

CARD
0035



SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subj: Long Range Planning for Western Pacific Bases (U)

Your memorandum of 4 October 1967 concerning long range planning for Western Pacific Bases was timely and highlights a matter of long standing grave concern to the Navy. The reversionary activities of the Ryukyans, and to some extent, the Japanese, have resulted in encroachment on existing facilities and limitations in future development. The Navy studied this problem in depth recently and concluded, inter alia, that the tenure of future base occupancy was secure for the immediate future but that reversion in some form was unavoidable. Furthermore, a series of studies conducted by the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a joint State/Defense group are now, or soon will be, examining this area in even broader and deeper terms. The findings from these studies may have important policy ramifications.

On the part of the Navy, a Western Pacific Base Policy, promulgated in March of this year, provides the responsible Fleet Commander with fundamental guidance related to base development throughout the entire area. It recognizes that rising political pressures could cause withdrawal from Ryukyuan bases within the next 15 to 25 years, possibly earlier, as the socio-political environment in Japan-Ryukyus continues to improve and sensitivity to the communist threat to national security diminishes. Consequently, it directs that existing and planned facilities should, wherever practicable, be developed to accommodate increases in base population and support requirements without expansion of base holdings.

Our present plans include provisions for various construction, modernization, and improvement projects in the Ryukyus; these all are adequately governed by the above policy. The only current exception to this policy of expansion within the confines of existing base holdings is to be found in a recent Navy proposal to construct a Marine Corps Air Facility on reclaimed land at Kushi Wan. Although Congress included funds for the initial phase of the facility construction in the Authorization Act (PL 89-367) and the President approved the legislation, no funds were appropriated. By separate correspondence, the project was deferred indefinitely by the Secretary of Defense.

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26 OCT 1967

27 OCT 1967

OP-004

OP-005

OP-006

OP-00C

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CNO BRIEFING SUMMARY

00 BRIEFED

Order
response to Sec. Army

SECRET

Ser 00566

We believe that accomplishment of future construction in accordance with the provisions of our current policy directive will tend to alleviate unnecessary future loss of investments and minimize political agitation associated with military basing overseas.

All of the above paragraphs are classified Secret.

C. F. BAIRD

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

Ser 00566/P60

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subj: Long Range Planning for Western Pacific Bases (U)

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Our present plans include provisions for various construction, modernization, and improvement projects in the Ryukyus; these all are adequately governed by the above policy. A recent Navy proposal to construct a Marine Corps Air Facility on reclaimed land at Kushi Wan has been deferred indefinitely by the Secretary of Defense.

We believe that accomplishment of future construction in accordance with the provisions of our current policy directive will tend to alleviate unnecessary future loss of investments and minimize political agitation associated with military basing overseas.

All of the above paragraphs are classified Secret.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

4 OCT 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

SUBJECT: Long-Range Planning for Western Pacific Bases (U)

Events in recent months indicate an increased interest on the part of the Government of Japan for the reversion of the administrative control of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan. I am concerned about the limitations which reversion will place on our military activities in the Ryukyus. The possibility of such future limitations demonstrates a need to evaluate carefully the anticipated long-term availability of any additional investments in the Ryukyus. The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands recently highlighted this question and I have attached an extract of his June 10, 1967 letter on this subject for your information.

I have been informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently considered several aspects of the impact which reversion of the Ryukyus would have on United States military strategy. They agreed that United States strategy and base planning, while holding firm on the requirements for continued unrestricted use of the bases in the Ryukyus, should include planning for alternative arrangements should these become necessary. I am told that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also provided guidance to the Services to consider the effects of the reversion issue in planning or programming mid-term base developments in the Ryukyus. (JCS 2326/28-1)

In addition, I believe it necessary to underline the concern expressed by the High Commissioner over the serious political implications which attend any attempt to expand our base holdings in the Ryukyus. Every recent effort by the U.S. Forces to acquire new land, and in fact efforts to acquire new land by commercial activities and by the utilities which we manage there in part for the benefits of the Ryukyuans, has become the focal point of serious political agitation directed against United States interests. At a time when the feeling

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
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for reversion among the Ryukyuans runs high, we can ill afford to give opponents of our presence there an issue which has such broad appeal to the Ryukyuans.

