

# STRATEGIC COUNTRY REPORT: FRANCE

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# Chapter 1

## Geopolitics

### Executive Summary

France exhibits a highly mature and sovereign digital landscape characterized by a concentrated telecommunications market and aggressive state-led investment in infrastructure resilience. The domestic internet ecosystem is dominated by four major Autonomous Systems (ASNs)—Orange, SFR, Free, and Bouygues Telecom—which collectively control over 85% of the residential market share [IYP-GRAPH].

Strategically, Paris is actively pursuing “digital sovereignty” through the **France 2030** initiative, allocating billions to 5G deployment, future network technologies, and cybersecurity compliance under the EU’s NIS2 Directive [Source 3]. The national incumbent, Orange S.A., demonstrates exceptional topological independence, relying almost exclusively on its own transit networks, thereby reducing reliance on foreign upstream providers [IYP-GRAPH]. This structure positions France as a resilient digital power within the European Union, though it remains integrated into the global ecosystem through strategic partnerships in AI and cloud computing [Source 5].

### 1.1 Market Concentration and Domestic Stability

The French telecommunications sector operates as a stable oligopoly. Analysis of population coverage (`r.percent`) reveals that the top four Internet Service Providers (ISPs) account for the vast majority of internet traffic. Orange S.A. (AS3215) leads the market with a 34.5% share, followed by SFR (17.9%), Free SAS (16.8%), and Bouygues Telecom (16.7%) [IYP-GRAPH].

This high degree of concentration simplifies regulatory oversight and infrastructure coordination but places significant critical infrastructure responsibility on a small number of private entities. Beyond the “Big Four,” the ecosystem includes significant cloud and hosting providers such as OVH SAS (1.6%) and Scaleway S.A.S. (1.6%), indicating a robust domestic hosting capability distinct from residential access providers [IYP-GRAPH].

## 1.2 Network Sovereignty and Topology

France maintains a high level of routing autonomy, particularly through its incumbent provider, Orange S.A. Analysis of upstream dependency (`d.hege`) indicates that Orange primarily relies on its own international backbone, OpenTransit, with dependency scores approaching 1.0 (absolute dependency on self/subsidiaries) [IYP-GRAPH].

While Orange maintains some connectivity via external Tier-1 providers like Hurricane Electric (dependency score 0.2306), the network topology suggests a deliberate strategy of self-reliance [IYP-GRAPH]. This topological weight minimizes the vector for foreign surveillance or routing manipulation, reinforcing the state's capacity to maintain connectivity during geopolitical crises.

In terms of interconnection, the ecosystem is supported by active participation in Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). Entities such as Jaguar Network (Free Pro SAS) and various route collectors (e.g., BGP Tools) show high engagement in domestic peering, with membership in over 40 IXPs each, facilitating efficient local traffic exchange [IYP-GRAPH].

## 1.3 Strategic Infrastructure Initiatives

The French government is executing a comprehensive strategy to modernize its digital infrastructure, driven by the **France 2030** investment plan. This €54 billion initiative includes a dedicated focus on digital security and emerging technologies. Specifically, up to €735 million has been allocated by 2025 to support 5G rollout and future network technologies, leveraging a total anticipated investment of €1.7 billion [Source 3].

Key strategic developments include:

- \* **Cybersecurity and Resilience:** France is currently implementing the NIS2 Directive, which mandates strict cybersecurity obligations and incident reporting for critical infrastructure and digital service providers, with full compliance expected by late 2024 [Source 3].
- \* **AI and Data Center Hubs:** To support AI-ready infrastructure, Cisco is establishing a Global AI Hub in Paris. This project focuses on energy-efficient data centers and innovative cooling solutions, aligning with national sustainability goals [Source 5].
- \* **Digital Skills:** The “Skills and Jobs of the Future” component of the National Digital Decade roadmap allocates €2.5 billion to workforce development. This includes a partnership with Cisco to train 230,000 individuals in AI and digital skills over three years [Source 2] [Source 5].

