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Op-93/lrb  
Memo No. 20-63  
10 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST

Subj: Presentation of the CAB approved draft of LRO-63  
to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Ref: (a) Op-93 Memo ser 004-63 of 4 January 1963

1. As directed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, addressees are invited to attend the presentation of the CAB approved draft of LRO-63, to the Chief of Naval Operations. The presentation will be held at 0900, Tuesday, 15 January 1963 in the Program Evaluation Center, room 4E577, the Pentagon.

2. Corrected pages to reference (a), reflecting CAB decisions of 8 January 1963, will be forwarded by separate memorandum.

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1-4-63 Draft

CONTENTS

Chapter

- I Introduction
- IA Strategic Development for Employment of Naval Forces
- II Naval Retaliatory Forces
- III Attack Carrier Striking Forces
- IV Amphibious Striking Forces
- V Antisubmarine and Related Forces
- VI Mine Warfare Forces
- VII Other Supporting Requirements
- VIII Naval Logistics
- IX Summary of Ship Objectives

Tables

- 9-A Objectives for Functional Surface Task Groups
- 9-B Active Fleet Submarine Objectives
- 9-C 1973 Force Objectives and FY 1963-70 Shipbuilding and Conversion Objectives, Active Fleet Ships
- 9-D 1973 Force Objectives and FY 1963-70 Shipbuilding and Conversion Objectives, Navy-Supported Active Ships other Than Active Fleet
- 9-E Tentative Reserve Fleet and Selected Reserve Objectives
- X Shipbuilding Programs Toward the Force Objectives
- XI Summary of Aircraft Objectives
- XII R&D Items Requiring Particular Emphasis

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NAVY LONG RANGE OBJECTIVES THROUGH 1974

UNDER LIMITED FUNDING ASSUMPTIONS

(SHORT TITLE: LRO-63)

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

1-1. Background and Purpose

a. OPNAV Instruction 5000.19 series establishes the Statement of Navy Long Range Objectives (LRO) as a Stage ONE Planning document within the Navy Planning System.

b. Until approval of the "Statement of Long Range Requirements for U.S. Naval Forces, 1970-75 (LRR-60)" in April 1960, the LRO had been the only comprehensive long range planning paper approved and issued by the CNO. Now the LRR and its derivative, the LRO, both provide long range guidance for the Navy in terms of the goals to be reached in the latter part of the projected period (1970-75) and in terms of construction, procurement, and R&D programs necessary for achieving these goals. LRR-60 will be revised in 1963.

c. The LRR is a statement of naval force levels required in the long range period in order to fulfill the Navy's projected responsibilities in the anticipated threat

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and political environments of the period. These requirements are established without reference to fiscal considerations although a rule of reasonableness is applied.

d. The LRO, on the other hand, is derived from the LRR and provides basic internal planning guidance, in terms of objectives which must usually be short of the requirements. The LRO (objectives) unlike the LRR (requirements) is keyed to assumed funding limitations and is intended to develop the best balance of forces attainable within the fiscal limits prescribed. The requirements stated in the LRR then provide reference marks for measuring the deficiencies which will arise from this limited funding and for assessing the risks imposed by these deficiencies. One of the principal reasons why the LRO is permitted to be used only for internal planning guidance is that its prescribed fiscal limits are self-assumed (established by the CNO), for the sole purpose of forcing early consideration of an optimum program balance at a funding level in the vicinity of possible appropriations.

1-2. Scope

a. It is essential to understand that the LRO does not, in any sense, state what forces the Navy will require in the future. Neither are the task groupings of ships, used

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as examples herein, which are made to derive total numbers, intended to establish a rigid tactical pattern. The LRO is intended to answer one principal line of questioning: If the funding for the next 8 years is restricted to certain assumed levels, with only a modest rate of increase beyond current funding, what is our best current estimate of the number and balance of types and type characteristics procurable and operable within the resource levels assumed?

b. The answers to the above line of questioning are summarized in:

Chapter IX - Summary of Ship Objectives

Chapter X - Shipbuilding Programs Toward the Force Objectives

Chapter XI - Summary of Aircraft Objectives

Chapter VII - Major Objectives Other than Force Levels (paras. 7-10 thru 7-28)

