

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 04058 01 OF 08 102108Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 SS-15 ACDA-12 DODE-00 AID-05  
EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 MCE-00 OMB-01  
NSC-05 SP-02 TRSE-00 HA-05 SR-05 DLOS-09 OES-09  
IO-14 SAA-01 INM-05 LABE-00 SIL-01 SPTA-02 ICA-11  
/140 W

-----128813 110204Z /75

R 091700Z MAY 79  
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6160  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 8 LA PAZ 4058

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/31/84 (BOEKER, PAUL) OR-M  
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX  
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

REF: (A) STATE 77582, (B) 78 STATE 167901, (C) 78 LA PAZ 6309

1. SECRET- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. INTRODUCTION: SINCE AUGUST, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL  
CHANGES IN BOLIVIA'S POLITICAL/MILITARY ENVIRONMENT WHICH  
BEAR ON OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP. FIRST, THE  
GOVERNMENT OF AIR FORCE GENERAL JUAN PEREDA PROVED TO BE  
SHORT-LIVED: IT WAS DEPOSED ON NOVEMBER 24, 1978, BY A  
MILITARY JUNTA HEADED BY ARMY GENERAL DAVID PADILLA.  
THE PADILLA GOVERNMENT PROMPTLY DECLARED GENERAL  
ELECTIONS FOR JULY 1, 1979, SETTING AUGUST 6 AS  
THE DATE OF TRANSFERRING POWER TO THE NEW  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 04058 01 OF 08 102108Z

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. SECOND, THE ECONOMY,  
WHICH BEGAN TO DECLINE TOWARD THE END OF THE  
BANZER REGIME, HAS, UNDER PEREDA AND PADILLA,  
DETERIORATED EXPONENTIALLY. PADILLA HAS BEEN  
RELUCTANT TO IMPLEMENT NECESSARY CORRECTIVE MEASURES  
FOR TWO REASON: (1) HE FEARS THAT ATTENDANT SOCIAL  
UNREST COULD THREATEN THE ELECTORAL TIMETABLE, AND

(2) HE DOES NOT WANT TO INVITE POPULAR CRITICISM OF THE ARMED FORCES. DESPITE THE DEEPENING ECONOMIC CRISIS, PADILLA AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO SACRIFICE THEIR INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS. AWARE THAT FUNDS ARE IN EVER SHORTER SUPPLY, THEY ARE DETERMINED TO PURCHASE NECESSARY MILITARY EQUIPMENT BEFORE SURRENDERING POWER ON AUGUST 6. IN OUR VIEW, AT LEAST SOME OF THESE PURCHASES, ALTHOUGH HARDLY TIMELY, MAY BE NECESSARY. IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, BOLIVIA'S ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN UNDERSUPPLIED AND UNDEREQUIPPED. WITHDRAWING FROM THE GOVERNMENT, THEY WILL REQUIRE NEW EQUIPMENT IN ORDER TO RECOUP THE PROFESSIONAL EFFORT THAT HAS ATROPHIED IN RECENT YEARS. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH THE THREAT OF CONFLICT BETWEEN CHILE AND PERU HAS DIMINISHED, TOP COMMANDERS STILL WORRY THAT BOLIVIA'S BORDERS CAN BE VIOLATED WITH IMPUNITY. THIS PERCEPTION IMPELS THEM TO REFURBISH THEIR INVENTORIES. JUSTIFIED OR NOT, THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO FEEL SECURE UNTIL THEY HAVE DONE SO.

3. US INTERESTS/OBJECTIVES:

A. THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS DIRECTLY TIED TO THE PIVOTAL UNITED STATES' INTEREST OF  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 04058 01 OF 08 102108Z

MAINTAINING STABILITY IN THE ANDEAN REGION. IN ADDITION, THE PROGRAM HELPS DEVELOP INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN US AND BOLIVIAN OFFICERS. SUCH RELATIONSHIPS FACILITATE VALUABLE EXCHANGES OF VIEWS AND SERVE AS A CONDUIT FOR EXPRESSIONS OF US INTEREST IN MATTERS SUCH AS DEMOCRATIZATION, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ARMS CONTROL AND THE REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE ANDEAN REGION. FINALLY, SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMPLEMENTS PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND HELPS SUSTAIN AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THE US HAS ACCESS TO DOMESTIC RAW MATERIALS AND IN WHICH US PRODUCTS MAY BE MARKETED COMPETITIVELY.

B. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES ARE POSTULATED ON THE MAINTENANCE OF A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY. THEY ENTAIL ENCOURAGING THE MILITARY: (1) TO DISPLAY RESTRAINT AND MODERATION IN ITS RENOVATION EFFORTS; (2) TO CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE ITS NATION-BUILDING AND CIVIC ACTION ROLES; AND (3) TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, WE MUST REMAIN RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN

ACQUIRING REASONABLE AMOUNTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT  
AND BE ABLE TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE CZ AND CONUS  
TRAINING FOR ARMED FORCES PESONAL.

4. EXTERNAL/INTERNAL THREATS:

-) THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT BETWEEN CHILE AND  
ARGENTINA OVER THE BEAGLE CHANNEL ISSUE APPEARS TO  
HAVE DIMINISHED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS;  
SIMILARLY, NEARLY HALFWAY THROUGH THE CENTENARY YEAR  
OF THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, A PERUVIAN ATTACK AGAINST  
CHILE SEEMS MOST IMPROBABLE. NONETHELESS, THE SPECTER  
OF SUCH CONFLICTS, HOWEVER UNLIKELY, HAS MADE  
A STRONG IMPRESSION ON THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY. WHATEVER  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LA PAZ 04058 01 OF 08 102108Z

STRATEGIES THE POTENTIAL COMBATANTS MAY CONSIDER,  
BOLIVIAN OFFICERS VIEW THEIR NATIONAL BOUNDARIES AS ALL  
BUT DEFENSELESS. THEY ARE ACUTELY AWARE THAT SINCE  
GAINING INDEPENDENCE IN 1825, BOLIVIA HAS LOST TERRITORY  
TO ALL FIVE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. WITH A LAND AREA  
APPROXIMATELY TWICE THAT OF FRANCE AND WITH A POPULATION  
OF LESS THAN FIVE MILLION, THEY NEED NOT RESORT TO  
SOPHISTICATED ANALYSIS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT REMAINS  
VULNERABLE TO ARMED INCURSION AND CULTURAL ENCROACHMENT.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 04058 02 OF 08 102058Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 SS-15 ACDA-12 DODE-00 AID-05

EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 MCE-00 OMB-01

NSC-05 SP-02 TRSE-00 HA-05 SR-05 DLOS-09 OES-09

IO-14 SAA-01 INM-05 LABE-00 SIL-01 SPTA-02 ICA-11

/140 W

-----128737 110204Z /75

R 091700Z MAY 79

FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6161

INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 8 LA PAZ 4058

IMBUE WITH THIS REALITY, THE MILITARY, PARTICULARLY  
AS IT RECEDES FROM ITS ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT,  
PERCEIVES THE NEED TO IMPROVE ITS TABLES OF  
ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT--IN EFFECT, TO BECOME  
WORTHY OF ITS CALLING.

