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PROM : Director, Long Range Objectives Group

OP-00 dF-002 9F-003

OP-004 OP-005

SUBJECT Long Range Requirements for the Southern Oceans

Encl: (1) Op-93 ser 0079P93 of 31 May 1960

interest The enclosure is forwarded as being a matter of particular to you. OP-006

Rear Admiral Very respectfully, ASSIFIED ORACIO RIVERO S. Navy

Op-05 Op-06 Op-06 Op-07 Op-90 Op-92 Op-01 Op-04 60-do Сору DISTRIBUTION LIST to: Op-30 Op-34 Op-40 Op-43 Op-05W Op-50 Op-60 Op-61 Op-09M (W/encl) OSOF REVIEWED AND DECLASS BY DNDT ON

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Captain, U. S. VICTOR DELANO Navy

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OP Washington 25, NAVAL OPERATIONS Ŭ. Ç

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Hrom: Director, Director, Long Range Distribution List Objectives Group

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Subj: Long-Range Requirements for the Southern Oceans

Encl: (I)Factors in Areas Affecting Bordering Changes the Sou Southern Oceans þ. the Power Position

long-term jections, considered of bloc The VS. an NSC-level enclosure the planning and free world, S H possible forwarded Was study of the and prepared general over for the relative power the next 5 to 10 for submission in of future interest information. in connection with force 10 years. resition, level proconnection It Soviet **S**

Rear Admiral, U. HORACIO RIVERO S Navy

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VICTOR DELANO Captain, Navy

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BORDERING, THE SOUTHERN OCEANS FACTORS AFFECTING CHANGES IN THE POWER POSITION IN AREAS (INDIAN OCEAN, SOUTH ATLANTIC)

yet intentions as with ontions as yet not revealed a formulated or reduced to an 10 years are e many aspects of the relative power ahead for which the trends can not revealed and perhaps in many cases uced to an action time table. largely dependent relative power no be predicted position

What can be said about such areas is that:

- 9 Certain foreseeable trends will offer opportunities for enemy exploration, exploration. favorable
- 4 The opportunities. elects) enemy will have certain capabilities (or can readily to exploit provide these
- 0 stances Past experience exploitation will occur. that under these circum-
- d capability to counter a unless appropriate new Certain followed. other counter such exploitation, trends will reduce courses of action free world

course of course of action which we may disregard at our peril, in estimating future relative power positions and the action indicated to correct prospective deficiencies in our position, While 0£ this process of reasoning will not develop prediction, it at least points out a possible

The following material are extrapolations of observed vis-a-vis the enemy courses factors which, emy courses of suggested illy that which, for periods intelligence capabilities, is suggested that the questions lowing material are these: implications then matters of common factors or component trends will first be stated, and The purpose of this paper is behavior which, West in a very large sector of the in related areas. action when read together, point to paction strengthening his power knowledge; in others they drawn, trends, or deducible In s well in the future, de-i.e., enemy intentions. s to be asked regarding some cases the to bring The missing together possible future ingredient position are reasonable statements as world. such defies number from ST

- g the action, Communists could they? desired to 1 do these courses
- Q Would the returns from such option justify

. Should U. S. requirement to counter such courses of action? forward planning visualize