1-3. Assumptions. As a basis for generating this LRO, it was assumed that:

a. The objectives established should be attainable within annual funding levels which do not exceed significantly those required by PO-64.

b. The objectives must in general be feasible of attainment by approximately the end of calendar year 1974, and so far as new ship construction is required, must be attainable by fiscal year shipbuilding programs through that of FY 1971. While the tables herein assume that FY 1971 ships will be completed by the end of CY 1974, it is recognized that this will not be

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true in all cases. In these cases the shipbuilding objectives will prevail, and the force goals dependent thereon will be attained in 1975.

c. Marine Corps forces, supported within the funding above, will remain at 3 Division/Wing teams throughout the period.

1-4. Preliminary analysis indicates that this LRO can probably be accomplished within the foregoing assumptions, if certain limitations regarding ship characteristics (described in Chapter X) are adhered to, and if the broad criteria for other programs and procurements stated or implied elsewhere are not exceeded. While all included objectives can probably be accomplished within the funding and the time described, it is probable that some of them cannot be accomplished as early within the period as would be desirable, at the funding levels stated. A major factor likely to cause slippage will be the increase in maintenance and operation costs required to:

- a. Raise present readiness to desirable levels.
- b. Maintain this higher level of readiness in the face of the more complex equipments reaching the Fleet hereafter.

1-5. It is possible that manpower ceilings may impose more stringent limits than will funding on the size of future

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naval forces. Studies will explore this problem further, but it is clear enough now that future technical development and ship design must emphasize reduction in manning requirements. The degree to which a high procurement cost penalty will be warranted to reduce manpower, will depend on the future balance between personnel pressures and funding pressures. Moderate fiscal penalties to this end can now be accepted; severe ones may prove to be required later.

#### 1-6. Basic Inputs

a. Chapters II and III of LRR-60 are generally descriptive of the Political, Economic and Military Environment of the 1970 era, and of the Threat and Strategic Considerations, on which these objectives are based. It should be noted, however, that developments in 1961-62 emphasized and increased the importance of provisions for future naval deployments to the Caribbean, Indian Ocean and South Atlantic in addition to the current commitment to the European and Western Pacific areas. Additional emphasis must also be placed on provisions for the support of covert types of contingencies i.e., U.S. assistance to indigenous forces resisting infiltration, subversion and overt aggression fomented and supported by the Bloc. This may occur in South and Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and in several places simultaneously; it may in some cases, lead to overt limited war.

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b. In addition to the above-mentioned change in emphasis, Chapter II herein reorients the future development of naval retaliatory forces. Other significant changes from LRO-62 goals will be found in the amphibious forces and command ship areas. Chapter V contains a unified treatment of the ASW problem, formerly covered under two chapters. Findings of the 1962 CNO ASW Study have been drawn on in developing this and other chapters, resulting in some force increases, but the ASW forces remain, as in previous years, confined by the goal of balance within limited funding.

c. Projected goals for RDT&E are maintained at a high level. This is a sound policy under the conditions of arbitrarily restricted funding assumed herein. It will be essential to persevere with new developments, even though limited funding may inhibit subsequent procurement, so that irreplaceable development time will not be lost. This will make advanced developments available in the future if the threat<sup>w</sup> so requires and the funding policy then permits.

d. Attention is invited to the fact that LRR-60 (and in consequence, LRO-63) does not provide forces adequate to prevent heavy losses of military support and merchant shipping if a concerted, wide-ranging Soviet

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campaign against the Western World's sea lines of communication were carried out.

Even with advanced weapons and technology, no substitute for surface escorts is visualized by 1974. To maintain in the active fleets at all times acceptable numbers of surface escorts for this convoying effort would be a severe strain on national resources. The Navy's responsibility to protect this nation's sea lines of communications essential to prosecution of the war effort is acknowledged. Nevertheless, budget constraints dictate this risk. An objective stated herein, which will only alleviate and not cure the situation, is increased emphasis on maintaining an inactive escort reserve in such condition that it can realistically be reactivated quickly for limited convoy duty.

