

# GV101 Into to PolSci

Professor Simon Hix

## Lent Term Revision Document

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May 2019

### **Abstract**

This is a revision document for selected Lent Term Topics for the GV101 course. This is specific to the GV101 exam in May. The notes are mine fully and may not be authentic to the lecturer's as they have been modified.

The format of this material is usually recounted lecture by lecture. Material may be merged together if it fits appropriately though this is unlikely in this course.

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# 1 How Government Works

We will begin with a discussion on the workings of government which is an overarching theme on political institutions

## 1.1 Consequences of Democratic Institutions

There are two fundamental ways in which Democracy should work:

1. Majoritarian
2. Consensus

The choices on these electoral rules has a huge impact on who gets to govern. The tension between majoritarian and consensus democracy is between **a guarantee of coherent stable choices (group transitivity)** and **a guarantee of freedom to form their own preferences (universal admissibility)**. Below I will explain the two types of visions associated with the two main forms of democracy.

### 1.1.1 The Majoritarian Vision

Key features:

- Elections are a choice between alternatives
- Elected party has responsibility over policy etc.
- Two models exist:
  - Trustee model: politicians have autonomy
  - Delegate mode: politicians have to stick to the constitution

Further to that, other features for citizens include:

- Ability to decide on performance and whether or not to reward or punish the party in power (clarity of accountability)
- However, you are only able to assert this influence every election
- Policy is only determined by the majority you vote in, there is no influence whatsoever from minority parties
- Voters need to vote in a clear majority for this system to be effective

### 1.1.2 The Consensus Vision

Key features:

- Elections as an opportunity to choose a wide range of representatives
- Representatives are chosen by belief that they would be effective for particular issues or views
- Consensus is based on the trustee model of representation:
  - Autonomy to bargain
  - Constantly shifting majorities
  - Continuously shift in accordance with citizen's preferences

Further to that, other key features in the decision-making process include:

- No privileged status in the decision-making process by any one party
- As many people as possible should be able to govern

## 1.2 Institutions

Below is a table of the institutions and how they differ between Majoritarian and Consensus governments.

Institution	Majoritarian	Consensus
Electoral System	Majoritarian	Proportional
Party System	Two parties	Many parties
Government Type	Single-party Majority	Coalition/Minority
Federalism	Unitary	Federal
Bicameralism	Unicameral	Bicameral
Constitutionalism	legislative supremacy	higher law
Regime Type	Parliamentary	Presidential

There is almost a dichotomy between representation of as many views as possible in a meaningful manner versus efficiency and action

## 1.3 Political Representation

Hannah Pitkin describes four different views of political representation:

1. **Formalistic Representation:** how representatives are authorised and held accountable
2. **Substantive Representation:** how representatives act for the people and promote interests

3. **Descriptive Representation:** the extent to which representatives resemble their constituencies
4. **Symbolic Representation:** focuses on the symbolic ways representatives stand up for

The idea is that Descriptive and Symbolic forms of representation focus on **who** is being represented whilst Substantive representation focuses on **actions taken** by these representatives.

### 1.3.1 Formalistic Representation

Formalistic representation is about authorisation and accountability.

#### Authority

- **Majoritarian:** majority authorises the distribution of power; policy-making decisions by the minority is considered illegitimate
- **Consensus:** dispersion of power as an important factor: direction proportion to electoral size, authority as distributed accordingly

#### Accountability

- **Retrospective voting:** the ability of voters to sanction the ruling part based on their performance
- **Clarity of responsibility:** the ability to identify who the responsible people are for certain policies. This is required to have accountability. Higher concentrations of power lead to increased clarity whilst lower concentrations means more dispersion and a subsequent lack of clarity within the system
- **Accountability:** the extent to which we can attribute blame or praise for certain actions that were carried out.
  - Majoritarian systems have **high levels** of accountability
  - Consensus systems has **lower levels** of accountability
- Institutions such as **bicameralism** or **federalism** also reduce clarity within the system due to a further dispersion of power

### 1.3.2 Substantive Representation

Substantive representation focuses on the actors taking actions in line with the ideological interests which they represent. The higher the substantive representation, the more in line the interests they represent and subsequent policy.

There are two key concepts to recognise:

1. Ideological Congruence: the extent to which actions representatives do are in line with the interests of the people at a point in time (static capture of alignment and representation)
2. Ideological Responsiveness: this is how quickly representatives change their behaviour to become more congruent with the interests of their people over time (dynamic and directional form of representation)

### Congruence

Judged by the ideological distance between the government and the **median** voter

- **Majoritarian:** representatives tend to be congruent with the majority
- **Consensus:** representatives tend to be congruent with as many people as possible

### Responsiveness

Conditions necessary for responsiveness include representatives **wanting to be more congruent** and also the representatives **having the ability to become more congruent**.

- **Majoritarian:** higher responsiveness due to ability to enact change more easily to stay in power
- **Consensus:** lower responsiveness due to dispersion of authority and perhaps a strict alignment with party interests. There is also less clarity of responsibility and more veto players in a consensus system

### 1.3.3 Descriptive Representation

Descriptive representation is about whether or not representatives resemble who they represent. This could be on the category of **race, gender, religion or class**. Here are some key features:

- Descriptive representation is valued more highly in **consensus based government** than **majoritarian based ones**
- Plausibly inferior to **substantive representation**
- This is focused more on **who people are** rather than **what they do**
- Cannot be held accountable by descriptive characteristics especially if they are **morally arbitrary**
- Critics argue that it can promote group essentialism, an exclusivity which is not conducive to cooperation
- However, descriptive representation can often lead to **substantive representation**
- Large district magnitudes lead to more descriptive representation
- It is a particularly pertinent issue with regards to women's representation



### 1.3.4 Symbolic Representation

Symbolic representation is about what representatives stand for. Key features include:

- A dynamic, performative and constitutive process
- Involves a back and forth claims-making process between the representatives and the represented
- It is, however, **understudied** compared to other forms of representation

