to accomplish the highest amount of tasks they can. When they hit their skill cap, they restart their efforts, so as to spend their entire time allowance helping out the next worker:

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^k} T_q(l, l_q^k) \times \text{ta}_q(l) dl + \int_0^{\bar{l}} T_q(l, l_q^k) \times \text{ta}_q(l) dl &= 1 \\ \int_0^{\bar{l}} 1 \times \text{ta}_q(l) dl &= 1 - \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^k} 1 \times \text{ta}_q(l) dl \\ \int_0^{\bar{l}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl &= \int_{\tilde{T}_q^k}^1 \text{ta}_q(l) dl \\ \text{TA}_q(\bar{l}) - \text{TA}_q(0) &= \text{TA}_q(1) - \text{TA}_q(\tilde{T}_q^k) \\ \text{TA}_q(\bar{l}) &= \text{TA}_q(1) - \text{TA}_q(\tilde{T}_q^k) \\ \bar{l} &= \text{TA}_q^{-1} \left(\text{TA}_q(1) - \text{TA}_q(\tilde{T}_q^k) \right), \end{aligned}$$

so that k accomplishes tasks of difficulty levels 0 through \tilde{T}_q^k on their "first run", and restarts their effort to provide additional $l \in \left[0, \text{TA}_q^{-1} \left(\text{TA}_q(1) - \text{TA}_q(\tilde{T}_q^k) \right) \right]$ levels worth of complex tasks. Thus, the next worker does not need to start from zero, but rather from where k "left off": either \tilde{T}_q^k , \bar{l} , or some $l \in [0, \tilde{T}_q^k]$.

6.4.2.

$$\mathcal{U}_q = \left[\sum_{k=1}^n [k \in \Lambda_q] \times \mathcal{U}_q^k \right]$$

$$= \left\lfloor \sum_{k=1}^n [k \in \Lambda_q] \times \int_0^1 T_q(l, l_q^k) dl \right\rfloor$$

6.5. weakly holistic: each task $l \geq \bar{l}$ requires all the previous $l \in [0, \bar{l}]$, $\bar{l} \in [0, 1]$ difficulty levels to be accomplished. however, if not all $l \in [0, 1]$ levels are accomplished, the whole effort is not vain and the operation is partially completed (i.e. do not round \mathcal{U}_q when calculating operational output). furthermore, each and every $l \in [0, 1]$ difficulty level can be outsourced (i.e. workers can output partial units of the occupation's operation, which contribute to the operation's completion).

7. assume weak occupational complexity axiom (the other versions are too strict)

8. perhaps posit an even weaker version of occupational complexity:

8.1.

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_q}{\partial l} > 0, \tag{1}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 \mathcal{U}_q}{\partial l^2} < 0, \tag{2}$$

so that even though tasks of a particular level are not required for the operation to “count” (i.e. partial delivery), it is still detrimental to focus too much on one subset of tasks, that is, employers are incentivised to produce the entire spectrum of difficulty levels, because marginal productivity increases when a tasks of a particular difficulty level have not been accomplished yet.

(actually, we need a indicator variable for the amount of tasks accomplished for a difficulty level, something analogous to $T_q(l)$)

9. now, because of weak occupational complexity, employers will maximize operational output by attempting to produce the entire spectrum of difficulty levels for the complex tasks of an occupation.

10. this can be done either by having only perfectly qualified employees work on the operation individually from beginning to end, or by splitting responsibilities into two, or more, types of jobs, thus allowing for less qualified, “junior” employees, to work alongside more qualified and perfectly qualified, “senior” employees towards the common goal of accomplishing the entire occupational operation.

11. additionally, because there are skill differences among workers in the labor market, any rational employer will always, and rightly, expect their employees to be of varying skill levels, rather than all perfectly qualified, so that splitting responsibilities into separate positions will not only be an alternative mode of hiring and producing, but in fact the optimal one.

12. therefore, given expected and actual skill differences among workers, employers will split job posts based on the required skill level. thus, there will be “junior” job posts and “senior” job posts, each dedicated to accomplishing a particular subset of complex tasks with difficulty levels appropriate for employees’ respective capacity.
13. notice this does not mean all people working on “junior” positions will, necessarily, be “junior” employees themselves, that is, less qualified. indeed, if talent is abundant in the labor market, these “junior” positions will have to be filled by more qualified, or even perfectly qualified, “senior” employees. for if there were only one type of job, spanning the entire difficulty level spectrum, highly qualified workers would already have to accomplish these “junior” tasks themselves, in order to maximize operational output. however, by having two, or more, types of jobs, split by minimum required competence, highly qualified workers may specialize to the measure that there are less qualified workers available to accomplish the easier tasks. but, if there are none, they will, again, have to work on these themselves.
14. analogously, from the employers’ perspective, it does not matter who accomplishes “junior” tasks, so long as they are accomplished. thus, if highly qualified workers are abundant in a particular time period of a labor market, production is not hindered when allocating “seniors” to “junior” positions, for in these circumstances talent is not wasted. that is, because only highly qualified workers can accomplish highly demanding tasks, rational employers will generally not hire them to work on “junior” tasks, thus “saving” their talent for more difficult tasks, which a “junior” would not be able to accomplish. but, if there is enough talent to output the optimal quantity of “senior” tasks, it can actually be more productive to employ the remaining “seniors” to “junior” positions.
15. furthermore, in a continuous setting, rational employers will maximize their hiring pool by offering more than only two types of jobs. thus, there will not only be “senior” and “junior” positions, but several levels in a production hierarchy, each responsible for a particular subinterval of task difficulty, which will approximate a continuum of “seniority” as the number of workers becomes large enough.
16. now, as for employees’ work routine, rational employers will have them work over their responsibility spectrum in a proportional and optimal matter, thus avoiding wasting production (i.e. uncompleted “loops” over the responsibility spectrum). [this means each employee will spend their entire time allowance producing a partial operational output, that is a multiple of the difficulty subinterval they were hired to accomplish, which will, in turn, contribute, alongside the partial outputs of other employees, to accomplish the entire occupational operation.]
17. the reason this avoids wasting production is because [...].

18. Weak Skill Differences Axiom (WSDA)

18.1. There are, or there could be, skill differences among people in the workforce (i.e. workers are not all “clones” of one another or equally competent). Thus, the expected value of productivity is:

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{T}_q^k] \in [0, 1], \quad (3)$$

instead of

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{T}_q^k] = \tilde{T}_q^k = 1, \quad (4)$$

for all $k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\}$. This means employers do not expected every worker to be perfectly qualified and will adjust their hiring and production strategies accordingly.

Definition: Employability

In any labor market, employability is the percentage of available jobs in which one could be hired:

$$\tilde{W}_q^k := \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \sum_{v=1}^p \left[\tilde{T}_q^k \geq \tilde{T}_q^v \right] \tilde{w}_q^v \in [0, 1], \quad (5)$$

$$\sum_{v=1}^p \tilde{w}_q^v := \left(\frac{1}{w_q} \right) \sum_{v=1}^p w_q^v := 1, \quad (6)$$

where $\tilde{T}_q^v \in [0, 1]$ is the minimum productivity required to be hired in one of p types of positions in a labor market with w_q job posts; while h_q^k is a hireability statistic accounting for other selection criteria, such as years of education, experience, etc.

