# Automated Malware Classification using Deep Learning

Group Name: AccessDenied



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#### **BRIEF OVERVIEW:**

- A Malware Detection Application using Deep Neural Networks to classify binary executable files
- The application scans an executable just before its execution, giving the probability of the executable to fall into some particular malware class.
- If the probabilities of being malware is below a set threshold for all the classes then it is said to be benign.
- Else the executable is classified as the malware class with the highest probability.
- The Application uses a 1-D CNN model for Classification.

- In linux, for getting the executable file about to run we modified the libc environment initialisation function to send the file for scanning before execution.
- In Windows, we have developed a GUI application which can take the path of an executable file and give us the prediction whether the file belongs to a malware class or is benign in nature
- We have also implemented a white list which maintains the file path, its hash value along with it's predicted probability and malware class.
- This whitelist helps to speed up the subsequent execution of an already scanned executable file.

#### Literature Review

Efficient Malware Classification by Binary Sequences with One-Dimensional Convolutional Neural Networks

- This paper proposed a byte-level 1D CNN model to explore informative features from the one-dimensional structure of binary executables. The experimental results in this paper shows that their 1D CNN model achieves promising results by giving smaller resizing bit/byte-level sequences.
- 1D CNNs achieved better or comparable results with less computational cost compared with 2D CNNs in terms of the amount of multiply-add operations.

# **TOPICS**

**Dataset & Preprocessing** 

1-D CNN and It's Implementation

**Linux Malware Autodetection** 

System Application Implementation

Advantages & Limitations

Demo

#### **Dataset**

- Microsoft Malware
   Classification Challenge
   (BIG 15) dataset
- https://www.kaggle.com/ c/malwareclassification/data
- 10868 samples of malware belonging to 9 classes


Label	Malware Family	Size
0	Ramnit	1541
1	Lollipop	2478
2	Kelihos_ver3	2942
3	Vundo	475
4	Simda	42
5	Tracur	<b>7</b> 51
6	Kelihos_ver1	398
7	Obfuscator. ACY	1228
8	Gatak	1013

## Preprocessing

.bytes files in hex dump form
 (without PE header) are converted to
 binary form

Binary files are broken up into equi-sized
 chunks (16384) to be provided as input to the 1D CNN

- Last chunk is padded with zeros if needed
- Results from chunks are aggregated using sum rule



#### **1D CNN Motivation**

Our motivation behind using 1D CNN is twofold:

- 1. In our survey, we found that 1D CNNs can give comparable results with less computational cost compared with 2D CNNs in essence contributing user friendliness.
- 2. The key difference between 1D CNN and 2D CNN models is that we explore the informative features by following the original one-dimensional structure of binary executables. 2-dimensional conversion could twist the sequential structure of the machine codes since a fixed width will cut the sequential binary codes. More specifically, the binary codes representing a certain behavior might be broken into pieces because the image's width must be determined. Rather than convert the malware executables into images, we aim to apply one-dimensional CNNs to the binary codes for maintaining the sequential structures

#### 1D CNN architecture

- 6 CONV layers + 2 FC layers are used with 612,105 trainable parameters
- MaxPooling is used between convolution layers for reducing data dimension
- Leaky ReLU activation is used in hidden layers and softmax in the last layer
- 90% of the dataset is used for training and 10% as test
- Training is done for 100 epochs with Early Stopping

#### **Linux Malware Autodetection**

- Any function enters main from \_libc\_start\_main built inside glibc in linux found in libc.so.6
- My custom library overrides this builtin function used by loader when loading any executable
- This allows me to intercept any executable before starting and pass to the main tester
- The export of LD\_PRELOAD allows us to make it global and across all users.

## **Advantages & Limitations**

- Application does not interfere with any IDS system like wazuh or snort
- It does not waste CPU cycles on running a benign query again or when system is idle
- It only starts up when an executable is about to run
- Unlike a NIDS it doesn't scan entire packet stream to check for malware, as it directly checks the
  exe file.
- Specially useful in data centers where the typical antivirus technique leads to a lot of wastage as all
  data are scanned as opposed to only the executables that are run.
- Having a ML based classifier helps to avoid the issues faced by the signature based antivirus who
  cant detect auto modifying malwares and new malwares
- It is quite user friendly and easy to install compared to Wazuh

#### Con

- Significant delay on testing for a fresh binary file.
- Accuracy of ML model can be improved using better compression and resizing techniques

# Linux and Windows application demo

<u>Linux Demo link</u> <u>Windows demo link</u>

```
(base) arpank@gpu:/data/pkalwar/malwareproject$
```

### **Conclusion**

- We implemented 2 interactive applications using 1D CNN to detect whether an executable file belongs to some malware class with predicted probability.
- Linux application does this detection even before the start of execution of the executable and thus, doesn't execute the file if found malicious.
- Porting the linux automation to Windows would have immense applications.

# Thank You!