## References

- [Source 2] France - National Digital Decade strategic roadmap (<https://digital-skills-jobs.europa.eu/en/actions/national-initiatives/national-strategies/france-national-digital-decade-strategic-roadmap>)
- [Source 3] France - Digital Economy - International Trade Administration (<https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/france-digital-economy>)
- [Source 5] Cisco Expands Commitment to France with Strategic Initiatives and Global

AI Hub (<https://newsroom.cisco.com/c/r/newsroom/en/us/a/y2025/m05/cisco-expands-commitment-to-france-with-strategic-initiatives-and-global-ai-hub.html>)

- [IYP-GRAPH] Internal Knowledge Graph (Neo4j)

## Chapter 2

# Infrastructure

### Executive Summary

France’s infrastructure presents a dual-layer topology: a logically sovereign domestic access market underpinned by a physically internationalized backbone. While the “Big Four” ISPs control residential access, the physical layer—comprising data centers and transit facilities—is heavily populated by global content delivery networks (CDNs) and transit providers. Notably, Cogent Communications and Cloudflare operate the highest number of facilities within the country, surpassing domestic incumbents in pure facility count [IYP-GRAPH].

From a security perspective, the French routing ecosystem demonstrates exceptional maturity. Intelligence indicates a reported Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) adoption rate of 100% for French prefixes, suggesting a comprehensive deployment of route origin validation across the national address space [IYP-GRAPH]. This technical hygiene significantly mitigates the risk of BGP hijacking and routing leaks, reinforcing the digital sovereignty goals outlined in the previous geopolitical analysis.

### 2.1 Physical Topology and Interconnection

The physical internet landscape in France is anchored by major Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) in Paris and Marseille, which serve as critical aggregation nodes for traffic entering Europe from Africa and the Middle East.

**Key Interconnection Hubs:** \* **France-IX Paris:** The dominant exchange point with 1,946 members, acting as the central nervous system for domestic traffic exchange [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **DE-CIX Marseille:** With 1,506 members, this hub is strategically vital, leveraging Marseille’s status as a landing station for Mediterranean subsea cables [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **Equinix Paris:** Hosting 1,332 members, this exchange facilitates high-volume peering between financial institutions, cloud providers, and ISPs [IYP-GRAPH].

**Facility Ownership:** Unlike the residential access market, which is dominated by French

entities, the physical facility layer (Data Centers and Points of Presence) shows strong foreign integration. The top entities by facility count include: \* **Cogent Communications (AS174)**: 4,085 facilities. \* **Cloudflare (AS13335)**: 1,547 facilities. \* **Amazon.com (AS16509)**: 1,496 facilities. \* **Twelve99 (Arelion)**: 1,375 facilities.

This data reveals that while French ISPs route the traffic, the physical nodes processing and caching this data are frequently owned by US-based global infrastructure giants [IYP-GRAPH].

## 2.2 Upstream Dependencies and Routing Hierarchy

While the Geopolitics chapter established the market dominance of the “Big Four,” an analysis of the **d.hege** scores (dependency metrics) reveals the specific upstream transit providers that power these domestic giants.

**Critical Upstream Pathways:** \* **SFR (LDCOMNET)**: Exhibits dependency on AS49011, AS208157, and AS42117 for global reach [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **Orange S.A. (AS3215)**: Primarily relies on AS2286 (OpenTransit), AS24763, and AS199233. This confirms Orange’s strategy of utilizing its own international carrier arm (OpenTransit) to maintain routing independence [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **Bouygues Telecom**: Depends on AS41473, AS51038, and AS12844 [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **Free SAS (Proxad)**: Utilizes AS202023, AS51207, and AS12322. Notably, its mobile arm, **Free Mobile**, shows a concentrated dependency primarily on AS51207 [IYP-GRAPH].

## 2.3 Domestic Cloud Ecosystem

Beyond the residential ISPs, the French infrastructure landscape includes a robust tier of domestic hosting and cloud providers. Analysis of the top 10 ASNs by population reach identifies significant non-ISP actors: \* **OVH SAS**: A major global cloud provider rooted in France. \* **Scaleway S.A.S. (AS12876)**: The cloud division of the Iliad Group (parent of Free).

The presence of these entities in the top tier of national connectivity indicates that France possesses a “full-stack” domestic internet economy, capable of hosting data locally rather than relying solely on foreign hyperscalers [IYP-GRAPH].

## References

- [IYP-GRAPH] Internal Knowledge Graph (Neo4j)



# Chapter 3

## Market

### Executive Summary

The French digital market is defined by a rigid oligopoly in the access layer and a state-curated competitive environment in the cloud and service layers. While the “Big Four” telecommunications operators—Orange, SFR, Free, and Bouygues—maintain a stranglehold on residential and mobile connectivity, the market is distinct within Europe for its robust domestic cloud ecosystem. Unlike many neighbors solely dependent on US hyperscalers, France retains significant domestic market share through entities like OVH SAS and Scaleway, supported by aggressive protectionist policies such as the “SecNumCloud” certification [Source 4].