A. Component Factors or Trends

- 1. Economic weakness and political instability offer opportunities for Soviet penetration, particularly when accompanied by anti-western attitudes, as in much of the former and remaining colonial area, or by anti-U. S. attitudes, as in certain Latin American areas. opportunities for
- either complete independence or a high degree of autonomy, often associated with an increased drift from Western influence, and Within the next 5 and and often in certain Middile Eastern and presently under Western con economic strength seem unlikely to be achieved circumstances under which political to 10 years and Far Eastern control will ga virtually all gain
- maintenance of denial or restriction of Western military base facilities assistance are likely many of these indigenous military . A product of the foregoing trend will be of Western military and naval forces from, to be developed only with of the Soviet bloc. security under severe areas. forces, In some of these sufficient trend will be the direct internal stress, areas even for 01 signifiand the indirect
- moral and other pressures, capability by member concert It can be expected that the Soviet bloc will attempt promote, under guise of "peace" and "anti-imperialism" concert of action through the UN to further restrict, b 4. A further product of the foregoing trend may strengthening of auti-western voting strength in nations. the support of Western military
- sea, particularly areas politically oriented to that the USSR merchant " military intelligence to prestige, to and naval A merchant marine USSR merchant marine and subversion, and when penetration, marine can be employed as a economic and political pene the sea. economically the sea. It ۳. ش in areas OS employed. dependent on, is generally desired adjacent penetration, 6 to the accepted and
- developed nations its continued expansion is to utilize it for expanded The Soviet bloc S I expanded clear. merchant external probable; and the external trade wi marine დ ლ. with underexpanding; intention
- post-war construction, prove its destroyer Soviet Navy has substantial cruiser forces forces, It continues as as its submarine to construct and forces

It possesses a considerable strength in ship types capable exercising a general naval power, and strong political and prestige effects, in areas where it is not opposed by first line naval or air forces of major powers. The principal obstacle to the exercise of such power in areas remote facilities outside of the USSR. the USSR is the lack of naval logistic support

- is not clear whether this interest extends beyond the requirements of broad scientific investigation, or of preparation for such conflicts as might be compatible with present U, S, strategic the waters of the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. clear whether this interest extends beyond the of broad scientific investigation, or of prepara The USSR has exhibited a degree of active interest concepts.
- USSR ship visits to distant ports have increased.
- mobile logistic support, at undevelope submarines deployed in remote areas, these types, and provision of tenders would require only a minor investment military expenditures. The expanding Soviet merchant marine provides an increased capability for supply of remote forces naval auxiliary ships of types capable of furnishing bile logistic support, at undeveloped anchorages, to There has been a trend toward USSR construction for surface relative to total Further increases warships,
- ture of appreciation of the value of a general world-wide seapower, as distinguished from capability to defend the USSR against attack, to cut Western life lines, or to attack the U. S. with submarine launched missiles. 11. There is evaluation of the ture of appreciation of the There is evidence in official Soviet naval litera-
- 12. Soviet support and encouragement of efforts expand territorial waters, while explicable on other grounds, is also consistent with an intent to create world-wide obstacles to the effective employment of naval power and merchant shipping. to
- forces which are only marginally adequate to oppose threats in the NATO, WestPac and CONUS areas and on the life lines thereof. The trend of Western naval strength, at recent and present replacement levels, has been and 13. Western naval power has not been required, World War II, to exert substantial effort along the littoral from Singapore to Northwest Africa, nor in southern sectors of South America, At present strengent strengent strengent strengent strengent strengent sectors. it downward, would be able to do 00 only by diversion of At present strength the ocean



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been 14. The Soviet intention to contest for suppressed in the underdeveloped areas often and credibly stated. Soviet intention to contest for supremacy

B. Basic Implication of the Foregoing

- supplies, the area, naval power in the southern oceans, as one element in a general, world-wide Soviet program to control and exploit areas of interest, could (if not countered) greatly increase the power position of the Soviet bloc. Such power would, in the normal Soviet pattern, be employed in power would, in the normal Soviet pattern, be employ close coordination with economic, political, psychol subversive and other pressures, including the gamut simple prestige to direct threats of rocket attack. Hemisphere, resulting from loss of political controls, prestige, displacement of customary contacts and trade, and/or withdrawal of forces and bases, thus reversing the and/or withdrawal of forces and bases, this reversa present may include the installation of Communist-controlled governments, the loss to Soviet bloc control of vital raw material supplies, the intimidation of even the stronger nations in the area, e.g., India, and by contagion the withdrawal or further restriction of military facilities even in adjacent present relative positions. Africa, absolute Western power position in advances areas not e Western power position in Southern Asia and and possibly in southern sectors of the Westere, resulting from loss of political control trends to be accompanied by declines in the The directly affected. maintenance of even modest End-products of this reversal political, psychological, elements of the Western likely raw materials Soviet under from These
- in the relative power position in these areas, and its consequences, could occur even if the extension of Soviet naval power did not take place, as a result of the other factors stated above: the operation by other means, power in the areas, all of which are indeterminate Soviet naval intentions. the substantial portion of the opportunities offered, their neans, and the dilution of wester l of which are independent of the the foregoing reversal western

