

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
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MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

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Subj: Indian Ocean Deployments (U)Ref: (a) Op-93 ser 00135P93 of 9 Dec 1959OP-00
OP-002
OP-003
OP-004
OP-005
OP-006Encl: (1) Study of the Feasibility and Cost of Maintaining Continuous Balanced Deployments in the Indian Ocean 1961-65

1. By marginal note CNO approved Op-93's proposal in reference (a) to prepare a study of deployments for the Indian Ocean. The intent was to have material available on which to base a request for additional resources for this specific area, in the event international or political developments should dictate a firm requirement.

2. Enclosure (1) is a first draft of Parts I-VII of this study, a development of added force and base requirements to support balanced, continuous deployments of moderate size, and to furnish the added logistic support which would be required by contingency augmentations from the present fleets, in this area. Comments are requested on the enclosure, following submission of which appropriate revisions will be incorporated and cognizant offices will be requested to provide information on feasibility and costs of implementation, for addition as Parts VIII-IX of the study.

3. The philosophy entering into the requirements developed in the enclosure may be summarized as follows:

a. To provide mainly for cold war effect, but with teeth enough to cope with a local situation, and an augmentation capability readily visible to deter larger threats.

b. To think big but realistically; to provide a rounded, balanced force tailored to real needs and to the real difficulties (personnel, politics, climate, etc.) of operating in this remote area.

c. To provide as much force as could be expected to be approved for continuous employment, but not to allow this deployment to reduce our deficiencies on other fronts (other than the added logistic support forces essential for augmented deployments in the Indian Ocean, which of course retain a degree of helpfulness elsewhere).

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25 August 1960

d. To schedule only forces which conceivably could be provided within about two years (necessarily from Reserve Fleet or ships scheduled for inactivation), thereby not significantly reducing the present deployment capabilities in other areas.

e. The deployments set forth are not to be considered as an unbreakable package, but as one from which selections may be made.

4. In view of the possibility of rapid external developments comments are requested by 7 September.

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Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Director, L
Long Range Objectives Group

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STUDY OF THE FEASIBILITY AND COST OF MAINTAINING
CONTINUOUS BALANCED DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
1961-1965]

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ENCLOSURE (1) to
CNO ltr ser 00125ps3 of 3/25/60

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STUDY OF THE FEASIBILITY AND COST OF
MAINTAINING CONTINUOUS BALANCED DEPLOYMENTS
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
1961-1965

I	Objective and Scope
II	Assumptions
III	Combatant Forces, Deployed and Ready
IV	Combatant Backup Requirements
V	Base Requirements
VI	Mobile Logistic Support Forces
VII	Total Required Additions to Active Fleet Forces
VIII	Phasing and Cost of Providing the Additional Ships
IX	Added Personnel Requirements
X	Added M&O Costs
XI	Phasing and Cost of Base Construction

Parts I-VII constitute the foundation for Parts VIII-XI, which are to be added later after coordination of Parts I-VII with interested divisions.

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Part I

OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

1-1. The purpose of this study is to explore the feasibility and cost of implementing a continuous deployment of minimum balanced naval forces in the Indian Ocean during the period 1901-65, in the event that national policy should call for such action.

1-2. The term "balanced forces" is used in the sense of balance against the more likely cold war and limited combat tasks to be expected. The intent is to provide the minimum deployed force strength required to accomplish such tasks effectively, and to provide non-deployed augmentation in lieu of deployed strength where time-distance factors indicate its feasibility.

1-3. The development herein of specific deployment levels, support requirements, and phasing rates is not intended to preclude consideration of other goals or other approaches. Obviously, if the program herein is feasible, so are any parts of it, and on any slower schedule, if lesser objectives are sought. The intent herein is simply to consider what could be done on a moderately expansive scale toward providing in the area the broad range of contributions which naval power can make to national aims. If only token or part-time contributions are desired, clearly these will be simpler and cheaper.

