

8. Control Flow Hijack

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### We will take a Quiz in Next Class

Date: 09/26 (TUE.), Class time

- Scope:
  - -Mode of Operations (in Symmetric-key Encryption (2))
  - -Public-Key Infrastructure and Integrity

- O/X quiz
  - + some computation quiz

### **Recap: Our Environment**

- Linux (Debian/Ubuntu) on x86
- GNU Binutils (objdump, readelf, strip, etc.)
- GNU Debugger (GDB)
- No IDA Pro
- Vagrant VM for exercise and homework
  - Install latest version of VirtualBox: <a href="https://www.virtualbox.org/">https://www.virtualbox.org/</a>
  - Install latest version of Vagrant: <a href="https://www.vagrantup.com/downloads.html">https://www.vagrantup.com/downloads.html</a>
  - -mkdir YOUR\_PATH; cd YOUR\_PATH
  - Download box from <u>https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/3ssmv98wky2uvpju5q66s/cse467.box?rlkey=s</u> su5llgq9n548ugp4fgyfmm6x&dl=1

## Recap: Our Environment

- Vagrant VM for exercise and homework
  - -vagrant box add cse467 cse467.box
  - -vagrant init cse467
  - -vagrant up
  - -vagrant ssh

Just use these two after installation is complete

- (Just for your reference) A Vagrant box is created with
  - Virtual box 7.0.10 r158379
  - Vagrant 1.9.8
  - Debian 9.1.0
  - -ID: vagrant
  - -PW: vagrant

## Recap: Our Goal in Software Security

• Find out whether a program is secure or not.

• To do so, we need to see how the *binary code* (= executable code) executes on a machine!

### **Recap: Compilation**



 Converting a <u>high-level language</u> into a <u>machine language</u> that the computer can understand


```
int test (int a){
    return 32;
}
```

High-level language




Machine language

### **Recap: Compilation Process**




### **Recap: Compilation Process**



### Recap: Disassembling Binary Code

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Assembly code



Binary code

Disassembly!

#### **Disassembler:**

- Objdump
- IDA
- B2R2

- ...

### Recap: GNU objdump





# Source



Intermediate code



Assembly code



Binary code

#### 00000000 <test>:

0: 55 push ebp

1: 89 e5 mov ebp,esp

3: 8b 45 08 mov eax, DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8]

6: b8 20 00 00 00 mov eax,0x20

b: 5d pop ebp

c: c3 ret



\$ objdump -M intel -d test.o

#### test.o

### **Software Bug**

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Software bug is an error in a program


**Q**: If you only have time for fixing one bug out of hundred, which bug will you fix first?



### **Exploitable Bugs**



We often call an *exploitable bug* as a vulnerability




### **Exploitable Bugs**



We often call an *exploitable bug* as a vulnerability

**Exploitation** is an act of taking advantage of a bug to cause unintended behavior of the target program




Some vulnerabilities allow an attacker to run any *arbitrary code* on victim's machines without their consent


# **Control Flow Hijack**

#### 1

## **Control Flow Hijack**



### **Control Flow Hijack**









• The first computer worm (called Morris Worm) was born



#### **Robert Tappan Morris**

- Creator of the worm
- Cornell graduate
- Professor at MIT now

### **Morris Worm**



Exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
  char line[512];
  /* omitted ... */
  gets(line); /* Buffer Overflow! */
  /* omitted ... */
```

This simple line allowed the Morris Worm to infect 10% of the internet computers in 1988

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### Replicating Historic Exploitation

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
  char line[512];
  gets(line);
  return 0;
}
```

Compile this program with:

\$ gcc -mpreferred-stack-boundary=2
-00 -fno-stack-protector -fno-pic
-no-pie -z execstack -o morris
morris.c

#### Compiler Warning (ignore this for now):

morris.c:(.text+0x11): warning: the `gets' function is dangerous and should not be used.

