## Political competition and public procurement outcomes:

**Online Appendix** 

Table A1. Swedish municipalities and one-party rule

Municipality		Municipality	-	Municipality			
Ale	Turnover	Essunga	Shift 2011	Hylte	Turnover		
	Turnover	Fagersta	Turnover	Järfälla	Turnover		
Alingsås Älmhult				Jokkmokk			
Älvdalen	Turnover	Falkenberg Falköping	Turnover		Turnover		
	Turnover		Turnover	Jönköping	Turnover		
Alvesta	Turnover	Falun	Turnover	Kalix	Turnover		
Älvkarleby	One-party rule	Färgelanda	Turnover	Kalmar	Turnover		
Älvsbyn	One-party rule	Filipstad	One-party rule	Karlsborg	Turnover		
Åmål	Turnover	Finspång	Turnover	Karlshamn	One-party rule		
Aneby	Turnover	Flen	Turnover	Karlskoga	One-party rule		
Ånge	One-party rule	Forshaga	Turnover	Karlskrona	Turnover		
Ängelholm	Turnover	Gagnef	Turnover	Karlstad	Turnover		
Arboga	One-party rule	Gällivare	Shift 2015	Katrineholm	One-party rule		
Åre	Turnover	Gävle	One-party rule	Kävlinge	Turnover		
Årjäng	Shift 2014	Gislaved	Turnover	Kil	Turnover		
Arjeplog	Turnover	Gnesta	Turnover	Kinda	Turnover		
Arvidsjaur	One-party rule	Gnosjö	Turnover	Kiruna	Turnover		
Arvika	Turnover	Göteborg	Turnover	Klippan	Turnover		
Åsele	Turnover	Götene	Turnover	Knivsta	Turnover		
Askersund	Turnover	Gotland	Turnover	Köping	One-party rule		
Åstorp	Turnover	Grästorp	Turnover	Kramfors	One-party rule		
Åtvidaberg	Turnover	Grums	One-party rule	Kristianstad	Turnover		
Avesta	Turnover	Gullspång	Turnover	Kristinehamn	Turnover		
Båstad	Turnover	Habo	Turnover	Krokom	Turnover		
Bengtsfors	Turnover	Håbo	Turnover	Kumla	One-party rule		
Berg	Turnover	Hagfors	Turnover	Kungalv	Turnover		
Bjurholm	Turnover	Hällefors	One-party rule	Kungsbacka	Turnover		
Bjuv	Turnover	Hallsberg	One-party rule	Kungsör	Turnover		
Boden	Turnover	Hallstahammar	One-party rule	Laholm	Turnover		
Bollebygd	Turnover	Halmstad	Turnover	Landskrona	Turnover		
Bollnäs	Turnover	Hammarö	Shift 2011	Laxå	Shift 2015		
Borås	Turnover	Haninge	Turnover	Lekeberg	Turnover		
Borgholm	Turnover	Haparanda	One-party rule	Leksand	One-party rule		
Borlänge	One-party rule	Härjedalen	One-party rule	Lerum	Turnover		
Botkyrka	Turnover	Härnösand	Turnover	Lessebo	One-party rule		
Boxholm	One-party rule	Härryda	Turnover	Lidingö	One-party rule		
Bräcke	One-party rule	Hässleholm	Turnover	Lidköping	Turnover		
Bromölla	One-party rule	Heby	Turnover	Lilla Edet	Turnover		
Burlöv	One-party rule	Hedemora	Turnover	Lindesberg	Turnover		
Dals-Ed	One-party rule	Helsingborg	Turnover	Linköping	Turnover		
Danderyd	One-party rule	Herrljunga	Shift 2014	Ljungby	Turnover		
Degerfors	Turnover	Нјо	Turnover	Ljusdal	Turnover		
Dorotea	Turnover	Hofors	One-party rule	Ljusnarsberg	One-party rule		
Eda	Turnover	Höganäs	Turnover	Lomma	Turnover		
Ekerö	Turnover	Högsby	Turnover	Ludvika	One-party rule		
Eksjö	Turnover	Höör	Turnover	Luleå	One-party rule		
Emmaboda	Turnover	Hörby	Turnover	Lund	Turnover		
Enköping	Turnover	Huddinge	Turnover	Lycksele	One-party rule		
Eskilstuna		Hudiksvall	Turnover		Turnover		
	One-party rule	!		Lysekil			
Eslöv	Turnover	Hultsfred	Turnover	Malå	Turnover		

öv *Turnover* [Hul (continued on next page) (Table A1, continued)