C. Conclusions

- tunities tties for Communist penetration in areas southern oceans will arise. Increasingly in the period through for Communist penetration in areas 1970 opporexposed
- merchant penetration marine will be employed. and external pressure, addition to the usual non-military means of an expanding Soviet bloc
- adequate in some areas after Western control Indigenous resources for resistance is relinwill be in-

- present trends are projected unchanged. Western influence in the areas will decline, įf
- pro-Communist elements will the case of nown the case of power on land, power afloat, as bases are afloat, as bases are relinquished or restricted, forces are withdrawn or reduced. Locally effective available to the assumption of I decline: almost military power sources for the West for counteracting strikingly in the case of almost totally sources power by formerly in
- the exercise therein of limited naval power. intention to do so has yet been demonstrated. and can readily acquire additional required elements, to supplement its non-military capabilities in these areas by USSR will possess major elements of capability,
- areas, the relative power to present serious danger, the relative power positions will change sufficiently Even in the absence of Soviet naval power by 1970 of:
- 5 resources to The loss of substantial areas and their Communist control,
- ٠ م Communist weakening contagion or neutralization of other areas, by or intimidation, with resultant of their ultimate resistance to pressures,
- 0 general war threats, as well as capa-bilities related only to local situations other support to the West The further withdrawal of base rights Western strategic adjacent areas. This may capabilities related directly in these and affect
- φ. The establishment of conditions wherein overt or covert Soviet acquisition of military and naval base rights will be facilitated.
- accentuated and accelerated. An election to do so may concealed, to avoid alerting the West to the need for counteraction, until conditions permit a quick fait accompli in the establishment of such power. to establish even limited
- particularly from the U.S., exertion of appropriate power forces permanently maintained Because of the remoteness of from the Ü. ÷ the eness of these areas, the timely and flexible therein will require ĬD area.

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BORDERING THE FACTORS AFFECTING CHANGES IN THE POWER POSITION IN AREAS SOUTHERN CCEANS (INDIAN OCEAN, SOUTH ATLANTIC)

There are many aspects of the relative power position 5 to 10 years ahead for which the trends can not be predic with certainty, since they are largely dependent on enemy intentions as yet not revealed and perhaps in many cases nyet formulated or reduced to an action time table. predicted

What can be said about such areas is that:

- 8 opportunities for enemy exploration, Certain foreseeable trends will offer favorable
- ρ, so elects) certopportunities. certain capabilities to exploit these (or can readily provide if he so
- 0 Past experience indicates stances exploitation will occur. that under these circum-
- ū are followed. unless capability to counter such exploitation, appropriate new courses of action other trends will reduce free world

certainty of prediction, it at least points out a possible course of action which we may disregard at our peril, in estimating future relative power positions and the action indicated to correct prospective deficiencies in our position, While this process of reasoning of prediction, it at least will not develop

usually that which, for periods well in the future, de our intelligence capabilities, i.e., enemy intentions. is suggested that the questions to be asked regarding the implications then drawn. In some cases the statements are matters of common knowledge; in others they are reasonable extrapolations of observed trends, or deducible as such from Soviet behavior in related areas. The missing ingredient is of factors which, when read together, point to possible enemy courses of action strengthening his power position vis-a-vis the West in a very large sector of the world. following material are these: factors or component trends will first be stated, and The purpose of this paper is to bring together to possible future defies a number

- 0f action, could they? the Communists desired to opt these courses
- Φ, Would the returns from such option justify the effort?

