

Message Text

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ACTION SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 PM-06 DODE-00 NSC-05 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 /048 W
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P 212100Z NOV 79
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9417

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 LA PAZ 10076

FOR UNDER SECRETARY BENSON

EO 12065: GDS 11/21/85 (BOEKER, PAUL H.) OR-M
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, BL
SUBJECT: JUSTIFICATION FOR IMET

REF: STATE 292744

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. OUR PROBLEM IN JUSTIFYING IMET IS THAT IT IS BY NATURE A LONG-TERM PROGRAM DIRECTED AT SUBTLE CHANGES IN ATTITUDE THAT NEITHER APPEAR CLEARLY AND SUDDENLY NOR DEMONSTRABLY AS THE RESULT OF OUR INVESTMENT. THE BEST I CAN OFFER FROM BOLIVIA IS THE APPARENT COSTS OF CUMULATIVE UNDER INVESTMENT IN IMET OVER MANY YEARS.

3. THROUGH THE 70S OUR INVESTMENT IN IMET IN BOLIVIA HAS BEEN A CONTINUAL SUCCESSION OF REDUCTIONS, TO THE POINT WHERE OUR IMPACT ON THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF OFFICERS IS PROBABLY MARGINAL. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THIS GENERATION OF OFFICERS HAS HAD ITS ENTIRE CAREER UP TO AUGUST 1979 UNDER MILITARY GOVERNMENTS AND HAS RECEIVED ITS EXTERNAL TRAINING IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND PERU WHERE THE MILITARY ALSO RULES BY SOME PRESUMED NATURAL RIGHT. THIS COMBINATION OF

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FACTORS HAS PRODUCED A GROUP OF OFFICERS WHO HAVE NO REAL COMPREHENSION OF THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND WHO ARE A GLARING AND DANGEROUS ANACHRONISM IN A SOCIETY WHICH HAS EVOLVED TOWARD A REPRESENTATIVE, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT TENACIOUSLY DEFENDED BY ALL SECTORS OF THE CIVILIAN SOCIETY.

4. IN THE FIRST HALF OF NOVEMBER THIS DICHOTOMY BETWEEN PART OF THE MILITARY AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION LED TO A BLOODBATH IN WHICH A GROUP OF ARROGANT, RIGHTIST OFFICERS COMPLETELY OUT OF TOUCH WITH THEIR OWN COUNTRY TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO IMPOSE A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP ON A SOCIETY THAT WOULD NOT HAVE IT. PROBABLY 500 UNARMED CIVILIANS WERE KILLED AND THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY WAS DISGRACED IN A TRAGIC COUP THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN--FROM ANYONE'S PERSPECTIVE.

5. ONE OF THE COMMON CHARACTERISTICS IN THE GROUP OF MIDDLE-AGED RIGHTIST OFFICERS WHO LED THE COUP AND IN THE YOUNGER OFFICERS WHO FOLLOWED THEM WAS THAT THEY HAD VIRTUALLY ALL HAD NO TRAINING IN THE US, WHEREAS US TRAINING OR CLOSE TIES WERE COMMON AMONG THE MORE DEMOCRATIC-MINDED OFFICERS WHICH THE COUP LEADERS PUSHED ASIDE. IF ALL GOES AS EXPECTED NOW, THE MIDDLE-AGED RIGHTISTS AND SOME OF THE MORE BRUTAL YOUNGER OFFICERS INVOLVED WILL NOW BE PURGED OR PUSHED ASIDE TO UNIMPORTANT ASSIGNMENTS. BUT A VERY SERIOUS ATTITUDINAL CRISIS REMAINS WITHIN THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY.

6. WHILE IMET OR THE SHORTAGE OF IT HAS OBVIOUSLY NOT BEEN A PRINCIPAL FACTOR IN THIS RECENT TRAGEDY, I
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DO BELIEVE THE VERY LOW LEVEL OF THE YOUNGER OFFICER'S EXPOSURE TO THE US AND US ATTITUDES AND THE ROLE AND DOCTRINE OF THE US MILITARY, COMBINED WITH THE DOMINANCE OF ARGENTINE TRAINING IN PARTICULAR, HAS BEEN A FACTOR BEHIND THE PREVALENCE OF ARROGANT, ANACHRONISTIC, AND DANGEROUS ATTITUDES ON THE MILITARY AND POLITICS AMONG YOUNGER BOLIVIAN OFFICERS. AMONG AN OLDER GENERATION MANY OF WHOM SPENT CHERISHED MONTHS AT FORT BENNING OR IN OTHER US SCHOOLS THERE IS A CLEAR SOFTER EDGE ON THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS, A MORE HUMBLE CONCEPT OF THE MILITARY AND A MORE RATIONALIST APPROACH TO ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY.

7. THE FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO THE QUESTIONS POSED IN PARAGRAPH 2, REFTEL, WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO OUR SITUATION AND NOT ADDRESSED ABOVE:

A. THE IMET PROGRAM SERVES THE DUAL PURPOSES OF (1) INTRODUCING BOLIVIAN OFFICERS TO US MILITARY DOCTRINE, TACTICS AND TRAINING METHODS, AND (2) PROVIDING BOLIVIAN OFFICERS AN IN-DEPTH REAL LIFE EXPOSURE TO US INSTITUTIONAL IDEALS AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY.