### gets(char \*s)



\*

Reads a line from STDIN into the buffer pointed to by s until a terminating new line or EOF, which it replaces with a NULL byte ('\0')

### Disassembled Code for the Morris Worm <sup>41</sup>

\$ objdump -M intel -d morris

```
08049162 <main>:
                                        ebp
 8049162:
           55
                                 push
 8049163:
          89 e5
                                        ebp, esp
                                 mov
 8049165: 81 ec 00 02 00 00
                                 sub
                                        esp,0x200
          8d 85 00 fe ff ff
                                 lea
                                        eax, [ebp-0x200]
 804916b:
 8049171:
                                 push
          50
                                        eax
         e8 b9 fe ff ff
                                 call
                                        8049030 <gets@plt>
 8049172:
                                 add
                                        esp,0x4
 8049177:
          83 c4 04
          b8 00 00 00 00
                                        eax,0x0
 804917a:
                                 mov
 804917f:
          c9
                                 leave
 8049180:
           c3
                                 ret
```



return address

0xbffff70c

eip: 0x8049162

ebp: 0x0

esp: 0xbffff70c

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax,[ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret



return address

old ebp (= 0)

eip: 0x8049163

ebp: 0x0

esp: 0xbffff708

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax,[ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

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return address

old ebp (= 0)

eip: 0x8049165

ebp: 0xbffff708

esp: 0xbffff708

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets


8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

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
Virtual memory

08049162 <main>: push ebp 8049162: ebp, esp 8049163: mov esp,0x200 8049165: sub 804916b: eax,[ebp-0x200] lea 8049171: push eax 8049172: call 8049030 ; gets esp,0x4 8049177: add eax,0x0804917a: mov 804917f: leave

ret

8049180:







return address

old ebp (= 0)

line

Virtual memory

eip: 0x8049171

ebp: 0xbffff708

esp: 0xbffff508

eax: 0xbffff508

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

**Execution context** 



return address old ebp (= 0)line eip: 0x8049172 0xbffff508 ebp: 0xbffff708 0xbffff504 eax: 0xbffff508

Virtual memory

08049162 <main>: push ebp 8049162: ebp, esp 8049163: mov esp,0x200 8049165: sub 804916b: eax, [ebp-0x200] lea 8049171: push eax 8049172: call 8049030 ; gets esp,0x4 8049177: add eax,0x0804917a: mov 804917f:

leave

ret

8049180:



```
08049162 <main>:
                                                  push
                                         8049162:
                                                          ebp
return address
                                         8049163:
                                                          ebp, esp
                                                   mov
                                                          esp,0x200
                                         8049165:
                                                   sub
old ebp (= 0)
                                         804916b: lea
                                                          eax, [ebp-0x200]
                                         8049171: push
                                                          eax
                                         8049172: call
                                                          8049030 ; gets
    line
                                                          esp,0x4
                                         8049177:
                                                   add
                              int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
                  eip: 0x80
0xbffff508
                                char line[512];
                  ebp: 0xbf
                                gets(line);
                  esp: 0xb
                                                    Address of the
                                return 0;
                  eax: 0xbf
                                                     variable line
                   Execution
 Virtual memory
```

return address

old ebp (= 0)

line

0xbffff508

08049162 <main>:

162: push ebp

.63: mov ebp,esp

520 consecutive 'A's? L65: sub esp,0x200

04916b: lea eax,[ebp-0x200]

49171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

eip: 0x8049177

What if user input is

ebp: 0xbffff708

esp: 0xbffff504

eax: 0xbffff508

**Execution context** 

return address old ebp (= 0)1 the 0xbffff508 Virtual memory

What if user input is 520 consecutive 'A's?

.63: mov ebp,esp .65: sub esp,0x200

<main>:

push

04916b: lea eax,[ebp-0x200]

ebp

49171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

08049162

.62:

eip: 0x8049177
ebp: 0xbffff708

esp: 0xbffff504

eax: 0xbffff508

**Execution context** 



; gets

```
return address
old ebp (= 0)
  41414
e
 Virtual memory
```

8049162: push ebp ebp, esp 8049163: mov esp,0x200 8049165: sub eax,[ebp-0x200] 804916b: lea 8049171: push eax call 8049172: 8049030 esp,0x4 8049177: add 804917a: eax,0x0mov 804917f: leave 8049180: ret

<main>:

08049162

0x804917a

ebp: 0xbffff708

esp: 0xbffff508

eax: 0xbffff508

**Execution context** 



```
return address
old ebp (= 0)
    414<u>1</u>41
                         0x804917f
                    ebp: 0xbffff708
                    esp: 0xbffff508
                          0x0
                    eax:
                     Execution context
 Virtual memory
```

```
08049162
         <main>:
8049162:
          push
                 ebp
                 ebp, esp
8049163:
          mov
          sub
                 esp,0x200
8049165:
                 eax,[ebp-0x200]
804916b:
          lea
8049171:
          push
                 eax
8049172:
          call
                 8049030 ; gets
                 esp,0x4
8049177:
          add
                 eax,0x0
804917a:
          mov
804917f:
          leave
```