And we can further aggregate employability for n occupations to assess how many of all W jobs in the economy are suitable for one’s skill set:

$$\tilde{W}_k := \sum_{q=1}^n \tilde{W}_q^k := \sum_{q=1}^n \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \sum_{v=1}^p \left[\tilde{T}_q^k \geq \tilde{T}_q^v \right] \tilde{w}_q^v \in [0, 1], \quad (7)$$

$$\sum_{q=1}^n \tilde{w}_q := \left(\frac{1}{W} \right) \sum_{q=1}^n w_q, \quad (8)$$

$$W := \sum_{q=1}^n w_q. \quad (9)$$

19. (Binary Employability Theorem) thus, in the binary case, “junior” productive output will be given by:

$$\mathcal{U}_q^{\text{Jr}} = \frac{1}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl} = \left(\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl \right)^{-1}, \quad (10)$$

where $\text{ta}_q(l)$ is the time allocation function of occupation q 's complex tasks, and time allowance (the numerator) is set to one.

20. analogously, “senior” productive output is:

$$\mathcal{U}_q^{\text{Sr}} = \frac{1}{\int_{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}}^1 \text{ta}_q(l) dl} = \left(\int_{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}}^1 \text{ta}_q(l) dl \right)^{-1}. \quad (11)$$

21. finally, as a mismatch in productive output due to time allocation differences between “junior” and “senior” tasks would result in wasted production, a rational employer will optimally “orchestrate” the productive effort by offering just enough “senior” job posts in the labor market to meet “junior” productivity. thus, by setting “junior” job posts to $w_q^{\text{Jr}} > 0$ and “senior” job posts to $w_q^{\text{Sr}} > 0$, we get the ratio between “junior” and “senior” positions required to output any level of occupation q 's operation:

$$w_q^{\text{Sr}} \times \mathcal{U}_q^{\text{Sr}} = w_q^{\text{Jr}} \times \mathcal{U}_q^{\text{Jr}} \quad (12)$$

$$\therefore w_q^{\text{Sr}} \times \left(\int_{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}}^1 \text{ta}_q(l) dl \right)^{-1} = w_q^{\text{Jr}} \times \left(\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl \right)^{-1} \quad (13)$$

$$\therefore w_q^{\text{Sr}} = w_q^{\text{Jr}} \times \left(\frac{\int_{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}}^1 \text{ta}_q(l) dl}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl} \right). \quad (14)$$

with this, “senior” employability (i.e. the percentage of job posts for which they could be hired) is

$$\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Sr}} = \frac{w_q^{\text{Jr}} + w_q^{\text{Sr}}}{w_q^{\text{Jr}} + w_q^{\text{Sr}}} = 1 \quad (15)$$

and “junior” employability is

$$\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}} = \frac{w_q^{\text{Jr}}}{w_q^{\text{Jr}} + w_q^{\text{Sr}}} \quad (16)$$

$$= \frac{w_q^{\text{Jr}}}{w_q^{\text{Jr}} + w_q^{\text{Jr}} \times \left(\frac{\int_{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}}^1 \text{ta}_q(l) dl}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl} \right)} \quad (17)$$

$$= \left(1 + \frac{\int_{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}}^1 \text{ta}_q(l) dl}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl} \right)^{-1} \quad (18)$$

$$= \left(1 + \frac{\int_0^1 \text{ta}_q(l) dl - \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl} \right)^{-1} \quad (19)$$

$$= \left(1 + \frac{1 - \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl} \right)^{-1} \quad (20)$$

$$= \left(1 + \frac{1}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl} - \frac{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl} \right)^{-1} \quad (21)$$

$$= \left(1 + \frac{1}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl} - 1 \right)^{-1} \quad (22)$$

$$= \left(\frac{1}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl} \right)^{-1} \quad (23)$$

$$= \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{jr}}} \text{ta}_q(l) dl. \quad (24)$$

thus, the employability of a partially qualified worker, that is a “junior”, is precisely the percentage of an operation’s total time duration their skill set allows them to accomplish (i.e. the inverse of their operational output).

Maximum-Monotonic Labor Stratification Definition

Now, to generalize this conclusion, we shall define notation in terms of maximum labor stratification, a productive arrangement where there are several job subtypes, indeed as many as there are jobs themselves, each with a limited spectrum of responsibilities.

Hence, mathematically,

$$l \in [\ell_{v-1}, \ell_v], \quad (25)$$

with

$$\ell_v \in [0, 1] \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}, \quad (26)$$

$$\ell_{w_q} := 1, \quad (27)$$

$$\ell_0 := 0 \quad (28)$$

is one of w_q responsibility spectra in a maximally stratified labor market, in which employment levels are unitary, or given by

$$\sum_{v=1}^{w_q} 1 = w_q, \quad (29)$$

so that any available position is its own job subtype and covers only a restrictive range of task difficulty, accounting for

$$\Omega_q^v := \frac{1}{\bar{U}_q^v} = \int_{\ell_{v-1}}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl \in [0, 1] \quad (30)$$

of an operation's total time duration,

$$\sum_{v=1}^{w_q} \Omega_q^v = \sum_{v=1}^{w_q} \int_{\ell_{v-1}}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl = \int_0^1 \text{ta}(l) dl = 1. \quad (31)$$

Intuitively speaking, we would say production in a maximally and monotonically stratified labor market is not “independent”, in the sense that employees do not work on an occupation's operation from beginning to end. This means each of them will spend all their time allowance producing a partial operational output, that is a multiple of a difficulty subinterval of complex tasks, which will, in turn, contribute, alongside the partial outputs of other employees, to accomplish[ing?] the occupational operation in its entirety.

However, in a maximum labor stratification setting, these partial operational outputs will not be produced merely via “senior” and “junior” positions, as previously, but rather within a myriad of levels in a production hierarchy, approximating a continuum of “seniority” as the workforce becomes large enough.

Again, this does not mean employees are, themselves, more or less competent, only that available job posts are preemptively stratified with respect to task difficulty, in order to maximize employers' hiring pool and safeguard production in the case workers are not sufficiently qualified to produce the whole responsibility spectrum independently (see “Maximum-Monotonic Labor Stratification Lemma” below).

[end definition of maximum-monotonic labor stratification]

Infinite Stratification Lemma (ISL)

Having understood what maximum-monotonic labor stratification is, one may wonder whether there could be more than w_q job subtypes in a labor market. For though it is intuitive to think of w_q , the workforce size, as the upper bound for stratification, if we allow for partial hiring, with “fractional jobs”,

$$w_q^v \in [0, w_q] \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, p\}, \quad (32)$$

$$\sum_{v=1}^p w_q^v = w_q, \quad (33)$$

where $p \in \{1, 2, 3, \dots\}$ is the number of positions in a labor market, then workers can allocate fractions of their time allowance to multiple responsibility spectra, and the productive arrangement we have just defined, may not, technically speaking, be “maximally stratified”.

