

OAB, NAC, CNO 00 files, 1964, Box 20, 11000/1A
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OP-06A1/lap
Ser: 0015P06
28 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR OP-60

Guam and

Subj: Point Paper for SECNAV on Pacific Islands Acquisition

1. SECNAV has requested, for use in a conference at 0800 Friday, 30 October with SECDEF, that OP-06 prepare a 1 to 2 page rationale supporting the Navy's need for early incorporation of certain islands in the Pacific Trust Territory into the State of Hawaii or otherwise insuring that they will be permanently under U. S. control. The motive for such action presumably should include inter alia an anticipated increase in CHICOM power and influence in the Pacific area.

★

2. Request OP-60 take for action and prepare the paper to reach Vice Admiral Jackson by 1330 Thursday, 29 October. The paper is due in SECNAV's office Thursday afternoon. (Time not specified.)

3. By copy of this memorandum, OP-61 is requested to assist as necessary in the preparation of the paper.

Very respectfully,

J. J. LEBOURGEOIS

Copy to:
OP-002
OP-09A ←
OP-61

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DATE 10/25/02 BY 60301

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION
UNITED NATIONS
MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. (10017)

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26 October 1964

Dear Dave:

I am becoming increasingly concerned regarding the injection of U.S. Territories, such as the Pacific Trust Territories, Puerto Rico, etc., into the deliberations and discussions of the Anti-Colonialism [Committee of 24.] We realize that the results of the Committee of 24 are only recommendations and are not mandatory. However, they do have great propaganda value and hence tend to influence the neutral and less sophisticated nations. This is a "stitch-in-time" type letter.

As you know, the purpose of the Committee of 24 is to accelerate the granting of independence to all colonial countries and territories. See enclosure (1) for membership of Committee. The U.S. objective as a member of the Committee is to prevent or minimize any embarrassing or harmful Committee action when considering U.S. territories. Always on the defensive by its very nature.

Since the Committee convened on 25 February 1964, it has discussed the following areas: Mauritius, Seychelles, St. Helena, Cook Islands, Niue Tokelau, Guam, American Samoa, Gilbert/Ellice Islands, Pitcairn, Solomon Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat Islands, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Vincent, Barbados, Aden, Zambia, Gambia, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Fiji, TTPI, Fernando Poo, Rio Muni, Ifni, Spanish Sahara, Gibraltar, Papua, New Guinea, Nauru, Cocos Islands, New Hebrides, Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks, Caicos, Cayman Islands, Portuguese Guinea, South West Africa, Falkland Islands, Southern Rhodesia, British Guiana and there are more to come. None of these areas are large, few of them are viable entities, politically or economically -- [they are little specks of nothing more than of strategic value,] which is and always has been of paramount importance to Defense rather than to State. The general conclusions of the Committee regarding the above territories can be summarized as follows:

1. More progress is needed towards self-government and independence and

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2. Members of the Committee should visit the territories to obtain first-hand information. Many thousands of dollars are spent for these junkets.

Also, despite the U.S. objection, the Committee of 24 has recently been discussing the Strategic Pacific Trust Territories. U.S. strategy in discussions in the Committee has been to minimize discussions and prevent embarrassing Committee recommendations from resulting by pointing out that (1) under the terms of the Charter, all functions of the UN relating to the Pacific "strategic area" are to be exercised by the Security Council, and (2) that the U.S. is carrying out its obligations with the people of the Trust Territories under the Charter and Trusteeship agreements. Also, there is agitation within the Committee to send a "Committee of 24" visiting mission to determine first-hand conditions in the Pacific Territory. Perhaps the article in Saturday Evening Post brings this on. The U.S. position has constantly opposed any committee visiting mission. ~~I heartily concur with this and strongly support the JCS position (JCS 2326/11) which states: "The TTP lies across the lifeline which supports our strategy in the Western Pacific. Under the terms of our United Nations agreement, we cannot open the TTP to any United Nations member without opening it to all members, including the Communist Bloc nations. Such an opening would afford the opportunity to undermine the U.S. position in the Pacific."~~ Can you imagine a Cuba or a Zanzibar in our Pacific Territory. JCS

With the tide running towards independence for all non-self-governing territories throughout the world, I think it is time we consider incorporating the Pacific Trust Territories into the U.S. political structure. This would completely divorce the territory from UN scrutiny. *

The recent Cairo Non-Aligned Conference resolution on Puerto Rico specifically called attention of the United Nations Committee of 24 to the case of Puerto Rico. By so doing the NAC presumed to supersede the authority of the UN General Assembly. As a result, the Chairman of the Committee of 24 (Mr. Coulibaly of Mali - a Communist) has indicated that he would push to place Puerto Rico on the Committee's agenda. This action, Coulibaly indicated, would be deliberate, and in spite of strong U.S. objection (including U.S. referral to the General Assembly Resolution 748 (1953) which recognizes that the Puerto Rican people have already exercised their right to self-determination). Additionally, the U.S. has told

*Op-612B Memo for Record, Subj: Incorporation of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands into permanent part of U.S. of 15 June 1964

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Mr. Coulibaly that if he persists, the U.S. might logically expect the Committee's list to include such Soviet territories as the Baltic States, Caucasian Republic and Central Asian Republic, which would open a Pandora's box. In reply, Mr. Coulibaly brushed this off with the remark that he did not think any Pandora's Box would be opened. According to CIA information, Coulibaly is a member of the Leftist, Pro-Communist Faction in Mali. Until now he has been seemingly at least neutral. This year we have the same chairman, however he is under increasing pressure from the Puerto Rican pro-independence movement, the Non-Aligned Cairo Conference, and the Communists. Consequently he is a bit truculent towards the west. Because of this, the time is right for a little ~~more~~ tougher stand insofar as the strategic islands are concerned.

