# F8 Community Governance Oversight: Closing Report



*Cherish those who seek the truth but beware of those who find it.* - Voltaire

# Proposal details

Community Governance Oversight https://cardano.ideascale.com/c/idea/62069; proposal ID 800116
**Budget:** $34,300
**Challenge and Fund:** *Improve And Grow Auditability* challenge, Fund 8
**Project dates:** July to October 2022
**Voting:** The proposal had an average PA score of 4.67. A total of 228 unique wallets voted on it, with ₳45,573,294 voting Yes and ₳3,361,129 voting No. The proposal was therefore 5th of 6 successful proposals in its challenge, and the average (mean) wallet size voting on it was ₳214,625.

# Proposal team

Stephen Whitenstall
Allison Fromm
Kenric Nelson
George Lovegrove
Thorsten Pottebaum
Jo Allum
Matthias Sieber
Phil Khoo
Vanessa Cardui
Tevo Saks
Treasury Guild (Andre Diamond, Miroslav Rajh)

# Challenge KPIs and how the project addressed them

The KPIs for the F8 Auditability challenge were about the audit of **Catalyst proposals**, and making this "*efficient, distributed and transparent*". Arguably, CGO did not address this directly, since its focus was instead on the audit of **Catalyst governance processes**. But clearly, both PAs/VPAs and voters saw the relevance of this to auditability, and recognised that the governance framework in which proposals operate also requires oversight and audit; so they agreed that it was within the spirit of the Challenge. This is relevant to CGOs work on oversight of the challenge-setting process - our own proposal itself demonstrated some of the unsatisfactoriness of the challenge system, and showed that voters and PAs alike can see beyond it.

# Proposal aims and how the project addressed them

Our core aim was to **provide community oversight of Catalyst governance processes**, by engaging a **wide range of experienced participants from the Catalyst community with backgrounds in finance, academic research, accountancy, project management, entrepreneurship, community outreach, facilitation and development**.

Our skilled proposal team clearly met this brief. Our meetings discussed the most significant governance issues in Catalyst at the time (July-Oct 2022), and developed analysis and oversight of them, from our varied perspectives. By documenting and sharing our work (Youtube videos of our fortnightly meetings; meeting summaries on the project GitBook; regular updates in the Catalyst Weekly newsletter; regular slides at Wednesday Town Hall; several After Town Hall sessions; engaging community members as reviewers of our whitepaper on dReps and liquid democracy, and wide sharing of the finished whitepaper; and inviting the community to submit commentary on Catalyst parameter changes via this form) we offered a range of pathways for community members to become more aware of developments in governance as they happened. The final way in which the project is meeting its aims is through this report, which draws together our insights on four key governance processes: challenge-setting, dReps, Catalyst Circle, and parameter changes.

# Key achievements

- Holding 6 meetings at which core governance issues were discussed; plus extensive work outside meetings to collate data, discuss, and analyse; and sharing our work in a wide variety of channels, to raise community awareness of core governance issues.

- Engaging community members as reviewers of our whitepaper on dReps and liquid democracy; and producing the whitepaper itself, which was widely-viewed.
- Producing this final report as a reference point for future governance debates.

# Key learnings

Similarly to the F7 CGO proposal, our two general learning-points for the project overall were:

- Changes to governance can occur quickly in Catalyst; but the thinking, motivation, or academic theory *behind* a change is rarely shared with the community. IOG's process to implement a change is also rarely shared: although the community is often invited to give feedback, there is no defined process for how this feedback will be dealt with. A document might be shared by IOG, or a meeting held - but the thresholds /acceptance criteria for IOG to consider a community suggestion are usually left undefined, as are the actual decision-making processes, who the decision-makers are, why a particular idea from the community is or isn't accepted, what level of community engagement is considered sufficient, and which voices are missing from the discourse.

- Oversight provides a balance to all this via independent commentary; however, it has limits. In our view, "oversight" should not seek to arbitrate, govern, or intervene directly in processes, but should only collect data, document the process, and oversee. For this reason, we chose not to release some of our commentary (particularly about Circle) until afterwards, so as not to influence the process. We simply hope that the insights we are presenting in this report will be considered in future iterations.

See the main body of the report for detailed learnings from the 4 areas of oversight that we conducted.

# Next steps

Regrettably, there was no suitable challenge in F9 to submit a governance oversight proposal. This is particularly unfortunate given that there have been many proposed changes to Catalyst governance since this project ended, which could have benefitted from some focused community oversight. Also, the long hiatus between F9 and F10 has meant that several members of the CGO team - in common with many other community members - have been unable to sustain their engagement with Catalyst.

However, other CGO team members are continuing to pursue research, documentation and oversight in their various fields, with the benefit of the connections forged in this project. Individual members plan to propose governance projects in F10, which is likely to include a proposal for a continuation CGO project.

# Links to project sources or documents

GitBook: https://quality-assurance-dao.gitbook.io/community-governance-oversight
Youtube playlist: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL4dGsCqdRj6fks_uiISpGwGKlsuFn1SMr
Close-out video: https://youtu.be/nyI9tj_-u4k

# F8 CGO Oversight Report

## Background

The F8 Community Governance Oversight (CGO) proposal was a continuation of the work begun in the F7 project of the same name (read its final report [here](#)).  The intent was *to provide community oversight of improvements to and innovations in Catalyst Governance, by collecting feedback and providing tracking, documentation, research and analysis of any proposed changes.*

Both proposals reference the "[Voltaire Principles](#)" developed by Dor Garbash (ex-IOG) as an outline of what decentralised governance looks like:

1. No central entity controlling governance: any actor can be removed and governance still functions.
2. Key groups are fairly represented: voters, SPO's, toolmakers & maintainers, funded proposers, PAs/VPAs, challenge teams, Cardano Ambassadors, and IOG.
3. The activities of participants in any governance change are accountable to the community.
4. The risk of adversarial capture is mitigated.
5. Governance is transparent and understandable through accessible, timely and widely distributed documentation and communication
6. Will assess whether improvements to Catalyst governance have a) recruited capable participants, b) access to impartial data and analysis, c) robust methodologies and d) clear rules and policies.
7. Formal security and emergency mechanisms are developed and implemented.
8. Governance culture is legitimate, stable and lively.

As in F7, CGO maintained oversight of four key areas of governance; the main change was that with Catalyst Circle, we broadened our focus to look at Circle as a whole, rather than only its problem-sensing process:

- Challenge setting (George Lovegrove, Phil Khoo)
- Catalyst Circle (Vanessa Cardui, Phil Khoo, Tevo Saks, Kenric Nelson)
- dReps (Kenric Nelson, Thorsten Pottebaum, Stephen Whitenstall)
- Governance parameters (Vanessa Cardui, Phil Khoo, Allison Fromm, Tevo Saks, Andre Diamond)

---

## Meetings and Town Hall Slides

6 fortnightly CGO meetings were held between 14th July and 20th October 2022.  The day before each meeting, Allison Fromm presented slides in the main Wednesday Town Hall, including updates on CGO's activities, and recent governance-related news in Catalyst.