## 1.4 Veto Players

Veto players are already covered in the Short Answer Question document. Refer to the GitHub to have access to those. Key things to remember though are:

- More veto players means less policy change
- Bigger policy distances between veto players means less policy change

## 1.5 Types, Pros and Cons

Below is a table on the regime types that can be related to the Majoritarian and Consensus visions:

	Regime Type	
	Parliamentary	Presidential
Single Party	Majoritarian Westminster	Consensus USA
Coalition	Consensus Cont. Europe	Super-Consensus Lat-Am Model

Below is another table to illustrate some common-found pros and cons of Majoritarian versus Consensus Democracy systems:

	Majority	Consensus
Pros	Decisive Government Clear responsibility Electoral Promises Kept	Slower decisions Broad compromises Protection of Minorities
Cons	Decisions too quick Elective dictatorship No compromises Threat to minority interests	Decisions too slow No clear responsibility Electoral promises broken Vetoes by minorities

## 2 Regimes: Presidents, Ministers and Parliaments

How a democracy's regime is classified depends on the relationship between the government, the legislature and the president. The type of government formed depends on policy-seeking or office-seeking candidates. Presidential democracies include more **more minority governments** but fewer **coalition governments than parliamentary ones**. Semi-presidential democracies, however, are understudied.

### 2.1 Classification Questions

Classification is based on how **people are kept in power**. Hence, there are two essential questions:

- Is the government responsible to the elected legislature?
- Is the head of state popularly elected for a fixed term in office?

### 2.2 Overview

Below is an overview of Regime Types, their Political Implications and Pros and Cons:

#### 2.2.1 Functional Overview

There exists two main powers of government.

- Leadership (e.g. Foreign Policy, Budget and Legislative duties)
- Management (e.g. Implementation of this policy)

Further to that, there are elements of government as well:

Head	Prime-minister/President
Cabinet Ministers	Finance, Education etc.
Junior Ministers	Outside the cabinet
Civil Servants	Deputies and agencies

Further, a breakdown of the different models are given below:

- **Presidential:** Separation of powers where the President appoints the cabinet and votes elect the legislature. The President and cabinet cannot dissolve congress and congress cannot remove the executive
- **Parliamentary:** Fusion of powers where both the PM and Cabinet can dissolve Parliament and the legislature can call a vote of no-confidence
- **Semi-Presidential:** President appoints the PM which appoints the cabinet. They can both be removed by the President or Parliament.

## 2.2.2 Political Implications

### Policy Making

- **Presidential:**

Legislature controlled by congress (Agenda Setter)

President has veto power (Veto Player)

President commands majority and can set legislative agenda

However, cannot force party cohesion

Coalitions are built issue by issue and still require compromise

In a divided government, parliament dominates OR gridlock exists

- **Parliamentary:**

Government (Agenda Setter)

Majority in government or Median Voter (Veto Player)

The government has a monopoly over agenda setting

Party cohesion is maintained through carrots (promotions) and sticks (no promotions, no-confidence votes)

Except this carrot reward system doesn't work if candidates are:

- Rejected: non-promoted backbenches

- Ejected: former ministers

- Dejected: policy outliers

Variations in consensus versus majoritarian parliaments affect power

**Majoritarian** has stronger government power

**Proportional** has weaker government power

- **Semi-Presidential:**

President via Government (Agenda Setter)

Majority in parliament (Veto Player)

Unified government, similar to presidential

Co-habitation can also occur where the parliament governs

## 2.2.3 Pros and Cons Overview

Here is a table of some of the pros and cons associated with Presidential and Parliamentary systems:

	Presidential	Parliamentary
Pros	Directly Accountable Working Parliament Checks and Balances Deliberative Decision-making	One Election Powerful Executive Cohesive Unit Mandate to Govern
Cons	Grid Lock Weak Executive Weak Parties Regime Instability	Indirectly Accountable Weak Parliament (Talk Shop) Powerful Party Whips Policy Change can be too quick

### 2.2.4 Government Responsibility

Legislative responsibility means that a legislative majority has the constitutional power to remove the government from office without cause. This is done through a vote of no confidence, a constructive vote of no confidence which includes a suggested replacement and a vote of confidence which is initiated by governments confident that they will stay in power. Presidential democracies are **defined by the absence of legislative responsibility. The legislature cannot remove the government without cause**

### 2.2.5 Head of State

A Head of State is popularly elected if they are elected through a process where voters either:

- Cast ballots directly for the candidate
- Cast ballots to elect an assembly (electoral college) that elects a head of state

### 2.2.6 Summary

Below is a summary on the differences between regime types.

- **Presidential:** does not depend on a legislative majority to exist
- **Parliamentary:** depends on legislative majority, **the Head of State is not popularly elected**
- **Semi-presidential:** depends on legislative majority, **the Head of State is popularly elected**

## 2.3 Presidential Regimes: Making and Breaking

This section will go over presidential democracies, how they form, what types there are and what types of compositions they can have.

### 2.3.1 Formation Process

- Comprises of the president and the cabinet
- No requirement of a legislative majority to stay in office e.g. Republican President but Democratic Senate
- The president is always the **formateur which leads the formation of a coalition government**

Coalitions form in two main ways:

1. Portfolio Coalition: legislators form a coalition related to the parties in the cabinet
2. Legislature Coalition: bloc voting occurs for a piece of legislation

### 2.3.2 Presidential Cabinets

Here are some features of cabinets leading to different types:

- Can rule with minority cabinet but implicit legislative majority
- Coalition governments are thought to be exceptional cases in presidential governments dependent on policy/office seeking objectives
- Presidential decree: **order by the president that has the force of law**
- Weak decree power creates more incentives for coalitions
- Coalition governments may be more unstable in presidential democracies
- Coalition governments may survive longer but not be as effective
- Portfolio coalitions can outlive legislative coalitions

### 2.3.3 Composition of Presidential Cabinets

- Less partisan ministers and lower cabinet proportionality
- Some look more parliamentary

