

A close-up of Morpheus from the movie The Matrix, wearing his iconic black sunglasses. The image is used as a background for a meme. The text is overlaid in a bold, white, sans-serif font with a black outline.

WHAT IF I TOLD YOU

THE GRAY ZONE EXISTED

Modern Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional Warfare

Special Warfare

Counter-Unconventional Warfare

Political Warfare

All apply to the “Gray Zone”

Gray Zone 1

- **Gen Votel March 2015 Congressional Testimony:**
 - **Actors taking a “gray zone” approach seek to secure their objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting. In this “gray zone” we are confronted with ambiguity on the nature of conflict, the parties involved and the validity of the legal and political claims at stake. These conflicts defy our traditional views of war and require us to invest time and effort in ensuring we prepare ourselves with the proper capabilities, capacities, and authorities to safeguard US interests.**

Gray Zone 2

- **DEPSECDEF Robert Work at the Army War College, April 2015:**
 - Argued that adversaries are increasing using “Agents, paramilitaries, deception, infiltration, and persistent denial to make those avenues of approach very hard to detect, operating in what some people have called ‘the gray zone.’ Now, that’s the one in which our ground forces have not traditionally had to operate, but one in which they must now become more proficient.”

Gray Zone 3

- **USSOCOM White paper September 2015:**
 - Gray zone challenges are defined as competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.
 - They are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.
 - Gray zone challenges are not new

Gray Zone 4

- Mike Mazarr's gray zone hypothesis:
 - Argues that three elements – rising revisionist intent, a form of strategic gradualism, and unconventional tools – are creating a new approach to the pursuit of aggressive aims, a new form of conflict.
 - Evidence from a number of ongoing campaigns by China and Russia, suggests that gradual gray zone strategies may be becoming the tool of choice for states wanting to reframe the global order in the 21st century.
 - The idea of competing below the threshold of war is hardly new: States and non-state actors have employed gray zone approaches for thousands of years most ambitiously during WWII and the Cold War.
 - Nonetheless, this analysis finds reason to believe that gray zone conflict represents an identifiable and intentional strategy for several states, and a phenomenon of growing importance.
 - *If this hypothesis is valid, then the US needs to become more adept at operating in the environment.*
- (I could not agree more)

Gray Zone 5

- Hal Brands' paradoxes of the gray zone:
 1. *"Gray zone" cannot mean everything if it is to mean anything*
 2. *Gray zone challenges are the wave of the future—and a blast from the past*
 3. *Gray zone conflict reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the international order*
 4. *Gray zone strategies are weapons of the weak against the strong—and of the strong against the weak*
 5. *Confronting gray zone challenges requires both embracing and dispelling ambiguity*
 6. *Gray zone conflict is aggression, but military tools are only part of the response*
 7. *America is not poorly equipped for the gray zone—but it may not be fully prepared*
 8. *Gray zone challenges can be productive and counterproductive at the same time*

Gray Zone 6

- Frank Hoffman illustrates the spectrum of conflict

VIOLENCE LEVELS				
Low				High
Gray Zone Conflict	Irregular Warfare/ Terrorism	Hybrid Threats	Limited Conventional Warfare	Theater Conventional Warfare w/WMD
Unconventional Warfare				


No Peace - only a spectrum of conflict

Gray Zone 7

- **Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone By Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin**
 - **The Gray Zone is characterized by intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war. It is hardly new, however. The Cold War was a 45-year-long Gray Zone struggle in which the West succeeded in checking the spread of communism and ultimately witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. To avoid superpower confrontations that might escalate to all-out nuclear war, the Cold War was largely a proxy war, with the United States and Soviet Union backing various state or nonstate actors in small regional conflicts and executing discrete superpower intervention and counter-intervention around the globe. Even the Korean and Vietnam conflicts were fought under political constraints that made complete U.S. or allied victory virtually impossible for fear of escalation.**