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1-4. The broad objectives to be supported by naval capabilities are conceived to be as follows:

- a. To provide continuous evidence of enduring U. S. interest and commitment to the solution of the problems of South Asia and Eastern Africa in a context of freedom.
- b. To seize the initiative in this vast area; to establish U. S. presence; to support a continuing awareness of U. S. power; and to forestall Soviet initiative to establish a power base facing the Indian Ocean.
- c. To bolster irresolute wills against Soviet threats.
- d. To support people-to-people programs.
- e. To provide on-the-spot, ready effective components, combatant or logistic support, for UN forces.
- f. To turn the spotlight from Soviet rocketry to the realities of power; to show U. S. confidence in its nuclear deterrent and U. S. superiority in control of the seas for peaceful development.

1-5. Support of these objectives is considered to require, optimally:

- a. The continuous presence of U. S. forces, evidenced by repetitive visits to a number of ports.
- b. An intention to remain indefinitely, evidenced by the establishment of permanent U. S. bases in the area (but for obvious reasons not encroaching on the territory of the new nations, nor held at the sufferance of a colonial power).

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c. The maintenance of an obvious and credible capability to intervene effectively and promptly to forestall local Communist coups.

d. Maintenance of a discreet capability to respond effectively to overt Communist aggression from the north - a capability known to all directly concerned but not advertised. This can be served by continuous deployment of a limited nuclear strike capability, plus maintenance of capabilities for logistic support of major augmenting forces.

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Part II

ASSUMPTIONS

2-1. The following major assumptions have been made in this study:

- a. That the forces required to support continuous routine deployments in the Indian Ocean must be provided without reducing or increasing (but may have side-effects of strengthening indirectly), the normal deployment and support levels and the levels of augmentation normally available in Fleets.
- b. That major augmentation for the Indian Ocean will come from existing forces.
- c. That ships routinely deployed to the Indian Ocean will be administratively assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, except logistic support types, which may be assigned to either Fleet in proportion to the gross deficiencies of each Fleet for meeting contingency requirements.
- d. That ships need be added to existing forces only as necessary to meet (1) added routine deployments, (2) overhaul and refresher training backup, (3) specific contingency deployments, and (4) rotational backup in addition only when total routine deployments for the type in LanFlt would otherwise exceed one-third of the active ships of the type. That is, if LanFlt now has C ships of a type, and now normally deploys only one, the addition of a second deployment requirement would add only one ship to the active list, not three.

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e. That existing IMF forces can support the rotating deployment to the Indian Ocean of one CIFT and one or two company-size detachments, plus supporting HR, and not to exceed one VT squadron and one VA squadron.

f. That nations owning suitable base sites will be willing to sell them or grant long-term, minimum-restriction development and use rights to the U. S., on reasonable terms; that the U. S. will proceed expeditiously to acquire the essential sites; and that one anchorage, suitable at least on an interim basis, can be available for start of development by mid-1961.

g. That the Soviet bloc will gain no bases in Eastern Africa, or in South Asia beyond those now available in North Vietnam.

h. That Suez is likely to be closed, or sufficiently unreliable to require southern routing of augmenting or logistic support forces, in the event of hostilities or severe tension in the northwest sectors of the Indian Ocean, and possibly in other situations involving Africa.

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Part III

COMBATANT FORCES, DEPLOYED AND READY

3-1. Indian Ocean. To carry out the objectives fully, the minimum requirements for routinely deployed combatant types are considered to be as follows:

a. A minimal striking force possessing alternate capabilities as follows:

(1) Execute an amphibious assault against light ground opposition not equipped with heavy or sophisticated weapons, under conditions of (a) negligible submarine threat, (b) air threat limited to small numbers of jet aircraft employing unsophisticated non-nuclear weapons.

(2) Execute hit-and-run tactical nuclear strikes to interdict or delay aggressive forces entering South Asian nations by land over the tortuous low-capacity routes from the north; submarine threat remains negligible, air threat may be sophisticated and nuclear, but will be limited in size by the ranges involved.

b. Sufficient additional surface combatants to:

(1) Augment the defenses of the striking force in severe conditions.