(Table A1, Commuea)										
Municipality		Municipality		Municipality						
Malmö	Turnover	Partille	Turnover	Tibro	Shift 2015					
Malung-Sälen	Turnover	Perstorp	Turnover	Tidaholm	Turnover					
Mariestad	Turnover	Piteå	One-party rule	Tierp	One-party rule					
Mark	Turnover	Ragunda	One-party rule	Timrå	Turnover					
Markaryd	Turnover	Rättvik	Turnover	Tingsryd	Turnover					
Mellerud	Shift 2015	Robertsfors	Turnover	Tjörn	Turnover					
Mjölby	Turnover	Ronneby	Shift 2011	Tomelilla	Turnover					
Mölndal	Turnover	Säffle	One-party rule	Töreboda	Turnover					
Mönsterås	Turnover	Sala	Turnover	Torsås	Turnover					
Mora	Turnover	Salem	One-party rule	Torsby	Turnover					
Mörbylånga	Turnover	Sandviken	One-party rule	Tranås	Turnover					
Motala	Turnover	Säter	Turnover	Tranemo	One-party rule					
Mullsjö	Turnover	Sävsjö	Turnover	Trelleborg	Turnover					
Munkedal	Turnover	Sigtuna	Turnover	Trollhättan	One-party rule					
Munkfors	One-party rule	Simrishamn	Turnover	Trosa	Turnover					
Nacka	One-party rule	Sjöbo	Turnover	Tyresö	Turnover					
Nässjö	Turnover	Skara	Turnover	Uddevalla	Turnover					
Nora	Turnover	Skellefteå	One-party rule	Ulricehamn	Turnover					
Norberg	Turnover	Skinnskatteberg	Turnover	Umeå	Turnover					
Nordanstig	Turnover	Skövde	Turnover	Upplands Väsby						
Nordmaling	Turnover	Skurup	Turnover	Upplands-Bro	Turnover					
Norrköping	Turnover	Smedjebacken	One-party rule	Uppsala	Turnover					
Norrtälje	Turnover	Söderhamn	One-party rule	Uppvidinge	Turnover					
Norsjö	Turnover	Söderköping	Turnover	Vadstena	Turnover					
Nybro	Turnover	Södertälje	Turnover	Vaggeryd	Turnover					
Nyköping	Turnover	Sollefteå	One-party rule	Valdemarsvik	Turnover					
Nykvarn	Turnover	Sollentuna	Turnover	Vallentuna	Turnover					
Nynäshamn	One-party rule	Solna	Turnover	Vänersborg	Turnover					
Ockelbo	One-party rule	Sölvesborg	Turnover	Vännäs	Turnover					
Öckerö	Turnover	Sorsele		Vanisbro						
		Sotenäs	Turnover	Varisbro	Turnover					
Ödeshög	Turnover	•	Turnover	i	Turnover					
Olofström	One-party rule	Staffanstorp	Turnover	Varberg	Turnover					
Örebro	Turnover	Stenungsund	Turnover	Vårgårda	Shift 2011					
Örkelljunga	Turnover	Stockholm	Turnover	Värmdö	Turnover					
Örnsköldsvik	One-party rule	Storfors	One-party rule	Värnamo	One-party rule					
Orsa	Turnover	Storuman	Turnover	Västerås	Turnover					
Orust	Turnover	Strängnäs	Turnover	Västervik	Turnover					
Osby	Turnover	Strömstad	Turnover	Vaxholm	Turnover					
Oskarshamn	One-party rule	Strömsund	Turnover	Växjö	Turnover					
Österåker	Turnover	Sundbyberg	Turnover	Vellinge	Turnover					
Östersund	Turnover	Sundsvall	Shift 2011	Vetlanda	Shift 2011					
Östhammar	Turnover	Sunne	Shift 2015	Vilhelmina	Turnover					
Östra Göinge	Shift 2011	Surahammar	One-party rule	Vimmerby	Shift 2011					
Ovanåker	Turnover	Svalöv	Turnover	Vindeln	Turnover					
Överkalix	Shift 2015	Svedala	Turnover	Vingåker	Turnover					
Övertorneå	Turnover	Svenljunga	Shift 2015	Ydre	One-party rule					
Oxelösund	One-party rule	Täby	Turnover	Ystad	Turnover					
Pajala	Turnover	Tanum	Turnover							

Note: Data from Dagens Samhälle #38 (2013), complemented by authors' own checks for shifts before and after 2013.

**Table A2. Descriptive statistics** 

		ble A2				atisti				
		ss-sectio			1/14)		Panel sa	ample (	2009-15	)
	N	mean	sd	min	max	N	mean	sd	min	max
Single bidding ratio	275	12.21	7.74	0.00	41.67	1901	12.51	14.88	0	100
One-party rule	275	0.23	0.42	0	1	1901	0.23	0.42	0	1
New ruling party	273	0.23	0.12	Ü	•	1901	0.29	0.45	0	1
Reelected once						1901	0.18	0.39	0	1
Reelected twice or more						1901	0.13	0.50	0	1
Population						1701	0.55	0.50	U	1
<5,000	275	0.04	0.20	0	1	1901	0.05	0.21	0	1
5-10,000	275	0.19	0.39	0	1	1901	0.03	0.21	0	1
10-15,000	275	0.19	0.39	0	1	1901	0.19	0.39	0	1
15-30,000	275	0.25	0.44	0	1	1901	0.25	0.41	0	1
30-250,000	275	0.23	0.44	0	1	1901	0.29	0.45	0	1
>250,000	275	0.28	0.43	0	1	1901	0.29	0.10	0	1
	275	6.49	1.27	2.16	9.87	1901	6.49	1.26	2.16	9.87
Area (log)	275	226.31	22.73	180.30	303.55	1901	223.94	24.67	168.10	324.10
Median income	213	220.51	22.13	160.50	303.33	1901	223.94	24.07	106.10	324.10
Mayoral party	275	0.47	0.50	0	1	1001	0.49	0.50	0	1
Social Democrats Moderates	275	0.47 0.34	0.30	0	1	1901	0.48 0.31	0.50	0	1 1
	275					1901		0.46		
Center Party	275	0.15	0.36	0	1	1901	0.15	0.36	0	1
Christian Democrats	275	0.01	0.12	0	1	1901	0.02	0.12	0	1
Liberals	275	0.02	0.13	0	1	1901	0.02	0.13	0	1
Left Party	275	0.01	0.09	0	1	1901	0.01	0.09	0	1
Other, local party  County	275	0.00	0.06	0	1	1901	0.01	0.10	0	1
Stockholm	275	0.09	0.29	0	1	1901	0.09	0.29	0	1
Uppsala	275	0.03	0.16	0	1	1901	0.03	0.16	0	1
Södermanland	275	0.03	0.17	0	1	1901	0.03	0.17	0	1
Östergötland	275	0.04	0.20	0	1	1901	0.04	0.20	0	1
Jönköping	275	0.05	0.21	0	1	1901	0.05	0.21	0	1
Kronoberg	275	0.03	0.17	0	1	1901	0.03	0.16	0	1
Kalmar	275	0.04	0.20	0	1	1901	0.04	0.20	0	1
Gotland	275	0.00	0.06	0	1	1901	0.00	0.06	0	1
Blekinge	275	0.02	0.13	0	1	1901	0.02	0.13	0	1
Skåne	275	0.12	0.33	0	1	1901	0.12	0.33	0	1
Halland	275	0.02	0.15	0	1	1901	0.02	0.15	0	1
Västra Götaland	275	0.16	0.37	0	1	1901	0.17	0.37	0	1
Värmland	275	0.06	0.23	0	1	1901	0.06	0.23	0	1
Örebro	275	0.04	0.20	0	1	1901	0.04	0.20	0	1
Västmanland	275	0.03	0.16	0	1	1901	0.03	0.16	0	1
Dalarna	275	0.05	0.23	0	1	1901	0.05	0.22	0	1
Gävleborg	275	0.03	0.16	0	1	1901	0.03	0.16	0	1
Västernorrland	275	0.03	0.16	0	1	1901	0.03	0.16	0	1
Jämtland	275	0.03	0.16	0	1	1901	0.03	0.16	0	1
Västerbotten	275	0.05	0.23	0	1	1901	0.05	0.22	0	1
Norrbotten	275	0.05	0.22	0	1	1901	0.05	0.22	0	1
Discounted number of bids	275	0.21	0.08	0.03	0.49	1901	0.22	0.14	0.01	1
Voteshare, ruling party	413	0.41	0.00	0.03	∪. <del>+</del> ⊅	1899	34.78	10.63	6.90	67.40
No single bidding						1901	0.29	0.45	0.90	1
Media influence	275	4.60	0.87	1.93	6.71	1701	0.27	0.43	U	1
Local press coverage	275	0.56	0.87	0.04	0.71					
Bureaucratic human capital	275	45.26	6.99	31.75	77.00					
Local winner ratio	275	11.63	9.78	0.00	50.00					
Audit chair from majority	275	0.19	0.40	0.00	1					
Higher education (% of	413	0.17	U. <del>4</del> U	J	1					
population)	275	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.32					
New ruling party	275	0.25	0.43	0	1					
Reelected once	275	0.23	0.42	0	1					
Reelected twice	275	0.08	0.27	0	1					
Reelected thrice or more	275	0.22	0.42	0	1					
received united of more	213	0.22	0.72							