Each meeting followed an agenda focused on the four major proposal deliverables : challenge-setting, Catalyst Circle, dReps, and governance parameters.. The agenda also included standing items such as budget and expenditure (Treasury Guild) and monthly reporting.

At first, meetings were video recorded, and the videos shared on [YouTube](#); but the group agreed that this was not particularly useful or accessible, and so agreed to change to a different documentation process for meetings #5 and #6 - i.e. a brief summary video detailing action items from each meeting.

---

# Insights on the four key oversight areas

## 1) Challenge setting (George Lovegrove, Phil Khoo)

### Issues

- [Overlapping categorisations](#) - Overlapping categorisations add complexity for proposers when submitting proposals, as they must decide between multiple categorisations. There is a higher complexity for voters too when similar proposals are submitted in separate categorisations, as voters now need to compare similar proposals across multiple categorisations to make informed voting decisions.

### Improvements made

- [Assessment approach for challenges was simplified](#) - The guidance for PAs assessing challenge settings was improved based on feedback given, and was simplified to remove certain elements such as giving bonus points for a good challenge team, when the team may not be fully established at the point of assessing.  A recurring categorisation approach has been suggested to IOG to replace the challenge-setting process; this would remove the effort and cost to constantly assess funding categorisations each round.

### Observations

- [Little to no funding access for some focus areas](#) - Community & outreach focus areas saw either little or no access to funding for fund 10.
- [Overlapping categorisations](#) - This included 15 overlapping product & integration categorisations, 13 overlapping development & infrastructure categorisations, 21 overlapping community & outreach categorisations and 5 overlapping governance & identity categorisations.
- [17 broad categorisations and 42 specific categorisations were submitted](#)

### Data & statistics

|  | Fund 7 | Fund 8 | Fund 9 |
|--|--------|--------|--------|

| Number of challenges proposed | 67 | 76 | 61 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of challenges funded | 22 | 12 (11 after two merged) | 10 |
| Highest upvote ADA amount on a challenge | ₳222,760,136 | ₳175,986,427 | ₳257,748,012 |
| Highest number of wallet votes on a challenge | 1,321 | 1,190 | 1,352 |

## Funding categories as an alternative to challenge setting

Analysis has continued on funding categories as an alternative approach to funding categorisation - https://docs.catalystcontributors.org/funding-categorisation-analysis/
Access to funding for different focus areas
Fund 9 challenge settings led to selected categorisations for Fund 10 that heavily leant towards the development & infrastructure category. Community & outreach focus areas received little access to funding.



Funding categories could achieve similar or better outcomes in most cases with a simpler approach. A similar outcome would be achieved with the following weightings:

- **Community & Outreach** - 1%
- **Products & Integrations** - 28%
- **Governance & Identity** - 18%
- **Development & Infrastructure** - 53%

## Cost comparison

Funding categories could have reduced the total overall cost by 87% for handling funding categorisation for Fund 9, if it had been fully used as an alternative approach. The methodology for this cost comparison is documented.



## Recent updates

The funding categorisation analysis has recently been refined and improved to reach a version 1.0. The exact changes have been fully documented; a handful of the main noteworthy changes include:

- Improved explicitness of focus areas included in each category
- Refined the contributor categorisations with better shared responsibilities, role task definitions and surrounding analysis
- Improved contributor proposal guide and example proposals
- Analysis and date updates for fund 9 categorisation results
- How funding categories can be scaled
- Incentives and game theory for open source development
- Comparing more categorisation types with the introduction of task and community categorisations

## Upcoming changes

George Lovegrove has been in conversations with IOG regarding making improvements to the funding categorisation process, and has suggested a change towards more effective approaches as outlined in the funding categorisation analysis documentation.
From these conversations emerged an agreement on the issues that exist with challenge settings, and sufficient rationale to pilot new changes in fund 11.

In terms of oversight, the manner in which the funding categorisation process changes will need to be reviewed to determine what information is shared for feedback with the community, what process is used to make the change and what authority has made the change - was it determined by IOG, the community or both?

---

## 2) Catalyst Circle (Vanessa Cardui, Phil Khoo, Tevo Saks, Kenric Nelson)

## CCv3 background

Catalyst Circle version 3 (CCv3) began in Feb 2022, and the F7 CGO project worked with CCv3 members in Spring 2022 on developing their process for prioritising problems.

However, by the time the F8 CGO project began in July 2022, several Circle members had either resigned (Nadia Hopkins, Dimitri Fernando, Bullish Dumpling), or had appointed a deputy to attend meetings (Mercy). This was for a range of reasons, including a lack of clarity on the length of CCv3's term (some reps had thought it was only 3 months rather than 6), exhaustion with the work and/or the interpersonal relationships within Circle and/or the criticisms Circle faced from some sections of the community; and in one case (Dimitri), dissatisfaction with restrictions on how his subcircle could be paid. Nadia and Dimitri were replaced either temporarily or permanently by unelected members from their subcircles; Bullish Dumpling was replaced by Felix Weber for CF; and the IOG representative also changed from Harris Warren to Kriss Baird. This new version of Circle sometimes described itself as "CCv3.2". So as F8 CGO, we were working with a Circle which had seen a lot of instability and tension, and a Circle in which only 2 of the 7 people regularly attending meetings were elected.

Further, CCv3.2 decided (although this was not agreed publicly in a meeting, and the exact source of the decision remains unclear) to do no further work on sensing and prioritising problems from the community, but to focus entirely on designing an election process for CCv4. CGO could thus not continue its work on Circle problem-sensing, as no problem-sensing was taking place; so our oversight shifted to looking at Circle as an entity, particularly with a focus on legitimacy and representation; and to Circle's proposals for a CCv4 election process.

# "Oversight" vs "influence"

As already mentioned, the majority of the CGO team felt that "oversight" should mean observing, investigating and recording issues in order to raise them at a later stage, rather than intervening or influencing the process. But during our F8 project, we sometimes struggled as a team with where "oversight" stops and influence begins. Although we were very concerned about what we saw emerging in CCv3.2, we were conscious that raising these issues publicly could amount to

influencing the outcome, which was not part of our remit. (Alongside this, the CGO team were being frequently trolled and abused by one member of Circle, often in private channels such as Slack, where the wider community did not see it happening. This was distressing at times, and made it doubly difficult for some of us to feel able to raise concerns.)

It is our hope that raising these issues now, in this report, will encourage critical thinking in retrospect, and will enable the Catalyst community to become more vigilant against similar problems in future.

## CCv3.2 legitimacy issues

CGO identified a number of significant concerns around Circle's legitimacy during the period of our project. These are listed below, and some of them are also addressed in the [closing report for the F8 *Oversight of Catalyst Circle* project](#).

1. **Unelected:** Several elected reps resigned in May/June and were replaced by unelected subcircle reps and/or individual community volunteers. Arguably all Circle's actions after this are questionable, because Circle ceased being a "community-elected human sensor array" and turned into an unelected discussion group supported by IOG. Additionally, the change was poorly communicated, and there was considerable confusion in the community about who was on Circle and what the roles were. It is notable that the idea of officially disbanding Circle, and creating a broader working group drawn from the community to work on the election, was mooted several times, but never acted on. In one meeting, it was raised 4 times by 3 different people, but still never voted on.

