

law  
enforcement

counter  
intelligence

LAWRENCE B. SILC

LAW ENFORCEMENT  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

**LAW ENFORCEMENT  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE**

**LAWRENCE B. SULC**

**VARRO PRESS  
Kansas City**

# LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

**Lawrence B. Sulc**

VARRO PRESS

P.O. Box 8413 ~ Shawnee Mission, Kansas 66208 USA

Copyright 1996 by Lawrence B. Sulc

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording, of any information storage or retrieval system without permission in writing from the publisher, Varro Group, Inc.

Publisher's Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sulc, Lawrence B.

Law enforcement counterintelligence / Lawrence B. Sulc.  
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

LCCN: 96-60178.

ISBN: 1-888644-74-5.

1. Police--United States. 2. Law enforcement--United States. 3. Intelligence service--United States. I. Title.  
HV8141.S85 1996 363.2'4  
QB196-20238

Printed and bound in the United States of America

## Table Of Contents

Preface	vii
Foreword	xi
Introduction	xiii

### PART ONE **THE OPPOSITION**

1. Counterintelligence In Law Enforcement	23
2. Dangerous Domestic Groups	39
3. Big City Gangs	55
4. Prison Intelligence	73
5. Terrorism and Counterintelligence	89
6. Destabilization By Crime	105
7. Internationalization Of Crime	119
8. Personal Data In The Wrong Hands	127

### PART TWO **THE GUARDIANS**

9. Counterintelligence In County And State Law Enforcement	135
10. Intelligence Lost	145
11. Corruption In The Ranks	149
12. The Hunters Become The Hunted	153
13. Civil Disturbance	157

**PART THREE**  
**FIXING THE PROBLEM**

14. Some Problems and Some Solutions	165
15. A Counterintelligence Guide	187
16. The Intelligence Process For Counterintelligence	191

**APPENDICES**

A. On Secrecy	197
B. Language Specialists	199
C. On Monikers	205

**INDEX**

About The Author	211
------------------	-----

**Preface**

---

Crime is burgeoning everywhere - throughout most of the world. The global expansion of serious crime is compounded by interlocking organized criminal enterprises - narcotics, arms, prostitution, extortion, fraud, counterfeiting, the laundering of money from criminal profits, and so forth. Crime, international and domestic, must be monitored in a systematic way by law enforcement, that is to say, by the employment of intelligence measures. It is not. For years, prestigious panels and prominent individuals have delivered thoughtful, forceful entreaties for improved law enforcement intelligence, recommendations that have been largely ignored, at least in the United States. International conferences of law enforcement officials repeatedly echo pleas for law enforcement intelligence and cooperation.

Most of the foregoing problems acutely affect the U.S. Large, wealthy, and affording unprecedented opportunities and freedom of association and movement, the U.S. is the scene for expanding criminal activity. International organizations, including terrorist movements and narcotics traffickers, to mention just two, and a variety of national and local criminal groups, confront federal, state, and local police. In addition to all of these threats and the problems they bring, American law enforcement at all levels is faced with hostile intelligence and intelligence-like forces. In addition to adequate intelligence, of which there is too little, American law enforcement needs *counterintelligence*, of which there is even less, to meet these challenges.

There is much good work in the literature on law enforcement intelligence. Very little has been written on counterintelligence, however. Much is needed. This book is an attempt to begin to respond to the need. In it, something is said about intelligences - some definitions are given - and the "leverage" that intelligence provides. Intelligence is a "multiplier" of scarce resources and greatly needed by American law enforcement. Inasmuch as this book is primarily about counterintelligence (CI), a pitch is made for the acquisition of CI skills and the development of a "CI culture" by law enforcement.

Some of the many bad groups that threaten the country and the police (institutionally and individually) are described. Some MOs (methods of operations) of these groups are outlined and specific attacks on law enforcement and/or particular problems facing it are related.

Many of the problems described are serious but many of them can be dealt with by awareness and training on the part of the police. Some solutions - not just a list of problems - are also suggested here. The lack of sharing is *the* big problem, according to a number of sources. The excuses for not sharing range from "knowledge is power; keep it to yourself," to "cops don't like to write." One source reminded me, however, that "you have to give to get." That view makes more sense to me.

Almost all my sources lauded cooperation - cooperation, among agencies, especially in maintaining undercover operations, and the acquisition (or sharing) of resources lacking (for example, language skills and cultural knowledge). In many instances volunteers are filling the needs that all police forces have.

Regional intelligence centers are also described here. These examples of dynamic coordination are making a real difference in several areas. They can be made to be useful in counterintelligence work as well as in the collection and analysis of positive information. Sharing

and cooperation are essential, of course, for regional intelligence units to function.

Intelligence and counterintelligence are defined here, some serious threats to law enforcement are spelled out, and some examples are given of what CI must do to detect, identify, counteract, neutralize and, in certain cases, manipulate, hostile forces. Inasmuch as much crime exists in prison and hostile intelligence efforts go on there, prison intelligence and CI are discussed too. Counterterrorism and the internationalization of crime are also treated. And more.

A number of people have remarked on the quality of my sources. I am delighted to have had some excellent interviews with some fine, knowledgeable, and indulgent practitioners and former practitioners of the things I am writing about. With some of these interviews, rather than try to weave them into the story, I have left them free-standing, if you will.

Inasmuch as my editors have always told me not to scare my readers without suggesting some solutions to my litany of terrors, I submit a number of suggestions for dealing with some of the issues raised. Although cops don't scare easily, even some of them will be taken aback by some of the stories related here. No apologies.

Finally, as everyone in law enforcement knows, there is much evil out there. Increasingly - a point I try hard to make - much of the evil is directed at law enforcement itself. The task for law enforcement is to understand the many faces of evil talked about and try to stay abreast of developments - the twists and turns on the criminal scene, as it were. In the "eternal cat-and-mouse game" involved in the business of cops and robbers, law enforcement needs to be the "cat" as much as possible.

Lawrence B. Sulc

## Foreword

---

The end of the Cold War era has unleashed not only pent up nationalism, but a new wave of organized crime and anarchy with which law enforcement must deal. Vital for law enforcement at all levels, in this life and death struggle, is the effective use of one of its most potent tools - intelligence. But effective intelligence is inseparable from counterintelligence, a responsibility which has often been ignored. Today's sophisticated criminals naturally attempt to penetrate their opponents, whether they be government in general, or specifically law enforcement. This effort must be countered and turned to law enforcement's advantage.

Using interviews, research and drawing on his own personal experience, Larry Sulc has produced a work that is both readable and practical on the subjects of intelligence and counterintelligence. Not only does Sulc provide a historical overview, but he, unlike others, offers solutions to the problem areas he identifies.

Robert J. Heibel  
Mercyhurst College

*Robert J. Heibel, Special Agent, FBI, Retired, specialized in Counterintelligence, thereby acquiring a unique perspective of law enforcement CI. He is now coordinator of the Research and Analysis Program at Mercyhurst, a four-year program leading to a baccalaureate.*

# Introduction

---

## **The Thin Blue Line's First Line Of Defense**

Law enforcement - the “thin blue line” - is the first line of defense within society. Intelligence is *its* first line of defense. It is often the *last* line of defense, as well. Intelligence is also deeply involved with much of what goes on in between those two lines. And *beyond*. At least a general awareness of intelligence is important - in some cases vital - for *anyone* in a responsible position - government or nongovernment, public or private, at home or abroad. And that includes people in law enforcement. The beleaguered “thin blue line” needs all the help it can get. It needs intelligence.

## **Pearl Harbor - Intelligence “Failure”**

“Pearl Harbor” was one of the great intelligence “failures” in history. The lack of good intelligence prior to Japan’s attack on December 1941 was immensely costly to the Allies of World War II. There was the loss of more than 2,000 lives at Pearl, itself, not to mention a major part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The disaster of Pearl Harbor added years to the war and could have caused America’s defeat.

As it turned out, information about Japan’s intentions and capabilities *was* available in early December 1941 - available in the hands of a number of people in a number of different parts of the U.S. government. What

was *not* available was centralized collation and analysis of that information - someone, some entity, somewhere in the government - to pull it all together and make sense out of it. In other words, what was not available was *intelligence*. With adequate *intelligence* about Japan's planned attack on American targets in the Pacific - the *information* was there - preemptive action could have been taken or at least a better defense prepared. As it was, the U.S. suffered an unprecedented disaster.<sup>1,2</sup>

After World War II, the lesson of Pearl Harbor was taken to heart by America's leaders. A national system of centralized intelligence was formed and a Central Intelligence Agency established.<sup>3</sup> The idea was to coordinate the many intelligence components of the federal government to ensure that their important bits and pieces of raw information would be processed into meaningful intelligence, which would, in turn, quickly reach the policy and decision makers and other users - "consumers" - such as the people in the field (or in the air or at sea) who could put it to use.

## Intelligence In Law Enforcement

What does all of this have to do with law enforcement? This: Things are going on all the time that affect all kinds of government at every level - Washington, D.C., state houses, county seats, town halls. Included are the sheriff's offices, headquarters, local precincts and districts, and state police barracks all around the country. All of these things that are going on can be ignored, of course, but they'll take place anyhow and may eventually rear up and bite. With good intelligence all the "Pearl Harbors," some little - some not so little - can be avoided.

Moreover, good intelligence gives law enforcement some kind of idea of what it's up against, as well as some

advance warning of problems and a chance to deal with issues before they become too big to handle. It combines disparate information to form a comprehensive picture. The intelligence created in the process must be disseminated in a timely way and in meaningful form to commanders and managers and officers in tactical situations - to give them the knowledge required to do their jobs and help them anticipate, and/or avoid, and/or solve, problems in their work.

## What Is Intelligence?

What is intelligence? According to a consultant with experience in both government and business intelligence, intelligence "is organized information." To another, also with experience in government and business, "analysis in the field of intelligence is equivalent to 'value added' in the economic realm." Intelligence is also described as, "skill in extracting meaning from everyday experience." To the former head of a foreign intelligence service, it is "the need to understand the enemy deeply." Numerous authors relate intelligence to law enforcement by emphasizing its role in the containment of organized crime.

Intelligence, then, is "focused attention," "organized information," "added value," getting "meaning from everyday experience," and "understanding the enemy deeply." So we must focus on the enemy and learn all about him. We must organize the data, analyze it, and make intelligence out of it. Finally, we must get the intelligence to the people who need it because intelligence is leverage and everyone can use leverage, especially law enforcement and especially at a time of shrinking resources.

The demands imposed on domestic law enforcement make for a tall order and law enforcement cannot respond

and do its job well without adequate intelligence. No entity of any size - government or private - can get along well without the systematic collection, collation, and analysis of information having to do with its mission and problems. Law enforcement needs intelligence. For intelligence to work, however, it needs direction - the best that command, top management, and middle management can provide - *plus* the feedback that only patrol officers and detectives can give.

The intelligence users on the beats and the stake-outs and on patrol on the streets and highways have to tell the intelligence makers what *they* need to do their jobs. Sometimes, on the other hand, from their vantage point in the strategic sense, the intelligence producers must provide the users with what the latter sometimes fail even to *realize* they need.

The primary purpose of intelligence, according to Paul Copher,<sup>4</sup> experienced in both police work at home and military intelligence overseas, is to increase "the probability of accuracy in operational staff decisions by gathering and disseminating the appropriate information in a timely manner."<sup>5</sup> In any case, a successful law enforcement intelligence effort needs the *determined* communication and cooperation of *everyone*, a constant give-and-take between the providers of information, the producers of intelligence and the users and doers. Everyone has responsibility for input, to provide information and to evaluate the system, continuously. The system must be *managed* with key commanders at each level deeply involved in the workings and the results of the effort. Meaningful intelligence must get back to the person on the spot - the cops at the "business end" of law enforcement - and, as a matter of fact, to every appropriate person who needs it and can use it in doing his or her job. Everyone has to be "on board."<sup>6</sup>

## Law Enforcement Counterintelligence

A number of authors have made the case for law enforcement intelligence very well (although it is questionable as to how much attention is being paid by the appropriate people in state and local governments). This is a book mainly about law enforcement *counterintelligence*, however, and, although everything that has been said about intelligence applies to counterintelligence, much needs to be said about counterintelligence by itself. Unfortunately, *counterintelligence*, that special - and increasingly important - component of the overall intelligence structure, has received little attention in the open literature. I believe that this situation must change. I hope that this book will contribute to an understanding of counterintelligence, that special discipline of law enforcement intelligence.

## ENDNOTES:

1. In 1989, Hal Ford, a former senior CIA officer who at the time was at the Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., prepared a "theoretical SNIE" (Special National Intelligence Estimate) which he called "SNIE 10-41: The Likelihood of Japanese Military Attack," and which he dated 4 December 1941, for the purpose of the exercise. This "theoretical SNIE" reached a very interesting conclusion. Ford's intellectual exercise, using a U.S. Intelligence Community reporting and estimative SNIE form of a much later time, pulled together real intelligence data (since declassified) that had actually been available in late 1941 to diverse U.S. government officials.

Ford's "theoretical SNIE" spelled out its reasoning, cited its sources, and indicated the likelihood of a surprise Sunday dawn air attack by Japan on Hawaii and the Philippines. The estimate warned "...that the contingency of a sudden Japanese attack in the very near future is sufficiently great to justify certain extraordinary, immediate steps." Although the analytical tools the author used in his exercise (*real* reports, it must be emphasized) were certainly available at the time of the "theoretical SNIE" (that is, late 1941), they had *not* been brought together and analyzed as "centralized" intelligence on December 7, 1941. Unfortunately.

2. Although, it was more a matter of *security* than *counterintelligence*, or intelligence, law enforcement in Washington, D.C., had its own "Pearl Harbor," of sorts, when a career criminal walked into Police Headquarters and murdered a MPD homicide sergeant and two FBI special agents and seriously wounded a third, not to mention a young visitor, in a tragic shootout. The murderer also died. In any case, good intelligence contributes to security and vice versa.

The murdered FBI agents and the police detective mentioned above are not forgotten. The lesson of the shootout is another matter. In the immediate aftermath of the assault, two metal detectors were installed at each of the building's entrances and combination locks put on the doors of the homicide and internal affairs offices. Still, a year later, stairwells remain largely open and visitors often jump over ropes to avoid the long lines at the metal detectors. Moreover, officers using the corridors often find themselves face-to-face with criminals: the parole office is located in the building now. It ran out of rent money and had to be moved *somewhere*. A positive action the city did take, however, was to rename the building in honor of the dead

detective; eventually, the building will be called the Henry "Hank" Daly Municipal Center in his memory. (*The Washington Times*, Nov. 22, 1995, C5.)

3. The executive order of the U.S. government that currently mandates intelligence at the federal level is E.O. 12333 of December 1981. It says, "The United States intelligence effort shall provide the president and the National Security Council with necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign defense and economic policy and the protection of United States national interests from foreign threat. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully." In other words, the president determined that everyone in the government has a stake in the intelligence process and should play a role in it.

4. Copher is widely quoted in this book and was interviewed for a chapter as well.

5. One reason for having a good intelligence system is to prevent "Pearl Harbors." Almost everyone, however, knows of other instances when a "heads up" - or *foreknowledge* - would be useful. "Foreknowledge must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation," Sun T'zu, the Chinese sage (c. 400 B.C.), said. It seems to me that what Sun T'zu was saying was that intelligence is based on information from the "guy on the spot" and the boss better pay attention. (It is the rare book on intelligence today that fails to mention Sun T'zu, that wise proponent and practitioner of the discipline, who lived so long ago.)

6. "Our policies cannot be effective unless the information on which they are based is accurate, timely, and complete," President Ronald Reagan said. Although referring to intelligence at the *national* level, the then president's injunction applies very well to *local* law enforcement, as well. Intelligence can't always be complete, unfortunately, but it should be reasonably accurate and timely, at least, and everyone along the line should work hard to make it so.

## **PART ONE**

---

### **THE OPPOSITION**

## Counterintelligence In Law Enforcement

The last decade has witnessed an immense global expansion of crime - crime of all kinds. The need for law enforcement intelligence at every level to meet and keep up with the growth of crime has boomed. Traditional organized crime has burgeoned and, as stated by Paul Andrews and Marilyn Peterson in their book, *Criminal Intelligence Analysis*, "non-traditional organized crime groups (such as the outlaw motorcycle gangs, the Jamaican posses, the Colombia cartels and others), the diversification of traditional organized crime (aka *La Cosa Nostra*) into the corporate world, and the expanded complexity of crime (money laundering,<sup>1</sup> containerized smuggling, etc.) made the use of intelligence and analysis a necessity."<sup>2,3,4</sup>

Added to ordinary - and *extraordinary* - crime in America is the immense problem of the large urban gangs<sup>5</sup> using tactics that combine military and psychological operations designed to undermine the legitimacy of govern-

ment itself, not to mention destroy its military capabilities.<sup>6</sup>

For whatever reason(s), the numerous interlocking organized criminal enterprises in the United States made up of domestic street gangs, narcotics traffickers, and terrorists are not monitored by law enforcement in a systematic way. Yet, the government (*any* government) *must* understand the environment in which it functions, whether in the international arena or at home. A government simply must know what its opposition is up to. Faced with more crime than it can handle - not to mention potential major uprisings - communities must find ways to avoid disastrous surprises and head off confrontations, or at the very least limit their effects. Intelligence is essential - in addition to providing "leverage," it is a great "multiplier" of limited resources. Law enforcement needs it.

The skills and disciplines of intelligence have repeatedly been called upon to cope with crime. As long ago as 1967 in the U.S., The Organized Crime Task Force of the President's Crime Commission declared the urgent need for improved law enforcement intelligence. "Police departments in every major city should have a special intelligence unit solely to ferret out organized criminal intelligence activity. Relevant disciplines, such as economics, political science, sociology, and operations research (must) begin to study organized crime activity," the Task Force said.<sup>7</sup> The need for law enforcement intelligence was and remains evident.

Weaknesses in intelligence, nevertheless, remain largely uncorrected in much of the country and in many areas law enforcement and prison intelligence hardly exist at all. Many officials, some highly placed, fail to understand intelligence and its benefits. Others understand perfectly well and place themselves effectively "on the other side."<sup>8</sup>

Despite the obvious need and repeated appeals from

prestigious and authoritative panels for more and better law enforcement intelligence, things have not gone as they should. In fact, they have gone from bad to worse. "Many intelligence programs have been abandoned and nearly all that remain have failed to realize their potential," claims Frederick T. Martens, former executive director of the Pennsylvania Crime Commission and a former high official of the New Jersey State Police.<sup>9,10</sup> Martens goes on to speak of even newer and greater problems for law enforcement, such as new technologies in the hands of criminals and the encroachment of new ethnic groups with new cultural mores and values, and other problems demanding greater attention on the part of intelligence. As the problems for law enforcement worsen almost everywhere, law enforcement intelligence should be reinforced and expanded. It has not been.

If it is difficult to "get a handle" on *intelligence* in law enforcement, it is no wonder that law enforcement *counterintelligence* scarcely receives any consideration at all. *Counterintelligence* is the other side of the intelligence coin. Although in the U.S. principally the concern of federal law enforcement agencies in the past, domestic counterintelligence (CI) is more and more a matter for local law enforcement. Local law enforcement must face up to the rising demands placed on it by hostile intelligence and intelligence-like forces. The bad guys are at work out there. To pretend they are not is foolhardy. To fail to understand what is at issue is dangerous and *can* be fatal.

Even foreign counterintelligence (FCI), as it is called in the United States - CI directed at foreign intelligence activities - although falling mostly within the jurisdiction of federal intelligence agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is of growing importance to local law enforcement.<sup>11,12</sup> Moreover, many leads and much information that contribute to FCI comes from local police forces.

Counternarcotics and counterterrorism are only two of many foreign-origin criminal issues. Political and social issues of foreign origin have caused *criminal* problems in the U.S. since its early days. International problems affect the local scene more and more. They are serious and diverse. What does the average American police officer know (or care) about Japan or Syria, for example? Or the issue of Israel and the Palestine question? There are people of many nationalities who *do care about Palestine* - enough to kill other people, including Americans, over it. The deadly bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City in February 1993, where a gang of foreign religious fanatics tried to murder thousands of Americans, is the most notorious example. There have been others.

In 1988 an alert state trooper at a New Jersey Turnpike service area became suspicious of Yu Kikumura. Apprehended after a brief chase, Kikumura was identified as a member of the Japanese Red Army (JRA), a small but virulent group involved in terrorism for years on several continents. Kikumura had been traveling widely in the U.S., picking up components for his bombs and, possibly, the FBI said, servicing a network of other agents. Vigilance, training, and proper motivation caused the N.J. state trooper to react.<sup>13</sup> He prevented what might have become a series of catastrophic bombings the JRA was planning for the New York City area, a kind of prelude, as it were, to the WTC bombing four years later.

Earlier that same year, an alert local police officer foiled an attempt to smuggle demolitions into the U.S. from Canada. A small town police chief in Vermont saw Wallid Kabbani, a stranger with a black bag, and sensed trouble. He questioned the suspect. The bag contained explosives. Kabbani and two accomplices were arrested and convicted. Although Canadian citizens, the three were members of the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP), a

Near Eastern terrorist group with a nasty record of bombings in Europe. The widow of an SSNP member, for example, is suspected of having placed a bomb on a TWA flight in 1986, killing four Americans over Greece, one just a baby who was sucked out of the hole created in the fuselage by the explosion.<sup>14</sup>

What federal, state and local police agencies are dealing with, when they go up against foreign government entities, international organized criminal groups, terrorist organizations, the drug cartels, and so forth, are *hostile intelligence* - or *intelligence-like* - operations. Sometimes, the groups - and the motives of their members - are mixed but they often mean big trouble (such as mass murder). *Counterintelligence* is required to sort out all the factors and deal with them.

Biker gangs, racial extremists, certain cults, satanists, environmentalists, anti-abortionists, animal rights advocates, immigrant support, and sanctuary movements - to mention some - also run intelligence operations against the police. In many cases the threat of penetration comes from the usual suspects, more-or-less "normal" American organized crime groups, the regular "mob." In December 1990, for example, Det. William Peist, a member of the Intelligence Unit of the New York City Police Department, no less, was arrested for alerting John Gotti, a top leader of the Gambino crime family, to a listening device the police had planted in his (Gotti's) office. Peist, an associate of the Gambino organization since 1986, was sentenced to seven and a half years in federal prison. He could have received 70 years. Ironically, Peist, in an unrelated case, won \$1.25 million in damages from an automobile accident in which he lost part of his leg.

Peist, at this writing, is in federal prison. In poor health now, he will be a wealthy man if he survives to December 23, 1999, the scheduled date for his release (with good behavior). His relationship with Gotti, who is also

now in federal prison, was discovered "inadvertently" from another NYPD audio operation. "Often we back into these things," said the NYPD official who related the above information to me.<sup>15</sup> There are many unfortunate consequences to police betrayal of the trust placed in them. In Washington, D.C., recently, U.S. District Judge Thomas F. Hogan gave a Metropolitan Police Dept. (MPD) officer the maximum sentence for bribery. "All this does is add another layer to the citizens' cynicism and distrust of our criminal justice system," he said, "leading to acquittals in cases where jurors do not believe police officers."<sup>16</sup>

In Washington, D.C., a former police officer was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and tampering with evidence on behalf of the drug gang in which she had been a member. As an on duty officer, Fonda Moore, had "...checked police investigative files for members of the drug gang," an assistant U.S. attorney charged; he could not "think of anyone who violated [the] oath as a sworn officer more than this one," he told the court.<sup>17</sup>

Peist, the "turned" detective, was a classical penetration of a law enforcement agency by organized crime, the sort of activity good CI is essential to combat, or preferably, *prevent*. The MPD's Moore, while not at the same level as the big-time Gotti penetration of the NYPD, nonetheless also reemphasizes the need for good CI practices by law enforcement to protect itself from hostile infiltration.

The police, whether their own intelligence efforts are adequate or not, must make a leap, intellectually *and* operationally - they must jump *beyond* intelligence, whether or not they have mastered *its* skills and acquire the skills of *counter*-intelligence.

Some time ago I wrote that a "CI mentality is a must to understand and to be able to counter the intelligence and intelligence-like measures of opponents. A CI mentality is essential for one's health," I said.<sup>18</sup> What-is-more,

the principles embraced by such a CI mentality must be applied in practical ways. "The protection of...assets [people, first of all] will take priority over questions of identities, motives, and definitions [of who and/or what is posing the threat], all of which can be sorted out later."<sup>19</sup>

The CI discipline helps to protect against loss - understanding who, what, when, how, and so on, is all very important but protection must come first.

The question is frequently asked, "What is counterintelligence?" Dr. Roy Godson, head of the Consortium on Intelligence in Washington, D.C., says "practitioners themselves disagree about the meaning of the CI concept." At a minimum, however, he says, "it can be defined as the identification and neutralization of the threat posed by foreign intelligence services and the manipulation of those services for the manipulator's benefit."

Godson's definition of counterintelligence fits the purposes of *domestic* law enforcement very well merely by adding to the phrase, "foreign intelligence services," the words "and *other* anti-law enforcement organizations" (more about this elsewhere). In any case, whether or not everyone defines counterintelligence in the same way, law enforcement better learn as much as it can about the subject.

Foreign counterintelligence (FCI) is of intense importance to local law enforcement for a number of reasons:

*Foreign Missions.* Foreign intelligence services operate in many areas throughout the U.S. - in Washington, D.C., obviously, where many nations have embassies; in New York City, where there are numerous foreign missions to the United Nations; in other cities (Chicago, San Francisco, and Houston, for example) where consulates, trade missions, information bureaus, and travel offices are located. Other nations have identical or similar situations where foreign installations - official or otherwise - are well established on *their* soil.

Any one of these installations, whether a walled mission with blocked-out windows and roofs festooned with antennas, or a room or two in a downtown commercial office building, *can* be a center of foreign intelligence and intelligence-like activity. So can a modest suburban house or simple apartment displaying no foreign flag or shield at all and devoid of diplomatic immunity or consular privileges.

*Groups, Leagues, and Alliances.* In addition to official and semi-official governmental representations, there are delegates (official and *unofficial*) of governments in exile, "governments" the *host* government does not recognize, rebel groups, leagues, alliances, coalitions, and even terrorist organizations. Official and *semi-official* activities go on in some of these places all the time. Lawful and unlawful activities are sometimes mixed. In, or perhaps *near*, a religious center, for example, terrorist planning may take place although the religious entity itself *may not* have anything to do with the illegal activity. Near Eastern terrorist groups sometimes are closely connected with their religious institutions although the latter vehemently and repeatedly deny having anything to do with lawlessness.<sup>20</sup>

*Branches, Fronts, and Covers.* Added to the above list, worthy of attention are local branches of foreign government firms, "front" companies for foreign governments, "cover" companies used by foreign intelligence personnel and just plain foreign commercial enterprises. Many of these installations, in addition to their totally lawful activities, will be engaged in the unlawful collection of economic intelligence from not only the government but local firms - or even the more traditional collection of classified information.

Although in the U.S., the primary responsibility for monitoring the FCI activities outlined above belongs to federal agencies, law enforcement at the local level must

not only attend to its own priorities but strive to assist national interests where possible.<sup>21</sup> Local law enforcement should be aware of the installations described above and understand the kinds of illegal activities that might be going on there or might be carried out *from* there or *around* there.

Many definitions of counterintelligence, in addition to Godson's, although meant to apply to a *national* government in an *international* context, are useful to local law enforcement (and even to private business security) by merely changing a word here and there. For example, the U.S. CIA defines counterintelligence as "intelligence activity intended to detect, counteract, and/or prevent espionage and other foreign clandestine activity, sabotage, international terrorist activity, or assassination conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers. Counterintelligence also refers to the information derived from such activity."<sup>22</sup> The substitution of the word "domestic" for "foreign," makes the CIA definition of CI useful for law enforcement intelligence purposes.<sup>23</sup>

Borders blur as far as many foreign and domestic criminal matters are concerned. In any case, *identify, neutralize, manipulate* and *detect, counteract, prevent* - in the two definitions given here - are on much the same track. The important thing is that CI is an *active* discipline.<sup>24</sup> In CI work, as in any kind of intelligence effort, information is collected and turned into intelligence. The purpose of CI is to *detect* what *opposition* intelligence is up to, but, CI looks beyond that purpose and gets into prevention and *counteraction*. And CI, remember, also sometimes *manipulates*.<sup>25</sup>

Criminal organizations and their operations - large and small - have become so varied and sophisticated (even *ingenious* and *professionalized*), not to mention *transnational* and *international* in scope, that domestic law enforcement agencies must go beyond collecting in-

telligence on them. It must improve its awareness to the point that counterintelligence plays a vastly larger role in combatting crime. To paraphrase Louis Freeh, Director of the FBI, we must throw more and more light on the "dark side," and, I would add, while we have them in the light, do something to them.

## ENDNOTES:

1. According to a task force of the Group of Seven industrial democracies, about \$120 billion of laundered money circulates around the world annually.
2. *Criminal Intelligence Analysis*, edited by Paul P. Andrews, Jr. and Marilyn B. Peterson, Palmer Enterprises, Loomis, CA, 1990.
3. Not included in this list are Gypsies, but only because they are not among the most violent organized criminal groups. Clever enough not to resort to violence as often as the gun-slinging hoods and stick-up artists, they are important to law enforcement, never-the-less. "No single criminal group fits the accepted description of organized crime more than does the criminal element among the ROM Gypsy community," says Jack Morris, former police and corrections officer and editor of *The Intelligence Officer*, law enforcement-oriented bulletin. "Gypsies may not be as violent as their lawless cousins, the '7-11 bandits,' who rob stores for pocket money," as Morris puts it, but the Gypsies are more crafty burglars than the former, with their "once-a-day \$20,000 thefts." The Gypsies compare favorably with the *Mafia*, Morris says, "in their organizations, their mobility, the continuity of their crime efforts, and their near impregnable security due to unique language and family ties." High mobility makes the criminals among the ROM Gypsy community hard to track and even more difficult to prosecute. "No better target can be found for the intelligence unit than this one and no better unit to take it on as a target," Morris claims. (*The Intelligence Officer*, Palmer Enterprises, Loomis, Calif., July 1994, p. 3.) Also see Morris's book, *The Master Criminals Among the Gypsies*, Palmer Press, Loomis, Calif.
4. "To conceal the source and destination of the funds that give them power," the Colombian drug cartels are partial to "coffee exports, car dealerships, insurance annuities, construction projects [and] check-cashing stores," according to David A. Andelman, "The Drug Money Maze," *Foreign Affairs*, Jul-Aug 1994, p. 95.
5. According to a survey conducted by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), of 110 U.S. jurisdictions reporting, in the previous 12-month period there were, 249,324 gang members in 4,881 gangs. Gang-related crimes totalled 46,359 of which 1,072 were homicides. "A problem of this magnitude calls for the development of law enforcement strategies that are flexible enough to

meet local needs while possessing sufficient uniformity to make it possible to compare results across different communities. To do this requires accurate statistics on gangs...and the crimes gang members commit." *Police Times*, Fall 1994, p. 4. In other words, law enforcement strategies depend on the practices of law enforcement intelligence.

6. The problem of the big gangs in America is a question of insurgency. Insurgency requires as a response counter-insurgency. Obviously, intelligence and *counterintelligence* play a major role in any serious counterinsurgency effort. In March 1995, unprecedented sweeps were conducted on the gangs in Los Angeles, California by federal and local authorities, among other things, to forestall *their* buildup.

7. Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, aka President's Crime Commission. Report of the Task Force on Organized Crime (TFR) p. 15, 1967, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. As quoted by Frederick T. Martens in *Criminal Intelligence Analysis*, ibid., p. 4.

8. For mention of an extreme case, see the interview with William Dunman, especially his remarks on the close relationship of the administration of a major American city with the mob.

9. Frederick T. Martens, "The Intelligence Function," Chapter One of *Criminal Intelligence Analysis*, op. cit., pp 1-3.

10. What law enforcement intelligence there was in the U.S. in the 1960s, '70s and '80s was weakened almost everywhere and abolished in many places.

11. R. Patrick Watson, FBI assistant director of operations, said on Nov. 16, 1994, that "FBI counterspies have detected some cases in which computer hackers [in the U.S.] have been used by foreign intelligence services for information collection." "Foreign governments are not the only perpetrators of information espionage," said Clint L. Howard, director of Security at Hughes Aircraft Co., addressing the same forum. "Our competitors - both domestic and international - unscrupulous investors, media people, hackers, and disgruntled and former employees might all engage in information espionage," he said. Bill Gertz, *The Washington Times*, Nov. 17, 1994, A4.

12. As far as U.S. government intelligence is concerned the benchmark document is Executive Order 12333, Dec. 1981, described earlier.

13. Lt. John Schroth, operations officer, NJSP Academy at Seagirt, told me that the 150 entrants to the 21-week course have an attrition rate averaging 50 percent. The academy, with

its paramilitary orientation, heavily emphasizes physical training, of course, but also teaches, among other things, sociology, psychology, and English. The 24 sworn officers of the NJSP in addition to performing the normal highway patrol duties of the state police, conduct criminal investigations, exercise an intelligence function, run forensic laboratories, and have jurisdiction in toxic waste and environmental crimes, which incidentally, are on the increase. The NJSP also polices the Atlantic City casinos. The academic training stresses discipline, leadership, and teamwork, and, of course, police practices and procedures. The state trooper must demonstrate the motivation, initiative, and judgment required to work alone effectively. As would be expected, car stops are most important (as I have emphasized elsewhere, because police officers have *emphasized* that fact to me). Verbal and non-verbal communications (body movements and so on) are stressed in academy training to aid the trooper in sensing potential risks. He is taught, as much as it can be taught, to detect deception (*deception*, again) on the part of the occupants of automobiles on the roads and highways. His life depends on it. (Lt. John Schroth, operations officer, NJSP Academy, Seagirt, New Jersey, Aug. 19, 1994.)

14. See Sulc, "Counter-Terrorism - First Line, Last Line," *Terrorism*, Vol II, Oct. 1988, pp 241-245.

15. Peist, through his attorney, turned down my request for an interview. Apparently, he would want to be paid for his story, the million plus, not being sufficient to "provide for his family." Perhaps it all went to his defense.

16. *The Washington Post*, Apr. 12, 1995, A6.

17. *The Washington Times*, Apr. 5, 1995, C7. Perhaps he was unaware of the Peist case.

18. Sulc, "Counterintelligence: Defending Your Company's Secrets," Chapter 10, "Perfectly Legal Competitor Intelligence," edited by Douglas Bernhardt, Financial Times, London, 1993, p. 217.

19. Unpublished paper, "Organizational Intelligence and Counterintelligence," Sulc, 1993.

20. Steven Emerson, investigator and writer on Islamic terrorism, demonstrated in his Congressional testimony, on television, and in numerous articles that radical Islamic terrorism is supported both with money and recruits from mosques in the U.S. The Islamic Association for Palestine, Islamic Project for Charity International, and the Islamic Committee for Palestine, are prominent in collecting money and recruiting adherents in

American mosques. The groups, of course, deny involvement in terrorism - their support goes to hospitals and schools and the like in the Mid-East, they say. John Bremer, former anti-terrorist official of the U.S. State Department, and Oliver "Buck" Revel, former FBI official, largely support Emerson's claims. Emerson, and other observers, carefully point out that the targets of radical Islamic violence are Jews, of course, Americans, and *moderate* Moslems. Islam is essentially a peaceful religion and Moslems are overwhelmingly *not* involved in terrorism. Some are, however, as the bombing of the World Trade Center showed.

21. My own hometown, Washington, D.C., happens to be the nation's capital. The principal local force, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), has many dignitary (executive) protection responsibilities, of course, and must cooperate with federal authorities. Cooperation is good but not always good enough. For example, a foreign chief of state visited Washington some time ago. During his movements, housing arrangements were changed. Instead of staying at Blair House across the street from the White House, he was to stay at his country's embassy. These things happen. The "feds," however, had not *told* the locals that the embassy had been moved so the protection detail headed for the *old* embassy. Fortunately, someone in MPD Special Operations knew where the official party *should* be going. With a minimum of disturbance, the motorcade changed course and deposited the foreign official visitor, safe and sound, at the right place. Acute embarrassment was avoided, perhaps a war.

22. The CIA's definition of counterintelligence actually does not go as far as Godson's definition. Sometimes governments have to be more circumspect than private persons. For one thing, the CIA's definition says nothing about "manipulation" - the manipulation of a foreign intelligence service (offense for defense) - as Godson's does.

23. When the CIA defines counterintelligence as an *international* intelligence threat, recall that the Agency is *foreign* oriented, by law, and that its definitions are directed toward the foreign and international.

24. Or *should* be. Frederick T. Martens writes that "in their classic text, Basic Elements of Intelligence," [E. Drexel] Godfrey and [Don R.] Harris "added yet another dimension to the investigative process; a dimension that encourages *proactive* as opposed to *reactive* responses." (Emphasis added.) "Criminal Intelligence Analysis," op. cit., pp. 1,2. The point is that *intelli-*

*gence* should be proactive. *Counterintelligence must* be.

25. Law enforcement officers aware of so-called "sting" operations in investigative and enforcement work, will have a good understanding of what the *manipulation* of wrong doers is all about.

## Dangerous Domestic Groups

**S**tate and local police need a counterintelligence consciousness. They need CI as much as federal agencies do, if only to protect themselves against the many individuals and groups that want to penetrate police departments or harm their people or property.<sup>1,2</sup> The opposition would especially like to learn the identities of undercover officers and agents and know about police tactics and procedures. By knowing what the “other side” is doing, our own side can protect itself better.<sup>3</sup>

Paul Copher is a former police officer with extensive experience as a special agent, U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, both in the United States and overseas.<sup>4</sup> In accord with his many varied interests, among other things, he monitors computer bulletin boards (BBS),<sup>5</sup> including those of the “Aryan” Nation. Copher uses “Aryan” as a generic term for Christian Identity Churches; Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA); elements of

the Ku Klux Klan (KKK); and the National Alliance. These are the quasi-religious "right," fundamentalist Christians, extreme conservatives, all claiming to be constitutionalists, as Copher describes them.<sup>6</sup>

Some Aryan units are "personality cults," Copher says, among them James Ellison's CSA, the Rev. Richard Butler's Aryan Nation, which he describes as "hard core," and The Order of David Lane, currently in federal prison. All these groups agree on one thing, Copher says, that ZOG is the enemy. ZOG - the "Zionist Occupation Government" - is what "Aryans" call federal and local government authorities. Aryans refer repeatedly, as a special abomination, to what they term the ZOG "IRS/ATF Task Force" (the Internal Revenue Service/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Task Force).<sup>7</sup>

These extremist groups are very well versed in intelligence and counterintelligence practices. Members of the Aryan Nation, for example, watch television programs of the "real life" variety, such as COPS, Top Cop, True Tales of the Highway Patrol, etc., to identify officers and learn the tactics of police Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (SWAT), informant handling, raid planning and hostage negotiations, Copher says.<sup>8</sup> A commercial film of great interest, "Red Dawn," depicts popular resistance in the Mid-West U.S. to a Communist military occupation. A favorite of the AZ [Arizona] Patriots led by Ty Hardin, former TV and motion picture actor, the film is a fictional account of a Communist occupation of part of the U.S. It is monitored repeatedly for its tactical lessons. If those lessons could be used against a *Communist* occupation (albeit fictional), the thinking goes, they can be used against a *U.S. Government* occupation.<sup>9</sup>

Anti-ZOG elements identify and track local police officers who might be encountered some day under cover, Copher says. Their homes and personal automobiles are identified and noted for future reference. Their installa-

tions are photographed. Postal service "sorters" are recruited to report who receives police magazines, and so forth.