Figure A1. Single bidding ratio and one-party rule, 2011-14. Outlier analysis

Note: Data averaged for the 2011-14 term period. Markers for <=2 contract municipalities have been jittered for increased legibility. Including all municipalities garners a weakly significant (p=.08) positive correlation with one-party rule estimated bivariately (positive coefficient, p=.2 when the full battery of controls are introduced).

Table A3. Single bidding ratio and one-party rule, contract-level propensity score matching results.

SCOLC	matering res	uits.
	Raw comparison	Propensity score matching
One-party rule	13.294	13.286
Turnover	11.509	12.035
<i>Difference</i> 95% confidence interval:	-1.785***	-1.251*
lower bound 95% confidence interval:	-1.054	-0.273
upper bound	-2.516	-2.229
N	56,303	17,680

Note. Propensity score matching using logistic model including common pool support sample only (2 treated contracts excluded due to lack of support), without replacement (psmatch2 package in stata 14.0). Contract level controls included: Contract value, product group (2 digit CPV codes), whether the contract is below or above EU reporting thresholds, the number of contracts awarded per year, and type of municipal buyer (municipal administration or municipal company). \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01. \*\* p<0.05.




Figure A2. Single bidding ratio and one-party rule, contract-level propensity score matching, comparison of unmatched and matched samples' bias on the covariate level.

Table A4. Single bidding ratio and one-party rule, contract-level propensity score matching, comparison of unmatched and matched samples' overall bias.

Sample	Ps R2	LR chi2	p>chi2	MeanBias	MedBias	В	R	%Var
Unmatched	0.11	5395.24	0	3.8	1.4	81.2*	0.02*	100
Matched	0.002	60.19	0.327	1.3	0.9	11.7	1.01	0

<sup>\*</sup> if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]

Table A5. Single bidding ratio and stability (2+ reelections), contract-level propensity score matching results.

r- rr		
	Raw comparison	Propensity score matching
Reelected ruling party (2+ reelections)	12.057	12.576
New ruling party	11.645	11.646
difference	-0.412	-0.930*
95% confidence interval: lower bound	-1.080	-1.697
95% confidence interval: upper bound	0.256	-0.163
N	44,014	27,706

Note. Propensity score matching using logistic model including common pool support sample only (no treated contract excluded due to lack of support), without replacement (psmatch2 package in stata 14.0). Contract level controls included: Contract value, product group (2 digit CPV codes), whether the contract is below or above EU reporting thresholds, the number of contracts awarded per year, and type of municipal buyer (municipal administration or municipal company). \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05.




Figure A3. Single bidding ratio and stability (2+ reelections), contract-level propensity score matching, comparison of unmatched and matched samples' bias on the covariate level

Table A6. Single bidding ratio and stability (2+ reelections), contract-level propensity score matching, comparison of unmatched and matched samples' overall bias

Sample	Ps R2	LR chi2	p>chi2	MeanBias	MedBias	В	R	%Var
Unmatched	0.007	355.33	0	1.9	1.2	20.1	0.74	100
Matched	0.008	309.13	0	2.3	1.9	21.2	1.08	100

<sup>\*</sup> if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]

Table A7 Single bidding ratio and stability (one reelection), contract-level propensity score matching results.

	Raw comparison	Propensity score matching
Reelected ruling party (1 reelection)	11.128	11.128
New ruling party	11.645	10.720
difference 95% confidence interval: lower	0.517	-0.408
bound 95% confidence interval: upper	-0.266	-1.209
bound	1.300	0.393
N	51,117	23,244

Note. Propensity score matching using logistic model including common pool support sample only (no treated contract excluded due to lack of support), without replacement (psmatch2 package in stata 14.0). Contract level controls included: Contract value, product group (2 digit CPV codes), whether the contract is below or above EU reporting thresholds, the number of contracts awarded per year, and type of municipal buyer (municipal administration or municipal company). \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01. \*\* p<0.05.




