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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

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Ser 0031P60

31 JAN 70

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: Proposed Naval Communication Facility on Diego Garcia (S)

Encl: (1) Description and Justification of Proposed Facilities

The Navy's number one priority project in the FY 70 MILCON Program submission was the first construction increment of a proposed modest logistics facility on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. This facility had been approved in principle by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 15 June 1968. The first increment, in the amount of \$9.556 million, was omitted from the FY 70 Military Appropriations Bill by joint Senate-House Committee action during the latter stages of Congressional deliberations on the FY 70 Appropriations Bill. The concept of the proposed facility would have provided for modest logistic support, including austere communications, POL storage, an 8000 foot runway, and channel and anchorage dredging at a total construction cost of approximately \$23 million. Although this project enjoyed enthusiastic support from both House Committees concerned with military construction, it failed to gain final approval due to apparent misgivings of one or two key Senators that the proposed facility would involve the U.S. in another overseas commitment.

The strategic importance of developing a modest logistic support capability in the Indian Ocean has been long recognized, and the requirement for an austere naval support facility on Diego Garcia remains a valid one. In view of the apparent opposition to such a facility held by key members of the Senate, however, it may not be realistic to expect that the proposed facility in its present conceptual form could gain necessary approval for inclusion in the FY 71 program. For that reason, it is proposed that only so much of the original concept as would provide for an austere communications facility on Diego Garcia be retained for inclusion in the FY 71/72 MILCON Programs. The requirement to close the gap in reliable communications coverage which exists today in the central Indian Ocean/Bay of Bengal area was a major consideration in developing the initial concept for a support facility on Diego Garcia. Establishment of a communications support capability in this area is an immediate requirement and is a requirement which exists independent of the modest logistics support facility which was rejected by the Congress. The purely passive role and image of a communications facility should not raise the same concern of active commitment which had apparently been associated with the logistics support aspects of the original concept.

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The inadequacy of communications with forces within and traversing the Middle East, and particularly the Indian Ocean area, long has been a concern to the U.S. This national concern has been expressed through three presidential administrations. In October 1962, as a result of demonstrated worldwide communication inadequacies brought to light by the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy established a special subcommittee on communications chaired by Mr. William H. Orrick, Jr. (then Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration) to provide urgent solution to critical national communication system problems worldwide. One of the significant results of the Orrick committee deliberations was the affirmation of the need for an Indian Ocean gateway station to fill the communication gap in the area south and east of Suez for maritime operations. In the DCA Mid-Range Plan of 1962, the Navy was tasked to provide such a station. After extensive study, the island of Diego Garcia was determined to be the optimum location for the proposed station.

The proposed communications facility on Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean would link with the communications stations at Asmara, Ethiopia, and Northwest Cape, Australia, to provide reliable communications support to maritime forces operating in or transiting the broad expanse of the Indian and contiguous ocean areas. Without Diego Garcia the link is not closed, and the ability to properly exercise command and control is marginal. Units of the U.S. Middle East Force currently operate in areas where their communications requirement cannot be adequately met. These units are on station and operate in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and occasionally in the Bay of Bengal. The U. S. Naval Communications Station, Asmara, currently has responsibility for their communications requirements. While Asmara communications support is generally satisfactory in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the western reaches of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, this support becomes marginal in the southern, central and northeastern portion of the Indian Ocean and severely limited in the western Bay of Bengal. These latter areas are covered neither by the Naval Communications Station Philippines nor by the Naval Communications Station Harold E. Holt, Australia. Thus a significant communications gap exists.

While under the present level of operations the Middle East Force is a small force, it is particularly important that this force receive reliable communications support. Their presence and operations in an area of high international sensitivity demands assured command and control. The proposed naval facility on Diego Garcia is required to provide that assurance. Additionally, Diego Garcia is required to provide this necessary assurance of adequate communications support to meet the contingency requirements of USCINCEAFSA. There is also the existing requirement to provide improved communications support to units transiting the Indian Ocean. Since closure of the Suez Canal, Atlantic and Mediterranean U.S. Naval Forces are routed around the Cape of Good Hope through the Indian Ocean enroute to the Persian Gulf, ports in the Asian subcontinent and the Southeast Asia/Western Pacific

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theaters of operations. The facilities at the Naval Communications Stations Harold E. Holt and Asmara have neither the range nor the configuration to provide for required command and control of such forces during a considerable portion of the transit. Closure of the Suez Canal has also dramatically increased the flow of commercial traffic to and from the Middle East via the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian Ocean. Many of these vessels operate under the aegis of the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS), Environmental Sciences Service Administration (ESSA) or other U.S. agencies. The communications requirements of this U.S. sponsored shipping are presently being marginally met through reliance upon foreign commercial radio stations in the area. Due to political instabilities in this area, continued use of these foreign facilities is subject to interruption. An austere naval communications facility on Diego Garcia would provide minimum requisite maritime and aeronautical support including communications for safety of life at sea, safety of flight, weather advisories, and support of hydrographic and oceanographic research.

