

NAVAL MESSAGE

(When filled in)

SECRET**NAVY DEPARTMENT**

PRECEDENCE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT. NO.
ROUTINE				
ROUTINE	(INFO)			

R 24 0323Z
FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUMGCF/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUXRYY/COMCARDIV FIVE

INFO RUECW/CNO
RUHQ/CCGPAC

S E C R E T

U. S. NAVAL CRUISE IN INDIAN OCEAN (S)

1. THE FOLLOWING WAS CONDENSED FROM A SECSTATE MESSAGE,
IS PASSED TO YOU FOR INFO AND PLANNING AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
A SAILING ORDER:

A. THE PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED SUBJECT CRUISE AS FIRST
PHASE OF CONCEPT FOR INTRODUCTION OF U.S. MILITARY POWER
INTO THIS REGION IN INTERMITTENT BUT REGULAR BASIS. IN PUBLIC
DISCUSSIONS AND UNCLASSIFIED TRAFFIC THE TASK FORCE WILL
BE REFERRED TO AS "CONCORD SQUADRON". NO REFERENCE WILL
BE MADE TO SEVENTHFLT OR AS "INDIAN OCEAN TASK FORCE".

B. FOLLOWING TENTATIVE CRUISE SCHEDULE APPROVED BY
JCS PENDING DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE AND PORT CALL ARRANGE-
MENTS:

APR 4 - SAGE THROUGH MALLACCA SOICBT

APR 14-17 DIEGO SUAREZ

APR 20-23 MOMBASSA

APR 27-29 ADEN

MAY 2-3 GULF OF OMAN.

CRUISE IS LEFT OPEN ENDED TO PERMIT ADDITIONAL CALLS
IF SITUATION WARRANTS.

33 COG

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CONTROL NO.	CIRCUIT NO.	PAGE OF PAGES	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
12965/DC/L/4	A108	1 3	24/1046Z MAR	240323Z MAR 64

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C. IN LIGHT OF PAST IN INESIAN REACTION AND POSSIBILITY OF ORGANIZED DISTURBANCES WHILE TASK FORCE IS IN MALACCA STRAIT THE DESIRE IS TO AVOID PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF CRUISE UNTIL FORCE IS THROUGH STRAIT ON 4 APRIL. THERE-AFTER, PLAN IS TO HAVE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS OF PORT VISITS MADE FIRST BY HOST GOVT'S.

NOTE: BRITISH AND FRENCH ARE TO BE INFORMED PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF CRUISE BUT ARE BEING REQUESTED TO WITHHOLD PUBLIC RELEASE FOR TIME BEING.

D. CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO PROTOCOL CALLS AT DIEGO SUAREZ AND MOMBASSA BY HAVING TF COMMANDER FLY TO CAPITALS AND THEN GOVT OFFICIALS RETURNING CALLS ABOARD CARRIER.

E. SHAH OF IRAN WILL BE INVITED TO ATTEND ON BOARD WEAPONS' DEMONSTRATION 2 MAY, REMAINING OVERNIGHT TO OBSERVE NIGHT FLIGHT OPERATIONS. SHAH AND SWMLL PARTY WOULD BE PICKED UP AT ZAHEDAN BY COD ACFT AND RETURNED DURING MORNING OF 3 MAY. IF SHAH UNABLE TO ATTEND, SECSTATE CONSIDERING INVITING FAISAL ABOARD WHILE TASK FORCE IS IN GULF OF OMAN

F. IN THE EVENT SUKARNO DESIRES BRIEF COURTESY VISIT DURING RETURN TO PACIFIC OCEAN AREA, SECSTATE CONSIDERS A BRIEF STOPOVER AT A MALAYSIAN PORT APPROPRIATE, OTHERWISE ANY REQUEST FOR A MALAYSIAN PORT VISIT WILL BE DISCOURAGZD.

G. SECSTATE EMPHASIZES THAT IN LIGHT OF EARLIER PRESS LEAKS AND CERTAIN ADVERSE PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AGAINST EXTENSION OF COMSEVENTHFLT OPS INTO INDIAN OCEAN AREA, NO POLITICO/MILITARY IMPLICATIONS SHOULD BE PUBLICALLY ATTACHED TO HIS CRUISE. ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO CONVEY IMAGES OF FRIENDLY INTEREST AND PEACEFUL RESOLVE AND NOT ONE OF CRISIS ANTICIPATION. DISCUSSIONS ON OUR CAPABILITIES TO DISCOURAGE EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, ASSUME ROLE AS STABILIZER IN REGIONAL DISPUTES, OR INTENTIONS TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA SHOULD NOT BE ENTERED INTO. EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FACT THAT U.S. FLEET IS UTILIZING FREEDOM OF THE SEAS TO MAINTAIN

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1 A CONTINUING FAMILIARIZATION WITH INDIAN OCEAN WATERS AND TO VISIT FRIENDLY COUNTRIES BY MEANS OF INFORMAL PORT-CALLS. ANY QUESTION AS TO NEED FOR BASES FOR FUTURE DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BY STRESSING THAT A "CARRIER SQUADRON" WITH ITS SUPPORTING REPLENISHMENTS SHIPS IS A SELF CONTAINED UNIT CAPABLE OF REMAINING AT SEA INDEFINITELY.