1-7. Limitations

a. LRO-63 is intended to influence those long-lead-time actions which must be taken within the next few years in order to insure the Navy capabilities which it specifies in the period from about 1970 to 1974.

b. Long range guidance is particularly subject to change by unforeseen developments. Lead times in research and development, and in replacing any significant part of the Fleet, make it essential to take bold, forward action.

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despite this risk. This statement represents the best judgment available at this time. As insurance against unforeseen contingencies, it incorporates a considerable reliance upon flexible and versatile concepts and forces, in some areas on multiple approaches to a solution, and in other instances on ships or systems capable of future growth.

c. The mention herein of specific technical approaches to any given problem is not to be interpreted as excluding study, development and evaluation of other promising approaches. For example, although sonar is the key means programmed in this LRO for submarine detection, a non-acoustic breakthrough resulting in greatly increased detection and classification capabilities might immediately dictate a substantial change in the mix of ASW forces listed herein.

d. In choosing certain directions of effort, other directions have necessarily been excluded in order to remain within the fiscal limits. The items excluded may be desirable, useful and effective, but are considered to provide less Fleet capability in terms of cost-versus-effectiveness than the items selected for inclusion. It should be understood, however, that the choices made herein cannot be expected to control all the program decisions affecting future forces. Responsible officials may for good

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reason make contrary choices in specific cases. Such choices must be made with full knowledge that, under limited funding, they may operate to exclude, sooner or later, certain of the other forces or capabilities included in these objectives.

e. The continuing revision and refinement of long range objectives is an inevitable necessity. However, the principles upon which these objectives rest change only slowly.

f. Periodic revision of these objectives will, of necessity, adjust to overriding decisions and action by higher authority, to changes in long run fiscal prospects, and to changes in threat, technology, and applications thereof.

1-8. Utilization

a. LRO-63 does not fully state long range Navy needs and it should not be used for this purpose. However, this document is not intended to inhibit efforts to establish Navy requirements at higher levels; that is the function of the LRR. It does present balanced objectives for internal program planning guidance based upon the annual funding limits stated.

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b. These objectives cannot be adjusted for lower funding assumptions by simple across-the-board force reductions. Adjustments might require elimination or disproportionate reduction of some types, postponement of modernization or replacement in others, and possibly reductions in some support levels.

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Chapter VII  
OTHER SUPPORTING REQUIREMENTS

7-1. Command Ships (CC)

a. Command Ships (CC) for National Emergency Command Post Afloat (NECPA).

To fulfill the need for secure command facilities for continuation of the highest functions of the nation's government, mobile facilities which are at sea and thus cannot be pre-targeted offer the best solution. At least two command ships with facilities adequate for continuing the vital functions of National Command will be required, in order to assure that one is always operational when needed. The two programmed CVL conversions will be acceptable to meet this need.

b. Command Ships (CC) for Theater Commanders. Theater

Commanders-in-Chief should also be assured of continuing their vital functions in spite of the threats of ICBM and IRBM destruction of headquarters and facilities ashore. When new developments in the Naval Advanced Communication System permit, the resultant equipments together with such Operational Control Center configurations as may be required can be installed in ships of such increased command, control, coordination and communication capabilities as to be excellent mobile afloat alternate command facilities for such commanders. These ships would be ready to assume major operational control center and communications functions for continuity of command of forces surviving a major nuclear

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procurement offer an economical form of augmentation for sites, and for prompt readiness (including manning and transportation) in event of emergency. The possibility of deploying these equipments afloat, as van-type units employing special installed antennas, on ships which can be economically kept in a Ready Reserve status, should be explored against general war or other major communications contingencies.

7-3. Forces for Anti-Surface Patrol, Blockade, and Counter Insurgency Operations.

a. As the Communist bloc powers continue to modernize and expand their merchant and fishing fleets, their capabilities for using the seas for furnishing support to subversive and insurrectionary movements, and to aggressive minor nations under their influence, in areas remote from the Sino-Soviet homelands, will continue to increase. It is vitally important that the United States increase its capability to monitor bloc merchant and naval traffic and fishery operations at points of current interest throughout the world. Only by timely and certain knowledge of destabilizing activities of this sort, can timely preventive action, either military or political, be taken, and the creation of a fait accompli difficult or impossible to reverse be avoided.

b. Preventive action, in turn, may call for the application of a blockade, or at least for the clear demonstration of the ability to sustain a blockade at the appropriate place, wherever located.