The facility proposed at Diego Garcia would be an austere U.S. Navy communications facility of low political profile with only those ancillary facilities necessary to make the station self-sustaining. The station would provide the following communications services:

Point-to-point trunks (one to NAVCOMMSTA Asmara and one to NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt) for entry into the DCS Worldwide Communications System.

Minimum ship/shore.

A time-shared single-channel high frequency rebroadcast which would serve U.S. Naval Forces, MSTS and other U.S. agency-owned or contracted shipping, providing operational and environmental information during the period of transit.

Air-ground flight service.

The physical concept of the proposed facility includes the following construction projects (enclosure (1) provides individual cost and justification information):

Austere communications facilities including communications building, transmitter and receiver sites.

An 8,000 by 150 foot runway for logistics resupply, mail, and emergency personnel support.

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Minimum waterfront facilities to accommodate resupply by lighterage.

Personnel support facilities for approximately 194 military personnel. (Manning level is 164. Excess for transient berthing.)

Utilities to include power plant, desalinization plant, and minimum roadway to link transmitter site and airstrip to receiver and cantonment areas.

POI storage for 60,000 barrels to support power, desalinization plant requirements and provide limited refueling capability for logistics aircraft.

Dredging to provide channel and turning basin for deep draft tanker/oiler resupply. (This will be accomplished in the third construction increment.)

Naval Construction Forces (Seabees) will be utilized in the construction of the proposed facility to minimize MILCON costs. As had been planned in the case of the original concept for a logistics support facility, construction of the communications facility has been planned for incremental accomplishment and funding. The cost of the first construction increment, which is proposed for inclusion in the FY 71 Defense MILCON budget, is \$5.4 million. ~~This amount is \$1.455, or about 45 percent, of the \$3.2 million cost~~ increment of the original logistics support facility which was submitted in the FY 70 budget. Construction costs of the second and third increments of the proposed ~~communications~~ facility come to \$8.18 million and \$4.2 million, respectively, for a total construction cost of \$17.78 million. This compares to the total construction cost of approximately \$23 million for the previously planned logistics support facility.

The proposal outlined herein is considered to be the minimum required to establish an intermediate communications facility at Diego Garcia. This facility would satisfy the immediate requirement for an improved communications capability in the Indian Ocean area, and would additionally provide a reduced lead time capability for subsequent expansion to meet other defense requirements.

Joint approval of this concept for a Naval communications facility on Diego Garcia is requested. Your approval is also requested for inclusion of the first increment of this project (\$5.4 million) in the Defense FY 71 Military Construction budget.

/s/ J. H. CHAFFEE

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DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF PROPOSED FACILITIES

COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES

Description: Buildings to house communications spaces, receiver station and transmitter site.

Cost: First Increment \$0.83 million. Total \$0.83 million. (See TAB A for costs of C-E Equipment to be provided through OPN funding).

Justification: To house communications-electronics equipment and provide space for communications operations.

AIRFIELD

Description: 8,000 X 150 foot runway with taxiway, parking apron, lighting, small operations building, and POL storage (20,000 barrels JP-5).

Cost: First Increment \$0.65 million. Total \$3.05 million.

Justification: To support logistic aircraft. The isolated location of this small island dictates that there be a minimum airstrip for logistics support, emergency evacuation for medical or humanitarian reasons, for mail service and other morale factors attendant to isolation. The island's position in the middle of the Indian Ocean is remote from any other airfield and can be reached only after a long over-water flight. An 8,000 foot runway is the minimum required to offer a realistic margin of safety.

PERSONNEL SUPPORT FACILITIES

Description: Administration building, mess hall, BOQ, BEQ and Petty Officer's quarters (total accommodations for 14 officers and 180 enlisted), dispensary, small club and theater, gymnasium, Navy Exchange/laundry, warehouse and cold storage.

Cost: First Increment \$0.80 million. Total \$2.56 million.

Justification: To provide messing, berthing, medical, laundry, convenience and recreational facilities for officer and enlisted personnel who will be assigned on an unaccompanied basis. Expected manning of the facility is 10 officers and 154 enlisted men. BOQ/BEQ space.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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in excess of manning figure is for transient logistic aircraft crew and personnel turnover.

POL STORAGE

Description: POL storage (exclusive of JP-5 for airfield) for 40,000 barrels POL. Bottomed laid fueling system for receiving or delivering POL via fuel buoy off-shore in lagoon.

Cost: First Increment \$0.65 million. Total \$1.43 million.

