



CERTORA

Formal Verification Report of GHO Gsm

Summary

This document describes the specification and verification of GHO Stability Module using the Certora Prover. The work was undertaken from August 9, 2023 to December 7, 2023. The latest commit that was reviewed and run through the Certora Prover is [f368bef](#)

The scope of our verification includes the following contracts:

- [Gsm.sol](#)
- [Gsm4626.sol](#)
- [FixedPriceStrategy.sol](#)
- [FixedPriceStrategy4626.sol](#)
- [FixedFeeStrategy.sol](#)
- [OracleSwapFreezer.sol](#)

The Certora Prover proved the implementation correct with respect to the formal rules written by the Certora team. During verification, the Certora Prover discovered bugs in the code which are listed in the tables below. All issues were promptly addressed. The fixes were verified to satisfy the specifications up to the limitations of the Certora Prover.

List of Main Issues Discovered

Issue:	<code>getAssetAmountForSellAsset</code> is slightly unfair to user
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	<code>getAssetAmountForSellAsset_optimality</code>

Issue:	getAssetAmountForSellAsset is slightly unfair to user
Description:	When user wants to swap assets for <code>x</code> GHO, <code>getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x)</code> should report, among other values, the amount of assets to sell. In some cases the system recommends selling more asset (and receive more GHO) than necessary, i.e., the system encourages users to spend more assets than needed. The recommended amount might also result in higher percentual fees than the real minimum. The error can be in the range of <code>10⁻¹⁷</code> GHO.
Example:	<code>priceRatio = 1</code> , <code>sellFee = 49%</code> . <code>getAssetAmountForSellAsset(36) = (x=71, 71, 35)</code> . When calling <code>sellAsset(x, _, _)</code> they receive <code>36*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO for any <code>70 <= x <= 71</code> .
Mitigation/Fix:	Fixed in PR#168

Issue:	Inconsistency in the amount of GHO user asks to sell and how much GHO is actually deducted from their account.
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	R4_sellGhoUpdatesAssetBuyerGhoBalanceGe
Description:	When swapping GHO for underlying asset, gsm requires user to specify an amount of underlying asset <code>asset_amount</code> they would like to get in <code>buyAsset(asset_amount)</code> . The function computes the amount of GHO needed to be sold in order to acquire the desired amount of asset. The API does not provide a function for buying underlying asset that takes the amount of GHO to be sold. For the case where a user wants to sell a specific amount of GHO, <code>gho_amount</code> , the contract provides a view function, <code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(gho_amount)</code> , which supposedly returns the amount of assets that needs to be passed to <code>buyAsset()</code> in order to sell exactly <code>gho_amount</code> . Since the precision (number of decimals) of the asset is fixed, it is possible that there is no amount of GHO that would correspond to a given <code>asset_amount</code> . In these cases gsm behaves inconsistently: for some values, gsm charges more than user specifies and for some others, less.
Example:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Let <code>gho_amount = 6</code> , price ratio <code>PR = 4</code> , underlying asset units <code>UAU = 1</code> , buy fee in BP <code>buyFeeBP = 0</code> . The change

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	<p>in GHO balance after <code>buyAsset</code> is 8, which is greater than <code>gho_amount</code> .</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Let GHO amount <code>gho_amount = 3*10³⁶+5</code> , price ratio <code>PR = 1*10³⁶+2</code> , underlying asset units <code>UAU = 1</code> , buy fee in BP <code>buyFeeBP = 0</code> . The change in GHO balance after <code>buyAsset</code> is <code>2*10³⁶+4</code> , which is less than <code>gho_amount</code>
Mitigation/Fix:	Fixed in PR#168

Issue:	<code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset</code> exceeds user-given bound
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	R1_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV2
Description:	<p>The user may ask the amount of assets <code>a</code> to provide for <code>buyAsset(a)</code> by calling <code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(max)</code> , where <code>max</code> is the maximum amount of GHO user is willing to pay. One of the return values of <code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset</code> is the exact amount of GHO that will be deducted. This value can be higher than <code>max</code> by at most <code>2*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO.</p>
Example:	<p><code>priceRatio = 1</code> , <code>buyFee = 25.01%</code> , <code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(4) = (2,6,4,2)</code> , i.e., user wants to spend at most <code>4*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO , gsm tells him they should buy 2 assets and they will pay <code>4*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO + <code>2*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO fee.</p>
Mitigation/Fix:	Fix rounding directions in fee strategy. Fixed in PR#196 and #198 (for 4626)