Government intervention is the primary market driver, with the **France 2030** investment plan injecting capital into 5G, AI, and cybersecurity compliance. The impending full implementation of the EU NIS2 Directive in late 2024 is reshaping the B2B market, forcing a consolidation of cybersecurity services and elevating compliance as a key market differentiator [Source 4].

### 3.1 Domestic Access and Colocation Dynamics

The residential and enterprise access market is characterized by high barriers to entry, resulting in a stable four-player dominance. Orange S.A. retains the commanding market position with a 34.5% population reach, nearly double that of its closest competitor, SFR (17.9%) [IYP-GRAPH].

However, intelligence on physical facility presence reveals a complex web of interdependence between these domestic giants and carrier-neutral colocation providers. The “Big Four” do not operate in isolation; they heavily utilize third-party infrastructure to facilitate interconnection: \* **Orange S.A.** maintains a hybrid footprint, leveraging its own facilities (e.g., Orange/Chartres, Orange/Val de Rueil) while maintaining critical presence in carrier-neutral hubs like Telehouse (Paris 2 & 3) and Digital Realty (Paris PAR2) [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **SFR (LDCOMNET)** and **Bouygues Telecom** show a heavy reliance on the Digital Realty and Equinix ecosystems in both Paris and Marseille for traffic aggregation [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **Free SAS (Proxad)** exhibits the most diverse physical strategy, utilizing its own “Opcore” facilities while simultaneously

anchoring in Digital Realty and Telehouse nodes [IYP-GRAPH].

This reliance on shared physical infrastructure (Equinix, Telehouse, Digital Realty) creates a market convergence point where competitive ISPs are physically adjacent, facilitating the high-speed peering noted in the Infrastructure analysis but also concentrating physical risk.

## 3.2 The Sovereign Cloud Ecosystem

A distinguishing feature of the French market is the viability of domestic cloud providers against global competition. Analysis of the top 10 ASNs by population reach identifies **OVH SAS** (1.6%) and **Scaleway S.A.S.** (1.6%) as top-tier players [IYP-GRAPH].

This market structure is not accidental but the result of the “Trusted Cloud Strategy” (Stratégie Cloud de Confiance). The French government mandates the **SecNumCloud** certification—maintained by ANSSI—for government agencies and operators of vital importance (OIVs). This regulatory moat protects domestic providers like OVH and Scaleway, ensuring they retain a share of the public sector and critical infrastructure market that might otherwise drift to non-sovereign hyperscalers (AWS, Azure) [Source 4].

## 3.3 State-Led Market Stimulation

The French state actively distorts the market to favor modernization and sovereignty through direct capital injection and regulation. The **France 2030** initiative serves as the central economic engine, allocating €54 billion to re-industrialize key sectors.

**Key Market Drivers:**

- \* **5G and Connectivity:** A specific tranche of €735 million (leveraging up to €1.7 billion total investment) is allocated to 5G deployment and future network technologies by 2025. This subsidy lowers the CAPEX burden for the “Big Four” while mandating coverage targets [Source 4].
- \* **Artificial Intelligence:** To counter US and Chinese dominance, Paris invests over €500 million annually in AI research and development. This funding supports the domestic startup ecosystem and infrastructure providers, aiming to create a French alternative in the generative AI value chain [Source 4].
- \* **Cybersecurity Compliance:** The transposition of the EU NIS2 Directive, expected to be fully integrated by Fall 2024, is creating a surge in demand for managed security services. By imposing strict incident reporting and defense obligations on critical sectors, the government is effectively expanding the total addressable market for cybersecurity firms [Source 4].

## References

- [Source 1] National Initiatives | Digital Skills & Jobs Platform - European Union (<https://digital-skills-jobs.europa.eu/en/actions/national-initiatives>)
- [Source 2] France and Cyber security - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non->

proliferation/fight-against-organized-criminality/cyber-security/)

- [Source 4] France - Digital Economy - International Trade Administration (<https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/france-digital-economy>)
- [IYP-GRAPH] Internal Knowledge Graph (Neo4j)

## Chapter 4

# Localization

### Executive Summary

France’s digital localization landscape is defined by a dichotomy between a highly centralized domestic access market and a diverse, internationalized interconnection layer. While the “Big Four” ISPs (Orange, SFR, Free, Bouygues) effectively localize the vast majority of residential traffic within national borders, the peering ecosystem reveals France’s strategic role as a digital gateway for the EMEA region. Intelligence indicates that major international transit providers, particularly those serving Africa and the Middle East—such as Angola Cables and Liquid Telecommunications—maintain significant physical presence and peering relationships within French borders [IYP-GGRAPH].

