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00-938/e15

Op-93B/ejs
Memo No. 00128-60
DATE: 11 July 1960

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OP-004
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OP-006

1. The enclosure is forwarded as being a matter of particular interest to you.

Very respectfully,

Francis Pickens
 FRANCIS PICKENS
 Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

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Year - 1874
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~~the~~ first year.

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Op-01	Op-30
Op-03	Op-34
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Nicholas J. Jafare

VICTOR DELANO
Captain, U. S. Navy

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington 25, D. C.

Op-93G/ejs
Ser: 0079P23
31 May 1960

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upon removal of enclosure

From: Director, Long Range Objectives Group
To: Distribution List

Subj: Long-Range Requirements for the Southern Oceans

Encl: (1) Factors Affecting Changes in the Power Position
in Areas Bordering the Southern Oceans

1. The enclosure was prepared for submission in connection with an NSC-level study of the relative power position, Soviet bloc vs. the free world, over the next 5 to 10 years. It is considered of possible general interest in connection with long-term planning and support of future force level projections, and is forwarded for information.

HORACIO RIVERO
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

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AUTHENTICATED

Victor Delano

VICTOR DELANO
Captain, U. S. Navy

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FACTORS AFFECTING CHANGES IN THE POWER POSITION IN AREAS
BORDERING THE SOUTHERN OCEANS (INDIAN OCEAN, SOUTH ATLANTIC)

There are many aspects of the relative power position 5 to 10 years ahead for which the trends can not be predicted with certainty, since they are largely dependent on enemy intentions as yet not revealed and perhaps in many cases not yet formulated or reduced to an action time table.

What can be said about such areas is that:

- a. Certain foreseeable trends will offer favorable opportunities for enemy exploration.
- b. The enemy will have (or can readily provide if he so elects) certain capabilities to exploit these opportunities.
- c. Past experience indicates that under these circumstances exploitation will occur.
- d. Certain other trends will reduce free world capability to counter such exploitation, unless appropriate new courses of action are followed.

While this process of reasoning will not develop a certainty of prediction, it at least points out a possible course of action which we may disregard at our peril, in estimating future relative power positions and the action indicated to correct prospective deficiencies in our position.

The purpose of this paper is to bring together a number of factors which, when read together, point to possible future enemy courses of action strengthening his power position vis-a-vis the West in a very large sector of the world. The factors or component trends will first be stated, and the implications then drawn. In some cases the statements are matters of common knowledge; in others they are reasonable extrapolations of observed trends, or deducible as such from Soviet behavior in related areas. The missing ingredient is usually that which, for periods well in the future, defies our intelligence capabilities, i.e., enemy intentions. It is suggested that the questions to be asked regarding the following material are these:

- a. If the Communists desired to opt these courses of action, could they?
- b. Would the returns from such action justify the effort?

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- c. Should U. S. forward planning visualize a possible requirement to counter such courses of action?

A. Component Factors or Trends

1. Economic weakness and political instability offer opportunities for Soviet penetration, particularly when accompanied by anti-western attitudes, as in much of the former and remaining colonial area, or by anti-U. S. attitudes, as in certain Latin American areas.

2. Within the next 5 to 10 years virtually all of Africa, and certain Middle Eastern and Far Eastern territories presently under Western control will gain either complete independence or a high degree of autonomy, often associated with an increased drift from Western influence, and often in circumstances under which political stability and economic strength seem unlikely to be achieved.

3. A product of the foregoing trend will be the withdrawal of Western military and naval forces from, and the denial or restriction of Western military base facilities in, many of these areas. In some of these areas significant indigenous military forces, sufficient even for the maintenance of security under severe internal stress, are likely to be developed only with the direct or indirect assistance of the Soviet bloc.

4. A further product of the foregoing trend may be the strengthening of anti-western voting strength in the UN. It can be expected that the Soviet bloc will attempt to promote, under guise of "peace" and "anti-imperialism", a concert of action through the UN to further restrict, by moral and other pressures, the support of Western military capability by member nations.

5. A merchant marine can be employed as a strong aid to prestige, to economic and political penetration, to intelligence and subversion, and when desired to the military and naval penetration, in areas adjacent to the sea, particularly areas economically dependent on, and politically oriented to the sea. It is generally accepted that the USSR merchant marine is so employed.

6. The Soviet bloc merchant marine is expanding; its continued expansion is probable; and the intention to utilize it for expanded external trade with underdeveloped nations is clear.

7. The Soviet Navy has substantial cruiser forces of post-war construction. It continues to construct and improve its destroyer forces, as well as its submarine forces.

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It possesses a considerable strength in ship types capable of exercising a general naval power, and strong political and prestige effects, in areas where it is not opposed by first line naval or air forces of major powers. The principal obstacle to the exercise of such power in areas remote from the USSR is the lack of naval logistic support facilities outside of the USSR.

8. The USSR has exhibited a degree of active interest in the waters of the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. It is not clear whether this interest extends beyond the requirements of broad scientific investigation, or of preparation for such conflicts as might be compatible with present U. S. strategic concepts.