Issue:	Collected buy fees are rounded down and can be 0 in extreme cases
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	<code>collectedBuyFeelsAtLeastAsRequired</code>
Description:	<p>In extreme cases, for sufficiently small amounts of bought asset, the fee collected by the contract can be zero even if the fee expressed in basic points is non-zero.</p>

Issue:	Collected buy fees are rounded down and can be 0 in extreme cases
Example:	<code>buyFee = 0.02%</code> , <code>underlyingAssetDecimals = 10¹³</code> , <code>price_ratio = 14,995,000,000,000,001</code> . <code>BuyAsset(minAmount=3) →</code> <code>_calculateGhoAmountForBuyAsset(3) → (2, 3001, 3001, 0)</code> .
Mitigation/Fix:	PR#196

Issue:	<code>getGrossAmountFromTotalSold</code> does not revert when <code>_sellFee = 100%</code> .
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	<code>getGrossAmountFromTotalSold_isMonotoneInTotalAmount</code>
Description:	For <code>x != 0</code> , there's no correct return value of <code>getGrossAmountFromTotalSold(x)</code> with <code>_sellFee = 100%</code> . Returning <code>0</code> is arbitrary and may lead to unexpected behaviour on the side of the caller.
Example:	For <code>_sellFee = 100%</code> , <code>getGrossAmountFromTotalSold(10) = 0</code> . It is never possible to receive <code>10*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO for selling any amount of assets. With <code>_sellFee = 100%</code> , <code>sellAsset(x)</code> always provides <code>0</code> GHO.
Mitigation/Fix:	Prevent 100% sell fee. Fixed in PR#107

Issue:	<code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset</code> provides incorrect information
Violated property:	<code>R2_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV_vs_GhoBalance</code>
Severity:	Informational
Description:	<p><i>Note: this issue is similar to the one called</i> <code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset</code> <i>exceeds user-given bound, but on an earlier version of gsm.</i> The method <code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset</code> informs the user how much asset they should buy in order to spend a specified amount of GHO. It can mislead the user by telling them they will be charged <code>x</code> GHO while actually charging them <code>(x+1)</code>. I.e., it can be off by at most 1 in favor of the protocol.</p>

Issue:	getAssetAmountForBuyAsset provides incorrect information
Example:	<code>priceRatio = 1</code> , <code>buyFee = 50%</code> , <code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(4) = (3, 3, 1)</code> , i.e., user wants to spend <code>4*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO, gsm tells they should buy 3 assets and they will pay <code>3*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO + <code>1*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO fee. When calling <code>buyAsset(3, _, _)</code> the user is charged <code>5*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO instead of <code>4*10⁻¹⁸</code> .
Mitigation/Fix:	PR#168

Issue:	Inconsistency between the reported and accrued fees when swapping
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	R2_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetNeBuyAssetFee, R4_estimatedBuyFeeGeActualBuyFee, R3_estimatedSellFeeCanBeHigherThanActualSellFee
Description:	When a swap takes place in gsm, the contract may collect a fee. The fee is represented in basic points. When a concrete transaction takes place the fee in basic points is used to obtain a concrete fee in GHO. The API exposes the fee in three different ways. (1) Directly based on BP through <code>getBuyFee(x)</code> and <code>getSellFee(x)</code> , (2) As the fee reported by <code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x)</code> and <code>getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x)</code> , (3) As the fee accrued through <code>buyAsset(a)</code> and <code>sellAsset(a)</code> . The fee reported by <code>getBuyFee(x)</code> and <code>getSellFee(x)</code> can be less than, greater than, or equal to the fee accrued by <code>buyAsset(a)</code> and <code>sellAsset(a)</code> . In addition, the fee reported by <code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x)</code> can be less than, greater than, or equal to the fee accrued by <code>buyAsset</code> .
Mitigation/Fix:	ections. Fixed in PR#168

Issue:	User may pay slightly more GHO than the maximum they requested
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	R2_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV_vs_GhoBalance
Description:	The user may ask the amount of assets <code>a</code> to provide for <code>buyAsset(a)</code> by calling <code>getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(max)</code> ,

