




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The Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa

13

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The USSR has used military assistance extensively in Sub-Saharan Africa to build influence with governments, to affect the outcome of conflicts, and to secure access to naval facilities and airfields. To accomplish these objectives, it has provided \$5 billion in arms and military equipment to African nations since 1978. Nearly 5,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians are currently in Africa.

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Soviet Economic Ties to Sub-Saharan Africa

19

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Economic relations between the USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa have expanded rapidly since the mid-1970s, reflecting the USSR's greater involvement in the region. Because Moscow prefers to rely on its military assistance program rather than economic aid to project its presence in the region, its ability to expand relations through economic ties is probably limited.

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Other Topics**Soviet Security Policy on the Chinese Border**

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Despite recent improvements in Sino-Soviet political relations, prospects for a reversal or even a significant relaxation of the Soviet military buildup opposite China appear slight, at least during this decade. In its political and military dealings with China since the early 1960s, Moscow has judged that a strong military posture is indispensable to its security. In addition, the military strategy that Moscow has adopted against China, coupled with the geopolitical situation in East Asia, leaves little room today for major force reductions.

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Soviet-Peruvian Military Relations and Political Ties

31

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Lima's financial problems and Moscow's continued willingness to provide attractive financing are likely to ensure the USSR's position as Peru's primary source of weapons over the next few years. In light of the Peruvian military's rightist views and the Belaunde government's hostility toward the USSR, however, Moscow probably will be unable to translate this position into political gain in the near term.

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Soviet Educational Reform To Accent Vocational Training (U) 35

Largely motivated by the labor shortage, a Politburo-sponsored commission has drafted proposals for changing Soviet general education. The proposals recommend placing greater emphasis on vocational education, particularly at the secondary level, and lowering the school entry age to six years. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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	<p>A debate in recent months over the prospects for US-Soviet relations under the Reagan administration reveals pessimism regarding any significant breakthrough. The door remains open, however, for maintaining a dialogue on secondary issues while awaiting a new US initiative on arms control. [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>		

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The USSR and Africa: Policies and Prospects

Perspective

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The socialist and often authoritarian character of African regimes and the persistence of anti-Western attitudes in former colonial states give the USSR important advantages in its African policy. The Soviets are well-equipped to meet African demands for arms and military support, but they are much less willing and able to provide the economic aid required over the longer term. As a result, Moscow's success in Africa has been mixed, and its prospects are uneven.

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Soviet leaders are driven by a mixture of motives in Africa. They are influenced by their perception of trends in their rivalry with the United States and their view of the Soviet Union's rightful role in the world. They also welcome an opportunity to demonstrate their solidarity with the self-proclaimed Marxist regimes in the region and thereby encourage the growth of similar regimes elsewhere in the area. These factors reinforce one another and impart considerable momentum to the Soviet commitment to the African countries where Moscow's presence is greatest—Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.

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The USSR, however, has no vital security interests at stake in the region; indeed, its military objectives in Africa are—aside from Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf concerns—of a regional rather than strategic character. (See the article "The Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa.") Nor do economic considerations play a significant part in Soviet policies toward Africa. (See "Soviet Economic Ties to Sub-Saharan Africa.") The Soviets already possess adequate domestic resources of most of the strategic raw materials found in the region, and any attempt to interrupt deliveries of South African strategic materials or Persian Gulf oil would bring the USSR into an unwanted confrontation with the West.

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Arms sales and associated training and advisory packages are the longest standing instrument of Soviet policy in the Third World and continue to be the USSR's major means of influence in Africa. As discussed in the article on Soviet-Ethiopian relations, the USSR has used these tools and exploited foreign and insurgency threats in Ethiopia to develop a strong position in Addis Ababa with little likelihood of any serious setback in the next few years. Despite such gains, the Soviets have reason to be concerned that their future role in Africa is highly dependent on the security situations that prevail in such key states as Angola and Mozambique. [REDACTED]

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It is not certain to what lengths the Soviets might go to maintain the MPLA in power in Angola, but, as the article on Soviet prospects in southern African states, the USSR has escalated its military support to Luanda over the past year, assumed a more active advisory role, and endorsed a greater Cuban troop presence to halt and reverse the momentum of the UNITA insurgents. Recently delivered Soviet equipment will improve Luanda's capability to conduct a counterinsurgency, protect its garrisons, and develop a more adequate air defense against South African attacks on newly arrived weaponry and associated personnel. Soviet advisory personnel are also playing a more active role in Angola, operating a squadron of AN-12 transport aircraft and upgrading communications with Moscow. [REDACTED]

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Security problems in Mozambique are less critical than Angola's, but Soviet military officers in Maputo have helped to plan operations and to operate transport aircraft for internal military use. Moscow's major success in Africa has been in Ethiopia, where Soviet military assistance has sustained a pro-Soviet regime in Addis Ababa and led to access to naval facilities on the Horn of Africa. Whereas Soviet transfers of military aid can affect the outcome of internal or regional conflicts, as in the Angolan Civil War or the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, it is extremely difficult to alter the basis of African politics and garner genuine political influence. [REDACTED]

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The USSR does not have a commensurate economic penetration of even those African states with which it has close political and military ties. Continued Soviet reluctance to extend significant economic assistance to even its closest clients, in fact, could create strains in bilateral relations in Africa and could limit Soviet opportunities to exploit certain Third World situations. The Soviet hard currency position is better than it has been for the past several years because of increased oil exports, the stabilization of oil prices, and the leveling off of imports, all of which make the "cost of empire" more manageable. Nevertheless, aid has been a sore point in relations with Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, whose leaders have

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been unhappy with Soviet willingness to meet their demands on development and have been looking elsewhere. Soviet military assistance will remain crucial to those regimes, but Soviet restraint in the economic sphere could provide openings for Western nations. [REDACTED]

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Soviet prospects in Africa are uneven, and successes will depend largely on the tendency of African leaders to acquire as much weaponry as possible, regardless of the level of threat, and on the impact of South Africa's policies on other black African states. Persistent ethnic, religious, ideological, and territorial conflicts within and between states will provide many opportunities for the USSR. The Soviets will be particularly successful in states such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique where their clients face serious insurgent threats. [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, the Soviets are probably concerned by the possibility of a Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, US success in gaining military facilities in Kenya, the pro-Western stance of Nigeria, and their general inability to offset Western economic influence. Soviet officials have acknowledged, moreover, that the USSR's poor domestic performance is undermining the credibility of the socialist model abroad. Moscow has no illusions about its ability to capitalize on uncertain situations in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Whatever their disappointment, however, the Soviets are content to play a waiting game, taking whatever opportunities arise to increase their influence and meddle in African affairs. [REDACTED]

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The Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship: Strong Ties Despite Differences [REDACTED]

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Soviet pressure for increased access to Ethiopian naval facilities, Ethiopia's requests for additional military assistance, and its inability to meet its debt payment schedule are causing increased squabbling between the USSR and its key African client. Still, the relationship remains strong because of Ethiopia's importance to the USSR and Moscow's crucial role as arms supplier in Addis Ababa's war against various insurgent groups. [REDACTED]

Soviet Objectives and Basis of Influence

The USSR has sought a strong relationship with the Mengistu regime—its sole asset on the strategic Horn of Africa—to enable it to support naval forces in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, to counter US influence in the region, and to give it the potential to project air and naval power there. Presumably, the Soviets also believe that the development of socialism in Ethiopia would demonstrate the benefits of the Soviet "model" for emerging Third World states and support Moscow's claims of a pro-Soviet tilt in the world correlation of forces. Moreover, the Soviets may view Ethiopia as a potential springboard from which to support or promote other leftist movements in Africa. [REDACTED]

Moscow's position in Ethiopia rests primarily on its role as an arms supplier. While the military threat from Somalia has largely diminished, Addis Ababa still needs significant military assistance to conduct its campaigns against insurgents in Eritrea and Tigray Provinces. Since 1976 the Soviets have agreed to provide the Mengistu regime roughly \$4 billion in military assistance, of which some \$2.6 billion has been delivered. The USSR also provides about 1,700 military advisers and 1,000 civilian technicians, and it partially subsidizes the Cuban presence.¹ [REDACTED]

¹ The US Embassy in Addis Ababa reports signs of an imminent drawdown of the 6,000 to 9,000 Cubans in Ethiopia; about 2,000 are expected to remain as a security force near the capital. The Cuban forces have not been militarily active since the 1978 Ogaden campaign; Castro has not allowed them to participate in the Eritrean counterinsurgency. Given their limited utility in recent years, we do not believe a drawdown would necessarily diminish Soviet influence in Ethiopia. [REDACTED]

Continuing Bilateral Frictions

Despite the generally strong bilateral relationship that has developed since the mid-1970s, Soviet access to naval and air facilities in Ethiopia has been a long-time source of friction. At the time of Somalia's break with Moscow in 1977, [REDACTED] senior Ethiopian officials were resigned to acceding to Soviet requests for facilities in order to retain Moscow's military support. The Soviets, however, did not immediately press for such facilities, at least in part because of the uncertain security situation. [REDACTED]

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Continued instability in Eritrea may have prompted Moscow to push for more modest facilities in one of the isolated islands of the Dahlak Archipelago. Efforts to develop a small facility on Dahlak Island began in April 1978. Since that time, we believe that Moscow and Addis Ababa have reached a mutual understanding giving the Soviets nearly exclusive use of this austere facility. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets do not have similar access to the key coastal ports in Mits'iwa and Aseb. Since 1978 there have been scattered reports of Soviet requests—and pressure—to construct private facilities in or near these ports, but Mengistu has resisted such efforts. Soviet combatants have called infrequently in both ports. [REDACTED]

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Since mid-1983 Moscow has made several requests to enhance its naval access in Ethiopia. It has asked:

- To assume full responsibility for the defense of Dahlak Island.
- To place an additional 70 technicians on the island.
- To assume control of the proposed construction base facilities near the port of Aseb.