Indeed, if it were possible to stratify beyond w_q , rational employers would readily do so, for, again, labor stratification reduces the uncertainty around production and serves as an insurance policy to guarantee the available talent is sufficient to output an occupation's operation.

But, because of this, if p can be greater than w_q , then the optimal production strategy is, logically, to offer as many types of jobs as possible, even infinitely many.

Hence, infinite labor stratification is defined as an economic configuration where labor markets are subdivided into infinitesimal jobs, each contributing very little to production. In fact, in such a market, “job posts” are so small as to be indistinguishable from tasks themselves:

$$\lim_{p \rightarrow \infty} \tilde{w}_q^v := \tilde{w}_q(l) = \text{ta}(l) \in [0, 1] \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, p\} \quad (34)$$

$$\therefore w_q(l) = w_q \times \tilde{w}_q(l) = w_q \times \text{ta}(l) \wedge \int_0^1 w_q(l) dl = w_q. \quad (35)$$

Therefore, employers are guaranteed maximum insurance against workers’ potential underqualification; and employability is simply

$$\tilde{W}_q^k = \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \int_0^1 T(l, l_q^k) \tilde{w}_q(l) dl = \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^k} \text{ta}(l) dl, \quad (36)$$

where the hireability statistic $h_q^k \in [0, 1]$ accounts for hiring requirements other than productivity; and $\tilde{w}_q(l)$ is the proportion of fractional positions for a particular job subtype, which coincides with its time allocation when there are infinite “jobs”, each dedicated to a single, infinitely narrow task. We note, as well, this formula is the same as it was in binary labor stratification (with “junior” and “senior” positions). Thus, again, employability is the percentage of an operation’s total duration one can accomplish.

All this said, infinitely stratified markets are rather abstract, and it is not realistic to think of actual job posts as infinitesimal tasks; for, then, the very concept of a “job” itself disappears. Fractional positions do not make much sense in reality, where jobs usually deal with a set of multiple responsibilities. Furthermore, a maximally – though not infinitely – stratified labor market with sufficient positions, will, in practice, yield the same results when w_q is large enough, so that we do not even need to consider infinite labor stratification as a production strategy.

Maximum Stratification Axiom (MSA)

Therefore, let us assume

$$p \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}, \quad (37)$$

$$\sum_{v=1}^p w_q^v = w_q, \quad (38)$$

and

$$w_q^v \in [1, w_q] \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, p\}, \quad (39)$$

as it is somewhat arbitrary setting minimum employment levels to any value other than one; for then it would always be optimal to choose an even smaller value than that, in which case we would converge back to an infinitely stratified labor market. Thus, we define there has to be at least one worker per job subtype.

With this, we can now demonstrate that, given our axioms, maximum-monotonic labor stratification is, in fact, the only optimal production strategy and, so, holds in the labor market. But, to do so, we must first derive an upper limit for aggregate operational output, irrespective of productive arrangement, to serve as our “benchmark”.

Maximum Operational Output Lemma (MOOL)

The maximum operational output of any labor market is exactly the number of employees in its workforce:

$$\mathcal{U}_q^* = \mathcal{U}(\mathbf{w}_q^*, \mathcal{U}_q) = \min(\mathbf{w}_q^* \times \mathcal{U}_q) = w_q, \quad (40)$$

where \mathbf{w}_q^* is the vector of optimal employment levels in a labor market with w_q employees; and \mathcal{U}_q , the vector of partial operational outputs. Or, assuming maximum labor stratification with unitary employment levels,

$$\mathcal{U}_q^* = \mathcal{U}(\mathbf{1}, \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*)) = \min(\mathbf{1} \times \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*)) = w_q, \quad (41)$$

where ℓ_q^* are optimal stratification bounds for the responsibility spectra of occupation q 's job posts (see “Optimal Stratification Lemma” below).

Moreover, when optimizing employment levels, this maximum production can only be attained when the percentage of each position relative to the entire workforce respects the Proportional Employment Condition (PEC):

$$\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q^* = \frac{\mathbf{w}_q^*}{w_q} = \mathbf{\Omega}_q, \quad (42)$$

which determines the ratio, or proportion, of a particular job subtype in a labor market is the percentage of an operation's total time duration,

$$\mathbf{1}^\top \cdot \mathbf{\Omega}_q = 1, \quad (43)$$

accounted by it.

Proof:

We begin with the most trivial of economic configurations, that of independent production with perfectly qualified workers. In this scenario, each employee devotes their unitary time allowance, which coincides with the total time duration of occupation q 's operation,

$$\int_0^1 \text{ta}(l) dl = 1, \quad (44)$$

to output exactly one productive unit:

$$1 \times \left(\int_0^1 \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} = 1; \quad (45)$$

while w_q of such employees working in parallel, yield an output of

$$w_q \times \left(\int_0^1 \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} = w_q. \quad (46)$$

Here, we have taken occupation q 's responsibility spectrum $l \in [0, 1]$ as a whole, or as a single, "holistic", task, covering all its activities; and we have found the maximum amount that can be produced of it is one unit per worker, or w_q aggregate units.

However, it can be easier to comprehend this result if we analyze responsibility spectra individually, as if a perfectly qualified, independent, employee worked on a series of tasks, which sum to their time allowance,

$$\mathbf{1}^\top \cdot \boldsymbol{\Omega}_q = 1. \quad (47)$$

With this, we note that, as each worker's time allowance is the same as operations' total duration, failing to output any single task by overemphasizing another would nullify the whole productive effort. Hence, the optimal choice of hours to allocate to any responsibility spectrum has to be the minimum time required to complete it, or

$$\Omega_q^\ell \in [0, 1]. \quad (48)$$

Furthermore, by the definition of partial operational output (ref) above, one outputs \mathcal{U}_q^ℓ when spending their unitary time allowance to produce a responsibility spectrum. So, the output, with only Ω_q^ℓ time units, is:

$$\Omega_q^\ell \mathcal{U}_q^\ell = \left(\frac{1}{\mathcal{U}_q^\ell} \right) \times \mathcal{U}_q^\ell = 1. \quad (49)$$

Finally, as Weak Occupational Complexity implies the production function is homothetic, the aggregate operational output of w_q perfectly qualified employees working independently is:

$$\mathcal{U}_q^* = \min(\boldsymbol{\Omega}_q \times \mathcal{U}_q) \times w_q = \Omega_q^\ell \mathcal{U}_q^\ell \times w_q = 1 \times w_q = w_q. \quad (50)$$

Therefore, a perfectly qualified employee working full-time and independently can output one unit of an occupation's complex tasks with one unit of their time (i.e. their entire time allowance). And, likewise, a workforce with w_q employees identical to this one produces w_q units of operational

output. Or, to put it simply, a maximally productive person achieves maximum production.

We, now, proceed with the binary setting presented above, where employees choose a $\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}} \in [0, 1]$ percentage of less qualified (i.e. “junior”) job posts to offer, which determine the remaining $\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Sr}} = 1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}} \in [0, 1]$ percentage of perfectly qualified (or “senior”) job posts.