Gray Zone 8

- Adam Elkus debunks the gray zone concept:
 - In Fifty Shades of Gray in WOTR:
 - There's only one problem: The “gray wars” concept lacks even the most basic strategic sense. Like the [book](#) and [movie](#) *50 Shades of Grey*, the gray wars concept grossly over-exaggerates its own transgressions from the norm.
 - First, it should be observed that this definition, [which is applied](#) to *both* wars with Vladimir Putin's deniable “[little green men](#)” and Middle Eastern wars in Iraq and Syria featuring mobile combined arms maneuver, is incoherent.
 - You Cannot Save the Gray Zone Concept in WOTR:
 - He has have argued, in part, that the gray zone concept merely puts a new spin on older and more well-understood ideas from political science, military history, and strategic theory about how actors pursue strategic objectives under constraint.
- Bottom line I think for Adam is that since the gray zone provides nothing new from the existing norm it is; therefore, unhelpful.
- That may be the case or perhaps not.
- Most importantly if policymakers and strategists are embracing it and it helps them to understand and articulate strategic challenges then it may be of value.
- We need to decide whether to embrace it – it may not be perfect but to help us think strategically with a common frame of reference then we need to “make a decision and then make the decision right.” – making the decision right is the equivalent of “doing strategy.”



UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
PART I
GUERRILLA WARFARE




U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY
LIBRARY


Special Bibliography Series
No. 21

May 1962

Special Warfare Magazine 1962



DEFINING WAR 2011



“100 NAMES” OF LIC!!!

Since 1994 at CGSC

- Little Wars
- Small Wars
- Guerrillas
- Guerrilla warfare
- Partisan warfare
- Asymmetric warfare
- Low Intensity Conflict
- Low Intensity Opns
- Insurgency
- Counterinsurgency
- COIN
- Terrorism
- Counter-terrorism
- Anti-terrorism
- Imperial Policing
- Nation Building
- Intervention
- Irregular Warfare
- Wars amongst peoples
- AND MANY MORE
- Operations Other Than War
- Military Operations Other Than War
- OOTW
- MOOTW
- Gray Area Phenomena
- Revolutionary War
- Insurrection
- Counter-narcotics opns
- Counter Drug opns
- Punitive opns
- Peace opns
- Small scale contingencies
- Stability opns
- SASO
- Nation Assistance
- Occupation
- Uncomfortable Wars
- 4GW
- 5GW
- Civil wars
- ETC.

Definition and Terminology Paralysis

Our Challenge in the Gray Zone

- To use a soldier's vernacular: As a nation we suck
 - at Unconventional Warfare
 - at Counterinsurgency
 - at Counterterrorism
 - at Nation Building
- *But the bottom line is we suck at strategy*
 - *Both developing and executing our own and recognizing our enemies' strategies and countering them.*

Is the Gray Zone Useful?

- **If it helps us to “do strategy” better then yes it is useful**
- **If it helps policy makers, strategists, and planners to recognize and understand the phenomenon of revolution, resistance, and insurgency then yes it is useful**
- **If it helps us to understand the strategies of our adversaries then it is useful**
- **If it helps us to campaign then it is useful**

My Thesis on UW, C-UW, Special Warfare, Political Warfare and Surgical Strike in the Gray Zone

1. The future is characterized (not exclusively of course) by states and non-state actors conducting UW (revolution, resistance and insurgency (RRI)) and thus there is a requirement to conduct Counter-UW. SOF is organized, educated, trained, equipped and optimized for both (but does not conduct them unilaterally or in a vacuum but as one element of the means in support of a joint campaign and national strategy)
2. We have the greatest Surgical Strike capability in the world but we need to prioritize and resource correctly (but not necessarily equally) our Special Warfare capabilities. - But we have to be careful of Anthony Cordesman's "Strategic Tokenism."
3. *We need Strategists and Policy Makers who have a deep (or at least sufficient) understanding of and value the strategic options of offered by UW and Counter-UW.*
4. Effective Special Warfare (which includes UW and counter-UW and supports Political Warfare) is counter-intuitively characterized by slow and deliberate employment – long duration actions and activities, relationship establishment, development, and sustainment.
5. SOF will always have a role in hybrid conflict and major combat operations.