The groups use high-tech means in their work. By monitoring BBS and checking with subscribers to newsletters, Copher has learned that the Christian Identity group, survivalists and others have studied videotapes of the siege of the compound in Waco, Texas, of David Koresh's "Davidians" for lessons on FBI and ATF operational organization, tactics, and equipment. The BBS, he says, have noted the absence of ATF radio security before and after the Waco raid, lack of coordination with local fire fighting units, lack of concern for the presence of children inside the compound, and the effectiveness of Koresh's disinformation, with each cult member emerging from the compound giving different details of what was going on inside.

According to Copher, the various groups hope to learn from the lessons of Waco ways to frustrate hostage negotiations, a particularly important aspect of police "special operations" work. As a barricade crisis develops, some hostage-takers insist on continuing conversations with the "first guy" - the local officer first on the scene. If hostage-takers insist on negotiating with the "first guy," the supposedly more-experienced and better-trained state or federal specialists who arrive on the scene later will be frozen out of the process. This tactic is also employed by international terrorists to confuse hostage negotiators.

In his "Domestic Intelligence Report," a column appearing in *Security Intelligence Report*, the widely-respected biweekly security newsletter,<sup>10</sup> Copher writes that "(m)any of the groups are now taking steps to exploit weaknesses they found, including a vulnerability to adverse publicity.<sup>11</sup> In terms of hardware and facilities, they are discussing external command-detonated devices, booby traps, tank ditches, and other measures. They have bought

new gas masks, ceramic vests, night vision devices, electronic sensors, perimeter security alarms, parabolic microphones, and dark goggles. They have bought the latest technology and equipment books, as well as video tapes on hostage techniques."<sup>12,13</sup> This is preparation for real combat.

Local law enforcement officers, active duty and reserve, are recruited and paid to provide training to the Aryan groups, Copher claims. Armed Forces veterans, especially special warfare personnel, are spotted in the lobbies of Veterans Administration hospitals. Later, attempts are made to persuade them to become instructors for the groups. Similar methods are used by narcotics groups to recruit mustered-out military pilots for drug flights. Former military technicians are especially sought, Copher says.

The far right has become very sophisticated in its security procedures before recruiting new members. Twenty-four hour surveillance is often placed on prospective recruits, for example, with parabolic microphones put near their homes to learn as much as possible about them before deciding whether or not to sign them up.<sup>14</sup>

Many illegal groups clandestinely exploit advances in technology to frustrate law enforcement, Copher says. Drug traffickers watch commercial television "reality" programs such as "COPS," as extremists groups do, to identify potential undercover law enforcement officers. American terrorist-oriented groups do the same thing, he says, videotaping news and so-called "expose" programs. With the advent of new technology, he points out, TV film images are isolated and high-quality photographs made and transmitted abroad by facsimile machine for CI use by criminals overseas. The criminal groups can also communicate by radio using "burst transmissions."<sup>15</sup>

Two TV programs on the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), aired on the A&E and Fox TV networks,

reportedly yielded high-quality photographs of DEA field agents and supporting military personnel in Latin America. The murder in Arizona in mid-1994 of a DEA agent points out the need for personal protection awareness by agents, Copher says. The killing of the agent got broad local TV coverage and, in view of the practice of local dealers to record such news programs and ship the tapes to Latin America, the appearance on TV of other DEA agents, including those under cover, creates new risks for them, Copher points out.

The overall issue of television coverage, incidentally, has more than one aspect: following TV appearances, such as on the "Geraldo" show, extremists claim they receive hundreds of applications for membership and thousands of requests for information on their groups.

The foregoing examples of particular CI problems facing law enforcement demonstrate excellent intelligence and CI practices on the part of the drug cartels. Not long ago, according to press accounts, federal agencies and a federal court did away with "reality" commercial TV coverage of law enforcement operations, with good CI sense apparently winning out over PR - or public relations - sense, after all.

Dangerous criminal groups also use more classical CI means to build their files and prepare for future operations. For example, right wing computer networks, Copher reports, listed the names and addresses of signers of newspaper advertisements congratulating Israel on its birthday in 1993. The signers are listed as "ZOG leaders" and "race traitors." The names and addresses of "anti-gun politicians" are similarly listed. Some of the groups' files are becoming quite technical. "A computer net called *Wiederstand* is in operation by Aryan Nations to warn of federal or local surveillance, interviews or any expression of interest," Copher says.<sup>16,17</sup>

Members of certain extremist groups apply CI prin-

ciples cleverly, and are becoming quite sophisticated in their conduct. Skinheads, for instance, let their hair grow to avoid easy identification. They hang around the peripheries of other groups to help out or provoke trouble, depending on the situation. Acting the part of peaceful demonstrators, they know their presence can be a provocation to others, Copher says - in the event of trouble, police are forced to protect the white supremacists from attack and the desired media coverage is obtained.<sup>18</sup>

To make police counteraction more difficult, gang *modus operandi* (method of operation, or M.O.) is evolving and becoming more sophisticated. Gang members are changing their habits, Copher points out. To prevent easy identification based on their manner of dress, they are wearing normal street clothing and learning to blend in. Gang affiliation, Copher says, is now being noted on the underside of cap visors or in sweatbands or written on the underside of belts, requiring police to check suspects' caps and belts.<sup>19</sup>

Members of hate groups, Copher continues, especially in the suburbs, employ CI skills in seeking out and recording police officers' home addresses and personal automobile license numbers. Women and girls, while making the rounds collecting money for high school athletic programs, look for indications of membership in police fraternal organizations, Military Police, bomb squads, and so forth. They look for concealed police lights or radios in automobiles or for magazines, jackets, decals, and other evidence in homes of law enforcement connections, Copher explains. A photocopied notebook with such details was distributed to local gang members, on one occasion, he says.<sup>20</sup>

Members of Aryan Nations groups actually boast of penetrations of several American police departments. The groups are sometimes sophisticated enough to use cover companies for their work. In one case, a cleaning service

was used to enter a police intelligence office where "link charts" of criminal connections on the walls were photographed.<sup>21</sup>

After television coverage revealed FBI telephone surveillance of Palestinians in the U.S., certain hate groups began to upgrade their own communications by turning to dead drops. (Ironically, they had to stop using soft drink cans as message containers because environmentalists were picking them up for recycling.) A favorite dead drop device is the hollow plaster "rock" often sold to suburban householders to hide a spare house key, Copher says. The rock can hold a note for secret communication, the extremists realize.<sup>22</sup>

Sometimes, despite their mutual antagonisms, the divergent groups get together peaceably. For example, according to Copher, in mid-1992, Earth First!, religious sects, anti-abortion activists, Muslim extremists, and other immigrant groups were all represented at a rally at an American university along with the National Alliance, Patriots Coalition, and Aryans. Members of Latin American church sanctuary organizations even mingled freely with those of the latter units.<sup>23</sup>

More recently private "militias" have been formed, the "Arizona Rangers" (not to be confused with the police volunteer organization with the same name), "Arizona Patriots" and "BP Militia,"<sup>24</sup> being some examples. The KKK, for its part, now has a maritime arm<sup>25</sup> and also has members within the U.S. Armed Forces, mostly in the Navy.<sup>26</sup> The Black Liberation Army, a leftist black revolutionary organization, has infiltrated the Air Force, Copher says. Extremist groups seek to recruit members in the U.S. Armed Forces, especially those in communications, security police, and explosive ordnance disposal.

If Copher has it right - that criminal and extremist groups identify officers and pass the information to other gang members, permitting hostile elements to "make"

undercover assets, possibly with fatal results for the latter - it demonstrates that the other side's CI is better in many ways than that of law enforcement.<sup>27</sup> It would not be the first time, of course, nor would it be the first time that American CI and security interests - keeping undercover personnel undercover - lost out to the penchant of the bureaucracy for favorable publicity or its carelessness at the expense of security.

Copher, a former law enforcement officer himself, is convinced of the value of police intelligence and counterintelligence. It is worthwhile therefore to quote him at length, making note of the measures the opposition uses to counter law enforcement. His observations emphasize the seriousness of the problems faced by law enforcement and the need to deal effectively with them. The point - again - is that *we* better have good intelligence and counterintelligence - the *other side* certainly does.

According to Copher, "Surveillance and background checks by US gangs are increasing, and gangs have acquired scanners and similar equipment to monitor cellular phone calls. A TV program in the U.S. had a segment on how intelligence on an individual can be bought via legal and illegal means. Many people who thought gangs were a bunch of stupid kids in baggy clothes got a shock. Baggy clothes and tattoos<sup>28</sup> doesn't (sic) mean they can't break into a computer data base for information on undercover agents. Potential infiltrators of many kinds of gangs, as well as would-be drug clients, are increasingly being checked out. Defense Intelligence Agency prefix being printed on DIA credit union charge cards is one example of how easy some covert operators can be uncovered."<sup>29</sup>

There are many ways gangs and other criminals can harm the police. In addition to intelligence and CI operations, they carry out what in federal intelligence circles would be called "covert action" operations. For example,

Copher reports that LSD-spiked stamps were found by police during a routine check in Connecticut. In Arizona and California LSD has been squirted on the door handles of patrol cars. In a Western American city, more than half the squad cars in a police station parking lot were disabled by the insertion, by persons unknown, of Superglue in the keyholes of door and trunk locks.<sup>30</sup> Saboteurs, whether organized crooks or pranksters, should be denied ready access to police property.

Criminal gangs in the U.S. also have telephone and radio intercept capability, Copher warns. "They have contacts in credit bureaus, motor vehicle divisions and police departments themselves. Gang members have relatives in all walks of life.<sup>31</sup> Ex-cops, former military, and even (if drugs or money are involved) contracted private investigators are used to check out backgrounds of alleged buyers or new gang members," he says.<sup>32</sup>

Hostile action against the authorities has been going on for a long time. A retired homicide detective told me that some years ago a Colombian cocaine cartel illegally bought personal credit information about police drug investigators from a major credit company. With such information in hand, the cartels were able to threaten officers and their families (this issue is dealt with in more detail elsewhere).<sup>33</sup> Threats to officers are one thing to take into account - threats to family members are not something most of them bargained for when they swore the oath. The illegal source in the credit company in the above case was never found, incidentally.<sup>34</sup>

These and other examples of hostile intelligence-like threats against the police demonstrate that a counterintelligence war is indeed going on between criminal groups and law enforcement, whether or not it is fully recognized by the latter. Law enforcement cannot afford to fall behind in this war - it must develop and use CI skills better than the "dark side" does.

## ENDNOTES:

1. The police, corrections workers, and even employees of state mental hospitals are often "less liked," the term Maryland state senator John Hafer uses. Hafer has promoted legislation in Maryland to protect such public employees - anybody who has a job where they can be "less liked" - from harassment and even retribution from disgruntled people. For example, Sgt. Donald Cahill of the Prince William County Police in Virginia, testified before the U.S. Congress in February 1994 that "a member of a motorcycle gang threatened to kill his partner because he arrested the gang member's brother. The gang member found the officer's home address after hanging out at the police department," he said, "and writing down the tag number on the arresting officer's personal car." *The Washington Times*, Feb. 21, 1994, C4. Surely, many American police officers are aware of cases such as this.
2. Members of Aryan Nations groups boast that they have actually infiltrated several police departments. *Security Intelligence Report*, May 16, 1994, p.4. Such claims are often inflated, of course, but there are cases of penetrations, one example being the detective in the NYPD intelligence unit, described earlier, who was imprisoned for working with John Gotti, the New York mob boss. The extremist groups must be taken seriously. "In 1980-85, racist movements were the driving force behind a series of bank robberies and murders, including the deaths of five law enforcement officials and Denver radio talk show host Alan Berg." Patrick Clawson, "Coping With Terrorism in the United States," *Orbis*, Summer 1989, p. 342. Puerto Rican separatist terrorists, *Los Macheteros* (the Puerto Rican Popular Army), have murdered police officers and security guards during robberies of armored trucks.
3. Obviously, this maxim works both ways.
4. In addition to having been a law enforcement officer in the U.S., Paul Copher was a federal special agent and instructor in Terrorism and Intelligence Recognition at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School and Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). He put his training to use in counterterrorism and antiterrorism in the Middle East and had various intelligence duties concerning domestic terrorist and subversive groups. He continues to put his knowledge and experience to work in keeping up with these groups.
5. In addition to monitoring BBS, Copher monitors the publications and interviews members of groups of interest to study

- their aims, goals, etc. "HUMINT [human intelligence] is the key," he says.
6. There have been indications recently of a split between the "old" Aryans and the "new" Aryans.
  7. Targets bearing the portraits of federal officials and "gun-control" advocates have been found on the shooting ranges of these groups. Also a "wanted poster" has circulated picturing the FBI sniper who shot and killed the wife of "Randy" Weaver at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, during the law enforcement fiasco in 1993 in which three people were killed.
  8. American law enforcement is not the only victim of criminal "hi-tech" CI work. "Inmates at the Blakenhurst prison in central England saw a closeup news photo of warden David Brooke unlocking a cell door during a public visitors day tour. They scrutinized the photo, duplicated the keys and the prison spent \$128,600 replacing cell locks," according to a story in *Security Intelligence*, July 26, 1993, p. 1.
  9. Every now and then, a piece of fiction, whether a book or a movie, is of special interest for training purposes. For example, because of my intelligence background, I was particularly impressed by the book, *The Day of the Jackal*, by John Forsyth, when I first read it a couple of decades ago. (Later, the story appeared as a movie.) I was intrigued therefore when I read that a Soviet intelligence defector had reported that the KGB used the book in training. Apparently, "Red Dawn" has caught the imagination of the Aryans in the same way.
  10. The term, "widely-respected," is used advisedly. Both the good guys and others are fans of *Security Intelligence Report*. In 1992, Paul Copher says, extremist groups in New York City did some "dumpster diving" at an NYPD station to recover copies of *SIR* that the police had thrown out. That incident is a real endorsement - the fact that the troublesome folks wanted *SIR* so badly. Curiously, however, *SIR*'s editor-publisher is at a loss to explain the incident; the NYPD was not a subscriber to *SIR* that season, it seems.
  11. Copher has since told me that each time a U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agent "makes news" the "groups" show up to protest alleged civil rights violations. They secretly film USBP agents, using video cameras hidden in their cars, hoping to "catch" them using force or obscene language.
  12. *SIR*, op. cit., p 7.
  13. "...[T]ruckloads of Soviet-made night vision goggles," Copher told me later. The "dark goggles," are defense against "flash-

bang" grenades used by counterterrorist forces to stun their human targets.

14. We can only wish that units of the government, such as police departments, were as professional in personnel recruitment as some of these Aryan organizations appear to be. Press reports tell of police officers in New York City having been hired despite multiple felony convictions. The Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C., has had similar problems, having recruited drug traffickers, among other criminals, as cadets. Of course, the new officers continued as felons on the force but now with the additional "know-how" and the authority a "badge and gun" provide. The "higher level" jurisdictions have their problems too. For example, clearing White House employees has been a nightmare. Unable to properly clear a number of such employees, the Secret Service at one point expressed fear for the President's safety. See Sulc, "Security Clearances: What Do They Mean?", *SIR*, Apr. 18, 1994. Another problem with regard to clearances is that throughout the federal government, "security" considerations continue to play some role but "loyalty" is no longer a concern of the government, having been done away with as a criterion for clearance.

15. A "burst transmission" is a means of sending a radio message quickly - in a sudden "spurt," as it were - to reduce the chances of radio monitoring by someone else. Narcotics groups have the money for the latest technology.

16. *SIR*, May 17, 1993, p 7.

17. *Wiederstand* is German for "We Stand Again." It is difficult to understand the penchant of the Aryan Nation and other so-called "right-wing" groups in the U.S. for Nazi models. The Nazi (or National Socialist) phenomenon in Germany of the 1930s and 1940s had left wing origins. The same was true of Fascism in Italy. Both Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy and their early followers came from socialist backgrounds. Perhaps American racists can overlook the socialist content of Nazism as long as its racism is virulent enough. No one said extremists must be logical. In any case, there is considerable contact between American Nazis and German Nazis today and the latter import much of their printed propaganda from the U.S., partly because it is illegal to publish such material in Germany. Leftist groups in the U.S. have been busy at CI for many years. In 1977, when the NYPD intelligence unit was abolished, its files were sent to the New York State Library in Albany, during which process, the index "disappeared." Also, the American left has long exploited the Freedom of Informa-

tion Act to identify confidential police informants. For example, when Joanne Chesimard, the Black Panther Party revolutionary, escaped from prison she left behind FOIA material she had been analyzing to identify police informants inside her organization. Chesimard is still at large, incidentally.

18. In August 1990, in Washington, D.C., a march on the U.S. Capitol was planned by the Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. A Klan leader was quite candid in saying that any violence by counter-demonstrators would play into the hands of the Klan. "It proves that they're the ones that are violent. Not us," he said," as quoted by Carlos Sanchez, of *The Washington Post*. In 1982, counter-demonstrators to another Klan march, "angered at being denied a chance to confront the Klan directly, hurled rocks and bottles at police and smashed downtown store windows." Twelve officers were injured and many businesses looted on that occasion. The KKK brings out violent counter-demonstrators. *The Washington Post*, Aug. 29, 1990, D1. "They feed on each other," an official of B'nai B'rith observed some years ago.

19. Paul Copher, *SIR*, May 17, 1993, p. 7.

20. *SIR*, July 27, 1992, p 7.

21. See William Dunman's interview elsewhere for a similar story about a cleaning service working against police interests. Some break-ins were motivated by the desire to steal "criss-cross directories" in the search for information on police officers and other targets of interest.

22. The police should be very much aware of self-storage areas, often used by all kinds of groups for caching, Copher says. Also, containers for underground caching of weapons are much in demand in certain parts of the country.

23. *SIR*, July 26, 1993, p 7.

24. These so-called "militias" are private *paramilitary* organizations; whether they qualify as true militias in the Anglo-American tradition is open to debate. The United States National Guard and the individual state defense forces, where they exist, also militias, would likely be found on the side of the authorities (what the informal militias would call ZOG) in any face off.

25. With respect to the KKK, Copher says to look for the outward signs, such as bumper stickers that say, "AKIA," which mean, "A Klansman I Am." The symbol "88," used by Skinheads, means "Heil Hitler," the eighth letter of the alphabet being "H."

26. Recent press reports say the Ku Klux Klan has lost much of

its strength over the past few years.

27. Some extremist groups force a new member to take part in a serious crime and otherwise determine how much he/she will do for the organization. Such measures are daunting to infiltrators.

28. Speaking of tattoos, the U.S. Marines at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base have demonstrated how intelligence and CI should work. The overwhelming majority of interned Cuban rafters on the base are decent people, but as always among Cuban refugees, there are criminals as well as dispatched intelligence agents. In any case, the Marines at the "Gitmo" compounds look for tattoos on their wards, often found on the web of a hand, which display interesting things about the owner. Three dots mean a robber, for example, four, a murderer. Battalion S-2 (intelligence) passes such data down; Marines with binoculars, looking for suspects from outside the wire, report upward. Suspects are then removed for questioning. Interestingly, the data on Cuban tattoos used by the Corps at Guantanamo Bay was provided by the U.S. Coast Guard, a good example of sharing among agencies. As Jack Morris, former law enforcement officer in California, says, if crooks are stupid enough to advertise, we should be smart enough to respond appropriately. The Corps, apparently, agrees. *Semper fi. And, Semper Peratis.*

29. Paul Copher, *SIR*, June 13, 1994, p. 3.

30. *SIR* Sept. 5, 1994, p. 7.

31. Certain groups have acquired blue prints of public buildings, including jails, Copher says.

32. *SIR*, July 11, 1994, p.7.

33. See the interview with Stanley Wilson, former MPD homicide detective.

34. Americans by nature seem to have little innate sense of security. Police personnel - and professional intelligence and CI officials at the federal level, also, sad to say - are too often not the exceptions they should be. Overseas, where local servants are often about, what is overheard at embassy dinner parties, let's say, is appalling. In his book, *The Fourth World War*, the Count de Marenches, former director of the French foreign intelligence service - then called the SCECE - wrote about security in the U.S. Capital, describing a conversation he had in Washington some years before with Judge William Webster, then Director of the FBI (and later Director of Central Intelligence). Having hailed a number of taxi cabs in Wash-

ington, M. Marenches was unfavorably impressed by the large number of immigrant drivers. In Paris, more than 80 percent of all taxi drivers were French, it seems. "Don't you think this is a great danger to allow all these people to drive cabs in the capital without monitoring them or identifying them more closely?" Marenches asked the FBI director, who was surprised at the suggestion of a problem. "A cab is quite simply an automobile with a big trunk that can transport people, papers, ideas, explosives, weapons, plus it has a radio," the French intelligence chief pointed out. "It's perfect. If I had to organize terrorists in Washington, I'd recruit a couple of cabbies. They're terrific. They're everywhere. And *totally invisible.*" (Emphasis added.) (Paul Copher agrees, being particularly irked that delivery personnel and taxi drivers, virtually "invisible" in most places, are especially so, it seems, on military installations.) It was clear from his earliest visits to the U.S., de Marenches wrote, that a major incident might one day happen in the U.S. A nation without a national identity card, with enormous frontiers and coastlines and "foreigners and minorities of every persuasion and paranoia, some of them nursing every bitterness known to man," he wrote. The French intelligence chief's concerns regarding America's overall security were indeed prescient although, it must be admitted, he failed to predict the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993 or the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995. He was thinking about Washington, D.C., the U.S. Capital.

## Big City Gangs

The large organized gangs of the cities of America present problems beyond those of the dangerous domestic groups, of which they are such prominent members, and to which a full chapter has been devoted in this book. The gangs, by themselves, create special problems and require special attention on the part of law enforcement. Among the myriad headaches they cause the authorities, they present counterintelligence problems. To make matters worse, they offer up the specter of urban warfare.

The unprecedented rioting in Los Angeles in April 1992 was not spontaneous and was *not caused by* the jury verdict in the trial of police officers accused of beating Rodney King. The violence was well planned by the gangs, well in advance. A key part of the scheme was that the verdict, if it came out "not guilty," would serve as both the pretext *and* the signal for the South Central L.A. uprising. Whatever the presumed cause or causes of the riot-

ing, many key participants were organized and ready to go when the signal came. They struck first; the "popular" reaction to the verdict - the widespread looting and general lawlessness - followed their lead.

The media announcement of the jury verdict in the King case was the "go-ahead" for which the organized criminal groups were waiting.<sup>1</sup> Weapons had been distributed and targets, chosen in advance - principally gun shops and liquor stores - were then sacked according to plan. Then U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr later reported that a federal investigation found that the "involvement of gang members in the riot was significant."<sup>2</sup>

Repeated news bulletins and continuing lurid network treatment of the developing Los Angeles violence heightened emotions and drew rioters to key areas, but the gangs planned the rioting and the gangs started it. They were amply armed for the fight. "In '65 (the year of the Watts section rioting, which also took place in L.A.)," a gang member told *Nightline* of ABC-TV News, "we didn't have assault rifles, Uzis, hand grenades, bullet-proof vests - we've got 'em now." The gangs were prepared for war the second time around.

What the gangs did in L.A. was insurgency. The National Guard's "...role (in the Los Angeles rioting) was more akin to low-intensity conflict (or urban warfare) than riot control," said Maj. Gen. James D. Delk, commander of the federal troops sent to L.A. to restore order.

Estimates of gang membership in Los Angeles County run from 100,000 to 150,000 (including 26,000 Crips and 15,000 Bloods), according to *The Washington Times*, perhaps as many as 400,000, nation-wide.<sup>3</sup> A large proportion of gang members belong to highly organized groups involved in arms and narcotics trafficking and reaching into many other American cities. They also reach into the prisons, as we know. Many gang members are prison "graduates," some actually having been recruited and

trained behind bars.

The gangs are well financed by cocaine profits and some are directly involved with Colombian drug cartels. Gang ties have also been reported with *El Sendero Luminoso* (The Shining Path), Maoist, narco-terrorist guerrilla organization in Peru. *Sendero*, one of the most vicious revolutionary groups in the world, not content with destabilizing its own country, forged ties with revolutionaries in neighboring countries, as well as in the U.S. Much weakened over the past few years, *Sendero* is less of a threat, but, any connection with such a vicious organization at any time, should draw intense CI interest, not to mention widespread condemnation.

The notorious Crips and Bloods, two of L.A.'s largest gangs, have invaded as many as 50 American cities,<sup>4</sup> expanding as far as the East Coast and the Upper Midwest. Their personnel circulate continuously between the streets and the prisons, with the latter playing an important role in recruitment and training. Publicly financed private "social welfare" organizations, working with the gangs and their youth affiliates, also recruit, indoctrinate, and train new members. Some implicated social workers and prison missionaries are dedicated radicals, others are merely naive. Still others are dedicated radicals, under the guise of belonging to "prison reform" organizations or "social studies" groups to cover their real work.

Los Angeles is by no means the only dangerous hot spot for gangs in the U.S.; Chicago is another. "The Chicago street gang turned terrorists-for-hire, El-Rukn, which evolved from the infamous Blackstone Rangers, is another force to be reckoned with both inside and outside the prison walls of Illinois and elsewhere," says Daniel Meany. "Described by the controversial Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam as 'born warriors of true liberation,'" Meany recalls, "the El-Rukn in 1985 attempted to purchase a missile to be used at Chicago's O'Hare Airport in order to

attack an airliner."<sup>5</sup>

"Predicting that urban street gangs will play a 'very important role' in a future race war in the United States, Farrakhan has said that they 'were born to settle the score' and are 'born warriors for true liberation...waiting for the messiah.'"<sup>6</sup> It is worth noting that in 1979 El-Rukn sued the Illinois Department of Corrections, for recognition as a religious organization, with the special privileges that designation would confer, to hold their own "worship services" in state prisons. They lost.<sup>7</sup>

According to Paul Copher, the Republic of New Afrika (RNA), the Black Liberation Army (BLA), and the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) were also involved in the Los Angeles rioting and are among the organizations planning violence in many other American cities.<sup>8</sup> The RCP, a Marxist-Leninist group based in Chicago, like the Crips and Bloods in Los Angeles, is also deeply involved in prison work, making "...a conscious effort to recruit prisoners," and "Shine the Light of Revolution Behind Prison Walls," as the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) describes their work.<sup>9</sup>

More recently, Georgie Ann Guyer, in writing about big city gangs, said this: "There are an estimated 50,000 gang members in my beloved hometown of Chicago - many of them wearing emblems of belonging. Not only are they responsible, say the police, for the rise in the murder rate over the last 10 years, but now, five gang members and convicted murderers are actually running for the Chicago City Council under the rubric of the gangs new 'political party,' the 21st Century VOTE."<sup>10</sup>

Hispanic gangs in Los Angeles, some of which date to before World War II, although so far without the benefit of a political party, joined with whites in collaborating with the black gangs during the rioting, according to Copher, and even joined in the looting. Some white gangs, moreover, including hard-core white supremacists, added

to the bedlam by instigating further violence on the part of blacks.<sup>11</sup>

Hispanics appeared to be controlling or at least coordinating action in some places, using megaphones and hand-held radios, says Copher. They were particularly interested in looting sporting goods stores but their main objective seemed to be to overtax the authorities, causing chaos. At a certain point, the police, worried that they were dealing with full insurrection beyond the massive looting taking place, expected "total warfare," which fortunately did not materialize.<sup>12</sup>

Puzzled police officials, according to Copher, theorized that some of the gang action was in the nature of practice and testing (called "probing" in intelligence parlance). Hispanics in the mobs seemed to be trying to determine "what they could get away with," police officers told Copher,<sup>13</sup> perhaps for *strategic* reasons. Copher said he was reminded during the L.A. rioting of his experience in Tehran in late 1978 when mob violence toppled the Shah of that country. Then too, he recalled, the raging mobs were whipped up and directed by trained cadres using megaphones and radios.<sup>14,15</sup>

The investigation of the Los Angeles rioting conducted by the special panel chaired by Judge William Webster, former head of the CIA and FBI, was widely accused of sacrificing honesty for "political correctness." Det. Lou Koven, an 18-year veteran of the LAPD, charged that, among other things, "the Webster Commission's glossed over the fact that ... the city of Los Angeles is grossly underpoliced ..."<sup>16</sup> The report also ... "ignored the tremendous meddling in the LAPD by politicians, the ACLU, and other so-called community leaders."<sup>17</sup>

The news media had much to answer for in L.A. Much media coverage of the rioting, before and after, was fatuous.<sup>18</sup> TV stations sent helicopters to hover over the main scenes of violence to broadcast live the message that

the police had lost control, at least at certain points. Looters and arsonists on the ground were among those getting the message. Television, unwittingly or otherwise, was adding its expertise to the gangs' communications capability in the form of tactical reconnaissance (or "recon" as it is called in the intelligence trade).

Fortunately, there were also voices of sanity about L.A. "Witness Los Angeles," said William Murchison, newspaper columnist, "where the [TV] networks (much more than the local stations) made Rage all the rage. TV bestowed on murderers and looters a sociological identity - the dispossessed, the downtrodden - that must return to haunt us," he said, "as their example sinks in at home and elsewhere. Burn, baby, burn! and along will come the cameras," Mr. Murchison exclaimed.<sup>19</sup>

What is taking place in certain American cities is *insurgency*. The response to insurgency, of course, is *counterinsurgency*. The left knows all about insurgency - it is part of its revolutionary doctrine. Among other things, insurgents routinely seek to discredit government by highlighting the latter's inability to protect its citizens.<sup>20,21</sup> To illustrate: some years ago the chairman of the Communist Party of Peru (CPP) pointed out that Sendero Luminoso in Peru, by inflicting economic damage and creating "urban spectaculars," was ensuring maximum publicity and maximum humiliation of the government.<sup>22</sup>

What "Chairman Gonzalo" was talking about was insurgency. Standard Marxist dogma, the Communist leader's observations aptly apply to the "urban spectacular" of Los Angeles of April 1992, *not to mention* gang action in other American cities.

The L.A. rioting, the paramount example of this new (for *this* country, anyway) phenomenon of insurgency, may also be the harbinger of something of an entirely different order. Georgie Anne Guyer, the columnist, had just visited India when she wrote that whole states in that coun-

try "... were run by murderers, racketeers and felons, a process ...the Indians called the criminalization of politics." The phenomenon is apparent across the globe, Guyer said: "A growing takeover of politics, but also of the military and the economy, by criminals is occurring in country after country."

Although Guyer was referring primarily to India and countries such as the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Peru, and Somalia, she did go on to mention L.A. "Or take the case of the vicious Hispanic and black gangs in Los Angeles," she said.<sup>23</sup>

The U.S. itself may not be immune to the endemic lawlessness afflicting certain other countries around the globe. Such lawlessness contributes to and intensifies the problems of insurgency.

The core of a counterinsurgency program needs a strong law enforcement intelligence program including CI, of course, and encompassing both police and correctional agencies. As pointed out elsewhere, however, as a consequence of a number of factors, including political controversy, many law enforcement intelligence units around the nation were weakened or even abolished in the 1960s and 1970s and *counterinsurgency* has not caught on. Budgetary problems are often the reason but political problems also play a role. Before the April 1992 rioting in Los Angeles, "normal intelligence-gathering ... came to a virtual halt" ... and "... normal police operations were handcuffed," Lou Koven, the LAPD detective, said, because of political interference - the "tremendous meddling by politicians and so-called community leaders."<sup>24</sup>

Fortunately, however, it is not a one-sided struggle. With intelligence making a contribution, law enforcement has won some notable successes. A particular bright spot was heralded in the press in early 1992, when a series of convictions sent 52 members of El Rukn, the "invincible" and "dreaded" Chicago gang, described above, to prison.

Successors to the 1960s Blackstone Rangers, these "darlings of the left, recipients of federal funds and associates of mainstream politicians," as the Associated Press (AP) described them, finally succumbed to a long investigation and federal indictments.<sup>25</sup>

Cocaine was El Rukn's financial life blood, enabling the organization to own real estate and businesses including a restaurant and a *security guard* firm. El Rukn even had its own *political arm*. Several years ago, as a consequence of their international terrorist ties, "(f)ive members [of El Rukn]," to quote Meany, "... were convicted in 1987 of conspiring to obtain money from the Libyan government to commit terrorist acts in the United States."<sup>26</sup> "The nation's ultimate street gang" is "off the streets and behind bars," the AP reported. "...(S)urvivors, police say, lack the savvy or skills to run their lucrative drug-dealing trade."<sup>27,28</sup>

Chicago, albeit with federal help, beat - for a time, at least - its principal gang problem. So did Tacoma, Washington, earlier, for in the late 1980s the LA-based gangs, the Crips and Bloods, invaded that city, too. Eugene Methvin, an editor of *Reader's Digest*, in a riveting account in that magazine, outlined how Tacoma police, starting with two dedicated "beat cops," first on their own time and then with departmental support, developed an intelligence program to combat the "invaders."<sup>29</sup>

In any case, the urban rebellion in Los Angeles in April was by far the most significant instance of insurgency the country has seen in the 20th Century, with an estimated 71 deaths and as much a \$850 million in damage.<sup>30</sup> "The LAPD ... suffered the worst disgrace a police department can suffer, which is to lose a city through its own impotence," said Joseph McNamara, former police chief of San Jose, California, and a veteran of street disturbances in Harlem, New York, and Kansas City.<sup>31</sup> One of the causes for the extent of the rioting, Daryl Gates,

Chief of the LAPD, said later, was "the failure of political will."<sup>32</sup> Chief Gates was probably referring, at least in part, to the weaknesses of Mayor Tom Bradley with whom he had numerous disagreements. The mayor, at a news conference aired nationally, after the King verdict, urged residents to *protest* the verdict, albeit *peacefully*. "He did nothing to discourage the impending violence," charged Det. Koven, quoted earlier.<sup>33</sup> Such shortsightedness on the part of a high political figure is difficult to fathom.

A "failure of political will," incidentally, was also blamed as contributing to police *and* political mishandling of the rioting in Washington, DC in April 1991, a year before L.A.<sup>34</sup> The term, "a failure of political will," hardly seems adequate, however, and is even misleading, to describe the "meddling" by politicians and so-called "community leaders," as other observers have called them.

Street violence, drugs, terrorism, and agitation for race warfare on a large scale add up to anarchy. Anarchy, of course, is both the instrument of insurgency and one of its results.

Any government must understand the environment in which it functions, whether in the international arena or at home (a point I have made elsewhere). It must know what its opposition is up to. Faced with a major potential uprising, a community with good intelligence and CI can head off confrontation, or at least limit its effects. Intelligence is a matter of "leverage," a great "multiplier" of limited resources. Insurgency, a very serious state of affairs for a government and the people, needs intelligence and CI, too.<sup>35</sup>

The public must not be misled by the characterizations, "dispossessed" and "downtrodden," applied to armed, organized, thieving, murderous hoods, nor should it misunderstand the nature of their "urban spectaculars." To be sure, the Marxist revolutionary groups, and others, are plotting more. Officials, for their part, must understand

the real meaning of the "probes" and "provocations" and prison "reforms" on the part of "prison missionaries" and "social workers" and "social studies" groups of the gangs and their supporters. They must undertake reforms of their own, involving especially a viable counterintelligence program.

Law enforcement authorities must address such questions as how to deal with the "political arm" of such a terrorist organization as *El Rukn*, and particularly its *security guard firm*. How did such a security firm get a license? Surely the Chicago police played some role in its certification, perhaps by omission. Moreover, how could it happen that *federal* money went to El Rukn along the way? Finally, who finances the "citizen reform" and "social studies" groups who "minister" to prison gangs? Further questions: How does a political group justify a terrorist wing? How does a terrorist group merit a "political wing?"

Former U.S. Attorney General William Barr put the fundamental issue succinctly, as follows: "The first duty of any civil government is to protect its citizens. Through increased Federal, State and local cooperation we must rid our nation's communities of the violent predators who are attempting to destroy the fabric of our society."

The large urban gangs, described here, have been involved in domestic "urban warfare." They have connections with the "Columbian drug cartels," who specialize in protection rackets, extortion, and mass murder. They have conspired with Muammar Khadhafi's Libya, notorious for its numerous sophisticated, hi-tech, terrorist crimes, such as the destruction of civilian airliners. They have contacts with the uncommonly vicious *Sendero Luminoso*, those "protectors of the people" in Peru. Although despicable, these are enemies worthy of respect, having considerable resources with which to support "the revolution." They are capable of inflicting great harm.

They must be the objects of intensive intelligence attention and counterintelligence must play its role in defending America's communities from them.

### **The Infiltration of Law Enforcement Agencies by Gang Members**

As has been pointed out, elsewhere, the intelligence and counterintelligence skills of criminal organizations are often better than those of law enforcement. "Street gang members have infiltrated the ranks of the Chicago police force, a *Sun-Times* investigation shows, and the city's top cop says the department is largely helpless to weed them out," reported Jorge Oclander of the *Sun-Times* of Chicago on Oct. 8, 1995. "Gangs Move Into Police Ranks," the paper's front page headline said, with the Gangster Disciples, the Latin Kings and the Latin Lovers among gang members having penetrated the Chicago Police. "If the Mob bought judges, politicians and policemen, why do we think that the gangs can't do it?" Police Superintendent Matt Rodriguez asked rhetorically. Why indeed?<sup>36</sup>

"They come in and learn our investigative techniques, can spot undercover cops, know how we do things," Deputy Supt. Michael W. Hoke, head of police internal affairs, claimed.<sup>37</sup> Exactly as has been described by the sources of this book. Without adequate counterintelligence, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) is seeing the criminal penetrations that Washington, New York, Philadelphia, and other police forces throughout the U.S. have experienced.

One Chicago patrol officer, arrested while attempting to sell cocaine to undercover detectives, readily admitted that he was a Gangster Disciple, "had always been one and would continue to be one." While refusing to talk about the gang's drug operations, he made it quite clear which came first to him, his oath to law enforcement

or to his gang.<sup>38</sup> The crooked police officer is now in prison where he may well be serving as a gang "ambassador" or perhaps teaching police methods to eager recruits as a "crime college" instructor.