Figure A4. Single bidding ratio and stability (one reelection), contract-level propensity score matching, comparison of unmatched and matched samples' bias on the covariate level

Table A8. Single bidding ratio and stability (one reelection), contract-level propensity score matching, comparison of unmatched and matched samples' overall bias

Sample	Ps R2	LR chi2	p>chi2	MeanBias	MedBias	В	R	%Var
Unmatched	0.015	539.2	0	2.6	1.5	29.3*	0.76	100
Matched	0.02	645.23	0	3	2.3	33.2*	0.56	100

<sup>\*</sup> if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]

Table A9. Single bidding ratio and One-party rule, panel sample.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	. ,	. ,		etween estimat		(-)	\.\'\	(-)	( )	( - /	Pooled OLS	. ,	( - /	
_														_
One-party rule	3.43***	2.69**	3.27***	3.06***	2.50*	3.09**	2.47*	3.25***	2.68***	3.03***	2.83***	2.44**	2.97***	2.59***
	(1.18)	(1.14)	(1.17)	(1.16)	(1.30)	(1.24)	(1.30)	(1.03)	(0.96)	(1.02)	(0.98)	(1.09)	(1.07)	(0.95)
Population														
5-10,000		-7.20***					-4.82*		-9.11***					-6.40*
		(2.38)					(2.53)		(3.46)					(3.29)
10-15,000		-10.08***					-7.01**		-10.99***					-7.03**
		(2.36)					(2.76)		(3.25)					(3.11)
15-30,000		-8.67***					-4.73*		-10.37***					-5.73*
		(2.31)					(2.76)		(3.17)					(2.99)
30-250,000		-11.19***					-7.85***		-12.48***					-7.69**
		(2.29)					(2.87)		(3.12)					(2.98)
>250,000		-11.63**					-9.24*		-12.93***					-8.80***
		(5.05)					(5.29)		(3.15)					(3.17)
Area (log)			1.03***				0.14			1.40***				0.33
ν ο,			(0.39)				(0.68)			(0.35)				(0.58)
Median income				-0.08***			-0.09**				-0.09***			-0.08***
				(0.02)			(0.04)				(0.02)			(0.02)
Constant	11.16	13.24	3.70	26.01***	10.57	10.36	31.30**	9.07***	19.61***	0.02	27.59***	9.69***	6.63***	32.77***
	(8.58)	(8.47)	(8.95)	(9.29)	(8.64)	(8.69)	(13.02)	(1.11)	(3.23)	(2.44)	(4.47)	(1.23)	(1.21)	(8.24)
Observations	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901
R-squared	0.27	0.34	0.29	0.30	0.28	0.37	0.44	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.08
County FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
No.	110	110	110	1,0	125	.10	LLD	110	110	110	110	125	110	125
municipalities	288	288	288	288	288	288	288	288	288	288	288	288	288	288
Dana and and and all									***0.01 **			-00	-00	

Dependent variable: Single bidding ratio. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by municipality in POLS estimations). \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1)

Table A10. Single bidding ratio and Stability, cross-sectional sample.

Tuble Hills Single	Diading	, I allo a	iiu ou	Jiii	CODD DCC	violiai k	ampici
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Reelected once	-0.73	0.22	0.16	0.06	-0.43	0.24	0.76
	(1.24)	(1.28)	(1.26)	(1.26)	(1.33)	(1.40)	(1.50)
Reelceted twice	3.52*	3.00	3.84**	4.04**	4.31**	3.26*	4.34**
	(1.98)	(2.07)	(1.93)	(1.91)	(2.00)	(1.97)	(2.14)
Reelected thrice or more	0.59	1.43	1.54	1.33	0.73	1.54	2.52*
	(1.33)	(1.32)	(1.36)	(1.34)	(1.33)	(1.46)	(1.43)
One-party rule	3.59**	3.67**	3.99***	3.76***	3.28**	3.85***	4.47***
	(1.44)	(1.42)	(1.42)	(1.43)	(1.46)	(1.36)	(1.40)
Populatio	n						
5-10,000		-6.74*					-3.76
		(3.77)					(3.80)
10-15,000		-8.22**					-3.98
		(3.67)					(3.86)
15-30,000		-6.89*					-1.90
		(3.61)					(3.77)
30-250,000		-9.13**					-4.58
		(3.57)					(3.70)
>250,000		-9.31**					-5.35
		(3.75)					(3.93)
Area (log)			1.21***				0.14
			(0.38)				(0.67)
Median income				-0.07***			-0.09***
				(0.02)			(0.03)
Constant	11.16***	18.30***	2.77	26.10***	11.55***	9.08***	34.48***
	(0.94)	(3.50)	(2.81)	(4.89)	(1.02)	(1.45)	(10.81)
Observations	275	275	275	275	275	275	275
R-squared	0.05	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.16	0.23
County FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Party FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
D 1	1. 1. 1. 11	D .	1 C	1. 2011 1		. 1 D .14	. 1 1

Dependent variable: Single bidding ratio. Data averaged for the 2011-14 term period. Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1. Stability reference category: New ruling party.

Table A11. Single bidding ratio and Ruling party vote share.