B) ASSUMING REASONABLY HONEST ELECTIONS TAKE  
PLACE JULY 1, POLITICAL UNREST APPEARS UNLIKELY.  
LABOR PROTESTS, INCLUDING SPORADIC STRIKES AND  
WORK STOPPAGES SPURRED BY THE DEEPENING ECONOMIC  
CRISIS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE EXPECTED.  
NEVERTHELESS, AS LONG AS THE ARMED FORCES ARE  
PERCEIVED TO BE REASONABLY WELL EQUIPPED AND UNIFIED,  
THEIR MANDATE TO PRESIDE OVER PUBLIC ORDER WILL  
PROBABLY NOT BE CHALLENGED.

5. US EMBASSY VIEW OF THE EFFICACY OF BOLIVIAN  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 04058 02 OF 08 102058Z

CONCERNS: WHILE WE VIEW THE MILITARY'S CONCERN  
ABOUT A NEIGHBORING CONFLICT SPILLING OVER INTO  
BOLIVIAN TERRITORY AS EXAGGERATED, WE WOULD AGREE  
WITH THE PERCEPTION THAT THE NATIONAL BORDERS  
ARE EXTREMELY VULNERABLE. IN RECENT YEARS, ALTHOUGH  
IT IS TRUE THAT THE TOP LEVELS OF THE ARMED FORCES  
HAVE GROWN FAT OFF THE GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY'S  
LOGISTICAL FOUNDATION HAS ERODED. IN THIS CONTEXT,  
SOME EQUIPMENT PURCHASES, INsofar AS THEY CONFORM  
TO A LIGHT-WEAPON, DEFENSE-ORIENTED MODALITY,  
ARE PROBABLY NECESSARY AND IN ANY CASE WOULD APPEAR TO BE UN-  
STOPPABLE. A BETTER, BUT STILL LIGHTLY EQUIPPED BOLIVIAN  
MILITARY DOES SERVE THE US OBJECTIVE OF ACCOMMODATING THE  
ARMED FORCES TO A PROFESSIONAL ROLE OUT OF POLITICS.

6. HOST COUNTRY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: THE BOLIVIAN  
ARMED FORCES HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE EXTERNAL THREAT  
(SEE ABOVE) AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THEIR AVOWED GOAL  
OF OBTAINING A SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN  
BY DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS DEMAND THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF A CREDIBLE MILITARY FORCE. PREVIOUS EMBASSY MESSAGES  
HAVE ELABORATED ON THE SCOPE OF CURRENT BOLIVIAN ARMS  
PURCHASES. THE EXTENT OF RECENT PURCHASES HAVE BEEN  
MAGNIFIED BY THE ARMS PURCHASES RESTRAINTS EXERCISED

BY THE BANZER GOVERNMENT. THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES ARE PAINFULLY AWARE OF THE ABYSMAL STATE OF THEIR MILITARY EQUIPMENT INVENTORY. CERTAINLY, SOME OF THE URGENCY OF THESE ARMS PURCHASES RESTS ON THE RECOGNITION OF THE REQUIREMENT TO OUTFIT THE ARMED FORCES WITH REASONABLE STOCKS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT SO AS TO PROVIDE A MEANS FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO FULFILL THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ONCE THEY HAVE RETURNED TO THE BARRACKS. WE ARE AWARE THAT THERE HAS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 04058 02 OF 08 102058Z

BEEN SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE, AT LEAST WITHIN SOME UNITS OF THE ARMY (CHALLAPATA), FOR THE HIGH COMMAND TO TAKE ACTION TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. WE HAVE NOT ENTERED INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH BOLIVIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO DETERMINE SPECIFICALLY THEIR LONG TERM FORCE DEVELOPMENT GOALS. HOWEVER, BASED UPON THE REPORTS WHICH HAVE REACHED US, TOGETHER WITH QUERIES FROM THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES TO THE MILGP/DAO, IT APPEARS THAT THEY INTEND TO DEVELOP A REASONABLY BALANCED DEFENSIVE FORCE WITH EMPHASIS ON ANTI-TANK DEFENSE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ANY PROJECTION OF EQUIPMENT WHICH GOB MAY WISH TO PURCHASE FROM THE USG IN THE FY 81-83 TIME-FRAME MUST BE BASED ON TENUOUS INFORMATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES. WE ARE REASONABLY CERTAIN AS TO THE TYPE EQUIPMENT ITEMS GOB MAY SEEN TO ACQUIRE. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF MANY UNKNOWN, BUT CRITICAL FACTORS (E.G., DELIVERY CONSTRAINTS ESTABLISHED BY GOB, AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS/FINANCING, WILLINGNESS OF USG AND THIED COUNTRIES TO SELL/PROVIDE FINANCING ETC.) WE CANNOT PREDICT ACCURATELY THE COUNTRIES FROM WHICH PURCHASES WILL BE MADE, NOR THE METHOD OF FINANCING.

7. THE FORCE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES OF THE GOB ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH US ARMS TRANSFER POLICY, EXCEPT THAT THE PURCHASES REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE FORCE WILL INCREASE THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF GOB AND WILL DIVERT FINANCIAL RESOURCES FROM NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. THE ARMS BEING ACQUIRED WILL NOT CHANGE BOLIVIA'S RELATIVE POSITON OF MILITARYI INFERIORITY TO ANY OF ITS NEIGHBORS WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF PARAGUAY. HOWEVER, SUCH ACQUISITIONS COULD STIMULATE ADDITIONAL ARMS PURCHASES BY OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION IF IT WERE PLACED IN THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LA PAZ 04058 02 OF 08 102058Z

CONTEXT OF REGIONAL RELATIONS, ALLIANCES, AND  
INCREASED SECURITY THREATS.

8. DEFENSE SPENDING HAS INCREASED SHARPLY IN 1979,  
AS THE ARMED FORCES SEEK TO MODERNIZE THEIR WEAPONRY.  
PURCHASES REPORTEDLY AMOUNT TO \$103 MILLION BUT  
LITTLE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ABOUT THE TERMS.  
WE UNDERSTAND THAT SUPPLIERS HAVE GRANTED GRACE  
PERIODS ON PAYMENTS FOR SOME OF THE ITEMS PROCURED,  
THEREBY REDUCING THE IMPACT ON THE 1979 BALANCE OF  
PAYMENTS. BY INCREASING THE COUNTRY'S DEBT  
BURDEN, WHICH NOW AMOUNTS TO APPROXIMATELY \$1.8  
BILLION, THESE PURCHASES CAN BE SAID TO  
HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE DETERIORATING BOLIVIAN  
ECONOMIC SITUATION. HOWEVER, TO THE EXTENT THEY

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 04058 03 OF 08 102308Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 SS-15 ACDA-12 DODE-00 AID-05  
EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 MCE-00 OMB-01  
NSC-05 SP-02 TRSE-00 HA-05 SR-05 DLOS-09 OES-09  
IO-14 SAA-01 INM-05 LABE-00 SIL-01 SPTA-02 ICA-11  
/140 W

-----129455 110205Z /75

R 091700Z MAY 79  
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6162  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 8 LA PAZ 4058

FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THE MILITARY TO THE BARRACKS  
IN A DEFENSIVE ROLE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION WHICH SUPPORTS RATHER  
THAN REPLACES CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS, THESE ACQUISITIONS

MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF THE INCOMING ELECTED GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH THE NATION'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. RECENT MILITARY GOVERNMENTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED AMPLY THAT THEY ARE INCAPABLE OF DEALING WITH BOLIVIA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS, BUT A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY TO INTRODUCE THE STRINGENT STABILIZATION PROGRAM WHICH IS NOW REQUIRED. ON BALANCE, WE CONSIDER THE TYPE OF PURCHASES MADE IN 1979 TO BE REASONABLE. WHILE THE PRICES PAID ARE IN SOME CASES EXCESSIVE. IN LIGHT OF THE ECONOMIC CRUNCH WHICH WE FORESEE BY YEAR END, WE DOUBT THAT SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL PURCHASES WILL BE POSSIBLE DURING THE COMING FISCAL YEAR.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 04058 03 OF 08 102308Z

#### 9. LISTING AND ASSESSMENT OF ITEMS PROJECTED FOR PURCHASE FROM US.

##### A) LISTING

DEFENSE ARTICLES TO BE PROCURED FROM THE US IN FY 81:

ITEM	QTY (000)	COST	PRIORITY	METHOD
HELICOPTER UH1H	4	\$3,600	1	FMS CREDIT
RADIO SET TACTICAL				
AN/PRC 77 OR EQUIV	100	100#	2	FMS CREDIT
RADIO SET TACTICAL				
AN/GRC47 OR 3178;	100	200#	2	FMS CASH
BULLDOZER, D7	3	900#	3	FMS CREDIT
GRADER ROAD	4	600#	4	FMS CREDIT
TRUCK DUMP				
COMMERCIAL	25	1,000#	5	FMS CREDIT
CARRIER PERSONNEL				
M113	40	1,080	6	FMS CASH
TRUCK CARGO				
2 1/2T	90	3,600	7	FMS CASH
TRUCK TANK FUEL				
1200 GAL.	12	600#	8	FMS CASH
TRUCK UTIL 1/4T	90	810	9	FMS CASH
#ESTIMATED COST	TOAAL			FMS CREDITS 6,100
				FMS CASH 6,390
				GRAND TOTAL 12,490

##### 2) DEFENSE ARTICLES TO BE PROCURED FROM THE US IN FY 82:

ITEM	QTY (000)	COST	PRIORITY	METHOD
CH130H A/C	1	10,530	1	COMM CREDIT
HOW TOWED 105MM	18	2,196	2	FMS CASH

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 04058 03 OF 08 102308Z

HCPTR UH1H	4	3,940	3	FMS CREDIT
TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2T 90	3,780	6	FMS CASH	
CARRIER M113A1	40	4,280	5	FMS CASH
MORTAR 81MM	50	400	4	FMS CASH
VULCAN AD SYSTEM	6	2,886	7	FMS CASH
BULLDOZER D7	6	1,800#	9	FMS CREDIT
GRADER ROAD	4	600#	10	FMS CREDIT
AMMUNITION	VARIOUS	500	8	FMS CASH
REPAIR PARTS VARIOUS	200	11	FMS CASH	
# ESTIMATED COST TOTAL			FMS CREDIT	6,348
			FMS CASH	14,242
			COMM CREDIT	10,530
			GRAND TOTAL	31,120

## 3) DEFENSE ARTICLES TO BE PROCURED FROM THE US IN FY 83:

ITEM	QTY (000)	COST	METHOD	PRIORITY	OF PAYMENT
C130H A/C	1	12,070	1	COMM CREDIT	
TOW/ANTI-TANK					
SYSTEM	24	120	5	FMS CREDIT	
ABN CMD/CONTROL					
SYSTEM	1	3,000#	7	FMS CREDIT	
PAVING MACHINE	1	200#	2	FMS CRDIT	
BRIDGE BAILEY					
W/EQUIPMENT	2	2,000#	3	FMS CREDIT	
HOWITZER 105MM					
TOWED	18	2,286	4	FMS CREDIT	
AMMUNITION	VARIOUS	1,000	6	FMS CASH	
REPAIR PARTS	VARIOUS	200	8	FMS CASH	
# ESTIMATED COST TOTAL			COMM CRDDIT	12,070	
			FMS CREDIT	7,606	
			FMS CASH	1,200	
			GRAND TOTAL	20,876	

B. ASSESSMENT: WHILE IMMEDIATE CONCERN HAS BEEN  
EXPRESSED WITH OBTAINING A WIDE RANGE OF NEW EQUIPMENT  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LA PAZ 04058 03 OF 08 102308Z

BY AUGUST OF THIS YEAR, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS  
URGENCY CAN BE LAID TO THE DESIRE OF THE PRESENT  
MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM QUANTITIES OF  
MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHILE IT STILL HAS THE POWER TO  
INITIATE ACQUISITIONS. NEVERTHELESS, MODERNIZATON  
IN THE ARMED FORCES IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO  
ENABLE EXPANDED AND IMPROVED INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS,  
NATION-BUILDING AND TROOP/MATERIAL TRANSPORTABILITY,



CONCURRENT WITH IMPROVED DEFENSIVE CABILITIES IN  
ANTI-TANK, AIR DEFENSE AND LIMINTED FIRE SUPPORT OF

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 04058 04 OF 08 102334Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 SS-15 ACDA-12 DODE-00 AID-05  
EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 MCE-00 OMB-01  
NSC-05 SP-02 TRSE-00 HA-05 SR-05 DLOS-09 OES-09  
IO-14 SAA-01 INM-05 LABE-00 SIL-01 SPTA-02 ICA-11  
/140 W

-----129672 110206Z /75

R 091700Z MAY 79  
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6163  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 8 LA PAZ 4058

INFANTRY UNITS.  
INTERNAL TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE NEARLY NONEXISTENT  
IN BOLIVIAN ARMY UNITS. ACCORDINGLY, TACTICAL RADIOS ARE  
A PROBABLY PURCHASE FROM THE US SINCE  
NON-US OFFERS TO BOLIVIA HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN UNACCEPTABLE.  
QUANTITIES CAN ONLY BE ESTIMATED AT THIS POINT.  
FIRE SUPPORT IS SADLY LACKING IN BOLIVIAN ARMY UNITS,  
AND PURCHASE OF MORTARS AND HOWITZERS IS VIRTUALLY  
A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. HOWEVER, UNLESS BOLIVIAN ARMY CAN  
BE CONVINCED TO PROGRAM ITS PURCHASES OVER A RELATIVELY  
LONG TERM PERMITTING CONCURRENT FORCE DEVELOPMENT  
PLANNING, THE LONG LEAD TIMES REQUIRED FOR US  
EQUIPMENT MAY LEAD THEM TO PURCHASE FROM NON-US  
SOURCES.  
ANTI-TANK MISSILE CAPABILITY IS PROJECTED FOR ACQUISITION  
IN FY 83 BECAUSE OF BOLIVIA ARMY'S DESIRE FOR A VALID AND  
MODERN DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY WHICH EXCEEDD CURRENT  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 04058 04 OF 08 102334Z

(TO 90 MM RECOILLESS RIFLE) AND PLANNED (106MM RECOILLESS RIFLE, 105MM STEYR PUCH) CAPABILITIES. HOWEVER, THE HIGH COST PER ROUND FOR THE TOW SYSTEM AUGURS FOR PURCHASE OF SMALL QUANTITIES AT BEST.

