



Coordination in Conflict Theaters: Explaining Contributions to Coalition Warfare

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Abstract

Why do countries contribute forces to war-time conflicts in which they have seemingly little strategic interest? We construct a novel data set of country-level force structures and each country's specific commitments to the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. After employing measures of foreign policy preferences from UN voting data, we find that closer foreign policy preferences with the US are associated with greater troop contributions. However, countries without a military pact with the US or UK are less sensitive to these preferential differences. These analyses suggest that countries will contribute surprisingly to conflicts if signaling reliability can produce material benefits through subsequent cooperation.

Motivation

ISAF Troops


Current as of April 13, 2009

USA 26,215	Czech Rep. 580	Finland* 110
U.K. 8,300	Norway 490	Azerbaijan* 90
Germany 3,465	Belgium 450	Slovenia 70
Canada 2,830	Hungary 370	Portugal 30
France 2,780	Sweden* 290	UAE* 25
Italy 2,350	Croatia 280	Singapore* 20
Netherlands 1,770	Slovakia 230	Ukraine* 10
Poland 1,590	Lithuania 200	Luxemburg 9
Australia* 1,090	Rep. of Macedonia* 170	Iceland* 8
Romania 860	Latvia 160	Ireland* 7
Bulgaria 820	New Zealand* 150	Jordan* 7
Spain 780	Albania 140	Bosnia and Herzegovina* 2
Denmark 700	Estonia 140	Austria* 2
Turkey 660	Greece 140	Georgia* 1

* Non-NATO contributor (Source: NATO (ISAF): Facts and Figures)8

Theory


States want to signal good favor to central coalition states when they have similar foreign policy preferences but lack formal military ties. That signal manifests itself in relatively costly troop contributions to those conflicts, even when the outcome is irrelevant to the state.




Conflict Theater Network

Variation in Dependent Variable

- Denmark and New Zealand contributed the highest percent of their military to ISAF, over 0.6%
- Greece, Poland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, and the Czech Republic contributed less than 0.1%



World Military Alliances (2001)



Alliance Network

- The network of bilateral defense pacts. Highlighted countries contributed forces to the war in Afghanistan
- Of the countries contributing, those peripheral to the central actors over-contribute relative to their size

Research Design

Unit of analysis: State (2001)



DV: Percent of national military personnel fighting in Afghanistan War

EV: Preference Alignment with US/UK + Military pact with US/UK

Controls: Military Pact, Ideal Point Distance from US, Eigenvector Centrality in Preference Network, CINC score, Distance from Afghanistan

Model: $\text{pact} + \text{ideal point} + \text{pact} * \text{ideal point} + \text{eigen} + \text{cinc} + \log(\text{distance})$

Model and Results



Conclusion

Takeaway

- Small states fight for future military cooperation

Contribution

- New data on relative contributions helps explain free-riding exceptions

Next steps

- Examine variation in allocation of military equipment, type of personnel, and geography
- Investigate whether this signal pays off

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