## 2.4 Institutions and Democratic Survival

### 2.4.1 Perils of Presidentialism

Historical evidence points to less stability for democracy in presidential systems and has led to studies on the so-called **Perils of Presidentialism**. Perils are listed as such:

- Difficult for citizens to identify who is responsible for policies as there is a **low clarity of responsibility** due to the separation of powers
- Presidentialism is thought to slow the policymaking process as policies must work their way through the legislature and be accepted by the president which means its tougher for a cabinet with minority control
- Produces a pattern of executive recruitment different from parliamentary systems which might result in nepotism
- Difficult to produce comprehensive policy due to the complex bargaining and lack of clarity

Further to that, Juan Linz provides 6 factors to consider. They are listed below with brief explanations:

1. **Paradox of Presidentialism:** inability to have legitimacy and the suspicion of the personalisation of power

2. **Zero-sum:** winner takes all mentality due to the strength of executive power
3. **Style:** lack of a neat differentiation of roles within the government
4. **Dual Legitimacy:** clarity of responsibility: legitimacy from legislative or electorate?
5. **Stability Issues:** deadlock, legislative vs executive, minorities and majorities vetoing policy
6. **Time Factor:** rushed politics with hasty implementation due to time constraint

#### 2.4.2 Instability

We begin with the concept of **Immobilism:** a situation in parliamentary democracies in which government coalitions are so weak and unstable that they are incapable of reaching an agreement on new policy. An example of this is France and their highly fragmented legislature leading to government immobilism.

Another question of stability, when comparing presidential to parliamentary, is whether or not one system is more stable than the other. Stephen and Skach argue that parliamentary systems are more stable:

- Essence of Parliamentary Systems is mutual dependence
- Essence of Presidential Systems is mutual independence
- Mutual dependence encourages reconciliation
- Mutual independence encourages antagonism

Hence, democratic over-achievers are three times more likely to be parliamentary regimes as the drive to stay democratic is stronger due to this mutual dependence.

#### 2.4.3 Presidentialism and Multipartism

The Perils of Presidentialism might only be a result of timing as we have adopted the regime system at a wrong time. Legislature fragmentation can occur as a result of:

- Parliamentary cabinet instability
- Presidential democratic instability

Legislative and executive gridlock has no constitutional means of resolution. Possible methods are dissolving government or a vote of no confidence. Further, inability to find legal ways out of deadlock causes instability. Institutional choice matters much more in poorer countries than richer ones as there are lower margins for error. Increased veto players leads to less democratic stability as well.

## 2.5 In Sum

Three main ways in which democracies organise the relationship between the executive (government) and the legislature (parliament): presidential, parliamentary and mixed/semi-presidential.

- **Presidential Systems** are characterised by separately elected leaders but powerful parliaments and weak political parties, and presidents are particularly weak if they do not command a majority in the parliament.
- **Parliamentary Systems** are characterised by powerful governments, weak parliaments and powerful parties
- **Semi-Presidential Systems** have powerful presidents if their government commands a parliamentary majority, but weak presidents if the majority in parliament (and the government) is from the opposing side

Further, the table below helps with some key features in Presidential and Parliamentary systems:

	Presidential	Parliamentary
<b>How HoS is chosen</b>	Independent Elections	Appointed by Elections
<b>How Government is chosen</b>	Approval by President	Elections by Seats
<b>Removals</b>	No/No (Independence unless impeachment)	Yes/Yes (No Conf. or Dissolve Parliament)
<b>Fixed Term</b>	Yes (Fast Policy)	No (Slow Policy)
<b>Agenda Setter</b>	Depends on Majority	Government
<b>Veto players</b>	President and Congress	Median Voter in Legislature
<b>Cohesion</b>	No Cohesion	Carrot and Stick system
<b>Gridlock</b>	High propensity	Low propensity

### 3 Cabinets, Coalitions and Single-Party Governments

We begin this section with an overview of the types of government that exist:

- **Majority Government:** majority of the seats which is equal to  $50\% + 1\%$
- **Minority Government:** does not have a majority of  $50\% + 1\%$  seats
- **Single Party:** all controlling seats are controlled by 1 party
- **Coalition:** seats are from multiple parties
  - Minimum Winning Coalitions are when you take 1 party away and there is no more legislative majority
  - Surplus Majority Coalitions are composed with more than the number required to maintain a majority

An example government is the current UK government in 2019 which is a **Single Party Minority**

#### 3.1 Coalition Formation Processes

The Coalition Formation Process starts with the **Formateur** which creates the cabinet if no majority is present.

According to **Gamson's Law**, the cabinet portfolio is distributed according to proportion of contributing seats per party to legislative majority. Hence, if your party contributes more seats to the majority, say 70% of the seats, then your party should control 70% of the cabinet as well.

Further, Coalitions are formed on two bases:

- **Office Seeking:**
  - Assumption:* Parties try to maximise cabinet seats
  - Proposition:* Only minimum winning coalitions should form
- **Policy Seeking:**
  - Assumption:* Parties try to seek policy outcomes
  - Proposition:* coalitions should only form between connected parties

These two, however, are not necessarily **mutually exclusive** since if we get the two together, we would get a **minimum connected coalition**.

##### 3.1.1 Minority Governments

Minority governments can be stable, if the party or parties in government are in the centre in which case a majority coalition will not be preferred by the other parties in the legislature to the minority government. This is because the radical wings on the Left Right Spectrum, adhering to Axelrod's policy seeking theory, would not want to form a majority coalition with the opposing parties on the other side of the wing.



## 3.2 Consequences of Coalition and Single Party

Below are a list of questions related to performance that might be asked of these types of governments:

- **Duration:** are single-party governments more stable than coalition governments?
- **Policy-making:** is policy-making easier/faster in single-party governments than in coalition governments?
- **Accountability and Clarity of Responsibility:** are single-party governments more accountable than coalition governments?
- **Representation:** are coalition governments more representative than single-party governments?

### 3.2.1 Duration

- Single-party majority lasted around 3 years
- Minimal winning coalition lasted also around 3 years

Do not generalise from bad coalitions that all coalitions will not last long. It depends on the type of coalition you form.

