# Global Government Notes

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## Week 2

## LaForge & Slaughter

Anne-Marie Slaughter was Director of Policy under Clinton in the First Obama Admin. She then served on the Board of Directors for such wonderful corporations as McDonald's and Citigroup

- The authors' "solution" to bad governance is a dictatorship of the international bourgeoisie
- Want non-state actors (civil society technocrats) to take over the role of a national state.
- why?
  - Because power can no longer be assumed. They've only ever inherited it, but Trump has proven that they can't rely on democracy to win power
  - lacking a road map to acquiring power, the answer is to reassemble the state outside of democratic control
- Foreign Affairs is bad, do not read anything published by the Council on Foreign Relations

## Duerr

- right off the bat, he's adopting the "Cold War was a Battle of ideas" framework. This tells you everything you need to know he already implicitly sides with either Fukuyama or Huntington
  - The revisionist thesis that the Cold War was a resource battle –
    is never given any thought. Indeed, there is no non-western author
    discussed among these three
- Fukuyama:
  - "Democratic Peace Theory" is fucking stupid
  - The so-called "democracies" which weren't at war with each other from 1815 to 1914 could scarcely be called democracies
    - \* They were dictatorships of the national, rather than international, bourgeoisie and occasionally of an absolutist monarch
    - \* Total control of boss over worker
    - \* Racial violence in European Colonies
    - \* Gender Discrimination
    - \* Why were these so-called democracies at peace? Because it made good business for some
    - \* What Cause the world wars then? Certainly not anything Fukuyama's interested in, but here's my answer: The existence

of Germany as a united State at all. Made the Concert of Europe unstable no matter what.

- Now, the largest arena of conflict isn't between nations but within them, even as the overall violence of all war decreases
- last, most war-fighting occurs w/in immature democracies, but only because the lack of strong democratic institutions is a desirable condition for global capital. In other words: It's not an accident!
- The Arab spring was the nail in coffin for End of History the legacy of Colonialism was a good predictor of how things went
  - \* And in US-Aligned states, the Arab Spring was crushed
  - \* Again, Wahabbism and Political Islam is a deliberate artificial creation of Western Foreign Policy

### • Huntington:

- First, his rhetoric lends itself to ethno-nationalist sentiments which have no place in scientific conversations, let alone polite society
- Why the sudden re-emergence of "civilisation" as a unifying force? Because at the end of history, all that is left is CULTURE WAR
- So if Huntington is right at all, it's because all structural questions have been rule out, as Fukuyama said
- So what happens when the material basis of the mode of production is forced to change from climate change? He doesn't have a fucking answer!
- His theory only makes sense for the last 20 years, and if right now is the dawn of the "post-9/11" world, then I doubt his ideas will have any legs
- Also, wtf even is "western" civ? How much of these civilisational identities are just accidents of decolonisation in the last 100 years?
  - \* Again, Wahabbism and Political Islam is a deliberate artificial creation of Western Foreign Policy
- At no point does anyone mention climate change
- This is a stupid debate and it is not worth having

## Slaughter (2003)

Infuriatingly banal. Lays the groundwork for her more recent piece. Beneath comment.

#### Lake, Anarchy

Begins by saying that the NATO alliance was not hierarchical. Sure, in a purely technical, limited sense. But there was a clear preeminence which the US enjoyed and other members of the alliance banked on, especially after the Suez crisis.

On pp 16, Figure 2: Think of the "O" curves as "the potential damage an opportunist other could inflict" and the "G" curves are "the necessary cost in treasure to deter that opportunism." The nought-curves are actual Damage and Deterrence, but lacking perfect information, the prime curves represent

self-assessment by states, which are necessarily imperfect and therefore err on the side of caution, ie, greater potential damage. The intersection of the O and G curves is the optimal location for a dyad of partners, in a purely economic sense.

As you can see, at the extremes of either end of the x-axis, costs climb substantially; there are diminishing marginal returns for complete anarchy and complete hierarchy. This stands to reason: completely owning another territory's security policy is expensive. Importantly, the junior partner in any pair will have its political interests warped. This is because a polity's natural impulse to sovereignty – or perhaps belief in popular sovereignty – will chafe as its security policy is co-opted or dictated to it by an outsider. The efficient use of its resources towards security will be distorted (no such thing as comparative advantage in an imperial relationship).