Issue:	User may pay slightly more GHO than the maximum they requested
	where <code>max</code> is the maximum amount of GHO user is willing to pay. When the return value is provided to <code>buyAsset</code> , it is possible that the user is charged slightly more than <code>max</code> GHO.
Mitigation/Fix:	Fix rounding directions in fee strategy. Fixed in PR#196

Issue:	Bad rounding may steal small amounts of asset from the contract
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	totalAssetsNotIncrease
Description:	User can sell GHO and get more underlying asset than they should due to a rounding error. As a result, a user can obtain assets from the system or get preferential treatment in comparison to other users. The value of stolen asset is at most 9×10^{-19} GHO
Example:	<p>Consider the following problem with the <code>buyAsset()</code> function. Let <code>UNDERLYING_ASSET_DECIMALS=19</code> (i.e., <code>_underlyingAssetUnits = 10^{19}</code>) and <code>PRICE_RATIO=10¹⁸</code>. We assume zero fees. Then</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <code>getAssetPriceInGho(amount=11)</code> returns <code>1</code> meaning that a user needs 1×10^{-18} GHO to buy <code>11</code> underlying assets (since <code>floor(11 * 10¹⁸ / 10¹⁹) = 1</code>). However, the user can buy up to <code>19</code> underlying assets for 1×10^{-18} GHO. Consider <code>Alice</code> and <code>Bob</code>, both selling <code>10</code> underlying assets and obtaining 1×10^{-18} GHO. After these transactions there are exactly <code>20</code> underlying assets in the system. <code>Alice</code> buys <code>19</code> assets for 1×10^{-18} GHO. Then <code>Bob</code> cannot buy back <code>10</code> underlying assets for 1×10^{-18} GHO since only <code>1</code> underlying asset remain in system.
Mitigation/Fix:	Fixed in PR#168

Issue:	Overbacking when selling asset.
Severity:	Informational

Issue:	Overbacking when selling asset.
Violated property:	systemBalanceStabilitySell
Description:	When asset is sold for GHO, the value of the minted GHO is not exactly equal to the value of the asset. The GHO minted may be smaller than the asset value, which will result in overbacking.
Example:	<p>Consider the following settings: <code>PRICE_RATIO=10¹⁸</code>, <code>_underlyingAssetUnits = 10¹⁵</code>, <code>PercentageMath.PERCENTAGE_FACTOR=10000</code> and <code>_sellFee=9984</code>. If we call <code>sellAsset(maxAmount=1)</code>, from which <code>Gsm._calculateGhoAmountForSellAsset(assetAmount=1)</code> is called. Inside the function following computation happens:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <code>PriceStrategy.getAssetPriceInGho(assetAmount=1)</code> returns <code>10¹⁸/10¹⁵ = 1000</code> (which is correct). 2. <code>FeeStrategy.getSellFee(grossAmount=1000)</code> returns <code>1000*9984/10000 = 998.4 ≈ 999</code>, 3. <code>FeeStrategy.getGrossAmountFromTotalSold(totalAmount=(1000-999))</code> returns <code>1*10000/(10000-9984) = 625</code> 4. <code>PriceStrategy.getGhoPriceInAsset(ghoAmount=625, roundUp: true)</code> returns <code>625*10¹⁵/10¹⁸ ≈ 1</code>. <p>Finally <code>_calculateGhoAmountForSellAsset(assetAmount=1)</code> returns <code>(1, 1, 625, 624)</code>. So <code>625*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO is minted and user receives <code>1*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO selling 1 asset which is actually worth <code>1000*10⁻¹⁸</code> GHO.</p>
Mitigation/Fix:	PR#196.

Disclaimer

The Certora Prover takes as input a contract and a specification and formally proves that the contract satisfies the specification in all scenarios. Importantly, the guarantees of the Certora Prover are scoped to the provided specification, and the Certora Prover does not check any cases not covered by the specification.

We hope that this information is useful, but provide no warranty of any kind, explicit or implied. The contents of this report should not be construed as a complete guarantee that the contract is secure in all dimensions. In no event shall Certora or any of its employees be liable for any claim, damages or other liability, whether in an action of contract, tort or otherwise, arising from, out of or in connection with the results reported here.