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The Soviets have also asked South Yemen for new air and naval facilities near Aden. Inasmuch as these requests roughly coincide with the upsurge in US naval activity in the area—joint amphibious exercises with Egypt, Kenya, and Oman and the ongoing construction of new facilities at the Somali port of Berbera—they suggest that Moscow may be looking ahead to what it will need to counter the expanding US role. []

Soviet efforts to enhance and consolidate political influence have also contributed to tensions in bilateral relations. Moscow has had difficulty in establishing broad political ties in Addis Ababa, largely because Mengistu controls the political structure there. From Moscow's perspective, Mengistu's virtual monopoly of power is a mixed blessing. On the positive side, this clear delineation of authority must be welcome to the Soviets when contrasted with the factionalism that plagues Angola. On the other hand, if Mengistu sought to alter radically Ethiopia's pro-Soviet alignment—as Sadat did in Egypt—the Soviets would have few assets with which to counter such a move. Similarly, the lack of political assets could jeopardize Moscow's position in a post-Mengistu succession struggle. []

To remedy this problem, the Soviets have pressed Mengistu to create an Ethiopian Communist party since 1978. Such a party would abet Moscow's efforts to further institutionalize socialism in Ethiopia and, more importantly, would give Moscow the opportunity to cultivate a politically reliable cadre that could further strengthen Soviet influence and leverage with Mengistu. Judging by Mengistu's foot-dragging on the party question over the past five years, he too recognizes the implications of such a party on his position and is working to ensure that the party, when finally established, does not threaten his political power. []

Mengistu's sidestepping of the party question has not diminished Soviet efforts to build influence elsewhere in the Ethiopian military and civilian bureaucracies. Through the presence of some 1,700 military advisers and another 1,000 civilian technicians, the Soviets try to cultivate influence within the military forces and government ministries. Soviet military advisers are attached to each Ethiopian division headquarters and

possibly at the brigade level as well, according to attache reporting. Moreover, the US Embassy in Addis Ababa has reported that Army Gen. V. I. Petrov, Commander in Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, has advised Ethiopian commanders in each of the last two counterinsurgency campaigns in the north. []

On the civilian side, the Soviets reportedly have urged Mengistu to replace Western-educated Ethiopian officials with others trained in the USSR and Eastern Europe. In some cases, Soviet and East European advisers have been attached to specific departments; each of the recently established regional economic centers reportedly will have such advisers. []

To increase Soviet presence and influence, Moscow has also sought to become involved in Ethiopia's long-term economic policies. During the visit of a high-level Soviet economic delegation in March, State Planning Committee (Gosplan) chief Baybakov reportedly offered advice on the subject of timing and economic-sector priorities for Ethiopia's proposed 10-year plan; he also strongly urged that Ethiopia not incur any new debts to Western countries. []

While the Soviets would clearly like to become an essential component in Ethiopian economic planning, their economic aid commitments have not met Ethiopian expectations—and have prompted frequent complaints from Addis Ababa. Although Ethiopia has received a large amount of Soviet assistance by Soviet standards, such aid has been inadequate to meet Addis Ababa's major economic needs. Since 1974 the USSR has extended some \$550 million in credits and grants, half of which is in the form of commodity credit and oil subsidies—an unusual concession by Moscow. The rest of Soviet economic credits have

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been directed toward oil and gas exploration in the Ogaden, the Gambela irrigation project, the Dire Dawa cement plant, and small projects in transportation and agriculture. [REDACTED]

In recent months Moscow's rejection of an Ethiopian request for new military hardware and for rescheduling of debt payments has led to new tensions. [REDACTED]

Even if Mengistu were ousted, the intractability of the Eritrean situation, Ethiopia's weak financial position, and the limited possibility that a Western Power would assume Moscow's role as military supplier all point to a continued—and major—involvement with the USSR. [REDACTED]

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Embassy in Addis Ababa reported rumors that the USSR had turned down an Ethiopian request to cancel or delay military debt payments during the September visit of Defense Minister Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan to Moscow. Mengistu was also reported to be upset that General Secretary Andropov would not see him; this Soviet refusal, however, may have been related to Andropov's poor health. [REDACTED]

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Prospects

While the Soviets may be only partially successful in efforts to expand and consolidate their influence in Ethiopia, they will nevertheless retain a strong position there with little likelihood of any serious setback in the next few years. Indeed, Moscow may believe that Addis Ababa's continued dependence upon Soviet military assistance and its expected inability to meet its first major debt payment, scheduled for 1984—about \$200 million—will make Mengistu more forthcoming on Soviet requests. In this context, the Soviets may have been encouraged by Mengistu's public suggestion that an Ethiopian Communist party will be created on the 10th anniversary of the revolution in September 1984. Despite continuing frictions, we believe the bilateral relationship will remain strong, primarily because both sides need one another. Ethiopia remains Moscow's key asset on the Horn of Africa, and the USSR is the only superpower prepared to meet Ethiopian military needs. Moscow will continue to rely primarily on its role as an arms supplier to maintain and strengthen its influence in Ethiopia. While the military threat from Somalia has largely diminished, Addis Ababa still needs significant military assistance to conduct its campaigns against insurgents in Eritrea and Tigray Provinces.

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The USSR's Growing Military Involvement in Southern Africa

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Since the mid-1970s the USSR has established a significant political and military presence in southern Africa by providing military aid to the victorious Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Soviet weapons, some of them manned by Cubans, and Soviet military planners now play major roles in defending both Luanda and Maputo. Arms and related training and advisory services form the main component of Moscow's involvement in Zambia and its efforts to establish a presence elsewhere in the region.

Soviet activities in southern Africa are intended to weaken Western political and economic influence while enhancing Moscow's credentials as a supporter of Third World aspirations and black African grievances. The USSR also seeks to use its position in Angola and Mozambique to advance Soviet interests in nearby countries, particularly in support of black nationalist groups seeking to overturn white minority rule in Namibia and South Africa. Moscow has obtained the use of military facilities in Angola for occasional naval reconnaissance flights and a continuous warship patrol, but it has no interest in significantly expanding the activities of its own forces in the region.

The Soviet position in southern Africa faces a serious challenge in the months ahead from a deteriorating security situation and faltering economies in both Angola and Mozambique. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has, with South African backing, steadily expanded its power and reach, achieving major gains in the past year. This has forced Moscow to counter with more weapons, logistic support, and other help to protect its political position in Luanda. In Mozambique, another South African-backed insurgency, by the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO), has prevented Maputo's consolidation of control and similarly forced the Soviets to increase military aid.

In both countries, increasing reliance on Soviet weapons will preserve Moscow's position for the time being. The future outlook, however, may be cause for Soviet concern. Both Luanda and Maputo may ultimately be forced to explore a negotiated settlement that the Western Powers are in the best position to mediate. Moreover, the deteriorating economies in Angola and Mozambique are already prompting both countries to look increasingly to the West for economic aid that they have been unable to obtain in adequate quantity from the USSR.

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Roots of Soviet Influence

Moscow's position in southern Africa developed out of its support for black nationalist aspirations during and immediately after decolonization. The collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique and the spillover of the Rhodesian civil war into Zambia created turbulent conditions that Moscow played to its advantage. A major Soviet-Cuban intervention brought the MPLA to power in Luanda, and the USSR displaced China as the main Communist benefactor of FRELIMO. Soviet-supplied air defense equipment somewhat reassured Zambia after it had been vulnerable to Rhodesian air raids on guerrillas operating from Zambia.

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The successful establishment of Soviet-backed regimes in southern Africa enhanced the USSR's status as a superpower. It showed that Moscow had overcome its inability to project meaningful power deep into Africa, which was evident during the turmoil in the Congo (now Zaire) in the early 1960s. In Angola and Mozambique the Soviets established themselves as benefactors of states more distant from the USSR than any except Cuba yet influenced by Communist power. The Soviet role was formalized in friendship treaties signed with Angola in 1976 and with Mozambique in 1977.

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Support for Angola

The Soviet commitment to Angola's defense has been underscored by a substantial increase over the past year in the pace of deliveries of military equipment to counter insurgent inroads and South African incursions. Deliveries in 1983 included MIG-21 fighters, MI-8 transport helicopters, MI-24 helicopter gunships, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and more advanced antiaircraft missiles. Moscow has also put a dozen Soviet-piloted transport aircraft at Luanda's disposal and otherwise helped make its forces and the Cuban troops in Angola more mobile. While the number of Soviet military advisers in Angola is believed to have remained in the range of 1,000 to 1,200, they may be assuming greater command and control functions. There are 30,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola, of whom 22,000 to 23,000 are combat troops. []

Angola's leaders are divided over relations with the USSR, and the Soviets are concerned about the durability of their political position in Luanda. Contacts by President dos Santos with the West have worried Moscow, which is apparently relying on a pro-Soviet faction in the MPLA to protect its interests. []

[] The growing UNITA threat may have made dos Santos more amenable to Soviet concerns because the survival of his regime now more obviously depends upon Soviet arms and Cuban soldiers. []

Soviet statements on the situation in Angola have shown increasing alarm about the security situation and have reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to assist the regime. Press commentaries this past fall have portrayed the insurgency as threatening the "independence of Angola." A TASS commentary in early November warned that "the USSR and other countries of the socialist community will not leave the Angolan people in the time of trouble and will continue to support them in every way." This is the strongest public statement of support that the USSR has made so far. A more authoritative "TASS statement" on 5 January accused South Africa of trying to overthrow the Angolan Government but stopped short

of promising support to prevent it. []

Despite their military largesse, the Soviets apparently remain unwilling to offer significant economic aid. With Angola's oil income largely devoted to paying for military help, its diamond exports endangered by UNITA operations, its main agricultural areas caught in guerrilla raids, and its industry slowed by chronic shortages of spare parts and raw materials, Luanda is moving toward economic collapse. In January 1982 Moscow and Luanda signed an agreement for \$2 billion worth of long-term projects, but the Soviets have not provided the kind of short-term assistance that could help check a decline in living standards. As a result, Angola has turned to the West for aid but has found potential donors reluctant to plunge into such an unsettled situation. []

Aid to Mozambique

Mozambique faces a problem less critical than Angola's, but it nonetheless has serious difficulties with RENAMO. Although RENAMO lacks a cohesive leadership or wide popular appeal, South Africa has used it successfully to prevent President Machel's FRELIMO government from consolidating its political or economic position. []