Thoughts on RRI and Strategy in the Gap

- **Revolutions, resistance, and insurgencies (RRI) are being conducted around the world and will continue to be the norm in the space between peace and war. Our adversaries are exploiting political resistance and political violence and ambiguous and complex international conditions to achieve their ends.**
- **We have a strategy gap between diplomacy and war fighting and the US government (USG) requires a capability to achieve its objectives using all means necessary including and beyond diplomacy but short of war (adapted from George Kennan's political warfare memo 1948)**
- **Modern unconventional warfare, and the concepts of counter-UW, special warfare, and political warfare can provide a strategic capability to operate in this gap. To be effective, elements of the US military and Intelligence Community must continuously assess potential, nascent, and existing resistance organizations around the world on a day-to-day basis. Assessments will contribute to understanding when USG interests and resistance objectives can be aligned and provide the intellectual foundation to determine if a UW campaign is warranted or if opponents' UW campaigns should be countered.**

5 Categories of Revolutions 1962-2009

- **Modify the Type of Government**
 - NPA, FARC, Shining Path, Iranian Revolution, FMLN, Karen National Liberation Army
- **Identity or Ethnic Issues**
 - LTTE, PLO, Hutu-Tutsi Genocides, Kosovo Liberation Army, PIRA
- **Drive out Foreign Power**
 - Afghan Mujahidin, Vietcong, Chechen Revolution, Hizbollah, Hizbol Mujahedeen
- **Religious Fundamentalism**
 - Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Taliban, Al Qaeda
- **Modernization or Reform**
 - Niger Delta (MEND), Revolution United Front (RUF), Orange Revolution, Solidarity

From the ARIS Project

UW (RRI) Threats

- Al Qaeda
 - ISIL/ISIS/IL
 - Iran
 - Pakistan
 - Russia
 - China
 - north Korea
- (post-collapse/postwar)**
- Future??

“coerce, disrupt through and with an indigenous force”

Who is Conducting UW in the Gray Zone?

New House Armed Services Chairman Plans Focus on Unconventional Warfare

- In an interview with CQ Roll Call, new House Armed Services Chairman **MacThornberry**, R-Texas, said ***he planned to focus the committee on unconventional warfare by the likes of China, Russia and others.***
- As part of a larger talk on his agenda and philosophy, Thornberry said he would hold hearings on that subject.
- ***“Another difficult topic I think we need to explore is, what are Russia, China, others doing in the way of unconventional warfare?”*** Thornberry said Tuesday. ***“Not troops in uniforms marching in formation across borders, but the subversion and other sorts of influence attempts.”***
- <http://blogs.rollcall.com/five-by-five/new-house-armed-services-chairman-plans-focus-on-unconventional-warfare/?dcz=>

Chinese Three Warfares

- **Psychological Warfare** seeks to disrupt an opponent's decision-making capacity; create doubts, foment anti-leadership sentiments, deceive and diminish the will to fight among opponents.
- **Legal Warfare ("lawfare")** can involve enacting domestic law as the basis for making claims in international law and employing "bogus" maps to justify China's actions.
- **Media Warfare** is the key to gaining dominance over the venue for implementing psychological and and legal warfare.

3 Principles of Iranian UW

1. Leave a light footprint

Iran's preference for a light footprint, especially covert operations, has been confirmed on numerous occasions since 1979;... "The Quds Force is not a front-line unit, but functions as a special operations group whose presence and leadership improves indigenous forces on the battlefield." This preference, shaped by its experiences in the 1980s, coalesced into a more consistent approach in the aftermath of the killing of 13 Iranian diplomats in its Mazari Sharif consulate by the Afghan Taliban in 1998.

2. Partner with indigenous forces and use unconventional warfare

Iran has historically emphasized partnering with indigenous forces in carrying out its military interventions. While reliable publicly available information remains scant, these partnerships appear to follow a basic pattern epitomized by [Hezbollah](#), though there can be important variations from case to case.

