



# Security Assessment Report



## Aave v3.4 AIP

June-2025

*Prepared for:*

**Aave DAO**

*Code developed by:*



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# Project Summary

## Project Scope

Project Name	Repository (link)	Latest Commit Hash	Platform
Aave v3.4 AIP	<a href="#">Github Repository</a>	<a href="#">e958112</a>	EVM

## Project Overview

This document describes the verification of **Aave v3.4 AIP** code using manual code review. The work was undertaken from **May 8 to June 11, 2025**.

The following contracts are considered in scope for this review:

- src/ATokenMainnetInstanceGH0.sol
- src/CustomInitialize.sol
- src/L2PoolInstanceWithCustomInitialize.sol
- src/PoolConfiguratorWithCustomInitialize.sol
- src/PoolInstanceWithCustomInitialize.sol
- src/UpgradePayload.sol
- src/UpgradePayloadMainnet.sol
- src/VariableDebtTokenMainnetInstanceGH0.sol

The team performed a manual audit of all the solidity contracts. During the audit, Certora didn't find any significant issues in the code.

## Protocol Overview

The **Aave v3.4 AIP** is the upgrade payload dedicated to the transition of Aave v3.3 to v3.4. It consists of AToken and VToken contracts designed specifically for the GH0 token which requires special handling, the Pool instances and the Payload contract for Mainnet as well as the Payload contract for other networks. The upgrade changes the behavior of all the reserves and pools across all chains and the steps are performed in a specific order to maintain pre-existing states.

## Findings Summary

The table below summarizes the findings of the review, including type and severity details.

Severity	Discovered	Confirmed	Fixed
Critical	-	-	-
High	-	-	-
Medium	-	-	-
Low	-	-	-
Informational	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	-	-	-

## Severity Matrix

Impact	High	Medium	High	Critical
	Medium	Low	Medium	High
	Low	Low	Low	Medium
		Low	Medium	High
		Likelihood		

# Detailed Findings

## Audit Goals

1. The **aGHO** implementation should delete deprecated variables slots to align with the common **aToken** implementation.
2. The **vGHO** implementation should delete deprecated variables slots to align with the common **vToken** implementation.
3. The upgrade of **aGHO** should first distribute fees to the treasury.
4. The new **GHODirectMinter** should have the same bucket capacity as **aGHO** currently has.
5. The total amount of **GHO** minted should remain the same after the upgrade.
6. **aGHO** contract should be removed from facilitators with no residual privileges.
7. **aGHO** and **aAave** tokens must be upgraded differently than other **ATokens**.
8. All existing reserves should be upgraded with the new **AToken** and **VToken** versions
9. **GHO** reserve's **supply cap** and **reserve factor** should be updated accordingly in the pool to align with the new design.
10. Deprecated reserve fields stored in the pool should be correctly shifted to prevent any clash.
11. Any **GHO** allowance given by the DAO to Umbrella should be converted from **GHO** allowance to **aGHO** allowance, to support virtual accounts of **GHO**.

## Coverage and Conclusions

1. Inheritance chain is respected and **GhoAToken** slots are aligned with v3.4 **AToken**. The only difference was **GhoAToken** had 2 additional variables declared **\_ghoVariableDebtToken** and

`_ghoTreasury` which are correctly deleted during `ATokenMainnetInstanceGHO::initialize()` as per the storage layout. These variables are marked as deprecated to prevent unexpected use.

2. The special `vGHO` implementation correctly deletes storage slots dedicated to the deprecated discount model with the exception of the `_ghoUserState` mapping which can't be realistically cleared.

*The BGD team is aware of this behavior and will take it into account in future `vGHO` upgrades.*

3. The payload responsible for the upgrade on Mainnet starts by distributing fees before updating the `aGHO` implementation. This effectively transfers the entire contract balance of GHO to the treasury resulting in a 0 token balance.

4. The payload correctly retrieves the `aGHO` current bucket capacity and assigns it to the new facilitator, namely `GHODirectMinter` contract.

5. The amount of `GHO` minted by the new facilitator is used to burn an equivalent amount from the old facilitator, keeping the correct amount of minted `GHO` when the upgrade is done. Additionally, all `GHO` is accounted for – whatever needs to be swept into the treasury is, and all previously unaccounted profits are accounted for. Additionally any deficit is closed as a preprocessing step to the upgrade.

6. After reducing `aGHO` bucket level to 0, the contract address is removed from the `GHO` facilitators by the payload contract.

7. There is a special logic on Mainnet's payload that prevents `Aave` and `GHO` reserves from being upgraded like the other reserves.

8. The payload loops through the entire reserves list retrieved from the pool and updates the corresponding `AToken` and `VToken` contracts.

9. `GHO` supply cap is set to 1, effectively preventing the reserve from being supplied in the protocol. Its reserve factor is set to 100%, effectively redirecting all interest generated from debt to the treasury.

10. The payload correctly:

- upgrades the Pool implementation to v3.4
- takes, for each reserve, the `__deprecatedVirtualUnderlyingBalance` field (located at the last field of the v3.4 struct) and copies the value to `virtualUnderlyingBalance` field (now located at the 3rd last field of the v3.4 struct).
- sets the `__deprecatedVirtualUnderlyingBalance` field to 0 (since it won't be used anymore).

11. All DAO `GH0` allowance is converted to `aGH0` allowance in step 1 of the `execute` function.

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