In this case,

$$\mathcal{U}(\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}) = \min(\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}} \mathcal{U}_q^{\text{Jr}}, \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Sr}} \mathcal{U}_q^{\text{Sr}}) \quad (51)$$

$$= \min\left(\frac{\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}(l) dl}, \frac{1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\int_{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}}^1 \text{ta}(l) dl}\right) \quad (52)$$

$$= \min\left(\frac{\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}(l) dl}, \frac{1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\int_0^1 \text{ta}(l) dl - \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^{\text{Jr}}} \text{ta}(l) dl}\right) \quad (53)$$

$$= \min\left(\frac{\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}, \frac{1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}\right), \quad (54)$$

whereas the operational output of employing $\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}} \in [0, 1]$ is

$$\mathcal{U}(\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}) = \min\left(\frac{\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}, \frac{1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}{1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}\right) = \frac{\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}} = \frac{1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}{1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}} = 1. \quad (55)$$

With this, if \tilde{w}_q^{Jr} is set to $\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}} > \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}$, then

$$1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}} < 1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}} \quad (56)$$

$$\therefore \frac{\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}} > 1 > \frac{1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}} \quad (57)$$

$$\therefore \mathcal{U}(\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}) = \min\left(\frac{\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}, \frac{1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}\right) = \frac{1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}} < 1 \quad (58)$$

$$\implies \mathcal{U}(\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}) < \mathcal{U}(\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}); \quad (59)$$

and, if $\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}} < \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}$,

$$1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}} > 1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}} \quad (60)$$

$$\therefore \frac{\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}} < 1 < \frac{1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}} \quad (61)$$

$$\therefore \mathcal{U}(\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}) = \min\left(\frac{\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}, \frac{1 - \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{1 - \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}}\right) = \frac{\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}}{\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}} < 1 \quad (62)$$

$$\implies \mathcal{U}(\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}) < \mathcal{U}(\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}). \quad (63)$$

Hence,

$$\mathcal{U}(\tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}}) < \mathcal{U}(\Omega_q^{\text{Jr}}) = 1 \quad \forall \quad \tilde{w}_q^{\text{Jr}} \neq \Omega_q^{\text{Jr}} \in [0, 1]. \quad (64)$$

Analogously, with multiple job subtypes, optimal operational output is:

$$\mathcal{U}(\Omega_q) = \min(\Omega_q \times \mathcal{U}_q) = \frac{\Omega_q^\ell}{\Omega_q^\ell} = 1, \quad (65)$$

for, again, since

$$\mathbf{1}^\top \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q = \mathbf{1}^\top \cdot \Omega_q = 1, \quad (66)$$

choosing any $\tilde{w}_q^\ell \neq \Omega_q^\ell$ implies the proportion of at least one position, say \tilde{w}_q^r , is impacted, and aggregate output along with it, either because

$$\tilde{w}_q^\ell > \Omega_q^\ell \quad (67)$$

$$\therefore \frac{\tilde{w}_q^\ell}{\Omega_q^\ell} > 1 > \frac{\tilde{w}_q^r}{\Omega_q^r} \quad (68)$$

$$\therefore \mathcal{U}(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q) = \min(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q \times \mathcal{U}_q) = \frac{\tilde{w}_q^r}{\Omega_q^r} < 1 \quad (69)$$

$$\implies \mathcal{U}(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q) < \mathcal{U}(\Omega_q); \quad (70)$$

or, alternatively, because

$$\tilde{w}_q^\ell < \Omega_q^\ell \quad (71)$$

$$\therefore \frac{\tilde{w}_q^\ell}{\Omega_q^\ell} < 1 < \frac{\tilde{w}_q^r}{\Omega_q^r} \quad (72)$$

$$\therefore \mathcal{U}(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q) = \min(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q \times \mathcal{U}_q) = \frac{\tilde{w}_q^\ell}{\Omega_q^\ell} < 1 \quad (73)$$

$$\implies \mathcal{U}(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q) < \mathcal{U}(\Omega_q). \quad (74)$$

Thus,

$$\mathcal{U}(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q, \mathcal{U}_q) < \mathcal{U}(\Omega_q, \mathcal{U}_q) = 1 \quad (75)$$

$$\therefore \mathcal{U}(\mathbf{w}_q, \mathcal{U}_q) < \mathcal{U}(w_q \Omega_q, \mathcal{U}_q) = w_q \quad (76)$$

$$\forall \quad \tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q \neq \Omega_q \in [0, 1]^p, p \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}, \quad (77)$$

$$\mathbf{1}^\top \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{w}}_q = \mathbf{1}^\top \cdot \Omega_q = 1. \quad (78)$$

We can derive the same conclusion for a maximally stratified labor market, as well. But here, instead of determining the proportion of job subtypes with a \mathbf{w}_q^* vector of employment levels, employers maximize production selecting optimal ℓ_q^* responsibility bounds for w_q unique job posts.

So, let

$$\ell_q^* := (\ell_0^*, \dots, \ell_{w_q}^*) := (0, \dots, 1) \in [0, 1]^{w_q}, \quad (79)$$

with

$$\sum_{v=1}^{w_q} \int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl = \int_0^1 \text{ta}(l) dl = 1 \quad (80)$$

be the vector of optimal responsibility bounds that maximizes operational output, such that

$$\mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*) = \min(\mathbf{1} \times \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*)) = 1 \times \left(\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} := w_q, \quad (81)$$

as with the previous economic configurations.

Note, however, employers could, again, attempt to increase production beyond this level if they, now, reduced the responsibilities of a particular job subtype by setting

$$\ell_v < \ell_v^* \implies \left(\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} > \left(\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} = w_q. \quad (82)$$

Nevertheless, because every worker has the same unitary time allowance, this would also entail the missing subinterval of complex tasks $l \in (\ell_v, \ell_v^*]$ would either not be produced at all, in which case

$$\mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q) = 0 \times \left(\int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} = 0, \quad (83)$$

or that it would be produced with a $1 - \omega_q^v \in [0, 1]$ fraction of a time unit, yielding some quantity

$$\mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q, \omega_q) = (1 - \omega_q^v) \times \left(\int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1}, \quad (84)$$

where $\omega_q^v \in [0, 1]$ is the percentage of worker v 's time allowance dedicated to the emphasized $l \in [\ell_{v-1}^*, \ell_v]$ responsibility spectrum.

