



COMEBACK
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - attached
 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

ASD, NAC, 00, 173, R486, 5710

OP-00 1698

IN REPLY REFER TO

1698

25 MAY 1973

OG
 MEN
 6/1

OP-00 _____
 OP-09 _____
 OP-09C _____
 OP-002/003 **AR**
 OP-005/006 _____
 OP-00C _____
 OP-00D _____
 OP-00F _____
 OP-00G _____
 OP-00H _____
 OP-00K _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Future U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy

Ref: (a) ASD(ISA) memo I-22959/73 of 14 May 1973
 (b) ASD(ISA) memo I-29071/72 of 14 December 1972

Encl: (1) Proposed SECNAV reply to reference (a)

1. Reference (a) renews the request made by reference (b) for a copy of the Navy's study on the future U.S. Indian Ocean strategy. The study to which Mr. NOYES refers is in fact the "U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREA", on which you were briefed by CAPT COCKELL on 9 May 1973. I also understand that, on request, a copy of the complete strategy study was delivered to your office.
2. The briefing is scheduled to be given to Secretary CLEMENTS on 29 May. If he is impressed - and I believe he will be - by the comprehensive study effort and sound strategy which the briefing represents, the credentials of this Navy initiative will be significantly enhanced.
3. The study is still in draft form. I have reviewed it, and consider that it requires no substantive changes. We have purposely delayed printing it in its final form until you and Secretary CLEMENTS had an opportunity to be briefed on it, so that your comments and his could be accommodated in the finished product.
4. Enclosure (1) is a proposed reply to reference (a). Although the reply does not reflect the fact that Navy review of the study is essentially complete, it will buy us more time during which we will brief Secretary CLEMENTS and take aboard his comments on the strategy.

E. H. Zumwalt, Jr.
 E. H. ZUMWALT, JR.

OP-00 CONTROL NO C-4561
 (06)

SECRET

603/51708
11 JUN 1973

SECRET (Unclassified upon removal of encl)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subj: U.S. Strategy for the Pacific and Indian Ocean Area

Encl: (1) Summary of "US STRATEGY FOR THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN
OCEAN AREA"

1. Earlier this year my staff developed a comprehensive national strategy for the Pacific/Indian Ocean area in the 1970s, a summary of which is attached in enclosure (1). It places in proper perspective the three elements of national power - political and economic as well as military - and makes concrete recommendations on the employment of each of these elements in furtherance of national objectives in this strategically important area.
2. In view of your expressed interest in US military posture in the Indian Ocean basin and the Persian Gulf, I am forwarding you a complete copy of the strategy study under separate cover. The study is still in draft form, hence is subject to revision to accommodate the results of OPNAV-wide review. However, I am satisfied that it requires no substantive changes.
3. I would be very interested in your comments on the strategy, especially in any area in which your views are at considerable variance with those expressed in the study.

F. W. VANNOY
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Plans and Policy)

SECRET
SECRET

00-4561

SECRET

SECRET

U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREA

The briefing presents a comprehensive US strategy for the Pacific/Indian Ocean area in the 1970s which integrates the employment of political, economic and military power in support of defined national objectives.

The two oceans and their littorals (including the Persian Gulf states) are treated as a strategic entity. The strategy is broad and does not go into details of implementation, or develop specific military force levels. Owing to time limitations, the briefing's emphasis is on the military strategy, with only sufficient elements of the political and economic strategies described to place military elements in perspective.

Key US interests shaping the strategy include the stability of worldwide and regional (e.g., Northeast Asia, Persian Gulf) power balances; the security of Japan and (derivatively) South Korea from attack; and the maintenance of satisfactory international economic relationships, including secure US access to overseas resources and markets.

The strategy rests on the premise that the Asian strategic environment of the 1970s will be characterized by the interplay of multiple power centers, and that change will be its most pervasive characteristic. The principal US objective will be to influence that change constructively and to keep it from veering into dangerous directions.

Maintenance of stable balance will be complicated by uncertainties concerning the direction of Japanese policy; the presence of immature and unstable regimes in the area; continuing Sino-Soviet tensions and hegemonial drives; and the prospect of nuclear proliferation.

The recommended strategy is evolutionary, building on the bases laid by the Nixon Doctrine for a more flexible US politico-military posture in Asia. Its novelty lies in the degree to which it elaborates, in a single document, the interrelationships among political, economic and military considerations in attaining US objectives; and in its explicit linkage of military strategy to a balance-of-power rationale.

To support the US interest in regional stability and the related objective of preventing domination of the Pacific/Indian

CLASSIFIED BY: CNO (OP-60)
SUBJ TO G.D.S. OF E.O. 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO-YR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY ON 31 DEC 1981

ENCLOSURE () to CNO Ser/Memo

SECRET

SECRET

ocean area (or strategically important parts of it) by a single power, the strategy gives primary attention to an effective US posture toward the USSR and the PRC, as well as to the nature of US relationship with Japan and with the oil producing states of the Persian Gulf. It considers the roles of US allies, noting both the advantages and limitations of cooperating with them.

The strategy outlines a military force posture and basing structure capable of promoting stability throughout the area, and responding to contingency needs in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It recommends a strong offshore deployment posture, with emphasis on forces which possess flexibility and mobility; which are employable through the full range of military roles, from deterrence and politico-military presence through major combat; which are not dependent on allied forces or facilities; and which possess the capability for quick concentration anywhere in the area, in response to rapidly developing contingencies whose nature and locale may be more difficult to anticipate than in the past.

After forces have been withdrawn from Korea, bases will be retained in Japan, the Philippines and Thailand; augmented by a strong fallback position in Micronesia to ensure strategic access to the Western Pacific over the long term.

As a result of the Persian Gulf's increasing importance, the strategy recognizes that the Indian Ocean has become the area with the greatest potential to require increased US military activity over the next decade, and recommends a number of measures to broaden US options for both contingency operations and an increased permanent presence in the area.

Finally, the strategy considers the interrelationship of US Asian and European strategies and the problems of allocating increasingly scarce military resources between the two theaters. It concludes that the US should examine the possibility of restructuring its forces to provide enhanced capability to respond to contingencies in either theater.

SECRET