


# Friends Without Benefits: Explaining Costly Contributions to Unnecessary Wartime Coalitions

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# Motivation





year	country	percent
2001	Denmark	0.66
2001	New Zealand	0.65
2001	United States	0.53
2001	Romania	0.53
2001	Netherlands	0.44
2001	Germany	0.44
2001	Norway	0.34
2001	Australia	0.29
2001	Turkey	0.27
2001	Spain	0.20

# Puzzle

Why do some countries punch above their weight in contributing to coalition conflicts?

year	country	percent
2001	Denmark	0.66
2001	New Zealand	0.65
2001	United States	0.53
2001	Romania	0.53
2001	Netherlands	0.44
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# Point



# Point

Outsized contributions signal a desire for a stronger relationship

- Costly transmission of information
- Anticipate future payoffs because of reputation and reciprocity

# Goal is to convince you that...

Current explanations for alliance contributions incorrectly focus on:

- *Current* alliance tie, not *desired*
- *Value* of contribution, not *cost*

Examining cost of contributions to Afghan war (ISAF) and desired ties by contributing states better explains over-contributions to war effort

# Problems with conventional explanations

Largest share of forces are contributed by:

1. Collective action (Olsen and Zeckhauser 1966) - powerful states
2. Balance of threat (Walt 1987) - most threatened states
3. Alliance politics (Snyder 1984) - closest friends
4. Domestic politics (Ashraf 2011) - consistency with political ideology

# Problems with conventional explanations

Largest share of forces are contributed by:

1. **Collective action** (Olsen and Zeckhauser 1966) - powerful states
  - Expected free riders don't
2. **Balance of threat** (Walt 1987) - most threatened states
  - Non-threatened states do
3. **Alliance politics** (Snyder 1984) - closest friends
  - Closest friends don't over-exert
4. **Domestic politics** (Ashraf 2011) - consistency with political ideology
  - Extent of contribution unexplained



## New theory needs to look at:

What states carry the highest burden in US-led operations

What states most desire improved ties with the US

## Troop Contributions to War in Afghanistan (2001)

Total Troops Contributed



Percent Troops Contributed



Darker countries indicate higher values.

Both maps scaled relative to average contribution level to make values comparable.

# Theory

States wanting a closer relationship with the United States will make higher cost contributions to US-led war efforts

- **DV: Higher cost contribution** - larger strain on armed forces
- **EV: Desire for closer relationship** - “acquaintances” wanting to become “best friends”

# Theory

States wanting a closer relationship with the United States will make higher cost contributions to US-led war efforts because:

They are a costly signal of desiring a stronger relationship:

- Benefit to US without immediate benefit to over-contributor
- Cost to over-contributor (resource strain, risk of casualties/collateral damage)

Which creates:

- Reputation of reliability
- Expectation of reciprocity

# Empirical Data


## Unit of Analysis

Country-year (2001-2005)

Troop contributions

- Binary
- Ratio of available forces

## Troop Contributions to ISAF (2001-2005)



# Empirical Data

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percent of Forces</u>
Denmark	0.66
New Zealand	0.65
United States	0.53
Romania	0.53
Netherlands	0.44
Germany	0.44
Norway	0.34
Australia	0.29
Turkey	0.27
Spain	0.2

Top 10  
Contributors

Bottom 10  
Contributors

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percent of Forces</u>
Finland	0.14
Austria	0.13
Sweden	0.12
Albania	0.11
Greece	0.07
Poland	0.05
Belgium	0.05
Bulgaria	0.04
Portugal	0.02
Czech Republic	0.01


# Empirical Model

- Relationship is non-linear, two separate models capture decision-making process.

1. Who contributes any troops?


2. Among contributors, how many troops does each country provide?

Average Troop Contributions by Structural Equivalence with the U.S.







Logistic Regression Estimates of Decision to Commit Troops



Probability of Committing Troops by Ideological Distance from the U.S.



Linear Regression Estimates of Amount of Troops Committed



## Recognized by over-contributor

“...good opportunity for the New Zealand Defence Force to test its interoperability with contributing NATO nations. This deployment is an example of New Zealand's *commitment to playing our part in supporting NATO* in areas of common interest.”

- Jonathan Coleman, New Zealand Defence Minister (2014)

## Recognized by the US

“In the Libya operation, Norway and Denmark, have provided 12 percent of allied strike aircraft yet have struck about one third of the targets...These countries have, *with their constrained resources*, found ways to do the training, buy the equipment, and field the platforms necessary to make a *credible military contribution*.” - US Defence Secretary Robert Gates (2011)

## Conclusion and Next Steps

- Polynomial model to more explicitly capture curvilinear relationship
- Interacting ideal point similarity with measures of alliance network -- create a single measure of 'relationship status'
  - What should relationship be (ideal point) divided by what it is (network). Or something similar -  
- should standardize.
- Is structural equivalence the right measure? Netherlands and Luxembourg have the same score as the UK.