Gang members find police authority, among other things, provides them broad *entre*, including access to drug houses with false warrants or the *cache* to steal cocaine from street dealers. It also provides them with good counterintelligence. An undercover agent for the Drug Enforcement Administration told the *Sun-Times*, for example, that "[w]e get ready to pull off the raid and they [gang members] know we're coming."<sup>39</sup>

Regarding gang leaders actually *ordering* members to take the police entrance examination, Police Supt. Rodriguez "would not dismiss it out of hand. These are sophisticated organizations," he explained, "and this level of strategic thinking is well within their capacity. These are very elaborate organizations," he said, "which plan, organize, staff, coordinate and execute orders, rules and they execute people. Why would we think that a plan like this is beyond them?" Why, indeed?

"You never stop being a gang member," Chicago Alderman Ambrosio Medrano told the *Sun-Times*. He, himself, turned down an offer from a gang to become a lawyer at the gang's expense, the alderman said. "The deal they offered was simple. They would pay my tuition but I would have to represent the membership," he explained. The gangs are thinking far ahead, obviously, toward a future supply of crooked lawyers as well as crooked cops, enviable strategic planning.

An amusing aside to this story: one South Side Chicago gang member was taking the police entrance exam when his car outside was ticketed for illegal parking. It turned out that the car had been stolen. Perhaps his gang leader had told him to take the exam but had not *told* him to refrain from stealing a car just to get to the exam site.

As Jack Morris, mentioned elsewhere, would say, "If they are stupid enough to advertise, we should be smart enough to read the ads." In any case, the police aspirant was not allowed to become an officer.

Constitutional protection of freedom of association and a 1992 arbitration of the labor contract with the police union in Chicago make it nearly impossible to dismiss a police officer for having a relationship with gang members, Supt. Rodriguez complained to the *Sun-Times*. The union has a responsibility to defend the officer's right to associate with anyone, a union trustee countered. "Police are charged with a public trust," Rodriguez nonetheless insisted. "We have to hold them to a higher standard."<sup>40</sup>

A representative of the police union protested that "[t]he department can keep out bad cops through good background checks."<sup>41</sup> In fact, the police have a stringent "clearance" procedure for applicants. On paper, at least. Be that as it may, the security situation in the CPD is intolerable. Law enforcement in Chicago, and elsewhere in America, simply must develop systems capable of preventing penetration by criminal forces similar to those described here. Then it must go beyond defense and take the offensive.

## ENDNOTES:

This chapter contains material from an article, Sulc, "America's Insurgency: Terrorism On Our Doorsteps," *Security Intelligence Sourcebook*, Nov. 1993.

1. It is a scandal that, instead of counseling restraint and preparing for trouble, some Los Angeles city officials were calling for protest to the Rodney King verdict even though a blowup had been widely predicted.
2. Jerry Seper, *The Washington Times*, Aug. 26, 1992, A1.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Daniel Meany, "Intelligence Behind the Walls," *Terror Update*, May 1990.
6. "Extremism Targets the Prisons, An ADL Special Report," The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith/Civil Rights Div., New York, 1986.
7. Ibid.
8. Paul Copher, *Security Intelligence*, 27 July 1992, p. 1.
9. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith: "ADL Special Report," op. cit., p. 16.
10. *The Washington Times*, Mar. 13, 1995, A19. Chicago, apparently, continues to permit criminals/terrorists (or *vice versa*) to operate in the open political arena as if they were engaged in lawful pursuits. Other countries act similarly, Northern Ireland (Ulster), for example. The American Ambassador to Great Britain, Adm. William Crowe, is quoted as saying not long ago that many Americans, especially those of Irish descent, look upon the Irish Republican Army as freedom fighters while most British see them as terrorists. "I don't think [the distinction] is appreciated in my country...by the average citizen or *by our government*," the ambassador said (emphasis added). (James Morrison, *The Washington Times*, Mar. 4, 1995, A14). It's a bad business and the law should not permit it.
11. Copher, op. cit. This tactic, well known in intelligence circles, is called "provocation."
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. I believe that the ultimate fall of the Shah of Iran actually began in Washington, D.C., during the latter's visit with then

President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s. It was widely suspected that Iranian dissidents in the U.S. would demonstrate but the U.S. Park Police, the lead law enforcement agency, was unprepared. Its officers, wearing soft caps and equipped only with short clubs, were badly mauled by the demonstrators, whose placards were attached to staves rather than the usual flimsy wooden uprights. The demonstrators were masked - how many were Iranians and how many were allied effectives of other nationalities from sympathetic leftist groups was never revealed. Anyhow, the "Iranians" came to Washington in large numbers in buses from a number of points in the country and left the same way. Much tear gas was used to regain control. The image of the President of the United States and the Shah of Iran weeping together on the rostrum was broadcast throughout the world. His "good will" visit to Washington was a public relations disaster for the Shah. It was not much help for President Carter either. The fiasco in the realm of public order was never adequately explained.

16. The LAPD, at the time, had one of the lowest ratios of police to citizens in the country. Washington, D.C., on the other hand, had one of the highest. Washington plans to correct the imbalance by reducing the size of its police force. I do not know L.A.'s plans.
17. Det. Lou Koven, *The Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 4, 1992.
18. The problem of political meddling in legitimate police work is dealt with elsewhere as are attempts by certain media to explain the L.A. violence as somehow justifiable. By way of illustration, I quote Jerry Seper (op. cit.): "Little Monster" of the Crips gang was featured on ABC-TV's Nightline, where anchor Ted Koppel said he liked the gang leader and other gang bosses very much and was extremely impressed with a great deal of what they had to say and the passion with which they said it." *The Washington Post*, Aug. 26, 1992, A1. (As Victor Dennison said a few years ago, "...(T)raditional insurgents devote much of their efforts to winning popular support by pointing to government abuses and iniquities." Victor Dennison, "Dangerous liaisons:Insurgency and drugs," *Internal Security and Co-In*, May 1990.) In any case, no one says the gang bosses lack *passion*. "Little Monster," aka Kershaun Scott, is a convicted murderer (first degree). "His gang has been tied to hundreds of crimes, including killings, burglaries, and robberies," Jerry Seper reports (op. cit.). All of that crime certainly demonstrates "passion" all right. The questions are: Why was "Little Monster" invited to appear on TV? Why was he not in prison where

he belongs? What is wrong with Ted Koppel and why is he an "anchor" of a major TV network?

19. William Murchison, *The Washington Times*, July 7, 1992.
20. "Insurgents operate in a geographically limited area characterized by political, social and economic deprivation," Victor Dennison says. "Their tactics are a combination of military and psychological operations designed to undermine the legitimacy of the government and destroy its military capabilities." Dennison (*op. cit.*).
21. According to former Attorney General William Barr, "The first duty of any civil government is to protect its citizens." Justice Department report for Fiscal Year 1992, Washington, D.C.
22. "Interview with Chairman Gonzalo," Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru, in San Francisco, Calif., Red Banner Editorial House, 1988, p. 68, quoted in "The Fletcher Forum," Summer 1992, p. 165.
23. Georgie Anne Guyer, *The Washington Times*, Aug. 7, 1992, F4.
24. Koven, *op. cit.*
25. Associated Press, June 19, 1992.
26. Meany, "Intelligence Behind the Walls," *op. cit.*
27. *The Washington Times*, June 4, 1992, A6.
28. Local police and federal investigators are to be commended for their achievements over the vicious crime syndicate, successes that should not be underestimated. Yet, as Meany has pointed out, if the criminals are in a prison where they may have visitors, use the telephone and the mail, and talk to their lawyers, they are still in business. Jeffrey Forte, top El Ruken leader, Meany recalls, was convicted and sentenced to prison for running his criminal gang's enterprises from prison. Incarceration is often no more than an "inconvenience" for some gang leaders. "Conviction is not the end of it; they must still be monitored," Meany warns, prison intelligence and CI being the means to do so. Meany, interview, Aug. 25, 1992. This aspect of criminology is dealt with elsewhere.
29. Eugene Methvin, *Reader's Digest*, May 1992, p. 134.
30. *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 31, 1992.
31. Lou Cannon, *The Washington Post*, May 10, 1992, A22.
32. Lally Weymouth, *The Washington Post*, May 27, 1992, A9.
33. Koven, *op. cit.*

34. In Washington too the police for a time stood by, watching stores being looted and other crimes being committed, although not by choice. That situation is discussed at greater length elsewhere.
35. The language of the Justice Department report for Fiscal Year 1992 (*op. cit.*), recommending pilot programs to deal with urban problems, was the language of counterinsurgency, although the word itself was not used in the report.
36. *Chicago Sun-Times*, Oct. 8, 1995, p.1.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*, p.2.
39. *Ibid.*, p.23.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*

## Prison Intelligence

**I**ntelligence, “as a law enforcement discipline...is one of the most fundamental and key elements in our arsenal to combat crime and terrorism,” so says Daniel Meany, corrections officer and former police officer, both military and civilian.<sup>1</sup> Meany also makes the case, better than anyone I know, that *prison*, or *corrections*, intelligence is an important part of this “fundamental and key element in our arsenal.” What-is-more, an important aspect of prison intelligence is prison counterintelligence for all the reasons CI is important in other areas: to detect, to identify, to counteract, to prevent, to neutralize, and if necessary to manipulate the enemy.

The two basic functions of a prison intelligence unit (PIU) are these: (1) *Positive* collection and analysis, learning about criminals and crime - the leaders, members, operational areas, numbers, organization (including the power structures) of criminal groups - what criminals

think, their communications, their relationships with other criminal groups, their method of operation, profiles, and so forth. In other words, who and what the criminals are, where they are, and what they are up to; and (2) counterintelligence, working against the efforts of organized criminal groups - both in a defensive and an offensive way.

One of the tasks of the prison CI effort is to learn about individual criminals and their relationships with gangs to help local police maintain a full picture of these law breakers. For example, prison authorities can often discover and record the "monikers," or nick-names, of prisoners and relay the information to authorities on the outside who have to deal with them later. Some criminals are virtually unknown on the street except by their "monikers." PIUs can also track criminals by their tattoos, Meany points out.<sup>2</sup>

Certain gangs, a subject of special attention, of course, are actually formed in prison, Meany says. "Prison is often the 'cement' that brings them together," he claims. Gangs make important treaties, alliances and mutual aid pacts in prison and then implement them later outside. Gangs are dangerous; gang members are five times more likely to attack correctional officers and other inmates inside prisons and to very likely assault police officers outside, Meany says. "Doing time is a mark of honor" for many criminals, he says. One ex-convict can vouch for another outside based on their inside relationship - "He's a stand up guy," is an often-heard recommendation given by one ex-con about another to a third party.

Prison intelligence is often predictive, says Meany. "You can see which prisoners are 'up and coming' and which will be problems on the street." The use of computers by PIUs facilitates tracking, Meany points out. "Social" groups, "prison reform" groups, and "study" groups can be identified and monitored, especially in view of the knowledge that criminal gangs and terrorist gangs often

follow the same course. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the two groups often become indistinguishable. By virtue of networking in prison, "some petty criminal all of a sudden becomes radicalized," Meany says. Experience in Israel, Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union is similar in this respect, he points out.

By exchanging data, prison IUs and police IUs can help each other. Often, information can be got in prison that is not readily available outside. Information about who is visiting whom and the results of mandatory prison drug testing is very useful on the outside, for example. In answer to a question, Meany replies that prisoners' counselors may lawfully contribute to a PIU's data on prisoners. Counselors are employees of the state, not prisoners' advocates, he points out. It would be negligent on their part to fail to report relevant information to the PIU, safety and security being foremost. In any case, the FBI respects prison intelligence, Meany claims.

Regarding control in prisons, it is simply good management to use intelligence to segregate and monitor prisoners, Meany explains. The special problem prisoners cause special trouble. "Consider the [financial] liability in case of disaster," Meany warns, or attacks by certain inmates on others.<sup>3</sup> Think of the human cost of injuries and the losses from property damage, especially plumbing fixtures, he says, caused by violence. "Do you know how much plumbing costs?" he asks rhetorically. PIUs are cost effective, Meany insists.

Another task for the PIU is to learn what criminal matters are being taught by convicts inside prisons. Prison, among other things, is a "crime college," to use the phrase of cop-killer Ted Jeffrey Atsuki.<sup>4</sup> Inside the walls, criminals are learning the trade - or more *about* the trade they are involved in. It is there they are trained in weapons and martial arts and learn what is being taught in

the police academies, such as police procedures for "routine traffic stops."<sup>5</sup> As any officer knows, traffic stops are an important element of enforcement and occasionally go wrong, sometimes with fatal results.

With respect to the matter of traffic stops, according to Meany, "Gangs in the US are learning that three members in a car, for drug trafficking or other activity, gives a great advantage in overpowering and disarming a police officer during a traffic stop. Some have been training in tactics, including how to destroy video surveillance gear in a police car." Which door to use to leave a car, how to distract or disarm or shoot (and where to shoot to beat a protective vest) an officer - these and other things are taught by knowledgeable inmates to other inmates who eventually ply their trade outside the walls.<sup>6,7</sup>

Ted Jeffrey Atsuki himself is a "graduate" of Ft. Leavenworth Prison, known as "the bomb school," where inmates learn about demolitions. He has put his understanding of explosives to work in kidnapping extortion cases by strapping remotely-controlled bombs to hostages. Atsuki's numerous crimes were usually quite well planned, his criminal sophistication increasing with each term in prison. He tapes film documentaries on the FBI between stints in prison and studies such TV programs as COPS.<sup>8</sup> "These guys (graduates of prison 'crime schools') eventually get out of prison and put their learning to work," Meany reminds us.<sup>9</sup>

Students in "crime college" also learn to make weapons, ranging from crude knives for use *inside* to sophisticated, remotely controlled explosive devices for use *outside*. The weapons are often ingenious and have included slap-shotguns, match head rockets and, in one case at least, even a flamethrower. The flamethrower was unusual, of course, its maker(s) having more than the normal opportunity to work on it. It was manufactured by Cuban prisoners during their takeover of the Federal Peni-

tentiary in Atlanta, Georgia in 1987.<sup>10</sup>

Paul Copher has an interesting story on weapons-making inside the walls: "At some minimum security corrections facilities, inmates are allowed to attend community college courses. One class in anthropology got a lot of students until corrections staffers found the class was on the ancient art of flintnapping, where students made their own knives, axes and arrowheads from chert, flint or obsidian. Inmates had figured out that it is difficult to get fingerprints from finely edged stone...and rocks do not trigger metal detectors."<sup>11</sup>

In some institutions, convicts not only stay in touch with their outside operational assets from within, they often continue to *control* them from inside. Sometimes all that is needed for a criminal inside a penitentiary to function, is a *single* contact outside. In the State of Massachusetts, Daniel Meany recalls, "Billy" Barnoski served as the lone outside contact for convict "Chuck" Flynn, providing the telephone that was the latter's vital link with his extensive criminal contacts. A police telephone tap uncovered the operation. Barnoski, it seems, was also taking collect calls from a number of other inmates in New England prisons.<sup>12</sup> Meany has many stories like this one.

If convicts have visitors, as Meany points out, use the telephone and the mails, and talk to their lawyers, as is the case in most prisons in the U.S., "they are still in business," even though locked up. Meany mentions Jeffrey Forte as an example of this theory. Top leader of the *El Rukhn* terrorist organization, Forte was convicted and sentenced to *still further* prison time for running his criminal gang's enterprises *from inside*.<sup>13</sup>

A notorious Washington, D.C. criminal, Rayful Edmond, is also suspected of continuing his criminal operation from inside prison. "Rayful Edmond III, convicted of leading Washington's biggest and most violent cocaine ring in the late 1980s, is the focus of a new drug investi-

gation involving his activities in federal prison," *The Washington Post* reported, citing "a law enforcement source."<sup>14</sup> Edmond was suspected of running a lucrative drug network *by telephone* from the federal prison where he is serving a life sentence without parole. Authorities believed that the criminal network that landed him in prison, generated sales of as much as \$2 million a week and was linked to as many as 30 murders.<sup>15</sup> Edmond is still hard at work, apparently, if not necessarily making license plates.<sup>16</sup>

Gang members go in and come out of prison - the line between *in* and *out* blurs. Members remain in their gangs during the prison phase and for them street and prison are often two sides of the same coin. By the same token, prisons are not only *schools* for crime, they also serve as major sources of *recruits* for crime.

If the main purpose of law enforcement intelligence is to keep up with the "bad guys," particularly the ones involved in organized crime, conversely, the criminals in prison want to keep track of law enforcement techniques. "Many law enforcement officers are surprised to learn through various 'survival' seminars," says Meany, "that quite a few convicts have established extensive networks through which they trade information to counteract the efforts of the criminal justice system." The inmates clearly have their own intelligence system, which is often very good. The goal of law enforcement CI should be effective CI - to get and keep the upper hand and fight back.

"All the major prison gangs in the country have members and associates on the street and it is not difficult for the gangs to run illegal activities from inside the institutions," confirms Bob Jenkins of the National Law Enforcement Institute. "In many parts of the country, the prison gang and the street gang are one and the same. Even in the areas where prison gangs and street gangs have traditionally been separate entities, such as California, there

are increasing indications that prison gangs are using street gangs to sell narcotics and carry out hits. As more street gang members find themselves incarcerated in institutions dominated by prison gangs, the number and strength of these alliances will increase."<sup>17</sup>

According to Jenkins, "gangs have steadily grown in sophistication ... engendered in part by inter-gang competition in the crack cocaine trade. Asian gangs ... conduct classes on criminal activity for their members, and most of the major outlaw motorcycle gangs have been recognized for years as a form of organized crime."<sup>18</sup> Narcotics trafficking has been so lucrative for many street gangs," Jenkins says, "that they now have to learn money laundering techniques."<sup>19</sup>

Just as many gang members are fully involved in criminal activities while in prison, so are many gang members while out on parole. Both categories warrant ongoing intelligence attention. The U.S., of course, is not the only country in which convicts carry on their criminal activities inside the walls and teach criminal behavior too. "Muslim militants in an Egyptian prison," according to Reuters, "formed an underground group to plan and train for guerrilla attacks after their release. One prisoner taught martial arts. Another gave weapons training with pictures of firearms drawn on cell walls. "Egyptian prisons have become a battleground," Reuters says.<sup>20</sup> It's the same in the U.S.<sup>21</sup> The training, of course, both in Egypt and the U.S., is to be put to use on the outside.

According to Paul Copher, the Republic of New Afrika (RNA), the Black Liberation Army (BLA), and the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), were involved in the Los Angeles rioting in April 1992 and are among the organizations planning violence in other American cities.<sup>22,23</sup> The RCP, a Marxist-Leninist group based in Chicago, like the Crips and Bloods in Los Angeles, is also deeply involved in prison work, Copher says, making "...a conscious

effort to recruit prisoners," and "Shine the Light of Revolution Behind Prison Walls," as the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith describes the phenomenon. The "light of revolution" is to be trained on the cities of America later.

"The Chicago street gang turned terrorists-for-hire, El Rukn, which evolved from the infamous Blackstone Rangers, is another force to be reckoned with both inside and outside the prison walls of Illinois and elsewhere," says Meany. "Described by the controversial Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam as 'born warriors of true liberation,' the El Rukn in 1985 attempted to purchase a missile to be used at Chicago's O'Hare Airport in order to attack an airliner," Meany recalls.<sup>24</sup> Such an atrocity would be, in effect, shining the "light of revolution" into the skies, to use revolutionary jargon.

The BLA and "its prison inmate component, the Black Guerrilla Family," says Meany, had early contacts in and out of prison with other revolutionary groups including both the New World Liberation Front and the Weather Underground Organization (WUO). Members of the BLA killed a number of police officers in San Francisco and New York in the 1970s. "Among other things, leaders of the BLA had ties with the Symbionese Liberation Army, which gained notoriety for kidnapping and then recruiting Patty Hearst, the California publishing heiress, and with the WUO, infamous for its numerous lethal bombings.

Many criminals without ideological or organizational ties are recruited, trained, and developed systematically in prison by revolutionary groups. After release, these now dedicated, organized and trained "ex-cons" often take part in "cop-killer" operations and armed robbery "fundraisers," frequently teaming with other like-minded organizations to do so. While behind the walls, the gangs go so far as to put "hits" on correctional officers who live out-

side, according to Meany. Intimidation of prison guards, often with outside help, to threaten their families, is a standard gang tactic, he says, intimidation, of course, being the essence of terrorism.<sup>25</sup>

Compounding the problems of prison gangs, as outlined here, is that often publicly financed private "social welfare" organizations, working with the gangs and their youth affiliates, also recruit, indoctrinate, and train new members. Some social workers and prison missionaries are dedicated radicals, others are merely naive, Meany believes. Some gangs disguise themselves as "prison reform" organizations or "social studies" groups to cover their real work. Appropriate officials both "in and out" must understand these issues. To work against organizations such as these is the essence of law enforcement counter-intelligence.

Meany, moving across the political spectrum, provides examples of prison/street gangs which got their start as prison reform or "social welfare" groups. The Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson faction of the Weathermen - on the left - began as a New England-based prison reform group. The Aryan Nation, on the other hand - on the right - recruited many of its "soldiers" through the prison ministry of "Pastor" Richard Butler and its alliance with The Aryan Brotherhood, which, for its part, originated in the early 1960s in San Quentin Prison in California.<sup>26</sup> The alliance between the Aryan Brotherhood and The Order was also formed in prison - by Gary Yarborough, a leader of the latter group. The Order, incidentally, has been called the most dangerous terrorist group in the U.S. for its anti-semitic murder by submachine gun of Alan Berg, a radio talk-show host in Denver, Colorado.

Moving from left to right, the Black Guerrilla Family (BGF), the prison affiliate of the Black Liberation Army (left), was formed by George Lester Jackson in San Quentin Prison in California in the mid-1960s. Jackson,

a member of the Black Panther Party, killed in an escape attempt in 1971, was succeeded by James "Doc" Holliday of the Symbionese Liberation Army, bringing the two groups closer together. The BGF's contacts with the New World Liberation Front and the Weather Underground were also forged in prison - at that time. On the East Coast, on the other hand, the Irish American Heritage Group (left) in Massachusetts Walpole State Prison seemed to be an "innocent" prison social group until authorities learned that it was in fact the prison wing of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) of Boston.

Millions of dollars were raised for "the revolution" in the many robberies and attempted robberies by some of these leftist revolutionary gangs.<sup>27</sup> In this, the left has been more deadly. Numerous police officers and others have been murdered in the "liberation" process. The gangs have killed thousands of other people, as well. "Klan...murdered at least 20 African-Americans since 1960, according to Klanswatch," newspaper columnist Clarence Page points out, but "[s]treet gangs murdered at least 1,300 blacks [in 1991] alone, according to the FBI. We don't need to worry about the Klan or neo-Nazis nearly as much as we need to worry about 'brothers' and 'sisters' who do their job for them," Page says.<sup>28</sup>

In any case, hostile intelligence, or intelligence-like organizations, whether those run by black urban gangs or by white supremacists, have a long reach. For example, in 1988, authorities in California foiled the plans of imprisoned members of the Aryan Nation to murder corrections officers on the street, with gang members on the outside carrying out the actual hits. A former state employee, the wife of a gang member incarcerated in Folsom prison, had access to an official computer at the California Franchise Tax Board. She identified and monitored state officials, including police, and passed the information inside.

Another California gang compiled a so-called "Black Book" containing data on officers' identities. The book also contained photographs of unmarked police cars leaving their police department "undercover garage." The group also was able to observe police academy training, looking for things to exploit. In Arizona, imprisoned members of the Aryan Brotherhood were found with ingredients for bombs. They intended to blow up their guards. "Cops are not *tail conscious*," an officer told me. Officers must realize that the skills they employ in fighting crime are sometimes going to be used against them - they must remember that in the eternal "cat and mouse game," they are not always going to be the cat.

When political ideology and religious fervor combine it is something like the lethal mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil - ANFO - used to bomb the World Trade Center in New York. Law enforcement and corrections authorities must understand the forces at work in their areas of responsibility and respond accordingly. Law enforcement intelligence and CI officials especially must understand politics. The most dangerous prisoners in any institution are the terrorists, Dr. Jess Maghan told a meeting of the Office of International Criminal Justice some years ago. "Not because they are violent," he said, "but because they understand the political nature of their imprisonment and they communicate it to other inmates. They put the governability of the institution at risk," he explained.<sup>29</sup>

If all of this is not enough to interest law enforcement officials in prison counterintelligence, there is another concern. Members of organized crime groups in prison, especially the committed radicals and terrorists, present an additional problem. With their outside connections - their intelligence networks, "loyal minions," hideouts, access to money, and other resources - they remain continual *escape* risks, Meany reminds us.

Correctional officials may not put the need for intelligence - much less CI - at the top of their list because of what they consider to be "more immediate" problems. In Washington D.C., the Nation's Capital, the Corrections Department is beset by numerous problems (which may *not* be unique to Washington, actually). According to press reports, D.C. corrections officers receive only a six-week "quickie" training course, are issued radios that don't work, and carry shotguns that cannot even fire the "duds" in their chambers. There is not much opportunity for sophisticated penology in this kind of environment.

D.C. prison guards knock on dormitory doors before entering, for if they were to witness something illegal, they might be murdered by the prisoners. Guards often deal drugs to inmates, not for the money but to curry their favor in helping to control other inmates, according to reports. In such desperate situations, prison intelligence loses its priority concern for corrections officials. The opposite should be true. Intelligence and CI can help. Yet a D.C. corrections official - a former police officer with an advanced degree - once told me he had never even *heard* of prison intelligence but was glad to learn something about it, however.

The correctional system *needs* intelligence and CI, if only to keep it in - or help *return* it to - friendly hands.<sup>30</sup> A prison can no more be left to the inmates than an asylum. The cost for an adequate intelligence and CI capability for the prisons may be high in some cases, but without such a program the cost is even higher, and getting more so. As Daniel Meany has told me more than once, "*We better have good intelligence. The other side does.*"

It is clear that any major intelligence endeavor by law enforcement against organized crime must include an effort within those "high grey walls and razor wire fences," as Meany describes them.<sup>31</sup> Among other things, a good intelligence activity benefits the right people - those

"on the line" - the police officers and corrections officials who are up against the "bad guys" - the "dark side," as FBI Director Louis Freeh puts it - every day *and* every night.

## ENDNOTES:

1. Daniel J. Meany III. Some of the information in this chapter is from Meany's articles, "Intelligence Behind the Walls," *Terror Update*, May 1990, and "Prison Intelligence: A Necessary Tool," *Tactical Response Journal*, March/April 1991. Much of the information is from numerous conversations with him over the years, especially a six-hour interview on March 4, 1991 and updates on Nov. 28 and Dec. 12, 1994.
2. The importance of studying tattoos is discussed elsewhere. As far as tracking criminals from inside to outside, or the reverse, is concerned, something has to be done to improve things: Meany told me that one of the FBI's "Ten Most Wanted" was discovered in prison where he had been for some time, unknown to the authorities.
3. Homemade knives, or "shanks," are more difficult to come by in prison now than before, Meany says, with the "face melt" often replacing the "face cut." The "face melt" comes from a cup of baby oil heated in a microwave oven and thrown in the face of another inmate.
4. Atsuki was convicted of murdering a Boston police officer. "When asked during a television interview in prison what he was doing in Boston, Atsuki replied that he was on an "intelligence-gathering mission." Not a "fact-finding" visit, Meany points out, "or that he was picking up 'information,' but that he was on an 'intelligence-gathering mission.'" Atsuki is an unusual criminal, very sophisticated and so well thought of in the Massachusetts prison where he finds himself, Meany says, that he is the third ranking member of the prison Irish American Heritage Group, despite the fact that he is not of Irish heritage.
5. Ibid.
6. "Security Intelligence Sourcebook," Nov. 16, 1992, p. 5.
7. "Wearing bullet-resistant vests is probably the single most important thing a police officer can do to save his or her own life," says Sue Lange, president of Concerns of Police Survivors, a Missouri-based group. "Most police officers are killed, not in high-profile situations, but in routine incidents such as domestic disturbances and traffic stops involving drugs, convicted felons, or other unanticipated developments." *SIR*, Jan. 9, 1994, p. 4. For another reference to police traffic stops, see the interview with William Dunman and Dunman's remark on "war wagons."

8. See Paul Copher's remarks on the use by criminals of TV "crime shows."
9. Telephone interview, Feb. 15, 1995.
10. Many Cuban detainees came to the U.S. during the Mariel boat lift of 1980. Cuban dictator Fidel Castro included among the 125,000 or so otherwise legitimate refugees of the Mariel exodus many criminals, mental patients, and intelligence personnel. It is probable that among the *marielitos* in the Atlanta prison mutiny there were Cuban military and/or intelligence personnel with weapons (not to mention political) training. It is probable that at least some of the mutineers were acting under Cuban government instructions.
11. *Security Intelligence*, May 17, 1993, p. 7.
12. Meany, op. cit.
13. David A. Andelman, Washington correspondent for CNBC, says of drug traffickers that "...arresting, convicting, even imprisoning them is not enough. With vast wealth at their disposal, no prison can prevent them from continuing their pernicious activities." "The Drug Money Maze," *Foreign Affairs*, V.73, Jul-Aug 1994, p.102.
14. *The Washington Post*, July 23, 1994, B5.
15. Ibid.
16. Earlier, a Federal grand jury indicted Jose Naranjo, a prisoner in Richmond, Virginia, for "using a phone to set up a drug distribution network in the Washington area." Naranjo's distribution system delivered cocaine from Colombia to the streets of the nation's capital, using conference telephone calls. Serving a 38-year sentence, Naranjo may have wanted to keep his hand in until his release in a few years. *The Washington Post*, Feb. 4, 1994, A6.
17. Bob Jenkins in an interview with Daniel J. Meany III, *Security Intelligence Report*, Nov. 16, 1992, p 7. The National Law Enforcement Institute is a not-for-profit corporation involved in law enforcement and corrections training.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. Money laundering, of course, is a major target of law enforcement intelligence efforts.
20. *The Washington Times*, Jul. 10, 1993, A8.
21. According to Meany, some years ago a New Hampshire state trooper, found guilty of murdering his partner, was imprisoned in Massachusetts, where he was teaching his fellow prisoners what he knew. The latter accepted the former trooper as one of

them, apparently, despite his antecedents. Meany thinks they did so because he was considered primarily as a crook who happened to have been a policeman rather than the reverse. Imprisoned police officers are often viewed by other inmates as "criminals in uniform," "cops on the take," or whatever, but crooks all the same who really belong with the gang. Meany, interviews, op. cit.

22. Copher, *Security Intelligence*, 27 July 1992, p. 1.
23. See Chapter Three on The Big City Gangs.
24. Meany, "Intelligence Behind the Walls," *Terror Update*, May 1990, and interviews.
25. Intimidation of law enforcement and corrections officers is discussed elsewhere in this book.
26. Known for a while as the "Diamond Tooth Gang" because of the small piece of glass embedded in their front teeth, Meany says, they eventually became the "Bluebird Gang," for their distinctive neck tattoos.
27. ADL, "Special Report," op. cit., p. 13.
28. Clarence Page, *The Washington Times*, Aug. 14, 1992, F4.
29. *Counter-Terrorism Security Intelligence*, Oct. 3, 1988, p. 7.
30. Rikers Island, New York, with its thousands of prisoners, huge numbers of whom belong to gangs and, for a number of reasons, are especially dangerous, makes good use of intelligence and CI, Meany says. Rikers Island authorities exchange information with other police and prison agencies, he points out.
31. Some prison authorities are aware of the need. "A new and timely intelligence oriented association was formed in May 1993, to provide justice administrators and users with 'need to know' gang related information," reports *The Intelligence Officer* of July 1994. "[Thirty-nine] participants, representing intelligence managers of 25 states and the Federal prison system, gathered in Houston...for a workshop... (t)he emphasis of the new organization is to share findings related to prison gangs and other disruptive groups." The good news is tempered by the question, "Where were the other 25 states?"

## 5

## Terrorism And Counterintelligence

Terrorism is barbarism and anarchy, the very antithesis of law and order. It is a major concern of law enforcement at every level, not to mention corporations and private security firms. Because of its great importance and the expertise, skill, and discipline of many of its practitioners and the fact that it is often an instrument of state as well as international non-state policy,<sup>1</sup> terrorism is treated here as an intelligence-*like* activity. Many terrorist organizations are well-organized and skillful in the use of intelligence and counterintelligence practices. Terrorism requires *counterintelligence* skills to deal with it.

Inasmuch as most terrorist activity violates local and state laws in the United States, it is primarily of concern to those jurisdictions - at least at the start. Terrorist crimes such as the destruction of property, extortion, and murder are of course crimes almost everywhere and are of *immediate* interest in the U.S. to local law enforcement,

whether or not terrorism *per se* is considered a crime. Terrorism, moreover, is often intimately involved with racketeering and narcotics trafficking, as are prison and street gangs. These activities too are criminal in nature. The line between terrorism and ordinary crime is often blurred.<sup>2</sup> International connections on the part of a specific terrorist group in the U.S., of course, become a matter of interest to federal authorities.

The FBI defines terrorism as "The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." Domestic terrorism involves terrorist activities without foreign direction; international terrorism involves terrorist activity by groups or individuals that are foreign based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the U.S. or whose activities transcend national boundaries.<sup>3</sup>

"The purpose of terrorism is to terrorize," Lenin said. Terrorism is the warfare of the weak against the strong, others claim. It is meant to weaken its opponent; it is low intensity conflict; it is "warfare on the cheap;" it is an assault on civilization itself. And so forth. "All of these things are of course true," I wrote some years ago, "but in the end terrorism's purpose is what Lenin said it was, to *terrorize*. Terrorism's purpose is to influence people's behavior - to affect how things go."<sup>4</sup> I believe the point is still valid.

The key factor in terrorism, as the FBI says, is "intimidation" for purposes of influencing people and affecting "how things go." "An action of violence is labeled 'terrorist,' according to Raymond Aron, when its psychological effects are out of proportion to its purely physical result."<sup>5</sup> One of the many problems with terrorism is that it is so often completely out of proportion in so many respects to its ostensible causes.<sup>6</sup>

Counterintelligence and security play critical *and* complementary roles in countering terrorism. The skills of these disciplines are essential in the struggle against terrorist blight, on the local level as well as the national and international. People involved in counterterrorism have much to learn, however. Terrorists, for example, very often speak only foreign languages, belong to unfamiliar cultures, and have strange customs, factors which require specialized knowledge on our part to respond. They bring much of their world to ours and we must often deal with them largely on their terms. Bombs and automatic weapons make it so.

"We live in times where technology has made possible both the magnification of violence and also created complex and vulnerable targets for that violence," observed J. Bowyer Bell a long time ago.<sup>7</sup> The World Trade Center bombing in New York City in early 1993, as have many other terrorist depredations, amply demonstrated his point. Law enforcement can react to such violence after it has struck or it can play a role in trying to prevent it. There is much to be learned.

A Moslem in a barricade situation in the U.S., some time ago, asked the police negotiator for something to eat. The officer sent in a *ham* sandwich. It is difficult to believe that there are still people unaware of the Moslem intense aversion to pork, but then, there is much to learn about our own culture as well as others. On a more recent occasion, according to Paul Copher, described earlier, a Moslem in a western American state, when interviewed, was "asked to swear he was telling the truth." He was willing enough but wanted to use his copy of the Koran. The interviewer insisted that he use a Christian bible. "A later review by the agency," Copher says, "disclosed that it had conducted training sessions in cultural sensitivity so officers could better handle hostage situations or anything else involving minority groups. The officer had

elected not to attend."<sup>8</sup>

I draw on Copher again for another incident. An American lawman, not long ago, came upon a woman wearing a "mask" in public. Thinking she must be a criminal hiding her identity, he pulled off the mask. The man accompanying the woman hit the officer, a serious offense almost anywhere. The story: the woman was a Moslem, accompanied by her husband. Many Moslem women wear veils. The woman's husband was greatly offended, and struck the offending officer. The foregoing is a classic case of an incident that should not have happened.

The record does not show, incidentally, if an appropriate course of information had been offered to the officer in question and, if so, if he "elected" not to attend.<sup>9</sup> The point here is that a broad education, training, and up-to-date briefings are essential in intelligence, CI, and in counterterrorism.

In the same vein, Copher tells about a military exercise in which he once played a role. "Terrorists" working with Air Force security police (SP), he relates, "seized" a base building and a number of "hostages." Some of the hostages were "released" from time to time bearing messages, as sometimes happens in real situations. The "terrorists" insisted in negotiating in Arabic and "shot" a hostage every hour until they were offered a deal.

The exercise was called off. The SP "could not find, nor did they know *how* to find, an Arabic speaker," Copher explains. At the "after-action" debriefing it was learned that those hostages released had numerous "details on terrorist weapons, number of hostages and their locations," according to Copher. The SP, however, did not question the hostages fully, being more concerned with getting them to a hospital than collecting vital intelligence on the hostage-takers.<sup>10,11</sup>

One of Copher's points in the debriefing, he says, was that the kind of hostage-taking involved in the Air Force

exercise was different from one in which local police deal with a man holding his wife hostage. Certain "proven methods" do not apply in a terrorist hostage situation, he says.<sup>12</sup>

Copher has a number of ideas about hostage taking. Members of emergency response teams (ERTs)<sup>13</sup> should be trained in subjects beyond weapons and tactics, he believes. Officers must have area and cultural knowledge; they must know something about world affairs and conflicts. "The best-prepared SWAT team will have its own analysis center and have the members of that specialist group work with, and serve, the negotiator"...in hostage situations, he says. "Don't depend on others for analysis," Copher warns. Specialists can teach the SWAT team - outside speakers can be brought in. People with expertise are available but they have to be asked, he says. In any case, they must be real experts, he cautions.<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, if an expert is not close at hand, one should be found. Police in a western American city, again according to Copher, were concerned over what they thought was an American Indian protest "activity in the form of graffiti around university campuses." The letters "AIM" appeared with "funny little squiggles" and drawings. "As it turned out, the AIM initials meant 'Armed Islamic Movement' and the squiggles were the logos of the PLO and Shia groups in Arabic and Farsi, calling for recruits," Copher explains.<sup>15</sup> With specialized knowledge, that not every police agency can be expected to have, the department in question got itself up to date.<sup>16</sup>

Authorities should look for resources early, before a desperate need arises. A stable of talent should be catalogued and contacted for willingness to help if and when needed. A number of communities have a police reserve corps to assist in crowd control, traffic, and disaster relief. Specialized knowledge, language ability, and so forth should be considered in organizing such a reserve.<sup>17</sup>

**Police** intelligence and counterintelligence functions require close liaison with other law enforcement agencies, especially federal, and with appropriate security officers of private firms, as well.

For some years now, private investigators and security personnel have outnumbered law enforcement personnel. The quality of people in this kind of work is improving. Although in some cases (too many, unfortunately) improvement has not taken place, that fact applies to law enforcement as well. In any case, PIs and SOs (security officers) cannot be ignored. They are important parts of the overall public safety structure and are here to stay.

Increasingly, people find that their tax dollars do not buy the law enforcement and protection they want. Citizens in high crime areas pool their resources to hire private neighborhood security patrols, while corporations "buy" the PIs and security "guards" they need. For a number of reasons, private security is a growing industry and, within that sphere, much is happening. No longer mere gate guards or moonlighting cops punching time clocks on their rounds, private security personnel are increasingly high quality resources, playing ever more important roles in business and industry.