2. **Long tenure:** There was admittedly some confusion even at the start of CCv3 about whether its tenure would be 3 months or 6. However, it was definitely not set to be more than 6. In the end, however, CCv3.2 refused to dissolve and ended up running for 8 to 10 months (their final recorded meeting was in October 2022, but officially they were still in office until CCv4 was elected in December 2022).

3. **Decision to cease problem-sensing:** As mentioned above, around the time that several elected reps left the Circle (May/June 2022), it was decided that Circle would no longer work on problem-sensing, and would focus only on planning CCv4. However, there is no record of when, how, and why this was agreed - possibly it was done in an unrecorded working meeting, and the reason *may* have been related to some level of understanding that Circle was less legitimate without elected reps - but if so, this probably should have triggered the dissolution of CCv3, and a new election. The result of continuing, despite questionable legitimacy, but with no problem-sensing, was that Circle spent around 4 months without addressing the community's concerns, and instead focused on almost entirely self-focused experiments with what seats should be on CCv4 and how the election should be run. Has this been a good and legitimate approach? In effect the "CCv3.2" group chose unilaterally, and without consultation, to turn into a working group to prepare for the CCv4 election.

4. **Using Circle role to promote own proposals**: Catalyst GPS was a funded proposal led by a CCv3 rep and a CCv3 subcircle rep, which had its own plan for restructuring CCv4 and the whole Catalyst community. GPS was given an unprecedented level of access to Circle, being invited to present their solutions for the future of Circle at several consecutive Circle meetings. This could be deemed "use of one's Circle position to promote one's own proposals", which, even in the absence of a formal Code of Conduct for Circle, has always

been recognised as something that Circle reps should not do.  No attempt was made by Circle to seek or hear input or solutions other than GPS's, either from the community at large or from other funded proposals; and yet the justifying narrative emerged in Circle meetings that "*GPS were the only people who had any suggestions*". There was no evidence that this was the case - and in fact there is evidence to the contrary, via (among other things) a doc of community-sourced suggestions 📄 Community suggestions for alternative CCv4 structures  that was circulated in August (this doc was mentioned in a Circle meeting, but none of the ideas were actually discussed). Overall, Circle appears to have made no effort to invite or hear suggestions other than GPS's.

5. **Scale of changes**: Although Circle does have the task of planning the election of the next Circle, we question whether it is legitimate for any Circle - and particularly a mostly unelected one - to so completely restructure the seats and voting method for CCv4.

6. **Lack of community engagement**: Point 5 above is especially true given CCv3.2's shortcomings at community consultation. Often in meetings, Circle members agreed to go to their communities, get feedback on an issue or decision, and report back; but with a couple of notable exceptions, this was rarely done at all, and certainly not done very thoroughly. And once decisions had been made, little was done to explain decisions to the community. Overall, there was a profound lack of connection with the Catalyst community, and a lack of community engagement - CCv3.2 members were often working to their own personal views, rather than seeking the input of those they were supposed to represent.

7. **Poor decision-making process**: The in-meeting decision-making process at several points (particularly in July and August) was very unclear. Some Circle members reportedly voted without realising they were taking part in a binding vote; and some of the voted-on decisions were then not adhered to by Circle members. Further, Circle's misunderstanding of a Pol.is poll they conducted in August may have misled them about the community's views, and may have unduly shaped some of the decisions they made. Overall, Circle appears to have been operating in an echo-chamber - major decisions were made internally, with little process or clarity, that went far beyond Circle's declared scope of organising an election for CCv4.

8. **Going against the original purpose of Circle:** Further to point 7 above, Catalyst Circle was originally conceived as working on a broadly consensus model, and all parties in Circle were meant to agree with decisions. The intention of this was to disincentivise reps from making unilateral or selfish decisions, and instead to incentivise gathering and presenting the decisions made by the communities they were meant to represent. The transition to "CCv3.2" meant that Circle's own governance rules were broken; and no collective attempt was made to get back to consensus decision-making.

9. **Inward-looking**: CCv3, in all its iterations, spent much time discussing how it was perceived by the community, and trying to address its own image. This raised two questions for CGO. First, was this a legitimate use of Circle's time, or did it take undue amounts of time away from the task of problem-sensing? Second, what are the ethics of reputation in a governance body, and how should reputation be managed? There is a balance between addressing reputational problems a) by talk and PR, (i.e. telling critics that they are mistaken, and that actually one is working hard), and b) by *actually* working hard, i.e. getting on with the tasks one was elected/ funded to do, and hoping this will be noticed and that good reputation will follow. This balance was arguably askew in all

iterations of CCv3; its focus on addressing its reputation via PR rather than work only served to exacerbate the problem by making Circle seem even more inward-looking and solipsistic.

For example: CCV3 tried to address a perceived loss of community confidence by holding a special "Circle" Town Hall at the end of June. But in their following Circle meeting, their report-backs to each other on the event were not entirely accurate, and were unduly positive (for example, not mentioning that although many people were present, few actually spoke; and failing to note and report the criticisms that were raised).
Or: in the latter stages of CCv3.2, repeated meetings made little progress, sometimes undoing the progress of the previous meeting; yet members were still closing out their meetings by congratulating each other on how much progress they were making.

10. **Lack of any process on rule-breaking or loss of community confidence:** CCv3 members themselves had the perception that many of their problems - including a lack of trust from the community - stemmed from interpersonal tensions, many of these being centred on the General ADA Holder rep's actions. Clearly, there was tension - but there was no clarity on how this should be addressed. There was a process in place (suggested by Governance Alive when Circle v1 was created) for removing a rep who breaks the rules - but that process seems to have been designed for a much smaller community than we now have, and was clearly inappropriate/inadequate; and when attempts were made to create an alternative process on the fly, it did not go well. Despite this, CCv3.2, in all its deliberations about Circle v4, gave no thought to creating a process for how a rule-breaking Circle rep can be removed, or how the community could remove a corrupt or unsatisfactory Circle. There is no "enforcement" process in the Code of Conduct that CCv3 drafted, nor even any recognition that an enforcement process is necessary; and although CCv3.2 discussed the idea of a confidence vote on CCv4 after 3 months, they handed over to CCv4 without this in place. This is a major oversight in terms of governance practice; CCv3 was aware that many in the community wanted them to implement some sort of process, but they de-prioritised it.


## Deciding an election process for CCv4

CGO had some concerns over how CCv3.2 arrived at their plan for the CCv4 election. In brief, not enough research was done to look at all the alternatives, and Circle ended up going against its own vote on how the election should run.

1. A meeting was held in July to discuss the voting process; but DripDropz were the only organisation that was approached to come and present their voting solution. We believe Circle should have put out an open call for organisations who felt they could provide a voting solution, and given them all an opportunity to present themselves.