B. AS A RESULT OF THE MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND EXPANSIVE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE PAST, I AND KEY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF HAVE BEEN AFFORDED EXCELLENT ACCESS TO THE MILITARY OFFICIALS OF THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES. IN ALMOST ALL CASES, THE RESULTS OF THESE DIRECT CONTACTS HAVE BEEN MORE CONGENIAL AND FRUITFUL WHERE THE CONTACTED OFFICIAL HAS ATTENDED US MILITARY TRAINING IN PANAMA OR, ESPECIALLY, THE US.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LA PAZ 10076

FOR UNDER SECRETARY BENSON

C. RISING COURSE COSTS AND DECLINING BUDGET LEVELS HAVE SEVERELY REDUCED IMET EFFECTIVENESS. THE CONSTANT AND CONTINUING BUDGET SQUEEZE HAS MOST AFFECTED OUR ABILITY TO SEND STUDENTS TO TRAINING IN THE US. TRAINING IN THE PANAMA MILITARY SCHOOLS IS LESS EXPENSIVE; HENCE, IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE THE NUMBER OF BOLIVIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL ATTENDING US MILITARY TRAINING, WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO ALLOCATE THE MAJOR PORTION OF OUR LIMITED IMET PROGRAM TO PROVIDE FOR TRAINING IN THE PANAMA MILITARY SCHOOLS. THE VALUE OF THE PROGRAM IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO ITS SIZE. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WE COULD ACHIEVE GREATER BENEFITS FROM A LARGER PROGRAM. A MODEST INCREASE IN OUR IMET INVESTMENT NOW WOULD BEAR HIGH DIVIDENDS IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERM. IN THE SHORT TERM, AS A CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE INDICATION OF THE US GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE TIES WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY. AND, IN THE LONG TERM, THROUGH INFLUENCE ON THE ATTITUDINAL CONDITIONING OF THE EMERGING LEADERS OF THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES.

D. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO PROVIDE
TRAINING TO THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY AS GRANT AID. THE
EXTREME FRAGILITY OF THE BOLIVIAN ECONOMY WILL CERTAINLY
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IMPACT ON THE BUDGETARY RESOURCES OF THE MILITARY
SERVICES. THEY WILL NOT BE IN ANY POSITION TO PURCHASE
TRAINING THROUGH FMS. FURTHER, WE WILL BE IN A BETTER
POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE COURSES WHICH WE PREFER THAT THE
BOLIVIANS ATTEND AND ALSO TO INSURE THAT THOSE OFFICERS
MOST LIKELY TO RISE TO POSITIONS OF HIGH RESPONSIBILITY
IN THE MILITARY HIERARCHY ATTEND TRAINING IN THE US.

E. THE FY 81 IMET PROGRAM IS A FURTHER STEP IN
THE TREND OF THE STEADY REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM. THIS ALARMING AND
DAMAGING TREND CAN ONLY BE ARRESTED AND TURNED AROUND
BY INCREASING PROGRAM LEVELS OR REDUCING THE COST OF
TRAINING. THE FY 81 DOLLAR LEVEL WILL FALL FAR SHORT
OF PROVIDING US THE RESOURCES REQUIRED TO BEGIN TO
ACHIEVE OUR IMPORTANT GOAL OF CHANGING THE ATTITUDINAL
SET OF THE YOUNG OFFICERS WHO ARE STILL IN THE FORMATIVE
STAGES OF THEIR CAREERS. WE REQUIRE ADDITIONAL
RESOURCES SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR THE FOLLOWING TRAINING
IN THE US:

COURSE TITLE	NO STUDENTS	TOTAL COST #
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ARMY

ARMOR OFFICER BASIC	2	\$42,980
ARTILLERY OFFICER BASIC	2	22,204
INFANTRY OFFICER BASIC	2	25,606
ARMOR OFFICER ADVANCED	1	18,511
ARTILLERY OFFICER ADVANCED	1	16,661
INFANTRY OFFICER ADVANCED	1	15,011
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF	1	28,420

NAVY

NAVAL COMMAND COURSE	1	21,538
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USMC BASIC COURSE	2	31,300
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AIR FORCE

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING (3PHASES)	2	484,496
UNDERGRADUATE NAVIGATOR TRAINING	1	49,237

SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL 1 15,515

771,479

INCLUDES ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING COSTS.

8. IF WE COULD INCREASE OUR IMET PROGRAM SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE NEXT 5-10 YEARS FROM \$400,000 ANNUALLY TO APPROXIMATELY \$1,200,000, I AM CONVINCED THE US WOULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCING THE TENSIONS AND DANGER INVOLVED IN THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY'S STILL ANACHRONISTIC AND PARTLY HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARD BOLIVIA'S COURAGEOUS TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN CONSTITUTIONAL RULE. I CONSIDER SUCH AN INCREASE SO IMPORTANT THAT I WOULD BE WILLING TO TRADE SOME OF OUR \$5.5 MILLION OF FMS FOR AN IMET INCREASE, IF SUCH A TRADE-OFF WERE POSSIBLE IN FY 80, 81 OR BOTH. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REACTION AS TO WHETHER THE BUDGETING OF FMS GUARANTEE RESERVES AND IMET ALLOWS ROOM FOR SUCH A TRADE-OFF.

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