Firms more and more opt for quality and versatility in their security departments, according to Col. Edward Badolato, security specialist.<sup>18</sup> For example, certain petroleum companies and petroleum product carriers, are now putting their money "up front" to prevent disasters, such as spills and fires, rather than paying claims and cleanup costs later, Badolato says.

Giving new meaning to the term "security," security personnel in such firms are now "multi-trained" technicians, preventing or quickly stopping leaks and fires and effectively dealing with other emergencies on the spot. Security personnel are usually first on the scene in contingencies in any case, and, often, at night, as Badolato

points out, no one but security is on the scene. Security personnel can, if properly trained and motivated, react intelligently to all kinds of warning signs and incipient problems. Cross-trained in a number of disciplines, Badolato says, security can understand the complex instruments and use the complicated equipment found on many sites today. They can also be fire fighters and para-medics, if needed. Private security plays a large role in counterterrorism as well as other problems facing business.

The "souped-up" security specialist is paid more than a "regular" guard, naturally, and receives pay increases for each course of training completed satisfactorily. He/she costs a lot but many employers find the cost well worth it. The point, of course, is to save money by preventing problems from getting out of hand by rapid, *intelligent, skilled* intervention.

The cost of oil spills and fires, claims and cleanups, is "fabulous," Badolato points out. The place to save is prevention. With nine out of ten dollars of insurance payments and one out of every three dollars of cleanup costs going for legal fees, there is ever greater incentive for owners and managers to economize.

In the "mega high rise" buildings and other huge installations, the expensive sophisticated electronics systems - motion detectors, video access, biometric identification, and so forth - are all operated by security, Badolato points out. "The security world has led the integration of systems," in industry, he claims. "The security force has now become the 'contingency service' in many companies." The results of the initiative of the oil companies' in upgrading their security departments into modern "contingency services" seem to point the way for other industries.

Law enforcement officers, and not only those who have filled in for fire fighters during strikes, understand the value of cross training. The average police officer is beset

by numerous tasks beyond "law enforcement," *per se*, from animal control to midwifery in a taxi during rush hour. In any case, all of these developments in private security, described by Col. Badolato, affect counterterrorism, or antiterrorism, at least, and in this way relate to our main theme. They also provide models for law enforcement to contemplate.<sup>19</sup>

An important means of preparing CT forces for terrorist action is the employment of a warning system called the PII system. A Pre-Incident Indicator (PII), warning of a threat to life and property and often not readily appreciated by the untrained officer, is an intelligence warning keyed to special knowledge and interests. PIIs are based on patterns of past terrorist activities, for example evidence left by terrorists in hideouts or the results of interrogations of captured members (*and/or* media interviews, for that matter).

A PII stems from careful analysis of many (often thousands of) terrorist incidents and helps analysts predict incidents and plan for prevention or defense. It is obvious that a good compendium of PIIs is developed from outside studies and liaison reports and the contributions of many human sources - good intelligence for CI purposes.<sup>20</sup> Multi-source intelligence units are often aware of such events as planning sessions held by terrorist organizations, of travel or local sightings of known terrorists, or of funding operations, or the acquisition of specialized vehicles or weapons - all PIIs.

With or without this kind of warning intelligence, however, the security unit must keep abreast, insofar as possible, of surveillance and/or stakeouts conducted by potential terrorists. The detection of a suspicious person "hanging around" (reported by a cooperative corporate security officer, for example, or a cop on the beat, or a neighbor) is, of course, a PII. The sighting of known terrorists conducting a "pre-operation survey" is obviously

an even better PII. Counter-surveillance is one of the most important tools of CI and security.

Unnoticed, unreported, "coincidental" incidents of a possible hostile nature may have fatal consequences. Noticed, reported incidents, on the other hand, properly understood, become intelligence and contribute to survival. Such information should be shared with appropriate law enforcement and private colleagues. Obviously, care must be employed in these relationships (as in any relationship) but it is often necessary to "give to get," and effective liaison can provide the means.

Terrorist groups occasionally even conduct rehearsals - a giveaway, *if detected* - of a planned operation, in other words, a good PII. In this connection, some years ago, a television crew in a Western European country beset by terrorists, in preparation for a film on terrorism, took a position near a sensitive government building. Their cohorts then drove up in a van, stopped it abruptly and spilled out, leaving the van there and "running for cover."

The TV team, of course, was ready, eager to film the reaction of government security forces. There wasn't any. The guards were not alert, *fortunately* for the team's scrambling, fun-loving colleagues. The team got no film. Had it, the pictures might have been spectacular, showing some of the role players being blown away by security forces - an exciting segment for the evening news.

One point of this story is, of course, that police and private security should not be caught napping - either by pretense or the real thing. The TV jokers should be glad that in this case, security was asleep. More relevant for our purposes, it is important to know that terrorists run rehearsals to their operations. The authorities must be ready, with security, other police forces, and civilians, all primed to contribute to warning intelligence - PIIs. Good liaison and cooperation is - once again - essential.

Counterterrorist specialists must understand the

fundamentals of psychological warfare. They must be on the lookout for diversions, among other things - a shooting or a bombing, let's say - intended to distract law enforcement from the "main event" in a terrorist operation.

Early in our history, law enforcement intelligence was largely hit or miss as well as hit and run. In the early Twentieth Century anarchists unleashed an unprecedented terrorist attack on the American people. The form of the assault was the same as that employed by modern terrorists, and for many of the same reasons. The anonymity, the relative convenience, the enormity of the political and social impact afforded by a bomb were in 1919 what they are today. In any case, in 1919, presumed anarchists exploded a bomb on Wall Street in New York City, killing and wounding a large number of people. Residual damage can be seen today. More bombs and bomb threats followed.

The people demanded action. According to Lawrence Myers, investigator, writer, and specialist in explosives, "The aggressive official response to the perceived threat created by the spectacular bombing campaigns of 1919 secured the career of J. Edgar Hoover, who would become the director of the newly-created Federal Bureau of Investigation less than five years later at the age of 29."<sup>21</sup>

"The key to countering the threat of anarchy and subversion in America, in Hoover's view, was the collection of sound intelligence," Myers relates. His focus on penetrating the various threat groups, combined with informants and emerging technologies to attack the so-called "red menace" was, in his mind instrumental in preventing the bold bombing campaign from being planned or executed."<sup>22</sup>

Many components of the intelligence system established back then, and improved since then, were in effect *counterintelligence* techniques. Important aspects of both intelligence and CI (which will be mentioned repeatedly here) are communication, cooperation, and sharing.

Brigadier M.H. Mackenzie-Orr (Ret), an Australian authority on terrorist bombings having considerable experience in the troubles of Northern Ireland, adds another essential point: understanding the meaning of information. By way of illustration, Mackenzie-Orr writes that some years ago he attended a scene in Belfast where a police sergeant's car was blown up (in front of his family, incidentally) as he left his home. The policeman died. Within two hours a warning went out to all police stations. At one station, Mackenzie-Orr says, a part-time constable was asked to drive around to the homes of other policemen to warn them. His car blew up as he drove off.

"The story shows the importance of understanding information before acting upon it," the Brigadier points out (which is true of both positive intelligence and CI, of course). The aim of Britain's bomb data center, established a little earlier, he says, was "to ensure that no bomb technician should be put at risk because he was unaware of information available to other bomb technicians."

Mackenzie-Orr makes the case for sharing such bomb information, not only within a given country, but between countries. International cooperation, he says, has developed information on emerging patterns of bombings which suggests "new and improved equipment, teaching techniques, protective methods, disposal techniques and other evidence of increased sophistication" on the part of bombers. Such intelligence at bomb disposal centers (BDCs) becomes intimately involved in training and research and development (R&D), not to mention "advice to the public on risk reduction." Information is gathered from the field, passed to the BDCs and from there to the users - technicians, instructors, line officers, security personnel, and the public.<sup>23</sup>

The lessons here are those made elsewhere in this book by a variety of authorities: a broad knowledge of relevant matters, pertinent training, briefings, a search for

outside resources to fill gaps in knowledge, liaison, sharing, and cooperation.

## ENDNOTES:

1. Large radical movements, such as extremist Islam, use terrorism on an international basis. Some of this terrorism is sponsored by clerical governments of nation states, such as Iran. Some of it is sponsored by non-clerical states such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Some of it is not sponsored *per se* by any country, but is "free lance" in nature, or at least must be considered so until evidence is found to show ties with governments.
2. Speaking on radio in Great Britain in 1989, Douglas Hurd, then United Kingdom Home Secretary, said that "[w]ith the IRA and some of these Middle East groups, it is nothing really to do with a political cause anymore. They are professional killers. That is their occupation and their pleasure, and they will go on doing it." (BBC, Mar. 22, 1989.)
3. The FBI, concerned with the unlawful use of force or violence for "political or social objectives," excludes labor violence - which would be the use of force or violence for "labor objectives" - from its definition of terrorism. I disagree with exempting labor terrorism, believing that terrorism is terrorism. Including "labor," "economic," and "religious" objectives would make the definition of terrorism more reasonable, even if it would antagonize certain members of Congress or certain special interest groups, such as organized labor. If this view of terrorism seems simplistic, consider this: an expanded definition would mean improved terrorism statistics which would justify bigger law enforcement budgets for counterterrorism.
4. Sulc, "Security Intelligence Sourcebook," Nov. 1990, p. 19.
5. Conference on Terrorism, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., Dec. 19, 1988. It was at this conference that Jerold Post of George Washington University described terrorism as a "species of PsyWar" (psychological warfare), among other things, manipulating public opinion through the media. Western democracies, in their response to terrorism, "must improve their public relations, public information and public diplomacy," Post said.
6. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman of the University of Leiden, The Netherlands, studied 109 academic and official definitions of terrorism. Of these definitions, 83.5 percent included the element of violence; 65 percent, political goals; and 51 percent, the element of inflicting fear and terror. Only 21 percent of the definitions mentioned arbitrariness and indiscrimination in targeting, and only 17.5 included the victimization of civilians,

noncombatants, neutrals, and outsiders. Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism*, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1988, quoted by Frank Cass, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Winter 1993), pp. 213-251. These were, by and large, the definitions of Western officials and academics. The low percentage for "arbitrariness and indiscrimination" is odd; both are frequently involved in terrorist acts. Attacks against "noncombatants" (or "innocent" persons, as some definitions term them) are an essential part of U.S. government definitions of terrorism and those of many American academics as well.

7. J. Bowyer Bell, "Transnational Terror," Washington, D.C., 1975 p. 89, as quoted in "Combatting International Terrorism," The Atlantic Council of the U.S., Policy Papers, Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 5.

8. *SIR*, Nov. 16, 1992, p.5. I thought the officer's ignorance in this instance was grimly amusing until I read that, not long ago, a *judge* hearing a terrorist case in New York refused a defense motion to permit Moslem defendants to swear on the Koran - it had to be a Christian bible. Maybe that's the way the law reads.

9. In Washington, D.C., MPD officers have had problems with the Glock 9 mm semi-automatic pistols which have replaced their .38 cal. revolvers. According to press accounts, more than 50 percent have elected not to attend the course offered to help them deal with the new sidearm's problems.

10. Paul Copher, "Security Intelligence Sourcebook," October 1993, Interests Limited, Silver Spring, MD, p. 102.

11. I had a somewhat different experience as a role player in a police exercise at a new federal courthouse near Washington, D.C. As a "hostage" in a courtroom takeover by "armed criminals" (actually, federal deputy marshals), I managed to "escape." I talked to a number of police officers of several agencies, begging to speak to an intelligence officer. No one cared about my information on the number of criminals and their weapons, or the number and sexes of hostages, etc., nor in my ideas on how to handle the situation. The least they could have done, I thought, was to try to make a citizen *feel* he was being listened to. A different kind of problem in a real terrorist case was this: years ago a policeman was shot by terrorists in Athens, Greece. Concerned about their colleague's condition, a number of officers followed the ambulance taking their buddy to the hospital. Their solidarity was heartwarming but, lacking sufficient experience and/or training, they made a mistake; they should, of

course, have stayed on the job.

12. Copher, "SIS," op. cit., p. 103.

13. Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams is a term considered too bellicose in many quarters. The term Emergency Response Team (ERT) sounds better and is more descriptive, or *should* be. It should be more than a "shoot-'em-up" outfit. Officers I have talked to are (justifiably) proud of their record of *problem-solving* with the least amount of force. One civilian officer, who is also a military police reservist, tells me how, when Marines, Army reservists, and/or National Guard troops are called in to quell civil disturbances, they are supposed to tread cautiously, such as locating snipers for apprehension, for instance, rather than "blowing away" the offenders, themselves. The civil police then take the sniper out, preferably on his feet and manacled. The miliary often must account for *each* round, along the way. I have less tolerance for snipers myself (*theirs*, not *ours*) but respect the thinking behind these procedures.

14. Copher, op. cit., p. 103.

15. *SIR*, May 17, 1993, p. 7.

16. Police departments should keep up with graffiti, much of which has meaning. "Gang graffiti can not only mark an area, but also delivers a message to those who know how to read it," says David Alan Coia in *The Washington Times* (Sept. 2, 1994, C3). "There are even people whose main function is to put up graffiti and are called, Taggers. Individuals or groups whose primary interest is graffiti writing. Taggers may form into gangs or be used by established gangs for gang purposes, such as establishing territorial limits," Coia reports. Tattoos should be noted, also. They often impart a lot of information. For example, "Russian immigrants in the US were at a picnic of an Eastern Orthodox church. Soon, many removed their shirts in the warm sun and revealed numerous tattoos such as those worn by Japanese Yakuza. Local police said Russian mafia members have adopted this type of body decoration on their chests and backs so that nothing shows on arms or legs." (*SIR* Sept. 5, 1994, p 3.) The upshot is, as my editor says, correctly, that if "they" (the "bad guys") are stupid enough to advertise, we should be smart enough to read their message.

17. In Washington, D.C., in preparing for the World Cup Soccer games in mid-1994, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) enlisted the aid of Latino civil rights leaders in the areas of the city largely inhabited by Latin American immigrants. The MPD had been criticized in the past for being out of touch

with the so-called Hispanic community. Early planning helped reduce potential problems involving Spanish and Portuguese-speaking residents, fans, and players during the games. Liaison, on the other hand, included, in addition to MPD officers and federal agents, police from the countries having teams at the games. As an interesting twist, authorities decided that players, coaches, and support staff would be "official guests" of the U.S. That way, if the visitors became victims of crime, the FBI could work with the MPD on the cases. *The Washington Post*, June 18, 1994, A10.

18. Col. Edward Badolato, USMC (Ret), president of Contingency Services Management, Inc, of Fairfax, Virginia, and former deputy assistant secretary, Department of Energy. Interview Aug. 10, 1994.

19. Obviously, in dealing with private security, care should be taken, as in the case of liaison with other law enforcement agencies. Private security is sometimes substandard. Worse, private investigators sometimes work with criminal lawyers (that is to say, lawyers who are criminals), as discussed elsewhere. So do some police officers. The rule is, reach out but be careful.

20. The concept of Pre-Incident Indicators (PIIs) is not original. My notes contain considerable information on the subject which I see no reason to discard because I cannot identify the source(s).

21. Lawrence W. Myers, *Security Intelligence Sourcebook*, Second Edition, Interests, Ltd., p. 148.

22. Ibid.

23. Brig. M.H. Mackenzie-Orr, *Security Intelligence Sourcebook*, Second Edition, Interests, Ltd., Silver Spring, Maryland, p. 138.

## 6

### Destabilization By Crime

During the Cold War, Soviet intelligence services in the West, in addition to conventional intelligence collection, carried out numerous so-called "active measures" (A.M.) operations<sup>1</sup> against the West, some of which were very damaging. After all, Moscow in that period sought to damage or destroy many of the West's institutions, foremost among them those of the United States.<sup>2</sup> A number of Soviet active measures operations were in fact criminal activities designed not only to destabilize the West but also to make money for Moscow. Obviously, such operations affected law enforcement in the target areas - regional, national, and local - particularly in the U.S. Such operations required - and continue to require, where they continue to exist - the coordinated response of Western law enforcement, intelligence and counterintelligence forces and, insofar as the operations are ongoing, still do.<sup>3</sup>

The Soviets did not intend to closely monitor all of

their A.M. activities, much less completely control them, over any long period of time. Their main purpose in many instances was to hurt or destroy their perceived enemies. Moreover, it was better from their standpoint that the Soviet hand be hidden so that the less contact and follow-up with some of their trouble-making assets, the better. In any case, once set in motion, many Soviet A.M. activities acquired lives of their own and went crashing forward, with no one in charge - to the detriment of their victims in the West, obviously.

What does all this have to do with American law enforcement? In the late 1980s, concern among U.S. police and counterintelligence officials heightened at the rising volume of Soviet immigration. Among other things, not only was Soviet intelligence placing its usual, expected, intelligence agents in the immigrant flow but a large number of criminals, as well.<sup>4</sup> To the ever-increasing demand for the high-tech intelligence they so desperately needed, the Soviets increased their exploitation of emigres to support the motherland financially, as well. Criminals among the emigres, of course, were not to be overlooked for whatever use could be made of them.

In 1986 the U.S. President's Commission on Organized Crime cited "speculation that the Soviet Union attempted to empty their prisons and rid their country of undesirables much as Fidel Castro did several years later during the Mariel Harbor boatlift."<sup>5,6</sup> Many of those Soviet "undesirables" - Soviet *marielitos*, if you will - came to the U.S. They continued, as was to be expected, at what they were involved in back home - crime - very often very clever and very murderous.

As the Soviet economy plummeted in the 1980s, Soviet intelligence moved to increase the profitability of its overseas commercial ventures by exploitation of its overseas criminals, people over whom it had some control, thus enhancing its investment in international organized

crime.<sup>7</sup> Sometimes the two categories merged. In any case, American law enforcement found itself facing a mixture of espionage, active measures, and outright routine crime, all sponsored by Moscow. There is no reason to think that other Western countries were immune from the disease.

What local law enforcement officials need to know in all of this, at least in a general way, is the kinds of things that might be occurring in their jurisdictions as a consequence of this Soviet clandestine activity. Soviet criminals abroad excel in extortion, drugs, counterfeit "antiques," bootleg fuel (to avoid federal taxes), "plastic" (credit card) crime,<sup>8</sup> major frauds, and money laundering, to mention a few areas. Most local officials will never have anything to do with Soviet and Russian criminals but many are already deeply involved, mostly in the larger American cities. Some of whom are involved might not be aware of the dimensions or origins of their problems.

As long ago as 1986, there were "approximately 12 Russian organized crime groups in New York, with 400 to 500 members," according to press reports, with 100 members of Russian organized crime in Philadelphia, 10 to 12 Russian crime leaders in Los Angeles, and Russian gangs in Cleveland, Chicago, Dallas, Portland, Boston, Miami, and San Francisco.<sup>9</sup> Canada, meanwhile, was investigating a Soviet emigre crime network in Toronto with links to Italian organized crime.<sup>10</sup> The situation has gotten worse since.

More recently, "a new wave of callous Russian organized-crime figures, with ties to Brighton Beach (in Brooklyn in New York City) and the former republics of the Soviet Union, is responsible for the outburst of violence," a series of brutal beatings and murders that has struck in New York City and concurrently in Europe, according to The New York Times.<sup>11</sup> "(P)owerful crime gangs...are establishing bases among emigre communities in the United

States, particularly in South Brooklyn." The money flows back and forth between the U.S. and the old Soviet Union.

Soviet criminals abroad have expanded their contacts and the scope of their crimes and made new connections. For one thing, the U.S. President's Commission, mentioned above, reported that in the late 1980s Russian gangs in New York had established links to the Genovese *Cosa Nostra (Mafia)* family.<sup>12</sup> The U.S. Department of Justice had "elevated the Russian mafia to the highest investigative priority, the same level as the American and Sicilian Mafias, Asian organized crime groups and Colombian cocaine groups."<sup>13</sup>

The new wave of Russians, in branching out, has among other things, supplied heroin to the American *mafia*. "Russian organized crime in the United States is evolving faster than any organized crime group we have seen in the U.S.," says Jim Moody, chief of the FBI's organized crime section.<sup>14</sup> "The Russian groups, Moody says, are particularly well educated and well-suited to finance thievery. These people know what they're doing, and they're very good criminals," he says.<sup>15</sup>

A number of mobsters, *The New York Times* says, living in the U.S. with false identities, feel secure enough to hatch "plots with little danger of being compromised by informers." The FBI finds emigres reluctant to inform on other emigres, even if they can get into a witness protection program - "most Russians cannot survive unless they are in a Russian community," an editor of a Russian newspaper explained. Moreover, "[t]hey fear someone will retaliate against their relatives in Russia."<sup>16,17</sup>

In all fairness, it should be pointed out that, although federal officials paint this ominous picture of Russian crime, outlined above, "some state investigators and prosecutors are dubious about their overall importance in the underworld."<sup>18</sup> Be that as it may, it is particularly interesting from an intelligence standpoint that coordinated

"hits" of Russian mobsters take place in the U.S. and Europe at about the same time. Close relatives, such as brothers, or colleagues are struck down in Moscow or Berlin as emigres in the U.S. are murdered in ethnic gang killings.

The honest and hard working majority of emigres is, as is so often the case, the main prey of the emigre criminals, at least at first. Then the gangs branch out to infiltrate larger areas of society. No matter what, Soviet emigres have turned up in a number of counterintelligence investigations both in the U.S. and elsewhere - some in terrorist activities.<sup>19</sup>

One particularly interesting - and significant - fact for local law enforcement is the lack of concern of many criminals from the former Soviet Union with arrest and imprisonment in the U.S. as compared to home. Candidly, they view the American legal system as "Mickey Mouse" - American police "treat them with kid gloves compared to Russian cops," a law enforcement official told the press a few years ago. Traditionally, the Soviets generally treated their criminal prisoners better than their political counterparts, although it was no picnic for either. Criminals from the Soviet Union consider American authorities to be "pussycats." So a New York detective once told *The New York Times* - "the United States is one big candy store" to them, he said.<sup>20,21</sup>

To complicate matters, a number of Soviet criminals among immigrants to Israel have now relocated to the U.S., I have been told, creating a kind of troublesome Russian-Israeli-criminal mix with possible counterintelligence overtones. Besides settling in the Brighton Beach area of Brooklyn, many of these immigrants have gone to Los Angeles, unloading on the authorities there a whole array of new problems. New York and L.A. police have a lot to learn. They have learned a lot already, of course, and have much to teach law enforcement elsewhere, as do officials of Philadelphia, Cleveland, Dallas, etc., etc., etc.

Crooks from the former Soviet Union convey an entirely new culture to the New World and CI skills are very much required to deal with them - at every level.

Blackmailing criminals and prisoners is a very old practice world-wide, of course, but especially in communist countries. Obviously, convicts and criminals under police pressure are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by the authorities of totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union.<sup>22,23</sup> Soviet criminal agent recruits were allowed, or in some cases forced, to leave the country. Probably, not all of these agents, once established abroad, could be activated by their Russian case officers, nor would all of them respond to the call if it came. Nevertheless, the Soviets' successors still have *some* means of persuasion, even in foreign countries.

Of the thousands of emigres from the old Soviet Union around the world, clearly *some* would be working today for their new (or *perhaps, even old*) bosses, willingly or not. On the other hand, the interests of the old regime have changed in the meanwhile. New active measures goals might be quite different from the old ones.

Law enforcement should be particularly wary of terrorists among emigres. Although terrorism is only one of many forms of active measures, it is one of the most troublesome. The purpose of Cuba's "Plan Bravo," part of the Mariel boat lift of 1980, mentioned in the President's Report (cited above), was "destabilization by crime." According to Genaro Pérez, a Cuban intelligence defector, as reported by Daniel James, Washington author and authority on Latin America, the ultimate Cuban goal with respect to the U.S. was "disruption to be followed by revolution."<sup>24,25</sup> "Riots, bombings, shoot-outs, racial disturbances, and widening terrorism in the U.S." - "destabilization by crime," as Perez described the purposes of Plan Bravo<sup>26</sup> - are certainly matters that involve, if not *engulf*, local police and corrections officials. These things should

be pondered anew in light of new waves of rafters from Cuba.

Each nationality or ethnic group brings with it an array of cultural factors with which local police must deal, not to mention certain particular connections and criminal specialties.<sup>27</sup> I wrote in 1990 that, "For every new ethnic emigre group presenting a serious threat, law enforcement must adjust accordingly. In addition to ordinary run-of-the-mill crime, new and sometimes unusual *organized* activity must be recognized and countered but within our federal system response is not always uniformly adequate. At all levels, language and cultural barriers must be overcome, personnel must be recruited and trained for new tasks and a new police intelligence data base devised and instituted on a nation-wide basis."<sup>28,29</sup>

*As The New York Times* reported in mid-1989, "American law enforcement officials acknowledge they are ill-equipped to deal with the cultural and language complexities of the Soviet emigre crime problem."<sup>30</sup> Things have not changed much for the better since. "While the FBI has a task force that often deals with these crimes," the *Times* remarked, "their Russian-speaking agents are generally reserved for counterintelligence work."<sup>31</sup> It is always possible that, for whatever reason, federal authorities will be unable or unwilling to enter certain cases at local levels.

When it comes to foreign criminal elements - Russian, Russian-Israeli, Iranian, Syrian, Jamaican, Chinese, whatever, with all their dialects and cultural differences - local law enforcement will often be on its own in dealing with them. To cope with the many strange and perplexing problems encountered, among other things it will have to pool resources and look for *new* ones, perhaps human resources other than sworn officers, to provide the expertise, in languages, for example, or the cultural knowledge required.

In any case, although many aspects of crime in the U.S. fostered by foreigners are federal matters, the bulk of their burden falls on local and state authorities. The latter need a CI awareness to handle them.

## ENDNOTES:

1. *Activniye meropriyatiya*, the Soviets called them. "The term 'active measures,' is a literal translation of a Russian phrase used to describe overt and covert techniques and intelligence operations designed to advance Soviet foreign policy objectives and to influence events in foreign countries. In the United States, Soviet active measures operations utilized a wide range of techniques which include: forged documents, written and oral disinformation, agents of influence, political influence operations, use of Communist parties, and an international network of Soviet-controlled front groups." ("Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-1987," prepared by the FBI and entered into *The Congressional Record* by Rep. Bill Young, Dec. 9, 1987, E4717.) During the Reagan administration an Interdepartmental Working Group on Soviet Active Measures was established under the chairmanship of the State Department to monitor AM and counter them on a coordinated basis. Some of the more reprehensible active measures operations were the lies, stemming from Moscow, that the U.S. engineered AIDS to destroy non-white races and that "Jews and rich Americans" were involved in the murder of Third World babies to traffic in their body parts.
2. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, its successor republics, particularly Russia, have absorbed parts of the KGB and some, if not all, of its officers, foreign agents and other assets, as well as its operations and programs. Many intelligence and security services have merely changed names. In any case, care must be taken in dealing with clandestine assets of the old KGB or the newer services. Soviet military intelligence remains largely the same as before, except that it has been divided among the republics as the armed forces have been divided. Its mission seems to remain much as before with an even greater emphasis on the theft of high-tech information in the West. Much of what I know about Soviet active measures, I learned from serving on the Working Group mentioned in Endnote 1, above, and by talking to, and reading the work of, Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB major who defected to the U.S. in the 1970s.
3. Intelligence priorities have changed since the USSR broke up. "Now high-tech, industrial and economic intelligence is the most important priority," says Stanislav Levchenko (see Endnote 2). Without the resources and time necessary to carry out extensive R&D, Levchenko explains, "they will steal the

proprietary secrets of foreign companies. While posted to Tokyo in the 1960s, Levchenko knew about 25 KGB intelligence officers assigned to high technology subjects. These 25 represented half of the KGB [complement] in Tokyo, indicating the great importance the Soviets placed on high technology intelligence." Sulc, "Foreign Intelligence: Robbing Us Blind," *Conservative Review*, Sep/Oct 1993, p. 29. The Soviets' successors, especially the Russians, are even more interested now than before in picking up Western technology by stealing it.

4. *Bizarre* does not begin to describe the situation. U.S. Immigration complained that it could not check on the police records of Soviet immigrants because the KGB, Soviet internal security as well as foreign intelligence, would not cooperate. Had the KGB cooperated, of course, it would have said in effect, "These immigrants have no police records at all and we absolutely have not recruited any of them as agents, so you can let them in without any worry at all. Would we lie to you?"

5. Report of The U.S. President's Commission on Organized Crime, Washington, D.C., April 1986, p. 121.

6. In April 1980, 130,000 Cuban refugees flooded into the U.S. from the Cuban port of Mariel. Among the genuine political refugees were criminals, perverts, psychotics, and the seriously ill. Known as "Plan Bravo" inside the DGI, the Cuban intelligence service, the operation's purpose was "destabilization by crime" - riots, bombings, shootouts, racial disturbances, and terrorism. (*Human Events*, Oct. 31, 1981, p. 12.) It is too soon to have a good idea of what Havana has done to us with the most recent influx of "rafters" in mid-1994. It is certain, without knowing the full details, that among the large majority of good people from Cuba, there are problem cases that will trouble Uncle Sam for many years. Such is the nature of Communism. A former homicide detective, retired in Florida, told me that murderers among the *marielitos* are the "worst of all." He also said that the five convicted murderers who tunneled out of a Florida prison in January 1995 were *all marelitos*.

7. "Wealthy emigres might be persuaded to use their business and political connections...or might themselves provide helping hands to the Soviet Union." Evgueni Novikov, *Disinformation*, Summer 1989, No. 12, p. 1. Novikov's views and information from other sources are summarized in Sulc, "Security and the Soviet Emigre Problem: Hoods and Spies in 'The Big Candy Store,'" *Conservative Review*, Oct. 1990, pp. 16-19.

8. Cellular telephone toll fraud in the U.S. is considered to be credit card crime in which the Secret Service has principal ju-

risdiction. In 1992, a joint task force (LA IMPACT) was set up in Los Angeles to investigate cellular fraud. The L.A. Sheriff's Department and numerous local police departments worked together in a joint operation called LA BLITZ. Among those arrested were former Soviet citizens. Among other things, it was learned that the Soviet government had paid families \$18,000 to migrate to the U.S. In the end, there was little media interest in LA BLITZ. *The Los Angeles Times* did run one story. Secret Service officials told me that their agency was not interested in the counterintelligence implications of the case.

9. President's Commission, op. cit. *The New York Times*, June 14, 1989, A14.

10. *The New York Times*, June 14, 1989, A14.

11. *The New York Times*, Aug. 23, 1994, A1.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. *The Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 23, 1994, A14.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. *The Wall Street Journal* quotes a Russian mobster warning an American FBI informant of his fate if he were discovered to be working for the feds: "I want you to know that the Italians will kill you, but the Russians will kill your whole family." *The Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 23, 1994, A14.

18. Ibid.

19. One problem in U.S. law enforcement where foreigners are involved, is that the investigating agency, even if a federal agency, may have no CI interest. For example, cellular telephone toll fraud is considered "plastic" (credit card) crime, in which the U.S. Secret Service is the lead federal agency. The USSS has no CI responsibility even though foreign-origin criminals, for example former Soviet citizens, might be involved, as was the case a couple of years ago in Los Angeles, California.

20. Apparently, the Russians have found other "candy stores" here and there, Sweden being one. Bertil Haggman, editor of *MISTA* (now *DESTA*), a Stockholm newsletter on security matters, reported an official warning received in early 1993 by the Swedish Foreign Ministry from its consulate-general in St. Petersburg, Russia. "Russian criminals are coming to Sweden to commit crimes...but *also to be caught by the Swedish police* (my italics)," the message said. "Inmates in Swedish prisons are paid around US \$10 per day for the work they perform. A

Russian could live a month on that sum," *MISTA* explained. *MISTA* Vol. XI No. 2, March - April 1993. Talk about "pussy cats."

21. See Sulc, op. cit.
22. The former Soviet Union adopted a number of its internal security and intelligence practices from its predecessors, specifically the Czarist secret police. Such practices are not always successful, however. Josef Stalin himself was reportedly on the Czar's payroll, although a lot of good that did the Czar.
23. The KGB in the old Soviet Union "found the existence of the black market useful"...in the 1970s and 1980s, according to Konstantin Simis, an experienced and well-traveled Soviet lawyer. "The USSR: The Corrupt Society," Simon & Schuster, NY 1982, p. 194. Rather than use its black market informants to help roll up criminal activities, the KGB used them for counterintelligence. In doing so, it was uncommonly interested in foreigners who, once ensnared in illicit activity, could be persuaded to work for Soviet interests, usually intelligence tasks back where they came from. Soviet agents in the black market led their KGB handlers to promising foreigners whose vulnerabilities the CI people were able to exploit. Sulc, "Security and the Soviet Emigre Problem," op. cit. Soviet intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security (police) worked together closely, a practice that has probably not been totally discarded in the Soviet successor states.
24. *Human Events*, op. cit.
25. Shortly after the Mariel operation, Fidel Castro, Cuban dictator, told leaders of the communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua that "Cuba had developed the capacity to ignite race war in the United States...that we can make the Miami upheavals (the Miami race riots of 1980) look like a sunshower." Genero Pérez, testimony before Sen. Jeremiah Denton's Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the U.S. Senate in 1981.
26. Sen. Denton, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, after hearing the testimony of Cuban intelligence defectors, concluded that Fidel Castro "orchestrated the [Mariel] exodus partly to send intelligence agents to the United States." Associated Press, Washington, D.C., Feb. 22, 1982.
27. Soviet criminals, like those of other origins, wear tattoos. According to *SIR*, Sep. 5, 1994, p. 3, "Russian immigrants in the US were at a picnic of an Eastern Orthodox Church. Soon many removed their shirts in the warm sun and revealed nu-

merous tattoos such as those worn by the Japanese Yakuza. Local police said Russian mafia members have adopted this type of body decoration on their chests and backs so that nothing shows on arms and legs." Russian criminals thus seem to be a step ahead of American law enforcement. To gain the upper hand in this contest, the latter must come up with sufficient pretexts to get the former to take off their clothes. Again, to paraphrase a writer/editor I know, "If they are so stupid as to advertise, we should be smart enough to take advantage of that fact."

28. Sulc, op. cit.
29. Just as law enforcement was unprepared for the Sicilian *mafia* of 80 years ago, it "is woefully unprepared" today for the Asian gangs, says *Newsweek*. "Only 1.5 percent of FBI agents are Asian-American," the magazine points out. "The agency can't run a decent wiretap of [Chinese] Fujianese gangs, and the entire New York City Police Department has just one speaker of the dialect of Fujian...rich countries like America just need more police officers who can speak Fujianese, Russian and Estonian," *Newsweek*, Dec. 13, 1993. The bureau has also been hindered by a lack of Arabic speakers, Farsi speakers, and so on. Language study is not a high priority in the U.S., unfortunately.
30. *The New York Times*, June 14, 1989, A14.
31. Ibid.

## Internationalization Of Crime

Borders erode, communications technology blossoms, and international crime expands accordingly. Global changes in the last few years have been enormous and international criminal organizations continuously adjust. “The collapse of communism has abetted a rapid consolidation of international criminal groups, including Colombian drug cartels, the Sicilian Mafia and others, in a vast network for pushing drugs and laundering money,<sup>1</sup> witnesses told a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 1994.”<sup>2</sup>

“In mid-1992, Italian and Russian organized crime groups met in Czechoslovakia and allegedly agreed the Italians would provide ‘know-how’ to acquire and distribute drugs while the Russians would provide security,” R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, told senators. Organized crime “groups have the resources to bribe nuclear weapons handlers,” he told the subcommittee.<sup>3</sup>

"The international nature of organized crime makes it a danger for the economy and the political class of all countries...in ways that were not conceivable in the past," said Giancarlo Caselli, chief prosecutor of Palermo, Sicily, and renown *Mafia* fighter.<sup>4</sup>

Some of the tactics employed by international criminal organizations show a keen understanding on their part of intelligence and counterintelligence methods. For example, "U.S. and Colombian law enforcement officials said the Cali cartel has been able to expand its trade because it has the best intelligence network in Colombia...," reported Douglas Farah of the *Washington Post* Foreign Service. "Every operation against them has been compromised," said a U.S. agent. "It is seemingly impossible to mount an operation in Cali to get [individual leaders of the cartel]. Operations are compromised and these guys have such an intelligence network that it is damn near impossible for anything of significance to happen in Cali without their knowing about it."<sup>5,6</sup>

"...[T]he Cali leadership has a systematic, well-thought-through strategy," said one U.S. official. "These are people with more money than God, who have such a good intelligence network and [are] able to hire the best lawyers. They use the discovery process in the U.S., then find a stalking horse and make a deal so someone confesses to enough of the crime that all evidence against the [Cali] kingpin disappears."<sup>7</sup> That formula is hard to beat: "systematic, well-thought-through strategy," "good intelligence," not to mention the aggressive tactics of "discovery," "stalking horses," and getting "someone to confess." It is difficult for Uncle Sam to compete with the "best lawyers" and "more money than God" the U.S. official was talking about but "good intelligence," and "good counterintelligence," on our part, at least, gives us a fighting chance.