COMPLETE ABSENCE OF AIR DEFENSE MISSILE OR GUN CAPABILITY WOULD INDICATE ACQUISITION OF THE VULCAN SYSTEM SINCE IT IS BY FAR THE LEAST COSTLY OF ITS TYPE ON THE ARMS SCENE TODAY. HOWEVER, ONLY MINIMAL TRAINING OF BOLIVIAN ARMY PERSONNEL IN US AIR DEFENSE SCHOOLING HAS OCCURRED TO DATE; ACCORDINGLY THE PRIORITY FOR THIS SYSTEM IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN LOW.

GENERALLY, US AIRCRAFT (UH1H, C130H) PROJECTED FOR ACQUISITION ARE THE TYPES DESIRED BY THE BOLIVIAN AIR FORCE.

IN THE PAST, ABORTIVE ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO OBTAIN M113A1 PERSONNEL CARRIERS FROM NON-US SOURCES. THOSE IN THE HAND OF BOLIVIAN ARMY ARE WELL THOUGHT OF AND FILL A SORE NEED FOR TROOP TRANSPORT. MODERNIZATION OF AND EMPHASIS ON INFANTRY AND CAVALRY-TYPE REACTION UNITS CALL FOR EXPANSION OF THEIR APC ASSETS AND US VEHICLES ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE REQUESTED TO ASSURE STANDARDIZATION. ENGINEERS IN BOLIVIA HAVE PRAISED US EQUIPMENT AS THE BEST AVAILABLE ANYWHERE AND PROCUREMENT OF US COMMERCIAL TYPE EQUIPMENT IS VIRTUALLY ASSURED PROVIDING FUNDS ARE MADE AVAILABLE. COMPETITION FOR FUNDS, IN VIEW OF THE BOLIVIAN PERCEIVED NEED FOR MORE MODERN COMBAT TYPE EQUIPMENT, WILL PROBABLY KEEP THE PRIORITY LOW FOR BULLDOZERS, GRADERS AND DUMP TRUCKS FOR FY 81 AND 82, HOWEVER EMPHASIS ON ROAD AND AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION TOGETHER WITH THE STATED DESIRE TO FORM A COMBAT ENGINEER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 04058 04 OF 08 102334Z

CAPABILITY COULD RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN PRIORITY IN THE LONG TERM.

C) ANTI-TANK/RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES: THE PRESENT ANI-TANK CAPABILITY OF THE BOLIVIANS CONSISTS OF 24 BRAZILIAN CASCABELS WITH 90MM GUNS. AN AGREEMENT REPORTEDLY EXISTS FOR BOLIVIA TO BUY AS MANY AS 480 CASCABEL ANDURUTU APCS FROM BRAZIL. WE FIND THIS DOUBTFUL, AS OFFICERS OF THE ONLY UNIT WITH THESE BRAZILIAN WHEELED VEHICLES HAVE COMPLAINED OF THE CASCABEL/URUTU SHORT COMINGS IN THE 4,000 METER HIGH ALTIPLANO. BOLIVIA HAS RECENTLY

PURCHASED FROM AUSTRIA A REPORTED 20 PANZER JAEGER KURASSIER SELF-PROPELLED 105MM ANTI-TANK GUNS AND TANK RECOVERY VEHICLES. WITH LINKS THUS ESTABLISHED WITH AUSTRIA AND OTHER EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS, THE BRAZILIAN CONTRACT, IF IN FACT IT EXISTS, MAY BE CANCELLED. BOLIVIANS HAVE AS WELL COMPLAINED OVER THE POOR QUALITY OF THE BRAZILIAN CAIMAN TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES, AND MAY LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR OTHER TYPES OF TRUCKS TO BEEF UP THEIR LIMITED TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITY. EXCESSIVE LEAD TIME FOR US VEHICLE PROCUREMENT, THE FACT THAT 3/4 TON-1 1/4 TON VEHICLES ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE FROM THE UNITED STATES, WOULD INDICATE BOLIVIA MAY LOOK TO EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS FOR THESE ITEMS AS WELL.

D) TRAINING: A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF BOLIVIAN OFFICERS HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PERU AND TAIWAN. GENERALLY TWO OFFICERS ANNUALLY ATTEND THE THREE YEAR ARGENTINE ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL. ARGENTINA HAS A 22 MAN MILITARY MISSION, CLEARLY MOVING TO BE THE DOMINANT FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN BOLIVIA. BRAZIL, WHILE HAVING SOLD A GREAT DEAL OF EQUIPMENT (SEE ABOVE), HAS NO MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP AND ONLY MARGINAL  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LA PAZ 04058 04 OF 08 102334Z

MILITARY INFLUENCE. THE ARGENTINES HAVE CONCENTRATED THEIR PRESENCE IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM. BOLIVIAN DOCTRINE, ALTHOUGH ECLECTIC, HAS GENERALLY REFLECTED US TACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, BUT IS NOW BECOMING INCREASINGLY ARGENTINE IN ITS CHARACTER. IN A SENSE, THE ARGENTINES HAVE MOVED QUICKLY TO FILL THE VACUUM LEFT IN THE GREAT REDUCTION IN THE US MILGROUP IN THE LAST TWO YEARS.

10. USAID AND OTHER DONOR ASSISTANCE:

A) THE USAID PROGRAM IN BOLIVIA IS CONCENTRATED IN THREE SECTORS: AGRICULTURE, EDUCATION AND HEALTH, WITH EMPHASIS ON IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE RURAL POOR. ANNUAL FUNDING LEVELS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 04058 05 OF 08 102349Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 SS-15 ACDA-12 DODE-00 AID-05  
EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 MCE-00 OMB-01  
NSC-05 SP-02 TRSE-00 HA-05 SR-05 DLOS-09 OES-09  
IO-14 SAA-01 INM-05 LABE-00 SIL-01 SPTA-02 ICA-11  
/140 W

-----129871 110206Z /75

R 091700Z MAY 79  
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6164  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 8 LA PAZ 4058

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1978

LOANS \$138,574  
GRANTS 32,345  
NARCOTICS 6,244  
TOTAL \$177,163

	ACTUAL		PLANNED	
	FY-1978	FY-1979	FY-1980	FY-1981
LOANS	38,300	20,000	18,000	21,500
GRANTS	5,389	7,709	7,523	10,500
NARCOTICS	2,207			
PL-480				
TITLE II	7,225	11,603	12,000	13,000
TITLE III	0	12,000	15,000	15,000
HOUSING				
INVESTMENT				
GUARANTIES	-	8,000		15,000
TOTAL				

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 04058 05 OF 08 102349Z

B) IN ADDITION, US ASSISTANCE TO THE NARCOTICS  
CONTROL EFFORT TOTALS \$3,838. OF THIS AMOUNT, \$2,110  
IS EARMARKED FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND \$1,728  
FOR NARCOTICS CONTROL. FOR FY 80, \$1,706,000 IS  
PLANNED FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND \$1,355,000  
FOR NARCOTICS CONTROL. FOR FY 81, THE OPTIMUM AMOUNTS  
PROJECTED FOR THESE ENDEAVORS ARE \$2,545,000 AND \$2,167,000,

RESPECTIVELY.

