

Final Engagement

Attack, Defense & Analysis of a Vulnerable Network

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Traffic Profile



Normal Activity



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Traffic Profile

Traffic Profile

Our analysis identified the following characteristics of the traffic on the network:

Feature	Value	Description
Top Talkers (IP Addresses)	172.16.4.205 185.243.115.84 10.0.0.201	Machines that sent the most traffic.
Most Common Protocols	TCP, UDP,ARP	Three most common protocols on the network.
# of Unique IP Addresses	IPv4 808 ipv6 2	Count of observed IP addresses.
Subnets	172.16.4.0/24 185.243.115.0/24 10.0.0.0/24	Observed subnet ranges.
# of Malware Species	2	Number of malware binaries identified in traffic.

Behavioral Analysis

Purpose of Traffic on the Network

Users were observed engaging in the following kinds of activity.

“Normal” Activity

- Watching Youtube
- Browsing medical information
- shopping for toys

Suspicious Activity

- Creating a server on corporate network
- torrenting
- Malware Transmission

The background of the slide is a dark gray field filled with a complex, repeating pattern of geometric shapes. These shapes include squares and triangles of various sizes, some of which are slightly lighter or darker than the background, creating a subtle, textured effect. The overall aesthetic is modern and minimalist.

Normal Activity

Streaming Video

Frank-n-ted.com:

- For the streaming I had followed UDP stream allowing me to see all the transactions that occurred. The thing I found odd about this is them accessing port 53.

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture window with a filter set to 'ip.addr == 10.6.12.0/24 and udp.port == 53'. The packet list shows several DNS transactions between 10.6.12.157 and 10.6.12.12. The selected packet (No. 55686) is expanded, showing the details of a DNS query for '_ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.ForestDnsZones.frank-n-ted.com'.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
55686	2020-06-30 17:04:22.856430400	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.12	DNS	132	Standard query 0x79df SRV _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.ForestDnsZones.frank-n-ted.com type SRV, class IN
55687	2020-06-30 17:04:22.859599900	10.6.12.12	10.6.12.157	DNS	198	Standard query response 0x79df SRV _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.ForestDnsZones.frank-n-ted.com type SRV, class IN
55678	2020-06-30 17:04:23.162542400	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.12	DNS	117	Standard query 0xde86 SRV _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.ForestDnsZones.frank-n-ted.com type SRV, class IN
55679	2020-06-30 17:04:23.165134200	10.6.12.12	10.6.12.157	DNS	183	Standard query response 0xde86 SRV _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.ForestDnsZones.frank-n-ted.com type SRV, class IN
55740	2020-06-30 17:04:23.395691900	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.12	DNS	88	Standard query 0x4133 A ygrvqkgouzou.frank-n-ted.com
55749	2020-06-30 17:04:23.398331200	10.6.12.12	10.6.12.157	DNS	165	Standard query response 0x4133 No such name A ygrvqkgouzou.frank-n-ted.com
55775	2020-06-30 17:04:23.492265800	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.12	DNS	98	Standard query 0xde17 A Frank-n-Ted-DC.frank-n-ted.com

Frame 55686: 132 bytes on wire (1056 bits), 132 bytes captured (1056 bits) on interface eth0, id 0

Ethernet II, Src: Intel_08:42:d3 (08:11:75:08:42:d3), Dst: Dell_2a:f7:e5 (08:40:bb:2a:f7:e5)

Destination: Dell_2a:f7:e5 (08:40:bb:2a:f7:e5)

Source: Intel_08:42:d3 (08:11:75:08:42:d3)

Type: IPv4 (0x0800)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.6.12.157, Dst: 10.6.12.12

User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 50198, Dst Port: 53

Source Port: 50198

Destination Port: 53

Length: 98

Checksum: 0xdfea [unverified]

[Checksum Status: Unverified]

[Stream Index: 1150]

[Timestamps]

Domain Name System (query)

Transaction ID: 0x79df

Flags: 0x0100 Standard query

Questions: 1

Answer RRs: 0

Authority RRs: 0

Additional RRs: 0

Queries

_ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.ForestDnsZones.frank-n-ted.com: type SRV, class IN

[Response in: 55687]

Record information

What is the get request:

- After viewing the HTML protocol you can see that there was a successful GET over port 80.