International crime reaches into almost every local

jurisdiction. "Asian gangs may be the future of organized crime," according to U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, who has promised to make such gangs a priority, says *R/IAP Watch*.<sup>8</sup> "Asian organized crime...(is) like a giant spider spread across the world," according to Willard Myers III, director of the Philadelphia-based Center for the Study of Asian Organized Crime, *R/IAP Watch* reports. Some examples, according to Myers are: Chinese Triads, some with as many as 180,000 members worldwide specialized in smuggling aliens and heroin in the major U.S. cities. The tattooed Japanese *Yakuza*, experts at high-level financial fraud and almost a shadow government in their own country have also penetrated U.S. real estate and banking industries.<sup>9</sup> Increasingly violent Chinese and Vietnamese street gangs in the United States specialize in low-level drug dealing and protection rackets. They also provide muscle for Triads.<sup>10</sup>

*R/IAP Watch* goes on to say, "Vancouver, Canada, may be a model of what the future holds for many U.S. cities, according to Thomas Ritchie, the top organized crime investigator in British Columbia. The city's organized crime is already dominated by Chinese syndicates, including the Big Circle Boys, founded by former Maoist Red Guards."<sup>11</sup>

International criminal groups, bigger and more powerful than most of their predecessors, and operating globally, make it impossible for law enforcement in any one jurisdiction to neutralize major parts of their activities, say Roy Godson and William J. Olson of the National Strategy Information Center in Washington. "While some degree of cooperation exists among law enforcement agencies, and new initiatives are getting under way," they say, "many observers believe that it is inadequate to the task. In 1992, for example, a US Senate report noted that there is little evidence to suggest that either U.S. or foreign law enforcement entities are currently equipped to meet the challenge of this new breed of international criminal."<sup>12</sup>

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany, proposes a European police force to combat growing crime on the continent. Organized crime, with a turnover of from \$190 billion to \$250 billion a year, poses a threat to society, the German leader has charged. The new European police force should have authority "to pursue criminals throughout the continent," Chancellor Kohl believes; national measures to combat crime are not effective any more.<sup>13</sup>

There can be no question about the gravity and scope of internationalized crime, "...the most serious criminal threat in history and perhaps the greatest national security threat of our time," according to Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate subcommittee cited above. Officials from the U.S. State and Justice departments told the subcommittee that international criminal groups "jeopardize the ability of Americans to do business abroad," decrease profit potential, put executives in danger, and discourage new ventures. Of more immediate interest to American law enforcement, they said that Chinese Triads smuggled 200,000 illegal aliens into the country in 1993 and that drug trafficking and related crime and violence on the streets of American cities like Los Angeles was directly linked to international drug pushing and money-laundering networks.<sup>14</sup>

Whether international police forces, as proposed by Chancellor Kohl of Germany, are feasible, improved cooperation and better intelligence must be. Among the solutions offered at the Senate (Kerry) subcommittee hearing, mentioned above: "Greater use of intelligence gathered by the CIA, FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, and other groups."<sup>15</sup>

In this connection, it is important to remember that major sources of criminal intelligence for the CIA are foreign local police departments just as local police are for federal law enforcement agencies at home. Local police agencies obviously have a key intelligence function in both

national and international law enforcement. Over and over, the response called for is coordination, cooperation, and intelligence. It is the fortunate local jurisdiction that can long escape the reach of burgeoning internationalized crime.<sup>16</sup>

To sum up: "The face of crime is...changing," as Darrell W. Mills, Chief of the Intel-U.S. National Central Bureau in the U.S. Department of Justice, says. "Today's crimes are limited only by the imagination and sophistication of the criminal element in devising daring new schemes that transcend national boundaries," he says. "This internationalization of crime poses increasing challenges for law enforcement officials all over the world, and highlights the advantages of coordination and cooperation within the world's police community."<sup>17</sup>

## ENDNOTES:

1. The volume of laundered drug money in Europe and North America has surpassed \$1 trillion in the past decade, experts told a summit conference of the Group of Seven in Naples, Italy. *The Washington Post*, Aug. 2, 1994, A20. Britain's National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) estimates that profits from global organized crime now total about \$1 trillion a year. *The Washington Times*, Nov. 3, 1994, A12.
2. *The Washington Times*, April 21, 1984, A3.
3. Ibid.
4. *The Washington Post*, Aug. 2, 1994, A20. The Post remarks that, "Unlike other European states, Italy has been willing to sacrifice some civil liberties to carry out extensive wiretapping, coerce testimony from informants given new identities and impose draconian jail terms."
5. *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1994, A28.
6. Small wonder, in view of the remarks of Fernando Botero, minister of defense of Colombia, that leaders of the Cali drug cartel had evaded capture by bribing the security forces with huge sums of money. *The Washington Times*, Aug. 21, 1994, A8. Minister Botero's remarks are reported elsewhere in this book. A Colombian security officer told me that the drug lords can buy almost anyone; those they cannot buy, they shoot.
7. *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1994, A28.
8. *R/IAP Watch*, newsletter of the Research/Intelligence Analyst Program, Mercyhurst College, Erie, Pennsylvania, Aug. 1994, pp. 2-3. The R/IAP Program at Mercyhurst is interdisciplinary and leads to a B.A. degree. Graduates work for the FBI, CIA, USSS, NSA, crime commissions and task forces, and state and local police, not to mention multi-national corporations. The program coordinator, Robert J. Heibel, is a former special agent of the FBI.
9. The cartels are also penetrating banks, it seems. "The DEA and other U.S. anti-drug [agencies]...have come to a depressing conclusion," says David A. Andelman. "They have remained a step behind the cartels, who are hopscotching around the world finding new havens for their funds as each old sanctuary is denied them. Even more troubling is the latest wrinkle: the money launderers have begun to buy equity in international banks." David A. Andelman, "The Drug Money Maze," *Foreign Affairs*, V. 73, Jul-Aug 1994, p. 101.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Roy Godson and William J. Olson, "International Organized Crime: Emerging Threat to US Security," National Strategy Information Center, Washington, D.C., August 1993.
13. *The Washington Times*, Aug. 22, 1994, A12.
14. *The Washington Times*, April 21, 1994.
15. Ibid.
16. The experience of Peru offers a good example of resolve and resourcefulness. Peru's president, Alberto Fujimori, although at considerable cost, has had significant success in breaking one of the world's most virulent and violent terrorist groups, the notorious Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) Maoist terrorist movement in his country. Asked how he had defeated *El Sendero*, which had been responsible for 26,000 deaths and \$22 billion in material damage, the president responded: "First I ordered the army and the police to work with the people to get intelligence." Captures followed and, in time, Abemael Guzmán, the *Sendero* chief, one of the world's most vicious terrorists, was apprehended and sentenced to life in prison. The results-oriented president had his priorities right: "Get intelligence." "Get it from the people." "Get results." Unfortunately, a good part of the cost (mentioned above) of Peru's success, has been damage to the civil rights structure. The trick, of course, is to do the job without violating constitutional rights. It is appropriate here to remember that Justice Arthur Goldberg emphasized in "Kennedy vs. Martínez-Mendoza (1963)," that "while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact."
17. *The Police Chief*, Oct. 1993.

## Personal Data In The Wrong Hands

The Omnibus Crime Act (sometimes called the Clinton Crime Bill, H.R. 3355/P.L. 103-322), enacted in 1994, among other things, contains legislation to bar state motor vehicle departments (MVDs) from releasing personal information to people without a good reason. Women afraid of being stalked and abortionists afraid of being shot, among others, supported the provision. Corrections workers and employees of mental hospitals are among those who join them in opposition, for fear of being tracked by hostile people.

*The Washington Times* quotes a Maryland state senator as saying that a tighter law, insofar as his own state was concerned, was “needed for anybody who has a job where they can be *less liked* (emphasis added).”<sup>1</sup> Law enforcement personnel, especially those under cover, can certainly consider themselves among those “less liked” in certain parts of American society, especially when post

office supervisors and fast food managers, occupations formerly more or less neutral in the public mind, are among those who find themselves targets for violence in the work place.<sup>2</sup>

Obviously, there are those with a legitimate need for credit and MVD file information. News organizations, telemarketers, and private investigators (PIs) insist on exemption from restrictions. Automobile manufacturers also seek relief from restrictions based on the need for MVD data to recall a specific model of car or send out warnings to buyers. For PIs, solution of many criminal fraud cases depend on access to MVD and credit bureau information - false insurance and/or workman's compensation claims, for example. Moreover, private investigators need automobile license plate information to locate "deadbeat dads," drug dealers and industrial spies, their representatives say. It is important to remember that, "(i)n an era of shrinking police budgets, more and more criminal investigations are being handled by private investigators," as Ed McLean, a private detective in California, points out, as reported by *The Washington Times*.<sup>3</sup>

McLean, speaking for PIs, is right. My own experience, shows that important crimes are often left unattended but for the intervention of private law firms and private investigators. Involved peripherally in the investigation of two serious industrial espionage cases, I saw that both were ignored by government until solved by private investigation. In one case, organized crime figures were involved, and in the other, the beneficiary, in the end, was a foreign industrial competitor of the victimized American company. The foreign company accepted, and paid handsomely for the information.

The first case involved counterfeit turbine parts; the second, the formula of, and process for, diamond abrasives. Both victimized American firms had been pre-eminent in their distinct high-technology fields *until* their secrets

were stolen and sold. The United States as a nation, as well as the American companies themselves, was severely damaged by the thefts.

Interestingly, the appropriate district attorneys and the local U.S. attorneys remained aloof from the cases until private investigators and company lawyers had solved them and packaged them nicely for presentation in court. Judges in *civil* courts, however, were not only interested but aggressive in providing appropriate supervision and indispensable court orders to help the private interests pursue the cases. The cost of all this - the PIs and private lawyers - was all at the companies' expense, of course. The lack of interest on the part of the criminal justice authorities in the two cases, until the private investigative work had shown them the way, was a new wrinkle to me, but not to my more experienced colleagues; it was standard procedure they told me.

The civil courts issued enabling orders, injunctions and assessed damages; the criminal courts, in their turn, imposed fines and prison terms. The criminal prosecutors were aided immeasurably by having their work done for them. Nonetheless, in the end, the damage done the American firms was great - the cost of cleaning up was phenomenal.

Hundreds of millions of dollars were lost in these cases and the nation's competitive position in high technology world competition was hurt. The outcome of one case, as a result of the theft cited, was the loss of American preeminence in diamond abrasives. The authorities were busy with other important matters, of course, and big corporations have deep pockets. There was a bit less in those deep pockets, however, as a result of the losses these cases entailed.

It should be reiterated that federal judges in their civil mode were extremely cooperative, as were federal and local *police* agencies when called upon in tactical situ-

ations, especially the former when called upon by the judges.<sup>4</sup> The fact is that private lawyers and PIs, conducting legitimate investigations - such as in the cases cited above - need access to personal data in such places as MVDs and credit bureaus. Had such information been denied in the cases mentioned here, it is unlikely that damage control on behalf of the companies would have been as successful as it was. In any case, the issue of easy access to personal information, whether from credit bureaus or motor vehicle departments, or from other sources, is one of several on which legitimate investigative needs are arrayed against the interests of privacy.

According to the Federal Crime Bill, cited above, access to personal information from MVDs and CBs would be limited to certain categories of people presumably having legitimate motives for asking for it. Obviously, the "bad guys," using fronts and pretexts and money, will be able to get the information they want as they do now.<sup>5</sup> This aspect of the overall issue of access to MVD and credit information should be of great interest to law enforcement counterintelligence people and should be closely monitored by them.

## ENDNOTES:

1. *The Washington Times*.
2. Law enforcement and corrections officers should not be overly chastened at being deemed "less liked." Firemen, teachers, and medical personnel, among others, who presumably should be among those more liked, are also attacked. Still others find themselves less liked: a radio talk show host was murdered in Denver, Colorado, by members of a hate group, and a state legislator in Australia, crusading against rising gang violence among Asian immigrants, was shot dead outside his home in Sidney, the victim of a political assassination, the government said.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Persons involved in important legitimate private investigations will *usually* find local police departments and federal agencies extremely cooperative. A good idea is to brief the authorities early and well.
5. Obviously, the harder it becomes to pull up information from the local MVD, the more difficult it becomes for the young bachelor cop to check out the pretty blonde in the red convertible. Perhaps its just as well, but it takes some of the excitement out of police work.

## **PART TWO**

---

### **THE GUARDIANS**

## Counterintelligence In County And State Law Enforcement

“**Y**ou have to know the other side and what it is doing. You have to know the *dark* side,” says William H. Dunman, a third generation police officer who has developed and supervised major organized crime investigations and police intelligence training academies.<sup>1</sup>

Many groups conduct intelligence operations against the police. Law enforcement counterintelligence is *self*-defense against those groups. These criminal groups range from domestic motorcycle gangs to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Their activities range from the filing of law suits against police agencies to terrorism against individual law enforcement officers and their families. “They sometimes kill. They can make life hell,” for an investigator, Dunman says. Organized criminal groups are ingenious and dangerous. Many of their members are very capable.

Members of motorcycle gangs (“bikers”), for example, penetrate government offices at all levels, being especially

interested in police departments. One method of operation (M.O.) is to make clandestine videos of government employees, playing back the films in their club houses, Dunman says. In identifying law enforcement personnel, criminal organizations take special note of undercover officers. Members of one black extremist group work in this way, according to Dunman.

In one large mid-western U.S. city, mob associates were found to be assisting young people in the infiltration of the police department, not to mention City Hall and other city offices. The purpose of law enforcement counterintelligence is to identify, combat, and prevent or stop such practices.

"As you become more effective in arresting criminals - bikers, mobsters" and so forth - 'the 'enemy' will react with an 'intelligence offensive,'" Dunman explains. The police then need counterintelligence more than ever, he says. In some cases, for obvious reasons, criminals cultivate police officers and, in some cases, they develop their *family* members. In one case, the wife of a police officer in a southern state, worked in a section of the telephone company where she was aware of court orders for criminal wire taps. Her husband sold the sensitive information to the mob.

Organized criminal groups use a number of clever means to monitor police operations. For example, criminal groups, Dunman says, have been known to bid low on commercial cleaning contracts, at considerable cost to themselves, to get into police installations. Once inside their targets, they plant listening devices to eavesdrop on law enforcement operations. They are particularly interested, of course, in police investigations directed against themselves.

In one American state, Dunman recounts, a State Police captain was forced to fight the contracting people of his own state to keep the mob's cleaning firm out of his

offices. The captain with the CI mentality persisted, however, and eventually won. Incredibly, however, he had to go to court to do so. Had he lost to the state's "bean counters," the mob might have taken the State Police themselves to the cleaners.

Police offices, especially sensitive ones, need frequent periodic searches ("sweeps"), Dunman warns. The whole matter of CI, particularly countermeasures against hostile electronic surveillance, should be handled by professionals, however. Dunman remembers one case in which a CI officer spoke openly of an impending electronic "sweep" of his unit. It was discovered later that "someone was listening" and the illicit microphones were deactivated by the listeners until after the sweep was completed. CI personnel should be more clever than this.

The criminal opposition is increasingly well trained, often much better than the police, Dunman says. For one thing, prisons are excellent training schools for crime. Biker and racial extremist groups (black and white) are riddled by ex-convicts, Dunman points out. Many racist, terrorist, biker, Colombian, and Caribbean criminal groups (especially the *Marielitos*)<sup>2</sup>, have had intensive military training and experience. Some are highly professional, having expertise in weapons, including knives and sidearms, and explosives. Many Cubans, and Jamaicans trained in Cuba, served in combat in Angola with the Cuban army.

Local, state, and federal police all operate under the jurisdiction of the courts and are crime-oriented, Dunman points out. In view of that orientation, "you have to have a crime to start with," Dunman says. In counterintelligence work, however, the impetus of an investigation is "reasonable suspicion, that is, grounds to believe." The phenomenon of reasonable suspicion emerges from "the background of the officer involved - his education, training and experience," Dunman says. It is from reasonable

suspicion on the part of a competent, experienced officer, that a CI investigation develops.

Not only criminal elements and law enforcement agencies conduct intelligence and counterintelligence operations against each other, however. Sometimes, however rarely, the two work together. When they do, it makes for a dangerous combination. Dunman cites the case of the mayor and the chief of police of a large West Coast city who, fully understanding the great value of intelligence and counterintelligence, used their close connections with organized crime to exploit the latter's capabilities in these fields - for *mutual* benefit. The city's police had no formal intelligence or CI programs (and do not to this day) but did not, however, lack an intelligence *capability*. Intelligence and CI were provided by the mob.

The cozy relationship between civil servants and organized crime was, of course, a perversion of good government, especially its law enforcement function. None-the-less, the relationship *does* demonstrate the value of good intelligence, if for the wrong purposes. In any case, once again it is clear that the "other side" certainly appreciates the value of intelligence.

To further demonstrate the value of counterintelligence - in this case, *offensive* CI - as a function of intelligence, Dunman cites an instance in which CI was used by a police agency to *disrupt, or negate*, organized illegal activities. The wrongdoers were not arrested and tried as it happened but their operations were never-the-less interrupted, a most worthwhile outcome.

The mob in a large Mid-Western American city was convulsed when the police revealed knowledge of a "secret" murder that gang leaders had carried out. The story was this: the sons of top gang bosses were assigned the task of killing an errant gang "soldier" in a kind of "rite-of-passage" ritual murder. The killing took place in a basement, witnessed by assembled gang leaders. Obviously,

the whole thing was supposed to be secret but the police learned of it anyhow.

The gang's plan was for the two aspiring gang leaders, sons of higher bosses, to strangle the "guilty" party, who was bound and gagged in a chair. As luck would have it, however, the garrote broke in the act and the job had to be finished by a real "pro."

The bungled "execution" upset the mob. Internal gang punishment - especially an incident so extreme - is *supposed to go more smoothly* and is *supposed* to remain forever secret. The police had a well-placed informant, however. The cops decided on an unorthodox but highly effective operation: a couple of intelligence police officers entered a bar known to be a gang hangout. One "casually" queried a participant in the murder how it felt "when the rope broke." This threw the mob into turmoil.

Stunned gang members thereafter suspected any and every participant in the sordid affair. As a consequence, a "stand down" was ordered for much of the gang's activity for an extended period. While it is hard to assess the precise damage within the mob, mutual suspicion and distrust as a result of the CI "operation" must have been considerable.

Sharing is a key element of intelligence; all departments should share on a mutual basis. Much important data (intelligence) learned by one police department is also of value to another. Such information should move up and down and *laterally* between agencies, Dunman says.

Lives are often at stake in sharing (or not sharing) intelligence. For example, it should be widely recognized that during a traffic stop - as police know, one of the most dangerous activities in law enforcement - officers should be aware of the potential of a "war wagon," as Dunman refers to it, coming up behind. A war wagon is a car or van containing armed henchmen of the person(s) in the stopped vehicle. The officer(s) on the scene are at risk,

obviously, and must be ready for the war wagon when it rolls up behind the police car.

Dunman also has something to say about Jamaican "posses" illustrating the dangers they pose and the importance of disseminating intelligence about them and their methods of operation (MOs). Jamaicans have a history of excellence in carpentry, he explains. They are masters at concealment, hiding weapons and other contraband in closets, cabinets, walls, and so forth. He recalls a raid once on a Jamaican "smoke house" (a marijuana or *ganja* den) in New York City. The occupants of the targeted apartment disappeared into a closet. Unknown to the police, they climbed up a secret ladder inside the closet, and emerged on the stairs from the floor above with guns blazing. "The cops were shot," Dunman remarks.

The posses also rig their hideouts in other ways. An apartment is raided at night. In the dark, an officer flicks a wall switch for light and the place explodes.<sup>3</sup> Jamaicans are not the only ones ingenious at rigging things, however. As an example, bikers hide weapons in the handlebars of their motorcycles, Dunman says, a dangerous practice police officers should know about. It is crucial that information on this sort of phenomena moves up, down and across the intelligence network quickly.

"Philosophy and policy start with the top man and go down to the working level," Dunman says. Unfortunately, the constant change that occurs in an intelligence and CI activity creates a fertile field for mistakes. "That's when the weak link breaks," he says. When the "weak link" within the police breaks it has unfortunate results. Occasionally, however, the weak link on the *other* side breaks. When it does, it can have unfortunate results for *them*.

In a mid-western American state some years ago, police investigators concluded that, of the nine members of the board of directors of a prominent race track, *five* were connected to organized crime. Police intelligence

found a tenuous provision of the state racing law, however, which stipulated that board members "must be of good reputation." Investigators went to work to demonstrate the contrary was the case, and with the help of federal and Canadian authorities, they succeeded.

The Canadian connection began with a lone patrol constable, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), in the Great North Woods. It continued with good intelligence work and uncommon tenacity on the part of RCMP headquarters. The FBI and good liaison helped. Aggressive CI measures completed the job. The criminals exposed a weak link, in a manner of speaking and, in this instance, anyhow, good CI broke the chain.

Organized crime leaders must talk privately from time to time to conduct their business, Dunman points out. Often they meet clandestinely to do so. Certain American organized crime leaders believed that members of the racing entity in question needed to get together with other top mobsters from out of town. Big money was involved. A highly secret, out-of-the-way, conference was indicated.

A hard-to-get-to spot in upper Ontario Province in Canada was chosen for the secret conference. A hunting camp was used for cover. The "hunting" party looked unusual to the single snowmobile-mounted RCMP constable who happened by. No laws were being broken, but the group party "just didn't look right." The *mounty* saw no weapons, for example. The suspicious constable exchanged pleasantries with the "hunters" and left. Out of earshot, however, he dismounted and returned to the camp, silently on foot. Using an inexpensive camera, he surreptitiously and repeatedly photographed the mobsters.

The RCMP believes in intelligence - the constable's suspicions were shared by headquarters. His pictures were worked over and some of the targets eventually identified. The RCMP also believes in liaison. In time, U.S. federal and state authorities put the story together. Al-

though no indictment was handed up and no one went to trial, "heat," none-the-less, was applied by various means (including the press).

In time, the mob buckled and abandoned its grip on the racing board. It was victory for CI. Organized crime lost \$50 million annually when its race track operation was finally closed. One gangster, to replace lost revenue, bought into a Las Vegas gambling casino but tenacious federal authorities stayed with the case and broke up that operation too.

"The rule for successful counterintelligence," Dunman claims, is "good people." Get good people and assign them well, he says. Good people in CI work include sworn officers and non-police personnel, such as analysts, as well as other support personnel. They also include "sources." "You have to be able to protect your sources, protect your information, and fulfill your obligations to your sources," Dunman emphasizes.

As far as the quality of CI *sworn officers* is concerned, the key is whether a person can write well, Dunman says. "Can he write a report?" he asks. Many officers cannot; certainly, few like to. "Can he analyze? Can he interpret?" Dunman would want to know. "Every time you contact a criminal or suspect a criminal act, write a memo," Dunman says, "both for accountability *and* for self defense," he points out. Such a record also pinpoints a given person at a given place, he adds.<sup>4</sup>

Many officers, not specially trained for the job, have difficulties in CI investigations, Dunman says. Moreover, unfortunately, "cops are easy to tail," he believes. "Cops don't suspect tails." They must be trained to be surveillance conscious. Fortunately, in a high-level corruption case involving a judge and a state senator, in which he was one of the investigators, Dunman was able to detect an automobile following *him*. His discovery helped him to solve the case. He was able to gently trap his "tail," who

was unfamiliar with the area, in an alley, and learned who he was.

Dunman's surveillant turned out to be a private investigator (PI). That fact - that PIs from out of town had been brought in by the judge and senator under investigation - demonstrated to Dunman and his fellow investigators that the two suspects had no defense but to seek, at great personal expense, derogatory information on the investigators themselves - thus the PIs from another city. In the end, the judge and state senator were convicted.

For his part, Dunman's former boss, Nick Navarro, Sheriff (retired) of Broward County, Florida, believes that "a good police officer is a good *intelligence* officer." He develops "his own 'stable' of sources - *good* sources," Navarro says. "He has contact with people. He is aggressive - outgoing. He *talks* with people. He is a total *extrovert*," Navarro declares.

## ENDNOTES:

1. William H. Dunman is director of training, Training Center of Bert & Associates, Plantation, Florida. His police experience has been military and civilian. In the latter capacity, he has served as a patrolman, sergeant, special agent, and commander, and has worked at local, county, and state levels. He has specialized in organized crime investigations and has lectured at colleges and universities in the U.S. and abroad. The date of the interview was June 8, 1994.
2. The Mariel boat lift of 1980 has been described elsewhere.
3. The U.S. lost some good men in World War II because the Germans, in retreat, rigged booby traps behind pictures left crooked on the walls of houses evacuated. Americans, somehow, seem to be seized by the need to straighten crooked pictures. The *Wehrmacht* thought so, anyhow. German intelligence passed that word down and a lot of pictures were rigged with lethal results. U.S. intelligence had to counter the measure by passing the word, defensively, by its own means. Then there were the elaborate Nazi belt buckles that were supposed to fire a pistol round at the midsection of an unsuspecting captor. More recently, and more relevant to police today, foreign terrorists in the U.S. just a few years ago were booby trapping weapons. The weapons, seized by the police, were supposed to explode when examined. When I found out about this threat, I notified some police contacts of mine. They already had the intelligence, I was happy to learn.
4. Good record-keeping is the essence of counterintelligence. With the help of computers to record, collate, and cross reference information, CI can become increasingly effective, especially if there is rapid and accurate input by people who know what is significant, and know how to write and write well. It helps if they *like* to write. Many police officers do not; some observers claim that they are notorious for not liking to write. They frequently keep the information under their caps. Numerous traits inhibit good CI practices.

10

## Intelligence Lost

A former federal intelligence operations officer whom I know, after retirement worked with the intelligence element of a state anti-narcotics organization, to which civilians as well as state police officers were assigned. He shared his knowledge - gained from many years of headquarters and overseas experience - and learned a lot from his new colleagues, in turn.<sup>1</sup>

The lessons he learned are important, for if the problems he outlined to me exist in the overall area of intelligence, obviously the situation is even more serious in the realm of *counterintelligence*.

The intelligence element he worked in at the joint anti-narcotics organization, he says, regularly reviewed operational reports from down the line so as to pull out their intelligence content. This former federal officer found that the reports often did not separate intelligence from operational and administrative matters, a practice, he

recalled, that some years ago plagued federal intelligence agencies, also.<sup>2</sup> The time required by people up the line, he says, to extract intelligence from operational reports, was often so great that the job was not done at all and much valuable intelligence was lost.

Intelligence was lost in other ways, he says, some of which were these:

- Information on arrests and case files containing useful information were not always processed by an intelligence specialist.
- Because much information is passed by telephone, much valuable data never goes into the record. (Often, of course, communication by telephone avoids defense disclosure probes, which is another matter.)
- Where indexing of information in reports (general investigative reports and memoranda) was done by a secretary, or even the officer/author of the report, an intelligence officer rarely took part in the procedure, or got output.
- Inasmuch as members of joint teams frequently reported through separate channels, intelligence - as opposed to information on criminal leads - that could be obtained from the team member's separate reports was often lost.
- Valuable records in some jurisdictions - index cards on arrests, for example - might be filed in several places and forgotten in all.

Intelligence officers, my former colleague says, sometimes complain that they are bothered less by the job of organizing the information that comes into their offices than persuading patrol officers to stop trying "to keep their card files in their heads." It is a major effort, he says, to persuade officers that they will not hold their current jobs indefinitely and should make the effort to record their knowledge while they can. Some officers simply do not like to write, he says; still others, believing that "knowl-

edge is power," want to keep that knowledge to themselves. By unduly holding back on recording information, however, expertise and knowledge are lost. The knowledge goes with them when they transfer, in any case, he says.

With respect to *sources of information* useful to the operational officer in his work, several such sources are often overlooked. Tight budgets often cause things that cost money, such as publications, to be shunned. Some publications, nonetheless, are essential, my former colleague says. Some units find that certain "drug culture" publications, for example, *High Times*, available in "head shops," provide useful insights into the "opposition." The magazine's tables on drug prices and availability are as accurate a reflection of the narcotics situation as anything that can be had through official channels. On the other hand, liaison - *liaison* again - by narcotics officers with health officials, coroners (for death overdose statistics, say), and their own police forensic laboratories, where such liaison is not regularly maintained, would be valuable.

By the same token, various *means of disseminating* information are also often overlooked. Word-of-mouth communication is essential of course, but *written* communication is essential too. Some units find that a reading board - a centrally located clip board with current intelligence reports, operational aids, and significant card file entries - is useful, he says. The key issue for most police officers is the central importance of line versus staff functions, and regional (or street) "real work" as against headquarters bureaucracy. Intelligence must serve enforcement.<sup>3</sup> If that is the case, and I believe that it is the case, intelligence must be given its due so that it *can* serve. And so must counterintelligence.<sup>4</sup>

**ENDNOTES:**

1. Interview, May 4, 1994.
2. How well I remember those cables from headquarters dunning me for mixing positive intelligence and operational matters in my reports. I eventually learned to separate the two so well that later, when I was at headquarters, I was sending out such cables myself to the poor working case officers in the field. I tried hard to be considerate, of course.
3. The source comments that to many in police work, the aphorism that intelligence must serve law enforcement often means that the latter can borrow a couple of officers from the intelligence unit whenever they are short handed.
4. This interview was so worthwhile, I thought, that I decided to include it. Although its content is basically aimed at the intelligence level, rather than counterintelligence, *per se*, I believe it applies to CI very well. Many intelligence lessons apply to counterintelligence, as I have tried to make clear throughout. I should add that I learned from friends of the retired federal operations officer, interviewed here, that he had done a very good job with the state intelligence unit. I was glad to learn that; a knowledgeable high-level federal intelligence officer told me that local police officers picked up by his service were "worth their weight in gold." Maybe there is some transferability between the two professions at different levels, after all.

11

## Corruption In The Ranks

**T**raditional organized criminal organizations in the United States, as well as major drug groups, very often Colombians, frequently use lawyers to manage illegal activities for them. Attorneys have specialized knowledge and access to important persons and information. Among other things, they can learn a good deal about criminal cases under investigation - in most jurisdictions in the United States, the prosecution must reveal much of its evidence to the defense. With such special access, attorneys frequently provide their clients with information that allows them to identify informants and undercover officers.

Among other things, attorneys working for criminal employers often identify police officers and agents to the opposition or even approach such law enforcement personnel themselves in an effort to corrupt them. Unfortunately, they sometimes succeed in penetrating law enforcement entities in this way.

Corrupt lawyers have additional access to unique opportunities by hiring private investigators. Many former police officers become private investigators and, work for lawyers, carrying out investigations and other tasks. Such former officers are well qualified to identify former police colleagues to their new bosses for follow-up attention, which, if their bosses happen to be criminally inclined lawyers, could include either recruitment or intimidation of the latter.<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, former officers often rationalize their new work as a justifiable contribution to the adequate defense guaranteed by law to any defendant. They thereby claim to be exercising a lawful and necessary role in the legal system and make some money in the process.<sup>2</sup>

Some corrupt defense attorneys actually direct criminal intelligence operations against law enforcement, using corrupt PIs. Colombians in the drug trade, particularly, employ crooked attorneys and private investigators to expose if not actually *penetrate* law enforcement. In any case, foreign criminals have difficulty operating in the U.S. (or anywhere else, for that matter), until they become accustomed - or "street wise" - in their new environment. Thus, American lawyers and PIs are invaluable, particularly in the early stages of the foreign criminals' operations. The crooked lawyers and PIs provide information and operational help, as well as the legal advice that only those in such specialized professions can provide. Aware of the techniques employed by law enforcement, they are often able to avoid detection and prosecution.

Regarding communications, Colombian drug traffickers tend no longer to use public telephones, formerly an important aid in their communications. They, as well as many other organized criminal gangs, use cellular telephones, often "cloned" to evade electronic detection<sup>3</sup> and gain clandestinity in their communications. Law enforcement has adjusted to this challenge by working with tele-

communications companies to monitor suspect cellular calls.

Cellular carriers, while cooperative with law enforcement, often place telephone numbers of interest (i.e., those being tapped under judicial warrants) in special categories. Although ordinary employees of the telephone companies might remain unaware of special police interest in an account, some technical employees and certain higher company executives have easy access to such information. If these personnel are corrupt, of course, telephones numbers of interest to law enforcement are identified to the targets, that is, to the criminals whose calls are being tapped.<sup>4</sup>

The foregoing information points out in some detail the kind of help crooked lawyers can provide organized criminal groups, sometimes with the help of cooperative private investigators. Law enforcement must learn to deal with such adversaries. So must the legal profession and PI organizations.

**ENDNOTES:**

1. Sometimes, ironic twists make investigative work more interesting. In one case, a threatening telephone call to the wife of a prosecutor was traced by the police to the telephone of a *defense* lawyer. As it turned out, there was little to worry about and concerned investigators were relieved to learn that the caller was the attorney's *son*, who had nothing to do with the case, making a "crank" call. There is no record of the quality of the boy's defense when his lawyer father learned of his trick.
2. The source emphasizes that only a small minority of private investigators and attorneys become involved in the corrupt practices outlined here.
3. By means of the illegal use of computer technology, a cellular telephone - either stolen or relegated - can be "cloned," that is to say, duplicated, to be electronically identified as genuine by the carrier company. Users of cloned phones can also avoid toll charges. Inasmuch as the fraudulent calls are billed to the customer of record, the criminal making the calls gets "free" telephone service, around the clock. Moreover, the source points out that "cloned phones make it very difficult for law enforcement to develop the legal basis to eavesdrop on the illegal conversations taking place on them." Cellular carriers lose many hundreds of millions of dollars a year to toll fraud, most of which loss is borne by their honest subscribers. See Sulc, "Communicating Cellular Security Needs," *Security Management*, April 1994, pp. 63-64; and "Hobbyists, Hackers and Hams = H<sup>3</sup>," *Conservative Review*, Nov/Dec 1993, pp. 24-26.
4. According to the source, older telephone carriers had long-term trusted employees. Personnel turnover is greater now, especially among lower level employees more susceptible to approach by outsiders.

**12**

## The Hunters Become The Hunted

**L**aw enforcement personnel are justifiably concerned about "being made," *identified*, by criminals with murderous intent, says Stanley Wilson, former homicide detective, Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), in Washington, D.C. Not only undercover officers and agents are being made by their targets however, "ordinary" operating police are being "marked" by underworld figures, as well.<sup>1</sup> Anxiety on the part of a police officer is much greater, of course, when family members are threatened.<sup>2</sup>

In some cases, dangerous criminals have gained access to sensitive personal information on law enforcement officers from credit bureaus, "surveilled" the officers, Wilson says, and even appeared around their homes. Such abuse of the credit system is a grave concern to law enforcement professionals. The credit companies are much too lax on releasing personal data, police professionals say.

"How was the Medellin Cartel [of Colombia]," Wilson

asks, "able to obtain home addresses of reporters, like the ones in Miami working for the *Expectador* and other Colombian journalists who have been killed? [The Cartel] not only had confidential information on reporters but on police officers and their families." Terrorists intimidated officers and their family members in Washington by parking near their homes and making their presence known. In some cases they even sat in their cars directly across the street from officers' and agents' homes.<sup>3</sup>

"The 'wrong people' have been gaining access to credit information for a long time," Wilson claims, giving this example: "A CI (confidential informant) once showed me an Equifax report with my name, SS number, date of birth, and place of employment [as the] Metropolitan Police Department, Washington." As recently as 1992, unauthorized access to "confidential" credit data on officers was continuing, he says.<sup>4</sup>

"How many deaths and woundings of law enforcement officers have resulted from information from a credit bureau? How many officers have dropped narcotics or terrorist-related cases when their home addresses, names of family members, and unpublished telephone numbers have been illegally obtained from credit reports?" Wilson asks. In his own case, when he was in the dangerous business of buying heroin during undercover work, Wilson was told by the MPD Intelligence Division that "hits were put out" on him. The offenders - later defendants in Wilson's criminal cases - knew where he lived.

The illegal use of personal data from credit bureaus continues to this day.<sup>5</sup> People who have suffered financial loss at the hands of crooks, as well as those who fear being maimed or killed, claim their credit information is given out too easily and too cheaply - for as little as eight dollars in some cases - to practically anyone.<sup>6</sup> Added to the problems of mishandling of confidential credit information, is another, that complete new identities can be

created for illegal purposes by gaining access to such personal data. Problems such as these are clearly counterintelligence issues for law enforcement.<sup>7,8</sup>

**ENDNOTES:**

1. The "marking" of witnesses by criminals whom those witnesses can testify against and help send to prison is a similar problem. Obstruction of justice in the form of intimidation of witnesses is becoming a more-and-more serious problem for prosecutors and judges. "Witness killings and threats against witnesses in serious criminal cases in the District [of Columbia] have risen dramatically in the last three years... (t)here have been enough such attacks, dozens in recent years, to create a climate of fear in some neighborhoods that makes witnesses reluctant to come forward." Ruben Castaneda, *The Washington Post*, Oct. 24, 1994, D1. This issue is dealt with in more detail, elsewhere.
2. Other methods of identifying undercover personnel, such as by making videos of police activities and then spreading the identification, are also dealt with elsewhere.
3. Jack Morris, a former police officer himself, instructs on police subjects and publishes on police matters. He tells me that the police in Australia, where he has worked and instructed on law enforcement intelligence, are also concerned about being marked by criminal elements.
4. A television report by *The Investigators*, Channel 2, WESH, Orlando, Florida, in mid-1994, cited Equifax for several lapses in the improper release of credit information, according to Wilson.
5. The proper and *improper* use of personal information from government agencies such as motor vehicle departments as well as from private data banks such as credit bureaus is dealt with in another chapter.
6. With billions of dollars available, the cartels, of course, can buy a lot of credit information at eight dollars a report.
7. Scott Hanson, *The Investigators*, NBC-TV, April 19, 1994.
8. Easy access to information in state motor vehicle departments (MVDs) for illegitimate purposes provides further risks to the police. Sgt. Donald Cahill, Prince William County (Virginia) Police, testified on the issue before a Congressional committee in February 1994. "Numerous law enforcement officers have been tracked down by criminals under surveillance. These officers fear for the safety of their families," Sgt. Cahill told the press. Cahill's story is cited in another chapter.

**13**

## Civil Disturbance

**I**nspector Elliott Grollman of the Federal Protective Service has extensive experience in dealing with civil disturbances, both as a federal police official in Washington, D.C., and as an officer in the U.S. Army Military Police. He is still a major in the M.P.s in the Army National Guard. He believes that, "...while the police had refined their hostage rescue skills, counterterrorism tactics and crisis management abilities, their skills in handling civil disturbances had gone rusty since the 60s. Many police departments," he says, "are no longer trained in riot control tactics and have few, if any, officers who participated in the massive anti-Vietnam demonstrations."<sup>1,2</sup>

Grollman emphasizes the need for planning in this aspect of law enforcement (civil disorder), as in any other crisis management operation. "One of the first steps in being prepared [for disturbances]," he says, "is to gather intelligence. Most civil disorders don't just start up without some precipitating cause," he declares, "and if the

police have good intelligence, they may be able to predict some disorders and maybe even prevent them. Police intelligence officers and units must maintain their sources with each other and with the community."<sup>3</sup>

Many areas have many ethnic and political groups with a penchant for public manifestation. Demonstrations often start out peacefully but then may get out of hand. Often opposing groups mount counter-demonstrations and even provocations, Grollman points out. Monitoring these organizations, especially those in or near campuses, and keeping abreast of their grievances (actual or perceived) is essential. Checking applications for demonstration permits is one way to keep up, Grollman says.<sup>4</sup>

The police must facilitate the exercise of constitutional rights and maintain law and order in an objective, fair way, he makes clear. To carry out these responsibilities the police must have good intelligence, he says. Each organization of consequence with which the authorities might find themselves involved is likely to have a distinct method of operation (or *modus operandi* - M.O.). The IU should know if a particular crowd is likely to taunt and provoke, or lock arms and suddenly go limp, or set up blockades, or throw fire bombs, for example.

Police intelligence officers in nearby jurisdictions should be contacted. If the groups in question have been active elsewhere - Operation Rescue operates all over the country, for example - the police in cities where there have been problems should be queried for guidance.

Another source of information is the press. Reporters often have good sources and can be helpful, especially if they think violence is possible. Many groups planning demonstrations will go to the press to get publicity. Plainclothes officers visiting campuses for information and liaison with campus police can find such sources worthwhile. Also, posters and handbills and other public announcements will be available on campus. While police

infiltration, without evidence of a planned crime, is prohibited, police may attend public events where an observant officer can pick up much useful information.<sup>5</sup>

Obviously, the publications of groups in question should be read and the "alternative press" should not be overlooked. Groups themselves often cooperate with the authorities, obtaining required permits and even meeting with the police to plan public safety aspects. In some cases, group members opposed to breaking the law will actually notify the police if violence is planned.

