

SOFL: Self-organizing Federated Learning Based on Multi-party Computation and Consensus Algorithm

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Abstract—The security and privacy problem is a significant obstacle that hinders the development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. Federated Learning (FL) is a framework based on which numerous parties can train a machine learning model cooperatively without leaking information about their data. Parties in FL send parameters of local models instead of their data to the server to protect their local data from leaking. However, researches have proven that attackers can reveal FL parties' data through the leakage of local model parameters. Therefore, secure aggregation is critical to ensure privacy-preserving in FL frameworks. The current secure aggregation algorithms in FL rely on the parties to establish a secure channel between each other, which will lead to heavy communication costs for parties. Moreover, establishing secure channels between parties in FL may be unrealistic in some scenarios. In this paper, we propose self-organizing federated learning (SOFL), which is a privacy-preserving FL framework based on secure multi-party computation (MPC) and simplified consensus algorithm. Our method adopts secret sharing to hide local model parameters and runs a consensus algorithm to ensure that the communication is reliable, robust, and efficient. We also conduct a performance evaluation to demonstrate the practicality and efficiency of our proposed framework.

Index Terms—Federated Learning, Secure Aggregation, Machine Learning, Multi-party Computation, Consensus algorithm

I. INTRODUCTION

Mobile devices in daily life are equipped with more and more powerful computing and storage abilities, which enables individual devices to accumulate more and more valuable information. It facilitates a lot of rising technologies such as edge computing. Meanwhile, the accumulated data in users' devices can be used to train models for various practical purposes due to the flourishing of machine learning. In traditional machine learning frameworks, data needs to be gathered in a central server in order to execute the learning process. However, most data collected by mobile devices is sensitive. Users usually refuse to send their private data to others, such as a learning center, which impedes the development of distributed learning among common users.

Since the computing ability of mobile devices is powerful enough to run small-scale machine learning tasks, federated learning [1], which is a distributed machine learning framework, was proposed to address this problem. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of federated learning. In each round of FL, parties receive a global model from the server and train their models based on their own data respectively. Afterwards, the parties send the parameters of their models to the server while the server runs a particular aggregation algorithm to compute the global model based on these parameters. In such

frameworks, users don't need to send their data to the learning server, and thus privacies of participants are protected.

However, attackers are able to infer users' training data through the leaked information of the model's parameters [2], [3], [4]. On the one hand, honest-but-curious participants can eavesdrop others' parameters easily, and based on these they can establish inference attacks. On the other hand, the server is the most suspicious one because it can easily obtain all common users' parameters in the name of aggregation. In the original federated learning framework, parameters are directly sent to the server, which are easy to be captured by others, and it makes the server gathered all information easily. Therefore, sending parameters to the server directly faces the threat of inference attacks. This kind of attack is quite severe because it can be established by any malicious or semi-honest participant in the federated learning process. Therefore, how to conduct joint learning without leaking parameters to others comes into focus.

Secure aggregation protocols enable a group of parties who have private information to compute a function of these private without revealing them. There are many works paid attention to secure aggregation for better solutions [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. E.g., Shi et al.[5] utilized homomorphic encryption (HE) methods to achieve secure addition. With the data encrypted, attackers cannot obtain any useful information from leaked messages. Therefore, secure aggregation is suitable for federated learning, which helps to protect intermediate models' parameters. A trivial solution is to employ homomorphic encryption to implement secure aggregation, however, HE algorithms suffer from low efficiency which is hardly acceptable in FL [10]. Differential Privacy (DP) is another feasible method to implement secure aggregation whereas DP based frameworks add noises to the parameters to deceive the attackers and these noises also have an influence on the learning result and reduce accuracy. Moreover, Blockchain-based methods [11], [12], [13] are also very promising, and the generally used consensus algorithms in them can be inspiring. Yet blockchain-based methods are still implement-unfriendly.

One may think MPC is the best method to implement secure aggregation. However, most MPC protocols have a prerequisite: all participants are able to communicate with each other. In practice, common users of a federated learning task are unknown to each other, which means one party cannot communicate with another directly. This is a severe obstacle between MPC and FL. E.g., Bonawitz et al.[14] utilized Diffie-Hellman key exchange to generate pairwise secret masks with a dissatisfactory efficiency. As a result, some recent works' attention is on MPC's communication overhead now[15],




Fig. 1. The structure of federated learning. Participants train local models respectively and send their parameters to the server for aggregation.