Assumptions and Simplifications Made During Verification

We made the following assumptions during our verification:

- The buy and sell fees have been assumed to be between 0 and 50%
- Unless specified otherwise, the decimals of gsm's underlying asset have been assumed to range from 5 to 27
- We assume that `PRICE_RATIO` between GHO and underlying is in the inclusive range `10^16, 10^20`
- While proving the properties, we assume that
 - `Gsm` 's GHO token is implemented by `GhoToken.sol`
 - `Gsm` 's fee strategy is implemented by `FixedFeeStrategy.sol`
 - `Gsm` 's price strategy is implemented by `FixedPriceStrategy.sol`
- The implementation of openzeppelin's `node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol` was assumed to be correct
- We assume that `buyAsset` and `sellAsset` are not called with `Gsm` or its inheriting contracts as `msg.sender`
- We unroll loops. Violations that require executing a loop more than once will not be detected.
- We do not verify the cryptographic correctness of functions that involve calls to the `keccak256()` function.
- We do not verify function calls at `block.timestamp == 0`

Notations

✓ indicates the rule is formally verified on the latest reviewed commit.

✗ indicates that the rule was violated under one of the tested versions of the code.

Properties of Aave Gsm

Optimality of buy

1. ✗ `getGhoAmountForBuyAsset_optimality`
`getGhoAmountForBuyAsset(minAsset)` returns `finalAssetAmount` value that is as close as possible to user specified amount.
 - ✓ Verified after PR#198
2. ✓ `getAssetAmountForBuyAsset_optimality`
`getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(maxGhoAmount)` returns `assetAmount` value that is

as close as possible to user specified amount.

Optimality of sell

3. ✓ `getGhoAmountForSellAsset_optimality`

`getGhoAmountForSellAsset(maxAssetAmount)` returns `finalAssetAmount` value that is as close as possible to user specified amount.


4. ✗ `getAssetAmountForSellAsset_optimality`

`getAssetAmountForSellAsset(minGhoAmount)` returns `assetAmount` value that is as close as possible to user specified amount.

- ✓ Verified after PR#168

Balances when buying

Fig. 1: Balances when buying



5. ✗ `R1_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV2` The exact amount of GHO `y` returned by `getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x)` is less than or equal to `x` (Fig. 1)

- ✓ Verified after PR#196

6. ✗ `R2_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV_vs_GhoBalance` The exact amount of GHO `y` returned by `getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x)` matches the GHO amount `Dg` taken from user at `buyAsset(a)` (Fig. 1)

- ✓ Verified after PR#196

7. ✓ `R3_buyAssetUpdatesAssetBuyerAssetBalanceLe` The increase in asset amount on user's account after `buyAsset(a)`, `Da`, is greater than or equal to `a` (Fig. 1)

8. ✗ `R4_sellGhoUpdatesAssetBuyerGhoBalanceGe` The amount of GHO `Dg` taken from user's account at `buyAsset(a)` is less than or equal to the value `x` passed to `getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x)` (Fig. 1)

- ✓ Verified after PR#168

9. ✓ `getGhoAmountForBuyAsset_correctness` `getGhoAmountForBuyAsset` never drops below the given bound

```
(finalAssets, _, _, _) = getGhoAmountForBuyAsset(minAssetAmount) ->  
minAssetAmount <= finalAssets
```

Balances when selling

Fig. 2: Balances when selling



10. ✓ **R1_getAssetAmountForSellAsset_arg_vs_return** The exact amount `xe` of GHO returned by `getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x)` is greater than or equal to `x` (Fig. 2)
11. ✓ **R2_getAssetAmountForSellAsset_sellAsset_eq** The exact amount of GHO `xe` returned by `getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x)` is equal to the amount `Dg` obtained by the receiver after `sellAsset(a)` (Fig. 2)
12. ✓ **R3_sellAssetUpdatesAssetBalanceCorrectly** The asset amount `Da` taken from the user's account at `sellAsset(a)` is less than or equal to `a` (Fig. 2)
13. ✓ **R4_buyGhoUpdatesGhoBalanceCorrectly** The GHO amount `Dg` added to the user's account at `sellAsset(a)` is greater than or equal to the value `x` passed to `getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x)` (Fig. 2)
14. ✓ **getGhoAmountForSellAsset_correctness** `getGhoAmountForSellAsset` never exceeds the given bound

```

(finalAssets, _, _, _) = getGhoAmountForSellAsset(maxAssetAmount) ->
finalAssets <= maxAssetAmount
  