### 3.2.2 Policy Making

This depends on the type of cabinet you have, refer to the SAQ document for more information:

- **Single-party government:** if there is party cohesion, the leader of the majority party would be the dictator as they are the agenda setter and control a majority to pass legislation
- **Coalition Government:** members of the coalition are veto players, there can be compromise but also possible gridlock

### 3.2.3 Accountability

Also known as clarity of responsibility, this is how clear it is for voters to know which party is responsible for government policies i.e. who to reward or blame

- **Single-party government:** responsibility for policy is clear
- **Coalition government:** responsibility for policy is less clear and the more parties there are, the less responsibility individual parties have, popular policies credit can be claimed but then unpopular shifted away

A good example of this is Hellwig and Samuels (2008) who studied the effect of the clarity of responsibility. The regression output is shown below:

**Dependent Variables:**

- % Vote for PM/Pres Party

**Independent Variables**

- Previous Vote: % vote in previous
- Economy: GDP growth in year before
- Re-election: Dichotomous
- Age of Democracy: Number of years

Independent Var	High Clarity	Low Clarity
Previous Vote	0.45** (0.18)	0.71** (0.06)
Economy	0.55* (0.38)	0.28 (0.28)
Re-election	7.96* (4.66)	6.31* (2.08)
Age of Democracy	0.44** (0.18)	0.02 (0.09)
Age of Democracy <sup>2</sup>	-0.005** (0.002)	0.00 (0.001)
Constant	13.60 (9.13)	5.19* (2.88)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.52
F-Statistic	4.90**	46.54**
N	108	318

- High Clarity (Single-Party Majority in Parliamentary) → positive relationship because we can reward the government for performing well economically
- Low Clarity (Coalitions, Presidentials etc) → no relationship whatsoever as we cannot attribute blame or praise due to lack of clarity on who has done what

Thus, Hellwig and Samuels do show that clarity of responsibility matters a lot in rewarding of punishing parties.

**3.2.4 Representation**

One way of thinking about representation: the closer a government is to the median voter, the more representative it is. **A representative government** is a government which contains the party the median voter supported in the election.

Huber and Powell (1994) first introduced **Citizen-Government** distance. They found that the average distance of a coalition government to the median voter is closer than majority parties.

### 3.3 In Sum

Below are the key takeaways from this week:

- Democracies can have single-party or coalition governments and majority or minority governments.
- Office Seeking (Riker 1962) predict that minimum-winning coalitions will form and that cabinet seats will be allocated in proportion to parties' seat-shares
- Policy Seeking (Axelrod 1970) predict that connected coalitions will form between parties next to each other on a policy dimension and that parties will bargain about the content of a coalition agreement
- Single-party governments **tend to be more stable, more decisive and more accountable**
- Coalition governments **tend to be more consensual and more representative without much loss in decision-making**

## 4 Federalism and Decentralisation

Balancing Democracy and Diversity is a difficult task. Below are a collection of quotes on this topic:

- Small nations have always been the cradle of liberty; and the fact that many of them have lost their liberty by becoming larger shows that their freedom was more a consequence of their small size than of the character of their people ... The federal system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages which result from the magnitude and the littleness of nations.  
- **Alexis de Tocqueville 1835-40**
- Federalism is the main alternative to empire as a technique for aggregating large areas under one government ... The essential institutions of federalism are ... a government of the federation and a set of governments of the member units, in which both kinds of governments rule over the same territory and people and each kind has the authority to make some decisions independently of the other.  
- **William H. Riker 1987**
- For how long will English constituencies and English Honourable members tolerate ... at least 119 Honourable members from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland exercising an important, and probably often decisive, effect on English politics while they themselves have no say in the same matters in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland?  
- **Tam Dalyell Labour MP for West Lothian 14th Nov. 1977**

### 4.1 Models of Territorial Organisation of the State

Below are examples of how states can be organised.

#### 4.1.1 Federalism Overview

A definition of Federalism has 4 key components (Elazar 1997; Bednar 2009)

1. **Geopolitical division:** the country is divided into regional governments that are constitutionally recognised and that cannot be unilaterally abolished by the central government
2. **Independence:** regional and central governments have independent bases of authority e.g. separate elections, courts, laws etc.
3. **Direct Governance:** policy-making is divided between the regional and central governments, such that each has some 'exclusive competences' over their citizens, e.g. as set out in a 'catalogue of competences'
4. **Territorial Representation:** regional sub-units are represented in the upper chamber of the central legislature, and so have power over central government policy

### 4.1.2 Unitary State Overview

A unitary state has features as follows:

1. Geopolitical divisions decided by central government
2. May have independent elections, but not separate courts or laws
3. No direct governance
4. No territorial representation in central legislature

### 4.1.3 Devolution/Decentralisation within a Unitary State

Below are features of the half-way solutions:

1. Existence and powers of geopolitical divisions are decided by central government
2. Some sub-units have independent courts and legal traditions
3. Some sub-units have direct governance, i.e. exclusive power over some policies
4. Over-representation of (some) territorial sub-units in upper house

Where only some regional sub-units have exclusive policy-making power and special representation, this is sometimes called **Asymmetric Federalism**.