The USSR has supplied Maputo with basic military equipment and training since 1975, but as RENAMO has become stronger the Soviets have also sent increasingly sophisticated weapons. During 1983 these included MIG-21 fighters and MI-24 helicopter gunships. The Soviets also supplied transport aircraft, including two Soviet-operated transports for internal military use. As in Angola, Soviet military officers help plan operations and Cubans provide technical services such as flying fighters and helicopters. The Soviet and Cuban military presence in Mozambique is much smaller than in Angola—about 800 Soviet military personnel and an estimated 800 to 1,000 Cubans. []

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The USSR has been no more generous with economic aid for Mozambique than for Angola, and Maputo's problems are equally severe—perhaps worse now as a result of prolonged drought. Like Angola, Mozambique suffers from economic mismanagement, declining industry, and a disrupted agricultural economy. Machel's disappointment with Soviet support was indicated by his visit to Western Europe in October in search of economic aid and alternative sources of arms. [REDACTED]

Soviets and Namibia

Moscow supports the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), which claims to be the representative of the Namibian people. The Soviets provide financial assistance and weapons to the organization, scholarships in the USSR, and diplomatic support in world forums. SWAPO's leadership is divided in attitudes toward future relations with Moscow, however, and the Soviets probably are uncertain what influence they might have if a Namibian settlement put SWAPO in power. [REDACTED]

The USSR would prefer a peaceful Namibian settlement rather than prolonged war if the problem could be separated from the Angolan conflict. But Moscow wants a settlement to be achieved without a Western mediation role that would give credit to the United States and its allies in the eyes of black African countries. When the five-nation contact group appeared to be making progress toward a settlement in 1981, the Soviets encouraged the Frontline States—countries representing black African interests in Namibia—to stiffen settlement terms in order to obstruct that progress. Although settlement efforts are now moving slowly, the USSR would be expected to try in the future to block any arrangement worked out primarily by the West. [REDACTED]

Other Countries

Military assistance is Moscow's entree in the region, and, indeed, in the Third World generally. In southern Africa as a whole, arms aid has won the Soviets little political influence beyond Angola and Mozambique, since other countries lack the same dependence on continuing Soviet supplies. [REDACTED]

The USSR began selling MIG fighters and other military equipment to Tanzania in the mid-1970s. By the early 1980s, Dar es Salaam found itself in debt for equipment that was scarcely usable, and it was unhappy with the military training provided by the Soviets. At the same time, Moscow has been unresponsive to pleas for help in meeting Tanzania's large Western debts. [REDACTED]

Zambia turned to the USSR for air defense equipment after Rhodesian raids on guerrilla camps around Lusaka during the latter stages of the Rhodesian civil war. But the Zambians soon became disillusioned with the capabilities of the equipment and advisers they obtained. A few officials sympathetic to the USSR remain in high positions in Lusaka, but the relationship has cooled while Moscow still tries to collect the bills from the near-destitute Zambian exchequer. [REDACTED]

In Zimbabwe, Moscow has not yet been able to overcome the results of its support for Prime Minister Mugabe's rival, Joshua Nkomo, during the independence struggle. [REDACTED]

So far, however, Mugabe has failed to respond. When he indicated last autumn that he might be interested in visiting Moscow—partly to offset visits to the West and demonstrate his nonalignment—Moscow reportedly rebuffed him with a ham-handedness that further strained relations. [REDACTED]

The other three countries of southern Africa—Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho—are too conscious of their vulnerability to South African pressure to countenance much Soviet activity. Moscow has supplied some third-hand armored equipment to Botswana, reportedly offered free weapons, and tried to gain access through sports programs and the cultivation of

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political dissidents. A resident Soviet Embassy was opened in Lesotho and a chargé was accredited on 21 October 1983. [REDACTED]

Soviet Prospects

Soviet troubles in southern Africa have not yet reached a point that is likely to force a basic reassessment of Moscow's policy in the region. The rising military costs so far have been sustainable and the potential returns in prestige, presence, and prospects for eventual further gains—in Namibia and, perhaps, even South Africa—remain large. [REDACTED]

Present trends, however, seem to be going against Moscow in most areas except Namibia, where Western settlement efforts have stalled. Soviet unwillingness to loosen economic purse strings—underscored in General Secretary Andropov's remarks last June that Third World countries must depend primarily on their own economic efforts—means that Moscow will do little about its clients' faltering economies. South Africa's willingness to continue military pressure from its periphery signals a persisting security threat and further damage to those economies. Moscow's concern about its role would be even greater were the West to offer significant economic aid to Angola and Mozambique while convincing South Africa to reduce its pressure. [REDACTED]

The commitment of new and improved military equipment to Angola during the past year, including some of the USSR's best weaponry, demonstrates Moscow's resolve to defend its most important client in southern Africa. Moscow's determination to avert a defeat of the MPLA and an eclipse of its Angolan role may well have been strengthened by the setbacks it has recently been dealt elsewhere. [REDACTED]

Faced with the prospect of indefinitely increasing demands for military and economic aid, the Soviets might eventually explore a negotiated settlement between the MPLA and UNITA. Low-level Soviet officials have already raised the issue in private conversation. The head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's department for southern Africa mentioned this possibility to an American on 2 December, but he denied that Luanda was currently considering talks with UNITA. [REDACTED]

The USSR is less deeply committed in material or prestige to the Mozambique Government but faces a similar situation there. For the time being, RENAMO is unlikely to mount a major threat to the government, but its steady pressure is eroding Maputo's strength. Moscow's inability to provide the kind or quantity of assistance that could effectively counter RENAMO's challenge makes the FRELIMO regime another seemingly endless burden on the Soviets. Moscow might, therefore, eventually welcome a deal between Maputo and Pretoria to reduce guerrilla pressure, even though this would hamper Mozambique's support for black nationalist organizations harrassing South Africa. For the moment, however, Moscow seems prepared to put more weapons into southern Africa rather than risk its present position there. [REDACTED]

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The Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa []

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The USSR has used military assistance extensively in Sub-Saharan Africa to build influence with governments, to affect the outcomes of conflicts, and, most importantly, to obtain access to naval facilities and airfields in the region. To accomplish these objectives, the Soviet Union has provided nearly \$5 billion in arms and military equipment to countries in the region over the past five years (see table), responding quickly and massively at critical junctures to support governments with which it is allied. Nearly 5,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians are currently in Sub-Saharan Africa, and about 2,000 African military personnel are in training courses in the Soviet Union. In addition, there are more than 30,000 Cuban soldiers in Africa, principally in Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviet Navy routinely operates off the eastern and western coasts of the continent. []

Where Third World governments perceive internal or external threats, they are often vulnerable to a Soviet program of inducements that typically encompasses weapons deliveries, naval visits, and a military advisory presence and is likely to lead to pressures for access to facilities. This has been the case in Africa, although Moscow's efforts to parlay military assistance into military privileges there have met with mixed success. They have led to an extensive military presence and substantial political influence in Angola and Ethiopia, and access to facilities in both. In Somalia, however, despite massive military assistance, the Soviets in 1977 lost access to facilities they had developed, and their use of Guinean facilities has been sharply curtailed. []

Soviet presence and facilities in West Africa have developed separately from those in East Africa and, to a large extent, are oriented toward a different set of problems. []

Soviet Military Activities in West Africa

Soviet naval presence off West Africa originated as a response to local crises and opportunities. Initially, in 1969-70, these were in Guinea and Ghana. During the mid-1970s, with major Soviet assistance during the

Angolan civil war and constraints on the use of facilities in Guinea, the Soviet focus shifted south to Luanda. []

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Angola. A surge in Soviet deliveries of arms to Angola in 1983 reflected Moscow's growing concern about the deteriorating security situation there. There was a substantial increase in the number of sea deliveries, and—for the first time since the mid-1970s—numerous air deliveries. The new supplies (see table) included systems more sophisticated than the Angolans had previously received, such as MI-24 helicopter gunships, which should improve the effectiveness of government forces against the insurgents, and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, which could make South African air attacks more costly for Pretoria. The Soviets also increased their AN-12 transport aircraft in Angola from two to 12 during 1983 and upgraded communications capabilities between Moscow and the 1,500-man Soviet Military Assistance Group in Luanda. This surge in assistance probably is geared more to protecting Moscow's equities in southern Africa than to gaining additional military facilities in the region. []

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The small Angolan naval base at Luanda can provide replenishment services, but the Soviets must maintain a repair ship there to maintain and repair their surface ships and submarines. Pairs of TU-95 Bear D maritime reconnaissance aircraft periodically deploy for several weeks to Luanda, from where they fly surveillance missions over the South Atlantic. []

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Guinea. Despite the loss in 1977 of access to Conakry for maritime reconnaissance aircraft, limitations on the use of port facilities, and a substantial drop in the Soviet military presence in Guinea, the Soviet Navy continues to use Conakry regularly. []

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Soviet overtures

Soviet Military Assistance to Selected Sub-Saharan African States, ^a 1978 to Mid-1983


Country	Value of Total Deliveries, 1978 to Mid-1983 (million US \$)	Principal Aid Items, 1982-83	Country	Value of Total Deliveries, 1978 to Mid-1983 (million US \$)	Principal Aid Items, 1982-83
Angola	1,009	6 Osa-II-class missile pa- trol boats 12 MI-24 Hind helicopters 16 MI-8 transport helicopters 8 SA-8 and 20 SA-6 sur- face-to-air launchers 8 SA-9 launchers 15 SA-3 launchers 19 MIG-21 fighter aircraft 8 BM-21 rocket launchers 19 T-62 medium tanks 100 armored personnel carriers	Guinea	35	
			Guinea-Bissau	32	
			Madagascar	93	Artillery, small arms, air- craft replacement parts
			Mali	75	Trucks, radars
			Mozambique	293	3 AN-26 Curl transport aircraft 65 medium tanks 12 BTR-60PB armored per- sonnel carriers 24 BMP infantry combat vehicles 15 MIG-21 fighter aircraft 9 MI-8 and 8 MI-24 helicopters
Benin	147		Nigeria	92	2 MIG-21 trainers
Burundi	19		Seychelles	8	2 Zhuk-class patrol craft 2 coastal surveillance radars 10 SA-7 surface-to-air missiles AAA guns
Ethiopia	2,237	31 MIG-21 fighter aircraft 6 to 12 MIG-23 fighter aircraft 1 Petya-II-class light frigate 1 Polnocny-class landing ship 106 ZSU-23/4 self-pro- pelled antiaircraft guns 25 122-mm howitzers 92 medium tanks 29 BTR-60PB armored per- sonnel carriers 10 MIG-23 fighter aircraft 2 BE-12 Mail maritime re- connaissance and ASW aircraft	Tanzania	260	
			Zambia	218	
			Zimbabwe	0.4	1,000 AK-47 rifles

^a Excludes states that did not receive substantial assistance in recent years.

to President Toure to allow construction of a new, secure naval facility near Conakry, part of which would be reserved for use by the Soviet Navy. Moscow also has repeatedly raised the question of new Bear D deployments. Thus far, Toure has refused such requests, although military transports continue

to use the airfield regularly. Given the lack of an internal or external threat to the Guinean Government, the Soviets probably do not have much leverage on Toure at this time.