It appears that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken measures to guide the planning of the Services. The next step would appear to be for the Services to reflect this guidance in their specific plans for investment in facilities in the Ryukyus. I suggest that this is an area in which your interest might be directed to prevent any unnecessary future loss of investments if reversion does occur and to minimize political agitation if it does not.

Attachment
a/s


David E. McGiffert
Under Secretary of the Army

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- E X T R A C T -

Thank you for your letter of 1 June commenting on my recent suggestions concerning alternate base locations in the Pacific area. Because of the existing political climate in the Ryukyus and possible political overtures expected from Japan this fall I am glad that we are looking into this problem now. My thinking has changed somewhat since my letter of 24 February to which you referred. I am no less convinced now of the political difficulty of base expansion on the island of Okinawa than I was at that time. On the contrary, I have become even more convinced. My opinion of the practicality of base expansion elsewhere in the Ryukyus, however, has become less sanguine. When I proposed looking into alternate base sites or places where new bases could be created on less inhabited islands of the Ryukyus, I was prompted by two ideas: that it would be desirable to keep our base facilities as close to the Asian continent as possible while still being well protected, and that land acquisition in thinly populated areas would be politically feasible.

*in spirit
concept*

Both ideas taken alone are sound. However, in the broader context each has a weakness. The first, does not consider how long we shall have jurisdiction over or freedom of base use in the Ryukyus. The second overlooks the fact that wherever we build bases, the Ryukyuan population concentrates and grows in the area; the initial base construction might go smoothly, but later on this situation would not be unlike that around our older bases.

but

Neither idea adequately took note of my present feeling that in the absence of a resolution of the growing pressures for reversion, any major base expansion in the Ryukyus would serve as a focal point for vilification of the United States, and could complicate the achievement of our long-range goals. (I do not think the same problem would necessarily exist in a post-reversion situation, in which we had freedom of base use and an agreed mechanism for base expansion.)

My suggestion of 24 February would require us to assume the risk of building bases today that we might have to give up or accept limited use of tomorrow. The major risks attending Admiral Sharp's proposal involve the acceptance of more unfavorable time and distance factors and possible derogation of the symbolism (capability and willingness to carry out treaty commitments) of United States armed forces located on the rimland of Asia. But these are lesser risks. Consequently, I agree with Admiral Sharp that substantial additional investments should not be made in

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the Ryukyus at this time, and that future large-scale base development projects should be located in areas under long-term United States control. At the same time, information categorizing alternatives available should be on hand in case an unexpected situation arises in which we are required to react quickly. Some base expansion may be necessary in Okinawa, but we shall have to look to reclaimed land to accommodate such expansion if serious political trouble is to be avoided. Of course, reclamation is very expensive, but it does not take land away from the Okinawans.

As part of the overall problem, a need exists presently for a concerted policy among the services in regard to long-range planning for base development on Okinawa. The Army position is one of minimizing high cost construction projects on Okinawa as suggested by Admiral Sharp. On the other hand, the Air Force and, to a lesser extent, the Navy and Marines appear to be expanding their facilities on existing military bases. Although this expansion should not cause any particular problem (as you already know, our problems stem from projects requiring the acquisition of additional land, or the withdrawal of large areas from licensed farming), the policies and actions of the respective services are a bit incongruous.

- E X T R A C T -

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO
Op-605E/jww
Ser 00150P60

28 MAR 1967

SECRET

From: Chief of Naval Operations *Rivers*
To: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: Western Pacific Base Policy (U)

Encl: (1) Projection of Base Availability in WESTPAC

1. (S) Strategy

a. The basic tenet of US military strategy in the Far East is expressed as containment of Communist China. The developing military capability of Communist China may well require increasing commitment of US military resources to deter Chinese ambitions in the 1975-1985 time frame.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff currently approved strategic concept calls for: defense of Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Australia, and New Zealand; control of the Straits of Malacca, South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, Sea of Japan, Bering Sea, and Bering Strait; and defense as far forward as practicable beyond this minimum defense line, to include the continental areas of South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, Pakistan, and India, or lodgments in key areas if the continental defense is not militarily attainable.