8049180: ret

mov esp, ebp

return address

old ebp (= 0)

• 0xbffff70c

eip: 0x8049180

ebp: 0x41414141

esp: 0xbfffff70c

eax: 0x0

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

return address

old ebp (= 0)

0xbfffff70c

eip: 0x8049180

ebp: 0x41414141

esp: 0xbffff70c

eax: 0x0

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

pop eip

return address
old ebp (= 0)

■ 0xbffff70c

eip: 0x41414141

ebp: 0x41414141

esp: 0xbffff70c

eax: 0x0

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

804916b: lea eax, [ebp-0x200]

8049171: push eax

8049172: call 8049030; gets

8049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0


804917f: leave

8049180: ret

pop eip

### **Analyzing the Vulnerability**





■ 0xbffff70c

Control flow hijacked!

eip: 0x41414141

ebp: 0x41414141

esp: 0xbffff70c

eax: 0x0

**Execution context** 

08049162 <main>:

8049162: push ebp

8049163: mov ebp,esp

8049165: sub esp,0x200

4916b: lea eax,[ebp-0x200]

49171: push eax

49172: call 8049030 ; gets

€049177: add esp,0x4

804917a: mov eax,0x0

804917f: leave

8049180: ret

pop eip

#### So Far ...




 We hijacked the control flow of the program, i.e., we can jump to any where!

But, where do we jump to?

We want to inject some arbitrary code to run!

### Return-to-Stack Exploit




0xbffff70c

0xbffff508

Put some arbitrary code here

### Return-to-Stack Exploit




0xbfffff0c

0xbffff508

Put some arbitrary code here

#### Return-to-Stack Exploit



#### Executing Shellcode





- Shellcode can run any arbitrary logic
  - Download /etc/passwd
  - Install malicious software (malware)

**—** . . .

- Typically, executing /bin/sh is enough
  - This is the most powerful attack: we can run arbitrary commands
  - You can also achieve this with relatively *small piece of code*
  - This is the reason why we call it as shellcode (code that typically runs shell)

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### **Shellcoding**



How to write code that executes /bin/sh?

### execve() Function in C Library



\$ man execve

```
EXECVE(2)
                   Linux Programmer's Manual
                                                     EXECVE(2)
NAME
     execve - execute program
SYNOPSIS
                                  Executable path
     #include <unistd.h>
     int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[],
                    char *const envp[]);
```

Environment variables

Command line arguments

#### Shellcode in C

```
/*
    int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[],
        char *const envp[]);
*/
#include <stdio.h>
void main(void) {
  char* argv[] = { "/bin/sh", NULL };
  execve("/bin/sh", argv, NULL);
```

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### Compile with (-static) Option

```
08049162 <main>:
 8049162: 55
                               push
                                       ebp
8049163: 89 e5
                                      ebp, esp
                               mov
8049165: 83 ec 08
                                      esp,0x8
                               sub
8049168: c7 45 f8 08 a0 04 08
                                      DWORD PTR [ebp-0x8],0x804a008
                               mov
804916f: c7 45 fc 00 00 00 00 mov
                                      DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],0x0
8049176: 6a 00
                               push
                                      0x0
                                      eax,[ebp-0x8]
8049178: 8d 45 f8
                               lea
804917b: 50
                               push
                                      eax
804917c:
         68 08 a0 04 08
                               push
                                      0x804a008
          e8 ba fe ff ff
                               call
8049181:
                                       8049040 <execve@plt>
```

Is it possible to use this assembly for our exploitation?