(2) Without compromising the integrity of the striking force:

(a) Provide for continuing visits to remote sectors of the area when the basic striking force must be kept ready elsewhere.

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(b) Provide for surveillance and patrol operations in at least one sub-sector remote from areas to strike force operations.

(c) Provide for frequent visits throughout the area, to major and minor ports.

3-2. Striking Force. A minimal striking force possessing the described capabilities could be composed as follows:

1 LPV (CVS-13)

Complement: 24-30 VME/VMA; 3-4 WV; 12-18 EWR;
300-500 troops.

1 APA, with 500-1000 troops.

1 LSD, with 200 troops.

4 DD.

3-3. The total amphibious assault capability of this force would be that of 1 BLT with air and surface fire support at the full requirements level (less heavy gunfire). The combination of the three ships will provide a balanced capability for vertical and over-the-beach assault, and includes a heavy-vehicle capability. A hit-and-run nuclear strike capability of modest proportions should be available, leaving APA, LSD and troops behind.

3-4. Additional Surface Forces. In addition to the 4 DD with the striking force, which should normally be retained intact, or at least in one area, the following minimal deployments are included:

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a. 1 CA (139 class), for the following employments, principally along the northern axis of the theater:

(1) Flagship for area command.

(2) Repeated prestige visits to major ports from Persian Gulf to Singapore.

(3) Augmentation of striking force AAW and fire support when threats are more than minor.

b. 2 DD, for patrol and surveillance as well as port visits in the Arabian Sea sector. This constitutes no change from the present ~~MedEast~~ ^{For} ~~MD~~ deployment.

c. 2 DE, for patrol and surveillance as well as port visits in the East African sector of the theater, and for escort of URG's in the event of Soviet bloc SS operations in the theater.

3-5. Augmentation of the foregoing routinely deployed forces to be provided from existing force levels for the numbered fleets.

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Part IV

COMBATANT BACKUP REQUIREMENTS

4-1. The following table summarizes the foregoing deployment requirements, and applies appropriate backup factors:

TABLE 4-A

	A Deployments Above Present Levels	B Additional Ships to Support 1-in-3 Rotation	C Additional Ships to Cover Transit Overhaul and Training Time	D Total Additional Active Ships Required
CA	1	b	e	1
DD	6a	b	3	9
LPV	1	2c	d	3
APA	1	1	d	2
USD	1	b	e	1
DE	2	b	1	3
LPH(CVS)	-	-1c	-	-1
NET TOTALS	12	2	4	13

- a - Does not include 2 DD to Middle East, supported from present levels.
- b - None required; with additional ships in Column D, Pacific active ships of type will exceed 3 times the normal routine overseas deployment level, (leaving ships homeported overseas out of the calculation).
- c - One of these two LPV will release (for possible assignment to Pacific) the LPH(CVS) now assigned to the fast PhibRon.
- d - Included in Column B.
- e - Small fraction of one ship; absorb in present force level.

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4-2. The additional deployments of Part III could be met by the additional ships in Column D of Table 4-A, without reducing the ship-time available to Sixth Fleet, Second Fleet, or in home waters, for any type except fractionally to cover transit and overhaul time of the added CA and LSD. There will be some added ship-time available to the numbered fleets in the LPV, APA, APD and probably the DD types. Normal deployments will not go over 30% for any present type, nor exceed 33% for the LPV and APD types added.

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Part V

BASE REQUIREMENTS

5-1. Base requirements in the Indian Ocean must consider not only the needs of regularly deployed units, but the logistic support problems posed by augmented deployments, in relation to the sources of resupply. Because of distances from normal sources for supplies other than fuel, and because of possible interruptions to the relatively convenient normal fuel sources, these problems are particularly acute. Distances within the theater itself are also great; it is over 2500 miles from Lourenco Marques north to Aden, and 3500 miles from Aden across to Singapore.