2 IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE NO LEAKS FROM THE FLEET ON THIS CRUISE.

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Op-601F2/me
Ser : 00223P60

26 MAR 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Indian Ocean Islands (U)

1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) has requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff comment upon the agreements reached at the US/UK Conference on the above subject, and proposed implementing actions.
2. Although the concept of stockpiling base rights has received tri-service approval in the past, some resistance within DOD and other services may now be developing.
3. The unfortunate timing of the US/UK Conference in relation to the deployment of the "Concord Squadron" may have created the erroneous impression that the Navy's interest in foreseeing requirements for Indian Ocean island base rights is related to the needs of the currently planned task force deployment into this area.
4. The attached memorandum develops a rationale for implementing action in this area, will serve to clarify the Navy's position on this subject, and may aid in allaying Defense Department opposition, should any develop.

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ORIG: LCDR G F ROGERS, USN, Op-601F2, X-55825 on 3/20/64
REWRITTEN BY LCDR G F ROGERS, USN on 3/23/64
TYPD: MOORE, YNC, USN

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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AOA, NYNC, OO, '64, Dx 20; 11000/16

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Ser: 00221
MAR 28 1964

Nite

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Attn: Dep Asst E. K. Sloan)

Subj: Indian Ocean Islands (U)

Ref: (a) Memorandum by the DEPASSTSEC STATE for Politico-Military Affairs, subject as above, dated 2 March 1964

Recent events involving certain nations on the periphery of the Indian Ocean have served to underscore, again, a long-recognized deficiency in our military planning; namely the difficulties inherent in projecting a continuing U.S. military presence into this region without access to any in-area support sites. Among these events I would mention the evidences of lack of stability in several East African governments, the breakdown of the tenuous cease-fire between Malaysian and Indonesian border groups, and the manifestations of continuing hostility between India and her neighbors, Pakistan and China. The stability of this entire area has historically been rooted in a Western presence, primarily that of the U.K. There is growing evidence, however, that a continuing reassessment by the U.K. of her commitments world-wide will lead to a lower priority for Indian Ocean and East African involvement. U.S. policy objectives relating to stabilization of new governments and containment of communist encroachment may thus be prejudiced, unless we are prepared to provide an early and decisive military presence if circumstances require.

A first step in the amelioration of this potentially dangerous situation was taken in London recently, as a result of a meeting between State Department, Department of Defense personnel and representatives of the government of the United Kingdom. One U.S. objective of this conference was to obtain British permission to conduct an early survey of the Chagos Archipelago (with special attention to the island of Diego Garcia) to determine if this site is suitable for the programmed DCA "Asian Gateway" Communications Station (Project KATHY). Beyond this, however, our aim was to convince the British that in the light of emerging self-determination among the larger island groups of the Indian Ocean, it would be prudent to take steps now to identify and retain under

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U.K. continuing control, remote, economically unimportant islands that appear to have military support possibilities in the event that they are needed in the future. We emphasized the point that we have no plans to engage in any military support facility construction in a specific time frame. Further, we clearly stated that we have no desire or intention to supplant the U.K. as the primary Western force in this area.

The British reaction was sympathetic and cooperative. They have agreed to separate the Chagos Archipelago from the administrative control of Mauritius as soon as possible and to make arrangements for a joint site survey following this action. In the meantime, the U.S. team is requested to obtain U.S. governmental approval of the accords reached at the conference and to consider possible future support requirements involving U.K.-controlled islands in the Western sector of the Indian Ocean. This should be done with a view toward a second joint survey and consequent separation of selected islands from parent administrative groupings.

In view of the fact that there will be no commitment on the part of the United States to expend funds (apart from the DCA communications station) unless military support facilities are required, I feel that the impetus given to the development of this concept by the US/UK Conference should be continued by implementation planning now. Such planning need only relate to possible future U.S. utilization, so that a survey can realistically identify those sites that should be reserved.

Finally, I would like to comment briefly upon the timing of the conference in relation to the forthcoming deployment of the carrier task group to the Indian Ocean. The coincidence of action in these two separate efforts has, I believe, resulted in some confusion. The deployment of the "Concord Squadron" is independent of our efforts to stockpile access rights to military support sites, and under the present frame of reference (deploy to the Indian Ocean 2 months out of 6) will not rely upon in-area support.

A.
Dan. Nke
US NAVY

Sec. of the N.

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~~By _____~~

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