Soviet Military Presence in Africa



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Other States. Moscow has put considerable effort into developing relations with a number of other West African states—recently Ghana, Congo, Benin, and Nigeria—and has shown interest in their naval facilities. The Soviets have not undertaken an intense campaign to gain access to port facilities in any of these countries, but during 1983 they were successful in obtaining at least one stopover for transport aircraft in Nigeria and Ghana. [redacted]

Soviet Military Activities in East Africa

Naval facilities in East Africa are used to support the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron, whose principal operating area is the western Arabian Sea and southern Red Sea. These operations are chiefly supported from Ethiopia and South Yemen. In addition, Soviet IL-38 May naval reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare aircraft are stationed in South Yemen and Ethiopia for monitoring US and other Western navies in the northern Arabian Sea. [redacted]

In recent years the Soviet Navy has been more active in the southern Indian Ocean. In each of the past three years Soviet naval ships visited the Mozambican ports of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala more than 20 times, and they have operated more often in the Mozambique Channel. Major Soviet task groups transiting the region—including a recent one led by the Kiev-class aircraft carrier Novorossiysk—also make official calls in Mozambique and Seychelles. [redacted]

Whereas the naval presence off West Africa seems largely responsive to regional interests and contingencies on land, the Soviets probably view their ships in the Indian Ocean as a counter to US and French influence. The Western naval presence there has been relatively large since the US-Iranian crisis in 1979, and the Soviets view US facilities at Diego Garcia and along the rim of the Indian Ocean as providing important military and political advantages to the United States. The USSR also has used its Navy effectively as a tool to build political influence with East African governments. [redacted]

Ethiopia. Large-scale Soviet support to Ethiopia began in 1977, during the Ogaden conflict, with an impressive air and sea delivery of arms and high-level Soviet military direction to assist Addis Ababa in defeating a Somali invasion. Ethiopia has received

some \$2.6 billion in weapons and equipment since then. Last year this assistance included advanced MIG-23 Floggers, a Petya II-class light frigate, and two maritime reconnaissance and ASW aircraft (see table). The USSR has a substantial military advisory presence in Ethiopia—currently some 1,700 men whose efforts are abetted by some 6,000 to 9,000 Cuban advisers and combat troops. During the last two years, the Soviets have been deeply involved in supporting Ethiopian operations against insurgents in northern Ethiopia. Top-ranking Soviet officers, such as Ground Forces Commander in Chief General Petrov, have been sent in at key junctures to review and supervise operations. [redacted]

At the same time, there are problems in the relationship, particularly due to Soviet pressure for increased access to Ethiopian facilities, irritations over Soviet unwillingness to notify Ethiopian officials when Soviet naval ships enter Ethiopian waters, and resentment over conditions for military assistance. (See article on Soviet-Ethiopian relations.) [redacted]

The only “Soviet facility” in East Africa is located on Ethiopia’s Dahlak Island, where Soviet ships appear to have virtually unimpeded access (see inset). [redacted]

Mozambique. Since the mid-1970s Moscow has supported Mozambique against South Africa and its client insurgents. The Soviets responded with increased arms shipments as the threat to Maputo grew severe in mid-1982. They accelerated delivery of this aid with the first military transport flights to that country and may even have diverted a seaborne shipment of arms destined for Mali to Mozambique last January. More recent shipments included the first MIG-21 fighter aircraft and MI-24 Hind helicopter gunships; the helicopters especially should improve Mozambican capabilities for countering rebel activities. The Soviets recently installed in Mozambique a signal intelligence system that probably improves their capability to monitor military activity in southern Africa and naval activity throughout the southwestern Indian Ocean. Two Soviet AN-12 military transports also are stationed in Mozambique to provide logistic support. [redacted]

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Soviet Naval and Air Access in Ethiopia

Soviet interest in access to naval and air facilities in Ethiopia dates back to 1977, when large-scale Soviet military assistance to Addis Ababa began and Somalia broke with Moscow. Instability in Eritrea and the insecurity of Aseb and Mits'iwa may have prompted Moscow to press for more modest facilities in one of the isolated islands of the Dahlak Archipelago. Work on Dahlak Island began in April 1978 with the arrival of an 8,500-ton floating drydock that had been in Somalia. The Soviets subsequently improved these facilities, adding housing for some 200 personnel, two floating piers, fuel storage tanks, and helicopter pads. We believe that Moscow and Addis Ababa have a mutual understanding giving the Soviets nearly exclusive use of this facility, which provides the bulk of the support and maintenance required by the Indian Ocean Squadron.

Since 1980 the Soviets also have stationed two IL-38 May maritime patrol and antisubmarine warfare aircraft in Asmara; these are supported by a pair of AN-12 Cub transport aircraft.

Madagascar. Although it has received substantial Soviet assistance over the past several years, the Malagasy Government does not allow forces from outside the Indian Ocean to call at its ports or use its airfields for purposes other than assistance to Madagascar. Deliveries of weapons and military equipment

have dropped sharply over the past two years, probably in part because Madagascar's economy is in such desperate shape it cannot pay for those it has already received. Nearly one-quarter of some 200 Soviet military advisers departed in June 1983. Nevertheless, President Rasiraka has allowed the establishment of three signal intelligence sites with direction-finding antennas similar to the one in Mozambique.

Seychelles. By repeatedly sending ships to provide security on request when President Rene feels threatened or is leaving the country, the Soviet Navy has played a key role in developing influence in Victoria. In addition to port calls, the Soviets for the first time last year received permission to land military transports en route to Madagascar and Mozambique. The Soviet Navy also may be interested in securing contingency bunkering facilities in Seychelles. Last summer, Soviet personnel reportedly investigated the possibility of restoring five old naval fuel storage tanks on Ste. Anne Island in Victoria Harbor.

Outlook

Moscow's interest in increasing its influence in Africa and in retaining and expanding its access to military facilities there is unlikely to diminish. The Soviets will continue to seek additional access to regional facilities, using a combination of inducements—primarily arms shipments and other types of military assistance—probably with mixed success.

We judge that the USSR's access to port facilities is sufficient to support its current naval presence off East and West Africa. The Navy would no doubt prefer some additional services, redundant access, or more isolated and secure facilities, but it is quite capable of managing, given typical Soviet operating practices (low activity levels and reliance on afloat facilities), with those it currently uses.¹ We do not believe that the level of Soviet naval activity in the waters off West Africa would justify development of a facility even on the limited scale of the Dahlak Island complex.

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The situation with respect to airfields for deployment of maritime reconnaissance aircraft or stopovers by military transport aircraft is different. Soviet access to such facilities has been limited, and Moscow probably places a high priority on obtaining additional rights. In West Africa, Luanda is too far south to serve as a base for covering all the Central Atlantic sea lanes in which the Soviets probably are most interested. Consequently they are likely to continue to press for Bear deployments in Conakry, and we are likely to see initiatives elsewhere in West Africa.

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In the Indian Ocean, Soviet reconnaissance aircraft flying out of South Yemen and Ethiopia can cover much of the northern Arabian Sea area in which the US carrier groups operate. Nevertheless, Moscow probably would like to monitor Western naval movements elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, and it may well judge that developments in southern Africa will pose such requirements in the future. They probably are interested in obtaining access to at least one airfield in the southern Indian Ocean that would support reconnaissance flights. The Soviet use of several new airfields in East and West Africa as transit points for military transports en route to southern Africa may well represent a more vigorous effort to establish precedents for reconnaissance access in the future, as well as a variety of contingency stopover points that would facilitate arms deliveries. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Economic Ties to Sub-Saharan Africa

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Soviet trade with and aid to Sub-Saharan Africa have expanded rapidly since the mid-1970s, reflecting the USSR's greater involvement in the region. Moscow's willingness and ability to meet the military needs of key clients—especially Ethiopia and Angola—are the overriding factors determining Soviet presence and influence in the region. Soviet economic assistance is minimal, especially in comparison with Western aid. Precisely because Moscow prefers to rely on its military assistance program rather than economic aid to project its presence in the region, its ability to expand relations with Sub-Saharan Africa through economic ties is probably limited.

Recent Trends in Trade

Soviet trade with Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding deliveries of most military equipment, grew from relatively meager beginnings in the early 1970s to more than \$1.1 billion in 1982 or about 7 percent of total Soviet trade turnover with the LDCs¹ (see table 1). Most of this expansion occurred in Soviet exports to key client states, mainly Angola and Ethiopia. The value of imports declined after 1980, reflecting sharply falling commodity prices and Moscow's efforts to curb hard currency purchases in 1981 and 1982. Soviet exports and imports are limited to a relatively small number of trade partners and commodities.

Between 1975 and 1982 Soviet exports to Sub-Saharan Africa grew at an annual rate of almost 25 percent, accounting for 11 percent of total reported Soviet exports to individual LDCs.² This expansion has resulted entirely from increases in exports to four African countries—Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, and Mozambique. Exports to other Sub-Saharan countries

declined by 50 percent between 1975 and 1982. Soviet trade reporting for the first nine months of 1983 indicates that these trends continued last year.

Soviet trade expansion with Nigeria—the region's only major oil producer—is the result of large Soviet contracts won in the latter part of the 1970s, in the heyday of OPEC spending. These multibillion-dollar contracts, which call for the USSR to build two oil pipelines and a steel mill, have earned substantial amounts of hard currency and probably will continue to do so over the next eight to 10 years. The expansion of Soviet exports to Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique appears to be driven largely by political and strategic considerations. This is not to say these exports are free—for its commodities Moscow demands cash on delivery or extends credits, which it expects to be repayed.