2. (S) Current Assessment of Base Structure

a. The strategy requires an extensive network of bases and sea and air lines of communication throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. Present bases in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, Guam, and the communication station at Northwest Cape, Australia (and the proposed facilities on Diego Garcia and Aldabra) are considered to provide a geographically adequate base structure to support the strategic concept.

b. The present USN base structure in the Far East was acquired largely in the years immediately following World War II. In the intervening years, the material condition has gradually deteriorated because of inadequate construction funds, uncertain base tenure, and the consequent lack of uniform base policy. In addition, construction of facilities to meet requirements imposed by Southeast Asia hostilities has been undertaken without maximum consideration of long-term needs.

c. No major redistribution of facilities, forces, and equipment is considered necessary at present except to provide Okinawa basing for a WESTPAC Marine Air Wing. Existing and planned facilities should, wherever practicable, be developed to accommodate increases in population and support requirements without major redistribution.

Group-3

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d. Strategically located Guam, the westernmost territory under unequivocal US control, has the best potential as the key bastion in the Western Pacific for a wide range of heavy stockage, repair, and staging support.

3. (S) WESTPAC Base Policy for 1975-1985 Time Frame

a. Definitions

(1) Permanent Base: An established base with a continuing capacity to support peacekeeping duties and the potential to expand to meet the surge requirements of a nonnuclear or general war situation. Construction designed for long term use, employing standards suitable for acceptable levels of service, economy, and comfort for periods in excess of 25 years.

(2) Semi-Permanent Base: An established base with a capacity to support peacekeeping duties and the potential to expand to meet the requirements of a nonnuclear or general war situation. Construction designed for long term use, employing standards suitable for acceptable levels of service, economy, and comfort for periods of 15-25 years.

(3) Temporary Base: A base established for the support of combat or non-combat operations for a finite period of time. Construction designed on an austere basis (e.g., using Mobile Construction Battalions and Advanced Base Functional Components) to achieve maximum economy with conformance to minimum habitability standards for a period of less than 15 years.

b. Political Considerations

Current political considerations in the Far East reflect the many interrelationships between US vital interests and the interests of individual countries that have differing political alignments. The degree to which individual countries in the Far East will continue to identify mutual interest with the United States will be influenced by what they view as being in their national interest, their economic self-sufficiency, and their evaluation of the threat from Communist China. US problems with regard to base rights and tenure will be more or less proportional to the identified mutuality of interest; however, particular self interests and nationalism will continue to present unforeseen difficulties. Political developments which we may expect in the 1975-1985 time frame include a continuation of the current disintegration of alliances and ideological groupings. Any degradation of US base structure in WESTPAC, unless offset by a compensating increase in deployments of sea-based systems, would have the effect of reducing the total US political, economic, and strategic influence in the area.

c. Controlling Military Factors

(1) Base structure will be largely determined by the best mix of mobile and fixed base support.

(2) The post-Vietnam base structure in WESTPAC must be capable of greater support than the pre-Vietnam structure (with a built-in expansion capability to meet surge requirements).

(3) The degree of base construction permanency must be consistent with anticipated base tenure. Enclosure (1) contains a projection of WESTPAC base availability.

(4) All bases should provide adequate accommodations to promote the well-being and operational effectiveness of base occupants.

(5) Alternate base plans should be developed to meet unforeseen requirements.

(6) Guidance should be broad enough to permit some flexibility for base planners.

d. Guidance

(1) No significant alteration in the existing mix between mobile logistic support forces and fixed bases in the WESTPAC area is envisioned.

(2) Bases on the mainland of SEAsia should be of a temporary nature (if acceptable to host government).

(3) Major naval complexes in Japan and Okinawa should be retained and improved. In general, all construction in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, and Taiwan should be semi-permanent in nature, and such construction should be in the form of improvements to existing bases except for Marine Air Wing air base requirements in Okinawa.

(4) Major naval complexes in the Philippines and Guam should be retained and improved. Construction should be of a permanent nature. The potential of Guam to provide support and staging for the entire Asian periphery must be utilized.

(5) Any construction in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the British Indian Ocean Territory, and Australia should be of a permanent nature.

(6) Full consideration should be given to consolidation of dispersed facilities, joint Service use of facilities, or other arrangements to achieve maximum long-term efficiency and economy.

(7) The primary criterion in the development of alternate base plans is strategic and military necessity.

(8) Base plans should promote, to maximum practicable extent, well-being and operational effectiveness of base occupants.