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c. Customary intelligence activities ashore will continue to furnish much information on bloc shipping, but they are limited by Communist habits of secrecy and deceit. Active efforts at sea are required to locate ships determined on evasion, once they have passed through the last strait into the open ocean.

d. Air Patrol. The key naval instrument for shipping patrol is the long-range patrol aircraft. Reconnaissance satellites may at some future date assist in the task, principally by narrowing the areas in which more intensive patrol will be profitable. Close inspection, however, will continue to be required to identify the vessel and obtain information as to its probable cargo and mission. Continued close tracking will be necessary to confirm or deter the execution of the mission.

e. A long range air patrol will also continue to be an essential means of monitoring the movements and activities of Bloc naval vessels, including naval auxiliaries, and research or test ships, such as those employed in support of ICBM or satellite test activities. Remote ocean areas may increasingly be employed for covert research or test activity, and intelligency thereon is essential. Expanded ocean patrols will also become mandatory if the USSR obtains submarine or other naval base facilities in one<sup>or more</sup> of the undeveloped countries.

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f. The objectives herein for air patrol squadrons have been based, with the exception of one multi-purpose squadron each in the Northeast Atlantic and North Pacific areas, solely on requirements for ASW, for general support of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets within their present normal areas of operation, and for general purpose patrols out of bases from Hawaii to Guam. No provision has been made for air patrol in the South Atlantic, South Pacific, or Indian Ocean areas. Coverage in these areas can be accomplished only by diversion from primary tasks. Such diversion will be impracticable or highly risky during periods of tension or war.

g. Air Patrol Bases. Patrol coverage in remote areas will be infeasible even during routine cold war situations unless properly located bases are available for unrestricted use. Under cold war conditions, permission to use bases in many of the southern hemisphere nations may not be readily available. Carrier forces can fill gaps temporarily, but only at higher cost, and by diversion from primary missions.

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It is therefore essential that timely steps be taken to assure, by purchase, lease, or use agreements with respect to islands or other suitable sites, that a world-wide network of air patrol base sites,

is made available for the indefinite future. Use of these sites under cold war conditions should not be dependent on the permission of governments whose support the U.S. finds unreliable or embarrassing. Particular attention should be devoted to sites affording coverage of large areas not now assuredly accessible, including the Indian Ocean from Aden to Sunda Strait, West and East Equatorial Africa, the entrances to the South Atlantic, and the Southeast Pacific.

h. Blockade. The enforcement of high seas blockade will devolve primarily on surface ships because of their ability to inspect, halt, board, and if necessary, destroy or disable the ships discovered. The support of patrol aircraft; or of carrier based aircraft, is essential to detect and inspect shipping over a wide area, effect preliminary elimination of unaffected ships, and direct surface warships to a timely interception.

i. The basic instrument of blockade will be the destroyer or destroyer escort type. These objectives do not provide ships of these types specifically for this task. When blockade

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7-24. The Navy will support the objectives of the nation in space outside of specific Navy requirements.

a. Activities in this category will include the major portion of space support that is advantageously conducted at sea, but will also include the use of land-based Navy capabilities when it is to the national advantage to do so.

b. Sea launch, recovery, transportation, command and monitoring of spacecraft will support scientific, technical and military requirements. Special advantages will include safety and security of operations at sea and the availability of the greater part of the earth's surface as needed.

7-25. Nuclear Power

a. Support AEC development of nuclear reactor power plants for use at remote installations such as Antarctica, at advance bases, and for special purposes.

b. Support AEC development of radioisotopic power units for a variety of naval uses such as satellite auxiliary power units, unmanned weather stations, sonar devices, and other special purposes.