C) OTHER DONOR: OTHER DONOR ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA, WHICH THROUGH LAST YEAR AMOUNTED TO NEARLY \$700 MILLION (REFTEL C), REMAINS CONSIDERABLE. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, UPDATED FIGURES ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE.

D) FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE: THE MAJORITY OF FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE (NON SALES) HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM ARGENTINA. A 22-MAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP FROM ARGENTINA (13 NAVY, 6 ARMY AND 3 AIR FORCE) CONCENTRATES ITS EFFORTS IN THE MILITARY SCHOOL SYSTEM (SEE PARAGRAPH D). FOR ADDITIONAL DATA ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE SEE DIA PUBLICATION FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE, DATED MARCH 1979, PP IV-13 - IV-19.

#### 11. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT

A) NONE OF THE ITEMS LISTED FOR PURCHASE IN THE FYS 81 OR 82 IS CONSIDERED SOPHISTICATED OR HAVING CAPABILITIES IN EXCESS OF EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY ON HAND IN EITHER BOLIVIA OR ITS NEIGHBORS. THOSE MORE MODERN ITEMS NEW TO  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 04058 05 OF 08 102349Z

THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY (E.G., TOW, VULCAN) ARE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE AND WOULD BARELY SERVE TO COUNTER AN OFFENSIVE THREAT FROM PERUVIAN OR CHILEAN LAND OR AIR FORCES. THE 105 MM HOWITZERS, WHILE OF A LARGER CALIBER THAN IS PRESENTLY AVAILABLE TO THE BOLIVIAN ARMY, ARE CONSIDERED AS A MINIMUM FIRE SUPPORT WEAPON FOR BOLIVIA'S DEFENSIVE UNITS IN BORDER AREAS. THESE WOULD BE USED IN BATTALION SIZED UNITS SUPPORTING INFANTRY REGIMENTS IN THE BORDER AREAS.

B) THE ONLY ITEM PROJECTED FOR PROCUREMENT IN FY83 THAT ENTAILS ANY RADICALLY NEW CAPABILITY IS A COMMAND AND CONTROL (C&C) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WHICH HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY OFFERED BY A US COMMERCIAL FIRM BUT WHICH IS NOT BEING CONSIDERED AS A POSSIBLE PURCHASE AT THIS TIME. A PACKAGE WHICH CAN BE MOUNTED AS A UNIT IN A C-130 AIRCRAFT, THIS C&C CAPABILITY, WOULD ENABLE THE HIGH MILITARY COMMAND'S CONTROLLING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON A WIDE BASIS, NOT PRESENTLY POSSIBLE WITH THE EXTREMELY LIMITED INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS AVAILABLE TO THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES.

12. HUMAN RIGHTS STATEMENT: THE OVERALL HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN BOLIVIA HAS CONTINUED TO IMPROVE SINCE LATE 1977 AND AT PRESENT BOLIVIA HAS ONE OF THE BEST RECORDS OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. SINCE THE LAST EXTENSIVE TREATMENT OF THIS SUBJECT (SEE STATE 21895) THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CHANGE IN THE OVERALL SITUATION. FROM THE TIME PRESIDENT PADILLA ASSUMED POWER IN NOVEMBER 1978, THE GOB'S RECORD OF RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN EXCELLENT. THERE HAVE BEEN NO POLITICAL PRISONERS DETAINED AND THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE UNCONFIRMED ALLEGATION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LA PAZ 04058 05 OF 08 102349Z

OF INHUMAN TREATMENT. IN THE AREA OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATING TO BASIC HUMAN NEEDS THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FROM THE SITUATION REPORTED REFTEL. IN THE THIRD MAJOR AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RESPECT FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES, THE RECORD OF THE PADILLA REGIME HAS AGAIN BEEN EXCELLENT. IMMEDIATELY AFTER OVERTHROWING THE REGIME OF GENERAL PEREDA IN NOVEMBER 1978 PADILLA ANNOUNCED THAT NATIONAL ELECTIONS, PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 1980, WOULD BE MOVED UP TO JULY 1979. SINCE THEN, THE PADILLA GOVERNMENT HAS RESISTED PRESSURES FOR

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 04058 06 OF 08 110006Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 SS-15 ACDA-12 DODE-00 AID-05  
EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 MCE-00 OMB-01  
NSC-05 SP-02 TRSE-00 HA-05 SR-05 DLOS-09 OES-09  
IO-14 SAA-01 INM-05 LABE-00 SIL-01 SPTA-02 ICA-11  
/140 W

-----130086 110207Z /75

R 091700Z MAY 79  
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6165

INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 8 LA PAZ 4058

A POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS, AND THE MISSION NOW BELIEVES THAT THE ODDS ARE STRONG THAT THE ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD AS SCHEDULED ON JULY 1, 1979. MOVEOVER, THE PADILLA REGIME HAS, WITH ONLY MINOR EXCEPTIONS, RESPECTED THE RIGHTS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE. THE MISSION BELIEVES THAT A CONTINUATION OF THE MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AT THE LEVEL RECOMMENDED ABOVE WOULD SERVE THE INTEREST OF PROMOTING US HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES. FOR ALTHOUGH THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ITSELF HAS LITTLE INFLUENCE ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PROGRAM GIVES US MILITARY OFFICERS AND THE AMBASSADOR ACCESS TO THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY AND THEREBY PROVIDES THE OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THEM TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 04058 06 OF 08 110006Z

AND ACCEPTING US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. US MILITARY INFLUENCE, WHEN ADDED TO ALL OTHER FORCES TENDING TO MOVE THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY TOWARDS IMPROVING ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, CAN HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT. WITH NATIONAL ELECTIONS AGAIN SCHEDULED FOR JULY 1, 1979, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE MISSION TO HAVE AS MUCH INFLUENCE AS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY NOT ONLY TO HELP ENSURE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE HELD AS PLANNED BUT ALSO TO HELP ENSURE THAT FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS AND THE INSTALLATION OF A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT THE MILITARY COMES TO ACCEPT ITS PROPER ROLE WITHIN A CIVILIAN CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THAT IT RESISTS ANY TEMPTATION TO REASSUME THE REINS OF POWER UNDER WHATEVER PRETEXT.

13. PROJECTED US SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR FY 81.

A) LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM): IMET - \$405,000; FMSCAR \$4,000,000.

1) IMET - \$405,000. THIS LEVEL WOULD CAUSE A SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM TO

SUPPORT OUR INTERESTS IN BOLIVIA. IT WOULD ELIMINATE ALL CONUS TRAINING AND NECESSITATE A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF BOLIVIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL ATTENDING CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS. THE PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE BASIC COMBAT ARMS TRAINING FOR 170 BOLIVIAN ARMY CADETS, TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR 31 STUDENTS AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING FOR 10 OFFICERS.

2) FMS CREDITS - \$4,000,000. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE MINIMUM LEVEL SUPPORTIVE OF OUR EFFORTS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT EXACTLY WHAT USE GOB MIGHT MAKE OF THESE FUNDS. HOWEVER, ASSUMING THAT GOB USED FY 79 AND 80  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 04058 06 OF 08 110006Z

FMS CREDITS TO FINANCE THE EQUIPPING OF THE ARMED FORCES CENTRAL HOSPITAL (LA PAZ), WE BELIEVE THAT THESE CREDITS WOULD BE USED TO FINANCE THE PURCHASE OF AIRCRAFT ENGINES AND SPARE PARTS, UTILITY HELICOPTERS, AND ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT.

B) LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE): IMET - \$450,000; FMSCR \$5,000,000.

1) IMET - \$450,000. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL (ASSUMING A CONTINUATION OF RISING COURSE COSTS) WOULD RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF OVERALL TRAINING PROJECTED FOR FY 80. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR ATTENDANCE AT CANAL ZONE MILITARY SCHOOLS (CZMS) AS PROJECTED FOR LEVEL 1 AND ALSO SHOULD PROVIDE FOR LIMITED PROFESSIONAL LEVEL TRAINING (1 - 3 STUDENTS DEPENDING UPON THE COST OF SELECTED COURSES) IN CONUS.

2) FMS CREDITS - \$5,000,000. CREDITS AT THIS LEVEL WOULD BE USED TO PURCHASE ITEMS SIMILAR TO THOSE ENVISAGED UNDER LEVEL 1, BUT IN marginally INCREASED QUANTITIES.

C) LEVEL 3 (CURRENT): IMET - \$495,000; FMS CREDITS \$5,500,000.

1) KMET- \$495,000. CONSIDERING RISING COURSE COSTS, FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WILL ENABLE US TO CARRY OUT A PROGRAM SIMILAR TO THAT PROJECTED FOR FY 80; A COMBINATION OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING IN THE CANAL ZONE FOR 31 STUDENTS EXCLUDING THE 170 BOLIVIAN ARMY CADETS AND FIVE OFFICERS ATTENDING CONUS COURSES.

2) FMS CREDITS: \$5,500,000. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE A PROGRAM EQUAL, IN DOLLAR TERMS, TO THAT OF PRESENTLY PROGRAMMED FOR FY 80. GENERAL CATEGORIES OF PURCHASES WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE UNDER LEVELS 1 AND 2  
SECRET



SECRET

PAGE 04 LA PAZ 04058 06 OF 08 110006Z

ABODE.

D) LEVEL 4 (INCREMENTAL): IMET - \$545,000; FMS CREDITS \$8,000,000.

1) IMET - \$545,000. THIS LEVEL OF FUNDING (ASSUMING NO MAJOR INCREASES IN COURSE COSTS) WILL ALLOW US TO INCREASE THE NUMBERS OF STUDENTS ATTENDING CONUS TRAINING AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO IMPACT FAVORABLY ON USG STATURE AND INFLUENCE WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY BOTH IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERM. INCREMENTAL FUNDS WOULD BE USED TO SEND OFFICERS OF LOWER RANK (LT-MAJ) TO CONUS TRAINING. THE FOLLOWING CONUS COURSES WOULD BE PROGRAMMED BEYOND THOSE OF LEVEL 3; INFANTRY OFFICER BASIC, NAVY STAFF COLLEGE, AND COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD ALSO PROVIDE US THE RESOURCES TO PROGRAM MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS IN SUBJECTS SUCH AS MAINTENANCE, MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 04058 07 OF 08 110024Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 SS-15 ACDA-12 DODE-00 AID-05

EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 MCE-00 OMB-01

NSC-05 SP-02 TRSE-00 HA-05 SR-05 DLOS-09 OES-09

IO-14 SAA-01 INM-05 LABE-00 SIL-01 SPTA-02 ICA-11

/140 W

-----130254 110207Z /75

R 091700Z MAY 79

FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6166

INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

AMEMBASSY LIMA

AMEMBASSY QUITO

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

SECRET SECTION 7 OF 8 LA PAZ 4058

2) FMS CREDITS -(8,000,000. THIS LEVEL OF FUNDING WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE OVER THAT WHICH WE EXPECT TO OFFER IN FY 80 (\$5,500,000). AUTHORIZATION OF THIS AMOUNT WOULD PLACE US IN THE POSITION OF BEING ABLE TO CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES TO FIND A FULFILLING ROLE OUT OF MAINSTREAM POLITICS, BUT WOULD ALSO ASSIST THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN PROVIDING FOR REASONABLE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES. PURCHASES WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE AT LOWER LEVELS. THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE A DEGREE OF US INFLUENCE OVER BOLIVIAN ACQUISITION PLANS AND WOULD ENABLE US TO ENCOURAGE THE GOB TO EMPHASIZE THE NATION-BUILDING ROLE OF THEIR MILITARY IN THAT WE ARE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT WE COULD STEER ANY PURCHASES TOWARD DUAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT THROUGH THE MANIPULATION OF CREDIT TERMS (I.E. LONGER TERMS FOR CIVIC ACTION EQUIPMENT THAN FOR WEAPONS).

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 04058 07 OF 08 110024Z

E) IMET REPRESENTS A USEFUL AND COST EFFECTIVE PROGRAM THROUGH WHICH THE USG CAN MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES. THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES DO NOT HAVE THE EXPERTISE, NOR THE FACILITIES OR RESOURCES TO CONDUCT REALLY EFFECTIVE TECHNICAL TRAINING. WHILE THEIR PROFESSIONAL LEVEL SCHOOLS ARE ADEQUATE, THEY REQUIRE AND BENEFIT FROM EXPOSURE TO US MILITARY DOCTRINE AND TEACHING METHODS. CONTINUING LOW BUDGETARY LEVELS PRECLUDE GOB FROM PURCHASING TRAINING FROM ANY THIRD COUNTRY. THEY HAVE TRADITIONALLY PARTICIPATED IN TRAINING OFFERED AND FUNDED BY OTHER COUNTRIES, PRINCIPALLY THE US AND ARGENTINA.

#### 14. FY 81 PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS

##### A) SUMMARY

	US MIL	US CIV	LWR
- MINIMUM LEVEL	6	2	4
- INTERMEDIATE LEVEL	6	2	4
- CURRENT LEVEL	6	2	5
- INCREMENTAL LEVEL	6	2	5

##### B) JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS.

1) THE CURRENT MANNING LEVEL (6 US MIL, 2 US CIV, 5 LWR) HAS PROVEN TO BE ADEQUATE FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AUTHORIZED BY THE FAA OF 1978. HENCE WE HAVE CHOSEN IT AS THE BASE FOR JUSTIFICATION OF PROPOSED FY 81 MANNING LEVELS. SEVERAL FACTORS, UNIQUE TO ACTIVITIES HERE, HAVE THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE

SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT WORKLOAD AND IMPACT AT EACH PROGRAM LEVEL.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 04058 07 OF 08 110024Z

(A) MAP MATERIEL FUNDING FOR BOLIVIA WAS TERMINATED AT THE END OF FY 77; HOWEVER, MATERIEL FINANCED THROUGH THIS PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE TO BE DELIVERED THROUGH FY 81. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE REQUIREMENT TO ADMINISTER BOTH MAP AND FMS PROGRAMS AMPLIFIES THE MANAGEMENT WORKLOAD OF IN-COUNTRY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL.

(B) THE CONTINUED RECEIPT OF MAP MATERIEL FOR THE TIPO REGIMENTS AND FOLLOW-ON EQUIPMENT FOR THE SIGNAL BATTALION AND MAINTENANCE UNITS HAS TENERATED REQUESTS AIMED AT PROVIDING THE BOLIVIANS THE TRAINING AND EXPERTISE NECESSARY TO SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY EMPLOY THE EQUIPMENT. THIS CONDITION HAS THE OBVIOUS EFFECT OF INCREASING WORKLOAD AND WILL CONTINUE IN FY 81.