[16]. In addition, Bonawitz's work also pointed out that the robustness of FL frameworks is also significant because most MPC protocols will fail if there are some participants dropped out, and it usually costs a lot to recover from situations where several nodes are crashed. In practice, mobile devices' loss of communication happens frequently, which may cause breakdowns and delays. In summary, employing traditional MPC methods in a system with a large number of users is faced with a problem with efficiency and instability.

A. Motivation

We aim to design a federated learning framework which has these properties:

- 1) It protects users' privacy by employing MPC, while solving the problem that common users are unknown to each other.
- 2) It has low communication overhead, avoiding constructing too many pairwise connections.
- 3) It is secure in semi-honest environments, where all users and the server may eavesdrop information.
- 4) It is highly robust, which means self-adjusting must be enabled to handle emergencies where several terminals may lose connection.
- 5) It does not influence the accuracy of the trained model.

B. Our contribution

- 1) We propose Self-organizing Federated Learning (SOFL), a novel FL framework that utilizes MPC to protect users' privacy. SOFL employs a simple additive secret sharing protocol to realize MPC, which helps to hide intermediate parameters.
- 2) SOFL utilizes hierarchical structure to improve efficiency: our model first elects some leaders, who will construct secure communication with other parties. Afterwards, a party only needs to exchange information

with the leaders. The leaders will send the received information to the server, who helps to forward the information to the corresponding destinations. Appointing leaders reduces the need for communications greatly.

- 3) We take advantage of consensus algorithm to achieve high robustness. Consensus algorithm helps to handle unexpected situations where a leader node or a common client is crashed. It makes all parties come to an agreement quickly when such situations happen.
- 4) We conducted a series of experiments and verified that SOFL has satisfactory efficiency and robustness without reducing accuracy.

C. Roadmap

In Section II we introduce the background of knowledge and some definitions. Next, we introduce related work and some platforms of federated learning in Section III. Section IV detailedly illustrates our proposed framework while describes the attack model. Evaluations for efficiency and security are stated in Section V, followed with experiments and results in Section VI. Finally, we give the conclusion and future expectations in Section VII.

II. BACKGROUND

In this section, we briefly introduce the concepts of key exchange, Federated Learning, multi-party computation and Consensus Algorithms, which are used in our proposed framework.

A. Key Exchange

Key exchange protocols allow several parties to share secret keys under unsafe conditions. Diffie-Hellman [38] (DH) is a prestigious key exchange protocol. We introduce how DH protocol helps two parties to achieve agreement: suppose a and b wants to generate a secret key. They select a group G of order q , and randomly choose a number x_a and x_b respectively. Then a calculates $g_a = g^{x_a}$, where g is a generator of G , and b calculates $g_b = g^{x_b}$. a sends g_a to b , and b sends g_b to a . Finally they can calculate the shared secret s_{ab} respectively:

$$s_{ab} = g_b^{x_a} = g_a^{x_b} = g^{x_a x_b}$$

In this scheme, only g_a and g_b are sent under an unsafe condition. Attackers cannot infer s_{ab} from g_a and g_b , therefore a and b can communicate privately by means of s_{ab} . DH is lightweight and efficient, and it can be expanded to multi-party versions easily in order to enable more parties to share pairwise keys.

B. Federated Learning

Federated Learning was first proposed by McMahan and the algorithm was named FedAvg [1]. FL requires a number of users to jointly train a model. It usually runs for rounds. In each round, each user will train the model based on its data and get the model's parameter. Mark W_i^t as the i^{th} user's parameter in the t^{th} round. When all users have trained their model in round t , an aggregation algorithm Agg will be called to

compute the global model's parameter $Agg(W_1^t, W_2^t, \dots, W_n^t)$, where n is the total number of users. Agg is weighted average in FedAvg. FL not only helps to protect users' privacy but also deals with the "data in form of isolated islands" problem for companies or institutions. Yang et al. also categorized FL into horizontal, vertical and hybrid styles based on the fact that whether the data shares the same feature space or entities [17].

Federated Learning can be generalized to two work environments:

- 1) **Among-institutions:** In this situation FL is usually used to help companies or other institutions solving the "data in form of isolated islands" problem. Generally, companies and institutions are in equal status in an FL framework. Therefore, we can suppose one party can communicate with any other one privately. I.e., P2P is already enabled in this environment.
- 2) **Server based:** In this case a company or institution adopts FL to train a model based on their users' data while protecting their privacy. An FL party is a common user, which means users' communication usually needs to go through the server. With an honest-but-curious server, all information will be eavesdropped by it. Therefore, the problem with confidence is severe in such environments.