7-26. Construction

a. Maintain in efficient operating condition the minimum number of fixed installations required to support the level of long-range force objectives herein.

b. Provide austere advance base facilities to support

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normal deployments and contingency operations in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, and to compensate for such loss of present overseas base facilities or rights in other areas as may occur, especially in Japan and the Ryukyus.

c. Maintain mobile construction forces and advance base component stocks at required readiness levels.

7-27. Development Facilities and Ranges

a. Raise and maintain at the highest level the technical standards of the Navy's in-house RDT&E laboratories. Provide for both initial instrumentation and the recurring costs.

b. Continue development and management support of the Pacific Missile Range to meet requirements of the National Space Program and DOD weapons system development programs. Continue development and improvement of service ranges to meet requirements for support of Navy RDT&E programs. Establish as soon as practicable an underwater tactical range in the Pacific to support OPTEVFOR as well as fleet training and readiness requirements.

7-28. World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)

a. Provides National Command Authorities with the information on world situations needed for accurate and timely decisions, and includes the communications required for reliable transmissions of those decisions under all conditions

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of peace and war for the national direction of U.S. military forces. The system is comprised of the National Military Command System (NMCS) (i.e., National Military Command Center and alternates), and the sub-systems of the CINCs, Service Headquarters, Component Commanders and other DOD agencies and offices which directly support the command and control function.

b. Although most of the essential elements of the world-wide system exist now in one form or another, much improvement is necessary. Established requirements for the exercise of command may change or disappear while new ones emerge and crystallize. It is essential, therefore, that all elements of the system be developed by exploiting technological advances as they appear, such as improvements in reliability and speed of communications, automatic data processing, and improved visual displays.

c. Provision of a high degree of assurance of survival of a national "command and control capability" dictates that combinations of hardening, multiplicity and mobility must be employed in developing the facilities and communications required to support the National Command Authorities.

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Chapter VIII  
NAVAL LOGISTICS

Part A. Underway Replenishment Ships

8-1. Requirements for underway replenishment ships developed in LRR-60 do not constitute a useful base for generating objectives for these types, inasmuch as the ships to be replenished under LRO-63 are far fewer than in LRR-60. It has therefore been necessary to compute objectives based directly on the combatant force levels developed in the previous chapters.

8-2. Requirements for underway replenishment ships are highly sensitive to (a) the numbers of combat ships actively engaged at one time, (b) the intensity of engagement and the duration of sustained strike effort in the case of CVA forces, (c) the location, and (d) the distance which UR ships must travel to resupply points. Political conditions may dictate whether an established resupply facility can be used in a particular instance.

8-3. In view of all the variables it would not be difficult to pose extreme situations in which the requirements for UR ships would be very large. These objectives are based instead on studies of requirements in several more moderate limited war situations, adjusted to allow for certain deficiencies in the inputs. The basic situations included:

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a. Pacific

(1) 6 CVA groups, 2 CVS groups and one division of assault engaged in WESTPAC; Japanese bases available.

(2) 4 CVA groups, 2 CVS groups, and one division of assault engaged in SEA area; 2 CVA's standing by in WESTPAC; Japanese bases not available.

(3) 2 CVS groups engaged in Arabian Sea area; ~~resupply point at Diego Garcia assumed~~; 4 CVA groups, 1 CVS group and 2/3 division of assault standing by in WESTPAC.

b. Atlantic

(1) 3 CVA groups, 1 CVS group and 2/3 division of assault engaged in Mediterranean; 2 CVA groups and 1 CVS group standing by in NELant; all NATO bases available.

(2) 1 CVA, 1 CVS and 1 RLT of assault engaged in Gulf of Guinea, no local bases; normal Sixth Fleet deployment (not engaged).

Appropriate escort deployments, and active DE and CVS support of offshore surveillance systems against SLBM threats, were also used in developing the total replenishment requirements in each case.