Furthermore, because aggregate operational output is given by the Leontief production function,

$$\mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q, \omega_q) = \mathcal{U}(\mathbf{1}, \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q, \omega_q)) = \min(\mathbf{1} \times \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q, \omega_q)), \quad (85)$$

$$\mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q, \omega_q) = (\mathcal{U}_q^1, \dots, \mathcal{U}_q^{w_q}), \quad (86)$$

$$\mathcal{U}_q^v = \min \left(\frac{\omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl}, \frac{1 - \omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl} \right), \quad (87)$$

it would be pointless if only a subset of employees were to increase their operational output by themselves; for an occupation's complex tasks are all complementary: they work together to achieve its operation. Hence, for $\mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q, \omega_q)$ to be greater than $\mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*) = w_q$,

$$\mathcal{U}_q^v > w_q \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}, \quad (88)$$

which requires all partial operational outputs to surpass the following point of equilibrium:

$$\mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q, \omega_q) = \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*) = \min(\mathbf{1} \times \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*)) = w_q \quad (89)$$

$$\iff \frac{\omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl} = \frac{1 - \omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl} = w_q \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, w_q\} \quad (90)$$

$$\iff \omega_q^v = w_q \int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl \wedge 1 - \omega_q^v = w_q \int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl. \quad (91)$$

Now, if any single $\omega_q^v \in [0, 1]$ is set to

$$\omega_q^v > w_q \int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl, \quad (92)$$

then, indeed,

$$\frac{\omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl} > w_q, \quad (93)$$

but also

$$\frac{1 - \omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl} < w_q \quad (94)$$

$$\implies \mathcal{U}_q^v = \min \left(\frac{\omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl}, \frac{1 - \omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl} \right) = \frac{1 - \omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl} < w_q \quad (95)$$

$$\therefore \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q, \omega_q) < \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*) = w_q; \quad (96)$$

and, conversely,

$$\omega_q^v < w_q \int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl \quad (97)$$

$$\implies \frac{\omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl} < w_q < \frac{1 - \omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl} \quad (98)$$

$$\implies \mathcal{U}_q^v = \min \left(\frac{\omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl}, \frac{1 - \omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl} \right) = \frac{\omega_q^v}{\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl} < w_q \quad (99)$$

$$\therefore \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q, \omega_q) < \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*) = w_q; \quad (100)$$

so that

$$\nexists \ell_q, \omega_q \in [0, 1]^{w_q} \mid \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q, \omega_q) > \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*) = w_q, \quad (101)$$

$$\sum_{v=1}^{w_q} \left(\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl + \int_{\ell_v}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl \right) = \int_0^1 \text{ta}(l) dl = 1. \quad (102)$$

Finally, even with an ω_q^v vector of partial time allocations for each worker, at least one difficulty subinterval would have to be neglected to emphasize another, because

$$\mathbf{1}^\top \cdot \omega_q^v = \mathbf{1}^\top \cdot \Omega_q^v = 1 \implies \min \left(\omega_q^v \times \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q) \right) < w_q \quad (103)$$

$$\therefore \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^v, \omega_q^v) < \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*) = w_q, \quad (104)$$

as before.

Thus, we have demonstrated there cannot be, in any productive arrangement, a higher aggregate operational output than w_q , that is the number of employees in a particular labor market, as all attempts to increase production, actually, end up hindering it.

The intuition for this is quite simple. Production strategies can merely distribute the available talent across an occupation's responsibility spectrum: they are but ways of splitting and arranging tasks conveniently (via independent production, or any level of labor stratification); they do not, however, change activities' time requirements, nor the time allowances of employees, both of which are, by definition, equivalent. \square Therefore, these economic configurations only serve the purpose of "safeguarding" operational output, guaranteeing production in potentially adverse market conditions. The main limiting factors to production, then, are workers' capacity and time itself. , for the most one can produce in a day is a "day's work".

Optimal Stratification Lemma (OSL)

Because in a maximally and monotonically stratified labor market every position is its own job subtype (for, again, employment levels are unitary), optimal production is, then, obtained not by choosing how many workers to allocate to tasks of varying difficulty levels, but instead by setting appropriate responsibility ranges for each position (i.e. which tasks to allocate *to* workers). The bounds for these ranges are:

$$\ell_v = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{v}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0) \right) \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}. \quad (105)$$

Proof:

We have just demonstrated that the maximum operational output in any labor market, with or without unique, unitary, positions, is exactly

$$\mathcal{U}_q^* = \min(\mathbf{w}_q^* \times \mathcal{U}_q) = \min(\mathbf{1} \times \mathcal{U}_q(\ell_q^*)) = w_q, \quad (106)$$

or the number of employees in its workforce.

Therefore, optimal bounds for responsibility spectra can be calculated by equating partial operational outputs with maximum production; for if maximum-monotonic labor stratification is to be optimal, it must yield the same partial outputs as any efficient production strategy.

So, for the first job subtype,

$$1 \times \left(\int_{\ell_0}^{\ell_1} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} = 1 \times \left(\int_0^{\ell_1} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} = w_q, \quad (107)$$

which means the partial operational output of the first worker, whose tasks range from $\ell_0 = 0$ to $\ell_1 \in [0, 1]$ exclusively, should produce the same amount of the $l \in [0, \ell_1]$ responsibility spectrum as would be produced in an economic configuration with maximum operational output (e.g. with w_q perfectly qualified employees working independently).

Thus, solving for ℓ_1 , we get:

$$1 \times \left(\int_0^{\ell_1} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} = w_q \quad (108)$$

$$\therefore \int_0^{\ell_1} \text{ta}(l) dl = \frac{1}{w_q} \quad (109)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}(l)|_0^{\ell_1} = \text{TA}(\ell_1) - \text{TA}(0) = \frac{1}{w_q} \quad (110)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}^{-1}(\text{TA}(\ell_1)) = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0) \right) \quad (111)$$

$$\therefore \ell_1 = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0) \right). \quad (112)$$

Likewise, for the second worker,

$$1 \times \left(\int_{\ell_1}^{\ell_2} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} = w_q \quad (113)$$

$$\therefore \int_{\ell_1}^{\ell_2} \text{ta}(l) dl = \frac{1}{w_q} \quad (114)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}(l)|_{\ell_1}^{\ell_2} = \text{TA}(\ell_2) - \text{TA}(\ell_1) = \frac{1}{w_q} \quad (115)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}^{-1}(\text{TA}(\ell_2)) = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{w_q} + \text{TA}(\ell_1) \right) \quad (116)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}^{-1}(\text{TA}(\ell_2)) = \text{TA}^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{w_q} + \frac{1}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0)\right) \quad (117)$$

$$\therefore \ell_2 = \text{TA}^{-1}\left(\frac{2}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0)\right). \quad (118)$$

For the third worker,

$$1 \times \left(\int_{\ell_2}^{\ell_3} \text{ta}(l)dl\right)^{-1} = w_q \quad (119)$$

$$\therefore \int_{\ell_2}^{\ell_3} \text{ta}(l)dl = \frac{1}{w_q} \quad (120)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}(l)|_{\ell_2}^{\ell_3} = \text{TA}(\ell_3) - \text{TA}(\ell_2) = \frac{1}{w_q} \quad (121)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}^{-1}(\text{TA}(\ell_3)) = \text{TA}^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{w_q} + \text{TA}(\ell_2)\right) \quad (122)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}^{-1}(\text{TA}(\ell_3)) = \text{TA}^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{w_q} + \frac{1}{w_q} + \frac{1}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0)\right) \quad (123)$$

$$\therefore \ell_3 = \text{TA}^{-1}\left(\frac{3}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0)\right). \quad (124)$$