2. There was sentiment, both in Circle's meetings and in the community, that Jormungandr might offer a better voting platform for Circle for reasons ranging from voter privacy to familiarity. But in the rush to go with DripDropz, this possibility does not seem to have been fully explored.

3. In Circle's own decision-making [meeting on the voting mechanism on 4th August 2022](), a small majority voted to try other voting platforms alongside DripDropz to elect CCv4, and believed this would be possible. It appears that DripDropz themselves were not

comfortable with this, and that this is the reason it did not happen; however, at no point was it publicly shared that DripDropz were only willing to proceed if theirs was the sole platform, and that therefore what Circle members had voted for would need to be overturned. Circle members might have decided differently, had they known that the choice was "ONLY DripDropz" vs "other options".

4. The details of the nomination process for CCv4 are also in question. First, it seems Circle did not explore all the options. A community-sourced document was presented by a community member, exploring several possible approaches to organising Circle v4; but although this document was raised in a Circle meeting, the options in it were never actually discussed. There may well have been other ideas in the community too, but Circle didn't ask. Secondly, the final decision that Circle made about the nomination process for CCv4 (although initially, on 4th August, the opposite decision was taken) was that they would **not** base the nominations process on the seats defined by Catalyst GPS (a funded proposal that got an unprecedented level of access to Circle to promote its approach) - however, the nomination form nevertheless went out with the GPS nomination categories on it, and this was only changed after a community member queried it. This led to widespread confusion about what the seats were, and how they were defined. And although the seat structure had been agreed in CCv3's meetings (the plan was that seats were not going to be predefined; but nominees would define their own community, and their platform statement would say who or what they intended to represent), this is not what happened - in the end, most candidates did not define who or what they were representing. Finally, several candidates reported that upon nominating themselves or being nominated as a candidate for CCv4, they were only given 2 days in which to prepare a platform statement.

Overall, Circle did not communicate its plan for the CCv4 vote, or look for input, or engage with the community, as much as was needed. Since community engagement is part of Circle's remit, and its decisions are supposed to be based on community input, the conspicuous lack of it raises questions about how valid Circle's decisions on plans for the election were. Several times in the process, CCv3.2 agreed "We will go to our communities and ask their views on XYZ", but they then did not do so. The overarching issue is that although the original conception of Circle includes communication with the community, and although it is a widely-held view that the personal opinions of Circle reps should be secondary to the opinions of those they represent, still there has never been a clear remit for Circle on what level of consultation they needed to do on significant issues, or how and in what channels they should do it.

Note: the discussion process is documented in detail, meeting by meeting, on QA-DAO's CCv3 GitBook.


## The election process

The process agreed between CCv3 and DripDropz was a plutocratic, on-chain vote using the DripDropz platform. The minimum threshold was 5 ADA; the snapshot was taken on 6$^{th}$ December, 2022 at 21:44 PM UTC, and voting was open for 2 epochs. It was a form of ranked choice vote, where each voter had 5 votes; their first vote carried 100% of their voting power; their 2nd vote, 80%; and so on.

The voting results can be viewed on DripDropz' platform here.

The issues with the election process that CGO has identified are:

1. **Lack of voter understanding**:  The "ranked choice" element particularly seems to have been a blocker; it was poorly understood even by CCv3 themselves (see this [link to a relevant meeting](#)). Some of those who voted have reported not understanding it either - some reported only voting once, not realising they had 5 votes; others reported not realising that their first vote needed to be their most preferred candidate. (Some examples of this are [in this Tweet](#) and the replies to it, for example [this](#)). DripDropz did make some efforts to publicise and explain the process, for example in [this Medium article](#); nevertheless, the agreement was that this was Circle's responsibility, not theirs. We would suggest that this wasn't done sufficiently, particularly given that this was a new process. The vote felt somewhat rushed, and more time should probably have been allowed to ensure that people understood how it worked.

2. **Lack of appropriate outreach:** Information about the election, and opportunities for candidates to canvass, were shared mainly on Twitter and on the CF forum - platforms where many of the candidates are not very active. It is questionable whether CCv3.2 made sufficient effort to identify what platforms the candidates and their constituencies use, and to facilitate engagement there, rather than using their own opinions on where the community *ought* to engage.

3. **Lack of notice:** As mentioned above, several candidates have said that they were given only 2 days to write their platform statements. This militates against inclusion for many people - those who don't have English as a first language, those who are in paid work or have caring responsibilities, or have other things that might slow them down and make it harder for them to write their statement this quickly. Further, some candidates mentioned that they only heard about various election events at the last minute. This unnecessary rush and lack of notice created barriers to participation.

4. **Lack of transparency and lack of democracy:** The vote was plutocratic, which is not a democratic process; and initial analysis indicates that the outcome was substantially determined by whale voters (see graphs below for further detail). Analysis by community member Victor Corcino suggests that the 35 top wallets (out of a total of more than 900 wallets registered to vote) could elect all 5 candidates, if they decided to collude. 35 is not a large number of people to coordinate and work together; and even if there was no explicit organised collusion, these 35, or some of them, could still have a "bloc vote" effect if they have shared interests and a similar agenda, such as voting for candidates who are likely to work to support the interests of whales.

5. Although it was never actually hidden that the vote was plutocratic, not enough was done to make clear the implications of this for the average voter. In effect, many people's votes could not possibly have any impact on the results, and yet such publicity as there was consistently gave the impression that ordinary voters *could* have an impact. Many ordinary voters clearly believed this; and it was never transparently explained that actually, their voting was purposeless, and was merely an illusion of participation.

   Based on Victor Corcino's analysis of the vote, the top 2.5% of wallets held ~50% of all voting power; the top 10% of wallets held ~80% of all voting power; the top 15% of wallets held ~90% of all voting power; and the single biggest whale wallet (roughly $1.5M) held 10% of the voting power on its own - it had the same voting power as the bottom 300 wallets together.

The graph below, from 8th Dec 2023, indicates that at that point in the vote, fewer than 10 wallets out of more than 320 were in control of 50% of the total voting power. Further, as disproportionate as this graph shows the voting power to be, the actuality is even worse. If the probabilities were shown on a log scale, it would be an even steeper curve. The log scale is important because it is log p that measures information, or in this case, power.

**CCv4 Cumulative voting power**
**Date and Time: 2022-12-08 18:42:04 UTC**



6. The vote was transparent in the sense that a voter could see the progress of the vote as it went along. The experience of DripDropz in their own community's voting suggested that this does not have a significant impact on the vote - but the data suggests that in the CCv4 vote, showing the results beforehand did help a voter decide in which order they need to vote in order to secure a win for the candidates they wanted. In short, whales who voted last, with the information on how the vote stood, had an increased ability to influence the final outcome. Another interesting effect was the concentration of voting in a subset of candidates over time. As the voting period progressed, people did not continue voting for candidates who didn't have any chance of being elected; instead, most people only voted for the top 10 candidates.