The collection of intelligence should continue at the scene of a demonstration. The commander on the spot should monitor the crowd, get in touch with its leaders and talk with officers having a "feel" for the situation. The commander gauges his own capabilities and force readiness, appraising such factors as terrain and weather and the composition, size, mood and intent of the crowd. Along with command, control and communications, intelligence plays a key role. The main contribution of intelligence, however, is made before hand in the planning stage.

"Prior planning prevents poor performance," Grollman repeats, borrowing that old adage from the military - he is an Army M.P., after all.<sup>6</sup> Proper planning without good intelligence - well in advance - is very difficult to accomplish, however. Times have changed since the proverbial lone Texas Ranger, climbing off the train with his saddle, in response to an urgent telegram from the town fathers, would ask the nervous station master where the riot was. *One riot, one Ranger*, the story went. Law enforcement today needs more assets and better assets, better training and preparation and, certainly, better intelligence to even the odds.

Much of the foregoing primarily concerns intelligence, of course, but the reader, I hope, will by now see for himself/herself how counterintelligence fits in. CI plays a role in the area of disturbances as in other law enforcement

problems. Many troublesome groups, by the nature of their persistent law-breaking, need to be addressed from the CI standpoint. Many of their leaders become "professional" in their work and often target law enforcement with intelligence intent and intelligence skills. Law enforcement should respond accordingly.

There have been cases where people with criminal intent will collect relevant operational information about police officers and units assigned to certain response tasks. At the time an "event" is planned, the officers or units in question will be checked to see if they are on alert, or at work, indicating that the authorities might be expecting something to happen. If everything appears to be normal, the event - a break-in at an animal laboratory, an attack on a house of worship, whatever - will be carried out, with a better chance that the police will not respond.<sup>7</sup>


**ENDNOTES:**

1. Then Capt. Elliott Grollman, U.S. Federal Protective Service, "Security Intelligence Sourcebook," Second Edition 1993, p.95.
2. Grollman, in personal conversations, during which I have learned a lot about police tactical intelligence, has reiterated many of the things I am quoting here. He has also shown a good grasp of what I call "strategic" (or "macro") intelligence.
3. Ibid., pp. 95-6.
4. Ibid., pp. 95-6.
5. Again, a matter of keeping up with the competition's advertising.
6. Grollman, op. cit. pp.95-6.
7. Surveillance of officers' home and personal vehicles by religious extremist groups for just this purpose is discussed elsewhere.

## **PART THREE**

---

### **FIXING THE PROBLEM**



## Some Problems And Some Solutions

America has faced serious problems before but none like these - and all mixed together too: widespread organized crime involving arms trafficking, exceptionally vicious violence, narcotics and terrorism with international ties, large murderous gangs promoting insurgency, hate groups - issues, in turn, intertwined with deep-seated social problems - and more. Such problems, must be addressed but are unlikely to be solved in the short term. Taking into account that the United States federal government spent almost three *trillion* dollars on welfare from 1965 through 1989, money itself is obviously not the answer.

Some of that public money for welfare would have been better spent on improved law enforcement intelligence and counterintelligence - the political and social leverage gained in enhanced law enforcement would have eased many of the problems outlined here. In any case, the necessary investment should be made now. In some

cases there will be little or no monetary cost, actually.

### What Are Some Of The Problems That Must Be Addressed?

**Failure to share.** Blaming "petty rivalries among agencies" and claiming that even "units within a single department do not share information among officers in the same building," is Bob Jenkins of the National Law Enforcement Institute, cited elsewhere. "The number one problem plaguing law enforcement throughout the United States, whether it involves gang issues or not, is the failure to share information," he says. The failure to share is sometimes caused by "distrust of another agency's competence, or perceived competence, to handle delicate information," Jenkins believes.<sup>1</sup> Whatever the reason, intelligence must be disseminated and shared or it is no good.

"Many times [the lack of sharing] is simply a matter of not having a structure in place by which the information can easily be disseminated," Jenkins says. A lack of "structure" is clearly a failure on the part of the authorities involved to recognize the need for a good overall intelligence system.<sup>2</sup> There are, nonetheless, legitimate reservations about sharing: lack of trust and the need to protect confidential sources, and a widespread dislike of federal agencies on the part of local police. The latter take but rarely give, is a common complaint. Nevertheless, the problem of lack of sharing must be worked on with as much mutual good will as can be mustered. The problem remains serious and the stakes are high.

**Lack of training.** "The competence issue, if it is an issue," Bob Jenkins claims, "may be solved by increased access to uniform and quality training." Training is an integral part of intelligence, of course, as it is of police work in general. An adequate intelligence system pro-

vides for the training of all those connected with it.<sup>3</sup>

**Lack of cooperation.** Daniel Meany cites lack of cooperation between law enforcement and corrections, blaming it partially on "petty mutual disdain." Mutual scorn robs "both groups...of a useful information network," he says. Petty differences must be put aside - "the threat to society is very real," Dan Meany says, insisting that cooperation and sharing must be made to work.<sup>4</sup>

These problems go beyond the practitioners of law enforcement intelligence;<sup>5</sup> the entire law enforcement profession may be afflicted to a degree. "There is something about the enforcement business that makes its members quarrelsome, touchy, and cliquish," a federal law enforcement official said some years ago.<sup>6</sup> The same problems exist overseas: "Governments and law enforcement agencies in Europe spend much of their time bickering over jurisdictions and status, while criminal gangs cooperate much more freely than governments, a conference of European police chiefs was told," not long ago, according to *Security Intelligence Report*.<sup>7</sup> The newsletter continues: "Ethnic gangs from the former Soviet Union, as well as the Italian *Mafia* and other 'inventive' enterprises have exploited the end of the Cold War far more effectively than have governments, senior officials said."

It is probably too much to say that organized crime is taking over Europe. What Claire Sterling, the widely-respected American writer based in Italy, calls the "*Pax Mafiosa*" may be somewhat exaggerated - at this moment. Nevertheless, organized criminal groups, national and international cooperation between them, and their penetration of government at all levels, present law enforcement, including American law enforcement, with extremely serious challenges. Cooperation among agencies in the U.S. must be better than that among criminals internationally. One important way for police agencies to share and cooperate is to take part effectively in the re-

gional law enforcement intelligence centers, discussed at length earlier.

**Maintaining undercover operations.** One of the most nettlesome problems for law enforcement, at both the federal and local levels in the U.S., is the maintenance of undercover operations, a fundamental function of police work, and keeping the agents' identities secret. One initiative strengthening this vital activity is the sharing of deep cover agents - a program of cooperation called "*Operationsharing SWAP*." "Local police departments, taking a cue from federal agencies, are beginning to create information and assistance networks that cross state lines," reported Kerry Knobelsdorff in *The Christian Science Monitor*. "One outgrowth is temporary swapping of personnel for undercover work."<sup>8</sup>

"They [the actual agents] have homes and families and communities; their faces get known too fast,"<sup>9</sup> comments Gary Kreep, executive director of the United States Justice Foundation (USJF) in California.<sup>10</sup> According to Meany, although the problem of exposing undercover agents is still very serious, *teaming* in the form of inter-agency and regional task forces helps. Officers, including those under cover, from one jurisdiction work in others when needed, he says, with the feds, especially the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), often playing leading roles. "They [the DEA] are the ones with the money, now," Meany explains.<sup>11,12</sup>

There are broader problems, some of which cannot be solved by law enforcement, but they can be understood, at least, and law enforcement can have some influence in their solution by offering its best, informed opinion. It must be remembered that intelligence, including CI - and that includes law enforcement intelligence and CI - is a *staff* function, bearing the responsibility to carry to the authorities up the line, as best it can, an appreciation of the intelligence picture (including the problems). The

duty is there, despite the frustrations of rejection, to "call them as you see them."

The proper use of intelligence is often a political matter. In Los Angeles in April 1992, for example, the lapse in governing was a *political* failure rather than an intelligence failure, *per se*. Such failures, *theoretically*, anyhow, are correctable over time by citizen action. It is incumbent on law enforcement to help correct the problem.

**Misguided political interference.** In many areas in the U.S., foolish (or in certain cases *committed*) political forces work against police intelligence. Sometimes the results are disastrous. In Los Angeles, for example, as reported earlier, "... normal intelligence-gathering - talking to 'people on the street' and monitoring known criminals and troublemakers - came to a virtual halt," before the riots of April 1992, Det. Lou Koven of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) charged.<sup>13</sup> City councilmen had "lambasted the LAPD for more than a year for conducting routine police intelligence," Koven claimed. "(N)ormal police operations were handcuffed," he said.<sup>14</sup>

Ill-advised politicians interfere in unwarranted ways with law enforcement intelligence at all levels of government. (Remember the charges of "tremendous meddling by politicians" and "so-called community leaders"?). Police forces cannot be expected to function without good intelligence. Unwarranted political interference causes failures which can be fatal, sometimes on a large scale, as in Los Angeles in April 1992. In L.A., deaths were caused by faulty ideology and political ineptitude. Law enforcement must try to move ahead the best it can with intelligence (*both* meanings of the word).<sup>15,16</sup>

**"Guided" political interference.** In addition to the *misguided* political interference mentioned above, there is the problem of *calculated* political action against law enforcement - indeed, against the entire *public* - by committed ideologues. For example, there have been in-

stances of "political support groups" for terrorist organizations and other criminal groups. *El Rukn*, in Chicago, remember, had a "political arm" (not to mention, on an even more sophisticated level, as a CI problem, a security firm). Support groups for criminal organizations cannot be considered legitimate. Indeed, criminal/terrorists in Chicago now have a *political party*.

The problems enumerated above are in addition to those presented by the "social workers," "prison missionaries," and "social studies groups," with their own criminal - not to mention, *intelligence* and *CI* - agenda, that simply must be covered by law enforcement if organized crime is to be adequately monitored. The indulgence of politicians toward groups that provide material support to criminal organizations, once the absurdity of the concept is overcome, must end. At the same time - on the "plus side" - the support groups offer "softer" targets for law enforcement attention than the more-difficult-to-penetrate terrorist groups, themselves. Police IUs and CIUs should pay special attention to them, with that fact in mind.

**Misguided media.** Mistaken media coverage can undo much of what good law enforcement intelligence can accomplish. It can even be lethal.<sup>17</sup> In Los Angeles - L.A. again - the media came under attack for their role in making things even worse than they already were 1) *before* the rioting, by sensationalizing the King trial and priming people for an "adverse" verdict when it came, 2) *during* the rioting, by over-reporting on the violence and even pinpointing the key locations for rioters and looters to head, and 3) *after* the rioting, by putting out analyses justifying the violence.<sup>18,19</sup>

The police, of course, must deal with the media continuously. They should look at the exercise from a CI point of view, however. No matter what, extreme care must be taken to prevent exposure of undercover personnel, inad-

vertently or otherwise, to the media or by the media. Moreover, law enforcement people should be very careful in trying to use the media - the latter are usually better at that game.

**Especially dangerous prisoners.** Former police officers and specially trained military personnel and terrorists in prison should be kept away from other prisoners.<sup>20</sup> "Special response team tactics are being compromised by some officers now in prisons," jeopardizing many "restricted techniques," on the street, reports *Security Intelligence*.<sup>21</sup>

**Criminal lawyers (that is to say, crooked lawyers).** It seems to a layman<sup>22</sup> that lawyers serving as communications links in illegal activities between crooks inside and crooks outside prison or taking part in the management of a criminal enterprise are crooks themselves. It is long overdue for the Justice Department and the legal profession to examine the conduct of lawyers who take an active part in crime, including those who are especially politicized.

The Colombian drug cartels, especially, having "more money than God," are able to buy the "best lawyers," as we have been told. A few cases in the U.S. northeast, alone, attest to that fact. For example, American defense lawyers working for Colombian defendants, using the legal process of discovery, have been able to learn from prosecutors, among other things, the locations of their competitors' narcotics "stash houses." They have also uncovered confidential information about cellular telephones involved in criminal cases, thus permitting them to "clone" the phones of rival crooks and illegally pass off toll charges to their accounts.<sup>23</sup>

**Activities of organized criminal enterprises.** Often, local police with limited resources find the tougher cases, particularly of organized criminal groups, especially hard to crack. In some instances, federal law, including

civil law, can provide the required "muscle" that may be missing at the state or local levels. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (the celebrated federal RICO) statute, has been used successfully in a number of situations - in Chicago, against *El Rukn*, for example, and in Tacoma, Washington - to break up criminal gangs, and elsewhere, especially in New York, the notorious *Cosa Nostra*. The best of local, state, and federal police intelligence and strong backup are required to face down the bad guys and put them away. Putting them away, on the other hand, as important as that is, is not the end of the problem, as we have seen. Incarceration, the "end result" so devoutly sought in the criminal justice process, is really but one step in the neutralization of the criminal element, all of which takes us back to the earlier chapters on prison intelligence and counterintelligence.

**Getting more deeply into the communities.** Many areas are promoting what has been called community empowerment policing (CEP). Much in the news, as a means of addressing many of the problems facing the cities, albeit not always well defined, community policing clearly must incorporate intelligence and CI as key components. Community empowerment policing is based on understanding, in depth, local conditions and problems. It requires considerable record keeping, analysis, and planned, coordinated action. It emphasizes, not so much spur-of-the-moment arrests but *preventive* measures, longer-term solutions, and intense follow-up.<sup>24</sup> CEP incorporates citizen involvement and the participation of private organizations and non-police government agencies. Community policing has been described as, among other things, "block-by-block policing."

In 1992, the Justice Department announced what it called a "Weed and Seed" program, "a community-based, comprehensive, multi-agency approach to violent crime, drug use, and gang activity in high-crime neighborhoods."

The goal was to "weed out" crime and then "seed" the targeted areas with programs to prevent its reoccurrence. Community policing was to be an important element of the new program and social initiatives were to be "closely coordinated and integrated with law enforcement efforts." The program would combine, the then attorney general said, "...tough law enforcement with economic and moral revitalization of high-crime areas."<sup>25</sup>

Many elements of the community policing program are in doubt today although numerous mayors and chiefs refer to the program repeatedly. In any case, there are aspects of community policing, by *whatever name*, that are widely agreed upon in police circles. "There is nothing better than people knowing each other to get things to work," a police liaison official told me.

The liaison concept is especially important in the matter of intercommunication between the local police, sheriffs' departments, federal agencies, state defense forces, and the U.S. National Guard, particularly reserve military police units. Officials of all these forces should get to know one another early, the officer points out, so that they can work together effectively - learning early about each other's problems and capabilities *and* means of communications - when "the balloon goes up," as he phrased it. Cooperation and effective intelligence interchange take time to develop but are crucial in time of need.<sup>26</sup>

The "getting acquainted" principle applies also to the beat cop and neighborhood people. It is far easier to establish trust and build cooperation at the neighborhood level if the participants really know each other. At this level, too, intelligence and counterintelligence - perhaps in its most basic form - is nurtured. For example, the police, residents, and business people in a neighborhood meet. They discuss crime and suspicious activity in the area. In one instance, a van from out of the area had been

letting out teenagers with bicycles in the neighborhood. The youngsters rode their bikes around, were later recovered by the van, one by one, at separate points, and went on their way.

The police, it turned out, were unaware of this caper - the young riders were obviously "casing" the neighborhood, as a sergeant explained. The bikers and their driver-mentor were conducting a basic reconnaissance, in reality an intelligence function. The police, residents, and business people were now the wiser and others were made aware of the "van/bike recon" trick. Everyone seems to benefit from this kind of cooperation of police and citizens (except the criminals, of course). Neighborhoods become more cohesive, information flows back and forth, and the Neighborhood Watch people have a better idea of the sort of thing to be looking for. The police like the increased number of "heads up" calls they receive from citizens, people whom they now know.<sup>27</sup>

Mutual trust between citizen and police can produce substantial rewards in countless situations. Police officers have told me repeatedly that the most important way citizens can help is to report - anonymously, if need be - suspicious circumstances in their neighborhoods. "If one tip in a hundred 'produces,'" an experienced officer told me, "it would be well worthwhile."

**New resources.** To cope with the many strange, perplexing, and sometimes dangerous problems encountered (and outlined here), local law enforcement among other things will have to pool resources and look for new resources. The new ones, especially human resources other than sworn officers, can provide needed expertise - in languages, for example, or cultural knowledge - or simply help out in the stations or on patrol.

**Volunteers.** In looking for help, some jurisdictions are taking on volunteers, frequently older people. "It's massive. It's all over the United States," says Bud Meeks,

executive director of the National Sheriff's Association, referring to the increasing volunteer movement in American law enforcement. So reports the *AARP* (American Association of Retired Persons) Bulletin.<sup>28</sup> "We can't work without them. They're an integral part [of our nationwide operation]," Meeks explains. Volunteers work in (sometimes managing) crime analysis units, communications, patrolling, interpreting, and so forth, not to mention many clerical jobs. They also follow up with, and assist, crime victims. Some volunteers are even sworn officers, wear uniforms and carry side arms. Among other things, volunteers ride horses, drive patrol cars, and fly aircraft for law enforcement.

All of this extra help is in addition to police reserve units, also made up of volunteers, that function in some jurisdictions. The Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C. assigns the following duties to MPD Volunteer Reservists: home security surveys, community crime prevention workshops, support for "operation identification," assistance to the neighborhood watch program, patrolling with a regular police officer, operating the patrol signal system (PSS), traffic and special events details, and clerical duties. The age limits for MPD reservists is 21 to 55 years of age.

Other sources of support to local police in the U.S. have been cooperating for many years and include the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and the State Guard or State Defense Force in those states that have them.<sup>29</sup> The former have been of great value for decades in aerial searches and performed valiant service in World War II patrolling for enemy submarines, for example, and the latter are greatly appreciated in some areas for, among other things, their excellent communications abilities, what with their retired Special Forces veterans and other specialists with military experience.

**Regional intelligence units.** "Many serious prob-

lems confront the already beleaguered American law enforcement authorities who must somehow cope with rising foreign organized crime in the U.S. and the counterintelligence personnel who must deal with the intelligence and active measures threat," I wrote some years back.<sup>30</sup> "Sometimes crime, traditional intelligence collection, and active measures<sup>31</sup> are all mixed up together and must be sorted out. American authorities seem to have adjusted less readily to Soviets operating here than the latter have adapted to the congenial operating climate in the New World, especially in 'the big candy store.'"<sup>32</sup>

Things have improved somewhat, but not much, since those lines were written. Some state government agencies and local police forces are working more with regional intelligence units. After looking into what certain jurisdictions have done to improve cooperation in intelligence matters, I wrote this: "Increasingly, police in high density crime areas such as Miami [Florida] and Los Angeles [California], are combining their law enforcement intelligence (LEI) analytical capabilities. A big problem for the promotion of LEI in the past has been the almost standard rivalries and sometimes endemic mutual suspicion among jurisdictions and agencies. The new LEI centers are tackling that problem.

"Not only does combining intelligence functions makes it easier to get state and federal funding, but a properly run intelligence and resource center can and does reduce dangers to street cops and operating agents. It's very difficult for police executives to dismiss *those* potential benefits.

"Proper coordination can save lives. Where different departments or agencies carry out activities, such as drug 'buy/sell' operations *without* coordination, cops can find themselves shooting at each other. No chief wants to lose anyone, much less by friendly fire. What the centers do is combine intelligence with operations and, as more opera-

tors realize the benefits, they climb aboard.

"Cooperation by computer - instant liaison - permits the center to warn a unit planning an operation that someone else is ahead of it in line at the same approximate time and place. It can prevent an important investigation from being ruined by an inopportune arrest or a raid by someone else.

"The centers know the other agencies and persons interested in a given activity or case, and they know how to reach that other party. They also have 24-hour-day command centers and 'war rooms.' In addition to many benefits of intelligence and liaison, they can provide equipment, technical help, training, and meeting space ... all of which are attractive and valuable benefits.

"Local and state agencies increasingly realize that to combat more and better crime, they need more and better leverage of their own resources in the form of shared intelligence and other resources, as well as more and better communications among themselves.

"Among products of the LEI centers are graphics, charts, imaging, telephone toll analyses, travel data, money transfers, asset identification, crime patterns (especially unusual patterns of activity), as well as background information, histories, and methods of operation (MOs) of criminals and criminal groups. The centers also provide tactical information on a case-by-case basis. Their products are useful in investigations, briefings and analysis. Obviously they are particularly useful in criminal conspiracies.

"LEI units produce standardized packages of information for prosecutors, and their graphics are especially useful for presenting information to juries. The 'icing on the cake' is that - in some cases - money from property seizures helps to finance the centers."<sup>33, 34</sup>

Such law enforcement intelligence units can assist in counterintelligence efforts, as well, where they are

wanted and where a CI mentality is developed and nurtured. Whether or not all, or any, can be achieved, at a minimum the authorities must know who is likely to commit violence on a large scale. They must have intelligence to avoid such disasters as the LA riots of April 1992, for example, and they must have good counterintelligence to preserve the integrity of their officers and units from the intelligence intrusions of others.

**Foreign help.** Some police forces seek help from "foreign" sources, hiring naturalized Americans with the foreign language and cultural knowledge they need. Usually working as support assets, these "hyphenated Americans" sometimes get deeply into operations, including dangerous situations. Foreign police officers have also been brought in. Constables of the Royal Hong Kong Police (RHKP), for example, have served well in areas of the U.S. where Chinese criminals are rampant.<sup>35</sup> A White Russian (Belarus) police officer served a tour with an East Coast organized crime unit, providing much-needed language and cultural knowledge before returning home. There are numerous other examples.

Law enforcement is faced with many problems, from "destabilization by crime" - directed from abroad and meant to lead to "disruption followed by revolution" - to widespread domestic organized violence, urban insurgency directed by "trained cadres" with their megaphones and hand-held radios. Some of the "opposition" is quite sophisticated, using "probing" and "testing" and "provocation," techniques well-known among intelligence personnel.

Such problems as these are made worse, or on occasion even originated, by the "tremendous meddling" of politicians. The media rarely help and often, naively (or not), work on behalf of the other side. The elements of opposition range from extremely capable international drug cartels to domestic hate groups to attempts by home-

grown criminals to import ground-to-air missiles from countries with a record of mass murder to urban warfare (insurgency).

The problems are many<sup>36</sup> but there are solutions or, at least, partial solutions, to certain of them. To sum up then from the counterintelligence point of view the need is to detect, identify, counteract, prevent, neutralize and, if possible, manipulate the opposition, providing the needed leverage that intelligence and counterintelligence can give beleaguered law enforcement to help it do its job.

Former U.S. Attorney General William Barr defined the overall mission succinctly: "The first duty of any civil government is to protect its citizens. Through increased Federal, State and local cooperation we must rid our nation's communities of the violent predators who are attempting to destroy the fabric of our society."

The "thin blue line" is sorely beset - everywhere. The problems, some of which have been outlined here, are daunting. Good intelligence and counterintelligence can be of great help in meeting the challenge of the new breed(s) of criminal, assisted by vast sums of money and the latest technology. I hope that my sources and I have made at least some contribution to holding back and maybe even, on occasion, *beating* back the "dark side."

## ENDNOTES:

1. Bob Jenkins, interviewed by Daniel Meany III in *Security Intelligence Report*, Nov. 16, 1992, p. 7. Meany, a former law enforcement officer, both military and civilian, corrections officer and consultant, is the source of many citations in this book and is described in greater detail elsewhere.
2. It is difficult to make sharing work, a number of observers say. The mechanism for sharing involves writing, for one thing, and law enforcement people are notorious for not liking to write. Knowledge is power and people do not like to share power. Moreover, in police work everyone traditionally and jealously keeps his own files. Finally, as in any bureaucracy, there is constant turnover with loss of institutional memory and wasteful continual relearning. Some point to the Vietnam experience as an analogy: instead of having gained twelve years of experience in Vietnam, the United States had one year's experience twelve times. On the other hand, no one said it would be easy for sharing to go forward.
3. Jenkins, op. cit.
4. Meany, op. cit.
5. I am including here, besides sworn officers, others involved in law enforcement intelligence, principally researchers.
6. One officer in police special operations told me that he used to keep his own anti-terrorist files (at his own expense, incidentally). When his sergeant found them, he destroyed them - not ordered that they be destroyed, it should be noted, he destroyed them. Interview, Aug. 26, 1992. Happily, the officer is permitted to keep his own intelligence files once again.
7. *Security Intelligence Report*, May 30, 1994, p. 1.
8. Kerry Elizabeth Knobelsdorff, *The Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 3, 1986, p 3.
9. Police agencies should take care not to expose the faces of undercover people (or potential undercover people) to the cameras so that they are compromised. No matter how close a slain officer might have been, his undercover colleagues should not show up at his funeral, nor, should PR considerations overcome CI considerations in filming "real-life" TV stories for public display.
10. Ibid.
11. Meany, op. cit.
12. The benefits gained from teaming and swapping can be

wiped out by carelessness - failure to use good counterintelligence discipline - in protecting the identities of undercover assets. In some parts of the country, as described by Paul Copher, elsewhere, undercover assets are being filmed or their images are being "lifted" from commercial TV programs and used by criminals, in their version of police "mug books." Undercover assets attend the funerals of their slain comrades where they are taped for future reference by their enemies. This is poor CI, roughly akin to those cops in Athens, Greece, who followed their wounded brother officer to the hospital, instead of staying on the job.

13. Det. Lou Koven, LAPD, *Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 4, 1992. The L.A. situation, and Koven's remarks, were reported more fully earlier.

14. Ibid.

15. Our elected officials must do better by the police. The politicos in Washington, D.C., provided a glaring example of political interference in legitimate police work a few years ago when they restrained the arm of the law in its exercise of its responsibilities. I always thought, and still do, that assault on a police officer was a serious crime, yet, watching live television coverage of the Mt. Pleasant riots in Washington in the spring of 1991, I saw hooligans and looters stoning and fire bombing the police with impunity. An immediate and forceful response from the police did not materialize. I cannot help but wonder how the victims - the police - felt under such bombardment, restrained as they were by orders from above. The police were ill-equipped and poorly led during those disorders. The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) had no management training program at that time, said Gary Hankins, spokesman for the Fraternal Order of Police in Washington, in a telephone interview. Having watched the MPD's poor handling of the riots on TV, I could believe him. The District seemed to show more concern for the rioters than for the owners of the stores being looted, while the police on the line stood by, taking hits, unable to respond adequately.

When the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) arrived to identify and perhaps detain for deportation illegal aliens among the apprehended rioters, the D.C. administration refused to cooperate. There is no telling what might happen if the law - in this case federal immigration law - had been enforced and certain criminals (i.e., arrested rioters who were in the country illegally) had been deported. Seemingly, everyone would have benefited in such a case, except the criminals, of

course, and perhaps that was the point. Finally, I am assured that local officials in general in the U.S. - and surely those of the National Capital - swear to defend the U.S. Constitution and enforce the law, including federal law. Why D.C. officials in this breach were not taken to task is not clear.

16. There are, moreover, special interest groups and individuals whose reason for being is conflict with authority and, who represents authority more than the police? Many of these dissidents keep the pot boiling, as it were, while skimming off seemingly limitless financial support from Hollywood. Then there are the politicians whose cleavage to fiery local pressure groups wins them re-election. "The real money to be made on racial and poverty issues is to be made on the political left," says Thomas Sowell, the columnist (*The Washington Times*, July 29, 1991, D3.). Sowell might well have included "police bashing," as well, the three issues often being intertwined.

17. Ill-advised TV coverage probably contributed to the gravity of the near-fatal beating of Reginald Denny, the unfortunate truck driver, during the L.A. rioting. Helicopter TV coverage of the attack on the hapless trucker quite likely made the attack worse. Fortunately, Denny survived but the special TV attention was as bad as if it had been hawking thus: "Come on down to such-and-such an intersection and get in your licks!" Ironically, that same TV coverage was giving the police an excellent "heads-up" that an attempted murder was in progress. Chief Daryl Gates said later that the police should have gone in and saved Denny; he was sorry they hadn't.

18. Ted Koppel of ABC-TV's *Nightline* liked the gang leaders "very much," he told his audience; he was "extremely impressed with a great deal of what they had to say." Convicted murderers and terrorists don't act in a vacuum, however; even *they* have much to say that's impressive. Nevertheless, how many column inches and how many seconds of air time should be afforded to criminals to explain why they kill people and loot gun shops and liquor stores? Although the media's agenda often gets in the way of serious treatment of the issue of armed violence, at least some media newspeople understand *how* their agenda exacerbates national problems that affect all citizens, *including* these media people, themselves. Chief Jim Kouri, writing for *Police Times* (Summer 1992, p.11), protested the negative media treatment of police officers, especially on TV. "In a landmark interview for *TV Guide* magazine," Kouri said, "premier television reporter Bernard Goldberg of CBS-TV's '48 Hours' admitted that 'the press has an agenda.' Goldberg said,

"We in the press like to say we're honest brokers of information, (but) it's just not true. The press does have an agenda." Goldberg continued, "What bothers me the most is how totally lacking we are in retrospection. Why does no one ask, 'Is it possible our critics are *right*? Is it possible we sometimes *do* slant things?' " "Why is that question *never* raised by my colleagues?" Kouri asks. (Also see Sulc, "America's Insurgency: Terrorism On Our Doorsteps," *Security Intelligence Sourcebook*, Interests, Ltd., Nov. 1993.)

19. Media reform should not be expected soon but, no matter what, somehow, the public must be protected from reporting such as this, appearing in a major newspaper in the aftermath of the L.A. riots: "Death was everywhere in Los Angeles last week, grim images of smooth-skinned youths in pools of blood and women wailing over coffins. The stories that follow suggest the range of the killing, in distance and in demographics, and the way some went courting death, while others fell as if struck by lightning. They had nothing in common: neither pasts nor motives nor endings. Nothing but the consuming fire and hot lead rain and barking lunacy of the riot." *The Washington Post*, May 11, 1992, A1. "Smooth-skinned youth," "consuming fire," "hot lead rain," "barking lunacy." Can the American people stand much more of this? That is to say, can they endure this kind of writing for long?

20. See Meany's remarks elsewhere about the former New Hampshire state trooper in a Massachusetts prison who was found training his fellow inmates in police procedures and tactics.

21. *Security Intelligence*, 24 Aug. 1992, p. 6. Obviously, special arrangements should be made for such special, potentially dangerous, prisoners.

22. And, as a matter of fact, to a number of lawyers to whom I have raised this question. Then the lawyers - at least the ones I seem to know - usually go off on some other problem that especially rankles them. One such problem is the absence of Constitutional law in so many courtrooms, a question I do not feel qualified to deal with.

23. Source:the interviewee in the section about the "East Coast Organized Crime Investigative Unit."

24. When you come right down to it, the process essentially describes intelligence: lots of "tactical" (or *micro*) information, synthesized into "strategic" (or *macro*) intelligence. From such intelligence, estimates are made for use at all levels, especially

for operational planning. If they don't want to call it *intelligence* for some reason, that's acceptable, just so long as they use the system intelligently.

25. The language of the attorney general's report was actually the language of counterinsurgency, although the word itself was not used. It is worth noting that Operation "Weed and Seed" envisaged essential wide-spread "coordination."

26. The cooperation and interchange system the officer was talking about works in many areas of endeavor. For example, "(t)he only reason that the engineer aspects of [Hurricane] Carla disaster relief [in the Caribbean in 1992] proceeded smoothly was that all concerned cooperated informally and let the formal paperwork catch up later," Col. William P. Jones, U.S. Army (Ret.), wrote in *The Washington Post*. "This was possible," the colonel claimed, "only because the key individuals in each agency were familiar with each other's organizations and in many cases knew each other personally." *The Washington Post*, Sep. 6, 1992, B2. The point is, to get to know each other early rather than late. Cooperation, sharing, that sort of thing.

27. They say they are, anyhow, and there is good reason to believe them. In any case, it is wise not to directly relate increased arrests with more crime. More arrests may mean better cooperation, more citizen calls, and so forth - that the system is working. Perhaps more instances of decreasing crime are being detected. At the same time, possibly less crime is being attempted but more is being reported.

28. "*The AARP Bulletin*," July/August 1994, p. 1. The American Association of Retired Persons, Washington, D.C., has developed an alliance, called TRIAD, in conjunction with the National Sheriffs Association and the International Association of Chiefs of Police. "The program operates in the community through local police chiefs, sheriffs, and councils of 'senior citizens' - who work to combat crime against older people and help law enforcement in general," says the AARP. "They're dependable people, and they don't ask a lot of you," says Police Chief James Wetherington of Columbus, Ga., who has a TRIAD program in his community," *The AARP Bulletin* says. Two counties in the U.S. where volunteers have been especially valuable are Berkeley County, South Carolina, and Smith County, Texas.

29. The work of the Civil Air Patrol is well known in the U.S., especially in the area of search and rescue. State defense forces are less well known. Called state guards until the Congress decided that they should be known as state defense forces, such militias exist in almost half the 50 states. Volunteer units,

they assist the National Guard to mobilize and often occupy N.G. armories when the latter are away in federal service. They serve as "reserves to the reserves," as it were. Among other things, they load and safeguard N.G. equipment and are called up in emergencies. They are often trained in first aid, traffic and crowd control, search-and-rescue missions, communications, patrolling, and so forth. A trained and organized state defense force provides a governor of a state with a resource to deploy when his National Guard is federalized (mobilized for Federal service, that is). State units guard reservoirs and bridges in times of emergency, help out in natural disasters, chemical spills, and the like. Many are veterans of the Armed Forces. They cooperate with police, fire, and civil defense services. In some areas they have provided the "glue" for cooperation between city, county, and local elements of the state police in emergencies. Their communications skills, provided by state defense volunteers with military experience and U.S. government-provided radios, have proved especially useful.

30. Sulc, "Security and the Soviet Emigre Problem: Hoods and Spies in 'The Big Candy Store.'" *Conservative Review*, Oct. 1990, p. 19.

31. The Russians have continued some "active measures" (described elsewhere) since the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is conceivable that some of the problems for Western law enforcement inherent in A.M. have been and are being restarted. In any case, some of the A.M. problems set into motion under the old regime, undoubtedly, continue to seethe to this day.

32. Sulc, op. cit. "The Big Candy Store" refers to the indulgence of the United States as seen by Soviet criminals some years back; in other words, the U.S. was - and undoubtedly still is - a good place for a Soviet crook to ply his trade.

33. A prime example of such centers is the Western States Information Network (WSIN) in Sacramento, California. There are others, of course, all with appropriate acronyms. The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) has been a prime mover in forming and supporting the centers. IALEIA is located in Miami, Florida, P.O. Box 52-2924, Miami, FL 22152-2924, telephone 305-653-3010. Also see Richard B. Abell, "Effective Systems for Regional Intelligence Sharing," *The Police Chief*, Nov. 1988, v55, pp 58-59.

34. *Security Intelligence Report*, "Domestic Intelligence Report," July 11, 1994, p. 5.

35. "Hong Kong gangs dominate the international credit card

counterfeiting rackets and are still the main controllers of the heroin market, Hong Kong police say," reports Diane Stormont of Reuters News Agency in *The Washington Times* of Nov. 25, 1994. The so-called Clinton Crime Bill, among other things, had a provision to bring an unspecified number of RHKP officers to the U.S. for their expertise in dealing with "Asian drug-lords and gangs," according to *SIR*, Aug. 22, 1994, p. 9.

36. To repeat: the number one problem ... is the failure to share information ... We hear this complaint ... throughout ... the country." "Petty rivalries ... (U)nits within a single department ..." not sharing, etc. Law enforcement and correctional officials must make real, sustained efforts to share, set up better cooperation and liaison, and work at teaming.

15

## A Counterintelligence Guide

The following "counterintelligence guide," prepared by Herbert D. Clough, of Cointelsyi International, and Robert A. Margulies, of McDonnell Douglas, appeared in *Competitive Intelligence Review*, journal of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP). SCIP, as the name suggests, is a *business* intelligence organization, but, as we know, most counterintelligence principles and insights apply equally to federal government clandestine CI, business CI and to our own primary interest in law enforcement CI.

Although the Clough/Margulies "guide" was intended primarily for protection of private companies, it is as good as anything of its kind that I have seen recently. It is simple and concise and is eminently suited for use in law enforcement counterintelligence.

According to the guide, "The key ingredients of effective Counterintelligence are these:

- **Critical information analysis** - identifying information which must be protected
- **Threat analysis** - identify threats to critical information. Who and what are threat sources? What are their intelligence collection techniques and capabilities?
- **Vulnerability analysis** - conduct a comprehensive survey to identify specific weaknesses in the company's [my note: read here law enforcement department, agency, unit, etc.] current system of protecting critical information
- **Risk assessments** - examine the critical information that requires protection, the specific source threats and vulnerabilities, and rank the risks in decreasing order of severity
- **Countermeasures** - identify and design appropriate security controls. Estimate the cost of implementing those countermeasures. Discuss the resulting recommendations with management who confer, review, decide, and authorize implementation
- **Security effectiveness** - implement authorized countermeasures and review periodically the effectiveness of in-place countermeasures. Take into account new and changing key element ingredients.”<sup>1</sup>

After taking steps one, two and three, develop step four, “risk assessments.” Then develop appropriate “countermeasures,” step five. Countermeasures, the authors point out, should be reviewed from time to time, step six, taking into account changes in “key elements.” Such review is an important part of the process and, I imagine, is too often overlooked.

Clough and Margulies, in their “guide,” speak of “countermeasures” as largely a security function. Our definition of CI<sup>2</sup> would go beyond, however. We would in-

clude “detect, identify, and counteract,” and, to a degree, “prevent,” as unquestionably important CI functions, but, at this stage, we would insist on the need to try to “neutralize” our opposition. For us,<sup>3</sup> the *aggressive* aspects of law enforcement CI are indispensable. The concept of aggressive countermeasures as part of CI, is largely inappropriate to business, however, and Clough and Margulies were correct in stopping where they did.

**ENDNOTES:**

1. "The Corporate Competitive Intelligence/Counterintelligence Team: A Symbiotic Design for the Future," by Herbert D. Clough and Robert A. Margulies, *Competitive Intelligence Review*, Copyright © Vol. 5, No. 3, Fall 1994, p.48. Reprinted by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
2. I use the plural pronoun here, hoping that the reader, by now, is with me.
3. Ibid.

16

## The Intelligence Process For Counterintelligence

The following is a general intelligence outline for law enforcement. The outline applies to counterintelligence also, as do many other prescriptions meant for intelligence in a general, or overall, sense.<sup>1</sup>

### **Collection:**

- Street information,
- Information from other officers,
- Information from electronic surveillance,
- Information from liaison sources, federal agencies and other departments, and
- Public information, newspapers, business records, etc.

**Evaluation:**

- Determining the validity of the source(s): whether or not the information is hearsay, assessing the reliability of the source(s) in the past, determining any personal interest of the source(s) in the issue, etc.,
- Comparing the information with information from other sources, and
- Judging the information in total context.

**Integration:**

- Filing,
- Indexing,
- Collating, and
- Analyzing the information.