Regulatory frameworks reinforce this localization. France adheres to EU Regulation 2015/2120 regarding network neutrality, yet maintains a distinct national posture on “digital sovereignty,” evidenced by the deployment of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) like FranceConnect [Source 2]. However, the ecosystem exhibits specific points of fragility; analysis of dependency metrics (d.hege) identifies several domestic networks with absolute reliance (100%) on single upstream providers, creating potential chokepoints that contradict the national strategy of resilience [IYP-GGRAPH].

### 4.1 Domestic Interconnection and Transit Hubs

The localization of traffic in France is not merely a function of domestic consumption but a result of its status as a critical transit node. Analysis of Autonomous Systems (ASNs) that combine membership in major European Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) with physical data center presence reveals a complex mix of local niche players and intercontinental carriers.

**The “Gateway to the South” Effect:** Unlike a purely domestic market, the French interconnection layer hosts significant foreign entities that localize traffic in Paris and Marseille to serve external regions. Notable actors identified with physical facility tags include: \* **African and International Transit:** Entities such as **Angola Cables (AS37468)** and **Liquid Telecom-**

**munications (AS30844)** are deeply integrated into the French physical layer. Their presence confirms that France serves as the primary “localization point” for traffic originating from or destined for the African continent [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **Global Transit and Cable Operators: FLAG Telecom (AS15412)** and **Unitas (AS1828)** maintain active peering and facility presence, reinforcing the infrastructure findings regarding France’s role in subsea cable aggregation [IYP-GRAPH].

**Domestic Peering Diversity:** Beneath the “Big Four,” a vibrant layer of smaller, agile French networks facilitates localized traffic exchange, reducing latency and keeping data within national borders. Active participants in this layer include **MilkyWan (AS2027)**, **IzarLink (AS42687)**, and **ALARIG (AS208627)**. These entities, while smaller in population reach, contribute to the mesh density of the French internet, ensuring that regional traffic does not unnecessarily hair-pin through foreign transit providers [IYP-GRAPH].

## 4.2 Critical Dependencies and Chokepoints

While the national incumbent Orange S.A. boasts high topological independence, other segments of the French digital ecosystem exhibit “absolute dependency,” representing risks to national resilience.

**Dependency Analysis (d.hege Metrics):** The **d.hege** score measures the reliance of an ASN on its upstream transit providers. A score of 1.0 indicates 100% dependency, meaning if the upstream provider fails, the dependent network is isolated. Intelligence identifies several French entities with a **d.hege** score of 1.0, signaling critical bottlenecks: \* **NETCOM-AS (Nexera SAS)** and **CDNEXT (Datacamp Limited)** operate with absolute dependency on their primary transit providers [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **Outremer Telecom (AS-OUTREMER)**, serving French overseas territories, also shows high dependency, highlighting a fragility in the connectivity of non-metropolitan France [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **OVH SAS (AS16276):** Uniquely, OVH appears not just as a dependent entity in some contexts but as a critical *provider* for others. Its role as a cloud giant means that failures within OVH ripple outward, affecting numerous dependent downstream clients [IYP-GRAPH].

## 4.3 Regulatory Localization and Sovereignty

The technical localization of traffic is mirrored by a legal framework designed to enforce French jurisdiction over digital activities.

**Net Neutrality and Traffic Management:** France operates under **EU Regulation 2015/2120**, which mandates the equal treatment of internet traffic. This regulation, enacted in 2015, prevents ISPs from blocking or throttling specific content, a principle France has actively integrated into its national “Digital Bill” discussions [Source 1]. This framework ensures that while traffic is localized, it remains neutral; however, historical precedents, such as the 2013 incident where the ISP Free blocked online advertising, demonstrate a willingness

among French operators to test the boundaries of traffic management to exert leverage over content providers [Source 1] [Source 3].

**Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI):** Beyond traffic regulation, France is localizing digital identity through **FranceConnect**. Cited as a key example of Digital Public Infrastructure, this system centralizes authentication for public services, effectively creating a sovereign digital identity layer that reduces reliance on foreign commercial identity providers (e.g., “Log in with Google/Facebook”) [Source 2]. This initiative aligns with the broader France 2030 strategy to reclaim control over the digital value chain.

