

Information Security

Chapter 10: IDS/IPS

Lecturer: Nguyễn Thị Thanh Vân – FIT - HCMUTE


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Intrusion Detection Systems

IDS:

- is a system of devices or applications
- has capability of detecting illegitimate intrusions on networks



Intrusion Detection Systems

Logical components:

- sensors - collect data
- Detection (Analyzers) - determine if intrusion has occurred
- Response (user interface) - manage /direct /view IDS



A Comparison of Firewalls and IDSs

	Firewall	IDS
Protect	<u>permit or deny</u> traffic (incoming and outgoing)	Some: <u>like firewall</u> Almost: merely <u>monitor</u> the network, detect, and alarm on security violations
Detection capabilities	- are standard among the most popular firewall systems. - <u>Based IP, port address</u>	- monitoring a single computer or a network, - Based <u>signature</u> others do detection on both attack-signature and composite (port-sweep) attacks.
Response	respond to undesired incoming and outgoing connection requests	do respond to malicious activity: log the session, <u>alarm</u> through visual alarms, <u>email or message</u>

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IDS - Architecture

▷ Data gathering device (sensor):

thu thập dữ liệu từ hệ thống giám sát

▷ Detector :

phân tích dữ liệu để xác định các hành vi xâm nhập

▷ Knowledge base (database):


- Các dấu hiệu tấn công đã được biết trước (signature-based)
- Các profile về các hành vi hợp pháp trong hệ thống (anomaly-based).

▷ Configuration device:

cung cấp các thông tin về cấu hình hiện tại của IDS

▷ Response component:

bắt đầu các hành động khi một hành vi xâm nhập được phát hiện.



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
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IDS Requirements

- ∞ run continually
- ∞ be fault tolerant
- ∞ resist subversion
- ∞ impose a minimal overhead on system
- ∞ configured according to system security policies
- ∞ adapt to changes in systems and users
- ∞ scale to monitor large numbers of systems
- ∞ provide graceful degradation of service
- ∞ allow dynamic reconfiguration

IDS Classification

∞ IDS types:




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Two IDS types – Signature-based IDS and anomaly-based IDS


Signature-based

- Depend on matching patterns that are collected from known attacks




Anomaly-based

- Thru continuous observation and modeling of normal behavior, the system finds possible threats via deviation from the normal model or a classification executed



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Anomaly Detection



Anomaly Detection

threshold detection

- checks excessive event occurrences over time
- alone a crude and ineffective intruder detector
- must determine both thresholds and time intervals

profile based

- characterize past behavior of users / groups
- then detect significant deviations
- based on analysis of audit records
 - gather metrics: counter, gauge, interval timer, resource utilization
 - analyze: mean and standard deviation, multivariate, markov process, time series

Anomaly Detection


Advantage:

- detect insider attacks based on collected normal activities in the system;
- ability to detect previously unknown attacks; and
- it is very difficult for an attacker to know which certainty activity can be executed without generate an alarm.

Limits:

- the system must go through a training period in which appropriate user profiles are created by defining normal traffic profiles, that is a difficult task and consumes a lot time.
- Because it is looking for anomalous events rather than attacks, so they will generate false alarms when there is an anomalous behavior but not an attack

Signature-based: basic Architecture



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Signature Detection

- ☞ observe events on system and applying a set of rules to decide if intruder
- ☞ approaches:
 - rule-based anomaly detection
 - analyze historical audit records for expected behavior, then match with current behavior
 - rule-based penetration identification
 - rules identify known penetrations / weaknesses
 - often by analyzing attack scripts from Internet
 - supplemented with rules from security experts


Two IDS types – Pos & cons

Signature-based

- (+) Detect known attacks
- (-) False negative alarm
- (-) Can penetrate to know signatures, then another method is used to attack

Anomaly-based

- (+) Detect unknown attacks
- (-) False positive alarm
- (+) Can't penetrate to know certainty activity can be executed without generate an alarm.




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
Host-Based IDS

- specialized software to monitor system activity to detect suspicious behavior
 - primary purpose is to detect intrusions, log suspicious events, and send alerts
 - can detect both external and internal intrusions
- two approaches, often used in combination:
 - anomaly detection - defines normal/expected behavior
 - threshold detection
 - profile based
 - signature detection - defines proper behavior

Distributed Host-Based IDS



Distributed Host-Based IDS



Network-Based IDS


network-based IDS (NIDS)

- monitor traffic at selected points on a network
- in (near) real time to detect intrusion patterns
- may examine network, transport and/or application level protocol activity directed toward systems

comprises a number of sensors


- inline (possibly as part of other net device)
- passive (monitors copy of traffic)

NIDS Sensor Deployment




Network-Based IDS

⚙ Sensor Inline



Network-Based IDS

⚙ Sensor **Passive**



Intrusion Detection Techniques in NIDS

signature detection

- at application, transport, network layers; unexpected application services, policy violations


anomaly detection

- of denial of service attacks, scanning, worms

when potential violation detected sensor sends an alert and logs information

- used by analysis module to refine intrusion detection parameters and algorithms
- by security admin to improve protection


Distributed Adaptive Intrusion Detection



PEP = policy enforcement point
DDI = distributed detection and inference

Intrusion Detection Exchange Format

- Data source: raw data an IDS uses to detect unauthorized or undesired activity
- Sensor: collects data from the data source & forwards events to the analyzer
- Analyzer: process analyzing data collected for unauthorized/undesired activity
- Administrator: human with overall responsibility for setting security policy of org
- Manager: process from which operator manages components of ID system
- Operator: human that is the primary user of the IDS manager



Top Free Network-Based

	Pros	Cons
Snort	Fairly easy to install and get up and running. Vast community of users, many support resources available online.	Comes with no GUI, though community-developed add-ons exist. Packet processing can be slow.
Suricata	Can use Snort's rulesets. Has advanced features such as multi-threading capabilities and GPU acceleration.	Prone (easy) to false positives. System and network resource intensive.
Bro IDS	Platform can be tailored for a variety of network security use cases, in addition to NIDS.	Some programming experience is required. Gaining proficiency in Bro DSL can take some effort.
OpenWIPS-ng	Modular and plugin-based. Software and hardware required can be built by DIYers.	Primarily a wireless security solution.
Security Onion	Comprehensive security stack consisting of multiple, leading open-source solutions. Provides an easy setup tool for installing the whole stack.	As a platform made up of several technologies, Security Onion inherits the drawbacks of each constituent tool.


