Skip to content
SC for ICO
Branch: master
Clone or download
Fetching latest commit…
Cannot retrieve the latest commit at this time.
Permalink
Type Name Latest commit message Commit time
Failed to load latest commit information.
contracts
migrations
preico
test
.gitignore
README.md
deploy
package-lock.json
runganache.sh
truffle-config.js
truffle.js

README.md

Casper Token Audit

June 2018
By Coinfabrik

http://blog.coinfabrik.com/casper-cst-token-sale-security-audit/

  • Introduction
  • Summary
  • Detailed findings
    • Minor severity
      • Possible overflow in purchase functions
    • Enhancements
      • Consistent use of SafeMath
      • Use of modern solidity compiler pragmas
  • Conclusion
  • References

Introduction

Coinfabrik was asked to audit the contracts for the Casper Token sale. ​Firstly, we will
provide a summary of our discoveries and secondly, we will show​ the details of our findings.

Summary

The contracts audited are from the presale repository at https://github.com/Casper-dev/presale. The audit is based on the commit https://github.com/Casper-dev/presale/tree/3c66514423277c39bea26e62a7de47d51d712108 from branch feat/presale. This audit was updated to reflect the changes done on commit https://github.com/Casper-dev/presale/tree/8a702734c70e335661d21d04b9c995748d7b27b8 on the same branch.

The audited contracts are:

  • contracts/AdviserCasperToken.sol: An adviser token which can be converted directly to CST
  • contracts/CasperToken.sol: The token itself

The Casper token sale will have two phases: a presale one where each token will be sold at a fixed rate of $0.12 USD per token, and a sale one where they will be sold at $0.16 USD. There also is an adviser token sale contract which will be able to be exchanged 1:1 with the main token. The following analyses were performed:

  • Misuse of the different call methods: call.value(), send() and transfer().
  • Integer rounding errors, overflow, underflow and related usage of SafeMath functions.
  • Old compiler version pragmas.
  • Race conditions such as reentrancy attacks or front running.
  • Misuse of block timestamps, assuming anything other than them being strictly increasing.
  • Contract softlocking attacks (DoS).
  • Potential gas cost of functions being over the gas limit.
  • Missing function qualifiers and their misuse.
  • Fallback functions with a higher gas cost than the one that a transfer or send call allows.
  • Fraudulent or erroneous code.
  • Code and contract interaction complexity.
  • Wrong or missing error handling.
  • Overuse of transfers in a single transaction instead of using withdrawal patterns.
  • Insufficient analysis of the function input requirements.

Detailed findings

Minor severity

Possible overflow in purchase functions

In CasperToken.sol, there are lines in the purchase functions where a value is set with an addition, but these are unprotected against overflow. One of those is only callable by the contract owner, while the other one is public, in the functions purchaseWithBTC and purchaseWithPromoter. The lines which could be rewritten are the following:

function purchaseWithPromoter(address _to, address _ref) payable public {
    require(now >= presaleStartTime && now <= crowdsaleEndTime);
    uint _wei = msg.value;
    uint cst;
    ethSent[msg.sender] += _wei;
    ethSold += _wei;
//...
}

And:

function​ purchaseWithBTC​(​address _to​,​ ​uint​ _satoshi​,​ ​uint​ _wei​)​ ​public​ {
    require​(​msg​.​sender ​==​ admin ​||​ msg​.​sender ​==​ director ​||​ msg​.​sender ​==​ owner​);
    require​(​now>=​ presaleStartTime ​&&now<=​ crowdsaleEndTime​);
    ethSold += _wei;
    uint​ cst;
// ...
}

While the above was fixed in the latest commits, we've found the same possibility in the withdrawTeam function, in the latest commit., in the following:

function​ withdrawTeam​()​ ​public​ {
    require​(​now>=​ teamETHUnlock1​);
    uint​ amount ​=​ ​0;
    if​ ​(​now<​ teamETHUnlock2​)​ {
        amount = teamETH1;
        teamETH1 ​=​ ​0;
    }​ ​else​ ​if​ ​(​now<​ teamETHUnlock3​)​ {
        amount = teamETH1​ + teamETH2;
        teamETH1 ​=​ ​0;
        teamETH2 ​=​ ​0;
    }​ ​else​ {
        amount = teamETH1​ + teamETH2 + teamETH3;
        teamETH1 ​=​ ​0;
        teamETH2 ​=​ ​0;
        teamETH3 ​=​ ​0;
    }
    //...

Enhancements

Consistent use of SafeMath

In some parts of the code we’ve found lack of usage of SafeMath. We advice the use of the aforementioned code library in lines like:

cst ​=​ _satoshi​.​mul​(​btcRate​.​mul​(​ 10000 ​))​ ​/​ ​12;

By forcing the use of such a code library the code is guaranteed to avoid situations like overflow.

Use of modern solidity compiler pragmas

The contracts provided use the following compiler pragmas:

pragma solidity ​^0.4​.​19;

We strongly suggest updating the compiler version, so as to avoid any possible legibility issues, since newer compiler versions include features such as distinguishing the constructor and event emission with keywords, which means the legibility of the contract is improved against possible future developments. This observation was fixed in the last commit sent to us.

Use of modifiers for common require clauses

The contract uses require clauses mixed in the function code. In general, the contract’s legibility could be improved by putting frequently used clauses in modifiers, by typing:

modifier onlyOwnerAndAdmin​()​ {
    ​require​(​msg​.​sender ​==​ owner ​||​ msg​.​sender ​==​ admin​);
    _;
}
modifier onlyOwnerAndDirector​(){
    ​require​(​msg​.​sender ​==​ owner ​||​ msg​.​sender ​==​ director​);
    _;
}

This was fixed in the last commit sent to us, save for the redundant use in setMaxRate.

Conclusion

We found the contracts to be simple and straightforward and have an adequate amount of documentation. Some minor issues were found, but it is unlikely they could cause critical security problems. After contacting the development team, they were fixed in the next commits.

You can’t perform that action at this time.