## References

- [Source 1] NEW NETWORK NEUTRALITY RULES IN EUROPE ([https://ctlj.colorado.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/14.2\\_\\_4\\_\\_v2.final-Marcus-5.24.16.pdf](https://ctlj.colorado.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/14.2__4__v2.final-Marcus-5.24.16.pdf))
- [Source 2] Digital Progress and Trends Report 2023 - World Bank Document (<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099031924192524293/pdf/P180107173682d0431bf651fde>)
- [Source 3] Net Neutrality: France Is Playing The Telcos’ Game (<https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2014/1/net-neutrality-france-is-playing-the-telcos-game/>)
- [IYP-GRAPH] Internal Knowledge Graph (Neo4j)

# Chapter 5

## Security

### Executive Summary

France’s digital security posture is defined by a paradox: a highly resilient, decentralized domestic interconnection fabric that sits atop a transit layer heavily dependent on foreign backbone providers. While the “Big Four” domestic ISPs (Orange, SFR, Free, Bouygues) effectively concentrate and monitor residential traffic, the upstream routing ecosystem reveals significant reliance on non-French Tier-1 carriers, specifically Arelion (Twelve99) and Level3 (Lumen), creating potential vectors for extraterritorial routing influence [IYP-GRAPH].

The nation’s resilience strategy relies on a dense mesh of 17 Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) distributed across the territory—from Lille to Marseille—reducing the risk of a single geographical point of failure. However, intelligence identifies specific “absolute dependency” risks among smaller operators and hosting providers, where entities like NETCOM-AS and CDNEXE exhibit a hegemony score of 1.0, indicating a total lack of routing redundancy [IYP-GRAPH]. Regulatory oversight remains aligned with EU frameworks, specifically the 2016 Net Neutrality law, though the state maintains aggressive posture on platform regulation to safeguard digital sovereignty [Source 2].

### 5.1 Upstream Dependency and Foreign Transit Risks

Despite the “Digital Sovereignty” narrative driven by the France 2030 initiative, the underlying routing logic of the French internet exposes a reliance on foreign infrastructure for global transit. Analysis of ASN dependencies reveals that while domestic ISPs control the “last mile,” the “middle mile” is dominated by global Tier-1 actors.

**Foreign Backbone Dominance:** Intelligence indicates that **Twelve99 (Arelion, Sweden)** holds the highest incoming dependency count (55,318 relationships) within the French routing space, followed closely by **Level3 (Lumen, USA)** and **Cogent Communications (USA)** [IYP-GRAPH]. This data suggests that a significant portion of traffic leaving the domestic “Big Four” networks must traverse infrastructure owned by Swedish or American entities to reach

the global internet.

**Absolute Dependency (Chokepoints):** A critical security vulnerability exists within the second-tier market. The **d.hege** metric (hegemony score) identifies networks with a score of 1.0, signifying 100% reliance on a single upstream provider. If the upstream provider fails or is compromised, the dependent network is severed from the internet. Identified entities with this critical vulnerability include: \* **NETCOM-AS (Nexera SAS)** \* **CDNEXT (Datacamp Limited)** \* **GIECB**

These entities represent “soft targets” within the national ecosystem, lacking the multi-homed resilience of the major incumbents [IYP-GRAPH].

## 5.2 Interconnection Resilience and IXP Distribution

France mitigates the risks of centralization through a geographically distributed interconnection strategy. Unlike nations reliant on a single capital-city hub, France actively decentralizes traffic exchange to edge locations.

**Distributed Exchange Architecture:** The French ecosystem is supported by 17 distinct Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), preventing a “single point of failure” scenario in Paris. Key regional hubs include: \* **Southern Resilience: France-IX Marseille** and **DE-CIX Marseille** secure connectivity to Africa and the Middle East. \* **Regional Offloading: Lillix** (Lille), **France-IX AURA** (Lyon), **BreizhIX** (Brittany), and **France-IX Bordeaux** allow regional traffic to stay local, reducing latency and the attack surface for long-haul interception [IYP-GRAPH].

**Key Security Actors at IXPs:** The security of these exchange points is reinforced by the presence of major content and security providers. The top ASNs by IXP membership—indicating those most capable of rerouting traffic dynamically during a crisis—include: \* **Jaguar Network / Free Pro SAS (AS30781):** 44 memberships. \* **Cloudflare (AS13335):** 38 memberships. \* **Hivane Association (AS61317):** 38 memberships. \* **BGPTools (AS212232):** 40 memberships.

The high engagement of **Free Pro** (Jaguar Network) highlights the strategic importance of the Iliad Group (Free) in the B2B and enterprise security sector, surpassing even the incumbent Orange in pure IXP membership density [IYP-GRAPH].

## 5.3 Regulatory Oversight and Infrastructure Protection

The security of the French digital space is governed by a mix of national defense prerogatives and European regulatory alignment.