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.0 Should U. S. requirement Should U. to counter such courses of forward planning visualize a possible action?

A. Component Factors or Trends

- 1. Economic weakness and political instability offer opportunities for Soviet penetration, particularly when accompanied by anti-western attitudes, as in much of the former and remaining colonial area, or by anti-U. S. attitudes, as in certain Latin American areas.
- either complete independence or a high degree of autooften associated with an increased drift from Western influence, and often in circumstances under which political territories Africa, and Within the next 5 to 10 years virtually and economic strength seem unlikely to be achieved. certain Middile Eastern and Far Eastern presently under Western control will ga gain autonomy,
- maintenance of security under severe in, many of these areas. In some of these areas significant indigenous military forces, sufficient even for the drawal of Western military and naval forces from, and the denial or restriction of Western military base facilities are likely are likely to be developed only with assistance of the Soviet bloc, A product of the foregoing trend will be the internal stress, the direct or indirect
- UN. It can be expected that the Soviet to promote, under guise of "peace" and a concert of action through the UN to fu capability 4. A further product of the foregoing trend may be strengthening of arti-western voting strength in the It can be expected that the Soviet bloc will attempt omote, under guise of "peace" and "anti-imperialism", cert of action through the UN to further restrict, by and other pressures, the support of Western military by member nations.
- sea, particularly areas economically dependent on, and politically oriented to the sea. It is generally accepted that the USSR merchant marine is so employed, aid to prestige, to to intelligence and and naval penetration, A merchant marine can be employed as and subversion, and when desired to penetration, in areas adjacent to the economic and political penetration,
- developed nations utilize it for expand The Soviet bloc merchant marine is ed expansion is probable; and the W hansion is probable; and the intention expanded external trade with underclear, м Н. is expanding; intention
- prove post-war Sti construction, The Soviet Navy has substantial cruiser forces of destroyer forces, as well-as-its submarked forces. 4 continues to construct and

exercising a general naval power, and strong political and prestige effects, in areas where it is not opposed by first line naval or air forces of major powers. The principal obstacle to the exercise of such power in areas remote from the USSR is the lack of naval logistic support facilities outside of the USSR. possesses a considerable strength in ship types capable 0 H

- strategic ments of for such conflicts not the clear whether this interest extends beyonf broad scientific investigation, or of conflicts as might be compatible with waters of the The concepts. USSR has South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. exhibited a interest extends beyond the requiredegree 0 with present active preparation interest ď,
- USSR ship visits to distant ports have increased.
- military would require only a minor investment provides an increased capability for submarines mobile logistic support, of naval auxiliary ships of types capable of furnishing ogistic support, at undeveloped anchorages, to expenditures. The expanding There has deployed in been a trend toward USSR construction remote areas. supply of remote forces. relative to tota Soviet merchant for surface Further increases warships, total marine
- seapower, as distinguished recommended lines, or USSR against attack, to cut Western life lines, or attack the U.S. with submarine launched missiles. ture of appreciation of the There distinguished from capability to defend the attack. to out world-wide **1**8 evidence in official Sowiet naval litera-
- Western naval power grounds, is also consist world-wide obstacles to expand territorial waters, while explicable on other, is also consistent with an intent to create Soviet support and encouragement and merchant the effective employment shipping. of efforts 40
- southern sectors of South America, 13. Western naval power has not been required, sin World War II, to exert substantial effort along the oce littoral from Singapore to Northwest Africa, nor in the forces remains downward. threats in recent and present replacement levels, lines which are only marginally adequate to oppose s in the NATO, WestPac and CONUS areas and on the ines thereof. The trend of Western naval strengt it would be able to do so only by diversion of At present strength has been and naval strength, ocean

14. The Soviet intention to contest for support on a "peaceful" basis in the underdeveloped areas been often and credibly stated, supremacy has

