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**SECRET****SECRET**Assistant Secretary of the Navy  
(Installations and Logistics)

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Op-60 RM-0037-63

21 FEB 1963

Chief of Naval Operations

De Gow

[ Study on Strategic Requirements for Guam (U) ]

Ref: (a) Assistant SECNAV (I&amp;L) Memo of 6 FEB 63

1. The attached study on Guam is forwarded in accordance with reference (a).2. Naval installations on Guam provide irreplaceable logistic and advance base support for the fast tempo of today's peacetime naval operations. In case of contingency operations in Asia, possibly escalating to general war, the strategic importance of Guam for fleet support and for all the military Services will be substantially increased.3. The recent study conducted to determine feasibility of consolidation of NAS Agana with Air Force facilities at Andersen pointed up the illusory savings to be gained from consolidation.4. I fully concur with the decision of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (P&I) that facilities are to be restored to respective Service use, and in the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 2326/17 to the effect that U.S. posture in the Western Pacific for the foreseeable future indicates a greater rather than lesser requirement for military facilities on Guam. In-place facilities, when restored, its stature as a U.S. territory, and the strategic location of the island confirm a long-term requirement for Guam in projection of United States power in the Pacific Ocean area.CLAUDE RICKETTS  
VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONSRETURN TO OP-003S  
ROOM 4E629ORIG: CDR BLAIR DLEVELAND USN Op-601F2 X-55825 on 2-19-63  
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Subj: Guam

1. The island Territory of Guam is a U.S. possession, ceded to the United States in 1898 with its Capitol at Agana. Guam provides major Trust Territory support for the Marianas and Caroline Island groups. Until June 1962 Guam served as Headquarters for the Trust Territories of the Pacific (now at Saipan) comprised of the Marianas, Carolines and Marshalls, comparable in area to the United States and under U.N. Trusteeship. The Trust Territories have been assigned to the U.S. to administer. (Tab A).

2. U.S. National Defense Policy is based in part upon containment of bloc forces and a forward base strategy designed to counter their advantageous internal geographic position. As the westernmost U.S. territory in the Pacific, Guam provides the in place facilities for contingency/general war conditions in Asia and a strategically important redeployment base for WESTPAC forces (Tab B).

3. Naval strategy in support of National Policy stresses maintaining fleet forces in forward areas, replenished to optimum degree possible by mobile logistic support forces. Overseas bases provide a necessary and economical supplement to mobile support and enhance effective fleet replenishment. The naval base complex and air station on Guam provide strategically located fleet, ASW and AEW support plus communications command and control and nuclear storage facilities (Tab C).

4. Naval activities on Guam as follows: Commander, Naval Forces Marianas; Naval Station; Naval Air Station, Agana; Naval Ship Repair Facility; Naval Communications Station; Naval Hospital; Fleet Weather Central/Joint Typhoon Warning Center; Naval Supply Depot; Naval Magazine; Naval Public Works Center; Marine Barracks. (Tab D)

5. Regarding future requirements, the JCS have noted\* that "the role of Guam in the strategy of the Pacific dictates that it possess the capability for vastly expanded operations as a backup for our base structure in the Far Western Pacific. It must be capable of absorbing a redeployment from any or all of these Far West Bases." Expansion of facilities on Guam would be required in any rapid force build-up in WestPac. Emergency deployments in recent years have saturated facilities existing prior to Typhoon KAREN. Near future augmentation on Guam includes POLARIS FBM Squadron; B-52 Reflex aircraft, and a NIKE-HERCULES Battalion.

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6. Facilities noted in para 4. when rehabilitated will meet the basic minimum requirement for fleet activities currently supported on Guam. Agana is westernmost airfield under CINCPAC command on U.S. soil. Reduction of Guam naval facilities would degrade PACOM ability to react rapidly in support of strategic military concept in an emergency. Optimum utilization in support future requirements for contingency/General War must be equated to currently authorized funding for over-all fleet requirements, new weapons systems and continuing increase in upkeep and ship modernization. Significance of utilization factor is not related to current usage or future peacetime usage but to ability to support contingency or wartime operations on short or little notice. Current and programed facilities would be severely taxed in contingency or wartime situation.

7. The recent study on feasibility of consolidating Air Force and Navy facilities on Guam concluded that duplication did not exist prior to TYPHOON KAREN destruction and that in view economy and strategic requirements both Andersen and Agana should be rebuilt to meet the individual requirements of the Air Force and Navy respectively. Navy build back cost at NAS Agana estimated at \$2.7M. AF build back at Andersen estimated at \$8.6M. Consolidated build-back costs for both Services at Andersen estimated at \$33.4M. (Tab E)

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TAB B

RATIONALE FOR U.S. BASE SYSTEM  
RELATED TO NATIONAL DEFENSE

1. The defense posture and strategies of the United States are tailored to cope with the entire spectrum of the threat posed by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The present system of US military bases, both overseas and domestic, is an integral part of the US concept of a forward strategy designed to project US military strength to fulfill requirements established by Basic National Security Policy.

2. The present system of US military bases is essential to an effective fulfillment of basic national objectives. It provides a basis of support and dispersal necessary for the retaliatory forces of the Air Force and the Navy and for other forces in forward areas. It permits the forward deployment of ground, sea and air forces in or close to potential spots in areas throughout the world where the security interests of the United States require military strength to deter or deal swiftly with any military action against areas of the Free World. Our forces on or exercised through bases in our current system enhance the credibility both in the eyes of the Free World and the Communist Bloc that the United States has the will and capability to resist Communist aggression.

3. A lack of adequate base facilities to assure the necessary degree of survival and for contingency operations could reduce reaction capability to such a degree that U.S. military intervention would be too late to safeguard our security interests. Therefore, it is vitally important that the United States maintain one of the prime strategic advantages it enjoys over the USSR; that is, the surrounding of the Communist Bloc with combat forces (land, sea and air) that can be strategically positioned or shifted wherever needed. The US military base system is a primary means of exploiting this strategy and of promoting the continued collective defense effort among Free World nations.

4. The JCS have stated in JCSM 417-62 that the role of Guam in the strategy of the Pacific dictates a capability for vastly expanded operations as a back up for our bases structure in the Far Western Pacific, and that Guam must be capable of absorbing a redeployment from any or all of these Far West bases. They further concluded that any rapid force buildup to support limited or general war in Asia will require similar capabilities.

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