Soviet exports to Sub-Saharan Africa consist primarily of machinery and equipment, crude oil, and petroleum products. The combined share of these commodities in total exports to the region grew from 39 percent in 1970 to 90 percent in 1982. If deliveries to Nigeria for the pipelines and the steel mill projects are excluded, about half of Soviet machinery and equipment deliveries consist of transport vehicles and aircraft, many of which are intended for military use. Most of the remaining machinery exports are connected with various Soviet development projects. Almost all of the petroleum exports have gone to Ethiopia.

The pattern of Soviet imports from the region differs sharply from export trends. Since the early 1970s these imports have grown at half the rate of overall Soviet imports from the Third World. In part, this reflects the inability of the African countries to supply Moscow with critical agricultural products—grain, meat, sugar, and vegetable oils. Nor has the USSR

¹ According to estimates made by Dr. Herbert Block in *The Planetary Product in 1980: A Creative Pause*, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 12 percent of total GNP for the non-Communist LDCs.

² Because a large share of Soviet exports to the developing countries reported in official trade statistics is not specified by partner country, it is possible only to calculate a rough share going to Sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the unreported trade is believed to be military supplies, and the share exported to African nations can only be estimated.

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Table 1
USSR: Trade With Selected Sub-Saharan
African Countries, 1970-82

Million US \$

	1970		1975		1980		1982	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Total Non-Communist LDCs ^a	1,183	1,241	2,649	4,089	5,306	7,667	7,340	9,118
Sub-Saharan Africa	93	141	186	327	557 ^b	554 ^b	836 ^b	295 ^b
Ethiopia	1	1	4	3	186	40	252	18
Angola					106	24	84	5
Nigeria	12	22	34	117	124	30	366	19
Mozambique					28	3	61	9
Guinea	12	3	27	20	20	78	21	39
Ghana	11	44	15	64	1	118	1	51
Sudan	36	50	6	11	9	18	1	12
Ivory Coast	NEGL	2	18	24	4	188	1	96
Cameroon	1	8	3	48	8	8	5	15
Other	20	11	79	37	71	47	44	31

^a Excludes Soviet exports to the LDCs which are not specified by country; these are believed to consist largely of Soviet arms. Thus, the actual level of trade with both Sub-Saharan Africa and all LDCs is understated.

^b May understate the actual level of trade with this region as a result of exclusion of data in official Soviet trade statistics for a number of countries since the late 1970s.

Source: Official Soviet Trade Statistics.

become an important importer of Sub-Saharan non-agricultural raw materials. Imports of these commodities have stagnated at a level under \$100 million since 1980.

More important, between 1980 and 1982, the value of Soviet imports from the region fell by more than 45 percent—partly because of Moscow's efforts to reduce overall hard currency expenditures by cutting back nonessential purchases such as cocoa, coffee, and wood products. In the case of coffee, the Soviets diverted purchases to Latin America. In addition, falling world commodity prices further reduced the value of imports from Sub-Saharan Africa, including those from Ethiopia and Angola. While a strengthened Soviet financial position and slightly higher world commodity prices appear to have contributed to an increase in the overall value of imports from the

region during the first nine months of 1983, imports for the year will remain substantially below the 1980 level.

Military Trade and Aid

As with Soviet trade in general, military agreements and deliveries have expanded rapidly since 1975 with most of the growth in sales and deliveries to Ethiopia and Angola (see table 2). Through 1975, Soviet military sales and deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 5 percent of both total sales agreements and deliveries to the LDCs. Between 1975 and 1982, however, this share rose to 12 percent. About 60 percent of this trade has gone to Ethiopia and Angola to support the Marxist regimes in these

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Table 2 *Million US \$*
USSR: Military Agreements and Deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-82

	Agreements		Deliveries	
	1955-82	1976-82	1955-82	1976-82
Total Non-Communist LDCs	78,477	56,381	56,820	41,266
Sub-Saharan Africa	7,475	6,542	5,463	4,784
Ethiopia	3,942	3,936	2,252	2,329
Angola	782	758	774	774
Mozambique	318	294	290	295
Other	2,433	1,554	2,147	1,486

countries. Moscow is also the major supplier of military equipment to a number of other Sub-Saharan nations—including Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. []

The USSR has been the most generous in its military aid to Ethiopia. While this reflects, in part, Ethiopia's poor financial position, it also indicates the political importance Moscow attaches to this relationship. Almost all of the estimated \$4 billion worth of military equipment sold to Ethiopia since 1975 has been discounted by 50 percent from the foreign trade list price; that is, the Ethiopians were charged only about \$2 billion for the arms they received. These sales have, for the most part, been financed with 10-year credits at an annual interest rate of 2 percent with most of the payments not scheduled to begin until 1984. Nevertheless, with debt service payments to the USSR expected to climb to about \$200 million in 1984, Ethiopia already has approached the USSR for further debt rescheduling. No agreement has yet been reached, but Ethiopia's poor financial position may leave Moscow with no alternative but to agree to a moratorium on scheduled payments. []

Soviet financial terms with other Sub-Saharan countries are less generous, though much more so than Soviet sales to OPEC arms clients in the Middle East, where most sales are made for cash with substantial downpayments. Generally, the terms of Soviet credits

are for 10 years with interest rates of 2 to 4 percent, but few price discounts or deferred payments are granted. Moreover, Moscow usually demands cash payments in advance for spare parts and services. It does not hesitate to pressure even key client states, such as Angola and Mozambique, to make the required payments. According to US Embassy sources in Maputo, for instance, half of Mozambique's aircraft were grounded in late 1982 because of a lack of hard currency to purchase the required spare parts. []

Moscow is equally hard-nosed about debt servicing and rescheduling. [] the USSR suspended deliveries of military equipment to Zambia in early 1983 when that country suspended payments for arms already delivered. When necessary, the USSR will reschedule debt payments, but usually only after protracted haggling. It prefers to negotiate barter arrangements. In the past, it has accepted Zambian cobalt in lieu of cash payments. [] Angola recently agreed to supply 40,000 barrels of oil per day to the USSR and Eastern Europe in repayment for military purchases. []

The Economic Aid Program

Of the estimated \$23 billion of Soviet economic aid disbursed since the program began in the mid-1950s, only about \$3.5 billion has gone to Sub-Saharan Africa. As with Soviet trade and military sales, this aid is concentrated on a few countries and most has been extended since 1975 (see table 3). About 70 percent—almost \$2.5 billion—has gone to Nigeria (principally for the steel plant mentioned above), Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. Other relatively large aid recipients—those receiving \$100-250 million in aid—include Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Somalia. Most of the aid to these four countries as well as other, smaller recipients was extended during the 1960s and early 1970s, however, and Soviet economic involvement in these countries has since dropped considerably. []

Table 3
USSR: Economic Agreements and
Deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa,
1954-82

Million US \$

	Agreements		Deliveries	
	1954-82	1976-82	1954-82	1976-82
Total Non-Communist LDCs	23,336	11,289	11,105	4,935
Sub-Saharan Africa	3,530	2,526	1,402	895
Ethiopia	647	542	431	405
Angola	438	438	32	30
Mozambique	178	164	39	40
Nigeria	1,207	1,200	270	265
Guinea	236	4	218	30
Ghana	106	13	35	5
Somalia	164	4	101	30
Mali	120	31	98	25
Other	434	130	178	65

The level of Soviet economic assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is paltry in comparison with Western aid. In most instances Soviet largesse does not begin to supply the levels of aid required to spur economic development for even the USSR's largest aid recipients. Only a small portion of this aid consists of food grants, generally in 2,000- to 5,000-ton donations of grain with occasional grants of up to 25,000 tons. Mostly, Soviet assistance consists of long-term credits (10 years at annual interest rates of 2 to 5 percent) tied to Soviet exports for specific projects. As with the military aid effort, Soviet economic aid to Ethiopia is the notable exception to these general terms. Most of the USSR's support to Ethiopia since the mid-1970s has been commodity credits and grant aid, mostly in the form of oil subsidies and credits.

Much of Soviet economic assistance in Africa is devoted to developing mineral resources—bauxite in Guinea and gold in Mali. A portion of the output is often exported to the USSR in repayment. The USSR also participates in a number of agricultural, fishery, and power projects and assists in constructing a wide variety of small industrial facilities. Only two large projects are currently under way—the Ajaokuta Steel

Mill in Nigeria and preliminary work on the construction of the Kapanda dam and hydropower station in Angola

Although the USSR's economic assistance program in Sub-Saharan Africa is small, it does provide Moscow with a useful, low-cost tool to project its presence in the region. Enhancing the program's usefulness to the Soviets are an estimated 10,645 Soviet economic technicians—25 percent of all Soviet technical advisers currently in the Third World. These technicians are concentrated in Nigeria (5,000), Angola (1,500), Ethiopia (1,000), and Mozambique (1,000). Except for a few doctors and teachers provided free, the Soviets charge heavily for their services—over \$50,000 a year for project managers and nearly as much for geologists, interpreters, and other less senior personnel. Thus, these technicians not only increase the Soviet presence in Africa, but also provide Moscow with an additional source of hard currency.

Prospects for the Future

Despite the stinginess of Soviet economic aid and a generally hard-nosed attitude toward financing arms sales, those African states that have become tied to the USSR are likely to remain so because of noneconomic factors. Moscow's willingness and ability to respond quickly to meet the military needs of key regimes in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are the overriding factors influencing the closeness of their relationship to the USSR. This Soviet responsiveness has most recently been demonstrated by stepped-up military deliveries in 1983 to bolster the Angolan armed forces. The presence of surrogate forces and advisers—mainly Cubans and East Germans—increases Moscow's ability to aid its African clients. As long as the Marxist regimes of Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are threatened by insurgent forces, the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa will remain strong.

Whether Moscow's position would remain as strong with an improvement in the security situation in these countries is less clear. Moscow makes no secret of its unwillingness and/or inability to supply the Third

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World with the types and large amounts of aid required by the region or supplied by the West. Mozambique, disappointed with the low level of Soviet aid, has adopted a policy of expanding economic ties with the West. In addition, several African countries once close to the USSR—including Guinea, Benin, and Congo—have become disillusioned with Moscow's assistance programs and are strengthening their Western ties.

