# **Secure Channel**

## **Secure Channel: Security Requirements**

- Alice sends a sequence of messages  $P_1, P_2, ...$
- Bob receives (after removing those failed authentication) a sequence of messages  $P'_1, P'_2, ...$
- R1. Eve does not learn anything about messages  $P_i$  except for their timing and size
- **R2**. The sequence  $P'_1, P'_2, ...$  is a subsequence of  $P_1, P_2, ...$  and Bob knows for sure which subsequence he receives.

## Secure Channel: Key, Message Number, ...

- Key. Alice and Bob have a shared key. How they get it will be discussed later. Choose the key length to be 256
- Message number. Bob needs to recover the order of messages, so we need a message number. Besides it increases strength of the scheme. Choose 4-byte message number.
- Authentication. Use HMAC-h, where h is, say, SHA-256. For each i let  $P_i$  be the corresponding message and  $X_i$  certain auxiliary data about the message. Then the tag we compute is  $T_i = MAC(i \parallel \ell(X_i) \parallel X_i \parallel P_i)$
- Encryption. Use AES in the counter mode. Include the block counter into the message

$$k_i = E_k(0 \parallel i \parallel 0) || E_k(1 \parallel i \parallel 1) \dots C_i = i \parallel (k_i \oplus (P_i \parallel T_i))$$

#### **Secure Channel: Initialization**

Input: k key of the channel, 256 bits

**Output**: S state for the channel

Algorithm

KeySendEnc := h(k||`Enc Alice to Bob')

KeyRecEnc := h(k||`Enc Bob to Alice')

KeySendAuth := h(k||`Auth Alice to Bob')

KeyRecAuth := h(k||`Auth Bob to Alice')

MsgCntSend, MsgCntRec := 0

S := (KeySendEnc , KeyRecEnc , KeySendAuth , KeyRecAuth , MsgCntSend, MsgCntRec)

return S

For security we use 4 different keys to encrypt and authenticate by Alice and Bob

## **Secure Channel: Sending a Message**

- Input: S channel state, P message, X extra data
  Output: C data to transmit
- Algorithm

```
\label{eq:magCntSend} \begin{tabular}{ll} MsgCntSend := MsgCntSend \\ /* Authentication \\ T := HMAC-h(KeySendAuth||i||l(X)||X||P) \\ C := P||T \\ /* Encryption \\ K := KeySendEnc \\ k := E_K(0 \parallel i \parallel 0) \parallel E_K(1 \parallel i \parallel 1) \parallel \cdots \\ C := i||(C \oplus k) \\ \end{tabular}
```

## Secure Channel: Receiving a Message

- Input: S channel state, C ciphertext, X extra data
  Output: P original message
- Algorithm

```
i || C := C
\mathsf{K} := \mathsf{KeySendEnc} \qquad k \coloneqq E_K(0 \parallel i \parallel 0) \parallel E_K(1 \parallel i \parallel 1) \dots
P \parallel T := C \oplus k /* Decrypt
T' := HMAC-h(KeySendAuth||i||l(X)||X||P) /* Check authent.
if T \neq T' then destroy k, P return AuthenticationFailure
else if i ≤ MsgCntRec then
     destroy k, P return MessageOrderError
MsgCntRec := i
return P
```

### SSL, TSL

- SSL Secure Socket Layer, TSL Transport Secure Layer
- Integrated into IPv6, can be used with IPv4
- Supports many ciphers and MACs
- Structure:

Handshaking (to be discussed later) Produces the type of cipher and MAC used, key for encryption and authentication, verifies the server, etc.

**Encryption / Authentication** 

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and then encrypt