Figure 2 illustrates the structures of two environments. Executing MPC protocols and consensus algorithms are at a low price in the first environment. In the second environment, if local parameters need to be protected, we need to run some key-exchange protocols first to construct secure channels among users. Google's keyboard query suggestions [18] project was an effective application of server-based federated learning. One of our contribution is that we solved the problem in the second environment by building connections selectively and efficiently.




Fig. 2. The structures of 2 work environments in Federated Learning. The left is the "Among-institutions" model where institutions can communicate with others directly, and the right is "Server based" model where parties exchange information in virtue of the server.

C. Multi-party Computation

Secure MPC is a branch of cryptography which enables several parties to compute a particular function without leaking

their own data (inputs). Suppose there are n parties employing MPC to compute a function F , and the i^{th} party has its parameter A_i . Their goal is to compute $R = F(A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n)$. MPC has the feature that participants can only obtain R from the process and the party P_i has no idea about parameter $A_j (j \neq i)$. This feature fits the aggregation algorithm in FL greatly.

It was first proposed by Yao to solve the millionaire problem [19]. Most MPC protocols depend on two cryptography technologies: secret sharing [20] and oblivious transfer [21]. MPC can be implemented with garbled circuits, multi-party circuit-based protocols or hybrid methods [22]. It also benefits from fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) algorithms. Garbled circuits and FHE suffer from complicated design and poor efficiency. Therefore, secret sharing methods are more favored to solve the privacy-preserving problem in FL. SPDZ [23] (speedz) is a practical and secure MPC protocol introduced by Damgard et al. It supports addition and multiplication by means of the triples [24], which are generated by somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE). Our method does not require multiplication and hence we do not need to generate the triples choose to use simple additive MPC.

A secret sharing scheme involves a secret s , a set of n parties, and a collection A of subsets of parties. Each party has its share of s . The secret sharing scheme ensures any subset in A can reconstruct s [25]. By means of secret sharing, we can implement secure addition among parties, which is essential in our framework.

D. Consensus Algorithms

In a distributed or multi-party system, there is always a problem with consensus. I.e., in such systems parties always need to achieve agreement on a certain value. This could be difficult without any strategy because different parties may be in different statuses and have multifarious matters. Consensus algorithms are adopted to solve such problems. It is widely used in blockchain and various famous areas.

Paxos was the first consensus algorithm introduced by Lamport [26]. It is used in a lot of famous projects such as Ceph [27]. Raft is a modification of Paxos which is more industrial-friendly [28]. It contains two phases: leader election and log replication. Parties can achieve agreements based on leaders. Considering that FL model is a semi-decentralized system, our framework can utilize Raft algorithm to keep several leaders, based on which MPC protocols can be executed efficiently and robustly.

III. RELATED WORK

Homomorphic encryption based solutions are intuitively effective to solve aggregation problems, and there are many researchers tried to reduce the overhead caused by HE. Stephen et al. [29] designed an additively homomorphic encryption method for federated learning in 2017. However, the encryption method is complicated that it does not reach high efficiency. The state-of-the-art HE method was proposed by Zhang and Li [30]. It reduced the encryption overhead greatly at the cost of trivial loss of accuracy. However, it still costs

much time on computation compared to MPC based and DP based methods.

DP based solutions have better performance than HE based solutions, while Wei et al.[31] has indicated that there is a tradeoff between the performance and security levels, which means it needs numerous adjustments to adopt DP methods efficiently. Robin et al [32]. tested DP in FL in 2017 and the result showed that DP's influence on accuracy is untrivial. Bayesian differential privacy [33] was proposed in 2019. It considered the probability and distribution of data and is effective for machine learning models whose data are often restricted to a particular type. While it may be inefficient in vertical federated learning situations. Whereas all these methods did not prove DP does not impact the accuracy in other more complicated and large-scale models, which means it is different to find a universal DP method for all machine learning models.

MPC based methods have the least computation cost but require more communications. A typical MPC federated learning model is implemented by Google [14]. It requires pairwise key exchange among all clients, which results in enormous overhead on communication. It also provides robustness by means of mask mechanism with some random numbers. However, these mechanisms bring about more overhead. Other researches present hybrid methods [34], [35]. These hybrid methods combine MPC with either HE or DP and make tradeoff on computation and communication.