7. Further, on the issue of voter privacy, there was a lack of transparency about the fact that the vote was not private. Those accustomed to voting on Catalyst proposals are used to the vote being private - so did they understand that this was not the case in this vote? Possibly this was not an issue, if most voters were already aware because they already use DripDropz's platform - but this then raises its own question, as follows:

8. **Lack of outreach specifically to encourage new signups to the DripDropz platform** for those who are not already there. Obviously it is never easy to determine when "enough" outreach has been done; but CCv3.2's approach seems to have been to rely on publicising the vote to DripDropz' existing users CGO has not explored whether there were many new signups to the DripDropz platform around the time of the Circle vote - but if there were not, this would suggest that potential voters outside the established DripDropz community were not really being reached.

# Analysis after the vote

The final voting results can be found at https://dripdropz.io/vote/3/results. They are also added here for completeness:

| Place | Candidate | Total Voter power |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Melannie Duhon | 23,700,580 |
| 2 | HOSKY | 21,486,355 |
| 3 | Nebiyu Sultan | 18,606,029 |
| 4 | Patrick Tobler | 17,952,436 |
| 5 | Ninh Tran | 16,502,398 |
| 6 | George Lovegrove | 15,090,872 |
| 7 | Adaku Agwunobi | 13,813,433 |
| 8 | Darlington Kofa | 12,714,622 |
| 9 | Omolola Tofade | 6,947,602 |
| 10 | Curtis Myers | 6,854,781 |
| 11 | Lee Yost | 5,922,472 |
| 12 | Juliane Montag | 4,879,215 |
| 13 | Quasar | 3,473,140 |
| 14 | Peter Bismarck | 2,855,855 |
| 15 | Thomas DiMatteo | 1,887,475 |
| 16 | Kevin Mohr | 1,593,597 |
| 17 | David Baxter | 1,525,231 |
| 18 | Özgür Yaşar Akyar | 1,519,623 |
| 19 | Juana Attieh | 1,519,532 |
| 20 | Marcus Ubani | 1,149,417 |
| 21 | Mohammed Mustapha Yakubu | 901,895 |
| 22 | Daniela Balaniuc | 722,747 |
| 23 | Ross Pettitt | 698,354 |
| 24 | Ivan Kwananda | 629,369 |
| 25 | Seán Lynch | 587,377 |
| 26 | Patrick Roncato | 348,484 |
| 27 | Mike Ndaba | 180,482 |
| 28 | Boaz Bandu Balume | 157,432 |
| 29 | Stevani Ongko | 137,283 |
| 30 | Mobolaji Onibudo | 62,717 |

## Total Voter Power per Candidate



 The JSON file with the raw data of all voting transactions can be downloaded here: https://bit.ly/ccv4-voting-raw-data.

Some initial analysis was done by Victor Corcino immediately after the vote. This indicated the dramatic effect that very large wallets ("whale" voters) had on the outcome. The following graphs from Victor highlight some of the relevant issues:

**1) Cumulative voting power per CCv4 candidate: 14th Dec (one day before voting closed)**

CCv4 Cumulative voting power per candidate vs Date
Date and Time: 2022-12-14 00:59:45 UTC

## 2) Cumulative voting power and Unique votes over time: 13th Dec (2 days before voting closed)



CCv4 Cumulative voting power & Unique votes, per time
Date and Time: 2022-12-13 20:39:32 UTC

## 3) Cumulative voting power 11th Dec

(Note from Victor: *A 3.35M whale voted during the weekend. This wallet has the same voting power as the 515 smallest wallets together, out of 596 total wallets that voted so far.*) This appears to be this vote:

*Voter ID:  stake1uxrstxm27z8p07fmn3n94xn79luqstqlf0v8t6kfe0u7ntqdrvgeu*
*Voter Power:  1178465.981775*
*Ballot Choices:  ['HOSKY', 'Patrick Tobler', 'Ninh Tran', 'Melannie Duhon', 'George Lovegrove']*



CCv4 Cumulative voting power & Wallet sizes
Date and Time: 2022-12-11 13:51:54 UTC

Voter ID:  stake1u96mrrzhz4q0v8cgaccvzzkfwe5v7y4j5qx6er2mlfrl9ec5uj88r
Voter Power:  1221940.60814
Ballot Choices:  ['HOSKY', 'Juana Attieh', 'Mohammed Mustapha Yakubu', 'Melannie Duhon', 'Patrick Tobler']

And some further whale (above 1M) wallets:

Voter ID:  stake1u80jes5l3jrlytu7knmayszpd39qt4xtaf8t6zdyu6m8utgvj84y6
Voter Power:  3355058.180404
Ballot Choices:  ['Patrick Tobler', 'HOSKY', 'Darlington Kofa', 'Ninh Tran', 'Adaku Agwunobi']

Voter ID:  stake1u8lz6cw55qzgf7n3l4jhy98pn72ya2v7n5cgk30xa3q8zrgkvh4zy
Voter Power:  1842531.852653
Ballot Choices:  ['Adaku Agwunobi', 'Omolola Tofade', 'Nebiyu Sultan']

Voter ID:  stake1u9rp5ehdtnz36hnth7prcj70sm2agxxmn9vgtr8l7f066xsyr9a3a
Voter Power:  1414465.029262
Ballot Choices:  ['HOSKY', 'Lee Yost', 'Quasar', 'Ninh Tran', 'Adaku Agwunobi']

Voter ID:  stake1uxrstxm27z8p07fmn3n94xn79luqstqlf0v8t6kfe0u7ntqdrvgeu
Voter Power:  1178465.981775
Ballot Choices:  ['HOSKY', 'Patrick Tobler', 'Ninh Tran', 'Melannie Duhon', 'George Lovegrove']

## 4) Cumulative voting power per candidate: 15th Dec (note apparent large last-minute whale vote for Melannie Duhon)



CCv4 Cumulative voting power per candidate vs Date
Date and Time: 2022-12-15 21:42:26 UTC

There is also some evidence that Twitter had a strong influence on the vote. Initially, most of the information-sharing about the vote was restricted to Catalyst channels, and at this point, some candidates had attracted very few votes, but their vote rose dramatically when communications shifted to Twitter later on in the voting. This spreadsheet 📗 CC Tweets & Voting relations , if analysed alongside the progress of the voting, might help unravel how particular Tweets influenced the vote, although CGO has not had the capacity to do this detailed analysis.

## Summing-up, and the future of Circle

Overall, CGO saw significant issues with both Circle v3.2, and with the election for CCv4. It remains to be fully seen what effect this might have long-term. However, at the time of writing this report (May 2023), we note that CCv4 has already been in office since December 2022 - 5 months - and have not documented any of their meetings beyond some uncorrected AI transcripts, or given any regular Town Hall Slides to update the community on their progress, and have done little problem-sensing or engagement with the Catalyst community. Although they have engaged to an extent on Twitter, a Tweet is very short, and gives little detail that the community can actually examine to maintain some sort of oversight; also, CCv4 has tweeted a total of only 15 times since creating their account in February 2023. Further, on Twitter in February 2023, they redefined their own remit as being "a bridge between IOG and the *Cardano* community" although they were elected as **Catalyst** Circle, to serve the Catalyst community specifically, and there has been no community consultation on this change.