Justification: To satisfy POL requirements of the power and desalinization plants. The 40,000 barrels storage represents an eight month reserve based on estimated monthly consumption of 5,000 barrels for power and desalinization plants.

UTILITIES

Description: Power plant, desalinization plant, sewage treatment system, approximately 17 miles road network, public works shops.

Cost: First Increment \$1.37 million. Total \$3.31 million.

Justification: To provide power, potable water, sanitary sewage distribution system and intra-island communications necessary to the island's self-support.

WATERFRONT FACILITIES

Description: Pontoon causeway and dredging for 45 foot channel entrance and turning basin.

Cost: First Increment \$0.10 million. Total \$4.30 million.

Justification: Pontoon causeway to accommodate light cargo handling from lighterage and moorage for crash boat and harbor craft. Dredging entrance channel and turning basin in the lagoon is required to assure safe navigation for deeper draft commercial tankers (T-5) which are the expected resupply ships in MSTs employ in the mid-1970's. Dredging will also afford flexibility of permitting resupply by Navy AO/AOE.

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SHIPPING

Description: Assembly, shipment and delivery of construction materials.

Cost: First Increment \$1.0 million. Total \$2.3 million.

Justification: Self explanatory.

FACILITY SUMMARY

Please see TAB B.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

TAB AMAJOR ITEMS OF C-E EQUIPMENT

Transmitters:	40 KW	10
	10 KW	10
Receivers:		15
Transceivers:		7
Crypto:		30

OPN COSTS

C-E Equipment:

	XMTRS:	\$ 860,000
	RCVRS/TTY/TERM:	461,267
	Test:	150,000
Antennas:		307,400
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	Total	\$1,778,667

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TAB B TO ENCLOSURE (1)
DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF PROPOSED FACILITIES

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NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY DIEGO GARCIA

PROPOSED FIRST INCREMENT

<u>CONSTRUCTION ELEMENT</u>	<u>MCON COST (\$000)</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
COMMUNICATIONS	830	Operations Building and Transmitter Building.
WATERFRONT	100	Access road to and modification of pontoon causeway.
AIRFIELD	650	Rough grading and compacting of coral runway for emergency C-130 use.
PERSONNEL SUPPORT	800	Barracks for 150 men; mess for 194 men.
POL	650	1st increment of fuel system - 10,000 BBL of total requirement of 60,000 BBL.
UTILITIES AND OTHER SUPPORT FACILITIES	1,370	Desalinization Plant and start on roads, power plants, and associated utilities distribution systems, and other support facilities.
SHIPPING	<u>1,000</u>	Construction material from plant to dock-side to work site.
FIRST INC. TOTAL	5,400	

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Proposed Naval Communication Facility on Diego Garcia (S)

Encl: (1) OASD (I&L) memo of 14 JAN 1970

1. A DEPSECDEF memorandum of 15 June 1968 for the Secretary of the Navy, and others, approved in principle the concept of a modest facility on Diego Garcia to include austere communications, POL storage, an 8000 foot runway and anchorage dredging at a cost of approximately \$26 million. A plan was subsequently developed which provided for construction of the facility by Naval Construction Forces and to be accomplished and funded in two construction increments, a first increment of \$9.556 million and a second increment of \$13.68 million in MILCON funding.
2. The first increment (\$9.556 million) of the proposed naval facility was included in the FY 70 Military Construction Authorization Act; however, in spite of strong House support, this increment was deleted from the FY 70 Appropriations Bill by joint House-Senate committee action. Opposition by key Senate committee members apparently stemmed from concern that the logistics support functions of the facility, albeit austere, connotated another U.S. overseas commitment. We had hoped that these apprehensions might have been overcome before or during Congressional consideration of the FY 71 budget. It was, therefore, intended to modify the original concept to provide a somewhat expanded communications capability while reducing POL storage and dredging in order to stay within the approved \$9.556 first increment authorization. The revised first increment would then have been substituted in the FY 71 budget for the \$13.68 second increment which is currently included. The second increment would then have been restructured, with some minor increase in cost and manpower requirements, for programming in FY 72, thus limiting slippage of construction of the naval facility at Diego Garcia to one year.
3. Incident to review of the FY 71 MILCON budget, we have now received guidance from OSD (I&L), enclosure (1), that the proposed facility for Diego Garcia should be reexamined to assure that it will comply with the Secretary of Defense expressed desire that the project support only communications with everything else subsidiary. It has, therefore, been necessary to revise entirely the original concept of a modest logistic support facility to that only of a communications facility.
4. While the communications facility we are now proposing falls short of achieving our objective of a modest fleet support capability in the Indian

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Ocean, it does meet a valid requirement in filling a communications void in an area of increasing activity. It is therefore recommended that you endorse this change in mission of the proposed Diego Garcia facility, and that you sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense.

T. H. Moorer

T. H. MOORER

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