**Net Neutrality and Traffic Inspection:** France operates under a strict Net Neutrality framework established by national law in 2016, which aligns with EU directives. This legal baseline restricts the ability of ISPs to arbitrarily block or throttle traffic, theoretically limiting the



state’s ability to implement “great firewall” style censorship without judicial oversight [Source 2].

**Investment in Physical Security:** While specific details on new physical security projects are opaque, the market is seeing a shift toward private capital securing digital infrastructure. The protection of subsea cables landing in Marseille and the resilience of data centers are increasingly viewed through the lens of “basic public service,” necessitating high availability standards comparable to utilities [Source 1] [Source 3].

## References

- [Source 1] Private capital takes on expanding role in European infrastructure (<https://mergers.whitecase.com/highlights/private-capital-takes-on-expanding-role-in-european-infrastructure>)
- [Source 2] Neutrality, fairness or freedom? Principles for platform regulation (<https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/neutrality-fairness-or-freedom-principles-platform-regulation>)
- [Source 3] Digital infrastructure is a basic public service – from 5G to AI (<https://www.allianzgi.com/en/in-and-commentary/digital-infrastructure-is-a-basic-public-service-from-5g-to-ai>)
- [IYP-GRAPH] Internal Knowledge Graph (Neo4j)

# Chapter 6

## Governance

### Executive Summary

France’s digital governance strategy is characterized by a pivot from passive regulatory oversight to active “strategic autonomy.” The state is aggressively intervening in the digital ecosystem to reduce reliance on non-European technologies, utilizing a dual-track approach of heavy investment and protectionist certification frameworks. The cornerstone of this governance model is the “**Trusted Cloud Strategy**” (Stratégie Cloud de Confiance), which mandates the **SecNumCloud** certification for critical data handling, effectively creating a regulatory moat around domestic providers like OVH and Scaleway against US hyperscalers [Source 1].

Simultaneously, Paris is tightening the operational leash on its telecommunications oligopoly through the transposition of the **EU NIS2 Directive**, expected to be fully implemented by Fall 2024. This directive expands the scope of cybersecurity obligations, forcing the “Big Four” ISPs (Orange, SFR, Free, Bouygues) and the broader digital supply chain into a rigid regime of incident reporting and risk management [Source 1]. While the physical infrastructure layer remains heavily internationalized—with US-based Cogent Communications operating the most facilities—the logical and policy layers are increasingly dominated by domestic entities like Free Pro (Jaguar Network), which lead in Internet Exchange Point (IXP) governance participation [IYP-GRAPH].

### 6.1 The “Trusted Cloud” and Data Sovereignty

The defining feature of current French digital governance is the drive for data localization under the guise of security. Initiated in May 2021, the “Trusted Cloud Strategy” explicitly links national security to data residency. The policy mandates that government agencies and “Operators of Vital Importance” (OIVs) utilize cloud services that possess the **SecNumCloud** certification, a standard maintained by the national cybersecurity agency (ANSSI) [Source 1].

This framework influences the broader European regulatory environment, specifically the proposed **EU Cloud Services Scheme (EUCS)**. France advocates for strict sovereignty require-

ments within the EUCS, including data localization and restrictions on corporate control by non-EU entities. This stance has drawn criticism from US stakeholders, who view these headquarters and control requirements as market access barriers for non-EU suppliers [Source 1]. Consequently, the governance landscape is bifurcating: a highly regulated “sovereign” tier for critical data, and a general commercial tier where foreign competition is permitted but monitored.

## 6.2 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Resilience (NIS2)

The governance of network resilience is undergoing a significant shift with the implementation of the **NIS2 Directive**. Scheduled for integration into national law by late 2024, this framework represents a hardening of the state’s posture toward digital service providers. Unlike previous regulations that focused primarily on the largest operators, NIS2 extends strict cybersecurity obligations to a wider array of critical sectors, including digital infrastructure providers and data center operators [Source 1].

This regulatory expansion aligns with the **France 2030** investment plan, which allocates €735 million (by 2025) to support 5G deployment and future network technologies. The governance logic here is transactional: the state provides capital subsidies for modernization in exchange for compliance with heightened security and sovereignty mandates [Source 1].

## 6.3 Technical Governance and Interconnection

While the state sets the policy, the technical governance of the French internet—specifically the management of traffic exchange—reveals a complex interplay between domestic and foreign actors. Analysis of Internet Exchange Point (IXP) membership, a proxy for active participation in the routing ecosystem, highlights the leadership of domestic B2B players.

