

45. Akehurst concludes that India actually had prior statements concerning humanitarian justifications deleted from the Official Record of the UN ("Humanitarian Intervention," 96–97).
46. Amin attempted to justify this move by claiming that Tanzania had previously invaded Ugandan territory; Tesón, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 164.
48. Ibid., 164–67.
49. As quoted in Akehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention," 99.
50. As quoted *ibid.*, 97 n. 17.
51. One reason for the virtual absence of humanitarian arguments in this case, compared to the Tanzanian case, may have been the way the intervention was conducted. Tanzania exerted much less control over the kind of regime that replaced Amin, making the subsequent Ugandan regime's defense of Tanzania's actions as "liberation" less implausible than were Vietnam's claims that it, too, was helping to liberate Cambodia by installing a puppet regime that answered to Hanoi.
52. The definition in Article 2 of the 1948 Genocide Convention lists the following specific acts as included in the term "genocide": "(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group" (Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948. Available at [http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu.3/b/p\\_genoci.htm](http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu.3/b/p_genoci.htm)).
53. For particularly damning accounts, see Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), chap. 11; and Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), chap. 10.
54. The suppression of a cable from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)

commander in Kigali, Dallaire, to his superiors at the Department of Peace Operations in New York (then run by Kofi Annan) was a scandal when it was uncovered. See Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*; Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002); Michael Barnett, "The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide and Rwanda," *Cultural Anthropology* 12, no. 4 (1997): 551–78; *Frontline* documentary, "The Triumph of Evil," and accompanying website at [www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/frontline/evil](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/frontline/evil). The U.S. administration's attempts to avoid "the G word" would have been comical if they did not have such tragic effects. See the *Frontline* documentary, "The Triumph of Evil," and interviews with James Woods and Tony Marley at [www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/frontline/evil](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/shows/frontline/evil).

55. Samantha Power would probably be unimpressed with this change. She argues that the United States has known about virtually every genocide in the twentieth century and never acted to stop any of them. I do not dispute her claim; rather, we are investigating a different question. Power wants to know why the United States has not acted to stop genocide; I want to know why the United States has done any humanitarian intervention at all. See Power, *A Problem from Hell*.
56. John G. Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*, 6. Ruggie's edited volume provides an excellent analysis of the sources and power of multilateral norms generally.
57. Contemporary multilateralism is not, therefore, "better" or more efficient and effective than the nineteenth-century brand. I contend only that it is different. This difference in multilateralism poses a particular challenge to neoliberal institutionalists. These scholars have sophisticated arguments about why international cooperation should be robust and why it might vary across issue areas. They cannot, however, explain these qualitative changes in multilateralism, nor can they explain changes in the



amount of multilateral activity over time without appealing to exogenous variables (like changes in markets or technology).

58. For a more generalized argument about the ways international organizations enjoy legitimacy of action because they are able to present themselves as guardians of community interests as opposed to self-seeking states, see Michael N. Barnett and Martha

Finnemore, *The Power and Pathologies of International Organizations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).

59. Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*.

60. Barnett and Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations"; Barnett and Finnemore, *The Power and Pathologies of International Organizations*.