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Op-605E/jww
Ser 00150P60

4. (U) Action

Base planners shall be guided by this policy with the objective of achieving greatest possible coordination, efficiency, and economy in support of naval operations in the Western Pacific through the time frame 1975-1985. Further distribution may be made to subordinate commands at the discretion of addressees.



HORACIO RIVERO
Vice Chief of Naval Operations

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CNM (4 Copies)
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Op-04 (4 Copies)
Op-05 (2 Copies)
Op-06

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ENCLOSURE (1)

PROJECTION OF BASE AVAILABILITY IN WESTPAC

COUNTRY	*MAJOR INSTALLATIONS	RESTRICTIONS ON USE	**BASE CLASSIFICATION	AVAILABILITY 1975-1985
1. JAPAN	19 (5 Army, 5 Navy 9 Air Force)	Bases are for mutual defense purposes. Consultation at request of either party through Joint Committee on Consultation. Specific facilities reviewed at request of either Government. Use of facilities in practice unhampered, except for introduction of nuclear weapons in the country. Operations other than those under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security are subject to prior consultation between Governments.	Semi-permanent.	<u>Reasonably Assured.</u> (Termination after 14 on 1-yr notice, but expect Japan to opt for 10-yr extension; treaty will probably be renegotiated by 1982. Urban and industrial encroachment will influence all bases prior 1982 time frame.)
2. RYUKYU ISLANDS	5 (1 Army, 1 Navy, 3 Air Force)	Governed by Mutual Security Treaty with Japan. Consultation required but use for all practical purposes unimpeded. Probably will be increased Japanese pressure for restrictions on use.	Semi-permanent.	<u>Reasonably Assured.</u> (Probably be joint US-Japan defense area.)
3. KOREA	6 (3 Army, 3 Air Force)	Mutual Defense Treaty. Bases subject to mutual agreement. In practice, use unimpeded.	Semi-permanent.	<u>Reasonably Assured.</u> (Indefinite duration can be terminated after one yr's notice. Probably will be modified by 1982 in light of existing political and economic conditions. Some restrictions on US use likely.)

Group 3
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Not automatically declassified.

Enclosure (1) to CNO Ser 00150P60
of 28 March 1967

Page 1 of 3 Pages

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COUNTRY *MAJOR
 INSTALLATIONS

RESTRICTIONS ON
USE

**BASE
CLASSIFICATION

AVAILABILITY
1975-1985

4. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	3 (2 Navy, 1 Air Force)	Legally unimpeded by treaty. Consultation required on 3rd party use. Military Defense Board. Consultation on base problems.	Permanent	Assured Availabl (25 years from S 1966, although po pressures may affe selected facilities
5. TAIWAN	3 (Air Force)	Mutual Defense Treaty. Bases subject to mutual agreement. In practice, use unimpeded.	Semi-permanent	Reasonably Assured. (Indefinite duration be terminated after 1 notice. Death of Chia and UN decisions may re quire revision of this estimate.)
6. THAILAND	10 (1 Army, 9 Air Force)	No formal agreement. Use in practice unimpeded.	Temporary	Doubtful Tenure. (No base rights agreemen Political situation make any forecast unreliable.
7. SOUTH VIETNAM	20 (3 Army, 2 Navy, 15 Air Force)	No treaty. Use unimpeded.	Temporary	Doubtful Tenure. (No base rights agreemen If hostilities end, re- moval of US presence may be a condition of settle ment. If hostilities continue US presence assured as long as it chooses to stay.)

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<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>*MAJOR INSTALLATIONS</u>	<u>RESTRICTIONS ON USE</u>	<u>**BASE CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>AVAILABILITY 1975-1985</u>
8. GUAM & TTPI	All three Services have major facilities.	None for Guam. (US Territory) TTPI under UN mandate to the US.	Permanent	Assured Availability. (Some pressure from UN to change status but change will come and if US desires. No Department of Interior agreement provides for opportunity to oppose foreign entry.)
9. BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (BIOT)	None at this time. (1 Air Force, 1 Navy projected)	US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement in preparation. Establishment subject to mutual agreement. <u>Use unimpeded.</u>	Permanent	Assured Availability. (Initial period 25 yrs. subject to extension. No difficulties foreseen.)
10. AUSTRALIA	1 (Navy)	Use unimpeded.	Permanent	Assured Availability. (Initial period 25 yrs. subject to extension. No difficulties foreseen.)