3. Create broad non-sectarian coalitions

In its military interventions, Iran has tried to legitimize its actions and weaken its opponents by creating broad non-sectarian coalitions, meaning that it often seeks to avoid overt sectarianism both in its discourse and actions, where feasible.

<http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/military-intervention-iranian-style/>

Russia versus US

Unconventional Warfare

- US UW is very tactical, narrow, and limited
 - SOF focused
- Russian UW is joint and interagency and employs conventional as well as special operations forces
 - SOF and Conventional and Diplomatic and Economic focus
 - Broader tasks – e.g., no fly zones, blockades, EW, deception, propaganda
- US 7 phases – “How to” for SF/SOF
- Russian 8 phases – an outline for strategic employment and more than SOF

How do we operate in the Gray Zone?

Conduct Modern Unconventional Warfare:

Unconventional Warfare

Special Warfare

Counter-Unconventional Warfare

Political Warfare

Relationships within Modern Unconventional Warfare and the Gray Zone

1. Unconventional Warfare – the exploitation of the conditions of revolution, resistance, and insurgency (friendly or enemy)
2. Special Warfare – the province of SOF; supports UW, counter-UW and PW.
 - is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment
 - If there is an indigenous solution to a complex political-military problem short of war – consider a special warfare campaign
 - And of course there is always a requirement for surgical strike operations either as a stand alone unilateral operation or as part of a broader special warfare campaign.
3. Counter-Unconventional Warfare – a strategic approach to countering adversaries' strategies that employ UW - strategies that exploit the conditions of revolution, resistance, and insurgency
4. Political Warfare – the whole of government approach to competitive political-military-economic interactions in the international community among state and non-state actors

Unconventional Warfare

Defined as:

activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to
coerce, disrupt or overthrow a
government or occupying power

(Strategic decision – National Level/COCOM execution)

by operating through or with an
underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force
in a denied area

(CIA and Special Forces -
Sometimes shared battlespace)



~~by, with, or through...~~

Traditional strategic unconventional warfare objectives may include the following:

- **Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.**
- **Neutralizing the target authority's power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.**
- **Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority's leadership.**
- **Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.**
- **Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society.**

“coerce, disrupt through and with an indigenous force”

Fundamental SOF Activities in Army Doctrine

- Surgical Strike is the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence adversaries and threats.
- Special Warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.

Three Points to Consider

- A Principle of Special Warfare: "Go early, go small, go local, go long" LTG(R) Charles T. Cleveland remarks at NDU November 30, 2015
- Understanding indigenous forces: "Potential allies always start as at least unproven. It is hard work that starts with assessments and making the best of who you have, seeking to improve your position (and your partners') over time." LTG (R) Charles T. Cleveland, email January 18, 2016 *(Note: This can apply to resistance in nK)*
- Frank Hoffman's Principle of Understanding

UW Standing “PIR” For Resistance

- *Assessments – Special Forces Area Study/Area Assessment, PSYOP Target Audience Analysis, and Civil Affairs Civil Information Management*
- **Who is the resistance?**
 - Leaders, groups, former military, in or out of government, etc.
- **What are the objectives of the resistance?**
 - Do they align with US and friends, partners, and allies?
- **Where is it operating?**
 - From where is it getting support?
- **When did it begin?**
 - When will it/did it commence operations?
- **Why is there a resistance or the potential for resistance?**
 - What are the underlying causes/drivers?
- **How will it turn out?**
 - E.g., what is the assessment of success or failure of the resistance?
- **Most important - An expert recommendation: Should the US support or counter the resistance and if so how?**

Counter Unconventional Warfare

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND



Counter-Unconventional Warfare
White Paper

NDAA 2016 Section 1097

Counter Unconventional Warfare

<https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1735/text#toc-H57D78DE2C41D4347BF5202B774B80E94>

SEC. 1097. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE.