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SNORT


lightweight IDS

- real-time packet capture and rule analysis
- passive or inline




SNORT

Packet Decoder



SNORT Rules

- use a simple, flexible rule definition language
- with fixed header and zero or more options



- example rule to detect TCP SYN-FIN attack:

```
Alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any \
(msg: "SCAN SYN FIN"; flags: SF, 12; \
reference: arachnids, 198; classtype: attempted-recon;)
```

Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS)

- recent addition to security products which
 - inline net/host-based IDS that can block traffic
 - functional addition to firewall that adds IDS capabilities
- can block traffic like a firewall
- using IDS algorithms
- may be network or host based


Host-Based IPS

- ⌘ identifies attacks using both:
 - signature techniques
 - malicious application packets
 - anomaly detection techniques
 - behavior patterns that indicate malware
- ⌘ can be tailored to the specific platform
 - e.g. general purpose, web/database server specific
- ⌘ can also sandbox applets to monitor behavior
- ⌘ may give desktop file, registry, I/O protection


Network-Based IPS

- ⌘ inline NIDS that can discard packets or terminate TCP connections
- ⌘ uses signature and anomaly detection
- ⌘ may provide flow data protection
 - monitoring full application flow content
- ⌘ can identify malicious packets using:
 - pattern matching, stateful matching, protocol anomaly, traffic anomaly, statistical anomaly
- ⌘ cf. SNORT inline can drop/modify packets

Unified Threat Management Products



Snort-Inline IPS



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Snort-Inline modes

Drop Mode

A packet is dropped if it matches an attack signature.
Three options are available in this mode:

- Drop: Drops a packet, sends a reset back to the host, logs the event.
- Sdrop: Drops a packet without sending a reset back to the host.
- Ignore: Drops a packet, sends a reset back to the host, does not log the event

Replace Mode

A packet is modified if it matches an attack signature.

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Evaluating IDS

Confusion matrix:

	PREDICTED CLASS		
ACTUAL CLASS		Class=Yes	Class=No
	Class=Yes	a	b
	Class=No	c	d

Parameter	Definition
True Positive Rate (TP)	Attack occur and alarm raised
False Positive Rate (FP)	No attack but alarm raised
True Negative Rate (TN)	No attack and no alarm
False Negative Rate (FN)	Attack occur but no alarm



Evaluating IDS

Confusion matrix:

- TP rate = $TP / (TP + FN)$
- FP rate = $FP / (FP + TN)$

		PREDICTED CLASS	
		Class=Yes	Class=No
ACTUAL CLASS	Class=Yes	a	b
	Class=No	c	d

- Error rate = $(FP + FN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN)$
- Accuracy = $(TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN)$

IDS:

$$\text{Attack Detection Rate} = \frac{\text{Total number of attacks}}{\text{Total number of detected attacks}} \times 100\%$$

$$\text{False Positive Rate} = \frac{\text{Total number of misclassified processes}}{\text{Total number of normal processes}} \times 100\%$$

$$\text{Accuracy Rate} = \frac{\text{Total number of correct classified processes}}{\text{Total number of processes}} \times 100\%$$



Evaluating IDS


System should be:



- Scalable



- Resilient to attacks




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Chapter 10: Honeypot

Lecturer: Nguyễn Thị Thanh Vân – FIT - HCMUTE

Honeypots



Honeypots are **decoy systems designed to lure attackers** away from critical systems.

- filled with fabricated info
- instrumented with monitors / event loggers

Honeypots are designed to:

- divert an attacker
- collect information about an attacker
- encourage an attacker to stay long enough for administrators to respond

Honeypots



- A honeypot has **no production value**
- There is **no legitimate reason to access** a honeypot
- Any attempt to communicate with a honeypot is **most likely a probe, scan, or attack**
- If a honeypot **initiates outbound traffic**, the system is most likely compromised

Honeypot Classification



• Low interaction honeypot:

- Emulates particular IT services or systems well enough to provide a realistic initial interaction, but **does not execute a full version** of those services or systems
- Provides a **less realistic target**
- Often **sufficient for use as a component** of a distributed IDS to warn of imminent attack


Honeyplot Classification



•High interaction honeypot

- A **real system, with a full operating system**, services and applications, which are instrumented and deployed where they can be accessed by attackers
- More realistic target** that may occupy an attacker for an extended period
- However, it **requires significantly more resources**

Honeyplot Deployment



Summary

- ☞ IDS
- ☞ Comparison
- ☞ Architecture
- ☞ Requirement
- ☞ Classification
- ☞ Signature-based and anomaly-based IDS
- ☞ Host-based and network-based IDS
- ☞ IPS
- ☞ Honeypot

Practice

- ☞ Set up an IDS with one of the following:
 - **Snort**
 - **Suricata**
 - **Bro IDS**
 - **OpenWIPS-ng**
 - **Security Onion**
- ☞ Simulate attacks and use IDS above to detect
 - DOS, probe
- ☞ Honeypot