* Major Installation (USBRO definition) 200 men; value of \$2 mil; or high strategic value.

** Permanent Base - 25 years or more.
Semi-Permanent Base - 15 years or more.
Temporary Base - Less than 15 years.

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JCS 2326/28-1
of 6/2767

TOP SECRET

CDR F.C. JOHNSON, USN
Op-605E4/X-55927
27 September 1967

IMPORTANCE OF OKINAWA AS A MILITARY BASE (U)

- CONCEPT
- One of most important U.S. base complexes in WESTPAC.
 - Significance growing with increased tempo operations SEA.
 - US military facilities occupy about 22% of total land area.
 - As military buildup in support VN continues, pressures for use of limited resources and space on Okinawa will increase.

- STATUS
- Central location supports operations in North Central and Southeast Asia.
 - 16 major and numerous minor military installations on the island: major nuclear weapons storage and SIOP strike recovery base for SAC, base free of political restraints; logistic facilities, ELINT sites, staging and training areas for 3 MarDiv and Army units.
 - Major USN/USMC facilities on Okinawa:
 1. Naval Activities Ryukyus.
 2. Naval Air Facility, Naha.
 3. Naval Security Group Activity, Hanza and Sobe.
 4. Camp Butler, FMF Base Complex (6 subordinate camps, 3 training areas, 1 storage area).
 5. Camp Kinser Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Base.
 6. Marine Corps Air Facility, Futema.
 - Army plans for improving logistic support to forces in Vietnam involve expansion off-shore logistics base on Okinawa.
 - In 1964 SECDEF approved MAG (Marine Air Group) move from Japan to Okinawa. Aircraft/personnel congestion in Naha area necessitates development of another jet capable airfield. JCS recommended construction field for MAG at Kushi Wan. SECNAV proposed construction of \$39.7M airfield. On 5 July 1966 SECDEF deferred project indefinitely. SECNAV reclama dated 10 Nov 1966 rejected by SECDEF on 6 Jan 1967.
 - CINCPACFLT has submitted AGE Study for \$90M protected harbor facility at ~~Kushi Wan~~ to improve WESTPAC Navy/Marine amphibious posture.

- PROBLEM
- Full US freedom of action and control inhibited by the "respect for sovereignty" doctrine and concessions to Japanese desires. Supported by certain Okinawan officials. Public opinion and press in Japan strongly urge GOJ to obtain full reversion of Okinawa from US. Former Amb. Reischauer has recommended expanded local autonomy and increased economic aid to lessen friction. High level US visit scheduled for fall 1967.

CLASSIFICATION - The above paragraphs are classified Secret.

Secret
CP-44124
Cdr Flanagan
14 June 1967

SUBJECT (U)

New Airfield, Okinawa

HIGHLIGHTS (S)

Recognizing the operational/training requirement to co-locate the Marine Air/Ground Forces, CINCPACFLT proposed the construction of the Kushi-Wan Master Airfield. OSD deferred the project and reclama in view of uncertainties in the post-SEA period.

DISCUSSION (S)

CINCPACFLT phased construction plan for this project:

Phase I - Single runway jet-capable base for one MAG; cost \$39.7 Million.

Phase II - Dual runway base for two MAGS and one V2 squadron; cost \$39.9 Million.

Phase III - Two additional V2 squadrons, relocate NAF Naha base land and functions, and FAW Staff from MCAS Iwakuni; cost \$110 Million.

\$18.3 Million this project deleted from FY-66 SUPP MILCON Program by OSD pending JCS approval of requirement.

27 Jan 1966, JCS recommended to SECDEF early authorization and funding of Kushi-Wan, noting airfield urgently required to support current and projected air operations in Southeast Asia.

During Congressional testimony FY-66 Supplemental House Armed Services Committee learned necessity jet airfield, added \$39.7M to Authorization Act (PL-89-367).

Authorization approved by both houses in Congress. House and Senate Appropriations Committees did not provide funds.

SECDEF memo to the Chairman, JCS of 5 July 1966 deferred Kushi-Wan Project indefinitely as not appearing justified in view of extensive SEASIA base construction program and existing complex of airbases in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Okinawa, and Philippines, SECNAV recommended deferral 10 Nov 1966.

