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# **LI.FI Security Review**

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LiFiDEXAggregator(v1.1.0)

**Independent Review By:**

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# 1 About Researcher

Sujith Somraaj is a distinguished security researcher and protocol engineer with over seven years of comprehensive experience in the Web3 ecosystem.

In addition to working as an external auditor/security researcher with LI.FI, Sujith is a protocol engineer and security researcher at Superform and Spearbit.

Learn more about Sujith on [sujithsomraaj.xyz](https://sujithsomraaj.xyz)

## 2 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release, and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of that given smart contract(s) or blockchain software. i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee against a hack (or) the non existence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit-based assessment cannot be considered comprehensive, I always recommend proceeding with several audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Lastly, the security audit is not an investment advice.

This review is done independently by the reviewer and is not entitled to any of the security agencies the researcher worked / may work with.

## 3 Scope

- LiFiDEXAggregator.sol(v1.1.0)

## 4 Risk classification

Severity level	Impact: High	Impact: Medium	Impact: Low
Likelihood: high	Critical	High	Medium
Likelihood: medium	High	Medium	Low
Likelihood: low	Medium	Low	Low

### 4.1 Impact

- High** leads to a loss of a significant portion (>10%) of assets in the protocol, or significant harm to a majority of users.
- Medium** global losses <10% or losses to only a subset of users, but still unacceptable.
- Low** losses will be annoying but bearable — applies to things like griefing attacks that can be easily repaired or even gas inefficiencies.

### 4.2 Likelihood

- High** almost certain to happen, easy to perform, or not easy but highly incentivized
- Medium** only conditionally possible or incentivized, but still relatively likely
- Low** requires stars to align, or little-to-no incentive

### 4.3 Action required for severity levels

<b>Critical</b>	Must fix as soon as possible (if already deployed)
<b>High</b>	Must fix (before deployment if not already deployed)
<b>Medium</b>	Should fix
<b>Low</b>	Could fix

## 5 Executive Summary

Over the course of 1 hours in total, [LI.FI](#) engaged with the [researcher](#) to audit the contracts described in section 3 of this document ("scope").

This review is a relational to audit only the new callback functions (ramsesV2SwapCallback) and additional changes added to the originally forked contract from [SushiSwap](#), not the entire file under audit (as its an audited fork from sushiswap).

In this period of time a total of 0 issues were found.

Project Summary	
Project Name	LI.FI
Repository	<a href="#">lifinance/contracts</a>
Deployed Contract	<a href="#">0xE38621607316cB43367c134C65dca3f41B61250f</a>
Type of Project	
Audit Timeline	January 17, 2025
Methods	Manual Review

Issues Found	
Critical Risk	0
High Risk	0
Medium Risk	0
Low Risk	0
Gas Optimizations	0
Informational	0
<b>Total Issues</b>	<b>0</b>

## 6 Findings