Iubic			uuiiig i	auo an	a ituiiii	5 Pui ty	VOLC BIL	ui Ci
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
			Fixed	effects			Sys-GMM	Diff-GMM
Voteshare, ruling party	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.16*	0.22**	0.15	0.44**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.20)	(0.22)
LDV						-0.16***	0.02	0.02
						(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Area (log)							1.55	
							(2.24)	
Median income		0.07***			0.06	0.06	-0.09*	-0.00
		(0.03)			(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.26)
Population	1							
5-10,000							-5.23	
							(4.36)	
10-15,000							-5.22	
							(4.50)	
15-30,000							-3.22	
							(4.72)	
30-250,000							-4.80	
							(4.68)	
>250,000							-6.20	
							(5.42)	
Constant	9.32***	-6.42	10.29***	6.39**	-7.78	-7.95	0.00	
	(2.87)	(6.39)	(3.06)	(2.81)	(29.51)	(32.78)	(0.00)	
Observations	1,899	1,899	1,899	1,899	1,899	1,574	1,574	1,283
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.06		
Municipality FEs:	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year FEs:	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FEs:	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs:	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
No. municipalities	288	288	288	288	288	284	284	276
AR1 (p)							0.000	0.000
AR2 (p)							0.846	0.820
Hansen J statistic (p)							0.804	0.693
No. Instruments							81	43

Dependent variable: Single bidding ratio. Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1). GMM models use the twostep estimator with Windmeijer correction; Vote share, ruling party & LDV treated as predetermined and instrumented GMM-style (lag depth 1-4). Other covariates treated as exogenous and instrumented IV-style

Table A12. Odds of No single bidding and One-party rule.

		Tau	ne alz.	. Ouus (	DI 140 SH	igie bi	uumg ar	ia One	-party i	uie.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
			]	Pooled log	it					FE :	logit		
One-party rule	0.83	0.75	0.78	0.70*	0.59***	0.80	0.66**						
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.11)						
Reelected once								0.71	0.75	0.65*	0.77	0.80	0.78
								(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Reelected twice or													
more								0.63*	0.60*	0.51**	0.60*	0.58*	0.54*
								(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Population													
5-10,000				2.16**			1.90**						
				(0.77)			(0.62)						
10-15,000				1.12			2.13**						
				(0.39)			(0.70)						
15-30,000				0.55*			2.17**						
				(0.20)			(0.73)						
30-250,000				0.11***			3.30***						
				(0.04)			(1.47)						
Median income		0.98***					1.01		0.96***				0.97
		(0.00)					(0.00)		(0.01)				(0.03)
Number of tenders					0.83***		0.81***					0.78***	0.79***
					(0.01)		(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of tenders <sup>2</sup>					1.00***		1.00***					1.00**	1.00**
					(0.00)		(0.00)					(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.43***	20.02***	0.44***	0.64	4.04***	0.97	0.90						
	(0.04)	(17.40)	(0.06)	(0.21)	(0.64)	(0.13)	(0.83)						
Observations	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,171	1,171	1,171	1,171	1,171	1,171
Municipal FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
Party FE	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
No. municipalities	288	288	288	288	288	288	288	175	175	175	175	175	175

Dependent variable: No single bidding during year. Odds ratios displayed. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by municipality in pooled logit estimations); \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1). FE logit models estimated using the xtlogit, fe command in STATA 14.2. Number of contracts and its squared term included to account for the mechanical decrease in likelihood of receiving no single bid as number of contracts increase.

Table A13. (Discounted) Number of bidders and Political entrenchment

	(1)	(2)	(3) Cro	(4) oss-section (	(5) DLS	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10) Fixed	(11) Effects	(12)	(13)	(14) Sys-GMM	(15) Diff-GMM
One-party rule	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03***	0.03*** (0.01)								
Reelected once	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Reelected twice or more								0.02**	0.02*	0.03**	0.02**	0.02*	0.02 (0.01)	0.03*	0.05**
Populatio	n							(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
5-10,000		-0.08** (0.03)					-0.05 (0.03)							-0.07 (0.04)	
10-15,000		-0.10*** (0.03)					-0.05 (0.03)							-0.07 (0.04)	
15-30,000		-0.09*** (0.03)					-0.03 (0.03)							-0.05 (0.04)	
30-250,000		-0.11***					-0.05*							-0.07*	
>250,000		(0.03)					(0.03) -0.07*							(0.04)	
Area (log)		(0.03)	0.02*** (0.00)				(0.03) 0.00 (0.01)							(0.04) 0.02* (0.01)	
Median income			(0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)			-0.00*** (0.00)		0.00***			0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
LDV				(****)			(****)		(0100)			(4144)	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00	0.00
Constant	0.21*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.42*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.10)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.05)	0.21*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.14 (0.26)	0.20 (0.30)	0.00	(0.00)
Observations	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,576	1,576	1,286
R-squared	0.04	0.14	0.14	0.12	0.08	0.21	0.30	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.06	1,570	1,200
Municipality FEs:					****	*		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year FEs:								No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FEs:	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs:	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
No. municipalities								288	288	288	288	288	284	284	276
AR1 (p)														0	7.68e-10
AR2 (p)														0.669	0.719
Hansen J statistic (p)														0.677	0.745
No. Instruments								61:11	27.		1 (1)			93	52

Dependent variable: Average number of bidders (discounted). Note that the discounting procedure (1/[number of bidders²]) means that higher number of bidders generate lower scores, and vice versa. Data averaged for the 2011-14 term period in models with one-party rule. Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1). GMM models use the twostep estimator with Windmeijer correction; Vote share, ruling party & LDV treated as predetermined and instrumented GMM-style (lag depth 1-4). Other covariates treated as exogenous and instrumented IV-style.

Table A14. Single bidding ratio and Stability in small and large municipalities.