## 4.2 Examples

Below are some examples:

### 4.2.1 USA

Federalism design in the USA:

- **Geopolitical Division:** 50 states recognised by the US Constitution
- **Independence:** separate state elections, constitutions, courts, laws etc.
- **Direct Governance:** constitution preserves state rights over all policies not explicitly allocated to the federal government and is protected by the Supreme Court
- **Territorial Representation:** each state has 2 members of the Senate who are directly elected  
Malapportionment - issues of Democracy:  
Wyoming has 280k people per Senator  
California has 18.63m people per Senator

### 4.2.2 Germany

Federalism to prevent too much centralised power:

- **Geopolitical Division:** 16 states (Länder) recognised by the German constitution
- **Independence:** each state has its own elections, constitutions, judges, laws etc.
- **Direct Governance:** there is a catalogue of competences in the constitution, if they conflict i.e. both central and state government have the competency, central overrules
- **Territorial Representation:** the state government sit in upper house with votes by population proportion

### 4.2.3 India

- **Geopolitical Division:** 28 states and 7 union territories, set up by constitution and legislative statute
- **Independence:**  
*States:* separate governments, elections, laws, courts etc.  
*Unions:* governed directly from the center
- **Direct Governance:** Constitutional division of powers:  
*Union:* defence, foreign affairs, citizenship, income and company taxes  
*State:* police, justice, health, agriculture, money lending, land taxes etc.  
*Concurrent:* marriage, education, labour rights, media etc.
- **Territorial Representation:** 28 states and 2 of the union territories directly elect members of the upper house in proportion to population

### 4.2.4 UK

Unitary system

- **Geopolitical Division:** UK divided into 4 nations: Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland.  
England is divided into regions, counties and local councils.  
All set up by UK legislative statutes
- **Independence:**  
Scottish parliament and Welsh, Northern Ireland and London assemblies are elected  
Scotland has separate legal tradition and courts  
English regional assemblies (non-elected) were abolished in 2008-10
- **Direct Governance:**  
Scotland: direct power in some areas e.g. education, limited tax powers  
Wales, Northern Ireland, London: policy implementation powers, no tax powers
- **Territorial Representation:** Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are slightly over-represented in the House of Commons

#### 4.2.5 France

- **Geopolitical Division:** 13 regions, 96 departments, 342 arrondissements, 3883 cantons and 36569 communes all set up by legislative statute
- **Independence:** all levels of government are elected but no independent legal authority
- **Direct Governance:**  
Regions have no legislative authority but can raise taxes (but then receive less from central government)  
Some discretion on the implementation of laws/spending on secondary education, public transport, universities and business subsidies
- **Territorial Representation:** no separate territorial representation. Upper house is indirectly elected, the system is biased to favour rural areas

### 4.3 Why Decentralise

Three key arguments will be given:

1. Democratic Accountability/Checks and Balances
2. Ethnic Divisions/Divergent Policy Preferences
3. Fiscal Federalism

#### 4.3.1 Democratic Accountability, Checks and Balances

Principle of Subsidiarity

A central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more local level.

**Question:** What does effective even mean? This question is **open to interpretation** as there are externalities of decentralising most policies, such as environmental protection, education, transport etc.

##### **Vertical Checks and Balances**

Dividing powers between the centre and sub-states is analytically the same as dividing powers between the executive and the legislature (presidentialism) or between two legislative chambers (bicameralism).

**Question:** How much should a national majority be constrained by local preferences or interests?

Harold Lasky believes that change is endogenous to the system and dependent on what type of checks and balances exist within it. When asked why he supported federalism in the USA, the checks and balances would allow for change to grow.

In the UK, it would be a top-down approach since the checks and balances would prevent federalism and growth of opinion in the UK from the bottom-up.

### 4.3.2 Ethnic Divisions

#### **Ethnic Divisions**

If ethno-linguistic groups in a society are geographically concentrated, then decentralisation of power can give these groups autonomy over the issues they care about e.g. education, media, language etc.

#### **Divergent Policy Preferences**

More generally, some geographically concentrated social groups might have significantly divergent policy preferences from the national majority, and so prefer decentralised powers on these issues.

- Median Scottish voter is to the left of the median UK voter
- Median Catalan voter is to the right of the median Spanish voter

### 4.3.3 Fiscal Federalism

This is a normative theoretical framework for understanding which functions and instruments should be centralised and which should be decentralised.

#### **Central Government**

- Macro-economic stabilisation e.g. interest rates, currency intervention
- Income redistribution e.g. pensions, welfare spending
- National public goods e.g. defence

#### **Regional/Local Government**

- Responsible for provision of goods and services whose consumption is limited to their own jurisdictions
- Schools, hospitals, roads, local public housing as examples

However, for the local government, one could question if these goods are really **local** if people across states can come and use them etc. That question is also open to interpretation.

## 4.4 Consequences of Decentralisation

Below are a list of consequences that we go into:

1. Accommodating/Exacerbating Ethnic Conflict
2. Market-Preserving Federalism
3. Parties and Decentralisation
4. Malapportionment



#### 4.4.1 Ethnic Conflict

Conflicting evidence!

##### **Decreased Separatist Demands**

Some voters strategically support separatists, then when some decentralisation is granted, they go back to mainstream/national parties e.g. Basque Country, Belgium in 90s and Canada

##### **Increased Separatist Demands**

Limited autonomy is granted, separatists win regional election and use their powers to demonstrate that they can be trusted in the government which leads to more demands for autonomy and independence e.g. Scotland, Malaysia, Catalonia and Belgium in 2000s

#### 4.4.2 Market-Preserving Federalism

Weingast (1995) argues that federalism drives economic growth. This is because **thriving markets require political institutions that credibly commit the state to honour economic and political rights.**

Federalism can also lead to **regulatory competition** between states for better policies and better regulatory standards (known as the California effect)

Federalism can also lead to a **race to the bottom** as states cut their standards, welfare costs and taxes to attract business (known as the Delaware effect)

Hence, there are two sides of the same coin which can lead to prosperous growth or growth at the cost of good and proper regulation.

#### 4.4.3 Parties and Decentralisation

Preferences over decentralisation should follow from preferences over policy. Toubeau and Wagner (2015) argue that parties attitudes to decentralisation is influenced by these parties positions on:

- **Economic redistribution/efficiency:** decentralisation limits the redistributive capacity of central government and increases local economic accountability → economically right parties are more pro-decentralisation
- **Cultural identity:** decentralisation of power undermines national cultural homogeneity → socially liberal parties are more pro-decentralisation

#### 4.4.4 Malapportionment

One common consequence is this unfair representation due to federalism. This is because representation is based on territorial units rather than being based on the representation of people.