CCV4 have repeatedly been offered help with both facilitation and documentation, by members of CGO, members of of Governance Guild (the group that emerged from the old Circle Admin team), and from individuals in the community; but they have declined this help and stated that they prefer to document and facilitate themselves. This, however, is very poor governance practice, and a worrying precedent to set. An executive body should not document itself - documentation should be done by a third party, otherwise there would be nothing to stop the executive body from falsifying the record.

In short, although the CGO proposal has ended, we see continuing governance problems around Circle in its current iteration, and a continuing need for community oversight to hold Circle to high standards.

---

# 3) dReps (Kenric Nelson, Thorsten Pottebaum Stephen Whitenstall)

A scholarly review of liquid democracy, *Delegated Representation in Cardano's Project Catalyst Governance*, was conducted by the Community Governance Oversight team in collaboration with the Cardano Catalyst community. The purpose of the review was to a) provide the community with background context regarding the design of the delegated representation program planned for Catalyst, and b) to evaluate an experiment in community research.

Regarding the experiment in community research, the review was conducted in the following manner:

A portion of the funding from CGO's Fund 7 award was used to carry out a literature review, *Measuring the socioeconomic health of DAO Governance: A literature review of liquid democracy for the Cardano Catalyst Community*. The literature review, led by Kenric Nelson (Photrek) and Stephen Whitenstall (QA-DAO), accomplished several things necessary for a good review, including a) identifying members of the community interested in participating in scholarly research, b) establishing an open meeting for discussing liquid democracy research, c) introducing the use of Google Scholar and Zotero bibliography tool to search and organise reference material, and d) gathering and organising notes into a bibliography review.

The literature review provided the foundation for including funding within the F8 CGO proposal to write a scholarly review. The funding supported Kenric Nelson in leading the review, Thorsten Pottebaum as a co-editor, and rewards for community members who participated in the public review of the paper.  The contributors to the literature review were invited to be lead authors; however, they were expected to either volunteer and/or be sponsored by their own organisation for the time necessary to write a review. Initially, Philip Lazos (IOG) Steph Macurdy (Wolfram Research) Aharon Porath (Consenz), George Ramayya (independent) and Frank Albanese (Snapbrillia) began planning review sections. Ramayya and Albanese did not have scope to lead a section so their contributions were deferred.

The project was scoped to ensure that a high quality review could be completed in a four-month period. As such, lead authors were encouraged to focus on review of either existing capabilities within their organisation and/or a review of the literature. Lazos completed a thorough review of the literature on delegated representation, comparing and contrasting the concerns and benefits of allowing voters to either vote directly or to delegate their vote. Macurdy was able to draw upon resources within Wolfram Research to refine a *Mathematica* package to measure [Banzhaf Voting Power](). The analysis was applied to Cardano Catalyst Fund 4 & 5 voting data collected earlier by Photrek. Porath described an application of delegated representation within the Consenz community document writing tool. And Nelson wrote an introduction for the review. The first month was used to clarify the lead authors' focus; the second month was devoted to drafting the reviews; in the third month, the review was discussed with the Catalyst community at an [After Town Hall meeting]() and participants were given access to provide comments and suggestions; and in the fourth month, the review was finalised for publication.

The whitepaper was launched on Tues 4th October 2022; [another After Townhall ]()was held on Weds 5th October to launch it, and there was a [discussion at Catalyst Swarm]() on Sat 8th October.

The team has received positive feedback from the community and has held several meetings at the regional Catalyst Swarm Town Halls. For now, the paper has been self-published using Google Drive and the CGO GitBook. Medium or other self-publishing venues are also a possibility for wider disbursement.

Given the success of the review, pursuing publication in a peer-reviewed journal is worth considering. Peer-review is a lengthy process and would need to be pursued by the individual authors. Each author needs to identify a journal, clarify the requirements for acceptance, and strengthen the research by ensuring that original, unpublished content is included. A more ambitious endeavour to consider is for CGO to establish a Cardano Catalyst journal. We followed an editorial process similar to an edited book; however, the authors were selected in advance and each contribution was mentored toward successful completion. Publication of a journal and/or edited book would require at least a year to execute.  The process would include extending a public invitation for one-page abstracts, selecting a team of reviewers for acceptance/rejection of the abstracts, and then mentoring the selected authors toward completion of a paper/section to be published in the journal/book.

As an initial step toward peer-review publication, Stephen Macurdy, et. al. are presenting their section, *Measuring Voting Power in a Weighted Voting System*, at the New England Statistical Symposium and the Chain Science Conference in June 2023.

# 4) Governance parameters (Vanessa Cardui, Phil Khoo, Allison Fromm, Tevo Saks, Andre Diamond)

## Background

CGO's focus on governance parameter changes began in our F7 project. We noticed that some of the changes made to Catalyst by IOG, which IOG did not define as "parameter changes", often did in fact amount to a parameter change, since they had a significant impact on the functioning of Catalyst governance and Catalyst funding. We also noticed a lack of any defined, consistent process for introducing such changes, or for documenting them; and we noted that often, there was little explanation or engagement with the community when IOG did introduce a change, particularly a lack of information about the background thinking behind the change. This led to a [meeting between CGO members and Harris Warren from IOG](#) in May 2022, on defining what a "Catalyst parameter change" is, and how the community can begin to be more involved in changes.

CGO thus went into its F8 project with its own agreed definition of a "Catalyst parameter change": simply, any change that substantially alters the way a Fund operates or the way Catalyst is governed ([this video](#), from May 2022, gives more detail). By contrast, IOG's definition is somewhat narrower, as indicated by [this blogpost](#) by IOG's Kriss Baird from October 2022, which outlines F9 parameters from IOG's point of view.

## Researching parameter changes

In our oversight of Catalyst governance parameter changes in F8, we have continued to use our broader definition of what a parameter is. Our focus has been to:
1. attempt to identify and log parameter changes
2. note which area(s) of the ecosystem, and which stakeholder groups, are affected by each change
3. capture detail on who initiated the change; the background thinking that led to the change; who was consulted, how, and when; what the decision-making process entailed; and how transparent that decision-making process was.

We created a [spreadsheet of key parameter changes](#) that occurred during the run of the F8 project, together with some detail about them. We had community input on this, via personal conversations and [via a Google form](#) inviting people to report changes that they had noticed; but it's interesting that we ourselves did a lot of the research on how and when changes were made, and who was consulted, since we found there was not a great deal of clarity on these things in the community at large.

## What we found

The data we collected indicate that:

- IOG leads on the majority of the changes. (Note that this may not necessarily be a bad thing in itself at this stage of Catalyst's development, but it is important to be aware of it.)

- Some stakeholder groups in Catalyst (particularly, the PAs and VPAs) are heard more than others, and are more likely to instigate a change. There is no evidence to suggest that this is because the PAs are necessarily *more* organised than other groups; but could be because they organise in a particular way which IOG prefers to work with.

- Some groups (particularly, proposers) are more likely to be "acted upon" by sudden changes that are announced without discussion.

- Changes, whoever they originate from, have often been largely decided by their initiators before they are discussed with other stakeholders, so the sharing and discussion is usually somewhat cosmetic.