From the above, it can be seen that U.S. Territories are in for a rough time in the Committee, and possible adverse military base results could be in the offering. It seems to me that the U.S. should consider going on the offensive instead of always remaining on the defensive in regard to our territories and trusteeship areas. They do not always take top billing at USUN, because of other more acute and critical pressures and problems. In other words, even though we may not have a majority of nations with us, we should keep hammering away on the question of Soviet colonialism to the various Soviet territories which they acquired since WWII. For example, the Soviets by incorporating Estonia, Latvia and other Bloc countries renders discussion of these truly enslaved peoples beyond the pale of discussion here -- they simply state they are part of their sovereign country. We should not stand by while U.S. territories are being discussed without the Soviet territories being discussed also. In comparison with the Soviets, we would look very good, since our territories were never plundered or exploited in the standard colonial manner.

Accordingly, I recommend that: (1) DOD start, based on the military strategic importance of the Pacific Trust Territories, an effort to incorporate the territories into the U.S. political structure, and (2) Defense push State hard on the issue of keeping vital U.S. Territories and areas from being discussed in UN forums. If they are, we should insure that corresponding discussions take place on Soviet territories.

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We understand that State's interest has been wetted and they are interested - now is the time to strike!

With best wishes and warm regards.

Sincerely,

Quitch

H. T. DEUTERMANN
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

P.S. Attached is last Monday's UN Daily Journal. Note that Colonial Committee is number one item as it has been for the last several months.

P.P.S. If you consider this proposal of any merit, I suggest that Oley Sharp be cut in.

Admiral David L. McDonald, USN
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

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COMMITTEE OF 24 (COLONIALISM)

Australia

Bulgaria

Cambodia

Chile

Denmark

Ethiopia

India

Iran

Iraq

Italy

Ivory Coast

Madagascar

Mali

Poland

Sierra Leone

Syria

Tanganyika

Tunisia

UK

USA

Uruguay

Venezuela

Yugoslavia

USSR

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EXHIBITURE 61

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OP-005
OP-006
OP-00C

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Op-601F/hy
Ser: 00868P60

29 OCT 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Pacific Islands; point paper concerning

Encl: (1) Point Paper dtd 28 October 1964

1. The point paper you requested regarding Guam and the Trust Territory Islands is attached as enclosure (1).

A. McB. JACKSON
Vice Admiral, USN

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy)

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"Strategic
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Op-601E/hy
Ser: 00868P60

29 OCT 1964

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Vice Admiral, USN
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy)

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SI-60172/hy
27 October 1964

POINT PAPER

Subj: US Control of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

BACKGROUND

By Act of Congress, 1 August 1963, Guam is an unincorporated territory of the US. It has a population of 36,193 shares US citizenship. It is currently administered through the Secretary of the Interior by a Presidentially appointed Guamanian, Governor Manuel F. L. Guerrero, serving a four year term, until 3 March 1963.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is a US designated strategic area administered by the US. It is responsible to the US Security Council. This arrangement provides Security Council members with a veto power over the question of plebiscites in the islands.

POINTS

1. The military utilization of Guam is examined comparatively unrestricted although the defensive perimeter around the island has been well-established.

2. The increasing tenderness of our bases on foreign main land soil in the Western Pacific and the anticipated pressure of China as a nuclear power point up the importance of Guam as a US power base in support of our [defensive strategy] in this sector in the world.

3. Should political pressures force phase down or inactivation of naval support facilities in Japan or the Ryukyus, it can be assured that installations on Guam would have to assume the major portion of support for our deployed forces.

4. It is essential therefore that our political ties with Guam be continually strengthened so that any future subversion attempts may be forestalled and to groom this island for eventual statehood.

5. The incorporation of this territory is the next logical step toward a closer relationship with the United States. Such an action would follow the previous route of Alaska and Hawaii, and would require a new Act of Congress.

6. In the case of the Trust Territory Islands, F.M.A. 2-1 and F.M.A. 2-2 set forth as US policy the movement of these islands by informed and free choice, into a permanent relationship with the US.

7. "The Report by the U. S. Governor and Survey Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands" (January 1964).

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recommended that a plebiscite be held in 1967 or 1980.

3. Any plebiscite would be subject to UN Security Council approval. Under present circumstances the Soviets could be expected to veto if results were anticipated to be favorable to the US.

4. The importance of these islands which relates to their location and potential to support deployed naval forces as well as scientific and oceanographic research makes it mandatory that the US take steps to strengthen the allegiance of the indigenous people and prepare them for a plebiscite.

5. Each action should take the form of expansion of training and educational facilities and improvements in existing transportation and communications.

6. It is not considered feasible to attempt to arrange a political affiliation between Guam or certain of the Trust Territory Islands and the State of Hawaii. Cultural differences, physical remoteness and reluctance on the part of the State of Hawaii to assume the fiscal and administrative burden of a dependent economy militate against this action. Certain of the Trust Territory Islands could however, be incorporated politically with Guam following a plebiscite.

RECOMMENDATIONS

a.) Incorporate the Territory of Guam preparatory to her eventual admission as a state.

b.) Strengthen the economic, social and political ties between the US and the Pacific Trusteehip so as to facilitate a plebiscite which would result in the establishment of these islands as unincorporated US territory.

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