## 4.5 In Sum

- There are growing demands for more decentralisation in many established democracies
- Federalism is a formal and permanent territorial division of power between the centre and the states
- Decentralisation of power can lead to:
  - More political accountability
  - More checks and balances
  - Decreased Ethnic conflicts
  - Policy innovation
  - Better economic performance
- But it can also lead to:
  - Policy gridlock
  - Increased separatist demands
  - Concerns about over-representation
  - Negative policy spillovers
  - Pressure to reduce taxation and regulation

Further concepts to remember:

- **Congruent Federalism:** territorial units share the same political cultures
- **Incongruent Federalism:** units have different political sub cultures
- **Devolution:** unitary state granting powers (this is not Federalism)

## 5 Public Spending and Economic Equality

This section goes into the variations in public spending and how they are affected by democracy. Outline is as follows:

- Variations in public spending
- Relationship between Public Spending and Equality
- Democracies vs Non-democracies
- Between Democracies

### 5.1 Variations in Spending

OECD Countries do spend from 30% to 50% of their GDP on public spending. A large amount is allocated to Social Protection which is redistribution of wealth. Further, as countries get richer, there is an upwards trend in public spending. Some countries are off this trend though, such as the USA and Ireland.

Even amongst big countries there is big variation. A way in which we can evaluate this further is the pre and post-tax **Gini Coefficients**. This shows how unequal a society was before taxation and then public spending. **Refer to lecture slides for graphs.**

### 5.2 Democracies vs Non-democracies

Do democracies lead to more redistribution? Meltzer and Richard (1981), Boix (2003) and Larcinese (2007)

#### 5.2.1 Democracies

- Level of public spending, in a simple democracy, should be decided by the median voter.
- But, lower turnout in elections means less public spending due to skewed turnout whereby those that turnout are richer than the median hence unrepresentative of all eligible to vote (Larcinese 2007)
- This is because **the median voter is richer than the median citizen**
- Boix also shows that democracies only redistribute more wealth than non-democracies when you have high electoral turnout!

#### 5.2.2 Non-Democracies

- Level of public spending decided by ruling elite
- Ruling elite much richer than median voter
- Elites fear democracy because of a higher redistribution of wealth

Hence, we can plausibly conclude that there is more redistribution in democracies than non-democracies.

## 5.3 Between Democracies

What about these factors and their effects?

- Institutions: Pres vs Parl
- Institutions: Proportional vs Majoritarian
- Voter Turnout, Geography and Ethnic Diversity?
- Do parties even matter?
- 'Taxing the Rich' Scheve and Stasavage (2016)

### 5.3.1 Effect of Regime Type

Here is a brief history outline:

- Status Quo c. 1930: no democracy has a welfare state
- 1930s and 40s: economic depression and war
- Citizens and the median voter demand increased public spending:
  - New Deal by Roosevelt and Truman in the USA
  - European Social Democrats arise post WW2

#### **Presidential:**

- More veto players means it is difficult to change existing policies
- Weak and non-cohesive parties make it difficult for centre-left to act cohesively

#### **Parliamentary:**

- Fewer veto players and more cohesive parties
- Centre-left can come to power and set up a welfare state

The expectation is that presidential systems will have lower welfare spending than parliamentary systems.

### 5.3.2 Electoral System

Two key ways in which we can approach this:

1. Persson and Tabellini (2003):
  - Majoritarian: single-party government, spending close to preferences of the median voter as they rely on this voter to maintain power
  - Proportional: coalition government, parties have different spending priorities which increases spending
2. Iversen and Soskice (2003), Chang (2008), *inter alia*:
  - Majoritarian: centre-left voters concentrated in cities, left parties either compromise or centre-right win elections which leads to lower welfare spending
  - Proportional: centre-left form coalitions with liberals and elections are fought on general public goods rather than local goods leading to higher welfare spending

Hence, the expectation is that majoritarian electoral systems have lower welfare spending than proportional electoral systems.

### 5.3.3 Geographic and Ethnic Diversity

Alesina and Glaeser (2004) talk about geographic and ethnic factors in addition to the role of political institutions.

#### Geographic Disparity:

- Low population density and capital not the biggest city
- Weaker trade union movements and weaker socialist parties, the USA as a huge country makes it difficult
- Leads to lower welfare spending

Works the opposite as well!

#### Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity:

- Less national solidarity
- Median voter opposed to transfers to look after poor members of a different ethnic or linguistic group
- Leads to lower welfare spending

Again, works the opposite way as well such that homogeneity may breed more solidarity and more public spending of closer kin.

### 5.3.4 Do Parties Matter?

Two theses:

1. **Parties Don't Matter:**

In democracy, party policies converge on the median voter (Downs)  
Parties compete on the competence and leadership ability of their leaders  
Whichever party is in government will have the same policy

2. **Parties Do Matter:**

Parties represent particular electoral constituencies with different public spending preferences  
Working class leads to more welfare spending  
Middle-Upper Class leads to less welfare spending

The electoral system should matter, in that convergence on the median is likely to be stronger in Majoritarian systems than in PR systems. Hence, parties should **matter more in PR systems**.

Blais et al. (1993) show that parties do matter but not so much. The difference is moderate across both time and space. Their data shows that public spending increases by only 2% which seems less than one might think a priori. They state in their conclusion:

**A change in the composition of government is not systematically followed by a shift in public spending.**

### 5.3.5 Taxing the Rich

Most of the variation has been across time instead of across country. Ref. Piketty Graph. Hence they give some normative justifications for taxation as a means for redistribution:

- **Equal Sacrifice:**

We should all pay the same percentage of our incomes  
Rich pay more in total because they earn more

- **Ability to Pay:**

People who earn more are more able to pay more  
Progressive taxation with higher income groups

However, evidence suggest that countries have only managed to implement high marginal tax rates on high income groups after periods of war. This suggests that only when there is mass mobilisation during wartime is there sufficient public support for forcing high income groups to pay more as **compensation for not fighting**.

Evidence does show increased income tax and then a gradual decline of taxation across these crucial periods of war.

## 5.4 In Sum

Richer countries tend to spend more redistributing wealth than poorer countries and public spending does reduce income inequality. This can be seen through the pre and post redistribution Gini coefficients. However, there is a big variation between rich countries of this level of redistribution.