(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—***The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors.***

(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

- (1) An articulation of the activities that constitute unconventional warfare threats to the United States and allies.
- (2) A clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in providing indications and warning of, and protection against, acts of unconventional warfare.
- (3) An analysis of the adequacy of current authorities and command structures necessary for countering unconventional warfare.
- (4) An articulation of the goals and objectives of the Department of Defense with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.
- (5) An articulation of related or required interagency capabilities and whole-of-Government activities required by the Department of Defense to support a counter-unconventional warfare strategy.
- (6) Recommendations for improving the counter-unconventional warfare capabilities, authorities, and command structures of the Department of Defense.
- (7) Recommendations for improving interagency coordination and support mechanisms with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.
- (8) Recommendations for the establishment of joint doctrine to support counter-unconventional warfare capabilities within the Department of Defense.
- (9) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(c) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees the strategy required by subsection (a). The strategy shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DEFINED.—In this section, the term “unconventional warfare” means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.

Countering UW Described (*not defined*)

- Countering-Unconventional Warfare consists of operations and activities conducted by the U.S. Government and *supported by* SOF against an adversarial state or non-state sponsor of unconventional warfare in order to decrease the sponsor's capacity to employ unconventional warfare to achieve strategic aims. As such, Countering-UW may comprehensively employ political, economic, military, and psychological pressure in order to affect both an adversarial sponsor's will and capabilities.
- This is not merely countering insurgency but a strategy to counter state and/or non-state actors who are exploiting the conditions of revolution, resistance, and insurgency.
- In execution, Countering-UW efforts are likely to be characterized as protracted and psychological-centric in nature. Countering-UW operations and activities focus on decreasing the sponsor's efforts to support the underground, auxiliary, or guerilla force of an insurgency or resistance along with decreasing the sponsor's will to conduct UW. These efforts may be synchronized with special warfare campaigns or surgical strike operations conducted directly against the adversarial sponsor or sponsored insurgency or resistance movement where applicable.

Why Countering-UW?

- Irregular warfare threats are predominantly political – UW is fundamentally political
- Enemies conduct political mobilization
- Employ undergrounds and auxiliaries and sometimes guerrilla forces
- Subversion and sabotage are integral elements of UW
- All of this must be countered –
 - *Thesis: UW expertise provides the intellectual foundation to develop strategies and campaign plans for countering enemy UW strategies and operations*
- **Bottom line: We do not need new a new doctrinal term** – we need a new strategic focus to develop strategies to counter our enemies.
 - **Thinking in terms of COIN, CT, FID, UW, Nation Building does not make us think about strategy and most importantly about countering the enemy's strategy – Sun Tzu**

**UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**



**SOF Support to Political Warfare
White Paper**

Final

10 March 2015

Political Warfare

George F. Kennan defined political warfare as “the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace.” While stopping short of the direct kinetic confrontation between two countries’ armed forces, “political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command... to achieve its national objectives.” A country embracing Political Warfare conducts “both overt and covert” operations in the absence of declared war or overt force-on-force hostilities. Efforts “range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures..., and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.” See George Kennan, "Policy Planning Memorandum." May 4, 1948.

SOF Support to Political Warfare

USASOC White Paper

- **A whole-of-government endeavor, Political Warfare is best led by agencies beyond DoD and can only succeed if it is conducted in a way to “elevate civilian power alongside military power as equal pillars of U.S. foreign policy.”**
- **SOF is well suited to lead DOD's contribution to Political Warfare's activities, because they are relatively knowledgeable experts in this form of warfare**
- **The overall Political Warfare effort relies on persuasive and coercive diplomacy, economic coercion and engagement, Security Sector Assistance (SSA), Unconventional Warfare (UW), and Information and Influence Activities (IIA).**