And so on and so forth, up to the very last worker:

$$1 \times \left(\int_{\ell_{w_q-1}}^{\ell_{w_q}} \text{ta}(l)dl\right)^{-1} = w_q \quad (125)$$

$$\therefore \int_{\ell_{w_q-1}}^{\ell_{w_q}} \text{ta}(l)dl = \frac{1}{w_q} \quad (126)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}(l)|_{\ell_{w_q-1}}^{\ell_{w_q}} = \text{TA}(\ell_{w_q}) - \text{TA}(\ell_{w_q-1}) = \frac{1}{w_q} \quad (127)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}^{-1}(\text{TA}(\ell_{w_q})) = \text{TA}^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{w_q} + \text{TA}(\ell_{w_q-1})\right) \quad (128)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}^{-1}(\text{TA}(\ell_{w_q})) = \text{TA}^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{w_q} + \dots + \frac{1}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0)\right) \quad (129)$$

$$\therefore \ell_{w_q} = \text{TA}^{-1}\left(\frac{w_q}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0)\right) := 1 \quad (130)$$

$$\iff \text{TA}^{-1}\left(\frac{w_q}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0)\right) = \text{TA}^{-1}(1 + \text{TA}(0)) = 1 \quad (131)$$

$$\iff \text{TA}(\text{TA}^{-1}(1 + \text{TA}(0))) = \text{TA}(1) \quad (132)$$

$$\iff \text{TA}(1) - \text{TA}(0) = \int_0^1 \text{ta}(l)dl = 1, \quad (133)$$

which is true, by definition,

$$\therefore \text{ta}(l) := \text{ttc}(l) \times \left(\int_0^1 \text{ttc}(l) dl \right)^{-1} \quad (134)$$

$$\therefore \int_0^1 \text{ta}(l) dl = \left(\int_0^1 \text{ttc}(l) dl \right)^{-1} \times \int_0^1 \text{ttc}(l) dl = 1. \quad (135)$$

And, with this condition met, we can finally arrive, by the induction above, to a general form of optimal responsibility ranges:

$$\ell_v = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{v}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0) \right) \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}. \quad (136)$$

Equivalent Stratification Lemma (ESL)

Any efficient labor market where employers choose both \mathbf{w}_q and ℓ_q with $p \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}$ types of job posts converges to maximum labor stratification with $p = w_q$ unique positions;

$$\ell_q = \ell_q^* := (\ell_0^*, \dots, \ell_p^*) := (0, \dots, 1), \quad (137)$$

$$\ell_v^* = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{v}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0) \right) \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, w_q\} \quad (138)$$

optimal responsibility bounds; and unitary employment levels, $\mathbf{w}_q = \mathbf{1}$.

Proof:

By the Maximum Stratification Axiom,

$$\sum_{v=1}^p \tilde{w}_q^v := \sum_{v=1}^p \frac{w_q^v}{w_q} := 1 \wedge w_q^v \geq 1 \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, p\}, p \in \{1, \dots, w_q\} \quad (139)$$

$$\implies \tilde{w}_q^v = \frac{1}{w_q} \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, p\}, p \in \{1, \dots, w_q\} \iff \mathbf{w}_q = \mathbf{1}. \quad (140)$$

Furthermore,

$$\sum_{v=1}^{w_q} 1 = w_q \wedge \sum_{v=1}^p w_q^v = \sum_{v=1}^p 1 = w_q \implies p = w_q. \quad (141)$$

Therefore, the above implies, given the PEC and OSL,

$$\int_{\ell_{v-1}}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl = \tilde{w}_q^v = \frac{1}{w_q} \wedge \left(\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1} := w_q \quad (142)$$

$$\implies \int_{\ell_{v-1}}^{\ell_v} \text{ta}(l) dl = \frac{1}{\left(\int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl \right)^{-1}} = \int_{\ell_{v-1}^*}^{\ell_v^*} \text{ta}(l) dl \quad (143)$$

$$\iff \ell_v = \ell_v^* = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{v}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0) \right) \quad \forall v \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}. \quad (144)$$

[explain intuition].

Productivity Sufficiency Lemma (PSL)

The available talent in a labor market with $w_q > 0$ employees is, at least, sufficient to allow for maximally stratified production.

Proof:

22. Maximum-Monotonic Labor Stratification Lemma (MLSL)

22.1. From Employer Rationality Axiom, Weak Skill Difference Axiom, and Weak Occupational Complexity Axiom.

22.1.1. Now, to generalize this conclusion for other economic configurations, we shall define notation in terms of maximum labor stratification, that is a productive arrangement in which there are not one (“homogeneous” or “independent”), nor two (“juniors” and “seniors”), but rather several job subtypes, indeed as many as there are jobs themselves, each with a limited spectrum of responsibilities. Furthermore, we shall demonstrate that, given our axioms, such an economic configuration is, in fact, the only optimal production strategy and, so, holds in the labor market. Hence, the Maximum-Monotonic Labor Stratification Lemma (MLSL) states that a perfectly rational employer (ERA), which expects there could be skill differences in the workforce (WSDA), and can split operational output without either gain or loss to production (WOCA), will, therefore, strategically stratify their job offers monotonically, and even maximally, so that, if indeed there happens to be skill differences in the labor market, they can, then, allocate less competent workers to easier roles, and avoid wasting talent, thus “saving their best” for the most demanding tasks.

Mathematically,

$$l \in \left[\frac{\ell-1}{w_q}, \frac{\ell}{w_q} \right], \ell \in \{1, \dots, w_q\} \quad (145)$$

is a responsibility spectrum in a maximally stratified labor market, in which employment levels are given by

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{w_q} w_q^\ell = w_q, \quad (146)$$

so that any available position is its own job subtype and covers only a restrictive range of task difficulty, accounting for

$$\Omega_q^\ell = \frac{1}{\mathcal{U}_q^\ell} = \int_{\frac{\ell-1}{w_q}}^{\frac{\ell}{w_q}} \text{ta}(l) dl \quad (147)$$

of an operation's total time duration

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{w_q} \Omega_q^\ell = \sum_{\ell=1}^{w_q} \int_{\frac{\ell-1}{w_q}}^{\frac{\ell}{w_q}} \text{ta}(l) dl = \int_0^1 \text{ta}(l) dl = 1. \quad (148)$$

Intuitively speaking, we would say production in a maximally and monotonically stratified labor market is not “independent”, [in the sense that each employee does not work on the entire operation from beginning to end. This means each employee] will spend all their time allowance producing a partial operational output, that is a multiple of the difficulty subinterval they were hired to accomplish, which will, in turn, contribute, alongside the partial outputs of other employees, to accomplish the complete occupational operation.

However, in a maximally stratified labor market, these partial operational outputs, will not be produced merely via “senior” and “junior” positions, as previously, but rather within a myriad of levels in a production hierarchy, each responsible for a particular subinterval of task difficulty, approximating a continuum of “seniority” as the workforce becomes large enough.

Again, this does not mean employees are, actually, more or less competent, only that the available positions are [preemptively] stratified with respect to task difficulty.

