

(U) What's Happening in Counterterrorism? (part 1)

FROM: SIGINT Communications

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An interview with | S2I) (U//FOUO)

, Deputy Production Manager for Counterterrorism (CT,

• (U) Since 9/11, terrorism has been the nation's #1 intelligence target. What has this meant for the CT Product Line in terms of staffing levels, increased resources, etc?

(S//SI) Prior to 9/11, the CT Product Line was quite small -- 90 or so workers. Today we have over 400 in our workforce, so the growth has been dramatic. However, not all of our work force is permanent -- approximately 35% is considered "temporary," such as interns and military on 6-month tours, contractors, and personnel under the TEDNE (Temporary Employment for the Duration of the National Emergency) program. We're fortunate to have these talented individuals working with us, but we need to shift from crisis manning to a work force posture that will endure for the long fight. We are working with SID and A&P leadership to achieve a level of staffing consistent with our mission demands.

(S//SI) Our target is very complex -- almost indecipherable to those who are unfamiliar with it - and it demands the kind of expertise an analyst gets by working a target over an extended period of time. Another consideration is that the terrorism target is worked in many places outside the CT Product Line, and we need to coordinate those efforts. We have also deployed people to locations where they can have maximum effect. For example, we have two CT analysts working in Islamabad, Pakistan, where they are closer to the front line, yet can still tap into CT resources as needed. That has paid great dividends. So for all these reasons, we are looking for additional permanent staff.

- (U) How's morale in the CT Product Line?
- (U) Our workforce is incredibly dedicated and focused on their mission to prevent another 9/11. However, this dedication, over time, comes at a cost to people's health and personal lives. And since we are in this struggle for the long haul, we must plan accordingly. We can't continue to rely on or ask our folks to work excessive hours to accomplish the mission. And, people have to know that the most critical work is covered, so they can go home.
- (S//SI) The CT leadership intends to look after its workforce by making sure personnel can take leave, receive training, and work reasonable hours. We'll protect our work force from distractions that slow them down, try to get enough manning -- spread across the whole extended enterprise -- to complete the mission, and use partnerships and collaboration to increase efficiency.
- (S//SI) For some time now we've been running a CT watch operation to respond to queries at all hours. This reduces (but not eliminates) the need for calling people in, yet allows us to be responsive to customer needs (and CT gets high marks in that regard). If personnel wish to transfer to another organization, they should be able to do that knowing they have given of their time and talent; maybe using that talent elsewhere in the GWOT [Global War on Terrorism]. But before analysts leave, we need to make sure that any unique knowledge they have is passed on to others working the target.
 - (U) What's the greatest hurdle the CT Product Line faces at this time -- collecting against the target? ...getting personnel with the right specialized skills? ...something else?

(TS//SI) We don't have one key problem -- we have multiple issues that need attention. One area I already touched on is the need for **appropriate staffing**. The struggle against terrorism

will be with us for the long haul -- we view it as a generational war. After 9/11 we went into crisis mode, but that cannot continue indefinitely. As I mentioned, we are negotiating with A&P and SID for the right personnel mix to carry out the mission in CT. But we are also looking at this across the board -- how we can work with foreign partners, the RSOCs, and others, to get the job done. All of the RSOCs are already doing significant CT work, and we expect even more of the mission to be handled by the RSOCs as part of the build-out. [See DIRgram-390: "Mission Alignment and RSOC Build-Out - An Update"].

(TS//SI) Another concern we are struggling with is **technology**. Some of the systems our analysts use require a lot of time-consuming manual manipulation of data. We need to be just as flexible as our targets, who constantly switch communications from one mode to another -- phone to e-mail to SMS [short message service], etc. To tackle this problem, CT's technical directors are working on what we call the "Manhattan Project." Its goal is to improve our analytic capacity. Like the original Manhattan Project, we're bringing together some of the best minds across NSA to focus on a specific task of delivering tomorrow's capabilities today. It's intended to have long-term benefits, and near-term results. Our tech directors have expanded an existing great partnership with S3/Data Acquisition that has resulted in some tremendous successes. We work hard to provide S3 clear, prioritized requirements for the CT mission.

(S//SI) We need help in the area of **training**. We are talking to \underline{NCS} to see whether they can take up additional training responsibilities, easing the significant self-help training burden on personnel in CT. **Space** is another concern. We've had to "hot desk" and schedule additional shift work for some personnel because there were not enough desks to go around. We're also trying to improve our **infrastructure**, working with ITIS to have all needed systems available.

(TS//SI) The **target itself** presents many challenges. SIGINT collection against some CT targets isn't always possible -- sometimes they use couriers to pass messages. In those cases, HUMINT is the only possible means of getting the intelligence. Also, we're following individuals (not big organizations) who come and go, who operate with little guidance, who change their communications often, use unusual dialects and speak in codes -- it all adds up to a complex target.

(U) See the conclusion of this interview tomorrow on SIDtoday.

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