5-2. For the optimum support of U. S. national objectives in situations which may frequently involve sensitive ex-colonial nations (and territories still in dependent status), as well as relations with the UN, it is vital that U. S. forces in the area should not be forced by logistic support considerations to be or appear necessarily dependent on, or associated with, a colonial power. These considerations apply particularly to bases for cold war use, and may be of less consequence with respect to contingency facilities for use only if a major war is in progress.

5-3. Base facilities on the territory of states which have won, or will soon win autonomy, may be subject to denial, or to use under a protest which will be adverse to broad U. S. political interests, at the very time when the facilities are most essential. Reliance cannot safely be placed on the ability of the colonial powers to

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retain control and influence in any but the smallest territories.]

5-4. It therefore appears that base facilities in the Indian Ocean should, to the utmost extent practicable:

a. Be held under U. S. sovereignty (by purchase), or on long-term unrestricted lease.

b. Be located on oceanic islands of relatively small size and population, which are unlikely to seek or gain autonomy, or to be claimed effectively as integral parts of nearby states gaining independence. Sites meeting these conditions, appropriately located, and likely to be available if acquired soon, appear to exist.]

5-5. To support a continuing routine deployment as in Part III, the following Indian Ocean facilities appear desirable:

a. An adequate protected anchorage, for replenishment and upkeep.

b. Facilities for fleet recreation, and for occasionally exercising and housing a Marine BJT ashore.

c. An 8000-foot airstrip, for air logistic support and for occasional shore-based operation of IPV-based aircraft.

d. A minor fuel storage capacity (about an AO load) to insure against interruptions in normal AO supply from the Persian Gulf.]

5-6. Considering political factors, location, and site characteristics, the island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Group appears to be the optimum site for the above facilities, and for the primary

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supply and replenishment point in this theater. Its approximate equidistance (at about 2000 miles) from all prospective operating areas renders it particularly appropriate for support of a central striking force; this location may be too remote, however, for efficient support of small units deployed on continuous detached patrol or surveillance duties in remote sectors. Minor support points with fueling facility and COD airstrip may be desirable to reduce transit times; the islands of Socotra, and Aldabra, Desroches or Coetivy in the Seychelles group are possible sites meeting the criteria. Socotra (or its smaller neighbor, Abdal Kurri) may also be of considerable importance as a potential communications site in the event of denial or restriction of Asmara.

5-7. Contingency deployments of major augmenting forces pose additional facility requirements, particularly if they are engaged in combat. Most important of these will be additional fuel storage (at least 2 AO loads), and ammunition storage (at least 4000 tons). Expanded airstrip capacity at Diego Garcia will also be desirable in the event of long deployments. Having regard to the desirability of some dispersal, optimum fuel storage would appear to lie in re-habilitation and use of the unused M tank farm adjacent to Port Victoria, Mahe, Seychelles. If population density, high land usage and terrain prevent ammo storage in the Mahe area, and if limited space or other factors prevent ammo storage on Diego Garcia, the sizeable but lightly populated coral island of Aldabra or Coetivy may prove useful, with the advantages and disadvantages of further dispersal.

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5-8. The desirability of having available remote, developed anchorages for second-phase General War support of surviving forces (including ultimately FEM forces) presents an additional reason for acquisition of, and dispersal of logistic facilities on, several of the islands mentioned.

5-9. In summary, facilities appear required in the following rough order of importance:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>PRIORITY</u>
Diego Garcia:	Anchorage	1
	Airstrip	2
	Recreation and Incampment	2
	Fuel	3
Seychelles:	Fuel	2
Ammo Storage		
Diego Garcia, Aldabra, or Coetivy		3
Remote Support Point (Anchorage, airstrip, fuel)		4
Socotra		4
Aldabra or Desroches or Coetivy		
Communications:	Socotra	3-4

5-10. Related to Indian Ocean requirements, but supporting also WestPac, is the proposed VLF station for West Australia.