**Dissemination:**

- Passing the information to interested persons and organizations for study and for integration into their own intelligence, and for use,
- Searching for indicators of terrorism, organized crime (OC), international organized crime (IOC), etc., and
- Making reports available to the public.**

It is this last stage that is likely to cause problems: a citizen is photographed attending a mobster's funeral, for example. As long as the item remains in police files it is unlikely to cause a problem, but if it surfaces, an innocent association might impugn the character of the person in question in the public mind.

Most police departments do not have strategic intelligence. For political reasons, discussed elsewhere, many departments do not keep information long enough for it to become of strategic value. The rules of many departments, forced upon them by public insistence, require periodic review and destruction of intelligence within as little as 90 days or, perhaps, as long as two years.

True strategic intelligence, for use against organized crime, narcotics trafficking, international crime, and so forth, must be kept indefinitely. It must be repeatedly analyzed and collated, updated, and integrated with other intelligence for it to become strategic intelligence. Intelligence officers become discouraged. "Why should we collect to shred?" they ask.

The main purpose of strategic intelligence is to engender ideas.

**ENDNOTE:**

1. Interview, Apr. 1, 1994, with a retired local police officer who spent much of his law enforcement career in counterintelligence

**APPENDICES**

---

# A

## APPENDIX

### On Secrecy

***An American General on Secrecy:*** America's first "Director of Central Intelligence," as it were - and a very good one, at that - Gen. George Washington, in 1777 wrote this: "The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged - all that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of this kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, how well planned & promising a favourable issue." Although, somewhat quaint in modern terms, Washington's principle is clear enough. Although Washington said nothing about *counterintelligence*, *per se*, he understood the discipline very well and practiced it throughout his tenure.

***A Chinese General on Secrecy:*** "Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move. An army without secret agents is exactly like a man without eyes and ears," Sun T'zu in "The Art

of War" (ca. 500 B.C.). A master of intelligence, Sun T'zu, also understood counterintelligence.

Whatever a practitioner of the art of intelligence, counterintelligence and/or security - or any person, for that matter, who wishes to protect people and/or information - might think about the use of "secret agents" or ("confidential sources"), that person would be wise, in any case, to understand that others will use them.

# B

## APPENDIX

---

### Language Specialists

One of the many categories of support personnel employed by law enforcement is the language specialist. I use this term because "interpreter" in many Asian societies<sup>1</sup> - largely because of Confucian influences, where they are present - is the lowest category in the civil service and thus often looked down upon by Asians.<sup>2</sup> To prevent "social" problems with an Asian subject, an "interpreter" can be presented simply as another member of the staff. Between the officer/agent and language specialist themselves there needs to be a clear understanding regarding who is in charge. The officer/agent is in charge. (A *subject, however, Asian or otherwise*, need not know the internal arrangements of the team.)

Although clearly staff, and not command, the language specialist, nevertheless, needs latitude to work effectively and thus can be of greater help to the agent. Language specialists often have cultural understanding that is essential to the operation.

The goal is to accomplish what the officer/agent wants to accomplish. The key is team work; the alternative often is a hodgepodge. The language specialist is part of the process and he/she and the agent need to understand each other, the role each plays, the capabilities of each, and so on. (I have been both and I can understand the needs and problems of both officer/agent and language specialist).

A thorough dialogue between the two is desirable before an operation and/or interview and should include an assessment of the situation and what the agent wants to accomplish. The language specialist needs to know what the agent wants to find out by questioning the subject (the witness/prisoner) and how, if possible, to go about it. Ideally, the language specialist remains on the sidelines until needed. On rare occasions, he/she might even *appear* to be running things. If so, it should be role-playing, a variation of the old "Mutt and Jeff" or "good cop-bad cop" routine. There are occasions, I am told, where a subject seizes the language specialist in a kind of "no-one-understands-me-but-you" situation. The agent should understand such situations and try to exploit them. In one case I was told about, an agent treated an Asian "bar girl" as the prostitute she was. The "interpreter," on the other hand, treated her as an unfortunate fellow national - as a "person." The woman voluntarily, not to mention, effusively, told the latter everything the team needed to know, all in very short order. As far as the agent's prestige was concerned, it remained high in the staff's estimation; the subject's opinion was irrelevant.

Regarding pitfalls for people using interpreters, a federal law enforcement language specialist - an English/Japanese interpreter - told me that certain Asian languages often tend to be less direct than English. A "closed" sign, in a restaurant window in this country, for example, means "don't bother to try to come in." In Japan, a simi-

lar sign would more likely convey the message, "in preparation." (Sort of, "we'd sure like to let you in, but we are working real hard to make things nice for you," instead of "keep out and keep moving".) On the other hand, "So help you God" in the American courtroom standard oath can be disconcerting to a Japanese, suggesting some sort of shame on his part. In one instance, an American judge asked an Asian, "Do you swear...?" and stopped. The interpreter interpreted, leaving the hapless witness to explain to the court whether it was his practice to use profanity.

The officer/agent should be aware, of course, that a prisoner or witness may try to exploit the language specialist for his own purposes, blaming the latter for misinterpreting or claiming later that he himself misunderstood the question(s). Then there is the matter of approach - consecutive or simultaneous interpretation, for example, or verbatim or substance (accuracy vs. effectiveness). The subject of interpreting is not simple. Many people have no idea how to use an interpreter, talking so long, for example, that the interpreter can't get the statement or question straight. In this connection, a high U.S. official once spoke so long on an official visit to an Asian capital that the interpreter never got a chance to speak at all. The speech went *uninterpreted*. The question remains whether the official ever did realize whether the locals understood a word of his talk. The cynic, on the other hand, would wonder if it made any difference. The speaker, in this case, obviously failed to use his asset, his interpreter, wisely. Or *at all*.

As in many other professions, subtlety and cultural awareness are essential in police work. It behooves the law enforcement officer or agent to get as much as reasonably obtainable from his staff as from all other resources. Language specialists are among the most valuable staff resources, not merely for language interpreting, but for

cultural interpreting, as well. And often more.

Interpreting is an honorable profession. A language specialist is a valuable - *indispensable* - resource and should be treated accordingly. He/she is not in charge of the operation and must be aware of that fact. Nonetheless, the language specialist is an essential part of the team and, as with any other valuable tool, should be understood and well employed. The officer/agent who fails to understand these things is less professional for it.

#### ENDNOTES:

1. Asian languages are among the most difficult for Americans. Many Asians are immigrating; consequently, the need for capability in the languages of these newcomers has increased markedly. There seems to always be a shortage, however. With the increase in members of the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Triads, etc., I deal with Asian language specialization here.
2. The need for capability in Asian languages is increasing greatly - Korean, Japanese, Mandarin, and the numerous Chinese dialects, Vietnamese, and so on.

# C

## APPENDIX

### On Monikers

Here is a case in point, regarding “monikers” or just simply first names, by which Meany says most people on the street are known: not long ago, a Washington homicide detective learned from a tipster that a “Greg” or “Craig” was worth looking into in a double murder case. The informant provided an address as well. A computer search by the detective showed that a Gregory Mack at the address given had once been arrested on a drug charge. Mack’s police file photograph was shown to two people who had witnessed the murder, but who were unaware of the murderer’s identity. Both identified the picture as that of the gunman. Mack was jailed pending trial.

Among many other things, the relatively new Washington Area Criminal Intelligence Information (computer) System, can “check” and cross-reference nicknames and names, and nicknames of associates,” says Ruben Castaneda of *The Washington Post*.<sup>1</sup> Dilip Kinra, an MPD employee, customized the WACIIS, starting by interview-


ing detectives to learn what they wanted - "they wanted nicknames, gang affiliations, associates and addresses connected to suspects."<sup>2</sup> "As more investigators use it - and as more detectives input data - it will increase exponentially in value," MPD detectives said.<sup>3</sup> The key is input, of course, and as investigators use the system and come to realize its value, an intelligence culture will develop. The value of recording nicknames - monikers - is well understood, as Daniel Meany says it should be.

**ENDNOTES:**

1. *The Washington Post*, Oct. 8, 1995, B3.
2. Intelligence, like marketing, requires finding out what the customer wants.
3. Ibid.

## **INDEX**

---



## INDEX

Abbreviations key: CEP=community empowerment policing; CI=counterintelligence; PD=policing department; PI=private investigator; PII=pre-incident indicator; PIU=prison intelligence unit.

- AARP TRIAD program, 184
- abortionists, fear of being tracked, 127
- accuracy, xix
- accuracy of operational staff decisions, increasing, xvi
- ACLU, 59
- active measures, 105-6, 107, 113, 185
- aerial searches, 175
- African-Americans, murder of by street gangs or KKK, 82
- agents
  - of influence, 113
  - sharing deep cover, 168
  - aggressive aspects of law enforcement CI, 189
- AIDS, lies about, 113
- AIM. SEE Armed Islamic Movement
- airliners, destruction of civilian, 64
- AKIA bumper stickers, 51
- alert, criminals checking to see if officers are on before action, 160, 161
- aliens. SEE ALSO illegal aliens
- aliens, smuggling, 121, 122
- alliances, 30
- alternative press, 159
- ambulance, following to hospital instead of staying at post, 103, 181
- American Association of Retired Persons. SEE AARP
- American business, ability to do abroad jeopardized, 122
- American legal system as "Mickey Mouse", 109
- American preeminence, loss of from theft of trade secrets, 129
- ammonium nitrate & fuel oil. SEE ANFO
- analyzing information, 146, 192
- anarchy, 63, 98
- Andrews, Paul, 23
- ANFO, 83
- Angola, combat in, 137
- animal rights advocates, 27
- anti-abortionists, 27
- Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 58, 80
- anti-gun politicians, 43
- anti-law enforcement organizations, 29
- Arabic, insistence on negotiating in, 92
- Aryan, lack of speakers, 117
- Arizona Patriots, 45
- Arizona Rangers, 45
- Armed Islamic Movement, 93
- arms, illegal, vii
- arms trafficking, gangs, 56
- arrests increasing vs more crime, 184
- Art of War, The*, 197-8
- Aryan Brotherhood, 81, 83
- Aryan Nation, 39-40, 50
  - plans to murder prison guards, 82
  - prison recruitment, 81
- Aryan Nations groups, 43, 44-5
- Aryans, old and new, 49
- Asian gangs, 121
  - law enforcement unprepared for, 117, 178, 186
- Asian languages
  - difficult for Americans, 203
- less direct than English, 200-1
- need for capability in, 203
- Asian Organized Crime, Center for Study of, 121
- assassination
  - Australian political, 131
  - prevention, detection, & counteraction of, 31
- asset identification, 177
- asset protection more urgent than defining the enemy, 29
- Atsuki, Ted Jeffrey, 74, 75
- Australia
  - criminals "marking" police, 156
  - political assassination, 131
  - authority, conflict with, 182
  - automobile manufacturers, legitimate need for MVD data, 128
- AZ (Arizona) Patriots, 40
- background check methods used by gangs, 47
- background information, 177
- Badolato, Edward, 94-6
- banks, drug cartels penetrating, 124
- Barnowski, Billy, 77
- Barr, William, 56, 64, 179
- barricade crisis, 41
- BBS. SEE computer BBS
- BDCs. SEE bomb data centers
- "being made", 153
- Bell, J. Bowyer, 91
- Berg, Alan, 81
- Bible, The*, 91
- Big Circle Boys, 121
- biometric identification, 95
- "Black Book", 83
- Black Guerrilla Family, 80, 81-2
- Black Liberation Army, The, 58, 79, 81-2
- Black Liberation Army, The, in U.S. Air Force, 45
- blackmail, vii, 64
- blackmailing. SEE ALSO exploitation
- blackmailing criminals and prisoners, 110
- black market
  - informants used for CI, 116
  - KGB use of, 116
- Black Panther Party, 51
- Blackstone Rangers, 57, 62, 80
- Blair House, 36
- Blakenhurst, English prison, 49
- block-by-block policing, 172
- Bloods, 56-7
  - attempted invasion of Takoma, WA, 62
- blue prints of public buildings, 52
- bomb data centers, 99
- bombers, increased sophistication, 99
- bombing, 26-7
  - TWA flight over Greece, 27
  - World Trade Center, 26, 36, 53, 83, 91
- bombs
  - on hostages, 76
  - remotely controlled, 76
- bomb school, the, 76
- booby traps, 41, 144

Botero, Fernando, 124  
 BP Militia, 45  
 Bradley, Tom, 63  
 Branch Davidians. SEE Davidians  
 branches of foreign government firms, 30  
 bribery, police, Washington, DC, 28  
 briefings  
     counterterrorism requirement, 99-100  
     local authorities about private investigations, 131  
 Brighton Beach, Brooklyn, NY, Russian gangs, 107-8  
 broad knowledge, counterterrorism requirement, 99-100  
 budgets for counterterrorism, 101  
 bumper stickers, AKIA, 51  
 burglars, 33  
 burn, baby, burn!, 60  
 burst transmission (radio), 50  
 businesses, American, victimized, 128-9  
 business ventures discouraged, 122  
 Butler, Richard, 40, 81  
 buying or shooting (Colombian drug lords), 124  
 caching, 51  
 cadres, 178  
 Cahill, Donald, 156  
 calculated political interference, 169-70  
 Cali cartel  
     best Colombian intelligence network, 120  
     bribing security forces, 124  
 campus organizations, monitoring, 158  
 Canada, 26-7  
 "candy store, big", 109, 115-6, 185  
 canvassers for school athletic programs  
     recording police addresses and licenses, 44  
 carelessness vs security, 46  
 cartels, drug. SEE drug cartels; Colombian drug cartels  
 Carter, Jimmy, 69  
 Caselli, Giancarlo, 120  
 Castro, Fidel, 106, 116  
 cellular telephones. SEE ALSO headings  
     beginning with telephone or telephones  
     cellular telephones  
 calls monitored by gangs, 46  
 cloned, 150-1, 152, 171  
 Colombian drug cartels, use of, 150-1  
 toll fraud, 114-5, 152  
 Central Intelligence Agency. SEE CIA  
 CEP, 172-4  
     resembling intelligence, 183-4  
 challenges, serious, 167  
 charts, 177  
 chemical spills, 185  
 Chesiard, Joanne, 51  
 Chicago  
     gangs, 57, 58, 61-2  
     police union, 67  
 Chicago Police Dept. SEE CPD  
 children, lack of concern for presence of, 41  
 Chinese dialects, 203  
 Chinese street gangs, 121  
 Chinese Triads, 121, 122, 203  
 Christian fundamentalists. SEE fundamentalist Christians  
 Christian Identity Churches, 39, 41  
 Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 51  
 CI. SEE ALSO FCI  
 CI  
     awareness of local law enforcement to deal

with foreign criminals, 112  
 briefings & broad education essential in, 92  
 budgetary problems, 61  
 computer use in, 144  
 counteraction, 31  
 in county law enforcement, 135-44  
 defined, 74  
     CIA, 31, 36  
     Godson, 29, 36  
 domestic law enforcement agencies' need for, 31-2  
 functions, 188-9  
 from gang infiltration of police depts., 66  
 good people in, 142  
 guide, 187-90  
 has not caught on, 61  
 increasingly a matter for local law enforcement, 25  
 intelligence lessons applying to, 148  
 intelligence process for, 191-4  
 interest, investigating agency having none in crime involving foreigners, 115  
 investigation, reasonable suspicion as impetus of, 137-8  
 key ingredients of effective, 187-8  
 law enforcement needing, vii  
 leap beyond intelligence into by police required, 28  
 LEIs in, 177-8  
 manipulation, 31  
 mentality, 28-9  
 needed in civil disturbance, 150-60  
 needs in, 179  
 officials, law enforcement, understanding politics, 83  
 operation, mutual suspicion & distrust in gang as result of, 139  
 political problems, 61  
 practical application of, 28-9  
 prevention, 31  
 program requisites, 61  
 provided to police by organized crime, 138  
 purpose of, 31  
 quality of sworn officers, 142  
 record-keeping, 144  
 as reform, 64  
 scant open literature on, xvii  
 skills required to deal with terrorism, 89  
 as staff function, 168-9  
 in state law enforcement, 135-44  
 and terrorism, 89-104  
 vs public relations, 180  
 war between criminal groups & law enforcement, 47  
 CIA, 25  
 foreign local police major sources of intelligence, 121  
 greater use of intelligence gathered by, 122  
 history, xiv  
 citizen involvement in CEP, 172  
 citizen reform groups, how financed, 64  
 citizens  
     protection of as first governmental duty, 64, 179  
 reporting suspicious circumstances in neighborhoods, 174  
 Civil Air Patrol, 175, 184  
 civil courts helping private interests pursue their cases, 129  
 civil disturbance. SEE ALSO riot or rioting  
 civil disturbance, 157-161

Constitution not a suicide pact, 125  
 constitutional  
     law, absence in court, 183  
 rights  
     exercise of, 158  
     rights, violating, 125  
 consular privileges, 30  
 consulates, 29  
 context, judging information in, 192  
 contingency service, security force as, 95  
 cooperating informally & doing the paperwork later, 184  
 cooperation. SEE ALSO liaison  
 cooperation  
     between agencies, viii, 64, 121, 186  
     by computer, 177  
     counterterrorism requirement, 100  
     improved, 122, 124  
     inadequate for handling international criminals, 121  
     in intelligence and/or CI, xvi, 98  
     and intelligence interchange, 173, 184  
     lack of, 167, 186  
 cooperation between agencies. SEE ALSO sharing  
 coordinated hits. SEE murder of Russian Mobsters  
 coordination to save lives, 176  
 Copher, Paul, xvi, 39-53, 79-80, 91-3  
 COPS, 40, 42  
 corporate organized crime, 23  
 corrections, mutual scorn with law enforcement, 167  
 corrections intelligence. SEE prison intelligence  
 corrections workers  
     fear of being tracked, 127  
     plans to bomb, 83  
     selling drugs to inmates, 84  
 corrupt  
     lawyers, 149-52, 171, 183  
     Pls, 150-2  
     police, 27-8  
     telephone company executives & technicians, 151-2  
 corruption, small minority of lawyers & Pls involved in, 152  
 Consortium on Intelligence, Washington, DC, 29  
 Cosa Nostra, 23, 27-8  
     breaking up, with RICO, 172  
 counteracting, 31  
     as CI function, 188-9  
     the opposition, needed in CI, 179  
 counter-demonstration, 158  
 counterfeiting, vii, 185-6  
 counterinsurgency, 34, 60, 184  
 counterintelligence. SEE CI  
 countermeasures, 188  
     reviewing effectiveness of, 188  
 counternarcotics, 26  
 counter-surveillance, 96-7  
 counterterrorism, 26, 91  
     briefings & broad education in, 92  
     budgets for, 101  
     private security's large role in, 95  
     requirements for, 99-100  
 county law enforcement, CI in, 135-44  
 Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA), 39, 40  
 cover companies  
     cleaning service, 44-5, 51  
     used for foreign intelligence, 30

covert actions, gangs, 46  
 CPD  
   applicant clearance procedure, 67  
   criminal penetration, 65-7  
   infiltration by gangs, 65-7  
 crack cocaine trade, 79  
 crank calls, 152  
 credit bureaus  
   gang contacts in, 47, 153-5  
   identifying & tracking with data from, 153-6  
   limiting access to personal data from, 130  
 credit card crime, 114-5  
   international, 185-6  
   Secret Service lead agency in, 115  
 credit data  
   legitimate need for, 128  
   mishandling of confidential, 153-6  
   sold for \$8, 154  
 crime. SEE ALSO organized crime  
 crime  
   changing, 123  
   complexity increased, 23  
   destabilization by, 105-17  
   fighting by individual countries now  
     ineffective, 122  
   global expansion of, vii, 23  
   imaginative, 123  
   increasing vs more arrests, 184  
   initiation requirement, extremist groups, 52  
   international, expanding, 119-23  
   internationalization of, 119-25  
   more and better, 177  
   patterns, 177  
   sophisticated, 123  
 crime college, 66, 137, 183  
   what is being taught, 75  
 crime involving foreigners, investigating agency  
   having no CI interest in, 115  
 crimes unattended without private law firms &  
   PIs, 128  
 criminal conspiracies, LEI products useful in,  
   177  
 criminal contacts, memos on, 142  
 criminal enterprises  
   interlocking, organized, vii, 24  
   run from prison, 70, 77  
 criminal groups, military training & experience,  
   137  
 "Criminal Intelligence Analysis", 23  
 Criminal Intelligence Information (computer)  
   System, Washington Area, 205-6  
 criminal intelligence information, computer  
   data base of, 206  
 criminal investigations, more handled by PIs,  
   128  
 criminal issues, foreign-origin, 26  
 criminalization of politics, 60-1  
 criminal organizations  
   professionalized, 31  
   sophistication, 31  
   transnational and international, 31  
 criminals  
   cultivating police and family members, 136  
   exploitation of overseas, 106-7  
   foreign, new to U.S., helped by corrupt lawyers  
     and PIs, 150  
   identifying law enforcement personnel, 153-4,  
     156  
   new, money & technology, 179  
   reacting to arrest with intelligence  
     offensives, 136

criminal specialties and particular connections,  
   ethnic groups, 111  
 Crips, 56-7, 69-70  
   attempted invasion of Takoma, WA, 62  
 crisscross directories, 51  
 critical information  
   current system of protecting, 188  
   analysis, 188  
 cross training of security officers, 94-5  
 Crowe, William, 68  
 Cuba  
   attempt to destabilize U.S. by crime, 110-1  
   Plan Bravo, 110-1, 114  
 Cuban prisoners, takeover of Atlanta Federal  
   Penitentiary, 76-7  
 cults, 27  
 cults. SEE ALSO personality cults  
   cultural & language barriers, overcoming, 111  
   cultural mores and values, new, 25  
   cultural sensitivity, training sessions in, 91-2  
   cultures  
     unfamiliar, in terrorism, 91  
     new to the New World, 110  
   customs, strange, in terrorism, 91  
 Czarist secret police, 116  
  
 danger, reducing, 176  
 dark goggles, 42  
 dark side, 32, 85, 135, 179  
 data security. SEE personal data security  
 Davidians, lacks in FBI/ATF operations  
   against, 41  
 "Day of the Jackal, The", training with, 49  
 DEA  
   field agents, high-quality photographs of  
     from TV shows, 43  
   greater use of intelligence gathered by, 122  
   officers working in other jurisdictions, 168  
   TV programs on, 42-3  
 deadbeat dads, locating, 128  
 dead drops, 45  
 deception, detecting, 35  
 decisions, operational staff, increasing accuracy  
   of, xvi  
 defendants, PIs' justifiable contribution to the  
   adequate defense guaranteed, 150  
 Defense Intelligence Agency credit union charge  
   cards, 46  
 delivery personnel invisible, 53  
 Delk, James D., 56  
 demolition. SEE bombs  
 demonstrating groups  
   cooperating with police, 159  
   members notifying police of planned violence,  
     159  
 demonstration permits, checking applications  
   for, 158  
 demonstration scene, intelligence collection at,  
   159  
 demonstrators' information sources, 158-9  
 Denny, Reginald, near-fatal beating of, 182  
 deportation of illegal aliens, 181-2  
 destabilization by crime, 105-17, 178  
 destabilization by crime, Cuban attempt, 110-1,  
   114  
 destruction  
   of files, 180  
   of intelligence, periodic, 193  
   of property as terrorist crime, 89  
 detection, 29, 31  
   needed as CI function, 179, 188-9

DGI, Cuban intelligence, 114  
 DIA. SEE Defense Intelligence Agency  
 dignitary protection duties, MPD, 36  
 diplomatic immunity, 30  
 direction, intelligence needed in, xvi  
 disaster prevention, petroleum companies, 94  
 disaster relief, 184  
 discovery, legal process of, 171  
 disinformation, 41, 113  
 dispossessed, 63  
 disrupting or negating organized legal  
   activities, 138  
 dissemination, general intelligence outline of,  
   192  
 distrust of another agency's competence, 166  
 diversions in terrorist operation, 98  
 doing time, 74  
 domestic groups, dangerous, 39-53  
 "Domestic Intelligence Report", 41  
 domestic terrorism, 90  
 downtrodden, 63  
 drug cartels. SEE ALSO Colombian drug cartels  
 drug cartels, 27, 178  
   intelligence & CI practices, 43  
   penetrating banking, 124  
 drug clients, would-be, being checked out, 46  
 drug dealers, locating with license plate data,  
   128  
 Drug Enforcement Administration. SEE DEA  
 drug traffickers  
   not systematically monitored, 24  
   using lawyers to manage illegal activities, 149  
 drug trafficking  
   gangs, 56, 121  
   international & national, 122  
   and terrorism, 90  
 drug use, Weed and Seed program approach  
   to, 172-3  
 Dunman, William H., 51, 135-44  
  
 economy & political class, international  
   organized crime a danger for, 120  
 Edmond, Rayful, 77-8  
 effective policies, requisites for, xix  
 Egyptian prison, criminal activities & crime  
   schools, 79  
   eighty-eight (88, Heil Hitler), 51  
 electronic sensors, 42  
 electronic surveillance, information from, 191  
 Ellison, James, 40  
 El Rukn, 57-8  
   attempt to purchase missile, 57-8, 80, 178-9  
   breaking up, with RICO, 172  
   businesses owned, 62, 64  
   cocaine financing, 62  
   Libyan terrorist ties, 62, 64  
   members imprisoned, 61-2  
   political arm, 62, 64, 170  
   security guard firm owned by, 62, 64, 170  
   suit for recognition as religious organization,  
     58  
   top leader of, 77  
 embassies in Washington, DC, 29  
 Emergency Response Teams, 103  
   broad training, 93  
 Emerson, Steven, 35-6  
 emigres  
   exploitation of to support motherland, 106  
   reluctant to inform on other emigres, 108  
   support groups, 27  
   terrorists among, 110-1  
  
 wealthy, 114  
 employees, disgruntled and former, 34  
 enemies worthy of respect & intelligence & CI  
   attention, 64-5  
 enemy  
   defining the, less urgent than asset  
   protection, 29  
   understanding the, xv  
 environmentalists, 27  
 Equifax, 154, 156  
 ERT. SEE Emergency Response Teams  
 escape risks, imprisoned organized crime  
   members, 83  
 espionage  
   information, 34  
   prevention, detection, & counteraction of, 31  
 ethnic groups  
   criminal specialties and particular  
     connections, 111  
   new, 25  
   public manifestations, 158  
 European police force proposed, 122  
 evaluation, general intelligence outline of, 192  
 executives endangered, 122  
 exploitation. SEE ALSO blackmailing  
 explosions triggered by light switches, 140  
 explosives. SEE bombs  
 external command-detonated devices, 41  
 extortion. SEE blackmail  
 extremist groups  
   Black, 136  
   crime initiation requirement, 52  
   domestic, 39-53  
   Islamic, 101  
   racial, 137  
   reading intelligence reports, 49  
  
 facsimile machine, 42  
 failure, political rather than intelligence, 169  
 families of officers, threats to, 47, 48, 153, 154  
 Farrakhan, Louis, 57-8, 80  
 far right, 40  
   security procedures for recruiting, 42  
 Farsi, lack of speakers of, 117  
 Fascism, Italian, 50  
 fast food managers, fear of being tracked, 127-8  
 FAX. SEE facsimile machine  
 FBI/ATF operations against Davidians, 41  
 FBI, 25  
   Asian-American agents, few, 117  
   greater use of intelligence gathered by, 122  
   history, 98  
   murder statistics, 82  
   and official guests, U.S., 104  
   "Soviet Active Measures in the U.S.", 1986-  
     1987, 113  
   task force on emigre crime problem, 111  
   telephone surveillance of Palestinians, 45  
   on terrorism, 90  
 FCI  
   activities, responsibility for monitoring, 30-1  
   importance to local law enforcement, 29-30  
   growing, 25  
   leads from local police forces, 25  
   fear & terror inflicted in terrorism, 101-2  
 federal agencies  
   dislike of, 166  
   primary responsibility for monitoring FCI  
   activities, 30-1  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation. SEE FBI  
 Federal Protective Service, U.S., 157, 161

feedback in intelligence, xvi  
 felons hired by police departments, 50  
 files, keeping one's own, 180  
 filing information, 146, 192  
 fire bombing the police, 181  
 fire fighters  
   lack of coordination with local, 41  
   security officers as, 95  
 first guy, insisting on negotiating with, 41  
 first names, 205  
 flamethrower, 76  
 flash-bang grenades, 49-50  
 flintrapping, 77  
 Flynn, Chuck, 77  
 focused attention, intelligence as, xv  
 follow-up, intense in CEP, 172  
 force, problem solving with least amount of, 103  
 Ford, Hal, xviii  
 foreign counterintelligence. SEE FCI  
 foreigners, threats against, 115  
 foreign government entities, 27  
 foreign groups, leagues, & alliances, 30  
 foreign intelligence services, neutralization of threat of, 29  
 foreign local police major sources of CIA intelligence, 121  
 foreign missions, 29-30  
 foreign police officers, 178  
 foreign sources of help, police forces, 178  
 foreknowledge, xix  
 forged documents, 113  
 Forte, Jeffrey, 70, 77  
*Forty-Eight Hours* show, 182-3  
 "Fourth World War, The", 52-3  
 Fraternal Order of Police, 181  
 fraud, vii  
 freedom fighters or terrorists, 68  
 freedom of association, 67  
 Freedom of Information Act 50-1  
 Freeh, Louis, 32, 85  
 free lance terrorism, 101  
 front companies for foreign governments, 30  
 front groups, Soviet-controlled, 113  
 frontiers, enormous, 53  
 Ft. Leavenworth Prison, 76  
 Fujian dialect, lack of speakers, 117  
 Fujimori, Alberto, 125  
 fundamentalist Christians, 40  
 funding, LEI centers, 176, 177  
 funerals, 180, 181  
 Gambino crime family, 27  
 gang affiliation marks hidden in clothing, 44  
 gang ambassador, 66  
 gang graffiti. SEE graffiti  
 gang members  
   criminal activities while imprisoned or paroled, 77-9  
   relatives aiding, 47  
 running for public office, 58, 170  
 use of police authority, 66  
 gangs  
   arms trafficking, 56  
   Asian, 117, 121, 186  
   background check methods, 47  
   big city, 23-4, 55-71  
   Black urban, hostile intelligence organizations of, 82  
   Chicago, 57, 58, 61-2  
   Chinese, 121, 178  
   CI problems for police, 55  
   clothing, 44, 46  
   contacts in credit bureaus, 47  
   contacts in motor vehicle divisions, 47  
   cooperating more freely than governments, 167  
   covert actions, 46  
   criminal & terrorist following same course, 74-75  
   destroying government military capabilities, 23-4  
   disguised as prison reform or social studies groups, 81, 170  
   domestic street, not systematically monitored, 24  
   drug trafficking, 56  
   exploiting end of Cold War, 167  
   financed by cocaine profits, 57  
   formed in prison, 74  
   Hong Kong, 185-6  
   infiltration of law enforcement agencies, 65-7  
   intelligence & CI skills, 65  
   L.A., 34, 55-7  
   leftist revolutionary, 82  
   membership, L.A. County, 56  
   MOs, 44  
   national connections, 56-7  
   observing police academy training, 83  
   police departments, contacts in, 47  
   potential infiltrators being checked out, 46  
   preparations for L.A. riot, 56  
   prison & street, 78-9  
   prison, involved with terrorism, 90  
   prison activities, 56-7  
   and Sendero Luminoso, 64  
   special attention required, 55  
   statistics, 33-4  
   strategic planning by, 66  
   street, involved with terrorism, 90  
   surveillance and background checks by, 46  
   telephone and radio intercept capability, 47  
   territorial limits, establishing, 103  
   undermining government legitimacy, 23-4  
 urban warfare, 55, 66  
 Vietnamese, 121  
 Weed and Seed program approach to, 172-3  
 youth affiliates, 81  
 Gangster Disciples, 65-6  
 ganja den. SEE smoke house  
 gas masks, 42  
 Gates, Daryl, 62-3, 182  
 Geraldo show, 43  
 global organized crime, profits, 124  
 Glock pistol, 102  
 Godson, Roy, 29, 121  
 Goldberg, Arthur, 125  
 Goldberg, Bernard, 182-3  
 Gonzalo, Chairman, 60  
 good cop-bad cop, 200  
 gossip. SEE loose talk  
 Gotti, John, 27-8, 48  
 government  
   in exile, delegates official and unofficial, 30  
   knowing what opposition is up to, 24, 63  
   legitimacy of, gangs undermining, 23-4  
   military capabilities, gangs destroying, 23-4  
   non-police agencies participating in CEP, 172  
   unrecognized, 30  
 graffiti  
   Arabic and Farsi, 93  
   meaning, 103  
   graphics, 177  
   grievances, organizations', 158

Grollman, Elliott, 157-9, 161  
 grounds to believe. SEE reasonable suspicion  
 Group of Seven industrial democracies, 33  
 Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 52  
 Guyer, Georgie Anne, 60-1  
 Guzman, Abemael, 125  
 Gypsies, 33  
 hackers. SEE computer hackers  
 hanging around, 96-7  
 Hankins, Gary, 181  
 harassment, 48  
 Hardin, Ty, 40  
 hate groups, 81, 131, 178-9  
   suburban, 44  
 hearsay information, 192  
 Hearst, Patty, 80  
 Helicopter TV coverage, 182  
 heroin  
   buying during undercover work, 154  
 market, Hong Kong gangs main controllers of, 185-6  
 smuggling, 121  
 high-crime areas, 176  
 revitalization of, 172-3  
   Weed and Seed program in, 172-3  
 high-tech  
   businesses victimized, 128-9  
   theft of Western information, 113-4  
*High Times*, 147  
 Hispanic gangs in L.A. riot, 58-9  
 Hispanics, L.A. riot coordination, 59  
 histories of criminals & groups, 177  
 Hitler, 50  
 "hits" put out, 154  
 Holliday, James "Doc", 82  
 Hong Kong Police. SEE Royal Hong Kong Police  
 hooligans, 181  
 Hoover, J. Edgar, 98  
 hostage  
   exercise  
     military, 92  
     police, intelligence ignored, 102  
   negotiations, 40, 42  
   negotiations, methods of frustrating, 41  
   situation, terrorist vs domestic, 93  
   strapping remotely-controlled bombs to, 76  
   taking, 93  
 hostile intelligence and intelligence-like forces, vii, 27  
 HUMINT (human intelligence), 48-9  
 Hurd, Douglas, 101  
 Hurricane Carla, 184  
 identification as CI function, 188-9  
 identifying the opposition, needed in CI, 179  
 identities, keeping agents' secret, 168  
 identity, new, creating for illegal purposes, 154-5  
 identity card, national, 53  
 illegal aliens, 181-2  
 imaging, 177  
 immigrants. SEE emigres  
 incarceration. SEE prison  
 indexing information, 146, 192  
 industrial spies, locating with license plate data, 128  
 infiltration. SEE penetration  
 informants  
   handling, 40  
   identifying confidential police, 51  
   lawyers identifying, 149  
 information  
   analyzing, 142, 192  
   delicate, 166  
   from electronic surveillance, 191  
   hearsay, 192  
   judging in context, 192  
   from liaison sources, federal agencies & other depts., 191  
   movement between agencies, lateral, up & down, 139, 140  
   organized, as intelligence, xv  
   from other officers, 191  
   passing to interested entities for study, integration & use, 192  
   protecting, 198  
   responsibility for providing, xvi  
   searching for terrorism & organized crime indicators, 192  
   sources often overlooked, 147  
   street, 191  
   tactical or micro, 183  
   timely dissemination of, xvi  
   understanding before acting on, 99  
 information bureaus, 29  
 informers relatives retaliated against, 108  
 input, responsibility for, xvi  
 input, vital to intelligence, 206  
 INS. SEE U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service  
 institutional memory, loss of, 180  
 insurance claims, false, 128  
 insurance payments used for legal fees, 95  
 insurgeny, 34, 55-6, 60, 178, 179  
   intelligence & CI needed in, 63  
 insurgents  
   destroying government military capabilities, 70  
   humiliating government, 60  
   tactics & area of operation, 70  
   undermining legitimacy of government, 70  
 integration, general intelligence outline of, 192  
 intelligence. SEE ALSO foreign intelligence services; law enforcement intelligence  
 intelligence  
   briefings & broad education essential in, 92  
   CEP resembling, 183-4  
   collection at demonstration scene, 159  
   communication in, xvi  
   component of CEP, 172  
   cooperation in, xvi  
   criminal operations against law enforcement, 150  
   defined, xv  
   destruction of periodically, 193  
   direction needed, xvi  
   failure Pearl Harbor, xiii-xiv  
   federal mandate, xix  
   feedback in, xvi  
   as first line of law enforcement's defense, xiii  
   general outline for law enforcement, 191-2  
   getting to agent with direct need for it, xvi  
   high-tech, 106  
   ignoring, 102  
   improved, 122, 124  
   in law enforcement, rationale for, xiv  
   input vital to, 206  
   integral part of training, 166-7  
   interchange and cooperation, 173, 184  
   lessons applying to CI, 148  
   as leverage, viii  
   lives at stake in sharing, 139

lost, 145-8  
making reports public, 192  
misunderstood by many officials, 24  
needed for proper planning, 159  
notable successes of, 61  
office mismanagement of, 146  
officials, law enforcement, understanding politics, 83  
and operations combined, 176-7  
predicting & preventing civil disturbances, 158  
primary purpose of, xvi  
process for CI, 191-4  
producers & users, xvi  
programs abandoned, 25, 34, 50, 61  
programs, unrealized potential of, 25  
programs weakened, 61  
proper use as political matter, 169  
provided to police by organized crime, 138  
researchers in, 180  
as resource multiplier, 24, 63  
separating from operational & administrative matters, 145-6, 148  
serving enforcement, 147  
strategic or "macro", 161, 183, 193  
successes, 61  
system, management of, xvi  
tactical, 161  
intelligence and security services merely changing names, Soviet successor republics, 113  
Intelligence Unit, New York City Police Dept., 27-8, 48, 50  
interagency liaison required, police intelligence and CI, 94, 96  
interference, misguided political, LA riot, 169  
International Association of Chiefs of Police, 184  
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, 185  
international crime expanding, 119  
international criminal groups bigger & more powerful, 121  
consolidation of, 119  
organized, 27  
internationalized crime, 119-25  
most serious criminal threat ever, 122  
international police forces, proposed, 122  
international terrorism, 90  
interpretation, consecutive or simultaneous, verbatim or substance, 201  
interpreter. SEE language specialist  
interviews, ix  
intimidation essence of terrorism, 81, 90, 154  
investigative techniques, learning by infiltrating, 65  
investors, unscrupulous, 34  
IRA. SEE Irish Republican Army  
Iran, clerical terrorism, 101  
Iranian dissidents, mob violence, 59, 68-9  
Iraq, terrorism, 101  
Ireland, Northern, bombings, 99  
Irish American Heritage Group (Massachusetts Prisoners), 82  
Irish Republican Army, 68, 101  
Irish Republican Army. SEE ALSO Provisional Irish Republican Army (Boston)  
Islam, 36  
Islamic Association for Palestine, The, 35-6  
Islamic Committee for Palestine, The, 35-6  
Islamic groups denying involvement in terrorism, 36  
Islamic Project for Charity International, 35