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For these reasons, the Soviet ability to expand relations with this region through economic ties is probably limited. Moscow is well aware of the limited catalogue of goods the Sub-Saharan countries can offer. The USSR cannot export the food and consumer products needed in these countries; nor is Soviet equipment, with its reputation for poor performance, particularly attractive to African countries. Thus, military trade appears to be the primary means of expanding Soviet presence and influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in situations where Moscow can capitalize on instability within the region.

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Other Topics

Soviet Security Policy on the Chinese Border

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Although political relations between the USSR and China have improved since early 1982, prospects for a reversal or even a significant relaxation of the Soviet military buildup on the Chinese border appear slight, at least during this decade. During their political discussions since October 1982, the Soviets and Chinese have agreed on several ways to expand their political contacts but remain deadlocked on key security issues. Moscow has refused to make any unilateral concessions on troop deployments until political relations improve, and Beijing insists that political relations cannot improve until basic security issues are resolved. Meanwhile, Moscow continues to strengthen its military forces opposite China, adhering in the process to a military strategy that leaves little room for force reductions.

The Soviet Military Buildup Opposite China: Phase I

The current posture of Soviet forces on the Chinese border is the result of a process that began in the early 1960s, when Moscow realized that Beijing was a potential military foe. Soviet military writings typically suggest that the purpose of military deployments is not just to deter potential enemies from attacking but to defeat them if they do. The normal way to win a war, according to this literature, is with a strategic-level offensive: a large-scale operation designed to strike the enemy's entire armed forces and their infrastructure and ultimately to destroy its ability to fight. In the Far East, however, the Soviets almost certainly found it necessary to focus initially on the lesser objective of deterring or containing a Chinese attack, both because their border with China was

largely unprotected and because they faced an immediate threat of border incursions instigated by an unpredictable Chinese leadership. The Damanskiy Island clashes of 1969 gave substance to these fears.

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During the initial phase of the buildup—1965-72—the Soviets appear to have concentrated on achieving two immediate military objectives: creating strong defenses where attack seemed most likely and developing the ability to launch shallow offensives into China. By 1972 the Kremlin had deployed 19 ready¹ divisions to positions on the Chinese border from which they could cover all likely invasion routes, and it backed these forces with 21 not-ready divisions distributed among the four military districts opposite China. The Soviets also built up air defenses around all major military and population centers in the Far East as well as along the eastern portion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

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By 1972 Moscow probably had achieved a capability to protect its territory in the east against Chinese ground and air forces. This judgment is based not only on the disposition of Soviet forces, but also on the fact

¹ *Ready* divisions are the most highly manned and the best equipped and trained: they are at least minimally prepared for combat operations with little or no mobilization. *Not ready* divisions would require extensive mobilization of both men and equipment and therefore would not be available for immediate combat operations. In the case of the Far East, they would require about 50 days to reach a minimum level of proficiency sufficient for offensive operations.

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that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) organized and equipped its forces to fight a war of attrition against invading forces—it did not give them the equipment, training, and logistics for an offensive into Soviet territory. PLA doctrine also called for nothing more than a defensive war on Chinese territory against Soviet invaders. []

The Soviet Buildup: Phase II

Changes in the Soviet force structure in the Far East since the early 1970s suggest that Moscow subsequently decided to go beyond its initial military objectives and develop the capability to launch a strategic-level offensive against a relatively small but vital part of China: northern Manchuria. The Soviets probably realized that, although their existing forces could repel a Chinese invasion, they could not prevent temporary crossings of Soviet borders and the resulting significant damage to Moscow's interests in border areas. They also may have feared that the Chinese could defeat the limited offensive thrusts for which they had prepared. Finally, Soviet statements in the 1970s about the "Chinese threat" revealed concern over the possibility that China would attack, not on its own, but during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Moscow probably hoped that its capability to seize northern Manchuria would guarantee good behavior by the Chinese even in a NATO-Pact war and, if not, permit the Kremlin to quickly knock China out of the war. []

Moscow enhanced its ability to coordinate such an operation in 1978 when it formed the High Command of Forces in the Far East, the only peacetime Soviet theater command. It probably controls all conventional Soviet forces opposite China. []

Moscow also increased its offensive capabilities against China by modernizing its theater nuclear forces in Asia, principally by deploying SS-20 IRBMs. The first SS-20 base opposite China was begun in 1976. The Soviets currently have 135 operational SS-20s targeted against Asia, and we estimate that they will have between 216 and 270 by the end of the decade. These missiles enable Moscow, in case of war, to destroy or disable key elements of the military infrastructure within China, most importantly those that can strike a nuclear blow against the USSR. In

addition, Soviet theater strike capabilities have been improved since 1982 by the permanent basing of Y-class SSBNs in the Sea of Japan and the institution of regular patrols there. A secondary theater strike role was always considered inherent in the Petropavlovsk-based Y-class units, but earlier patrols were all conducted off the US coast. []

Significant evidence of Moscow's plans for conducting a ground offensive against China is found in the positioning of newly created ground divisions on the border since the early 1970s. During 1972-82 the Kremlin added three new ready and 11 not-ready divisions. All three ready divisions were established in Mongolia. This brought to nine the number of ready divisions on the western borders of Manchuria, where Soviet defensive requirements, compared with those in the Far East Military District, are relatively minor. These divisions would probably spearhead a Manchurian offensive and would be supported, as defensive requirements permitted, by the forces in the Far East Military District. The Soviets may also be creating a theater reserve behind this force: since 1972 they have added five new not-ready divisions that could support any offensive into western Manchuria. []

Force modernization has also provided improved tactical air support for such an operation. During the early 1970s Moscow substantially upgraded the capability of most of its fighter-bomber regiments to provide close air support to ground forces by replacing their MIG-17 fighters with specialized fighter-bombers (Fitters and Flogger Ds, Fs, and Js). The effects were particularly pronounced in the Transbaikal Military District, where many of the fighter-bomber regiments opposite China were concentrated. Beginning in 1976, the Kremlin also upgraded its deep-interdiction capability against China by introducing the Fencer light bomber, first in existing Beagle bomber regiments and then in converted fighter-bomber regiments. This increase in the ground attack capabilities of Soviet air forces in the area is particularly dramatic, since China's air defenses would probably be ineffective against them. []

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
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Figure 1
Soviet Ground Force Divisions Opposite China



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Moscow also has enhanced the offensive strength of the Transbaikal Military District by concentrating its tank modernization program opposite China there. By 1982 all of the divisions in this district had received T-62 or T-72 tanks to replace their T-54s and T-55s, while only 38 percent of the divisions in the Far East Military District had T-62s. This bias in favor of the Transbaikal Military District only became apparent around 1978, although the introduction of T-62s opposite China had begun a decade earlier. By 1982 this district also had a preponderance of the self-propelled artillery deployed opposite China, enhancing the capability of its artillery units to support fast-moving tank operations.

The Primacy of the Military Approach


Since the mid-1960s Moscow has periodically made initiatives toward conciliation with Beijing, but until recently all such overtures were rejected by the Chinese or proved fruitless. Both because of Chinese inflexibility and its own conviction that military superiority is essential to security, Moscow has been unrelenting in its efforts to strengthen Soviet forces opposite China.

Moscow's economic investment in its ground forces (the main element of its posture) opposite China has increased steadily since 1965 (see figure 2). Expenditures for the force as a whole have fluctuated somewhat, but this has been due primarily to the modernization of air regiments at irregular intervals. In addition, although the Kremlin withdrew border troops from disputed islands in 1969, it has not disbanded or even pulled back a major ground force unit opposite China since 1960, either to demonstrate serious interest in political rapprochement or for any other reason. Finally, Moscow has not changed its military policies even when they seem to conflict with political initiatives. For example, the Soviets continue to strengthen their forces in Mongolia even though the Chinese are particularly sensitive to this issue, which Beijing treats as a major obstacle to normalizing relations.

The consistency with which the Soviets have implemented their military policy against China despite changes in their political tactics during the past 20 years underscores the strong and enduring consensus in the leadership that military strength is essential to

Figure 2
Dollar Costs of Soviet Forces Opposite China:
Estimated Growth, 1965-82

Index: 1965=100



^a Includes ground forces, frontal aviation, LRA, VTA, SRF, PVO, and KGB forces.

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Soviet security. There is probably also a consensus, however, that a dual political and military approach to China offers significant advantages. Soviet leaders probably believe that political initiatives help to mute foreign opposition to their military buildup without significantly endangering it. They may also believe that the buildup will eventually make China more willing to compromise in political negotiations, while providing insurance against the failure of those negotiations.

Prospects

The apparent long-term consensus behind the Soviet military program and the lack of any evidence of willingness to modify it, even in connection with the

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latest round of political discussions, indicate that there will be no significant change in Moscow's overall military policy against China in the near future. It almost certainly will be some time before the current Sino-Soviet dialogue reaches a point where the Soviets are tempted to make major military concessions. Resource constraints, although increasing, are also unlikely to force any significant alterations, at least in the 1980s.

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Any changes that Moscow might decide to make would probably be limited to token actions designed to create or sustain momentum for political progress without altering the essential elements of its current military posture. Such actions could include symbolic force reductions to elicit or respond to Chinese concessions at the negotiating table. They would probably focus on Soviet offensive capabilities, since these would have the greatest political impact on the Chinese.

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There is currently no sign, however, that the Soviets are considering such actions, and, indeed, all the evidence presently available seems to argue against even token changes in the Kremlin's security policy toward China.

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Soviet-Peruvian Military Relations and Political Ties

Despite the Peruvian military's growing dissatisfaction with Soviet arms, Lima's financial problems and Moscow's continued willingness to provide attractive financing are likely to ensure the USSR's position as Peru's primary source of weapons over the next few years. Given the Peruvian military's rightist views and the Belaunde government's hostility toward the USSR, however, Moscow apparently doubts its ability to translate this position into significant political influence in the near term. Instead, the Soviets will try to use their Peruvian connection to establish similar military supply relationships with other South American countries while cultivating better ties with Peruvian opposition forces.

Political Changes in the Peruvian Military

Relations between the Soviets and the Peruvian military have deteriorated over the past year—in large part because of the influence of anti-Communist general officers.