We also noted that IOG's process for dealing with any community input they do get on parameter changes is not clear to the community. In our F7 meeting with Harris Warren, Harris stated that there _is_ a process for implementing changes; Harris offered to share it (minus any private or commercially-sensitive details), but although F8 CGO have asked, the information hasn't yet been shared.

We have since heard from other IOG staff that IOG's change implementation process does include some degree of process for how changes should be shared with the community; but it is unclear whether this is simply about *informing* the community of a change, or whether it includes a defined method for seeking, processing and agreeing on actual community input and suggestions. It may be that this is done ad-hoc, depending on the nature of the change; or IOG may have a defined process in place; but either way, the community is not aware of what that process is. Several parameter changes have included things such as After TownHalls, shared documents open for community comments, and Miro boards; but the community still does not know how IOG make a decision on whether to act on a suggestion that is raised by one of these methods.

Questions that remain obscure include:

- What are the acceptance criteria that determine whether a suggestion from the community is implemented, or even considered?
- What is the decision-making process, and who decides?
- If IOG disagreed with a suggestion from the community for a modification to a proposed change, but the majority of the community supported it, would it be incorporated?
- Are there any thresholds for how far the community would need to disagree with a proposed change before that change would be dropped; and if there are such thresholds, are they about numbers of people, how well-informed the objections are, or something else?

On the question of "how well-informed community objections are", we also noted that it is comparatively rare for information about a proposed change to include the thinking (academic or otherwise) that underpins it. Reference to whitepapers or other academic research is appropriate for some kinds of change; but for other kinds, this would be more about links to the discussions and community consultation that has been done. Neither of these is usually shared when a change is announced.

## "Sufficient" community consultation? and who is affected

CGO also discussed the question of what level of community consultation is "sufficient". This is a question that applies beyond parameter changes to many initiatives in Catalyst, both IOG-led and otherwise; there is often no "definition of 'done'" for community consultation and input. While we are aware that the necessary level of community input may vary depending on whom the change affects, and the nature and scale of it, we still recommend that a good change process should include some thinking on what the appropriate levels of engagement would be *before* the change is shared, plus some thinking on what needs to be done if levels of engagement are much lower than anticipated. In the ordinary world, if voter turnout is low or if expected engagement doesn't happen, people usually shrug and ignore the fact; but we believe Catalyst can and should do better, and if people are not engaging, we should try to find out why not.

We would also suggest that a change process should include identifying which stakeholder group(s) will be most affected by the change, and specifically seeking input from them.


## Minumum guidelines for parameter changes

From all this, CGO have created the following draft set of minimum guidelines for how Catalyst parameter changes should be done - especially, minimum levels of community consultation.

**NOTE:** We are aware that several people in Catalyst have worked on developing processes for the community to initiate parameter changes (for example, trying to institute a "Project Catalyst CIP process"). While this is important work, and while we hope that CGO's thinking might feed into it, we would suggest that it's not the only approach that is needed, and at present, it may even be "trying to run before we can walk" as a community. This is because as things currently stand, most parameter changes are set in motion by IOG; and it seems probable that this will be the case for some time to come. So while we as a community _can_ create a parallel process whereby we initiate changes, in addition we need to look at how the process for IOG-initiated changes can be made more defined and transparent, since these are likely to be the majority of the changes that take place.

**<u>CGO's minimum guidelines for Catalyst parameter change process</u>**
We suggest that IOG - or any instigator of a Catalyst parameter change - should:

a) **<u>consult properly, and agree minimum levels of consultation in advance</u>**
Proper levels of consultation might vary according to the type of change; but agreed minimum levels should come from a community discussion. We would suggest that minimum levels should feature
   - ensuring that all sections of the community have been approached, and have been asked *how* they would like to give input, and that the pathways that have been suggested are enabled. This could be done globally at the start of a new decision-making process, rather than separately for each proposed change - but it would involve IOG, or community representatives, going directly to meetings of the various different groupings in Catalyst, and asking people for their thoughts, rather than expecting them to respond to a document or attend a separate meeting. This is based on a widely-used principle in community engagement work: meet people where they are, rather than demanding that they come to you.
   - ensuring that at least 4 key parts of the community have had input on an individual change (for example, 3 regional Town Halls and the PA community; or the SPOs, 2 regional Town Halls, and the Twitter community; etc) before that change can be implemented.
   - enabling input and discussion in languages other than English.

- ensuring that input has happened on a range of platforms, and has not all been required to be in writing - for instance, can people add to a Miro? Submit a short Loom video? Attend a meeting and have a documenter write up what they say? etc.
- ensuring that input *can* be given anonymously if people choose; and that people have clear  information on which pathways they can use anonymously.
- ensuring that requests for community input have been shared widely, and that people feel invited.
- ensuring that those who will be most affected by a proposed change have been identified, that they are treated as the most significant stakeholders, and that they have given some documented input before the change can be agreed.

b) **Clarify and publish what effect a change is intended to have**; and establish and **publish a baseline** (i.e. what is the current state, before implementation of the change, so the community can easily see if the change has produced the intended result).

c) **Fund and embed community-led monitoring and oversight** of parameter changes, conducted from a range of different perspectives by a range of groups and individuals, on a long-term basis. This could be via a "governance" Challenge, or by direct funding, and should use a range of monitoring methods including 1-to-1 interviews with those affected; focus groups; statistical analysis of the parameters that have been changed and the effects of the change; discussion in forums and social media; and surveys.

d) **Clarify acceptance criteria and decision-making processes for community suggestions** and modifications. Define how the initiating body (whether IOG or anyone else) will decide about whether to use a community-sourced suggestion. Ensure that processes other than voting are used for this where appropriate; and particularly, ensure that significant decisions in Catalyst are not made via a plutocratic vote, which effectively silences those who are not wealthy.

e) **Give enough advance warning** of changes to allow full discussion, and encourage discussion in a range of community-defined platforms, not only in Twitter spaces (which some people find unwelcoming).

f) **Share sufficient detail** (whether academic theory, or information about what consultation has been done) to _explain_ a change and the background to it. Fund outreach and education to ensure people fully understand what's being suggested; and do not try to predetermine how a group or community may discuss the change and what things they may consider or take account of. Instead, allow them to determine that for themselves.

g) **Ideally, move towards co-production,** by:
- seeing the various Catalyst communities as equal partners in creating change
- seeking community input on proposed changes at an early stage, rather than presenting them when they are almost decided;
- funding a process of investigating and removing barriers to participation (asking how easy different parts of the community find it to contribute, and how to hear "quieter" voices);
- doing outreach and engagement to invite the various parts of the community to instigate changes themselves, and /or ask them what change they would like to see, and working with them to build their capacity to develop a change process for it.

Another output from this element of CGO's work is the beginnings of work on a dashboard, developed by Phil Khoo of AIM and Andre Diamond of Treasury Guild, to enable the community to easily log parameter changes and collate information about them. This is an idea which will seek funding for full development in F10. (See repo at https://github.com/Catalyst-Auditing/Catalyst-Parameters-Dashboard). We believe this dashboard will support point c) above - embedding community oversight, on a long-term basis, of changes; and we hope also that a range of other tools for assessing and maintaining oversight of parameter changes will emerge in F10.

