

# Borda Election rules

The Borda algorithm is a simple election scheme where voters rank candidates in order of preference by giving 3 points to their first choice, 2 for their 2nd choice and 1 point for the 3rd choice.

Once all votes have been counted the candidate which has the highest number of points declared as the winner.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda\\_count](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count)

A simple loop free Solidity code and correctness rules are located in the git repository (The correctness rules are written in the Certora Specify language which is a bit low level at the moment)

<https://github.com/Certora/CertoraProverSupplementary/tree/master/Examples/Elections/Borda>

## Definitions:

We use the following attributes in the verification process:

`voted(address x) : bool`

The address x has already voted

`points(address c) : uint`

Returns the current number of points candidate c has.

`winner() : address`

Returns the winner of the election

We use the following state changing operation:

`vote(address x, address first, address second, address third) : bool`

Returns true when x has not voted before and successfully updates points and voted as required for first, second and third choices.

## Specification

We use [Hyper Linear Temporal logic](#) for specifying desired properties. This is a generalization of [linear temporal logic](#)

# Correctness Rules

## Basic rules

### Emptiness:

No user has voted if and only if all candidates have zero votes

**Globally**  $(\forall \text{address } c \text{ points}(c)=0) \Leftrightarrow (\forall \text{address } x \neg \text{voted}(x))$

other:

**Globally**  $(\exists \text{address } c \text{ points}(c) > 0) \Leftrightarrow (\exists \text{address } x \text{ voted}(x))$

Notice that this Globally is the usual case of global invariant. It signals that every step of the program preserves the above invariant.

### Persistency voting:

Once a user issues a vote operation, this use is marked as voted globally (for all next states)

**Globally**  $(\text{vote}(x,f,s,t) \Rightarrow \text{Next Globally } \text{voted}(x))$

Here we use the next operator which denotes the next execution of any API command. It is a special case of [linear temporal logic](#).

### Single vote per user

A user cannot vote if the user has voted before

**Globally**  $(\text{voted}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Globally } \neg \text{vote}(x,f,s,t))$

Other:

**Globally**  $(\text{vote}(x,f,s,t) \Rightarrow \text{Next Globally } \neg \text{vote}(x,f,s,t))$

### Integrity of points:

The Points data structure is updated as required, this rule also verifies that there are three distinct candidates

$\{ f\_points = \text{points}(f) \wedge s\_points = \text{points}(s) \wedge t\_points = \text{points}(t) \}$   
 $\text{vote}(x,f,s,t)$

$\{ \text{points}(f) = f\_points+3 \wedge \text{points}(s) = s\_points+2 \wedge t\_points = \text{points}(t)+1 \}$

Here we use [Hoare triples](#) of the form  $\{p\} C \{q\}$ , which means that if program C executes starting in any state satisfying p, then it will end in a state satisfying q.

### No effect on other candidates:

$\{c \neq \{f,s,t\} \wedge c\_points = \text{points}(c)\} \text{ vote}(x,f,s,t) \{ \text{points}(c) = c\_points \}$

### No effect on unsuccessful vote operation

$\{c\_points = \text{points}(c) \wedge b = \text{voted}(y)\}$

$\neg \text{vote}(x, f, s, t)$   
 $\{\text{points}(c) = c\_points \wedge \text{voted}(y) = b\}$   
 Here  $\neg \text{vote}(x, f, s, t)$  is a shorthand for  $\text{false} = \text{vote}(x, f, s, t)$

### Commutativity of voting

Order of votes does not change points and voted:  
 $\text{vote}(x, f, s, t) ; \text{vote}(x', f', s', t') \sim \{\text{voted}, \text{points}\} \text{vote}(x', f', s', t') ;$   
 $\text{vote}(x, f, s, t)$

Here we cannot require that the winner is the same in case of a tie. Different orders may result in a different winners in case of tie but the integrity winner rule should hold

This is specified in terms of code equivalence denoted by  $P1 \sim \{\text{voted}, \text{points}\} P2$  which means that P1 and P2 are equivalent in terms of voted and points.

### Integrity of winner

The winner has the most points

**Globally**  $\forall \text{address } c. \text{points}(c) \leq \text{points}(\text{winner}())$

(To make Borda count a completely defined function we may want to define lexicographic tie breaking -- I am not sure how that works with "address"s.)

## Wikipedia rules:

### Participation criterion

Abstaining from an election can not help a voter's preferred choice  
 (Voting does not hurt a voter's preferred choice)

$\{f = \text{winner}()\} \text{vote}(x, f, s, t) \{f = \text{winner}()\}$

### Resolvability criterion

For every possibly tied winner in a result, there must exist a way for **one** added vote to make that winner unique

In Dynamic Logic:

$c \neq \text{winner}() \wedge \text{points}(c) = \text{points}(\text{winner}()) \Rightarrow$   
 $\langle \text{vote}(x, f, s, t) \rangle$   
 $\forall \text{address } c. \text{points}(c) < \text{points}(\text{winner}())$

### Later-no-harm criterion (expected violation)

a voter giving an additional ranking or positive rating to a less-preferred candidate can not cause a more-preferred candidate to lose

$\text{exec}(s, \text{vote}(x, f, s, t)) = s1$   
 And  $\text{exec}(s, \text{vote}(x, f, s', t')) = s2 \Rightarrow$   
 $(s1.\text{winner}() = f \Rightarrow s2.\text{winner}() = f)$

## HyperLTL specification

### [Participation criterion](#)

the addition of a ballot, where candidate A is strictly preferred to candidate B, to an existing tally of votes should not change the winner from candidate A to candidate B

$$\forall \pi, \pi' . \forall f, s, t . \text{prefer\_A\_to\_B}(f, s, t) \wedge \text{add\_ballot}(\pi, \pi', f, s, t) \rightarrow \text{no\_change\_of\_winner\_A\_to\_B}(\pi, \pi')$$

Abbreviations:

#### **add\_ballot( $\pi, \pi', f, s, t$ )**

The elections  $\pi, \pi'$  are the same except that ballot (f,s,t) has been added to  $\pi'$ .

$$(\forall f', s', t' . \text{vote}_{\pi}(f', s', t') \leftrightarrow \text{vote}_{\pi'}(f', s', t'))$$

$$\mathbf{Awaits} (\text{vote}_{\pi}(f, s, t) \wedge \mathbf{Globally} (\forall f', s', t' . \text{vote}_{\pi}(f', s', t') \leftrightarrow \mathbf{Next} \text{vote}_{\pi'}(f', s', t')))$$

#### **prefer\_A\_to\_B(f,s,t):**

The ballot (f,s,t) strictly prefers A over B

$$f=A \vee (f \neq B \wedge s=A) \vee (f \neq B \wedge s \neq B \wedge t=A)$$

#### **no\_change\_of\_winner\_A\_to\_B( $\pi, \pi'$ ):**

The winner does not change from A to B

$$\mathbf{Globally} (\exists f', s', t' . \neg(\text{vote}_{\pi}(f', s', t') \leftrightarrow \text{vote}_{\pi'}(f', s', t'))$$

$$\rightarrow \mathbf{Globally} (\text{winner}_{\pi} = A \rightarrow \mathbf{Next} \text{winner}_{\pi'} \neq B)$$