And, indeed, regardless of workers' actual capacity, this arrangement must hold, because the expected value of operational output – and, therefore, of producers' revenue – is higher and constant when applying a stratified production strategy when compared to an independent production strategy; for in such a strategy, production is more easily limited by skill differences, and so the expected value of operational output is potentially lower, but never higher. That is,

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{T}_q^k] \in [0, 1] \ \forall \ k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\} \quad (149)$$

implies that

$$\int_0^1 T(l, \tilde{T}_q^k) \text{ta}(l) dl \quad (150)$$

$$\leq \tilde{v}_q^k \int_0^1 T(l, \tilde{T}_q^k) \text{ta}(l) dl + (1 - \tilde{v}_q^k) \int_0^1 T(l, 1) \text{ta}(l) dl \quad (151)$$

$$\leq \tilde{w}_q^k \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^k} T(l, \tilde{T}_q^k) \text{ta}(l) dl + (1 - \tilde{w}_q^k) \int_{\tilde{T}_q^k}^1 T(l, 1) \text{ta}(l) dl \quad (152)$$

$$= \sum_{k=1}^{n?} \sum_{\ell=1}^{w_q} [k \in \Lambda_q^\ell] \left[\tilde{T}_q^k \geq \frac{\ell}{w_q} \right] \tilde{w}_q^\ell \int_{\frac{\ell-1}{w_q}}^{\frac{\ell}{w_q}} \text{ta}(l) dl \quad (153)$$

$$= \int_0^1 T(l, 1) \text{ta}(l) dl \quad (154)$$

$$= \int_0^1 \text{ta}(l) dl \quad (155)$$

$$= 1, \quad (156)$$

where $\tilde{v}_q^k > \tilde{w}_q^k$, with $\tilde{v}_q^k, \tilde{w}_q^k \in [0, 1]$, is an inefficient allocation of workers above the optimal relative employment level \tilde{w}_q^k in a semi-stratified labor market; and the double sum in equation (ref) is the output of a maximally stratified labor market, in which every $\ell \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}$ job subtype is but a fraction of available positions, with a partial workforce of $w_q \times \tilde{w}_q^\ell$ individuals, all exclusively dedicated to their own responsibility spectrum, and identified by $[k \in \Lambda_q^\ell]$ employment statuses that are evaluated to 1 if they are employed in a particular Λ_q^ℓ strata of the labor market, and to 0 for all other job subtypes; while the remaining equations are the maximum operational output of a labor market with w_q perfectly qualified employees working independently on the entire responsibility spectrum of occupation q 's operation. Or, more succinctly,

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{U}_q^{\text{IP}} \mid \mathbb{E}[\tilde{T}_q^k] \in [0, 1] \forall k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\}] \quad (157)$$

$$\leq \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{U}_q^{\text{IS}} \mid \mathbb{E}[\tilde{T}_q^k] \in [0, 1] \forall k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\}] \quad (158)$$

$$\leq \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{U}_q^{\text{MS}} \mid \mathbb{E}[\tilde{T}_q^k] \in [0, 1] \forall k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\}] \quad (159)$$

$$= \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{U}_q^{\text{IP}} \mid \tilde{T}_q^k = 1 \forall k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\}], \quad (160)$$

where each of the terms above represents the expected value of aggregate operational output given the expected productivity in the workforce, for the three production strategies: maximum-monotonic labor stratification (MS), imperfect-monotonic labor stratification (IS), and independent production (IP).

In other words, splitting responsibilities in accordance with competence is always as productive as the maximum operational output (viz. that which is obtained when employing perfectly qualified workers independently), provided employees are sufficiently qualified for their responsibilities. But, again, this is, by definition, guaranteed by employers' rationality, as well as the simple fact the economy is already producing its current operational output (Operational Equilibrium Lemma, OEL).

Therefore, employing potentially underqualified workers to output the entire responsibility spectrum $l \in [0, 1]$ independently can only be as productive as the labor stratification strategy, but never more than it. Independent production, then, is a suboptimal strategy when employers expect there to be skill differences in the workforce.

Thus, maximum-monotonic labor stratification follows as an insurance policy against worker's potential underqualification: for if talent is lacking in the labor market, there is nothing to gain by employing individuals which are not sufficiently qualified for a difficult job, whereas if talent is abundant, there is nothing to lose when employing overqualified individuals to a job below their skill level.

Hence, given the same w_q workforce, operational output in a maximally stratified labor market is always greater or equal to the output of any other economic configuration. It is, therefore, always optimal to monotonically and maximally stratify responsibilities across w_q unique positions, each focused on increasingly demanding tasks.

22.2. Monotonic labor stratification is required and follows logically from employers' perfect rationality axiom.

22.3. maximum labor stratification is optional, but also follows logically from employers' perfect rationality axiom.

22.3.1. Because the General Employability Theorem (GET) holds true for imperfectly stratified labor markets as well, for less than maximum labor stratification is mathematically equivalent to just a variable change. This said, imperfect labor market stratification leads to inefficiencies in hiring, as the base requirements for each stratum are higher than they would be if labor was maximally stratified.

23. Productivity Sufficiency Lemma (PSL)

23.1. dsds

24. Definition of aggregate employability in a maximally and monotonically stratified labor market is:

$$\tilde{W}_k = \sum_{q=1}^n \tilde{W}_q^k, \quad (161)$$

where

$$\tilde{W}_q^k = \sum_{\ell=1}^{w_q} \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \left[\tilde{T}_q^k \geq \frac{\ell}{w_q} \right] \tilde{w}_q^\ell \quad (162)$$

$$= \sum_{\ell=1}^{w_q} \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \left[\tilde{T}_q^k \geq \frac{\ell}{w_q} \right] \frac{w_q^\ell}{w_q} \quad (163)$$

is partial employability, that is one's employability in a particular occupation q in the labor market.

$$\tilde{W}_k = \left(\frac{1}{W} \right) \sum_{q=1}^n \sum_{v=1}^{w_q} \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \left[\tilde{T}_q^k \geq \ell_v \right] \quad (164)$$

$$= \left(\frac{1}{W} \right) \sum_{q=1}^n \sum_{v=1}^{w_q} \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \left[\tilde{T}_q^k \geq \text{TA}_q^{-1} \left(\frac{v}{w_q} + \text{TA}_q(0) \right) \right] \quad (165)$$

25. Competitiveness in a maximally-monotonically stratified labor market with irregular responsibility ranges (i.e. without partial hiring):

$$\tilde{\text{vS}}_k = \left(\frac{1}{W} \right) \sum_{q=1}^n \left[\ddot{u}_k^q \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \sum_{v=1}^{w_k} \left[h_k^q \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \left[\tilde{T}_k^q \geq \ell_v \right] \quad (166)$$

$$= \left(\frac{1}{W} \right) \sum_{q=1}^n \left[\ddot{u}_k^q \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \sum_{v=1}^{w_k} \left[h_k^q \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \left[\tilde{T}_k^q \geq \text{TA}_k^{-1} \left(\frac{v}{w_k} + \text{TA}_k(0) \right) \right] \quad (167)$$