Definitional Building Blocks of Political Warfare

- **Diplomacy: Persuasive and Coercive**
- **Economic Aid or Coercion**
- **Security Sector Assistance**
 - Security Sector Reform
 - Building Partner Capacity
 - Foreign Internal Defense
- **Unconventional Warfare**
 - Traditional Unconventional Warfare
 - Counter-Unconventional Warfare (C-UW)
 - UW in a Proactive Fashion (Pr-UW)
- **Information and Influence Activities**
 - Public Affairs
 - Public Diplomacy
 - Cognitive Joint Force Entry and Military Information Support Operations (MISO)
 - Human Domain: Social, Cultural Physical, Informational, Psychological


Unconventional and Political Warfare

Peace

“Gray Zone”
(Revolution, Resistance, Insurgency
& Terrorism)

War

(D I m E)



(d i M e)

Requirement: sound policy,
comprehensive strategy
and supporting campaign
plan(s)

Options to consider if

“coerce, disrupt through and with an indigenous force”

is feasible, acceptable and suitable

Political Warfare – Joe Celeski

The objective: isolate, erode, manipulate, exhaust, wear down, attrit, overthrow, reduce, replace, or create conditions to coerce a belligerent government or regime to acquiesce to our national objectives, *without going to war.*

“coerce, disrupt through and with an indigenous force”

UW and Counter-UW

- **Not Phase Zero – Stands alone as an option or supports other government operations and activities**
- **Short of war option – Political Warfare**
- **Addresses complex threats; supports friends, partners and allies**
- **Not “left of bang” – if effective campaign no need for bang (or at least not the bang of large footprint US forces)**

Bottom line

- ***Revolution, Resistance and Insurgency (RRI)*** is taking place around the world
- **What is old is new again (but really never left)**
- **RRI breeds terrorism (B. Hoffman), Unconventional Warfare (US & Hostile SOF), Political Warfare (Kennan), Unconventional Conflict (F. Hoffman)**
- **Political Warfare, Unconventional Warfare and Counter-Unconventional Warfare are strategic ways to address the RRI phenomena in the Gray Zone**

Considerations

- **UW, Counter-UW and Political Warfare as strategic options**
 - Not appropriate in every situation
- **Change the narrative from Terrorism to enemy's UW strategy**
- **Bring a UW mindset to strategic problems**
- **Capitalize on UW expertise – tactical to strategic – understanding the conditions of revolution, resistance, and insurgency and the “gray zone.”**
- **Again – provide options to policymakers and strategists**

Conclusion

"Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives." George Kennan

<http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm>

The bottom line is:

- 1. Are we going to get comfortable operating in the space between peace and war that is described by hybrid, political and unconventional warfare where revolution, resistance and insurgency occurs?**
- 2. Are we willing to do strategy in that space to achieve our policy objectives?**
- 3. Are we willing to inform the national leadership that we have the will and capability to operate in that space between peace and war and conduct our own form of modern unconventional warfare?**

I suggest a read of the USASOC SOF Support to Political Warfare White

Paper: **<http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/03/sof-support-to-political-warfare-white.html>**

Russia versus US

Unconventional Warfare

(1 of 4)

New Generation Warfare

FIRST PHASE: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup).

SECOND PHASE: special operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.

US Sponsored Insurgency

PHASE I: PREPARATION

The preparation phase for unconventional warfare begins with the approval of the President and/or Secretary of Defense to execute an unconventional warfare campaign.

Intelligence and psychological preparation continues throughout.

PHASE II: INITIAL CONTACT

Ideally, a pilot team should make initial contact with an established or potential irregular element. A pilot team is typically an ad hoc element composed of individuals possessing the specialized skills appropriate to the particular mission.

Russia versus US

Unconventional Warfare

(2 of 4)

New Generation Warfare

THIRD PHASE: intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties.

FOURTH PHASE: destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion.

US Sponsored Insurgency

PHASE III: INFILTRATION

During this phase, special operations forces infiltrate the unconventional warfare operating area. Infiltration may be as overt as using a chartered civilian flight or as discreet as a clandestine insertion.