Federated learning is more and more practical nowadays and there are already many FL platforms: FATE [36] is an open-source federated learning project proposed by Webank's AI Department. It adopts both MPC and HE to implement secure aggregation, while it is still absorbing state-of-the-art methods for privacy-preserving. Pysft [37] is another open-source federated learning framework presented by OpenMined. It is based on Pytorch and offers HE, DP, and MPC as alternative methods to realize privacy-preserving. However, the cost of time of Pysft is dozens of times than pure Pytorch, which indicates that privacy-preserving methods of current federated learning platforms need to be improved.

IV. SELF-ORGANIZING FEDERATED LEARNING

In this section, we introduce the attack model and detailed design of the proposed framework Self-organizing Federated Learning (SOFL). At first definitions of some symbols are listed below:

- **N**: The total number of parties in FL system, and the i^{th} party is marked as P_i .
- **S**: The server, which is the host of federated learning and helps other parties to forward messages.
- **frac**: The fraction of users that will participate in the learning process each round.
- **n**: In each epoch, n parties will be chosen to train the model. $n = N * frac$.
- **N_l**: Number of leaders elected from N parties.
- **L**: The set of leaders.
- **W**: The parameters of a machine learning model. W_i means the i^{th} party's local parameter, and W_{global} is the global model's parameter.

- **C**: The total number of training data. $C = \sum_{i=1}^n C_i$, where C_i is the number of training data of the i^{th} party P_i .

Our framework is based on FedAvg, which computes the weighted average of local parameters as the global parameter. In epoch $t + 1$, the server's target is to compute the following formula:

$$W_{global}^{t+1} = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{C_i}{C} W_i^t$$

Although some researches protect C_i from semi-honest attackers by means of multi-party multiplication, leakage of C_i does not help attackers to reconstruct any data. In addition, C can also be aggregated based on multi-party addition since it only needs addition to compute C from C_i s. Thus, we can set $G_i = C_i * W_i$ to simplify the expression and computation. I.e., multi-party multiplication is unnecessary in this framework. Then the goal of each epoch is:

$$W_{global}^{t+1} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n G_i^t}{C}$$

Therefore, we modeled the FedAvg algorithm to a form where only secure multi-party addition is needed to enable privacy-preserving. When the server obtains C and the sum of G_i by means of multi-party addition, it can compute W_{global} locally.

A. Attack Model

The attacker can be either a party or the server, and we assume an attacker is **honest-but-curious** (or semi-honest). An honest-but-curious attacker gathers the information it receives instead of deviating from protocols. The attacker's target is to reconstruct a user's data based on its parameter, which has a high possibility of being eavesdropped by the attacker. If the attacker is the server, we can suppose all the communications are monitored by it. We also assume that there can be collusions among attackers, however, they do not have the authority and ability to cheat on some processes such as the election.

B. Framework Design

We take the server-based situation for example. Our framework consists of 4 processes: **leader election**, **key exchange**, **secure learning** and **reorganization**. In the leader election phase, the parties elect several leaders who are responsible for the MPC protocols. In the key exchange phase, all parties build secure channels with the elected leaders, based on which a party can privately communicate with leaders without leaking any information to the server. In the secure learning process, the whole system executes MPC enabled federated learning. The reorganization process is activated when a node is crashed. E.g., if a leader is crashed, the reorganization process will generate a new leader as the replacement. The 4 processes are elaborated below:

1) **Leader election:** A server-based federated learning system is different from other joint-systems such as blockchains. Therefore, consensus algorithms can be adjusted more compatible with federated learning models. Our framework adopted a simplified version of Raft: since we have a server in the system, the leaders can be appointed by the “center” instead of being elected by all participants, which can improve the performance greatly.

At the very first, the server randomly selects several parties as leaders. The server generates a set L consisting of the identifiers of leaders. Then it sends L to all parties who will participate in the federated learning process. Afterward, Key exchange protocols will be executed to construct secure channels between common parties and leaders. Note that the secure channels will be constructed between leaders with all N parties instead of n participants.

Heart-beat is used permanently to detect whether a leader is active: we set an interval t_h . The server will send a “heartbeat” to all leaders every t_h passed. If the server does not receive the response in time, it can determine that the leader is crashed and start the reorganization process.