	1 a	DIC AI	14. 9111	gie bit	iumg .	i auv a	mu su	anmity	111 2111	an am	ı iai ge	mum	страні	169.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
			<u>S</u>	mall mu	nicipaliti	es					L	arge mu	nicipaliti	<u>es</u>		
					_			Diff-				_	_			
				effects			Sys-GMM				Fixed	effects			Sys-GMM	Diff-GMM
Reelected once	4.69***	4.69***	4.87***	4.87***	5.05***	6.14***	7.50***	8.36***	-0.29	-0.81	-0.03	-1.04	-1.07	-0.94	0.75	-0.15
	(1.80)	(1.80)	(1.83)	(1.80)	(1.84)	(2.30)	(2.84)	(3.14)	(0.84)	(0.83)	(0.87)	(0.88)	(0.88)	(1.06)	(1.00)	(1.15)
Reelected twice or																
more	4.13**	4.12**	4.72**	4.28**	4.73**	3.78	7.70**	11.60**	0.75	0.34	0.95	0.15	-0.08	-0.74	1.74	1.12
	(1.78)	(1.78)	(2.12)	(1.80)	(2.17)	(2.59)	(3.36)	(4.84)	(1.27)	(1.17)	(1.37)	(1.14)	(1.22)	(1.50)	(1.41)	(2.37)
LDV						-0.18***	-0.02	-0.02						-0.12**	0.16***	0.10
						(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)						(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Area (log)							-0.75								2.68**	
							(2.34)								(1.19)	
Median income		0.00			0.13	0.30	-0.02	-0.34		0.12***			-0.18**	-0.23*	-0.02	0.04
		(0.05)			(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.48)		(0.02)			(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.15)
5-10,000							-5.09								0.00	
10 15 000							(4.93)								(0.00)	
10-15,000							-8.63								0.00	
15 20 000							(7.04) -9.73								(0.00) 7.00	
15-30,000																
30-250,000							(10.82) 0.00								(6.66) 5.65	
30-230,000							(0.00)								(6.67)	
>250,000							0.00								3.42	
>230,000							(0.00)								(7.12)	
Constant	10.76***	10.51	11.84***	9.54***	-14.74	-46.66	0.00		11.04***	-16.13***	12.01***	7.66***	46.72**	62.55**	0.00	
Constant	(1.10)	(11.61)	(1.32)	(2.17)	(54.22)	(61.59)	(0.00)		(0.73)	(5.14)	(0.81)	(0.80)	(19.42)	(25.61)	(0.00)	
Observations	896	896	896	896	896	718	718	573	1,005	1,005	1,005	1,005	1,005	858	858	713
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.08	/10	313	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.07	0.08	0.05	656	/13
Municipality FEs:	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year FEs:	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FEs:	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs:	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
No. municipalities	143	143	143	143	143	139	139	131	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145
AR1 (p)	1.0	2.0				,	0.000	0.000	1						0.000	0.000
AR2 (p)							0.496	0.662							0.115	0.187
Hansen J statistic (p)							0.535	0.502							0.832	0.834
No. Instruments							86	49							80	45
Danamatant and all and a control and a contr														0.41.63		

Dependent variable: Single bidding ratio. Sample split on median (minimun) population size (15,190.5). Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1). GMM models use the twostep estimator with Windmeijer correction; Vote share, ruling party & LDV treated as predetermined and instrumented GMM-style (lag depth 1-4). Other covariates treated as exogenous and instrumented IV-style

Table A15. Single bidding ratio and One-party rule, interacted by size.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
One-party rule	25.68*	28.31**	22.78	24.47*	33.44**	29.38**
	(13.81)	(13.75)	(13.85)	(13.98)	(14.06)	(14.53)
Population (log)	-0.95*	-0.69	-0.54	-1.00	-0.34	-0.18
	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.52)	(0.63)	(0.52)	(0.50)
One-party rule * (log) Population	-2.32*	-2.60*	-2.04	-2.24	-3.13**	-2.69*
	(1.34)	(1.33)	(1.34)	(1.36)	(1.37)	(1.43)
Area (log)		1.10***				0.18
		(0.36)				(0.69)
Median income			-0.05**			-0.07**
			(0.02)			(0.04)
Constant	20.89***	11.16*	27.70***	21.93***	14.23**	29.59**
	(5.79)	(6.40)	(7.13)	(6.46)	(5.81)	(12.27)
Observations	275	275	275	275	275	275
R-squared	0.07	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.17	0.21
County FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
Party FE	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO

Dependent variable: Single bidding. Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1




Figure A5. Single bidding ratio and One-party rule, interacted with population.

Note. Results derived from to table A15, column 6. Capped lines display 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. Values for controls are set at Ruling party=Social Democrats, Region=Västra Götaland, while (log)Area and Median income are set at their mean values.

xxii

Table A16. Single bidding ratio and One-party rule, by Party.

Table A10. Singl	le blaum	g rano al	ilu Olic-	party rui	c, by I a	ııy.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
One-party rule	2.46	2.35	2.67*	2.49	2.49	2.59*
	(1.55)	(1.54)	(1.51)	(1.55)	(1.53)	(1.48)
Conservatives	-1.47	-0.63	-0.15	0.04	-0.50	1.10
	(1.06)	(1.12)	(1.08)	(1.28)	(1.46)	(1.59)
Center party	-0.55	-0.02	-0.61	-0.80	-0.06	0.40
	(1.77)	(1.83)	(1.77)	(1.74)	(1.69)	(1.79)
Other party	-1.86	-1.23	-0.51	-1.67	-0.16	0.63
	(2.98)	(3.13)	(3.01)	(2.94)	(3.29)	(3.40)
One-party rule* Conservatives	-0.83	-0.21	1.46	2.58	-0.26	1.30
	(4.09)	(3.71)	(4.22)	(4.02)	(4.26)	(3.63)
One-party rule* Center party	1.67	1.71	1.67	1.38	2.58	1.98
	(2.68)	(2.65)	(2.68)	(2.54)	(2.81)	(2.62)
One-party rule* Other party	2.76	3.41	3.10	2.05	1.77	0.28
	(3.27)	(3.49)	(3.28)	(3.26)	(3.28)	(3.57)
Population	1					
5-10,000		-7.10*				-4.46
		(3.79)				(3.69)
10-15,000		-8.56**				-4.10
		(3.62)				(3.77)
15-30,000		-7.22**				-2.46
,		(3.59)				(3.63)
30-250,000		-9.24***				-4.69
,		(3.55)				(3.55)
>250,000		-9.43***				-5.24
		(3.45)				(3.69)
Area (log)		(====)	1.21***			-0.07
(8)			(0.43)			(0.69)
Median income			(01.15)	-0.07***		-0.09**
				(0.03)		(0.03)
Constant	12.27***	19.66***	3.84	28.24***	10.69***	36.41***
	(0.77)	(3.33)	(2.94)	(6.16)	(1.38)	(11.03)
Observations	275	275	275	275	275	275
R-squared	0.04	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.15	0.20
County FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
County I'E	NU	NU	NO	NU	LEO	ILO