## Challenge #1: Null Bytes

```
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```

```
08049162 <main>:
8049162: 55
                               push
                                      ebp
                                      ebp, esp
8049163: 89 e5
                               mov
8049165: 83 ec 08
                                      esp,0x8
                               sub
8049168: c7 45 f8 08 a0 04 08 mov
                                      DWORD PTR [ebp-0x8],0x804a008
804916f: c7 45 fc 00 00 00 00 mov
                                      DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],0x0
 8049176: 6a 00
                               push
                                      0x0
                                      eax, [ebp-0x8]
8049178: 8d 45 f8
                               lea
804917b: 50
                               push
                                      eax
804917c: 68 08 a0 04 08
                               push
                                      0x804a008
8049101. 20 pg to tt tt
```

#### Solution:

Write your own assembly code (shellcode) that does not contain any zero (NULL) byte

### **Challenge #2: String Pointer**

```
08049162 <main>:
 8049162: 55
                                push
                                       ebp
                                       ebp, esp
 8049163: 89 e5
                                mov
                                       esp,0x8
 8049165: 83 ec 08
                                sub
 8049168: c7 45 f8 08 a0 04 08 mov
                                       DWORD PTR [ebp-0x8],0x804a008
 804916f: c7 45 fc 00 00 00 00 mov
                                       DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],0x0
 8049176: 6a 00
                                push
                                       0x0
 8049178: 8d 45 f8
                                lea
                                       eax, [ebp-0x8]
                                                       Pointer to "/bin/sh"
 804917b: 50
                                push
                                       eax
804917c: 68 08 a0 04 08
                                push
                                       0x804a008
                                       8049040 <execve@plt>
 8049181: e8 ba fe ff ff
                                call
```

#### **Solution:**

Push "/bin/sh" string to stack and get the pointer from esp

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#### Challenge #3: External Call (execve)

```
08049162 <main>:
 8049162: 55
                                push
                                        ebp
                                        ebp, esp
 8049163: 89 e5
                                mov
 8049165: 83 ec 08
                                        esp,0x8
                                sub
 8049168: c7 45 f8 08 a0 04 08 mov
                                        DWORD PTR [ebp-0x8],0x804a008
 804916f: c7 45 fc 00 00 00 00 mov
                                        DWORD P
                                       0x0
                                                Just a wrapper function
 8049176: 6a 00
                                push
 8049178: 8d 45 f8
                                                 in the C library (libc)
                                lea
                                        eax,[eb
 804917b: 50
                                push
                                        eax
 804917c: 68 08 a0 04 08
                                push
                                        0x804a008
                                call
 8049181: e8 c7 29 02 00
                                        806c4b0 <
                                                   execve>
```

**Solution:** 

We can just inline this function

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### Challenge #3: External Call (execve)

```
0806c4b0 < execve>:
                                push
                                       ebx
 806c4b0:
            53
         8b 54 24 10
 806c4b1:
                                       edx, DWORD PTR [esp+0x10]
                                mov
                                       ecx, DWORD PTR [esp+0xc]
 806c4b5: 8b 4c 24 0c
                                mov
                                       ebx, DWORD PTR [esp+0x8]
 806c4b9: 8b 5c 24 08
                                mov
         b8 0b 00 00 00
 806c4bd:
                                       eax,0xb
                                mov
                                       08x0
 806c4c2:
            cd 80
                                int
```

System Call!

**Solution:** 

We can just inline this function

#### System Calls

#### allow a program to interface with OS

08x0

0806c4b0 < execve>: ebx 806c4b0: 53 push 8b 54 24 10 806c4b1: edx, DWORD PTR [esp+0x10] mov 806c4b5: 8b 4c 24 0c ecx, DWORD PTR [esp+0xc] mov 8b 5c 24 08 ebx, DWORD PTR [esp+0x8] 806c4b9: mov 806c4bd: b8 0b 00 00 00 eax,0xb mov 806c4c2: cd 80

int

Register	Meaning
eax	System call number
ebx	1 <sup>st</sup> argument
есх	2 <sup>nd</sup> argument
edx	3 <sup>rd</sup> argument

Register	Meaning
esi	4 <sup>th</sup> argument
edi	5 <sup>th</sup> argument
ebp	6 <sup>th</sup> argument
eax	Return value

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### List of System Calls for x86

See: /usr/include/i386-linux-gnu/asm/unistd\_32.h