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Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

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The SECDEF, in response to the SECNAV Memo of 10 Nov 1966, advised the SECNAV on 6 Jan 1967 by memo that he, the SECDEF, still believed the proposed construction of an airfield at Kushi-Wan should be deferred indefinitely in view of the uncertainties about future deployments raised by the war in Vietnam and the future U.S. role in Okinawa.

RECOMMENDATION (C)

It is recommended that the Kushi-Wan project be fully supported.

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25,

New Airfield, Okinawa (U)

Kushi-Wan Master Jet Airfield

BACKGROUND (S) CINCPACFLT phased construction plan for this project:

Phase I - Single runway jet-capable base for one MAG; cost \$46.4 Million.

Phase II - Dual runway base for two MAGS and one VP squadron; cost \$39.9 Million.

Phase III - Two additional VP squadrons and FAW. Close NAF NAHA and transfer functions to Kushi-Wan; cost \$30.4 Million.

Total Kushi-Wan Master Jet Airfield \$116.7 Million.

\$18.3 Million this project deleted from FY-66 SEPP MILCON Program by OSD pending JCS approval of requirement.

27 Jan 1966, JCS recommended to SECDEF early authorization and funding of Kushi-Wan, noting airfield urgently required to support current and projected air operations in Southeast Asia.

DISCUSSION (C) During Congressional testimony FY-66 Supplemental House Armed Services Committee learned necessity for airfield, added \$39.7M to Authorization Act (PL-89-367).

Authorization approved by both Houses in Congress. House and Senate Appropriations Committees did not provide funds.

SECDEF memo to the Chairman, JCS of 5 July 1966 deferred Kushi-Wan Project indefinitely as not appearing justified in view of extensive SEASIA base construction program and existing complex of airbase in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Okinawa, and Philippines. SECNAV reclaimed deferral 10 Nov 1966.

CURRENT STATUS (S) The SECDEF, in response to the SECNAV Memo of 10 Nov 1966, advised the SECNAV on 6 Jan 67 by memo that he, the SECDEF, still believed the proposed construction of an airfield at Kushi-Wan should be deferred indefinitely in view of the uncertainties about future deployments raised by the war in Vietnam and the future U.S. role in Okinawa.

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ATTACHED OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

TYPE Memo

ADDRESSEE(S) CNO

SERIAL 00565P60

MAIL ROOM R/S NO.

SUBJECT

Long Range Planning for Western Pacific Bases (U)

BACKGROUND/BRIEFING (If required, list references and enclosures immediately below, in naval letter format. It is not necessary to list references and enclosures to the basic incoming and outgoing documents. Duplication of information contained in the attached incoming or outgoing correspondence, or that inserted elsewhere on this sheet, should be avoided wherever practicable.)

1. (S) The Under Secretary of the Army in his memo of 4 October 1967 (Tab A) addressed the problem of Long Range Planning for Western Pacific Bases, specifically those in the Ryukyu Islands. It was suggested that SECNAV consider actions directed at preventing any unnecessary future loss of investment if Ryukyuan reversion occurs and to minimize political agitation if reversion does not transpire.

2. (S) Western Pacific Base Policy promulgated by CNO ltr ser 00150P60 of 28 March 1967 (Tab B) addresses the long-term tenure situation throughout the Western Pacific and establishes basic guidance which is in consonance with the spirit of the Under Secretary of the Army's memo. (SECNAV has not seen this before)

3. (S) JCS 2326/28-1 of 27 June 1967 (Tab C) included as its final recommendation that "The Services should consider the possible effects of the reversion issue in planning or programming mid-term base developments involving the Ryukyus."

4. (S) Point Papers containing additional information on the Navy/Marine Corps facilities on Okinawa and the planned base at Oura Wan/Kushi Wan are at Tab D and E respectively.

5. (S) The attached memorandum responds to the Under Secretary of the Army and reflects the existing policy on this matter.

6. (U) It is recommended that the attached memorandum to the Under Secretary of the Navy be signed.

☐ CONTINUED ON PAGE 2

SIGNATURE

W.H.C. Krendel

OFFICE CODE AND/OR TITLE

DATE

This sheet is unclassified when removed from described material, unless entry of classified information hereon requires classification

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