To provide higher security, “leader-tenure” can be adopted as an alternative enhancement. I.e., the system will revoke one’s leadership regularly, and randomly select another common party as the new leader. This method can prevent collusion attacks where the server selects leaders dishonestly. It will be discussed later in Section IV. The interval can be set as 3 epoch’s learning.

In the among-institutions environment, the election process is different because there is not a server helping to appoint leaders. Therefore, the leader election process is more Raft-like: first, the parties act as candidates and send “self-recommendation” to the others with different delays. Then, a party will vote for the first N_l parties that it has received “self-recommendation” from. The N_l parties with the most votes become leaders. The detailed algorithm can be referred to as Raft algorithm [28].

2) **Key exchange:** When the parties receive L , they will know who the leaders are. In order to communicate with the leaders privately, the parties need to run key-exchange protocols to share secret keys. We employ Diffie-Hellman protocol [38] to realize it.

In a server-based environment, a server can communicate with any clients while the parties are unfamiliar with each other. Therefore, the key exchange process should be conducted in virtue of the server. In the premise that the server is honest-but-curious, parties can exchange keys in a “man-in-the-middle” scheme, where the “man” is the honest server. The server delivers information for users to help them complete DH protocol. This process is secure because information leaked to the server in key-exchange protocols is useless.

After the key exchange process, each party-leader pair, a party P_i with a leader L_j will share a secret key K_{ij} . By means of K_{ij} the party P_i and leader L_j can encrypt their data against the honest-but-curious attacker. The message m can be encrypted as $Enc_{K_{ij}}(m)$. Figure 3 illustrates the institution-leader-user structure. Normally, the institution and the common users only need to communicate with the leaders.




Fig. 3. The institution can communicate with all users directly while all the leader-user pair share a secret key used for private communication. The server helps to forward encrypted messages from which it can know nothing.

3) **Secure learning:** The learning method is based on FedAvg algorithm [1]. A secure multi-party addition protocol is used to realize privacy-preserving. There are N_l leaders in the system. Without loss of generality, we suppose $N_l = 3$. The flow chart of secure learning process is shown in Figure 4 and the process is illustrated as below:

- 1) All the selected parties train the model locally. And a party P_i will get a parameter G_i .
- 2) Each G_i is divided into 3 pieces G_{i1} , G_{i2} and G_{i3} , where $G_i = G_{i1} + G_{i2} + G_{i3}$. Then G_{ij} is sent to the j^{th} leader L_j respectively.
- 3) A leader L_j will record a set B_j , which consists of the parties that have sent messages to L_j . When all the parties’ parameters are sent or time is up, the leaders will send B_j s to the server and the server will compute the intersection as B . Then B is sent back to all leaders. Each leader reserve parameter shares according to B in case that some parties did not send parameter pieces to all leaders successfully. Parties not included in the intersection are then removed.
- 4) Leader L_j then computes the sum of the parameters $A_j = \sum_{i=1}^n G_{ij}$. Afterwards, A_j will be sent to the server.
- 5) The server computes:

$$W_{global} = \frac{A_1 + A_2 + A_3}{C} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n G_i}{C}$$

and it is the target of FedAvg algorithm. W_{global} is used to update the global model and the server will prepare for the next learning round.

C can be obtained in the same manner: replace G_i with C_i and the server can get C privately. In fact, C_i and G_i are sent to leaders at the same time. Alternatively, C_i s can also

be directly sent to the server without encrypted since they do not help attackers understanding the parameters. When the system decides to discard a party P_i due to B , it also needs to discard C_i , which will change the amount of training data C . The pseudocode of secure learning is illustrated in Algorithm IV-B3. Neither the server nor any leader can figure out what exactly a certain party's parameter is based on the information it can receive.