```


Fees when buying

Fig 3: Fees when buying



15. ✓ **R1_getBuyFeeGeGetAssetAmountForBuyAsset** The fee f_1 reported by `getBuyFee(x)` is greater than or equal to the fee f_2 reported by `getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x+f1)` (see Fig. 3)
16. ✗ **R2_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetNeBuyAssetFee** The fee f_2 reported by `getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x+f1)` is equal to the fee f_3 accrued by `buyAsset(a)` (see Fig. 3)
 - ✓ Verified after PR#168
17. ✗ **R4_estimatedBuyFeeGeActualBuyFee** The fee f_1 reported by `getBuyFee(x)` is greater than or equal to the fee f_3 accrued by `buyAsset(a)` (see Fig. 3)
 - ✓ Verified after #PR168

Fig. 4: Fees when buying 2



18. ✓ **R3_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetFeeEqGetBuyFee** The fee f_1 reported by `getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x)` is equal to the fee f_2 reported by `getBuyFee(g)` where g is the gross GHO amount (see Fig. 4)
19. ✓ **NonZeroFeeCheckBuyAsset** If `buyFee percentage > 0` then amount of underlying received by user from `buyAsset` is less than `GHO spent / price ratio`

Fees when selling

Fig. 5: Fees when selling



20. ✓ **R1_getAssetAmountForSellAssetFeeGeGetSellFee** The fee `f2` reported by `getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x)` is greater than or equal to the fee `f1` reported by `getSellFee(x)` (Fig. 5)
21. ✓ **R2_getAssetAmountForSellAssetVsActualSellFee** The fee `f2` reported by `getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x)` is greater than or equal to the fee `f3` accrued by `sellAsset(a)` (Fig. 5)
22. ✗ **R3_estimatedSellFeeCanBeHigherThanActualSellFee** The fee `f1` reported by `getSellFee(x)` is less than or equal to the fee `f3` accrued by `sellAsset(a)` (Fig. 5)
 - ✓ Verified after PR#168
23. ✓ **R4_getSellFeeVsgetAssetAmountForSellAsset** The fee `f1` reported by `getSellFee(x)` is less than or equal to the fee `f2` reported by `getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x)` (Fig. 5)
24. ✓ **NonZeroFeeCheckSellAsset** If `sellFee percentage > 0` then GHO received by user from `sellAsset` is less than `underlying amount * price ratio`

Frozen state

25. ✓ **cantBuyOrSellWhenFrozen, cantBuyOrSellWhenSeized** Buying/selling is not possible when the gsm is frozen and/or after it has been seized.
26. ✓ **rescuingGhoKeepsAccruedFees** Rescuing GHO never results in there being less GHO available (as an ERC-20 balance) in the gsm than `_accruedFees`.
27. ✓ **rescuingAssetKeepsAccruedFees** Rescuing the underlying asset never results in there being less of the underlying (as an ERC-20 balance) than `_currentExposure`.

Exposure

28. ✓ **sellingDoesntExceedExposureCap** It is not possible for `_currentExposure` of a gsm to exceed the `_exposureCap` as a result of a call to `sellAsset`.
29. ✓ **cantSellIfExposureTooHigh** If the `_currentExposure` exceeds the `_exposureCap`, `sellAsset` reverts until the `_currentExposure` is reduced below the `_exposureCap`.
30. ✓ **buyAssetDecreasesExposure** When calling `buyAsset` successfully (i.e., no revert), the `_currentExposure` always decreases.
31. ✓ **sellAssetIncreasesExposure** When calling `sellAsset` successfully (i.e., no revert), the `_currentExposure` always increases.
32. ✓ **giftingGhoDoesntAffectStorageSIMPLE** Gifting GHO does not affect storage.
33. ✓ **giftingUnderlyingDoesntAffectStorageSIMPLE** Gifting underlying asset does not affect storage.