PHASE IV: ORGANIZATION

Once U.S. advisors link up with resistance leadership, the objective is to determine and agree upon a plan to organize the resistance for expanded operations. In addition to physical preparations, this entails a confirmation of mutual objectives and prior agreements. This requires a period of rapport-building to develop trust and confidence, as well as a period of discussion of expectations from both sides.

Russia versus US

Unconventional Warfare

(3 of 4)

New Generation Warfare

FIFTH PHASE: establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

SIXTH PHASE: commencement of military action, immediately preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions. All types, forms, methods, and forces, including special operations forces, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, and secret service intelligence, and industrial espionage.

US Sponsored Insurgency

PHASE V: BUILDUP

Plans agreed to in Phase IV are implemented in Phase V. The amount of effort required to conduct organization building will be based on the insurgent/resistance organization that may already exist. Organization could be time consuming and painstaking or friendly forces could fall in on well-established and robust organizations.

PHASE VI: EMPLOYMENT

This will be a series of many events, both lethal and nonlethal, throughout Phases IV through VII. In other words, Phase V does not come to a complete stop when Phase VI begins. Nevertheless, this may represent a planned surge or maximum growth of organization effectiveness synchronized with planned future operations.

Russia versus US

Unconventional Warfare

(4 of 4)

New Generation Warfare

SEVENTH PHASE: combination of targeted information operation, electronic warfare operation, aerospace operation, continuous air force harassment, combined with the use of high precision weapons launched from various platforms (long-range artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles, including microwaves, radiation, non-lethal biological weapons).

EIGHTH PHASE: roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations conducted by reconnaissance units to spot which enemy units have survived and transmit their coordinates to the attacker's missile and artillery units; fire barrages to annihilate the defender's resisting army units by effective advanced weapons; airdrop operations to surround points of resistance; and territory mopping-up operations by ground troops.

US Sponsored Insurgency

PHASE VII: TRANSITION

When unconventional warfare ends in overthrow of a state or liberation of occupied territory and leads to a new government, Phase VII will include those activities contributing to the promotion of the new government's legitimacy. In such cases, the unconventional warfare effort transitions to foreign internal defense at some point.

Recommended Readings

- In addition to Clausewitz, The Sun Tzu, ARIS, Mao, The USMC Small Wars Manual, Sam Sarkesian, Jack McKuen, and Military and Civilian Reading Lists:

1. Ted Gurr – Why Men Rebel, 1970
2. Eric Hoffer – The True Believer, 1951 (23d ed., 2002)
3. Crane Brinton – Anatomy of a Revolution, 1965
4. Anna Simons – “21st Century Cultures of War: Advantage Them,” (FPRI, April 1013)



Psychological, cultural, and practical



1. China's Unrestricted Warfare (1999)
2. Gene Sharp – From Dictatorship to Democracy, 2002
3. Saul Alinsky – Rules for Radicals, 1971
4. Current USAJFKSWCS UW doctrine

Assessing Revolution and Insurgent Strategy Project

<http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html>

<http://zimmerer.typepad.com/resistance/assessing-revolutionary-and-insurgent-strategies-aris-project.htm>

Do you have it, have you read it?

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts

<http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/CasebookV1S.pdf>

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II 1962 - 2009.

<http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/Casebook%20Vol%202%20%2004-27-12S.pdf>

Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies, 2d Edition, 2013,

<http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf>

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare, 2d Edition,

2013, <http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/UndergroundsS.pdf>

***Any UW planner or strategist must
READ, STUDY, SYNTHESIZE, INTERNALIZE
Without this foundation you cannot be a UW practitioner***

Counter-UW Strategy

- **Expose and attack threat UW strategy**
- **Counter-organize**
- **Remote area operations**
- **Law Enforcement and Intelligence in sanctuary countries**
- **Political Warfare strategies**