(C) THE LANDLOCKED POSITION OF BOLIVIA CREATES AN UNUSUAL AND INCREASED SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT WORKLOAD IN THAT SURFACE SHIPMENTS (THE BULK OF DEFENSE MATERIEL) TO BOLIVIA IS SHIPPED BY THIS MODE) MUST BE ACCEPTED AND TRANSLOADED AT A PERUVIAN PORT (MATARANI). EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES MAKE IT IMPERATIVE THAT A MILGP MEMBER PHYSICALLY BE ON HAND TO MONITOR ACCEPTANCE BY THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES OF WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, VEHICLES AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES AT THE PORT.

2) CURRENT LEVEL.

(A) SIX US MILITARY:

-- COMUSMILGP/SENIOR ARMY REP (ARMY O-6):

INCUMBENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND DIRECTING THE OVERALL SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN-COUNTRY. HE IS CONTINUALLY REQUIRED TO EFFECT COORDINATION WITH MOD. COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES, GENERAL/FLAG OFFICERS, AND SENIOR COLONELS OF HC. HE IS THE MILGP REPRESENTATIVE TO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LA PAZ 04058 07 OF 08 110024Z

THE COUNTRY TEAM AND IS THE AMBASSADOR'S PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISOR IN OTHER THAN ATTACHE MATTERS. (NOTE. THE WORKLOAD ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABOVE DUTIES PRECLUDES INCUMBENT'S

ACCOMPLISHING THE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES OUTLINED FOR THE ARMY LOGISTICS OFFICER DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.)

--LOGISTICS OFFICER (ARMY O-5): PLANS, PROGRAMS, COORDINATES AND MANAGES THE EXECUTION OF MAP AND FMS MATERIEL PROGRAMS. THOUGH NEW MAP FUNDING FOR BOLIVIA HAS TERMINATED, RECEIPT OF MAP FUNDED MATERIEL WILL CONTINUE THROUGH FY 81. TRANSITION TO FMS AND FMS CREDITS BY THE BOLIVIAN ARMY WILL REQUIRE EXTENSIVE MANAGEMENT BY A HIGHLY QUALIFIED ARMY OFFICER FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ADDITIONALLY, INCUMBENT COORDINATES THE EXECUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE ARMY PORTION OF THE IMET PROGRAM.

-- US LOGISTICS NCO/TRANSPORTATION SPECIALIST (ARMY E-7): WORKS UNDER SUPERVISION OF LOGISTICS OFFICER AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MAP/FMS MATERIEL SUPPLY TRANSACTIONS. PERFORMS DUTY AS CUSTOMS OFFICER FOR ALL MILITARY SHIPMENTS AND PROVIDES INTERFACE WITH BOLIVIAN CUSTOMS OFFICIALS. DUTIES INCLUDE MONITORING STATUS OF ALL REQUISITIONS AND DELIVERIES AND SUBSEQUENT PREPARATION OF ALL REQUIRED REPORTS. INCUMBENT IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTATION OF MAP/FMS SHIPMENTS FROM PORT OF MATARANI, PERU TO LA PAZ, BOLIVIA.

-- SENIOR NAVY REP-TRAINING OFFICER (NAVY O-5): PLANS, PROGRAMS AND MANAGES THE EXECUTION OF THE IMET PROGRAM. SPECIALIZED SUPPORT OF THE BOLIVIAN NAVY'S LOGISTIC AND TRAINING NEEDS ARE CRITICAL AREAS. HOST COUNTRY IS PLACING GREATLY INCREASED EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE EASTERN RIVERS. FURTHER, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BOLIVIAN NAVY WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES CAN BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE AS GOB CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR AN ACCESS TO THE SEA. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 LA PAZ 04058 07 OF 08 110024Z

REPRESENTATION TO ASSIST THIS SERVICE TO TRANSITION TO FMS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND TO MANAGE THEIR PROGRAM IS VITAL. IN ADDITION, INCUMBENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING THE PROGRAMMING AND EXECUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE NAVY PORTION OF THE MAP/FMS MATERIEL PROGRAMS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 04058 08 OF 08 110028Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 SS-15 ACDA-12 DODE-00 AID-05  
EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 MCE-00 OMB-01  
NSC-05 SP-02 TRSE-00 HA-05 SR-05 DLOS-09 OES-09  
IO-14 SAA-01 INM-05 LABE-00 SIL-01 SPTA-02 ICA-11  
/140 W

-----130310 110208Z /75

R 091700Z MAY 79  
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6167  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

S E C R E T SECTION 8 OF 8 LA PAZ 4058

-- SENIOR AF REP PROGRAMS OFFICER (AIR FORCE O-5): THE OFFICER  
IN THIS POSITION IS ASPECIALIST IN AIR OPERATIONS WITH EXTENSIVE  
BACKGROUND IN THE C-130. THE C-130 IS THE MOST EXPENSIVE BUY IN  
THE BAF HISTORY AND FOLLOW-ON FMS SUPPLY SUPPORT IS ANTICIPATED.  
THIS POSITION WILL ALSO BE INVOLVED IN FMS SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR THE BAF  
HELICOPTER FORCE ANF FINAL TAIL-OFF OF PENDING BAF MAP EQUIPMENT  
DELIVERIES. POSITION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING THE PRO-  
GRAMMING AND EXECUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE AIR FORCE PORTION  
OF THE MAP/FMS MATERIEL AND IMET PROGRAMS.

--STAFF SUPPORT/PLANS OFFICER (AIR FORCE O-4): THIS OFFICER  
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AND EXECUTIVE SUPPORT FOT THE  
MILGP. HE OPERATES THE MILGP END OF THE SUPPLY-SUPPORT AGREEMENT  
WITH THE EMBASSY. THE POSITION DEMANDS AN OFFICER WHO, BEYOND AD-  
MINISTRATIVE CAPABILITIES, IS QUALIFIED IN THE LOGISTIC FIELD AND  
HAS AN OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND TO AID THE ARMY LOGISTICS OFFICER  
ON TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AND AID THE SENIOR AIR FORCE REPRE-  
SENTATIVE AS NECESSARY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 04058 08 OF 08 110028Z

(B) US CIVILIANS:

--ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISOR (GS-7): INCUMBENT MANAGES THE  
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE WORKLOAD SERVING AS A SUBORDINATE TO STAFF  
SUPPORT/PLANS OFFICER AND SUPERVISOR TO SEC/SETNO, LWR AD-  
MINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT AND LWR SEC/STENO. THE MAJOR WORKLOAD  
ITEMS IN THIS AREA ARE MESSAGE, COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, UNIT  
LOGISTICS, UNIT TRANSPORTATION/MAINTENANCE, PUBLICATIONS MAINTENANCE  
AND OTHER FUNCTIONS AS DIRECTED BY STAFF SUPPORT/PLANS OFFICER.  
--SEC/STENO (GS-5): INCUMBENT INTERACTS WITH ADMINISTRATIVE  
SUPERVISOR TO COORDINATE ADMINISTRATIVE WORKLOAD OF USMILGP,  
ACTS AS RECEPTIONIST FOR COMUSMILGP, ADMINISTERS UNIT PETTY CASH  
FUND AND OTHER FUNCTIONS AS DIRECTED BY STAFF SUPPORT/PLANS

OFFICER AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISOR.