Algorithm 1 Secure Learning Algorithm

Require: G_i, L, K_i (the set of secret keys for party P_i), E_{max} (the maximum epoch for federated learning)

```

1: function SPLIT_PARAMETER( $G_i$ )
2:    $r \leftarrow \text{RANDOM}(0, 0.5)$ 
3:    $G_{i1} \leftarrow G_i * r$ 
4:    $r \leftarrow \text{RANDOM}(0, 1 - r)$ 
5:    $G_{i2} \leftarrow G_i * r$ 
6:    $G_{i3} \leftarrow G_i - G_{i1} - G_{i2}$ 
7:   return  $G_{i1}, G_{i2}, G_{i3}$ 
8: end function
9:
10: function PARTY_SEND( $G_i, L, K_i$ )
11:    $G_{i1}, G_{i2}, G_{i3} \leftarrow \text{SPLIT\_PARAMETER}(G_i)$ 
12:   for  $j \in \text{indexes of } L$  do
13:      $E_{ij} \leftarrow \text{ENC}(K_{ij}, G_{ij})$ 
14:     if Sends  $E_{ij}$  to  $L_j$  not successfully then
15:       Report “ $L_j$  is crashed” to  $S$ 
16:     end if
17:   end for
18: end function
19:
20: function LEADER_SEND( $K_j$ )
21:    $B_j \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
22:   Receive  $E_{ij}$ s from all possible  $P_i$  and add  $i$  to  $B_j$ 
23:   Send  $B_j$  to  $S$ 
24:   Receive  $B$  from  $S$ 
25:   Remove  $E_{ij}$ s whose  $i$  is not included in  $B$ 
26:    $G_{ij} \leftarrow \text{DEC}(K_{ij}, E_{ij})$  for each  $E_{ij}$ 
27:    $A_j \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n G_{ij}$ 
28:   Sends  $A_j$  to  $S$ 
29: end function
30:
31: function SERVER_AGGREGATION( $e$ )
32:   if  $e \geq E_{max}$  then
33:     return True
34:   end if
35:   Receive  $A_j$ s from leaders
36:    $W_{global} \leftarrow \frac{A_1 + A_2 + A_3}{C}$ 
37:   UPDATE( $Model_{global}, W_{global}$ )
38:   // Next epoch
39:   Select  $n$  parties to participate in the next epoch
40:   Send  $W_{global}$  to these  $n$  parties
41:   return SERVER_AGGREGATION( $e+1$ )
42: end function

```

4) **Reorganization:** The reorganization process provides the robustness for the framework. Normally, the server will notice a leader's crash within a heart-beat cycle. Meanwhile,

a party will report to the server if it finds a leader is crashed. After noticing a leader is crashed, the server sends “stop” signals to all parties, and randomly select a new party as the new leader. L will be updated and sent to all common parties. Finally, the learning process will be restarted.

C. Among-institutions Model

Since secure P2P communication is already constructed, the key exchange process is removed in this situation. In addition, consensus algorithms can be executed naturally in such an environment as it is in a decentralized system where parties are equal. Therefore, leaders are elected by voting as the original Raft does. The leader-tenure and reorganization processes also vote for new leaders instead of getting leaders from a server.

V. EFFICIENCY AND SECURITY EVALUATION

A. Communications

As illustrated in Section III, our framework only adopts simple algorithms to enhance security. Therefore, the execution overhead can be ignored compared to the communication overhead. Notice that any communication in our framework goes through the server. E.g., if P_i wants to send encrypted message c to L_j , c will be sent to server S first. Afterwards S will forward c to L_j . In general, our P2P communications are emulated with client/server communications. This method accelerates communication greatly because it costs much for two strangers to exchange messages directly. E.g., if two parties want to communicate directly, both of them need to store the addresses, confirm the “accept” signal after each message-exchange, et al. However, with a powerful server helping to forward, these things are no longer concerns for parties.

In each round, there are n common parties and N_l leaders. W.l.o.g., we suppose there is no common party that is also a leader at the same time. Common parties, leaders together with the server S are all parties requiring communication. Generally, N_l is a very small number such as 3, therefore we can treat it as a constant number. Our framework can be categorized into **set-up** and **epoch-learning** two phases. We analyze these two phases respectively:

- **Set-up:** All $N - N_l$ parties need to construct secure channels with all N_l leaders. Suppose it needs D communications in each DH protocol, then the amount of communications of the set-up phase is $D * (N - N_l) * N_l$. The time complexity is $O(N)$ based on the fact that D and N_l are small constant numbers. In the re-organization process, S chooses a new leader that needs to conduct DH protocols with all $N - N_l$ parties, which is $D * (N - N_l)$ communications. Therefore, a re-organization process also costs $O(N)$ communications.
- **Epoch-learning:** In each epoch, S sends the current W_{global} to n parties, which cost n communications. Then every common party sends W_{ij} to N_l leaders respectively, which cost $n * N_l$ communications. Finally leaders send A_j s to S , which cost N_l communications. Thus the total cost of one epoch is $n + n * N_l + N_l$, which is $O(n)$.




Fig. 4. The flow chart of the secure learning process. It is based on the fact that common users have already constructed secure communication channels with leaders. After step 6, the process will enter the next epoch and restart from step 1.

