

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

P R 232148Z
FM CINCPACFLT
TO CINCPAC
INFO CNO

CORRECTED ROUTING

sys 26 Jan, as CONCUSNAVEAR in 13 Aug 64

Indian Ocean study file
3 case file "strategic" "band" concept file

SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO

INDIAN OCEAN STUDY (U)

A. CINCPAC 182004Z (NOTAL)
B. SM-1400-30 OF 20 NOV 1963 (UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN)

1. REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN STUDY CONDUCTED BY THE CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS. THIS STUDY CONCLUDED THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF A MARINE BATTALION LANDING TEAM (BLT) WITH RELATED AMPHIBIOUS AND ESCORT SHIPS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN ON A SUSTAINED BASIS. THE PREFERRED MAKE-UP OF THIS "POLICY OPTION" FORCE WOULD BE A MARINE REINFORCED BLT, 1 LPH, 1 LPD, 2 AKA.

4. DD AND 1 AF. POL NEEDS WOULD BE MET BY UNREP FROM MSTs, TANKERS ENROUTE TO WESTPAC FROM THE MIDEAST OR BY AO/AOG ON A 10-15 DAY CYCLE. THE STUDY WAS THOROUGH IN ITS ANALYSIS OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL. HOWEVER, IT FAILED TO POINT OUT SOME OF THE OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF COMMITTING A PERMANENT FORCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WHETHER IT BE AN ATTACK CARRIER GROUP OR A BATTALION LANDING TEAM WITH ASSOCIATED SHIPS.

2. CINCPACFLT HAS LONG APPRECIATED THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN. HOWEVER, CURRENT AND PROBABLY FUTURE FORCE LEVEL RESTRICTIONS DO NOT PERMIT THE US TO MAINTAIN NAVAL FORCES IN ALL AREAS OF THE WORLD. FLEET RESOURCES MUST BE STRATEGICALLY POSITIONED WHERE THE THREAT IS THE GREATEST AND WHERE THE REACTION TIME CAN BE HELD TO A MINIMUM. FOR THE

Who the CONCPACFLT?
McLean?

60 COG

SECNAV 090 91 33 06 FLAGPLOT BFR

ADD 09 03 34 61 PER 0461D/DC/5

"BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY"

| COPIES NO. | PAGE | OF | PAGE | TIME OF RECEIPT | DATE TIME GROUP |
|---------------|------|----|------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 39310/TI/MS/2 | 1 | | 4 | 0035Z NOV 24 | 252148Z NOV 64 |

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

0035 COPY

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

FORSEEABLE FUTURE THE GREATEST ^{THREAT} IN THE PACOM AREA WILL BE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THIS IS WHERE SEVENTHFLT STRENGTH IS NOW FOCUSED.

3. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT IN THE MORE DISTANT FUTURE THE THREAT MAY CHANGE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL AND AT THAT TIME WE MUST BE PREPARED TO COUNTER THIS THREAT AND SHIFT OUR DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS TO THIS AREA. THE PACFLT WILL BE PREPARED TO DO THIS WHEN SUCH A SHIFT IS WARRANTED. FLEXIBILITY IS ONE OF OUR GREATEST ASSETS. HOWEVER, OF PRIMARY CONCERN REGARDING DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IS THE LENGTHENING OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPLY LINES. IF FORCES ARE DEPLOYED TO THIS AREA ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A FLEET ANCHORAGE AND AN AUSTERE FORWARD BASE WITH AN AIRSTRIP. THESE FACILITIES WOULD PERMIT RAPID RESUPPLY OF CRITICAL SPARE PARTS AND ADEQUATE SHIP MAINTENANCE. FURTHER, ADDITIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT SHIPPING WILL BE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE LENGTHENED SUPPLY LINES. THE ISLANDS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN HAVE RECENTLY BEEN SURVEYED AND DIEGO GARCIA IN THE CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO APPEARS TO HAVE THE BEST POTENTIAL TO SATISFY ALL OF THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE U.S. NAVY TO USE DIEGO GARCIA FOR ANY FUTURE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS OR IN THE EVENT FORCES MIGHT SOME DAY BE COMMITTED.