(C) FIVE LWR:

--LWR ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT (TRANSPORTATION): RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL RECORDS AND FILES DEALING WITH SHIPMENTS AND RECEIPTS ON MILAIR. WORKS WITH MAC STATION MANAGER AND MAINTAINS LIAISON WITH LOCAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES AND MAC FOR SERVICE. ACTS AS QUALITY CONTROL CENTER FOR ALL USEMB/GSO, USAID, AND USICA MILAIR SHIPMENTS.

--LWR SEC/STENO (ADMIN): RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MILITARY ORDERS, FILING PROCEDURES, SPANISH TRANSLATIONS, ETC., FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION. FILLS IN FOR SEC/STENO ABOVE IN ABSENCES (DAILY EMBASSY MAIL/MESSAGE RUNS, ETC.). IS LIAISON CENTER FOR ALL ROUTINE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS WITH HOST MILITARY.

--ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT (TRAINING): RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL CORRESPONDENCE AND FILES MAINTENANCE CONCERNED WITH IMET PROGRAM AND NAVY MAP/FMS MATERIEL PROGRAMS. ADDITIONALLY, ACTS AS SEC/STENO FOR SENIOR NAVY REPRESENTATIVE/ TRAINING OFFICER.

--ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT (AFSEC TRAINING/TRANSLATOR): RESPONSIBLE TO SENIOR AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVE FOR DISPOSITION OF ALL AFSEC TRAINING FILES, ORDERS, STUDENT BRIEFING, ETC.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 04058 08 OF 08 110028Z

IS OFFICIAL TRANSLATOR FOR ALL FORMAL USMILGP CORRESPONDENCE INCLUDING SOCIAL INVITATIONS/RESPONSES FOR COMUSMILGP. BECAUSE OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE, INDIVIDUAL OCCUPYING POSITION IS LIAISON IN ALL APPROPRIATE MATTERS IN WHICH MILGP MEMBERS AND FAMILIES NEED DOMESTIC/PERSONAL/OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

--ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT (LOGISTICS): IS RESPONSIBLE TO LOGISTICS OFFICER FOR TYPING, FILING, DISPOSITION, ETC., OF ALL USMILGP FMS/MAP MATERIEL COORESPONDENCE AND REPORTS.

3) THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT WORKLOAD IS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO PROGRAM FUNDING LEVELS (I.E., A DECREASE OR INCREASE IN FUNDING LEVELS DOES NOT PERFORCE DEMAND SIMILAR CHANGES IN MANNING LEVELS). THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE WITH REGARD TO THE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS ACCOMPLISHED BY US MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. AT ALL PROPOSED PROGRAM LEVELS, THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, COORDINATING AND EXECUTION REMAIN CONSTANT. PIPELINE DELIVERIES AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORT TO OPERATE MILGP AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE US MISSION HERE REMAIN CONSTANT. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT VARIABLE IS THE NUMBER OF HC PERSONNEL TO ATTEND US MILITARY TRAINING. HENCE, THE US PERSONNEL STAFFING REQUIRED TO MANAGE THE PROGRAM AT THE "CURRENT" LEVEL IS APPLICABLE TO ALL OTHER LEVELS. HOWEVER, REDUCTIONS IN THE LWR MANNING LEVELS WOULD BE POSSIBLE THOUGH NOT DESIRABLE AT THE INTERMEDIATE AND MINIMUM PROGRAM LEVELS.

15. ESTIMATED PROGRAM LEVELS FOR FY 82 AND 83. MISSION CONCEPT FOR FY 82 AND 83 FUNDING LEVELS ENVISIONS MAINTAINING IMET AT THE INCREMENTAL REAL LEVEL (I.E., THE INCREMENTAL LEVEL ADJUSTED UPWARD TEN PERCENT EACH YEAR TO OFFSET INCREASED COURSE COSTS). WHILE ESTABLISHING FMS CREDITS AT \$8,000,000

	IMET	FMSCR
FY 82	\$600,000	\$8,000,000
FY 83	\$660,000	\$8,000,000

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LA PAZ 04058 08 OF 08 110028Z

16 CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE. THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL (REF B), AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VARIOUS BUDGET LEVELS, APPEAR TO PRESUPPOSE THAT THE "CURRENT" LEVEL IS ADEQUATE FOR THE PURPOSES OF MAINTAINING TIES AND INFLUENCE WITH THE HOST COUNTRY MILITARY. IT IS NO. WE HAVE ARRIVED AT THE "CURRENT" LEVEL THROUGH A SERIES OF REDUCED BUDGETS WHICH HAVE HAD THE EFFECT OF STEADILY ERODING THE FOUNDATION ON WHICH THE STRONGER TIES OF THE PAST WERE BASED. ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT SPECIFICALLY QUANTIFY THE IMPACT OF FURTHER PROGRAM REDUCTIONS, WE ARE CERTAIN THAT LOWER PROGRAM LEVELS WILL RESULT IN A FURTHER DIMINUTION IN THE IMPORTANT BENEFITS WHICH WE DERIVE FROM THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

HERE. REDUCTIONS HAVE AFFECTED ADVERSELY ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM--IMET, FMS CREDITS, MAP AND MANNING LEVELS. ALL OF THESE ACTIONS HAVE LOGICALLY BEEN PERCEIVED BY THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES AS CLEAR SIGNALS OF WANING US INTEREST. EXPLANATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE REDUCED PROGRAMS ARE MERELY MANIFESTATIONS OF USG BUDGETARY LIMITATIONS DO LITTLE TO ALTER THEIR CONCLUSIONS OR ASSUAGE THEIR APPREHENSIONS OF THE FUTURE COURSE OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE. LOW (ROCK BOTTOM) BUDGET LEVELS CAN ONLY RESULT IN A LESSENING OF US INFLUENCE WITH THE POLITICALLY IMPORTANT BOLIVIAN MILITARY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LOW LEVELS OF RECENT YEARS PRESENT US

WITH AN ATTRACTIVE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE FUTURE. THE PROGRAM INCREASES PROPOSED AT THE INCREMENTAL LEVELS OUTLINED ABOVE, WHILE SMALL IN REAL TERMS, NONETHELESS, REPRESENT MARGINAL INCREASES. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN USE THESE SMALL INCREASES TO ACHIEVE CONSIDERABLY LARGER INCREMENTAL GRINS IN STRENGTHENED RELATIONSHIPS.

BOEKER

SECRET

NNN





## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ANNUAL REPORTS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 09 may 1979  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1979LAPAZ04058  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS 19850509 BOEKER, PAUL  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D790213-0374  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** LA PAZ OR-M  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1979/newtext/t19790591/aaaacxqi.tel  
**Line Count:** 1241  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** a8b209b7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION PM  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 23  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 79 STATE 77582, 78 STATE 167901, 78 LA PAZ 6309  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22 feb 2006  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3083870  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
**TAGS:** MASS, MPOL, XX, US, BL  
**To:** STATE BRASILIA  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/a8b209b7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014