Moscow is concerned that it runs the risk of being displaced as a source of arms and training for Peru.

US military sources describe Lt. Gen. Carlos Briceno, who retired as Army commander and president of the Peruvian joint command in December, as conservative and staunchly anti-Communist.

Briceno protested the Soviet downing of the KAL airliner in September by refusing to go to Moscow to renegotiate Peru's military debt.

Briceno's hostility toward the Soviets may be due in part to his belief that outside elements are backing and coordinating Peru's Sendero Luminoso terrorist group. (We have no evidence of this.) Attache reports state that he believes Communist electoral gains will encourage Sendero Luminoso and harm democracy in Peru. Before he retired, he expressed to US officials his interest in obtaining US equipment. Like other former Peruvian military chiefs, Briceno probably will remain an influential factor in the future. Many in the Army hierarchy reportedly share Briceno's view that the Soviet connection must ultimately be broken, and his successor has expressed this opinion.

changes in the command of the Peruvian Air Force could significantly alter the political outlook of this branch to the detriment of Soviet interests. the new leadership is likely to have more positive attitudes toward the United States than its immediate predecessors.

Moscow probably is also troubled by the reported deterioration of its relationship with the Peruvian National Intelligence Service (SIN). US Embassy sources report that over the years the KGB has regularly sponsored SIN Army officers for intelligence training in the USSR. The KGB's formal ties to the SIN, however, were damaged in early 1983 when officers of the traditionally anti-Soviet Peruvian Navy replaced Army officers in key SIN positions.

The Military Supply Relationship

The Soviet military supply line to Peru is Moscow's main source of influence with the Peruvian military. Over the past two years, however, Peru has made several attempts to diversify its supply of new military equipment. US Embassy officials report that Lima is

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negotiating the purchase of 15 US-made Sikorsky Blackhawk assault helicopters for the Army's use in its campaign against terrorism and insurgency. []

[] poor Soviet logistic support for the Soviet-made MI-6 and MI-8 helicopters in the Peruvian inventory prompted this move. []

The Air Force is also reportedly still trying to close its long-pending purchase of 26 French Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft. US military sources state, however, that since August Moscow has made at least two counteroffers of Soviet-made aircraft on favorable terms. Lima reportedly rejected the latest offer, in October, of MIG-23 fighter aircraft because of previously inadequate maintenance and logistic support from the USSR for Peru's SU-22 aircraft. []

Chronic maintenance problems have motivated the Peruvians to develop an indigenous maintenance capability. []

a transfer-of-technology agreement with the USSR three years ago that provides training of Peruvian technicians in the maintenance of SU-22 fighter engines and the eventual manufacture in Peru of related tools, special equipment, and spare parts.

The Peruvians, however, are reluctant to turn to third countries for spare parts and supplies for Soviet equipment for fear of Soviet reprisals. According to attache reports, the Peruvian high command believes that Moscow could harm Peru's military readiness by reducing supplies and cutting off logistic support if Lima looks elsewhere. These reports state that, although significant segments of the high command now believe that Peru's dependence on the USSR for military supplies must be reduced, the Peruvians do not wish to jeopardize their fighting capabilities. []

Peru's Financial Problems

Lima's \$11.6 billion foreign debt also is a major obstacle to any effort to diversify Peru's arms sources and reduce its military dependence on the USSR. The Peruvian economy remains depressed, and Lima is struggling to meet the austerity targets set by the International Monetary Fund as a condition for refinancing a portion of Peru's debt. []

While Western firms have been leery of Peru's creditworthiness, Moscow continues to demonstrate its willingness to work around Peru's financial difficulties. Although Lima owes the USSR an estimated \$1.2 billion for military purchases, in September the Soviets agreed to reschedule payments of \$411 million coming due in 1983 and 1984 over the next eight years. US Embassy officials report that the Soviets have gone out of their way to accommodate Peru by accepting as part of the package a payment-in-kind arrangement in nontraditional Peruvian exports such as textiles. We judge that Peru will act pragmatically and look toward the Soviets in the future if the West cannot offer technologically advanced equipment on more generous terms. []

Prospects

Largely because the Soviets perceive the government of President Belaunde as hostile to their interests, Moscow apparently doubts its ability to derive political influence from its ties to the Peruvian military in the near term. [] Moscow has sought to preserve its position by maintaining a low profile with the government while cultivating close ties with all branches of the Peruvian armed forces. []

The leftward trend in Peruvian domestic politics signaled by the results of the November municipal election could improve Soviet prospects in Peru. [] [] the Soviets over the past year have cultivated ties with the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), the moderate-leftist coalition party that made substantial electoral gains in November. By developing relationships

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with APRA politicians, the Soviets reportedly hope to get more accurate assessments of the Peruvian political scene, and, should APRA win the 1985 presidential election, an alternative avenue to influence in the Peruvian Government. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Soviets believe that the failure of the Belaunde government to solve the nation's social and economic problems coupled with leftist electoral gains might precipitate a coup before the 1985 presidential elections. [redacted]

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[redacted] rightist elements would be the likely leaders of such a move and that a coup would probably harm Moscow's interests. There are no indications, however, that military leaders are now preparing to stage such a coup. [redacted]

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Whether or not the Soviets can increase their political influence within Peru, we believe that Moscow sees the maintenance of its military relationship with Lima as important to the success of its efforts to establish similar ties elsewhere in South America. According to attache reporting, since the Falklands war the Soviets have approached the Argentine and Bolivian militaries with offers of arms and training. Although the Soviet-Peruvian military relationship has not been problem free, Moscow may believe that its continued willingness to do business with Lima's anti-Communist government and armed forces will strengthen its image as a reliable arms supplier. We believe, therefore, that the USSR will continue to make every effort to keep its Peruvian foothold intact. In the absence of more attractive offers of financing by Western arms suppliers, Lima's financial problems greatly enhance the prospects of Soviet arms sale efforts. [redacted]

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Soviet Educational Reform To Accent Vocational Training

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A Politburo commission established following the June 1983 Central Committee plenum issued comprehensive draft proposals for reforming Soviet education in January. The proposals—issued after six months of public debate on how the educational system could be changed to better serve the economy's needs—offer few concrete measures but strongly urge increased vocational training, particularly in the general secondary schools (roughly equivalent to US academic high schools). The reforms will be formally enacted in a few months, probably with little change.

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The commission also recommended restructuring the general education system so that children will start school one year earlier, at the age of 6. General education will become an 11-year program with the additional year in the primary grades (1 to 4). The incomplete secondary program will remain five years (grades 5 to 9); and general secondary will still be a two-year program (grades 10 and 11).

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The emphasis on vocational training is intended primarily to help offset the decrease in the number of young people who will be entering the labor force during the 1980s. Specifically, the Soviets are seeking to make a larger proportion of youth available for employment at an earlier age and, most important, to increase the number of skilled workers and improve the match between job openings and suitably trained personnel. The changes that will be made are in line with the traditional Soviet educational policy of giving priority to meeting short-term manpower needs. But the price for the immediate gains could be a long-run reduction in the supply of much needed highly trained manpower.

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There also appears to be an essentially ideological element in the proposals that might dilute the future quality of the professional component of the labor force. Perhaps reflecting an official attitude that vocational training is important in molding the character of Soviet youth, the draft program urges more vocational training even in the general secondary schools. Since they are supposed to train future

entrants into the professions, increased emphasis on vocational work in these schools seems inconsistent with their purpose.

Past and Present Emphasis on Vocational Education

The current proposals to expand vocational education are a continuation of an earlier policy that has had little success. In December 1977 the Council of Ministers, in anticipation of declining increments to the labor force, adopted a resolution calling for an increase in vocational training in secondary schools. Such training was to increase from two to four hours weekly, curricula and text books were to have a more polytechnical, practical orientation, and material deemed to be "of secondary importance" was to be eliminated. The resolution was designed to make secondary school graduates better suited to the economy's immediate needs, without abandoning the government's commitment to universal secondary education. The draft proposals reiterate the provisions of this resolution, calling for further streamlining of the academic curriculum, "stepping up the polytechnical thrust of the content of education," and increasing the time spent on labor training.

The 1977 resolution established completion of the eighth grade (ninth under the new system) as the point for choosing which secondary education track to follow, a decision that largely determines career possibilities. Since the mid-1970s almost all eighth-grade graduates have moved on to some type of secondary or vocational school. The different types of schools, their current programs, and proposed changes are listed below:

- *General secondary schools* will continue to offer academic training and some polytechnical experience in a traditional two-year program leading to higher education.

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Table 1
Distribution of Eighth-Grade
Graduates Percent

Year	Entered Work Force	Admitted to Full-Time Study		
		Vocational- Technical	General Secondary	Specialized Secondary
1965	42.5	12.3	40.0	5.2
1975	2.3	31.6	60.9	5.2
1980	0.5	33.1	60.2	6.2

- *Specialized secondary schools* now provide both eighth- and 10th-grade graduates technical training at the semiprofessional level for careers such as technicians, nurses, and elementary school teachers. The four-year course for eighth-grade graduates devotes approximately 75 percent of its time to technical subjects and applied training. The course for general secondary school graduates is one and a half to two and a half years and consists essentially of technical training. Under the new system, the course length will be two or three years.
- *Vocational-technical schools* will continue to offer a three-year course providing a specific skill and a secondary education. The one- to two-year course offering only vocational training for general secondary school graduates will be limited to one year under the new system.
- *Schools for working and rural youth* will continue to provide secondary education on a part-time basis.

The emphasis on vocational education since 1977 has not worked out as planned. As shown in table 1, there was little decline between 1975 and 1980 in the proportion of eighth-grade graduates entering general secondary schools.

The regime wanted to reduce the number of youths choosing the academic track, not only to increase the number being trained in specific skills and for specific trades, but because, as Soviet surveys have indicated, 15-year-olds (eighth-grade graduates) are more willing to take blue-collar jobs than 17- or 18-year-olds

Table 2
Distribution of 10th-Grade General
Secondary School Graduates Percent

Year	Entered Work Force	Admitted to Full-Time Study		
		Vocational- Technical	Specialized Secondary	Higher
1965	16.2		42.4	41.4
1975	55.3	12.9	16.0	15.8
1980	41.2	26.9	15.6	16.3

(10th-grade graduates). The new proposals do not specify the proportion of students to attend each secondary track, but they do call for the number of students entering secondary vocational-technical schools to double.