**Governance vs. Physical Presence:** \* **Logical Leadership:** **Jaguar Network / Free Pro SAS** leads the ecosystem with 44 IXP memberships, followed by **BGPTools** (40) and the **Hivane Association** (38). This indicates that domestic entities are the primary architects of the peering policies and interconnection agreements that govern traffic flow within the country [IYP-GRAPH]. \* **Physical Dominance:** In contrast, the physical facility layer is dominated by foreign transit providers. **Cogent Communications (AS174)** operates 817 facilities, nearly double that of the national incumbent **Orange S.A.** (416 facilities). This discrepancy suggests that while foreign entities own much of the “pipes” (fiber and racks), French entities retain tight control over the “valves” (routing logic and exchange points) [IYP-GRAPH].

## 6.4 Future Regulatory Outlook

Looking ahead to the 2025-2027 horizon, French governance will be shaped by the enforcement of the **EU AI Act**, which came into force in August 2024. While its immediate impact on network architecture is less direct than NIS2, it establishes a compliance layer for the AI-ready data

centers currently being funded by France 2030 initiatives [Source 1]. The convergence of these frameworks—SecNumCloud for data, NIS2 for resilience, and the AI Act for algorithms—creates one of the most strictly regulated digital environments in the Western world.

## References

- [Source 1] France - Digital Economy - International Trade Administration (<https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/france-digital-economy>)
- [IYP-GRAPH] Internal Knowledge Graph (Neo4j)

## Chapter 7

# Strategic Synthesis & Roadmap

## Chapter 8

# Section 7: Strategic Synthesis & Roadmap

**To:** The President of the Republic / The Prime Minister **From:** Office of the Chief Strategy Officer **Date:** October 24, 2025 **Subject:** STATE OF THE DIGITAL NATION – DIAGNOSIS AND ACTION PLAN

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### 8.1 1. Executive Summary: The “Big Picture” Diagnosis

#### 8.1.1 The Narrative: The “Fortress France” Strategy

France has successfully engineered a “**Digital Fortress**” within Europe. Unlike our neighbors who have capitulated to total reliance on US hyperscalers, we possess a “full-stack” sovereign ecosystem: a stable oligopoly of access providers (Orange, Free, SFR, Bouygues), a viable domestic cloud sector (OVH, Scaleway), and a regulatory firewall (SecNumCloud). We have effectively weaponized regulation to create a protected domestic market, and our technical hygiene (100% RPKI adoption) is world-class.

#### 8.1.2 The Paradox: Sovereign Logic, Foreign Physics

However, a critical contradiction threatens this sovereignty. **We control the software, but we rent the hardware.** While French entities control the *routing logic* and *access layer*, the *physical backbone*—the data centers and transit pipes—is heavily dominated by foreign actors. US-based Cogent Communications operates nearly double the facilities of Orange. Traffic leaving a sovereign French ISP often immediately traverses Swedish (Arelion) or American (Lumen) infrastructure to reach the world. We have achieved **Logical Sovereignty** but remain vulnerable to **Physical Tenancy**.

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## 8.2 2. SWOT Analysis: The Strategic Cheat Sheet

STRENGTHS (Internal)	WEAKNESSES (Internal)
<p><b>1. The “Big Four” Oligopoly:</b> High market concentration allows for rapid, uniform deployment of security protocols (e.g., NIS2 compliance).</p> <p><b>2. Nuclear-Powered AI:</b> Our energy grid makes France the most attractive location in Europe for energy-intensive AI data centers.</p> <p><b>3. Gateway to the South:</b> Marseille is the undisputed digital capital for Africa and the Middle East (via subsea cables).</p> <p><b>4. Technical Hygiene:</b> 100% RPKI adoption prevents routing hijacks, a massive security asset.</p>	<p><b>1. The “Middle Mile” Gap:</b> Absolute reliance on foreign Tier-1 carriers (Arelion, Lumen) for global transit.</p> <p><b>2. Single Points of Failure:</b> Specific domestic networks (e.g., NETCOM-AS, CDNEXT) show 100% dependency on single upstream providers.</p> <p><b>3. Physical Tenancy:</b> We rely on US-owned colocation hubs (Equinix, Digital Realty) for our critical interconnection.</p> <p><b>4. Overseas Fragility:</b> Connectivity to overseas territories (Outremer) remains a bottleneck.</p>
OPPORTUNITIES (External)	THREATS (External)
<p><b>1. The “Third Way” Export:</b> Package our “Sovereign Cloud” model (SecNumCloud) as a product for non-aligned nations wary of US/China surveillance.</p> <p><b>2. AI Sovereignty:</b> Leverage the Cisco AI Hub and domestic talent to build “Sovereign AI” models hosted on OVH/Scaleway.</p> <p><b>3. Nearshoring:</b> Attract sensitive EU data workloads that require immunity from the US CLOUD Act.</p>	<p><b>1. Extraterritoriality:</b> US surveillance laws applying to the physical infrastructure owned by US firms on French soil.</p> <p><b>2. Cable Sabotage:</b> Marseille is a high-value target; severing cables there would disconnect Europe from Africa/Asia.</p> <p><b>3. Regulatory Stagnation:</b> Over-regulation (NIS2 + AI Act) could stifle the agility of smaller French tech startups.</p>

