

After Deterrence: Explaining Conflict Short of War



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Abstract Gray zone conflict is a policy <u>choice</u> by <u>capable actors</u> who <u>both prefer</u> low-intensity conflict to high-intensity conflict

Initiator's Motivation

- 1. Deterrence cost of full-scale war is too high Result: initiator compromises and avoids optimal strategy Implication: raising cost of gray zone conflict discourages escalation
- 2. Efficiency objectives can be achieved at lower intensity <u>Result</u>: initiator expects success without unnecessary costs <u>Implication</u>: raising cost of gray zone conflict encourages escalation

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Innovations

Choice

Limited conflict is chosen to lower the risk of larger conflict

Capable actors

Distinct from terrorism, insurgency, civil conflict, etc.

Preference-oriented

Mutual desire to avoid escalation

Implications

Motivation should determine response Two-sided situations:

- Fear of escalation
- "Horns of strategic dilemma"

		Ends	
		Limited	Not Limited
SL	Limited	Limited War	N/A
leal	Not Limited	Gray Zone	Traditional
2			Conflict

Escalation Ability + Unwillingness = Gray Zone