Democracies redistribute more via welfare spending than non-democracies but democracies don't redistribute as much as one might expect:

- Lower turnout → less redistribution
- Presidential systems redistribute **less** than parliamentary systems
- Majoritarian electoral systems redistribute **less** than PR systems
- Geographic disparity and ethno-linguistic diversity leads to **less redistribution**
- Left-wing parties in government redistribute **more** than right-wing parties in government **although not by much**
- Only after we have countries been able to implement heavy progressive taxation

Relationships are very difficult to disentangle though!!

## 6 Politics in Ethnically Divided Societies

The standard view in political science is that democracy only works **if there are cross-cutting cleavages** where social divisions do not reinforce each other. If they do reinforce, identities can become rigid and hard to govern.

Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) state that: *Is the resolution of intense but conflicting preferences in a deeply divided society manageable in a democratic framework? We think not.*

Lijphart (1977) states that: *it may be difficult, but it is not at all impossible to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a plural society.*

The outline for this section is as follows:

- Definitions and Theories
- Explaining Ethnic Conflict and theories of identity
- Democracy in Ethnically-Divided Societies
  - Lijphart vs Horowitz
  - Examples including Northern Ireland and Nigeria
  - Electoral Systems and ethnic Voting by Huber

### 6.1 Definitions and Theories

Below is an overview of a definition we associate with this theory and how we can measure fractionalisation.

#### 6.1.1 Definition

Jim Fearon (2003) defines Ethnic Groups:

- Membership in the group is reckoned primarily by descent by both members and non-members
- Members are conscious of group membership and view it as important
- members share some distinguishing cultural features such as language, religion and customs which they share in common
- These cultural features are held as valuable
- Group has a homeland
- Group has a shared history
- Group is potentially stand-alone in a conceptual sense i.e. not a caste like European Nobility



One way in which you can measure it is by graphing largest ethnic groups to the second largest ethnic group. Here are the types:

- **Homogeneous:** one dominant ethnic group
- **Plural:** a 50/50 split which can lead to serious divide in politics
- **Heterogeneous:** many different groups found in society

### 6.1.2 Ethnic Fractionalisation

The Fractionalisation Index is as follows:

$$F \equiv 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2$$

Where p is population share of an ethnic group

The index ranges from 0 to 1. If there are two groups and they occupy 50% of the population each, the index would be 1. The higher the fractionalisation, the closer the index is to 1.

Most Advanced Democracies are also now multi-ethnic societies with the UK having a fractionalisation index of 0.3 and in London alone, an index level of 0.7 e.g. Sadiq Khan vs Zac Goldsmith.

## 6.2 Theories of Ethnic Identity

Three theories:

1. **Primordial** (Smith 1991)  
National and ethnic groups are ancient, natural, permanent and objective phenomena. Institutions and policies have little ability to modify these identities and should instead seek to accommodate ethnic identity.
2. **Constructivist** (Anderson 1983)  
National and ethnic groups are **constructed** via collective histories and experiences such as civil wars, nation building. Institutions and policies have some/weak effects on identity formation.
3. **Instrumental** (Posner 2004)  
Ethnic identification is chosen by individuals in response to changing economic and political incentives e.g. the political mobilisation of one group. Institutions and policies have strong effects on identity formation.

### 6.2.1 Example: Chewas and Tumbukas (Posner 2004)

**In Zambia** both Chewas and Tumbukas are small groups relative to the country as a whole.

**In Malawi** both groups are significant ethnic groups relative to the country as a whole.

Posner stats that political salience of a cultural cleavage depends not on the nature of the cleavage itself (since it is identical in both countries) but on the sizes of the groups it defines and whether or not they will be useful for political mobilisation. Hence, since Malawi has big groups which have more political weight, we see more conflict.

This shows that **context is extremely important.**

## 6.3 Democracy and Divisions

### 6.3.1 Problems of Majoritarian Democracy

Majoritarian democracies are based on winner-takes-all principles i.e. the Westminster Model.

**Lijphart (1985) states:** *the core problem of majoritarianism is its potential for majority dictatorship and the permanent exclusion of ethnic minorities*

**Sisk (1996) states:** *simple majority rule results in minimum winning coalitions that tend to exclude a significant minority; when minority preferences are intense and there is little chance of the minority becoming a majority, a recipe for conflict exists*

### 6.3.2 Lijphart vs Horowitz

These two present solutions to the issues present in democracy. They are listed below:

#### **Arend Lijphart**

Ethnic identities are permanent i.e. **Primordial** so institutions need to be designed to accommodate these identities:

- Incongruent federalism
- PR electoral system
- Power-sharing executive
- Parliamentary

#### **Donald Horowitz**

Identities are malleable i.e. **Constructivist or Instrumental** so institutions should be designed to force elites to appeal across ethnic divisions:

- Preferential Voting e.g. Alternative or Single-Transferable
- Cross-group coalitions
- Presidential

### 6.3.3 Lijphart's Consociationalism

Four characteristics:

1. Sharing of executive power (each ethnic group represented in cabinet)
2. Group autonomy (in education, language rights etc.)
3. Proportionality (in parliament, civil service, policy etc.)

4. Mutual Veto (for each ethno-linguistic-religious group) such that no one group imposes over another

**Assumption:** Ethno-political instability can be prevented through the institutionalised guarantee of political representation for all major ethnic groups in a society.

#### 6.3.4 Horowitz's Integrative Power-Sharing

Five elements:

1. Dispersion of power to take the heat off a single focal point
2. Territorial devolution to emphasise intra-ethnic competition
3. Institutions that create incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation e.g. STV and AV
4. Policies that encourage alignments based on alternative social alignments
5. Redistribution of resources to reduce disparities between groups

Vote-pooling electoral systems offer more effective incentives for inter-ethnic coalitions and the reduction of ethnopolitical tensions than the security offered to ethnic minorities in consociational power-sharing agreements. This is approaching the divisions in society with an optimistic outlook for cooperation between groups.