Finally, we have tried to maintain awareness, as far as our resources allowed, of how "parameter/ governance change" issues are addressed by other communities and other chains. For example, see https://deepfunding.ai/blog/governance-voting-experiment, a blogpost about experiments in governance from SingularityNET. We would like to see some kind of community-led process for collating knowledge about experiments in governance in other communities - perhaps a library, or a participatory document.

---

## Overall conclusions

The F8 CGO project successfully built on F7 CGO, and maintained and developed oversight of core governance processes in Catalyst. It published a well-regarded whitepaper about liquid democracy; engaged community members with reviewing academic research; maintained oversight of parameter changes and developed tools and thinking to embed community engagement; continued to hold Catalyst Circle to account; maintained oversight of the first on-chain vote for Catalyst Circle; and offered a locus of discussion and thinking on governance issues.

Through its work and the issues it has uncovered, it has demonstrated the importance of having some kind of focused, community-led oversight of governance in Catalyst.

# Appendix: CGO F8 project participants

## Allison Fromm

Allison left a 20+ year career in finance, banking, and business development to launch [Crypto Alley](). She has been involved in the cryptocurrency industry since 2012. Upon discovering the Cardano blockchain in 2020, she has focused primarily on projects in that ecosystem. Allison first participated in Project Catalyst during Fund 0; she attended the inaugural Atala Prism Pioneers program; and she was elected to Catalyst Circle v2 in November 2021. Outside of Cardano, she serves as a Co-Chair of the AML Working Group of Switzerland's Crypto Valley Association. Allison now lives in Switzerland but had spent most of her prior working career in the US.

## Andre Diamond

Linkedin: [https://www.linkedin.com/in/andré-diamond-45871242/](https://www.linkedin.com/in/andré-diamond-45871242/)

Experienced in small business operation and accounting, Andre joined the Catalyst Circle Admin team as treasurer in Nov 2021 and has expanded this role by starting the Treasury Guild alongside Miroslav Rajh to support projects in the Catalyst community. Currently using and documenting GitHub Actions to help automate some of the tasks in Catalyst Circle and treasury work.

## George Lovegrove

Linkedin: [https://www.linkedin.com/in/georgelovegrove/](https://www.linkedin.com/in/georgelovegrove/)

Involved with Catalyst since fund 3, and has worked on a number of funded initiatives around Catalyst documentation, Catalyst API data, community lists, auditing and credentials. George has focused on solving issues around funding categorisation and the incentive structures to improve and support Catalyst, by conducting extensive research and documentation on funding categorisation which led to the suggestion of Funding Categories as an improvement over the challenge setting process, and also included the introduction of a recurring contributor funding model to support the Catalyst and Cardano ecosystems.

## Jo Allum

Linkedin: [https://www.linkedin.com/in/joallum/](https://www.linkedin.com/in/joallum/)

Co-founder of community-led coworking space, Entrepreneur Support Organisation (including incubation, acceleration programs) and a country-wide network of ESO's for Impact entrepreneurs. Contracted to support Angel Association New Zealand's Investor network. Member of the committee of New Zealand's Open Source Society. Jo's intention is to advance the establishment of the global 'innovation commons' for common-good with Cardano. CA, F7, F6 Funded Proposer, Challenge Team member at Improve and Grow Auditability. Early contributor to Eastern and Pacific Townhalls, Audit Circle, Community Governance Oversight, the emerging Cardano Impact Collective, Done Collectively and Catalyst GPS.

## Kenric Nelson

Linkedin: [https://www.linkedin.com/in/kenric-nelson-ph-d-7495b77](https://www.linkedin.com/in/kenric-nelson-ph-d-7495b77)

Innovative leader in the research, development, and deployment of systems for complex decision-making. Proven record of creative research, team building, and customer-focused development spanning cyber-security algorithms, multi-sensor systems, machine intelligence algorithms, and decentralised governance. Co-inventor of the Coupled Variational Autoencoder designed to improve the learning of robust, accurate models. Served on Catalyst Circlev2 as representative for PAs/VPAs.

## Matthias Sieber

Linkedin - [https://www.linkedin.com/in/matthiasklaussieber/](https://www.linkedin.com/in/matthiasklaussieber/)

CEO and co-founder of Loxe Inc. Graduated as a Presidential Scholar from California State University, Dominguez-Hills with a Bachelor of Arts in Negotiation, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding and was a recipient of the Dean's Academic Excellence Award from University of Southern California's Gould School of Law with a Master's degree in Dispute Resolution. He taught at both institutions, *Dispute Resolution Pedagogy* and *Corporate Governance as a TA* respectively. He is currently on track to earning a certificate of specialisation in strategy from Harvard Business School Online.

As a Cardano Ambassador and former Catalyst Circle representative of the Cardano Foundation, Matthias has seen his fair share of conflicts that would have benefited tremendously from the support of a neutral third-party mediator.

## Miroslav Rajh

Linkedin: http://linkedin.com/in/miroslav-rajh-94566845

Miroslav has 20 years of experience in managing finances and organising the business of NGOs and the University. He also worked as a Human Resources Manager (HRM). He joined the Catalyst Circle Admin team together with Andre Diamond as treasurer in Nov 2021. Currently he is recording, documenting and managing all transactions for Governance Guild, Swarm, Cardano4Climate, Community Governance Oversight, and Bridge Builders.

## Phil Khoo

An active Catalyst community member, veteran Community Advisor, Proposal Assessor, Proposal Mentor, successful proposer, and Initiator of AIM, developers of community tools. He believes that blockchain technology can give power back to the individual to participate and develop quality social and financial interactions that can assist with pushing power to the edge and into the hands of people and self forming groups. He thinks that the importance of a group such as Community Governance Oversight group is its ability to show what is possible and to spearhead the experimentation of future similar groups that participate.

## Stephen Whitenstall

Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/stephen-whitenstall-166727210/

Founder of Quality-Assurance DAO, https://quality-assurance-dao.github.io/, Stephen has provided project management consultancy for many Catalyst governance projects since Fund 4, including Catalyst Circle, Audit Circle, Community Governance Oversight, Training & Automation (with Treasury Guild) and Swarm, and was the Circle V2 representative for funded proposers. He has 30 years of experience in development, test management, project management, social enterprises in Investment Banking, Telecoms and Local Government. A philosophy honours graduate with an interest in Blockchain governance.

## Tevo Saks

Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/tevosaks/

Co-founder of Catalyst Swarm and Catalyst School, with a deep understanding of how to manage decentralised projects. As an individual, Tevo's goal is to learn to create an ecosystem where proposal creation can be fun, and highly effective.

## Vanessa Cardui

Artist, archivist, activist, and community engagement worker, with 20+ years' experience of creative and archival co-production with communities, and community-led governance. Funded proposer since F6. Part of QA-DAO, the Facilitators' Collective, and the Funded Proposers' Sub-circle.