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Counter-UW Strategy

- **First a deep understanding of the threat and its methods allows a strategy to be developed to counter the enemy's overall strategy and not focus solely on his use of terrorism to achieve his subversive political and psychological goals. As important as capturing and killing high value terrorist targets is, it is more important to be able to attack the enemy's strategy because doing so not only can contribute to preventing terrorist acts but also will contribute to defending vulnerable people from radicalization as well as the general public from becoming disillusioned with the government and its agencies who are working hard to defeat the threats.**

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Counter-UW Strategy

- **Second, by understanding the enemy's strategy a *counter*-unconventional warfare strategy can be devised that will allow US law enforcement and homeland security agencies with intelligence support to locate and defeat the underground elements attempting to infiltrate, radicalize, and execute operations on US soil. Without an underground, effective terrorist operations cannot be conducted. Overseas, intelligence and military forces (with law enforcement support) who possess deep knowledge and understanding of unconventional warfare can advise and assist friends, partners and allies, to disrupt and defeat underground networks and deny sanctuary, resources, mobility, and popular support for the threat organizations.**

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Political Warfare – John Collins

- **Military Strategy**
- **Political warfare practitioners manipulate international relations offensively and defensively to strengthen their stance and sap opponents. They typically may cancel state visits, restrict cultural interchanges, boycott international athletic events, abrogate treaties, recall ambassadors, close embassies to prevent misuse of diplomatic immunity, deny entry to or deport offensive officials, sever diplomatic relations and, if additional clout is required, withdraw recognition, which deprives transgressors of legal rights. Adroit moves with potent military implications enable political warriors to:**
 - **Block enemy initiatives**
 - **Foster strategic flexibility**
 - **Deceive adversaries**
 - **Defang defeated enemies**

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Counter-Revolutionary Warfare – John McKuen

- “Nevertheless, experience indicates that often the governing authorities do not recognize the danger in time and allow a revolutionary movement to spawn. By this time, mere reforms will not only be ineffective but will be thwarted by revolutionaries who only want to oust the old regime. Much more important, however, will be the fact that often the Free World cannot allow a country to pass under the control of Communist-supported (or Islamic Fundamentalist) revolutionaries. In such a situation we cannot predicate our actions on what might have been. We must accept the situation as it is, and win”
- Although he’s a supporter of the “Hearts and Minds” school, McCuen takes it a step further, and advocates that one should take the techniques of the insurgent, and use them against him. By establishing groups of “counter-insurgent insurgents,” who are free to take the fight to the enemy in their cross-border sanctuaries, McCuen argues that fighting fire is the only way to win. (of course he does not advocate violating international or US law).

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Pseudo Operations – Lawrence Cline

- Pseudo operations, in which government forces and guerrilla defectors portray themselves as insurgent units, have been a very successful technique used in several counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo teams have provided critical human intelligence and other support to these operations.
- Pseudo operation strategies used in earlier counterinsurgency campaigns can offer valuable lessons for future missions. It is likely that most guerrilla movements have become more sophisticated in their operations; as a result, pseudo teams must also develop better techniques. Still, the pseudo operations strategy should provide major benefits against insurgent groups.
 - Huk Rebellion
 - Malaya
 - Kenya and the Mau Mau
 - French in Indochina and Algeria
 - Rhodesia and the Selous Scouts

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Remote Area Operations

- Remote area operations are operations undertaken in insurgent-controlled or contested areas to establish islands of popular support for the HN government and deny support to the insurgents. They differ from consolidation operations in that they are not designed to establish permanent HN government control over the area.
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- Remote areas may be populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups. They may be in the interior of the HN or near border areas where major infiltration routes exist.
- Remote area operations normally involve the use of specially trained paramilitary or irregular forces. SF teams support remote area operations to interdict insurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas in the remote area, and demonstrate that the HN government has not conceded control to the insurgents. They also collect and report information concerning insurgent intentions in more populated areas. In this case, SF teams advise and assist irregular HN forces operating in a manner similar to the insurgents themselves, but with access to superior combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) resources.
- (From FM 3-05.202 Foreign Internal Defense 2007.) (*NOTE: No longer in current FID Doctrine*)
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