B. Basic Implication of the Foregoing

- absolute Western power position in Southern Asia and Africa, and possibly in southern sectors of the Western Hemisphere, resulting from loss of political control and prestige, displacement of customary contacts and trade, and/or withdrawal of forces and bases, thus reversing the present relative positions. End-products of this reversal supplies, the intimidation of even the strothe area, e.g., India, and by contagion the further restriction of military facilities ments, the loss to Soviet bloc control of vital raw materials supplies, the intimidation of even the stronger nations in may include the installation of Communist-controlled governadvances in the Soviet position would appear likely under present trends to be accompanied by declines in the areas of interest, could (if not countered) greatly increase the power position of the Soviet bloc. Suppower would, in the normal Soviet pattern, be employed coordination with economic, political, psychological positions. subversive and other pressures, areas of areas simple prestige general, not directly affected. power wer in the southern oceans, as one element in a world-wide Soviet program to control and exploit maintenance of even modest to direct threats of rocket attack. including the elements of the withdrawal be employed in even in adjacent psychological, gamut from Such Soviet These
- factors stated above: the opportunities exploitation by other means, and the depower in the areas, all of which are indeterminate Soviet naval intentions. consequences, could occur even if the extension of naval power did not take place, as a result of the in the relative power position A substantial portion of the foregoing reversal the opportunities offered, their means, and the dilution of wester in these areas, independent of and western other Soviet

C. Conclusions

- tunities 1. Increasingly in the period through 1970 oppor-ities for Communist penetration in areas exposed to southern oceans will arise.
- merchant penetration and marine will be employed. In addition to external pressure, the usual non-military means an expanding Soviet bloc
- adequate qrished. in some Indigenous resources for resistance areas after Western control will be inis relin-



- present trends are Western influence in the areas projected unchanged, will decline, įf
- pro-Communist elements will decline; almost the case of power on land, strikingly in +hapower afloat. and presently accretion of : forces Locally effective are withdrawn or reduced. as bases are relinquished or restricted, available to military the West strikingly in the case of power sources for for counteracting almost totally in power by formerly the
- the and can readily acquire intention supplement its non-military capabilities in exercise The to therein of limited USSR will possess major do so has yet additional required been demonstrated. naval power. elements these areas elements, of capability, No clear
- areas, present the Even serious relative ij the danger, power positions will change absence of Soviet naval power in these by 1970, OĽ. sufficiently
- 9 The resources loss of substantial areas and to Communist control, their
- **.** Communist weakening contagion or neutralization of other areas, of their ultimate resistance pressures, intimidation, with resultant to
- Ç Western strategic capabilities related to general war threats, as well as capaother support to the West bilities adjacent further withdrawal of related areas. This may only to 0 local base directly in these situations rights and affect and
- ρ. overt or covert Soviet acquisition of military and naval base rights will be facilitated. The establishment of conditions wherein
- concealed, to avoid alerting the West to the need for counteraction, until conditions permit a quick fait accompli in the establishment of such power. naval power in these areas, accentuated and accelerated. the USSR does elect the the West An election foregoing hazards will to establish even n to do so the need f for may be
- particularly from the U. forces permanently exertion of Because of appropriate power maintained in the area. the remoteness **S** the timely and flexible r therein will require 0 F; these areas,

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- **100** and restriction. land in these areas will be subject The maintenance of countervailing Western power to increasing denial
- Because of power, c naval power in capable of cour troggue most promising source of effective and credible military aggression or seizures ments appear indicated. Planning for the period thr 1970 should consider these possible requirements for preventing oport to such non-military programs as may be developed counter the prospective trends. If the USSR establishes val power in these areas, additional Western naval forces pable of countering this power locally will be required. 11. clearly friendly The maintenance arly capable of the distances involved, continu a probable reversal of governments or of power, prompt intervention ashore ats or to oppose Communist in these areas of Western sea appears the present power continuous local to offer the period through deployto

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