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Part VI

MOBILE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCE REQUIREMENTS

6-1. Indian Ocean. Requirements for underway replenishment types have been calculated by Op-40 as follows:

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>
	To support routine Part III Deployments in Rotating Theater Backup		
AO	2	4	6
AE	a	1a	1
AF	1	2	3
AMS	b	-	-
AVS	b	-	-

a - Because of LPV ammo storage capacity relative to small VF/VA complement it is considered an LST in-port replenishment capacity will suffice until a non-rotating backup AE can be brought in.

b - Provide by in-port barge complex at Diego Garcia.

6-2. In general the foregoing requirements assume resupply by shuttle from the source nearest the operating area, as follows:

AO: Persian Gulf; when not available, emergency stocks at Diego Garcia/Nahe, as in Part V, or Subic, until WESTS pipeline can be established. AO's are not sufficient to support sustained deployments of augmenting forces present in the Arabian Sea if Persian Gulf source is denied.

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AF: Emergency stocks in area as per Part V; Guam or Subic.
AF: Guam or Subic; Fremantle. (Or routinely by rotation from Lant if Suez open).

AKS/LVS: Guam or Subic.

3-3. Allocation of additional URG ships to fleets must consider (a) normal logistic responsibility, (b) source of resupply, normal and emergency, (c) probable source of augmenting forces, and (d) existing deficiencies of URG types as between LANT and PAC. An Op-93 requirements study of November 1959 reported existing deficiencies as:

AC: 4 Lant, 4 Pac

AF: 2 Lant

AF: 2 Lant

Since Suez will probably be unreliable in crisis situations, the probability is that both augmentation and resupply of augmented deployments will more frequently come from PacFilt sources, despite routine deployments from Lant and basic logistic responsibility in LantFilt. Normal fuel source will be in the theater, and AO's from either Fleet can serve effectively.

3-4. Other logistic support requirements for the Indian Ocean are as follows:

- a. Deploy one AD/LI at Diego Garcia for general repair and upkeep support of all ships in the theater, rotating deployment.
- b. Deploy one LTF at Diego Garcia for the duration of the overhaul cycle; rotate crew by air.

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c. Permanently station at Diego Garcia (rotate crews by air):

- 1 APL
- 1 LST configured as in-port AE
- 1 A&D
- 3 YFMB (In-port AKS/AVS type support)
- 2 YF3N (In-port AF type support)

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Part VII

TOTAL REQUIRED ADDITIONS TO ACTIVE FLEET FORCES

7-1. The following table summarizes the required changes, as developed in previous sections, to present (ENEP-51) active fleet and service craft force levels:

	<u>East Fleet</u>		<u>Pac Fleet</u>		<u>Both Fleets</u>	
	<u>Add</u>	<u>Reduce</u>	<u>Add</u>	<u>Reduce</u>	<u>Net Change</u>	<u>(Add)</u>
<u>ACTIVE FLEET</u>						
CA	1				1	
DD	3				3	
DE	2				2	
APA	2			1	1	
LPV(CVS-19)	3				3	
LSD	1				1	
AO	2		3		5	
AE	1		1		2	
AF	2		1		2	
AKS			1		1	
AD/AT	1				1	
ATZ	1				1	
LST(AE)	1				1	
TOTAL ACTIVE FLEET	23	0	5	1	27	
<u>SERVICE CRAFT</u>						
APL	1				1	
ADD	1				1	
YFNB	3				3	
YFBN	2				2	
TOTAL SERVICE CRAFT	7				7	

7-2. It is assumed herein that present FMEF troop and squadron levels will be sufficient to support the rotating deployments of 1 BJT plus HA and VB/VA to the Indian Ocean. On this assumption, additional operating aircraft will be required only in small

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numbers for logistic, utility and SAM purposes. However, it is essential to note that at present aircraft procurement rates:

(a) CVA and Marine VF/VA strength cannot be maintained many years at present levels, and (b) an increasing deployment of ~~VME/VMA~~ aboard CVA's may be necessary to support CVA deployments. Thus an early and substantial increase in overall aircraft procurement will ultimately prove essential to meet the deployments herein.

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