Lake uses the US Federal Constitution as the example of a contract that is hierarchically organised but which finds a way to keep the junior partners vested in the future of the relationship – through participation in a parliament, a binding court for adjudication of claims, and so on. Thus, the dominant partner (understood in retrospect to be the Federal State itself) can buy participation of potentially sovereign juniors to work as a single security unit. Barring institutional buy-in, coercion can be used to enforce a hierarchy, typically because a senior partner has to want to be coerced by a junior (because let's face it, what are they gonna do about it?). Coercion isn't necessarily cheaper, however, and often coercive relations suffer blowback.

It begs to be asked then: whence imperialism? If there's enough money to be made via full subjugation, or another enemy's opportunism requires preemptive conquest, thence imperialism.

So while this theory seems to be a very long-winded explanation of something we already sorta know, the fact that it very closely resembles reality might offer some support for the postulations Lake had to make to get here, especially the riskier ones.

Rigourously testing this hypothesis leads to some substantial methodological challenges. First, there's a tendency to emphasise cases where security dyads fucked up and failed to produce security, whereas dyads which succeed (so far) offer poor data. Speaking of which, we lack rich systematic data because counterfactuals – namely, dyad-relationships which do not efficiently produce security – do not exist (because states would be foolish to enter such relationships). In other words, the sample is limited to only the meeting-points of O' and G', but we can't trace the curves like we could supply and demand.

As a pilot study, Lake selects Cold War Europe. Essentially, the US faced a high cost if it were to occupy west Europe and it also faced little threat from soviet opportunism in its own borders. This led it to favour an approach like NATO. Conversely, the Soviet situation was quite opposite: High likelihood (or perceived likelihood) of US meddling and low opportunity cost for dominat-

ing Easter Europe. Thus, it pursued a more hierarchical relationship with the Warsaw Pact countries. (see pp 24)

The Fear of Missing Out in the American Economic project was one such consent-buying structure in the Bretton-Wood System, much like the US Federal Constitution bought consent of the semi-sovereign provinces. For this exact reason, tight integration of communist economies through coercion rather than consent was the simplest and optimal solution to maximise security.

He concedes that controlling for regime type in a more comprehensive study might offer better results. The crucial insight is that governance institutions do not facilitate cooperation for no reason – indeed, they are instruments of control just as importantly. This hypothesis also adds more colour to our understanding of hegemonies within anarchy and structured reality.

#### Class Notes

What is research?

- Studies utilising the scientific method
- Logical, Falsifiable, Repeatable
- Describing phenomena and then explaining them
  - Generate hypotheses from observation which can then be tested empirically

## Terminology

- Unit of Analysis the subject and scope of your study
- Concepts and operationalisation
  - Often, these can be cribbed in whole from your Lit Review if it's good enough for other peer-review research, it's good enough for you!
- Variables
  - Independent explains the dependent
  - Control intermediating or external variables which are known to affect the research variables
- **Hypothesis** a falsifiable conjecture which relates two or more variables to one another
  - Theories are just hypotheses which have a strong corpus of supporting evidence

#### **Ethics**

- $\bullet\,$  The Institutional Review Board protects the University or research institution from liability not you
- just because they say it's ethical doesn't mean it is
- Think about how your research can be used for harm or how your study exploits the subjects
- Informed consent cannot exist where the perception of coercion exists

- Privacy how do you protect people's information?
  - Guaranteeing privacy is also a best practice because it helps with data collection
- Appropriate compensation how much is too much? How little is too little
  - Never forget that **you** the researcher are the primary beneficiary of any study shouldn't the human subjects benefit as well?
- Positionality & Reflexivity
  - What perspective and experience do you come from?
  - What biases and presumptions might you have which go unquestioned?
  - How does one practice reflexivity & Positionality? Make sure your lit review includes perspectives from people "closer" to the issue area, literally closer

Why are practitioner-funded academic studies becoming more common? Because the moneeyyyyyyy.... Ethics clearly matter a great deal when the results are literally published on the request of a practitioner. They primarily limit the scope of research (and rightly so) but ethical research is also *better* research.

#### Global Governance - Class Notes

Why does it exist? To solve collective action problems.

- Why are these problems difficult to resolve? Distance and culture certainly gum up the works, but there are also strong incentives for states to pursue opportunistic self-interest at everyone else's expense
- The Stakes are life-and-death and there are no hard rules.