In the time complexity aspect, our framework does not result in higher overhead expect for an $O(N)$ preprocessing compared to the original FedAvg algorithm. In the vertical aspect, our framework does not require more message-exchanges for any party-leader pair.

B. Security Evaluation

The evaluation is based on the fact that our adversaries are all honest-but-curious. Since our framework is based on MPC researches [20], [39], [40], the security against message-leakage can be guaranteed. The riskiest threat is the collusion attack. Colluding with a common party has no contribution to an attack because it lets out nothing but the information about this common party, which belongs to the attacker side. Therefore, we only discuss situations that collusion among leaders.

Apparently, the attacker must collude with all leaders in order to reconstruct one party's parameter. Since the leaders are assigned by the server randomly, it is hardly possible for all attackers to be elected as leaders with the server being honest. However, it is necessary to discuss the situation where the server cheats to select leaders as its wish, though it does not deviate from the learning protocols. In such situations, the leaders are always selected by the unreliable server. To address this problem, we introduced leader-tenure in Section III, which forces the system to change leaders regularly. Since it needs all leaders' betrayal to attack successfully, the system only needs to change one leader regularly. Changing one leader is equivalent to a re-organization process, which cost $O(N)$ time. Therefore, our framework has high security against collusive honest-but-curious attackers.

VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. Implementation

Our framework is implemented with Pytorch. We used AES-GCM-128 as the authenticated encryption algorithm as

Bonawitz et al. did [14]. We adopted Mnist and Cifar as datasets, which are also used in the original FedAvg [1]. We trained simple convolutional neural networks for the classification task. Our experiments are carried on a PC with an Intel i7-8700 CPU (3.2GHz), 16 GB of RAM, and a GTX 1080 GPU. The model was executed in a single thread to facilitate comparing and analyzing. The optimizer was stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and the learning rate is 0.01. The *fraction* is set as 0.1 which means that 10% of clients will be chosen to carry on the training process in each epoch. Our demo is open-sourced on <https://github.com/Carudy/sofl>.

B. Accuracy

Although our work does not modify the learning module compared to other federated learning frameworks, we still conducted a series of experiments to observe the accuracy. We compared FedAvg with our framework on both independently identically distribution (iid) data and non-iid data to verify the effectivity. Since this experiment aims to prove the validity instead of high accuracy, the models were not trained to high accuracy. Figure 5 shows the result. With iid data, our framework obtains accuracy quite similar to FedAvg. With non-iid data, the two systems did not match as well as they were with iid data when the *epoch* was small. However, they finally converged to the same stable scope with the same speed, which confirmed the differences were caused by biases. Therefore, our framework changes nothing about federated learning and it only provides privacy and robustness.

C. Set-up Overhead

In the set-up phase, our system selects several clients as leaders, and the number of leaders impacts the efficiency and a particular leader's load. We set the number of clients as 100, and Figure 6 shows the linear relation between computation time spent on Diffie Hellman key-exchange protocols and the number of leaders. The time spent on computation for DH




Fig. 5. The accuracy of FedAvg and SOFL with iid and non-iid data in MNIST dataset. The horizontal axis *epoch* means the total rounds that the federated learning system has been trained for.




Fig. 6. Total time spent on computation for DH protocols of Bonawitz's FedAvg [14] and SOFL. The number of clients is set as 100.

protocols can be ignored compared to the learning process due to its low cost.

Meanwhile, with more leaders, one common client needs to store more keys for leaders. Apparently, the relationship between the number of leaders and one client's storage overhead is also linear. In addition, we can consider that in the key-exchange process of Bonawitz et al. [14]'s system, all common clients are leaders, which requires all client-pairs to exchange keys and results in high overhead. The set-up overhead is also illustrated in Figure 6. Since it has no leaders, the computation cost does not change. Method of Kanagavelu et al. [16] performs the same as FedAvg because they did not take advantage of the server. Therefore, employing fewer leaders can help to improve efficiency. In contrast, employing more leaders can be beneficial to robustness because it is more flexible for t-out-of-n secret sharing methods, which we will discuss later.