34. **✗ totalAssetsNotIncrease** For `price ratio == 1`, the total assets of a user do not increase, where total assets is defined as the sum of balances of the underlying asset and GHO converted to same units.
- **✓** Verified after PR#196
35. **✓ whoCanChangeExposureCap** Only `updateExposureCap`, `initialize` and `seize` methods can change `exposureCap`.

Fees

37. **✗ collectedBuyFeelsAtLeastAsRequired**,
collectedSellFeelsAtLeastAsRequired The fee actually collected (after rounding) is at least the required percentage.
- Verified after PR#196
38. **✓ whoCanChangeAccruedFees** `_accruedFees` never decrease, unless fees are being harvested by Treasury using `distributeFeesToTreasury`.
39. **✓ accruedFeesLEGhoBalanceOfThis** `_accruedFees <= ghotoken.balanceof(this)` is preserved by all methods.

Optimality of buy

Fig. 6: optimality of buy



40. **✓ R2_optimalityOfBuyAsset_v2** non-4626: If user wants to sell at most `x` GHO, there is no better value `a'` to pass to `buyAsset` than the one given by `getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x)`. In Fig. 6 above, there is no value `a'` such that `Da' >= Da` and `Dx' < x`, or `Da' > Da` and `Dx' <= x`
41. **✓ getAssetAmountForBuyAsset_optimality.** non-4626:
`getAssetAmountForBuyAsset` returns a value as close as possible to user specified amount. Let `(AssetAmount, _, _, _) =`

`getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(maxGho)` . Then it is not possible to buy strictly more assets than `AssetAmount` while still paying less or equal to `maxGho` .

42. ✓ **R6_externalOptimalityOfBuyAsset** non-4626: The GHO sold by buying asset using values from `getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(maxGho)` is at least `maxGho - 2*oneAssetInGho + 1` . The lower bound is tight.

Optimality of sell

Fig. 7: Optimality of sell



43. ✓ * **R4_optimalityOfSellAsset_v2** non-4626: If user wants to buy at least `x` GHO, there is no better value `a'` to pass to `sellAsset` than the one given by `getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x)` . In Fig. 7 above, there is no value `a'` such that `Dx' <= x` and `Da > Da'` [1].
44. ✓ **getAssetAmountForSellAsset_optimality** non-4626: `getAssetAmountForSellAsset` returns a value as close as possible to user specified amount. Let `(AssetAmount, _, _, _) = getAssetAmountForSellAsset(minGho)` . Then it is not possible to sell strictly less assets than `AssetAmount` while still receiving more or equal to `minGho` .
45. ✓ **R5_externalOptimalityOfSellAsset** non-4626: The GHO received by selling asset using values from `getAssetAmountForSellAsset(minGho)` is upper bounded by `minGho + oneAssetInGho - 1` . The upper bound is tight.

Balances when buying

46. ✓ **monotonicityOfBuyAsset** non-4626: `buyAsset` is monotone (more asset bought <=> more GHO paid)

Balances when selling

47. ✓ **monotonicityOfSellAsset** non-4626: `sellAsset` is monotone (more asset sold <-> more GHO gained)

Selling and buying

48. ✓ **buySellInverse** non-4626: For price ratio == 1 and zero fees, `buyAsset` and `sellAsset` are inverse to each other.

Exposure

49. ✓ **enoughULtoBackGhoBuyAsset** non-4626: At every `buyAsset`, the insolvency of the contract will increase by at most 10^{-18} GHO non-4626: gsm is always solvent `getAssetPriceInGho(_currentExposure) + 1 >= ghoMinted`
50. ✓ **exposureBellowCap** non-4626: `currentExposure <= exposureCap` is preserved by all methods except `updateExposureCap` and `initialize`.
51. ✗ **systemBalanceStabilitySell** non-4626: The balance of the contract (difference between GHO minted and assets held by the contract converted to GHO value) can decrease by at most 10^{-18} GHO after `sellAsset`.
- ✓ Verified after PR#196
52. ✓ **whoCanChangeExposure** non-4626: Only `sellAsset`, and `sellAssetWithSig` can increase exposure. Only `buyAsset`, `seize` and `buyAssetWithSig` methods can decrease exposure.

-
1. Not shown when the number of decimals in the underlying asset is 7, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, and 17 ↻
-