8-4. To meet the foregoing situations ship requirements were developed, including an allowance for ships in over-haul and refresher training, as follows:

20 AE-21 equivalents  
12 AF-58 equivalents

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1/11/63 CH

26 AO-143 equivalents

Adjustments were made in these figures as follows:

a. After an allowance for the ammunition capacity of the 6 AOE's included in the objectives, of roughly 3 AE-21 equivalents, a requirement for 17 AE-21 remained. This is an increase of 5 over the LRO-62 objective. After consideration of the very high sustained aircraft sortie and expenditure rates used in developing the requirements, and pending more detailed study of the effects of new types of ammunition on both demand and supply factors, it was concluded to limit the increase to 3 AEs, resulting in a 1974 objective of 15 AE-21. Further study will be conducted to confirm or revise this objective for future projections.

b. Allowance was made for the fact that the provisions capacity of the present AFS is only 70% that of AF-58. Since 10 AFS are included in the objectives, they thus represent 7 AF equivalents, and an objective of 5 AF-58 equivalents is thus established, to fill the remainder of the need. As of 1974 it will still be necessary to use 2 WW II AFs against this objective, at a slight reduction of total capacity.

c. In establishing the oiler objectives, allowance was made for:

- (1) The necessity of retaining 6 of the 8 slow JUMBO conversions in the 1974 Active Fleet.
- (2) The uncertain prospects for obtaining the

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numbers of nuclear powered destroyers assumed in the supporting studies.

(3) The need for flexibility to support scattered or remote deployments.

Because of these factors the total oiler objective was established at 29, to include:

6 AOE  
6 AO-143  
6 JUMBO FRAM  
11 New AOR

8-5. AOE objectives were established at 6 in order to support a routine rotational forward deployment in each ocean, and to provide an assured availability of one to each numbered fleet. AFS objectives were established at 10 in order to assure the continuous availability of 1 AFS in each geographical area in a wartime situation despite cycling for provisions reload.

8-6. The foregoing objectives, as noted, may not be adequate for extreme situations but should prove generally acceptable to meet the most probable cold war and limited war situations, including readiness for initial actions in general war.

Requirements after initial strikes in general war are problematical because of the uncertain effects of attrition on both demand and supply points.

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8-7. A vital aspect of the development of the objectives is the assumption that the basic ships will transit at 20 knots. To the extent that slower ships must be utilized, the numbers required will be larger; the magnitude of the increase required varies with the type of ship, the unloading cycle, and the distance to resupply point. In addition, since the replenishment group is limited to the speed of its slowest ship, attainment of the added operational flexibility available

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from 20-knot ships requires that the inventory for all types - AE, AF/AFS and AO - be brought up to this speed at approximately the same rate.

8-8. All figures above are for both Fleets combined; no breakdown has been attempted. They are inclusive of ships in overhaul and refresher training. They make no provision for logistic support of warships or amphibious ships activated from the Reserve Fleet. To the extent that additional World War II replenishment ships may remain usable in 1974, they should be retained in reserve to meet the latter needs, plus contingencies which may result from remote deployments, loss of logistic support points, etc.

8-9. As extra provision against certain contingencies the following objectives are established:

a. Operations in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic (and in the Southwest Pacific if present bases are denied) will present the most severe strains on the replenishment capacity provided above. The establishment of a central supply point in the Indian Ocean, preferably at Diego Garcia, should be a long range objective. This should include a deep draft anchorage, a logistic airstrip, and a moderate volume of fuel storage for contingencies. In the event of continuous or sustained operations in this theater, floating provisions and stores depots on barges should also be provided. Small fuel caches at one or more island sites in the South Atlantic

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may also be of value in supporting fast transit or contingency operations in this area, when oilers are temporarily scarce.

b. The number of major oilers in 1974 will be less (29) than the 39 in commission today. The capacity of the 29 (making some allowance for faster AO cycling as well) will be significantly greater; however, the smaller numbers obviously cannot be in as many places at once, a deficiency not completely overcome by their speed. While probably the number is adequate for major forces, it may possess less than optimum flexibility to support the small deployments to remote areas which may be increasingly required. To offset this in part, an objective is established that future AOG replacements, while designed primarily for their customary point-to-point and beachhead supply roles, incorporate also a limited alternate capability for replenishment of small detached naval forces.

S-10. Ships for replenishment of POLARIS missiles have been treated in Chapter II.