#### 6.3.5 Example: Northern Ireland

Beginning with characteristics:

- **Societal Structure**

Protestants: approx 55%

Catholics: approx 45%

- **Identity**

Protestants identify with the UK (Unionists)

Catholics identify with the Republic of Ireland (Republicans/Nationalists)

- **Geographic Divisions**

Between counties/cities in Northern Ireland

Within cities e.g. Catholic and Protestant estates in Belfast

- **History of Conflict**

1960s → emerging conflict with British troops deployed in 1969

1972 → Bloody Sunday with 14 civil rights marchers killed

1970s to 1990s → escalation of conflict with IRA/UVF/UDA paramilitaries

#### Good Friday Agreement

- **Northern Irish Assembly**

Devolved powers elected by STV in multi-member districts (Horowitz)

- **Power-sharing Executive - Lijphart**

First minister from largest party

Deputy First minister from second largest part

Cabinet ministers appointed in proportion to parties strength i.e. not chosen by minister

- **Consensual Assembly - Lijphart**

All members have to declare as either **unionist, nationalist or other**

Key decisions need either parallel consent ( $> 50\%$  of both communities)

Or weighted majority (60% overall and  $> 40\%$  in both communities)

Committee chairs, public bodies e.g. police appointed to ensure large representation from both communities

### 6.3.6 Example: Nigeria

Beginning with characteristics:

- **Societal Structure**

250 ethnic groups with a population of 170m

3 main groups making 68%: Hausa: 29%, Yoruba: 21% and Ibo: 18%

Groups are geographically concentrated

50% Muslim, mostly in the North

50% Christian, mostly in the Centre and South

- **Recent Political History**

1960: Independence from UK

1963: Federal System set up with devolved powers

1960s: Military coups and civil war

1999: Return to democracy with a presidential system

Ethnic conflicts continue:

- North: rising Islamic fundamentalism

- South East: conflict over oil extraction and exploitation

**Nigerian Politics Today** Below is an overview of the system today. It is more of a Horowitz success story.

- **President**

Muhammadu Buhari

Directly elected in a two-round run-off election

Needs a majority or plurality of national vote with at least 25% in two thirds of all federal states

- **National Assembly**

House of Reps: 360 members in single-member constituencies (FPTP)

Senate: 109 members, elected in 36 3-seat constituencies (each state) plus 1 seat in the national capital (Abuja)

- **Main Political Parties**

- People's Democratic Party (PDP): centre-right, national party
- All Progressive Congress (APC): centre-left on economics, centre-right on social
- All-Nigeria People's Party (APP): centre-right support mainly in north
- Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN): centre-right, mainly in South
- Congress for Progress Change (CPC): centrist, mainly in North
- All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA): centre-left, mainly in South

- **Federalism**

With significant autonomy for states e.g. Sharia Law in some northern states

## 6.4 Electoral Systems and Ethnic Voting

**Lijphart states:** PR is **good** because it promotes ethnic representation whereas majoritarian systems lead to ethnic conflict.

**Horowitz states:** PR is **bad** because it promotes ethnic polarisation, whereas majoritarian systems should promote less ethnic voting

Hence, Huber asks: is there more ethnic voting under PR than majoritarian systems?

### 6.4.1 Measurement of Ethnic Voting

Two main types of ethnic voting are present:

- **Party Based Ethnicization**

Parties are catering towards one particular ethnic group e.g. Belgium with its French parties and Dutch parties

- **Group Based Ethnicization**

Parties are catering towards multiple ethnic groups but limited amounts. Hence there is group based ethnic voting where groups vote for a particular party

### 6.4.2 Conclusion for Huber

#### Key takeaways

- PR is indeed associated with lower levels of civil conflict
- However, it is not for Lijphart's reasons
- It is because of easy party formation that parties are formed to appeal on bases other than ethnic divisions
- This diminishes the salience of ethnicity

## 6.5 In Sum

Most countries in the world either already have multi-ethnic societies or are becoming multi-ethnic societies due to immigration. This presents a range of challenges for democratic politics:

- Conflictual political preferences
- Minority rights vs common norms
- Representation of minorities in politics and policy-making
- Competition for public resources

There are also some empirical regularities:

- Multicultural/pluralist policies are correlated with more tolerant societies
- Power Sharing can sometimes work in ethnically-divided societies
- Conflict can often be instrumental i.e. only salient when mobilized
- PR systems are better than majoritarian systems in ethnically-divided societies

## 7 Past Paper Questions

### 7.1 Consensus vs Majoritarian

#### 7.1.1 Consensus Democracy vs Majoritarian Democracy

**Question:** Consensus Democracy is better than majoritarian democracy. Discuss.

### 7.2 Presidential vs Parliamentary

#### 7.2.1 Gridlock in Systems

**Question:** Presidential systems, as opposed to parliamentary ones, result in gridlock. Discuss

#### 7.2.2 Stability in Regimes

**Question:** Parliamentary systems are more conducive to stable democracy than presidential systems. Discuss.

Referencing Perils of Presidentialism by Juan Linz

### 7.3 Cabinets and Coalitions

#### 7.3.1 Coalitions

**Question:** Coalition governments are the best type of government for every country. Discuss.

### 7.4 Federalism and Decentralisation

#### 7.4.1 Democracy and Diversity

**Question:** Federalism is the most appropriate way of balancing democracy and diversity. Discuss

## **7.5 Public Spending and Inequality**

### **7.5.1 Varying Spending**

**Question:** Which institutions can best explain variations in public spending across countries?

### **7.5.2 Inequality**

**Question:** Why is economic inequality higher in some countries than in others?

## **7.6 Politics in Ethnically Diverse Societies**

### **7.6.1 Tension and Decentralisation**

**Question:** Does decentralisation of power help reduce ethnic tensions?

or

**Question:** Is decentralisation the best way to manage ethnic tensions in a divided society?

### **7.6.2 Diversity and Provision**

**Question:** Does ethnic diversity undermine the provision of public goods?