Competitiveness in a maximally-monotonically stratified labor market with irregular responsibility ranges (i.e. without partial hiring):

$$\tilde{\text{vS}}_k = \left(\frac{1}{W} \right) \sum_{q=1}^n \left[\ddot{u}_k^q \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \sum_{v=1}^{w_k} \left[h_k^q \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \left[\tilde{T}_k^q \geq \ell_v \right] \quad (168)$$

$$= \left(\frac{1}{W} \right) \sum_{q=1}^n \left[\ddot{u}_k^q \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \sum_{v=1}^{w_k} \left[h_k^q \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \left[\tilde{T}_k^q \geq \text{TA}_k^{-1} \left(\frac{v}{w_k} + \text{TA}_k(0) \right) \right] \quad (169)$$

P.S.: SSL

$$a_i^k := \frac{l_i^k}{l_i} \in [0, 1] \quad (170)$$

$$\tilde{T}_i^k = \int_0^{l_i} T(l, l_i^k) dl \left(\int_0^{l_i} T(l, l_i) dl \right)^{-1} \quad (171)$$

$$= \left(\int_0^{l_i^k} 1 \times dl + \int_{l_i^k}^{l_i} 0 \times dl \right) \times \left(\int_0^{l_i} 1 \times dl \right)^{-1} \quad (172)$$

$$= \frac{l_i^k - 0}{l_i - 0} \quad (173)$$

$$= \frac{l_i^k}{l_i} \quad (174)$$

$$\therefore a_i^k = \tilde{T}_i^k \quad (175)$$

P.S.: SCL

$$\mathbf{a}_k := (a_1^k, \dots, a_m^k), \mathbf{a}_q := (a_1^q, \dots, a_m^q) \in [0, 1]^m \forall k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\} \quad (176)$$

$$l_q^k \leq l_q^q \forall k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\} \quad (177)$$

$$\tilde{T}_q^k = \int_0^{l_q^q} T(l, l_q^k) dl \left(\int_0^{l_q^q} T(l, l_q^q) dl \right)^{-1} \quad (178)$$

$$= \left(\int_0^{l_q^k} 1 \times dl + \int_{l_q^k}^{l_q^q} 0 \times dl \right) \times \left(\int_0^{l_q^q} 1 \times dl \right)^{-1} \quad (179)$$

$$= \frac{l_q^k - 0}{l_q^q - 0} \quad (180)$$

$$= \frac{l_q^k}{l_q^q} \in [0, 1] \quad (181)$$

$$\because \neg l_q^k > l_q^q \quad (182)$$

$$\because l_q^k = f(\mathbf{l}_k, \mathbf{l}_q) = f(\mathbf{a}_k, \mathbf{a}_q) \in [0, 1] \forall k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\} \quad (183)$$

$$\therefore \tilde{T}_q^k = f(\mathbf{a}_k, \mathbf{a}_q) \quad (184)$$

P.S.: Simplified Employability Theorem/Corollary (SET/SEC)

We want to show that, as with the Binary Employability Theorem (BET), so too in a maximally and monotonically stratified labor market, employability is the percentage of an operation's total time duration one is capable of producing. Or, mathematically,

$$\tilde{W}_q^k = \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^k} \text{ta}(l) dl := \Omega_q^k \in [0, 1] \forall k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\}. \quad (185)$$

To prove this result, let us, then, first consider what would be the employability of person k if they had exactly the minimum required productivity for every job subtype. So, for instance, when $v = 1$,

$$\tilde{T}_q^k = \ell_1 = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0) \right) \implies \tilde{W}_q^k = \frac{1}{w_q}, \quad (186)$$

as a productivity coefficient of $\tilde{T}_q^k = \ell_1$ is just enough to be hireable on the easiest job in occupation q 's labor market, but not on the second, much less on the remaining, more difficult, positions.

Likewise, for other values of v , we have

$$\tilde{T}_q^k = \ell_2 = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{2}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0) \right) \implies \tilde{W}_q^k = \frac{2}{w_q}, \quad (187)$$

$$\tilde{T}_q^k = \ell_3 = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{3}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0) \right) \implies \tilde{W}_q^k = \frac{3}{w_q}, \quad (188)$$

$$\vdots \quad (189)$$

$$\tilde{T}_q^k = \ell_v = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\frac{v}{w_q} + \text{TA}(0) \right) \implies \tilde{W}_q^k = \frac{v}{w_q}, \quad (190)$$

so that we may derive the following pattern for any $v \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}$:

$$\tilde{T}_q^k = \text{TA}^{-1} \left(\tilde{W}_q^k + \text{TA}(0) \right) \quad (191)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}(\tilde{T}_q^k) = \text{TA} \left(\text{TA}^{-1} \left(\tilde{W}_q^k + \text{TA}(0) \right) \right) \quad (192)$$

$$\therefore \text{TA}(\tilde{T}_q^k) = \tilde{W}_q^k + \text{TA}(0) \quad (193)$$

$$\therefore \tilde{W}_q^k = \text{TA}(\tilde{T}_q^k) - \text{TA}(0) = \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^k} \text{ta}(l) dl := \Omega_q^k \in [0, 1], \quad (194)$$

as we wanted to show.

However, because $\tilde{T}_q^k \in [0, 1]$ is not discretized as responsibility ranges $l \in [l_{v-1}, l_v], v \in \{1, \dots, w_q\}$ are, and because rational employers do not hire insufficiently qualified employees, we must approximate \tilde{T}_q^k with the closest

$$\tilde{T}_q^\kappa = \left(\frac{1}{w_q} \right) \sum_{v=1}^{w_q} \left[\tilde{T}_q^k \geq l_v \right] \quad (195)$$

productivity estimate, such that $\tilde{T}_q^k \geq \tilde{T}_q^\kappa$ and $\tilde{T}_q^k \approx \tilde{T}_q^\kappa$, where $\tilde{T}_q^\kappa = \ell_\kappa \in \{\ell_0, \dots, \ell_{w_q}\}$ determines the most demanding task for which k is still productive. Therefore, the adjusted coefficient is:

$$\tilde{W}_q^k = \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^\kappa} \text{ta}(l) dl := \Omega_q^\kappa \approx \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^k} \text{ta}(l) dl \in [0, 1], \quad (196)$$

when w_q is large enough.

Of course, this assumes candidate k is evaluated as “employable” in accordance with the hireability statistic

$$\left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right], \quad (197)$$

which accounts for selection criteria besides minimum required productivity. Thus, a more complete formulation would be:

$$\tilde{W}_q^k = \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^\kappa} \text{ta}(l) dl; \quad (198)$$

or, in the aggregate form,

$$\tilde{W}_k = \left(\frac{1}{W} \right) \sum_{q=1}^n \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \int_0^{\tilde{T}_q^\kappa} \text{ta}(l) dl := \left(\frac{1}{W} \right) \sum_{q=1}^n \left[h_q^k \geq \frac{1}{2} \right] \Omega_q^\kappa \quad (199)$$

$$\forall \tilde{T}_q^\kappa \in \{\ell_0, \dots, \ell_{w_q}\}; k, q \in \{1, \dots, n\}. \quad (200)$$