Israel, 26  
Israeli-Russian criminals, 109  
Italian and Russian organized crime groups, 119  
Italy sacrificing civil liberties to overcome crime, 124  
Jackson, George, 81-2  
Jackson, Jonathan, 81  
Jamaican carpentry excellence, 140  
Jamaican posses, 23  
MOs, 140  
Jamaicans trained in Cuba, 137  
James, Daniel, 110  
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, xiii  
Japanese language, 203  
"Japanese Military Attack, Likelihood of", xviii  
Japanese Red Army (JRA), 26  
Japanese Yakuza, 103, 117, 121, 203  
Jenkins, Bob, 78-9, 166  
Jongman, Albert, 101  
judges & local police agencies cooperating with private lawyers & PIs, 129-30, 131  
juries, graphics for, 177  
jurors not believing police, 28  
Kabbani, Wailid, 26-7  
Kennedy vs Martinez-Mendoza (1963), 125  
Kerry, John, 122  
key duplication using news photo closeup, 49  
KGB  
recruiting vulnerable foreigners in black market, 116  
and Soviet successor republics, 113, 114  
Khadafi, Muammar, 64  
Kikumura, Yu, 26  
killers, professional, 101  
King, Rodney, beating case, 55-6, 63  
media sensationalization, 170  
political meddling in, 69  
kingpin, confessing to protect, 120  
Kinra, Dilip, 205-6  
KKK, 40  
loss of strength, 51-2  
maritime arm, 45  
in U.S. Navy, 45  
Klanswatch, 82  
knowledge gaps, outside resources to fill, 99-100  
knowledge is power, 146-7, 180  
Kohl, Helmut, 122  
Koppel, Ted, 69-70, 182  
*Koran, The*, 91  
Korean language, 203  
Koresh, David, 41  
Kouri, Jim, 182-3  
Kreep, Gary, 168  
Ku Klux Klan. SEE KKK  
L.A.  
criminalization of politics, 61  
gangs, 55-7  
gangs Tacoma, WA combating, 62  
high-crime area, 176  
Russian-Israeli criminals in, 109  
street crime linked to international networks, 122  
underpoliced, 59  
L.A. BLITZ, 115  
L.A. IMPACT, 115  
L.A. riot, 55-6  
deaths & damage, 62  
Denny beating, 182

disaster, 178  
insurgency new to U.S., 60, 62  
investigation of, 59  
media coverage of, 56, 59-60, 182-3  
media coverage of, excerpt, 183  
planned by gangs, 55-6  
Police Dept. disgrace, 62  
labor terrorism, 101  
Lane, David, 40  
language & cultural barriers, overcoming, 111  
language barrier  
in graffiti, 93  
in hostage taking, 92  
in terrorism, 91  
language skills, sharing, viii  
language specialist, 199-203  
and agent, roles, 200, 202  
not in charge of operation, 200, 202  
prisoner or witness exploiting, 201  
valuable & indispensable, 202  
language study, low U.S. priority, 117  
Las Vegas gambling casino, 142  
Latin Kings, 65  
Latin Lovers, 65  
Latino civil rights leaders, 103-4  
law enforcement  
to ease problems, 165  
as first line of defense, xiii  
mutual scorn with corrections, 167  
needing CI, vii  
needing intelligence, xvi  
problems worsening, 25  
penetration by lawyers, 149-50  
law enforcement CI  
aggressive aspects of, 189  
as self-defense, 135  
law enforcement intelligence, general outline for, 191-2  
law enforcement intelligence centers. SEE LEI centers  
law enforcement officers. SEE ALSO police  
law enforcement officers  
dropping cases when "made", 154  
fear of being tracked, 127, 153  
law enforcement personnel, lawyers corrupting, 149  
law firms, private, crimes unattended without, 128  
lawful and unlawful activities mixed, 30  
lawlessness, endemic, 61  
law suits against police agencies, 135  
lawyers  
best, Cali cartel, 120  
corrupt, 66, 149-52  
corrupting law enforcement personnel, 149  
politicized, 171  
prisoners talking to their, 70, 77  
private, needing access to MVD & credit data, 129-30  
specialized knowledge and access, 149  
who are criminals, 105, 171, 183  
leagues, 30  
leap beyond intelligence into CI by police required, 28  
Leavenworth. SEE Ft. Leavenworth Prison  
leftist revolutionaries raising money by robbery, 82  
LEI centers, viii-ix, 167-8, 175-8  
products, 177  
Lenin on terrorism, 90  
less liked, 48, 127, 131

Levchenko, Stanislav, 113-4  
leverage  
as intelligence, xv  
intelligence providing, viii, 63  
liability, prison disaster, 75  
liaison. SEE ALSO cooperation  
liaison  
in CEP, 173  
counterterrorism requirement, 100  
with foreign police at world games, 104  
by narcotics officers with health officials, coroners, forensic laboratories, 147  
officials needing to make sustained efforts at, 186  
sources, federal agencies & other depts., information from, 191  
Libya. SEE ALSO Khadafi, Muammar  
Libyan terrorism, 64, 101  
Libyan terrorist ties, El Rukn, 62, 64  
"Likelihood of Japanese Military Attack", xviii  
line vs staff functions, 147  
link charts of criminal connections, 45  
listening devices, 27  
listening devices, cleaners planting to eavesdrop on law enforcement, 136-7  
"Little Monster", 69-70  
local conditions & problems, CEP based on understanding in depth, 172  
local law enforcement  
CI increasingly a matter for, 25  
dealing with foreign criminals alone, 111-2  
FCI's importance to, 29-30  
FCI leads from, 25  
FCI of growing importance to, 25  
new resources other than sworn officers, 111  
primary responsibility for monitoring FCI activities, 30-1  
local law enforcement officers training Aryan groups, 42  
local police  
identifying homes and personal automobiles of, 40, 44  
need for CI consciousness, 39  
loose talk at embassy dinner parties, 52-3  
looters, 181  
looting, 56  
media pinpointing locations of, 170  
police not stopping, 71  
Los Angeles. SEE L.A.  
Los Macheteros. SEE Macheteros, Los  
lost intelligence, 145-8  
low bids on commercial cleaning contracts, 136-7  
loyalty, 50  
LSD on patrol cars, 47  
LSD-spiked stamps, 47  
Macheteros, Los (Puerto Rican Popular Army), 48  
Mackenzie-Orr, M.H., 99  
macro intelligence. SEE strategic intelligence  
mafia. SEE Sicilian mafia; Cosa Nostra  
mail use, prisoners, 70, 77  
"making" undercover agents. SEE undercover agents, identifying  
management of an intelligence system, xvi  
Mandarin language, 203  
manipulating  
the enemy with prison CI, 73  
the opposition in CI, 179  
manipulation, 29, 31, 36, 37

Maoist Red Guards, 121  
 Maoists, 57  
 Marenches, Count de, 52  
 Margulies, Robert A., 187-8  
 Mariel boatlift, 106, 110, 114  
 Marielitos  
     intelligence agents in U.S., 116  
     murderers among, 114  
 marijjuana den. SEE smoke house  
 "marked", being, by underground  
     figures, 153, 156  
 Martens, Frederick T., 25, 36  
 martial arts training in prison, 75  
 Marxist-Leninists, 58, 79-80  
 Marxist revolutionary groups, 63  
 match head rockets, 76  
 McLean, Ed, 128  
 meaning from everyday experience, xv  
 Meany, Daniel, 57, 73-8, 80-1, 83-5, 167, 180  
 meddling  
     community leaders, 63, 169  
     politicians, 63, 68, 69, 169, 178  
 Medellin cartel, 153-4  
 media  
     agenda, 182-3  
     careful use of by law enforcement, 171  
     coverage of L.A. riot, 56, 59-60, 182-3  
     coverage of L.A. riot, excerpt, 183  
     information espionage by, 34  
     justifying violence, 69-70, 170  
     misguided coverage, 170-1, 182  
     news, legitimate need for information, 128  
     reform, 183  
     sensationalization of Rodney King beating  
         case, 170  
     slant, 183  
     working on behalf of other side, 178  
 Meeks, Bud, 174-5  
 megaphones, 59, 178  
 Melville, Sam, 81  
 mental hospital employees, fear of being  
     tracked, 127  
 methods of operation. SEE MOs  
 Miami  
     high-crime area, 176  
     riots, 1980, 116  
 "Mickey Mouse", American legal system as, 109  
 micro information. SEE tactical information  
 microphones, parabolic, 42  
 military personnel specially trained, in  
     prison, 171  
 militias, private, 45, 51  
 misguided political interference, LA riot, 169  
 missile, gang's attempt to purchase, 57-8, 178-9  
 mistakes, constant change making for, 140  
 modus operandi. SEE MOs  
 money from property seizures, 177  
 money launderers buying equity in interna  
     tional banks, 124  
 money laundering, vii, 23, 33, 79  
     international network, 119  
         volume of drug money, 124  
 money transfers, 177  
 monikers, 74, 205-7  
 Moore, Fonda, 28  
 more money than God, 120, 171  
 Morris, Jack, 33, 52, 67  
 MOs  
     for each demonstrating organization, 158  
 gangs, 44  
 Jamaican posses, 140

products of LEIs, 177  
 Moslem, 36  
     aversion to pork, 91  
     women's veils, 92  
 motion detectors, 95  
 motorcycle gangs, 23, 27, 79, 135  
 motorcycle gangs penetrating government  
     offices, 135-6  
 motorcycle handlebars hiding weapons, 140  
 motor vehicle dept. data. SEE MVD data  
 motor vehicle depts., gang contacts in, 47  
 mounty. SEE Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
 MPD  
     cooperation with federal authorities, 36  
     criminal penetration, 65  
     dignitary protection duties, 36  
     elective courses to deal with sidearm  
         problems, 102  
 Headquarters massacre, xviii-xix  
 hiring convicted felons, 50  
 management training, 181  
 ratios of police to citizens, 69  
 Volunteer Reservists, 175  
 World Cup soccer games security, 103-4  
 Mt. Pleasant riot, Washington, DC, 181  
 mug books, 181  
 Murchison, William, 60  
 murder  
     of African-Americans  
         by KKK, 82  
         by street gangs, 82  
     anti-semitic, 81  
 babies, lies about, 113  
 bungled, 138-9  
 Chicago, 58  
 Colombian journalists, 154  
 mass, 27, 64  
 of police by revolutionary gangs, 82  
 radio talk show host, 81, 131  
 of Russian mobsters, coordinated in U.S. &  
     Europe, 108-9  
 "secret", 138-9  
 statistics, 82  
 traced by first name, 205  
 witnesses, 156  
 Mussolini, 50  
 mutual suspicion & distrust in gang as result  
     of CI operation, 139  
 MVD data, 127-8, 130, 156  
 MVD data, legitimate need for, 128  
 MVDs, limiting access to personal data from,  
     130  
 Myers, Lawrence, 98  
 Myers, Willard III, 121  
  
 narco-terrorists, 57  
 narcotics traffickers or trafficking. SEE drug  
     traffickers or trafficking  
 National Alliance, 40  
 national boundaries as eroding, 119  
 national boundaries, transcending, 123  
 National Criminal Intelligence Service,  
     Britain, 124  
 National Institute of Justice, 33  
 National Law Enforcement Institute, 78-9, 166  
 National Sheriff's Association, 175, 184  
 National Strategy Information Center, 121  
 Nation of Islam, 57, 80  
 natural disasters, 185  
 naturalized Americans with language &  
     cultural knowledge, 178

Navarro, Nick, 143  
 Nazi belt buckles, 144  
 Nazis (National Socialists), 50  
 Nazis, American, contact with German  
     Nazis, 50  
 neighborhood intelligence & CI in CEP, 173-4  
 neighborhood security patrols, private, 94  
 Neighborhood Watch, 173-4  
 neutralization, 29, 31  
     of criminal element, prison as a step in, 172  
     of the opposition needed in CI, 179, 189  
     neutrals, victimization of, 101-2  
 New Jersey State Police. SEE NJSP  
 news media. SEE headings beginning with  
     media  
 news organizations, legitimate need for  
     information, 128  
 newspaper advertisements, signers of, 43  
 news photo closeup used to duplicate keys, 49  
 new technologies in criminal hands, 25  
 New World Liberation Front, 80, 82  
 New York City Police Dept. SEE NYPD  
 nicknames, 205-6  
 nicknames. SEE ALSO monikers  
 Nightline show, 69, 182  
 night vision  
     devices, 42  
     goggles, 49-50  
 NJSP, 26  
     Academy, 34-5  
     duties, 35  
 noncombatants, victimization of, 101-2  
 NYPD  
     criminal penetration, 65  
     hiring convicted felons, 50  
     Intelligence Unit, 27-8, 48, 50  
  
 objectivity and fairness, 158  
 official guests, U.S., 104  
 Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing, 53  
 older people  
     combating crime against, 184  
         as police volunteers, 174-5, 184  
 Olson, William J., 121  
 Omnibus Crime Act, 127, 130, 186  
 Operation Rescue, 158  
 operations combined with intelligence, 176-7  
 Operationsharing SWAP, 168  
 Order, The, 40, 81  
 organized crime  
     adequate monitoring of, 170  
     corporate, 23  
     diversification of, 23  
     helping young people infiltrate government  
         offices, 136  
     imprisoned members, escape risks, 83  
     non-traditional groups, 23  
     penetration of law enforcement agency by, 28  
     prison intelligence necessary against, 84-5  
     providing intelligence & CI to police, 138  
 Organized Crime Task Force, President's Crime  
     Commission, 24  
 organized information as intelligence, xv  
 outside resources to fill knowledge gaps,  
     counterterrorism requirement, 99-100  
 outsiders, victimization of, 101-2  
 overlooked sources of information, 147  
  
 Page, Clarence, 82  
 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 93,  
     135

Palestine question, 26  
 para-medics, security officers as, 95  
 paramilitary organizations, private, 51  
 parolees, involved in illegal gang activities, 79  
 passing information to interested entities for  
     study, integration & use, 192  
 patrol cars  
     disabled with Superglue, 47  
     LSD on, 47  
 Pax Mafiosa, 167  
 peaceful meetings of divergent groups, 45  
 Pearl Harbor  
     intelligence failure, xiii-xiv  
 Peist, William, 27  
 penetration  
     cover company use, 44-5  
     of law enforcement agencies, 28, 39  
         by Aryan Nations, 44-5, 48  
         by gangs, 65-7  
         by lawyers, 149-50  
 Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 25  
 people  
     army & police working with the, 125  
     protecting, 198  
         first governmental duty, 64  
         people knowing each other, 172  
 Perez, Genaro, 110  
 perimeter security alarms, 42  
 personal data security, 127-131  
 personality cults, 40  
 personal protection awareness by agents,  
     need for, 43  
 Peru, 57, 60  
     damage to civil rights structure, 125  
 Peterson, Marilyn, 23  
 petroleum companies, disaster prevention, 94  
 petty differences, putting aside, 167  
 Philadelphia Police Dept. SEE PPD  
 photographs from TV film images, 42  
 PIIs, 96-7  
     examples of, 96  
     security, other police forces & civilians  
     contributing to, 97  
 pilots, mustered-out military, recruiting for  
     drug flights, 42  
 PIs, 94-6, 104, 143  
     corrupt, 150-2  
     crimes unattended without, 128  
     legitimate need for information, 128  
     needing access to MVD & credit bureau data,  
         129-30  
 pistols, 102  
 PIUs  
     functions, 73-4  
     cost effectiveness, 75  
 Plan Bravo, Cuba, 110-1, 114  
 plastic crime. SEE credit card crime  
 PLO. SEE Palestine Liberation Organization  
 police & political mishandling of rioting, 71  
 police  
     academy training, gangs observing, 83  
     assault on, 92, 181  
     attending public events for information, 159  
     authority, use by gang members, 66  
     bashing, 182  
     campus, liaison with, 158  
     in cities which have had problems, liaison  
         with, 158  
     corrupt, 27-8  
     as crime-oriented, 137  
     departments, gang contacts in, 47

entrance examination, 66-7  
 forces, international proposed, 122  
 former, becoming PIs working for lawyers, 150  
 former, identifying former police colleagues, 150  
 former, in prison, 171, 183  
 identifying, 40, 44, 136, 153-4, 156  
 infiltration without evidence prohibited, 158-9  
 law suits against, 135  
 not being believed by jurors, 28  
 not stopping looting, 71  
 recruitment or intimidation of by corrupt lawyers, 150  
 representing authority, 182  
 skills, refined or rusty, 157  
 tactics and procedures, intelligence on, 39  
 tracking, 40-1, 153-4, 156  
 union, Chicago, 67  
 versatility, 95-6  
 police cars, photographs of unmarked, 83  
 police depts., penetrated by motorcycle gangs, 135-6  
 police intelligence and CI  
 interagency liaison required, 94, 96  
 private security officers liaison required, 94, 96  
 police intelligence data base, 111  
 police officers, information from other, 191  
 police offices, sweeps against hostile electronic surveillance, 137  
 police property, ready access to, 47  
 police reserve corps, 93, 175  
 police special operations work, 41  
 police work  
     cultural understanding in, viii, 199, 201  
     subtlety in, 201  
 political arms of terrorist organizations, 64  
 political goals in terrorism, 101-2  
 political groups, public manifestations, 158  
 political influence operations, 113  
 political interference, 169-70  
 political or social objectives in terrorism, 90  
*Political Terrorism*, 102  
 politicians, meddling, 63, 169  
 politics  
     criminalization of, 60-1  
     law enforcement intelligence & CI officials understanding, 83  
 positive collection and analysis, 73-4  
 Post, Jerold, 101  
 postal service sorters, 41  
 posters & handbills, 158  
 post office supervisors, fear of being tracked, 127-8  
 poverty issues, money made on, 182  
 power sharing, 180  
 PPD, criminal penetration, 65  
 PR. SEE public relations  
 practice and testing. SEE probing predicting & preventing civil disturbances, intelligence to, 158  
 Pre-incident Indicator. SEE PII  
 pre-need resources for dealing with terrorists, 93  
 pre-operation survey. SEE hanging around President's Crime Commission, Organized Crime Task Force, 24  
 press, the, as information source, 158  
 press, the. SEE ALSO media  
 prevention, 31  
 in CEP, 172

as CI function, 188-9  
 needed in CI, 179  
 prison  
     criminal enterprise run from inside, 70, 77-9  
     disaster liability, 75  
     former police officers in, 171  
     as source of crime recruits, 78  
     specially trained military personnel in, 171  
     as step in neutralization of criminal element, 172  
     terrorists in, 171  
 prison activities, gangs', 56-7  
 prison CI, 73-4  
     learning about prisoners & their relationships with gangs, 74  
 prisoners  
     dangerous, 171, 183  
     intelligence system, 78  
     outside contacts, 77  
     talking to their lawyers, 70, 77  
     telephone & mail use, 70, 77  
 prison guards. SEE corrections workers  
 prison intelligence, 73-88  
     given lower priority than "more immediate" problems, 84  
     necessary against organized crime, 84-5  
 prison intelligence unit. SEE PIU  
 prison missionaries, 57, 64, 81, 170  
 prison reform organizations, 57, 64, 74, 81  
 prison system, need for intelligence & CI, 84  
 privacy, 130  
 private investigators. SEE PIs  
 private organization participation in CEP, 172  
 private security  
     for antiterrorism, 96  
     care in liaison with, 104  
     proactive responses, 36-7  
     probing, 59, 64, 178  
 problems  
     advance warning of, xiv-xv  
     anticipating and/or avoiding and/or solving, xv  
     serious, 165, 167  
     and solutions, 165-186  
     solving with least amount of force, 103  
 producers & users of intelligence, xvi  
 profits, global organized crime, 124  
 program requisites, CI, 61  
 property seizures, money from, 177  
 prosecutors, standardized packages of information for, 177  
 prostitution, vii  
 protecting information, 198  
 protecting people, 198  
     first governmental duty, 64, 179  
 protection rackets, 64, 121  
 Protective Service, U.S. Federal. SEE Federal Protective Service, U.S.  
 Provisional Irish Republican Army (Boston), 82  
 provocation, 44, 58-9, 64, 68, 158, 178  
 psychological warfare, 97-8  
     terrorism as, 101  
 public, making intelligence reports, 192  
 publications, useful, 147  
 publications of groups in question, reading, 159  
 public information, newspapers, business records, 191  
 publicity  
     favorable, penchant for, 46  
     vulnerability to adverse, 41  
 public relations vs CI, 180  
 Puerto Rican Pop. Army. SEE Macheteros, Los

purpose of intelligence, xvi  
*R/IAP Watch*, 121  
 race track, organized crime connection  
     broken, 140-2  
 race war, 58, 63  
 racial extremists, 27  
 racial issues, money made on, 182  
 racist movements, bank robberies and murders, 48  
 racist movements. SEE ALSO white supremacists  
 Racketeer Influence & Corrupt Organization statute. SEE RICO  
 racketeering and terrorism, 90  
 radicalization of petty criminals by prison networking, 75  
 radio burst transmissions, 42  
 radio monitoring, 50  
 radios, hand-held, 59, 178  
 radio security, 41  
 rafters, 114  
 raid planning, 40  
 ratios of police to citizens. SEE ALSO L.A., underpoliced  
 ratios of police to citizens, Washington, DC, 69  
 reading board, 147  
 reasonable suspicion impetus of CI investigation, 137-8  
 rebel groups, 30  
 recon. SEE reconnaissance  
 reconnaissance, 60  
     van/bike recon trick, 173-4  
 record-keeping, 144  
     in CEP, 172  
     persuading patrol officers to do, 146-7  
 recruiting by extremist groups of U.S. Armed Forces members, 45  
 "Red Dawn", 40  
 "red menace", the, 98  
 regional "real work" vs headquarters bureaucracy, 147  
 regional law enforcement intelligence centers. SEE LEI centers  
 rehearsals, terrorist groups, 97  
 relearning, 180  
 Reno, Janet, 121  
 reporters, tracking with credit information & killing, 154  
 Republic of New Afrika, 58, 79  
 reputations of citizens, impugning, 192  
 Research/Intelligence Analyst Program. SEE R/IAP  
 reserves to the reserves, 185  
 resource leverage, more and better as shared intelligence & liaison, 177  
 resources  
     new, 174  
     sharing, viii  
     shrinking, xv  
 responsibility for evaluating intelligence systems, xvi  
 restricted techniques jeopardized, 171  
 retribution, 48  
 revolution, disruption followed by, 178  
 Revolutionary Communist Party, 58, 70-80  
     prison recruiting, 79-80  
 revolutionary groups  
     prison activities, 58  
     training formerly unattached prisoners, 80  
 RICO, 172  
 right, quasi-religious, 40  
 right-wing groups, 50  
 riot control tactics training, 157  
 rioting  
     media pinpointing locations of, 170  
     police & political mishandling of, 63  
 riot or rioting. SEE ALSO civil disturbance  
 risks, ranking in decreasing order of severity, 188  
 Ritchie, Thomas, 121  
 rivalries among agencies, 166, 176  
 robberies, raising money for revolution by, 82  
 Rodriguez, Matt, 65-7  
 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 141-2  
 Royal Hong Kong Police, 178, 186  
     expertise with Asian druglords and gangs, 186  
 Ruby Ridge, Idaho, 49  
 Russian criminals  
     Swedish prisoner pay attracting, 115-6  
     tattoos on torso, 103, 116-7  
 Russian gangs. SEE ALSO Russian organized crime  
     Russian gangs  
         Brighton Beach, Brooklyn, NY, 107-8  
         links to Genovese Cosa Nostra family, 108  
         location in U.S. & Canada, 107  
         tattoos, 103, 116-7  
     Russian-Israeli criminals, 109  
     Russian mafia. SEE Russian gangs  
 Russian organized crime. SEE ALSO Russian gangs  
 Russian organized crime, 107-10  
 sabotage, prevention, detection, & counteraction of, 31  
 sanctuary movements, 27  
 Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, 116  
 San Quentin Prison, 81  
 satanists, 27  
 SCECE, 52  
 Schmid, Alex, 101  
 scorn between law enforcement & corrections, 167  
 Scott, Kershaw, 69-70  
 search and rescue, 184  
 searching for information for terrorism & organized crime indicators, 192  
 secrecy  
     American general on, 197  
     Chinese general on, 197-8  
 secret agents, 197, 198  
 secrets, stolen & sold, 128-9  
 Secret Service, 50, 114-5  
     no CI responsibility, 115  
 security  
     clearances, 50  
     from unique language and family ties, 33  
     police buildings, xviii-xix  
     vs carelessness, 46  
     in Washington, DC, 52  
 security controls, identifying, designing & implementing appropriate, 188  
 security guard firms, licensing, 64  
*Security Intelligence Report*, 41, 49  
 security officers, 94-6  
     cross trained, 94-5  
     pay, 95  
     as fire fighters, 95  
     as paramedics, 95  
 preventing problems & saving money, 95  
 quality and versatility, 94

segregating & monitoring prisoners by using intelligence, 75  
self-defense, law enforcement CI as, 135  
self-storage areas, 51  
semi-official activities, 30  
Sendero Luminoso, 57, 60  
and American gangs, 57, 64  
breaking, 125  
Shah of Iran, 59, 68-9  
sharing. SEE ALSO cooperation  
sharing  
among agencies, excuses for not, viii  
counterterrorism requirement, 100  
failure at, 166, 186  
in intelligence & CI, 98, 139  
international bomb information, 99  
involving writing, 180  
PIUs & police intelligence units, 75  
power, 180  
sustained efforts at, 186  
units in a single department not, 186  
Shia groups, 93  
Shining Path. SEE Sendero Luminoso  
Sicilian mafia, 117, 119, 120  
Simis, Konstantin, 116  
skinheads letting their hair grow, 44  
slap-shotguns, 76  
smoke house, 140  
smuggling  
aliens, 121, 122  
containerized, 23  
heroin, 121  
snipers, locating for apprehension, 103  
soccer games, World Cup, Washington, DC, 103-4  
social groups, 74  
social studies groups, 57, 81, 170  
social studies groups, how financed, 64  
social welfare organizations, 57, 81  
social workers, 57, 64, 81, 170  
solutions & problems, 165-186  
solutions, longer-term, in CEP, 172  
SOs. SEE security officers  
sources, confidential, 198  
determining validity of, 192  
personal interest of, 192  
protecting, 142  
quality of, ix  
reliability, 192  
stable of, 143  
South Central L.A. riot. SEE L.A. riot  
Soviet. SEE ALSO headings beginning with:  
Russian; Soviet successor republics  
Soviet  
criminal agent recruits, 110  
criminals, 106  
considering American authorities  
“pussycats”, 109  
specialties, 107  
emigres  
in CI investigations & terrorism, 109  
crime problem, cultural & language complexities of, 111  
foreign police records unavailable, 114  
espionage, 107  
families migrating to U.S., paid, 115  
immigration, 106  
“Marielitos”, 106  
routine crime, 107  
undesirables, 106  
Soviet Active Measures, Interdepartmental

Working Group on (State Dept.), 113  
Soviet criminals. SEE Russian criminals;  
Russian gangs  
Soviet intelligence  
active measures, 105, 107  
acquiring lives of their own, 105-6, 185  
agents, 106  
Soviet successor republics  
active measures under new regime, 110, 185  
goals under new regime, 110  
intelligence and security services merely changing names, 113  
theft of Western high-tech information, 113  
Special Forces veterans retired, 175  
specialized vehicles, terrorist organizations using, 96  
Special Weapons and Tactics Teams. SEE SWAT teams  
stable of talent, 93  
staff function, CI as, 168-9  
Stalin, Josef, 116  
stalking horses, 120  
“stand down”, 139  
stand up guy, a, 74  
stash houses, narcotics, 171  
State Defense Force, 51, 175, 184-5  
deploying when National Guard federalized, 185  
State Guard. SEE State Defense Force  
state law enforcement, CI in, 135-44  
state police.  
need for CI consciousness, 39  
Sterling, Claire, 167  
stoning police, 181  
stores being looted, owners of, 181  
straightening crooked pictures, 144  
strategic intelligence, 193  
synthesized from tactical information, 183  
street information, 191  
structure, lack of, 166  
study groups, 74  
subtlety in police work, 201  
Sun Tzu, xix, 197-8  
surprises, disastrous, 24  
surveillance, computer net warning of, 43  
surveillance consciousness. SEE tail consciousness  
suspicion among agencies in law enforcement intelligence, 176  
swapping, 180-1  
SWAT teams, 40, 103  
own analysis center, 93  
swearing on holy book, 91, 102  
Sweden as “candy store”, 115-6  
sweeps, police offices, against hostile electronic surveillance, 137  
Symbionese Liberation Army, 80, 82  
Syria, terrorism, 101  
Syrian Social National Party (SSNP), 26-7

Tacoma, WA, combating L.A. gangs, 62  
tactical information, 177  
synthesized into strategic intelligence, 183  
Taggers, 103  
tail consciousness, police lack of, 83, 142-3  
tank ditches, 41  
targets  
arbitrary & indiscriminate, 101  
bearing portraits, 49  
support groups as softer, 170

tattoos, 46  
Cuban, 52  
Japanese Yakuza, 103, 117, 121  
Russian, 103, 116-7  
tracking criminals by, 74  
taxi drivers  
invisible, 53  
largely immigrants, unmonitored, 53  
teaming, 168, 180-1, 186  
technology  
magnifying violence, 91  
new, in criminal hands, 25  
Tehran, Iran, 59  
telemarketers, legitimate need for information, 128  
telephone company  
data on criminal wire taps, 136, 151  
employee turnover, 152  
executives & technicians, corrupt, 151-2  
executives & technicians telling criminals their phones are being tapped, 151  
telephone or telephones, headings beginning with. SEE ALSO cellular telephones  
public, no longer used by criminals, 150  
telephone toll analyses, 177  
telephone use, prisoners, 70, 77  
territorial limits, establishing gang, 103  
terrorism, 24  
against law enforcement officers and families, 135  
and CI, 89-104  
and corporations, 89  
arbitrary & indiscriminate targets, 101-2  
defined, 90  
definitions, study of, 101-2  
disproportionate psychological effects, 90  
diversions used in, 98  
domestic, 90  
free lance, 101  
inflicting fear & terror, 101-2  
instrument of state policy, 89  
as intelligence-like activity, 89  
international, 90  
intimidation essence of, 81  
labor, 101  
and narcotics trafficking, 90  
ostensible causes disproportionate to, 90  
political goals in, 101-2  
practitioners' expertise, skill & discipline, 89  
prevention, detection, & counteraction of, 31  
prison gangs involved with, 90  
and private security firms, 89  
as psychological warfare, 101  
purpose, 90  
and racketeering, 90  
requiring CI skills to deal with, 89  
sponsors, 101  
state clerical & non-clerical, 101  
street gangs involved with, 90  
violating local and state laws, 89  
violence in, 101-2  
terrorist organizations, 27, 30  
federal money for, 64  
funding operations, 96  
Near Eastern, & their religious institutions, 30  
planning sessions, 96  
political arms, 64, 170  
rehearsals, 97  
specialized vehicles, 96  
terrorists  
among emigres, 110-1  
or freedom fighters, 68  
imprisoned, dangerous, 83, 171  
parking by agents' & officers' homes, 154  
pre-needed resources for dealing with, 93  
surveillance and/or stakeout, 96  
terrorists-for-hire, 80  
testing. SEE practice and testing  
Texas Ranger, 159  
theft of Western high-tech information, Soviet successor republics, 113  
theoretical SNIE (Special National Intelligence Estimate), xviii  
thin blue line, xiii, 179  
threat analysis, 188  
threats  
to officers and their families, 47, 81, 153, 154  
against witnesses, 156  
timeliness, xvi, xix  
Top Cop, 40  
trade missions, 29  
traffic stops  
crime college training, 76  
most dangerous, 139  
training for, 35  
training  
criminal often better than police, 137  
integral part of intelligence, 166-7  
lack of, 166-7  
travel data, 177  
travel offices, 29  
Triads, Chinese. SEE Chinese Triads  
True Tales of the Highway Patrol, 40  
trust between citizen & police, 173, 174  
tunnel escape from Florida prison, 114  
TV. SEE ALSO headings beginning with video TV  
American terrorist groups watching, 42  
in communications capability, 60  
cop shows, 40  
drug traffickers watching, 42  
extremists' appearances generating membership & information requests, 43  
filming “real-life” stories for public display, 180  
identifying potential undercover officers by watching, 42  
ill-advised coverage, 182  
networks vs local stations, 60  
news programs, recording & shipping to Latin America, 43  
“reality” commercial coverage of law enforcement operations outlawed, 43  
team's terrorism rehearsal, 97  
Twenty-First Century VOTE, 58  
TZu, Sun. SEE Sun Tzu  
U.S. as “candy store”, 109  
U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 39  
U.S. Border Patrol agents filmed with hidden video cameras, 49  
U.S. Coast Guard, 52  
U.S. government occupation, 40  
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, DC administration refusal to cooperate with, 181-2  
U.S. indulgence as seen by Soviet criminals, 109, 115-6, 185  
U.S. Justice Foundation, 168  
U.S. Marine Corps, 52  
U.S. National Guard, 51, 184

- U.S. President's Commission on Organized Crime, 106, 108
- U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 119
- undercover agents
  - photographing, 180
  - protecting identities of, 181
  - temporary swapping of, 168
- undercover agents or officers
  - identifying, 39, 45-6, 136, 168
  - lawyers identifying, 149
  - media identifying, 170-1
- undercover garage, police dept., 83
- undercover operations
  - maintaining, 168-9
  - shared, viii
- underground containers for weapons caching, 51
- understanding local conditions & problems in
  - depth, CEP based on, 172
- union, Chicago police, 67
- United Nations missions, New York City, 29
- United States. SEE U.S.
- uprising, potential major, 24, 63
- urban problems, pilot programs to deal with, 71
- urban rebellion. SEE L.A. riot; Watts riot;
  - Washington, DC riot
- urban spectacles, 60, 63
- urban warfare, gangs and, 55, 56, 64
- Vancouver, BC, Canada, 121
- Vermont, 26-7
- vests
  - ceramic, 42
  - protective, 76
- veterans, training Aryan groups, 42
- victimization of civilians, noncombatants,
  - neutrals & outsiders, 101-2
- video. SEE ALSO headings beginning with TV
  - access, 95
  - cameras, hidden, 49
  - films, clandestine, of government employees, 136
  - surveillance gear, destroying, 76
- videotapes, studying, 41, 42
- Vietnamese
  - language, 203
  - street gangs, 121
- Vietnam War, demonstrations against, 157
- violence
  - by counter-demonstrators, 51
  - domestic organized, 178
  - large scale, who is likely to commit, 178
  - magnified by technology, 91
  - media analyses justifying, 69-70, 170
  - mob, 59, 69
  - organizations planning, 58
  - over-reporting, 170
  - terrorist, 90, 101-2
  - in work place, 128
- visitors, prisoners, 70, 77
- volunteers, 174-5
  - duties, 175
  - sharing resources with police, viii
- vulnerability analysis, 188
- Wall Street bombing, 1919, 98
- wanted poster of FBI sniper, 49
- war, secret operations essential in, 197
- war wagon, 139-40
- Washington, DC
  - Corrections Dept. problems, 84
- ratios of police to citizens, 69
- riot, 1991, 63, 181
- security, 52
- Washington, DC, Metropolitan Police Dept. SEE MPD
- Washington, George, 197
- Washington Area Criminal Intelligence Information (computer) System, 205-6
- Washington Post*, L.A. riot coverage, excerpt, 183
- Watson, R. Patrick, 34
- Watts riot, 56
- weak link, 140
- weapons
  - caching, 51
  - inmates learning to make, 76-7
- weapons training in prison, 75
- Weathermen, 81, 82
- Weather Underground Organization, 80
- Weaver, Mrs. Randy, 49
- Webster, William, 52-3, 59
- Weed and Seed program, 172-3, 184
- welfare spending, 165
- Western States Information Network, 185
- White House, The, 36
- White House employees, 50
- White Russian (Belarus) police officer, 178
- white supremacists. SEE ALSO racist movements
  - white supremacists, 44
  - hostile intelligence organizations of, 82
- Wiederstand, 43, 50
- Wilson, Stanley, 153-4
- witnesses, "marking", threatening or killing, 156
- women, fear of being tracked, 127
- Woolsey, R. James, 119
- worker's compensation claims, false, 128
- World Trade Center bombing, 26, 36, 53, 91
  - ANFO used, 83
- writing, not liking, 144, 146, 180
- writing skills, 142, 144
- Yakuza, Japanese, 103, 117, 121, 203
  - penetrating U.S. real estate & banking, 121
- Yarborough, Gary, 81
- ZOG (Zionist Occupation Government), 40
- ZOG IRS/ATF Task Force, 40



*Photo by: Stanley Wilson, Castleberry, Florida*

## **Lawrence B. Sulc**

In his 23 years as a C.I.A. operations officer, Lawrence B. Sulc saw a variety of assignments, from overseas special operations and counterintelligence in Latin America and the Far East, to Langley intelligence manager. Sulc has extensive first-hand knowledge of the length to which adversaries will go to gain tactical and strategic advantage. After his years with the C.I.A., Mr. Sulc served for seven years as an investigator and staff member for the U.S. House of Representatives. He left government service as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Interdepartmental Affairs in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Today he is a private consultant specializing in risk assessment, corporate intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. He is founder and president of the Nathan Hale Institute, an organization dedicated to strengthening U.S. intelligence capability.

# **law enforcement counter intelligence**

Very little has been written about law enforcement *counter* intelligence. One reason is that, until this book, few people were aware of the extent to which criminal organizations have gone to mount intelligence operations to protect their empires. Some of these operations are extremely sophisticated, and represent a serious, and sometimes deadly, threat to law enforcement officers and American citizens.

Lawrence B. Sulc, a former career intelligence operative and manager, uses his extensive personal experience, interviews with other experts, and review and analysis of actual incidents to reveal the extent of the problem, and the threat it poses. He concludes his book with specific recommendations and techniques to respond to the problem.

*"If you only read chapters two and nine, you will gain an insight into the problem and solutions that most law enforcement officers and administrators will never have. This is a highly informative book every street officer should have."*

**Capt. James Stalnaker, San Bernardino County California Sheriff's Dept.**

*"Lawrence Sulc effectively identifies the consequences of the lack of a counterintelligence program, and formulates some solutions to the problem. This book is no-nonsense and straightforward in nature."*

**Michael Wargo, Police Officer and Author**

*"Sulc presents an unassailable case for reinvigorating law enforcement intelligence capabilities in the '90s, with special emphasis upon counterintelligence. He sets down the risks now facing U.S. law enforcement personnel in this regard and offers constructive ideas for doing something to combat what is sure to be a growing, and deadly, problem."*

**H.H.A. Cooper, University of Texas at Dallas**

*"Lawrence Sulc points out critical areas that police administrators, mid-level managers, and even internal affairs officers tend to overlook."*

**Captain Roger Fulton, New York State Police, (Ret.)**

cover design by Maili Holman

ISBN 1-888644-74-5