4. I BELIEVE THE BEST WAY OF FILLING THE MILITARY SECURITY GAP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IS TO DEPLOY A CARRIER TASK GROUP TO THIS AREA INTERMITTENTLY FOR A ONE TO TWO MONTH PERIOD WHEN CONDITIONS IN SEASIA WILL PERMIT. THE CONCORD SQUADRON RECENTLY PROVED THE PACFLT ABILITY TO FILL THE GAP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WITHOUT OVERTAXING THE MOBILE LOGISTICS FORCES. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, IF THE SEASIA SITUATION EVERY STABILIZES, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO DEPLOY THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE (SLF) TO THE INDIAN OCEAN INTERMITTENTLY ON A "SOLANT AMITY" TYPE CRUISE. SUCH A DEPLOYMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE WHEN PACFLT LPH/LPD FORCE LEVELS ARE INCREASED. AGAIN, AN AUSTERE BASE FOR THIS TYPE FORCE WOULD BE NECESSARY NOT ONLY FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE BUT ALSO TO ALLOW THE TROOPS TO BIVOUAC AND TRAIN ASHORE.

5. IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCREASING INTEREST IN THE

"BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY"

| CONTROL NO. | PAGE | OF | PAGE | TIME OF RECEIPT | DATE TIME GROUP |
|-------------|------|----|------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 39310 | 2 | | 4 | | 232148Z NOV 5 |

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

INDIAN OCEAN AREA, I RECOMMEND A REVIEW OF THE LINE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN CINCPAC AND CINCLANT AREA. RESPONSIBILITY AS SET FORTH IN REF B. THE PRESENT LINE CUTS A PIECE OF THE ANZAM AREA OUT OF THE PACOM AND ALSO SPLITS THE BAY OF BENGAL. CINCPAC HAS PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE ANZAM AREA AND COULD OPERATE HIS NAVAL FORCES IN THE BAY OF BENGAL IN SUPPORT OF CINCPACAFSA. CONTINGENCY PLANS. AS IT NOW STANDS THE LINE OF DEMARCATION CUTS THE BAY OF BENGAL INTO TWO PARTS. THE WESTERN SECTION TO LANTCOM AND THE EASTERN SECTION TO PACOM. FURTHERMORE, THE WESTERNMOST BOUNDARY OF THE ANZAM AREA IS 78 DEGS E LONGITUDE FROM THE TIP OF INDIA SOUTH TO THE POLE. THIS THEN HAS PART OF THE ANZAM AREA INCLUDED IN THE CINCLANT AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE LINE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN CINCLANT AND CINCPAC BE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: FROM THE POINT 25 S, 60E TO THE POINT ON THE SOUTHERN TIP OF INDIA WHERE THE LONGITUDE LINE OF 78E TOUCHES THE INDIAN SHORE. THIS WOULD PLACE ALL

(over)

"BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY" "BEAT ARMY"

| CONTROL NO. | PAGE | OF | PAGE | TIME OF RECEIPT | DATE TIME GROUP |
|-------------|------|----|------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 39310 | 3 | | 4 | | 232148Z NOV 64 |

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

P R 232148Z
FM CINCPACFLT

TO: CINCPAC:

INFO CNO

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO

OF THE ANZAM AREA IN THE PACOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
AND WOULD NOT DIVIDE THE BAY OF BENGAL.

6. IN SUMMARY, CINCPACFLT DOES NOT CONCUR IN THE
COMMITMENT OF A BLT OR ANY OTHER FORCE TO THE INDIAN
OCEAN ON A PERMANENT BASIS WITH THE THREAT IN SEASIA
AS IT NOW EXISTS. PERIODIC COMMITMENT OF A CARRIER
GROUP SUCH AS THE CONCORD SQUADRON STILL APPEARS TO
BE THE BEST SOLUTION. FURTHERMORE, NEGOTIATIONS
SHOULD PROCEED TO OBTAIN RIGHTS TO DIEGO GARCIA AND
ULTIMATELY TO DEVELOP THAT ISLAND FOR CONTINGENCY USE.
IN THE EVENT LARGE SCALE NAVAL OPERATIONS BECOME NECESSARY IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN. FINALLY, A READJUSTMENT TO THE LANTCOM/
PACOM LINE OF DEMARCATION TO GIVE PACOM THE BAY OF BENGAL
AND ALL OF THE ANZAM AREA IS RECOMMENDED.
GP-3

| "BEAT ARMY" | "BEAT ARMY" | "BEAT ARMY" | "BEAT ARMY" | "BEAT ARMY" |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|
| CONTROL NO. | PAGE | OF | PAGE | TIME OF RECEIPT |
| 39310 | 4 | | 4 | |
| | | | | DATE TIME GROUP |
| | | | | 232148Z NOV 64 |

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL GEOGRAPHIC AREAS PROVIDED AS A BASIS FOR COORDINATION



Boundaries are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A

PROPOSED BOUNDARY
BETWEEN CINCPAC/CINCLANT
PER CINCPACFLT 232148 Z MAY