Dependent variable: Single bidding. Other ruling party include Liberals (5), Christian Democrats (4), Left Party (2), and local parties (1). Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1




Figure A6. Single bidding ratio and One-party rule, across party ID

Note. Results derived from to table A16, column 6, with one-party rule interacted with party ID ("Other" includes Liberals, Christian Democrats, Left Party, and other parties). Capped lines display 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. Values for controls are set at Region=Västra Götaland, population=30-250,000, while (log)Area and Median income are set at their mean values.

Table A17. Single bidding ratio and Stability, interacted by Party ID.

Tuble 11177 billigie bid	- 0		a Dubin		nucica		
	(1)	(2)	(3) Fixed effects	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Diff-GMM
Reelected once	3.37	3.32	Fixed effects 3.01	3.05	2.81	4.51*	6.97**
Reflected office	(2.11)	(2.11)	(2.09)	(2.10)	(2.38)	(2.59)	(3.43)
Reelected twice or more	0.91	1.01	0.79	0.83	-0.31	1.74	6.77
Reciected twice of more	(2.69)	(2.71)	(2.72)	(2.74)	(2.87)	(1.76)	(4.88)
Conservatives	-2.58	-1.75	-1.50	-1.44	-0.08	-1.88	1.07
	(1.61)	(1.70)	(1.74)	(1.72)	(1.63)	(1.54)	(2.03)
Center party	0.71	1.31	1.36	1.36	4.29	0.53	1.63
I J	(3.02)	(3.10)	(3.10)	(3.10)	(3.80)	(4.59)	(5.34)
Other party	-4.59	-3.99	-4.25	-4.19	-2.03	11.60	0.34
1 7	(4.23)	(4.22)	(4.29)	(4.29)	(4.35)	(12.60)	(5.13)
Reelected once *Conservatives	-2.24	-2.74	-2.08	-2.17	-1.71	-2.00	-5.11
	(2.43)	(2.47)	(2.53)	(2.52)	(2.90)	(2.93)	(3.65)
Reelected once *Center party	-2.36	-2.31	-1.90	-1.93	0.13	-5.60	-5.55
	(4.03)	(4.07)	(4.04)	(4.05)	(5.86)	(5.09)	(5.49)
Reelected once *Other party	1.31	1.39	2.00	1.92	3.40	-4.98	7.83
1 ,	(4.02)	(3.98)	(4.14)	(4.15)	(4.39)	(6.70)	(8.32)
Reelected twice or more *Conservatives	1.75	0.80	1.08	0.94	1.56	4.18*	-3.87
	(3.11)	(3.18)	(3.20)	(3.23)	(3.55)	(2.23)	(5.15)
Reelected twice or more *Center party	0.63	0.69	1.19	1.13	1.76	2.86	-0.99
	(4.36)	(4.33)	(4.33)	(4.36)	(4.79)	(4.99)	(6.21)
Reelected twice or more *Other party	10.40**	9.89*	10.22*	10.09*	10.84*	4.40	11.01
	(5.25)	(5.39)	(5.55)	(5.60)	(5.83)	(10.26)	(14.51)
LDV					-0.17***	0.02	-0.02
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Area (log)						1.09	
						(0.76)	
Median income		0.06**		0.04	0.04	-0.07**	0.11
		(0.03)		(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.03)	(0.21)
Population	n						
5-10,000						-2.19	
						(4.33)	
10-15,000						-2.32	
						(4.51)	
15-30,000						-0.80	
						(4.50)	
30-250,000						-3.03	
						(4.49)	
>250,000						-4.04	
_						(5.02)	
Constant	12.14***	-1.96	9.38***	0.60	6.43	26.71***	
	(1.18)	(6.80)	(1.81)	(28.69)	(32.88)	(9.32)	
Observations	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,901	1,576	1,576	1,286
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.05		
Municipality FEs:	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year FEs:	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs:	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	NO
No. municipalities	288	288	288	288	284	284	276
AR1 (p)						2.44e-09	5.07e-08
AR2 (p)						0.842	0.587
Hansen J statistic (p)						0.677	0.808
No. Instruments						193	130

Dependent variable: Single bidding ratio. Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1). GMM models use the twostep estimator with Windmeijer correction; Vote share, ruling party & LDV treated as predetermined and instrumented GMM-style (lag depth 1-4). Other covariates treated as exogenous and instrumented IV-style.




Figure A7. Single bidding ratio and Stability, across party ID

Note. Results derived from table A17, column 4, with stability interacted with party ID ("Other" includes Liberals, Christian Democrats, Left Party, and other parties). Values for controls are set at year=2012, while Median income is set at its mean value.