```
#define
          NR restart syscall 0
#define
          NR exit 1
          NR fork 2
#define
#define
          NR read 3
#define
          NR write 4
          NR open 5
#define
#define
          NR close 6
#define
          NR waitpid 7
#define
          NR creat 8
#define
          NR link 9
                                  0xb
#define
          NR unlink 10
#define
          NR execve 11
#define
          NR chdir 12
```

### Writing a Shellcode





• Shellcode should run regardless of the address it is loaded. In other words, it should be *position independent*.



### Writing a Shellcode

.intel\_syntax noprefix

; This is a comment

Assemble this code to see the binary

### **Final Exploitation**



0xbffff508 0x00000000 0xbffff508

0xbffff70c

- Fill the buffer with our shellcode (Let's assume) that it is 31 bytes)
- The rest of the buffer (481 bytes = 512-31) can be filled with any characters
- The old ebp can be filled with any characters (4 bytes)
- The return address should point to the shellcode (0xbffff508)<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The buffer address should differ from machine to machine. Thus, it is necessary to obtain the right address from a debugger (e.g., GDB)

#### **Caveat**



We assume that we know the exact address of the buffer

This is very difficult even without modern defenses such as ASLR

#### **Using GDB**





- GDB reference: <a href="http://www.yolinux.com/TUTORIALS/GDB-Commands.html">http://www.yolinux.com/TUTORIALS/GDB-Commands.html</a>
- It is recommended to always turn on the Intel syntax by using this command:
  - \$ echo "set disassembly-flavor intel" > ~/.gdbinit

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### Exploit w/ or w/o GDB

The buffer address identified through GDB is not the same as it without GDB

Thus, our exploit doesn't work outside GDB!

#### Why Different?



The key problem is Environment Variables

- GDB puts extra environment variables
- Each machine has different environment variables

Not the start address of the line



- NOP sled (a.k.a., NOP slide) is used to make the exploit robust against different buffer addresses
  - -One-byte NO-OP (NOP) instruction is equivalent to xchg eax, eax
  - -0x90 represents the NOP instruction



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# Off-by-One Error

#### **Subtle Error**



```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#define BUFSIZE (512)
void printer(char* str) {
  char buf[BUFSIZE];
  strcpy(buf, str);
  printf("%s\n", buf);
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
  if ( argc < 2 | | strlen(argv[1]) > BUFSIZE ) return -1;
  printer(argv[1]);
  return 0;
```

#### **Subtle Error**



```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#define BUFSIZE (512)

void printer(char* str)
  char buf[BUFSIZE]:
  strcpy(buf, str);
  printf("%s\n", buf);
}
```

We can just overwrite 1 byte NULL beyond the size of the buffer (buf)

But, some off-by-one bugs are exploitable!

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
  if ( argc < 2 || strlen(argv[1]) > BUFSIZE ) return -1;
  printer(argv[1]);
  return 0;
}
```

#### **Subtle Error**





```
#include <stdio.h>
                                 Exercise: Can you
#include <string.h>
#define BUFSIZE (512)
                                 draw the stack
void printer(char* str) {
                                 diagram?
 char buf[BUFSIZE];
 strcpy(buf, str);
 printf("%s\n", buf);
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
 if ( argc < 2 | | strlen(argv[1]) > BUFSIZE ) return -1;
 printer(argv[1]);
 return 0;
```

### Off-by-one Bugs Can be Exploitable

return address

old ebp (= 0)

str

return address

old ebp

buf

#### **GDB** Usage

\*

- Start: \$ gdb <your binary>
- Disassemble:

```
(gdb) disass <func name>
```

Breakpoint setting:

```
(gdb) b *<address>
```

• Run:

```
(gdb) r
```

• Step:

```
(gdb) step # Go to next instruction, diving into function
```

(gdb) next # Go to next instruction but don't dive into function

(gdb) continue # Continue normal execution

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#### **GDB** Usage

Register information:

```
(gdb) $<register_name>
(gdb) info register
```

Memory information:

```
(gdb) x/16w <address> (gdb) x/4w $
```

•••

```
x/nfu <address>
    Print memory.
    n: How many units to print (default 1).
    f: Format character (like "print").
    u: Unit.

Unit is one of:
    b: Byte,
    h: Half-word (two bytes)
    w: Word (four bytes)
```

g: Giant word (eight bytes)).





#### **GDB** Cheatsheet

-https://darkdust.net/files/GDB%20Cheat%20Sheet.pdf

Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit, Phrack 1996, by Alphe One

-http://phrack.org/issues/49/14.html

#### Summary



- Only some bugs are exploitable
- Some exploits allow an attacker to hijack the control flow of the program and to run any arbitrary code
- Return-to-stack exploit puts a shellcode in to a stack buffer and jumps to it by overwriting the return address
- We can make return-to-stack exploit robust by using NOP sleds
- Off-by-one errors can sometimes be exploitable

# Question?