D. Efficiency

As introduced before, the additional computation is insignificant compared to the communication overhead. Since the communication cost varies with equipment and environments, it is more sufficient to measure the overhead using the number of communications instead of wall clock time. Note that communication in our simulation means two communications in practice: a client needs to send a message to the server first, and the server forwards the message to the corresponding leader. We fixed the number of leaders to 3. The amount of communications increases with the *epoch*, and the result is displayed in Figure 7 with the assumption that there is no dropout of packets. The number of clients is another factor that impacts efficiency. We conducted experiments with the *epoch* set to 30 and got the results shown in Figure 8. The result is the same as what we analyzed in Section IV, which means they are all of the linear time complexity. Although the number of leaders also has an influence on the number of communications, we did not conduct corresponding experiments because it is always set as a very small number.




Fig. 7. The amount of communications in learning process with 100 clients without dropout.




Fig. 8. The amount of communications in learning process varies VS the amount of clients. The $Epoch_{max}$ is fixed to 30 and there is no dropout.

E. Robustness

1) *Crash*: The robustness of SOFL is mainly based on the re-organizing process, which happens when a leader is crashed. Crashes can hardly be completely avoided, therefore, we introduced $crash_{rate}$, which is the possibility that a leader would crash during one epoch, to help to measure the robustness. Generally, we consider $crash_{rate}$ is quite small because real crashes rarely happen in nowadays smart devices/servers. However, compared to real crashes, a leader is more likely to be unavailable due to various reasons, which also seldom happen. Therefore we still consider $crash_{rate}$ would not be larger than 0.1. We conducted several experiments on how $crash_{rate}$ impacts efficiency. First, we set the number of clients to 100 and the $Epoch_{max}$ to 10. Figure 9 shows that when crashes happened, it impacts the same on the value of communications instead of the ratio despite the $epoch$. E.g., a crash with $epoch$ 10 resulted in 66% overhead approximately, and it only resulted in about 0.06% overhead when the $epoch$ is 100. It indicates that a high $crash_{rate}$ does impact the efficiency heavily when $epoch$ is low. However, when the $epoch$ gets larger, the influence of crashes becomes insignificant. Considering that the $epochs$ used in real federated learning works are quite large, SOFL provides sufficient efficiency and robustness.




Fig. 9. The average amount of communications VS different crash rates.

2) *Network Delay and Dropout*: Sometimes several packets cannot be received in time due to network delays or dropouts. Bonawitz et al.'s method [14] has considered this issue and it has a pseudorandom generator (PRG) based mask algorithm to solve it. In SOFL's secure learning process, a leader will not be waiting for participants' parameters permanently. It has a time limit, over which the leader will abandon waiting and send the current B_j to the server (introduced in Section IV). Under this circumstance, some common parties will be recognized as having lost connection and removed from the participant-group without contributing to the learning process. However, if a party does not lose the connection while its message reached the leader late because of network delay, discarding it may influence the learning speed and result. We set the




Fig. 10. The average amount of communications with different crash rates.

dropout rate to show the probability that a common party fails to send its parameters to leaders due to packet loss or network delay. Therefore, we carried out several experiments to observe how network delay impacts the learning process. The result is shown in Figure 10. We observed that the influence of dropouts on accuracy is trivial. The accuracy reduced by only 0.002 in the worst case, which may be caused by biases. Therefore, SOFL has a strong resistance to packet loss.

VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

In this paper, we proposed a novel, efficient, and privacy-preserving federated learning framework named Self-organizing Federated Learning (SOFL). SOFL adopted MPC-based secret sharing methods to achieve privacy-preserving against honest-but-curious adversaries. It also employs consensus algorithms based leader election algorithms to reduce the communication cost and provide higher efficiency and robustness. Our experiments showed that SOFL has a linear time complexity VS either the number of clients or training rounds. And it has a high resistance to member changes. SOFL is lightweight and easy-deploying for many existing federated frameworks such as Pysyft and FATE.

However, it remains a problem for federated learning that malicious attackers are more harmful and difficult to defend against compared to honest-but-curious attackers. A malicious attacker can deviate from designed protocols or cheat on data that would go through it. Enhanced MPC protocols such as SPDZ [23] may help to deal with malicious attackers, which could be future work. Therefore, detecting malicious nodes is challenging work. In addition, other federated learning schemes besides FedAvg may contain algebraic calculus more than only addition and multiplication, which means existing MPC based methods will gain high overhead on those schemes. Some blockchain techniques are inspiring to solve malicious attacks such as poisoning and adversarial examples, which may be adopted to enhance SOFL to provide higher security by preventing fraud. It would be significant and interesting for future work to find more approaches to improve the security and efficiency of federated learning.

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