Table A18. Political entrenchment, Majority-minority conflict,

and Single bidding ratio.

anu Sii	igie biut	mng rau	U.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	D	V:		
	Majority/o	opposition	D	V:
	relat		Single bio	lding ratio
One-party rule	0.31	0.61**		
	(0.20)	(0.24)		
Majority/opposition relations			0.37	0.60*
			(0.30)	(0.31)
Population				
5-10,000		-0.19		-4.27
		(0.53)		(3.64)
10-15,000		-0.22		-4.48
		(0.55)		(3.70)
15-30,000		-0.24		-2.61
		(0.55)		(3.57)
30-250,000		-0.47		-4.81
		(0.56)		(3.47)
>250,000		-0.85		-5.80
		(0.57)		(3.62)
Area (log)		0.03		-0.17
		(0.13)		(0.71)
Median income		0.01		-0.09**
		(0.01)		(0.04)
Constant	5.26***	2.64	10.25***	35.88***
	(0.11)	(1.94)	(1.64)	(11.42)
Observations	275	275	275	275
R-squared	0.01	0.16	0.01	0.20
County FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Party FE	NO	YES	NO	YES

Table A19. Political entrenchment, Audit control, and Single bidding ratio.

ana on	igic bia	ums ra		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	D	V:		
	Audit ch	air from	D	V:
	maj	ority	Single bio	dding ratio
One-party rule	2.08**	2.55**		
	(0.70)	(1.01)		
Audit chair from majority			1.34	1.28
			(1.18)	(1.08)
Population	1			
5-10,000		0.54		-4.32
		(0.44)		(3.66)
10-15,000		0.45		-4.06
		(0.38)		(3.77)
15-30,000		0.50		-2.35
		(0.40)		(3.64)
30-250,000		1.01		-4.61
		(0.84)		(3.54)
>250,000		6.86		-6.37*
		(9.82)		(3.84)
Area (log)		0.99		-0.31
		(0.16)		(0.69)
Median income		0.99		-0.08**
		(0.01)		(0.03)
Constant	0.20***	5.19	11.95***	38.07***
	(0.04)	(14.12)	(0.52)	(11.01)
Observations	275	275	275	275
R-squared			0.00	0.19
Party FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
County FE	NO	NO	NO	YES
NUTS1 FE	NO	YES	NO	NO
D . 1.C .1. 0011	1.4	1 0 11	1. 1	1.0

Data averaged for the 2011-14 term period. Odds ratios displayed for models predicting Audit chair from majority (columns 1 & 2). Since a number of counties and mayoral parties perfectly predict Audit chair from majority, and are dropped from logit models, these have been substituted by NUTS1-region and the constrained mayoral party ID-variable used in table A16 & A17. Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1

Table A20. Political entrenchment, Media influence, and Single bidding ratio.

and bi	ingic blu			(4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	_	V:	_	V:
-	Media ii	nfluence	Single bio	lding ratio
One-party rule	-0.57***	-0.32**		
	(0.12)	(0.14)		
Media influence			-1.20**	-1.33**
			(0.51)	(0.60)
Population	on			
5-10,000		0.23		-4.19
		(0.34)		(3.65)
10-15,000		0.35		-4.19
		(0.35)		(3.74)
15-30,000		0.13		-2.76
		(0.35)		(3.61)
30-250,000		0.41		-4.79
		(0.36)		(3.52)
>250,000		0.64		-6.00*
		(0.40)		(3.63)
Area (log)		0.03		-0.11
ζ.		(0.07)		(0.68)
Median income		-0.01*		-0.08**
		(0.00)		(0.04)
Local press coverage		-0.33		-4.31
1		(0.39)		(4.16)
Constant	4.73***	5.45***	17.73***	44.45***
	(0.06)	(0.93)	(2.49)	(12.06)
Observations	275	275	275	275
R-squared	0.08	0.29	0.02	0.21
County FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Party FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Data a service of Constant 2011		1 D.1	110	125

Table A21. Political entrenchment, Bureaucratic human capital, and Single bidding ratio.

and b	and bright bluding ratio.									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)						
	DV: bur	eaucratic	DV: Sing	le bidding						
	human	capital	ra	tio						
		•								
One-party rule	-2.97***	-0.08								
F	(0.96)	(0.55)								
Bureaucratic human	(/	()								
capital			-0.34***	-0.31**						
oup run			(0.07)	(0.15)						
Population			(0.07)	(0.13)						
5-10,000		2.91***		-3.49						
3-10,000		(0.97)		(3.65)						
10-15,000		3.89***		-3.42						
10-13,000		(1.07)		(3.70)						
15 20 000		4.67***		, ,						
15-30,000				-1.36						
20.250.000		(1.05)		(3.56)						
30-250,000		7.59***		-1.98						
250 000		(1.24)		(3.61)						
>250,000		8.07***		-1.16						
		(2.06)		(4.01)						
Area (log)		-0.71**		-0.57						
		(0.28)		(0.71)						
Median income		0.05***		-0.04						
		(0.02)		(0.04)						
Higher education,										
population		62.94***		-1.19						
		(10.62)		(14.64)						
Outsourcing		0.19***		-0.01						
_		(0.05)		(0.07)						
Constant	45.93***	21.11***	27.40***	44.16***						
	(0.48)	(5.70)	(3.32)	(11.76)						
Observations	275	275	275	275						
R-squared	0.03	0.81	0.09	0.21						
County FE	NO	YES	NO	YES						
Party FE	NO	YES	NO	YES						
1 411/1 111	110	1 110	110	110						

Table A22. Political entrenchment, Local winner ratio, and Single bidding ratio.

IU.	iuuiiig i	auo.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	D	V:	D	V:
	Local	winner	Single bid	lding ratio
One-party rule	1.50	0.42		
	(1.37)	(1.33)		
Local winner ratio			0.10**	0.07
			(0.05)	(0.07)
Population	1			
5-10,000		-8.77**		-3.46
		(3.93)		(3.64)
10-15,000		-6.05		-4.59
		(4.04)		(3.71)
15-30,000		-6.52		-2.22
		(4.04)		(3.53)
30-250,000		-0.70		-4.84
		(4.19)		(3.48)
>250,000		16.59***		-7.49*
		(5.90)		(4.02)
Area (log)		1.56**		-0.03
, 0,		(0.74)		(0.72)
Median income		-0.02		-0.09***
		(0.04)		(0.03)
Constant	11.23***	6.69	11.15***	38.08***
	(0.64)	(10.97)	(0.74)	(11.22)
Observations	264	264	264	264
R-squared	0.00	0.36	0.02	0.23
County FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Party FE	NO	YES	NO	YES