## 8.3 3. Strategic Roadmap: The Policy Agenda

### 8.3.1 Phase 1: Immediate Actions (0 - 6 Months)

*Objective: Secure the Perimeter and Eliminate “Soft Targets”*

- **Action 1.1: The “Zero-Dependency” Decree.**
  - **Context:** Intelligence identified networks (NETCOM, CDNEXT) with a d.hege score of 1.0 (absolute dependency).
  - **Order:** Mandate that all Operators of Vital Importance (OIV) and their direct downstream clients must possess **multi-homed connectivity** (at least two distinct upstream providers). Eliminate single points of failure immediately.
- **Action 2.1: Physical Audit of “Foreign Pipes”.**
  - **Context:** Cogent and Cloudflare dominate facility ownership.

- **Order:** ANSSI to conduct a physical security audit of all Tier-1 transit facilities owned by non-EU entities. Ensure these “foreign pipes” cannot be remotely shut down or tapped without judicial oversight.
- **Action 3.1: Marseille Security Zone.**
  - **Context:** Concentration of subsea cables makes Marseille a critical choke point.
  - **Order:** Designate the landing stations in Marseille as “National Defense Zones,” increasing physical military/gendarmerie surveillance.

### 8.3.2 Phase 2: Structural Reforms (6 - 18 Months)

*Objective: Reclaim the “Middle Mile” and Physical Layer*

- **Action 2.1: The “Sovereign Backbone” Incentive.**
  - **Context:** Reliance on Arelion/Lumen for transit.
  - **Policy:** Utilize *France 2030* funds to subsidize Orange (OpenTransit) and Free to expand their **international Tier-1 transit capacity**. We must route French traffic through French pipes, not just within French borders.
- **Action 2.2: SecNumCloud Expansion.**
  - **Context:** Protecting the cloud layer.
  - **Policy:** Expand SecNumCloud requirements to include **AI Training Data**. If an AI model is trained on French citizen data, the physical compute must occur on sovereign infrastructure (OVH/Scaleway).
- **Action 2.3: Decentralize Interconnection.**
  - **Context:** Paris/Marseille dominance.
  - **Policy:** Aggressively fund the expansion of regional IXPs (Lillix, BreizhIX) to ensure that a physical attack on Paris does not paralyze the regional economy.

### 8.3.3 Phase 3: Long-Term Vision (18 - 36 Months)

*Objective: France as the Digital Powerhouse of the “Global South”*

- **Action 3.1: The “Eurafrican” Digital Hub.**
  - **Vision:** Leverage our position in Marseille and our relationships with African providers (Angola Cables, Liquid) to become the primary data broker between Europe and Africa.
  - **Policy:** Offer tax incentives for African tech firms to host data in Marseille/Paris, cementing France as the “digital capital” of the Francophonie.
- **Action 3.2: Energy-for-Compute Strategy.**
  - **Vision:** AI requires massive power.
  - **Policy:** Explicitly link nuclear energy contracts to data center sovereignty. Foreign hyperscalers (AWS, Google) get access to cheap nuclear power *only* if they enter Joint Ventures with French sovereign cloud providers (e.g., the Bleu/Orange model).



## 8.4 4. Final Verdict

**Investability Score: HIGH** *Explanation:* The market is protected by high barriers to entry (oligopoly) and backed by massive state capital (France 2030). The regulatory environment is strict but predictable. The “Sovereign Cloud” creates a guaranteed market for domestic infrastructure investors.

**Maturity Score: MATURE** *Explanation:* With 100% RPKI adoption, a stable four-player market, and a sophisticated regulatory framework (NIS2, SecNumCloud), France represents one of the most mature digital environments globally. The challenges are no longer about *building* connectivity, but about *securing* its physical ownership.