ip.src==10.6.12.203						
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
58655	658.246058100	10.6.12.203	10.6.12.12	EPM	222	Map request, DRSUAPI, 32bit NDR
58672	658.332013600	10.6.12.203	10.6.12.12	EPM	222	Map request, DRSUAPI, 32bit NDR
65129	742.187933600	10.6.12.203	10.6.12.12	EPM	222	Map request, DRSUAPI, 32bit NDR
65146	742.273954900	10.6.12.203	10.6.12.12	EPM	222	Map request, DRSUAPI, 32bit NDR
58748	658.621258400	10.6.12.203	205.185.125.104	HTTP	275	GET /pQBtWj HTTP/1.1
58752	658.636633700	10.6.12.203	205.185.125.104	HTTP	312	GET /files/june11.dll HTTP/1.1
59680	669.903931800	10.6.12.203	5.101.51.151	HTTP	713	POST /post.php HTTP/1.1
59689	669.929198400	10.6.12.203	5.101.51.151	HTTP	749	POST /post.php HTTP/1.1
60084	676.229913100	10.6.12.203	5.101.51.151	HTTP	646	POST /post.php HTTP/1.1
60085	676.239264300	10.6.12.203	5.101.51.151	HTTP	584	POST /post.php HTTP/1.1
60090	676.252043800	10.6.12.203	5.101.51.151	HTTP	579	POST /post.php HTTP/1.1

Malicious Activity

ZLoader Rat Download

Frank-n-ted have been bad boys:

- frank-n-ted (10.6.12.203) downloaded a file from 205.185.125.104
 - This was the GET request made for : pQBtWj june11.dll
- this is associated with an excel macro
 - june11.dll is identified as a RAT and posted to the host
snnmnkxdhflwqthqismb.com(5.101.51.151)
- snnmnkxdhflwqthqismb.com is a C2 site for the ZLoader RAT

The image shows a screenshot of a web browser displaying a file upload page and a VirusTotal analysis page. The top part of the browser shows a list of HTTP requests and responses:

```
513 GET /logs/invoice-86495.doc HTTP/1.1
561 HTTP/1.1 302 Found (text/html)
275 GET /pQBtWj HTTP/1.1
542 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
312 GET /files/june11.dll HTTP/1.1
946 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

Below this, the browser address bar shows the URL: <https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d3636666b407fe5527b96696377ee7ba9b609c8ef4561fa76af218ddd764dec>. The page title is "d3636666b407fe5527b96696377ee7ba9b609c8ef4561fa76af218ddd764dec".

The main content area shows the file analysis results. A red circle with the number "55" indicates that 55 engines detected this file. The file name is "june11.dll" and its size is "549.84 KB". The upload date is "2020-08-06 09:00:02 UTC" (8 days ago). The file type is "DLL".


Below the file information, there is a table showing the detection results from various engines:

DETECTION	DETAILS	RELATIONS	BEHAVIOR	COMMUNITY
Ad-Aware	Trojan.GenericKD.34007934	AegisLab	Trojan.Multi.Generic.4/c	
AhnLab-V3	Malware/Win32.FL.Generic.R348613	Alibaba	TrojanSpy.Win32/Yakes.56555448	
ALYac	Trojan.GenericKD.34007934	Antiy-AVL	GrayWare/Win32.Kryptik.ekis	
SecureAge APEX	Malicious	Avast	Trojan.Generic.D206EB7E	
Avast	Win32:DangerousSig [Trj]	AVG	Win32.DangerousSig [Trj]	

Net Support RAT Download

Remote Access Trojan:

- green.nattingsolutions.co 185.243.115.84
 - This is a known infected site
- Post request to 185.243.115.84 included.
 - 501 ASCII hexadecimal data files empty.gif
 - 2 screenshots of the infected users desktop
empty.gif?ss&ss1.img | empty.gif?ss&ss2.img
- Post request to 31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm
 - 114
application/x-www-form-urlencodedfakeurl.htm
 - This file name is associated with the NetSupportRat



```
185.243.115.84 HTTP 126 POST /empty.gif HTTP/1.1
172.16.4.205 HTTP 1168 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
185.243.115.84 HTTP 534 POST /empty.gif HTTP/1.1
```

```
126 POST /empty.gif HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
1168 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
534 POST /empty.gif HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
```

```
1199 Continuation
326 POST /empty.gif HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
341 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
268 POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-f...
172 GET /location/loca.asp HTTP/1.1
268 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
486 POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-f...
329 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
359 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
322 POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-f...
339 POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-f...
282 POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-f...
496 POST /empty.gif?ss&ss1img HTTP/1.1 (PNG)
341 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```




The End