9. USSR ship visits to distant ports have increased.

10. There has been a trend toward USSR construction of naval auxiliary ships of types capable of furnishing mobile logistic support, at undeveloped anchorages, to submarines deployed in remote areas. Further increases in these types, and provision of tenders for surface warships, would require only a minor investment relative to total military expenditures. The expanding Soviet merchant marine provides an increased capability for supply of remote forces.

11. There is evidence in official Soviet naval literature of appreciation of the value of a general world-wide seapower, as distinguished from capability to defend the USSR against attack, to cut Western life lines, or to attack the U. S. with submarine launched missiles.

12. Soviet support and encouragement of efforts to expand territorial waters, while explicable on other grounds, is also consistent with an intent to create world-wide obstacles to the effective employment of Western naval power and merchant shipping.

13. Western naval power has not been required, since World War II, to exert substantial effort along the ocean littoral from Singapore to Northwest Africa, nor in the southern sectors of South America. At present strength levels it would be able to do so only by diversion of forces which are only marginally adequate to oppose threats in the NATO, WestPac and CONUS areas and on the life lines thereof. The trend of Western naval strength, at recent and present replacement levels, has been and remains downward.

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14. The Soviet intention to contest for supremacy on a "peaceful" basis in the underdeveloped areas has been often and credibly stated,

B. Basic Implication of the Foregoing

1. The maintenance of even modest elements of Soviet naval power in the southern oceans, as one element in a general, world-wide Soviet program to control and exploit areas of interest, could (if not countered) greatly increase the power position of the Soviet bloc. Such power would, in the normal Soviet pattern, be employed in close coordination with economic, political, psychological, subversive and other pressures, including the gamut from simple prestige to direct threats of rocket attack. These advances in the Soviet position would appear likely under present trends to be accompanied by declines in the absolute Western power position in Southern Asia and Africa, and possibly in southern sectors of the Western Hemisphere, resulting from loss of political control and prestige, displacement of customary contacts and trade, and/or withdrawal of forces and bases, thus reversing the present relative positions. End-products of this reversal may include the installation of Communist-controlled governments, the loss to Soviet bloc control of vital raw materials supplies, the intimidation of even the stronger nations in the area, e.g., India, and by contagion the withdrawal or further restriction of military facilities even in adjacent areas not directly affected.

2. A substantial portion of the foregoing reversal in the relative power position in these areas, and its consequences, could occur even if the extension of Soviet naval power did not take place, as a result of the other factors stated above: the opportunities offered, their exploitation by other means, and the dilution of western power in the areas, all of which are independent of the indeterminate Soviet naval intentions.

C. Conclusions

1. Increasingly in the period through 1970 opportunities for Communist penetration in areas exposed to the southern oceans will arise.

2. In addition to the usual non-military means of penetration and external pressure, an expanding Soviet bloc merchant marine will be employed.

3. Indigenous resources for resistance will be inadequate in some areas after Western control is relinquished.

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4. Western influence in the areas will decline, if present trends are projected unchanged.

5. Locally effective military power sources formerly and presently available to the West for counteracting the accretion of influence and the assumption of power by pro-Communist elements will decline; almost totally in the case of power on land, strikingly in the case of power afloat, as bases are relinquished or restricted, and as forces are withdrawn or reduced.

6. The USSR will possess major elements of capability, and can readily acquire additional required elements, to supplement its non-military capabilities in these areas by the exercise therein of limited naval power. No clear intention to do so has yet been demonstrated.

7. Even in the absence of Soviet naval power in these areas, the relative power positions will change sufficiently to present serious danger, by 1970, of:

a. The loss of substantial areas and their resources to Communist control,

b. The neutralization of other areas, by contagion or intimidation, with resultant weakening of their ultimate resistance to Communist pressures,

c. The further withdrawal of base rights and other support to the West in these and adjacent areas. This may directly affect Western strategic capabilities related to general war threats, as well as capabilities related only to local situations,

d. The establishment of conditions wherein overt or covert Soviet acquisition of military and naval base rights will be facilitated.

8. If the USSR does elect to establish even limited naval power in these areas, the foregoing hazards will be accentuated and accelerated. An election to do so may be concealed, to avoid alerting the West to the need for counteraction, until conditions permit a quick fait accompli in the establishment of such power.

9. Because of the remoteness of these areas, particularly from the U. S., the timely and flexible exertion of appropriate power therein will require forces permanently maintained in the area.

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10. The maintenance of countervailing Western power on land in these areas will be subject to increasing denial and restriction.

11. The maintenance in these areas of Western sea power, clearly capable of prompt intervention ashore to support friendly governments or to oppose Communist aggression or seizures of power, appears to offer the most promising source of effective and credible military support to such non-military programs as may be developed to counter the prospective trends. If the USSR establishes naval power in these areas, additional Western naval forces capable of countering this power locally will be required. Because of the distances involved, continuous local deployments appear indicated. Planning for the period through 1970 should consider these possible requirements for preventing a probable reversal of the present power positions.

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