Since 1977 Soviet educators have staged a massive public relations campaign to raise the prestige of wageworker occupations and to steer students away from a college-bound track, the traditional path of upward mobility in Soviet society. The State Committee for Labor and Social Problems has been tasked with directing an ambitious program of career counseling for students about to enter a secondary school program.

Current educational arrangements are also contributing to wasteful use of manpower. First, a smaller proportion of secondary school graduates are going on to higher education—about 16 percent since 1975 compared with over 40 percent in 1965 (see table 2). More important, a larger share of these graduates—43 percent in 1980 versus 29 percent in 1975—subsequently enroll in specialized secondary schools or technical schools of the vocational-technical system. In 1982, 66 percent of the youths admitted to specialized secondary schools and 30 percent of those admitted to technical schools were graduates of general secondary schools. This large-scale sequential enrollment in two basically (though not entirely) parallel school systems has meant at least an extra year of schooling for numerous youths and consequent delay of their entry into the labor force. Interestingly, the

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proposed reforms apparently will not change this situation; the commission is recommending a one-year course in secondary vocational-technical schools or a two- to three-year course in specialized secondary schools for students who want more advanced technical training. Some secondary school graduates will enter the labor force at an earlier age, however, if the draft proposals to lower the minimum entry age for a number of occupations or industrial operations are adopted. []

The reforms seek a number of other changes as well:

- Gradually integrating 6-year-olds into general education schools beginning in 1986 as teachers and programs become available. The purpose is to (a) lighten the academic load for children in the primary grades and allow for an emphasis on basic skills and (b) permit some mothers to enter the labor force a year earlier than might otherwise be possible.
- Possibly decreasing the course length for specialized secondary school graduates who enroll in higher educational institutions to avoid repetition of basic course work.
- Expanding vocational training in all school programs. The proposals recommend attaching each school to a base enterprise that would act as a sponsor or patron. Vocational training in general secondary schools will be upgraded, primarily through increased use of interschool production combines. These combines consist of facilities set up by local governments and industrial and agricultural enterprises. Students work at the combines one day a week during the school year and three weeks during the summer. Currently, there are about 2,500 interschool production combines, which train a third of general secondary school students. Plans are being formulated to increase the number of such facilities to 3,200 to train over half of the students by 1985.
- Training more teachers by increasing admissions to teachers' colleges and upgrading their education by extending the present four-year course by one year. Measures designed to make teaching more attractive will include wage increases, preferential housing, and improved living and working conditions. []

Reform Likely To Have Limited Impact

The proposed reforms are to be implemented gradually. Many of the proposals have been made before, but issuing a comprehensive reform program suggests a willingness heretofore lacking in allocating the human and material resources required to reform the educational system. However, at least in the short run, even with massive investment, attainment of the program's objectives faces formidable obstacles. For example, reducing enrollment in general secondary schools and correspondingly increasing it in vocational-technical schools may be frustrated by shortages of the latter schools, particularly in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and some sections of the RSFSR. []

Reliance on the interschool production training combines to augment vocational training in the general secondary schools appears to be misplaced. Educators complain that one "work" day each week merely provides superficial acquaintance with an occupation and a minimal skill level. Furthermore, the physical facilities, teaching materials, and tools used in the program are considered unsatisfactory, and the prospects for improvement are not promising. School administrators have no financial authority and rely on the enterprises and ultimately the responsible ministry for financing. But the program enjoys little support from enterprises and ministries, which see it as more hindrance than help in meeting production targets. []

A similar educational reform was attempted, without success, under Khrushchev a generation ago. Initiated in 1958, it also came in response to a labor shortage, the result of a severe decline in the number of persons reaching working age in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Khrushchev overhauled the Soviet school system to provide increased amounts of polytechnical training at the secondary level, expand part-time education, and upgrade vocational-technical schools. []

After several years, general dissatisfaction with the reform seemed to outweigh its merits. Most schools did not have the necessary materials or qualified teachers to give adequate vocational training. Students complained of being overworked and showed

little interest in employment in industry or agriculture mainly because they often were assigned only menial tasks during training sessions. On-the-job training, a key part of Khrushchev's program, was not based on vocational interest, but on proximity of the factory to the student's home. Managers objected to lackadaisical student participation on the job, and enterprises were reluctant to spend time on training students. As a result, part-time educational programs often suffered from inferior instruction and high dropout and repeater rates, resulting in a decline in the quality of higher and specialized secondary education. The measures were rescinded by 1965 when a 10-year program of general secondary education was reinstated and polytechnical training was virtually eliminated. [REDACTED]

greater stress on training that leads to excessively narrow specialization could leave the USSR ill equipped to deal with the demands of an increasingly complex economy in an era of rapid technological change. [REDACTED]

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Though the current reform proposals are less extreme than the unsuccessful Khrushchev reforms, the Soviets face the same problems in revamping the schools now that they did 25 years ago—a shortage of vocational schools, training materials, and qualified production instructors, unwillingness by enterprises to provide training, and the negative perception of wage-worker positions held by students and their families. In fact, the resistance may be stronger now because of the gains made in educational attainment since the 1960s. [REDACTED]

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The objectives of the current reform are also open to question. Gearing the educational system to deemphasize the academic curriculum at an early stage in life and to promote more rapid placement of young people with finely tuned vocational skills into the labor force could help ease the short-term manpower squeeze. But Soviet education is already vocationally oriented—in the RSFSR, for instance, one-third of the hours in general secondary schools are devoted to labor training¹—and pushing it further in this direction could jeopardize long-term Soviet interests. Lowering the quality of general education and placing

¹ Most vocational-technical schools devote about 60 percent of course time to vocational and polytechnical subjects. The quality of academic instruction is lower in these schools than in general secondary schools. The draft proposals recognize this and call for equalizing educational quality. [REDACTED]

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Briefs

Efforts To Spur Labor Brigades ☐

Two party-state decrees in early December criticized the halfhearted way Soviet industry has introduced the brigade system of organizing labor—small groups of workers that are assigned resources and tasks according to a contract with enterprise management. The lack of success of the brigade program is another example of the difficulty Andropov has encountered in implementing even relatively moderate reforms. The new decrees listed several incentives for brigade leaders that are designed to breathe new life into the system but failed to provide monetary rewards for enterprise managers to encourage the introduction of brigades; this omission makes it likely that the decrees will have minimal impact. ☐

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The Soviet leadership has been pushing hard for extensive use of brigades since 1979, touting this method as an effective way to raise productivity through enlisting worker self-interest. A worker's remuneration under this system is tied both to the output of the brigade as a whole and to his individual contribution to that output. Andropov has given even greater emphasis to the brigade system than Brezhnev, making it a key element in his plans for revitalizing the economy. Even though 60 percent of industrial workers have been organized into brigades, most brigades, according to the December decree, exist in name only or have not been integrated into actual production. Only half of the brigades are operating under contracts, and wages continue to be paid on an individual basis, ignoring the link with brigade performance. A key reason for the limited use of brigades appears to be opposition by ministerial and working-level managers, who see the contractual arrangements of the system as diluting their authority over workers. ☐

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Retail Price Cuts ☐

On 1 December the USSR reduced prices of selected consumer durable goods by 13 to 30 percent. This was the third round of price cuts since an unannounced rise in prices in February 1983. The earlier price reductions took place in April and September. These cuts—like those in the past—are probably designed to reduce inventories, particularly of poor-quality items, and the US Embassy reports that they have indeed stimulated some increase in sales. Chairman of the State Committee on Prices Glushkov indicated in *Pravda* that there would be more price changes—both upward and downward—in the future, but he made clear that prices of basic foodstuffs and other staple items would not fluctuate. ☐

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In the first official acknowledgement of the price rises of February, Glushkov said the three price cuts since then would offset the inflationary impact of those increases, resulting in a net annual saving to consumers of 1.6 billion rubles. Prices charged by the state for consumer goods appear to have risen sharply in the last two years. According to official data, Soviet retail prices—following an unprecedented increase of about 3.5 percent in 1982—rose at an annual rate of 1.7 percent for the first six months of 1983, reflecting both the retail price increases in February and the first round of reductions in April. The subsequent reductions in September and December may have brought inflation for the year closer to historical rates of less than 1 percent.

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**Commitment to
Five-Day Workweek**

Soviet authorities have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to a five-day, 41-hour workweek despite the pressures of a growing labor shortage. The nonfarm labor force was shifted from a six-day to a five-day workweek in March 1967 with the expectation that a shorter workweek would boost labor productivity, raise the efficiency of plant and equipment, and provide more leisure time for workers. The regime's assurances of a five-day workweek are evidently intended to calm popular fears, generated by the discipline campaign, that improvements in worker welfare enacted long ago might now be in jeopardy.

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**Soviet-Japanese
Relations**

Premier Tikhonov's uncompromising statements on bilateral relations in *Pravda* earlier this month suggest that Moscow does not expect the recent Japanese elections to affect Tokyo's foreign policy. Tikhonov, answering questions from the Japanese press, accused the government of Prime Minister Nakasone of taking its cue from the United States in "dismantling the entire system of Soviet-Japanese relations" established during the postwar period. Soviet media coverage of the elections portrayed the setback dealt to Nakasone's Liberal Democratic Party as evidence of popular opposition to Tokyo's pro-US policies but predicted that those policies would not change.

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The Tikhonov interview suggests the Soviets have concluded they have little to gain from demonstrating flexibility, at least at present. Moscow apparently believes that its best course is to keep hammering away on the dangers of Japan's security ties with the United States, in the hope that Japanese public opinion will eventually force changes in Tokyo's foreign policy. Tokyo believes it is up to the Soviets to take the first step.

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**Soviet Pledge on
Nuclear Missile
Targeting**

A Soviet general who advised the USSR's delegation to the Geneva INF talks recently told a Spanish newspaper that the USSR would not target nuclear missiles against Spain as long as it remains "denuclearized." He said that, in spite of Spain's accession to NATO and the presence of US bases, Moscow considers Spain a neutral country and seeks good bilateral relations.

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The USSR has long maintained that it would not target nuclear missiles against any country not having nuclear weapons, but it has recently reemphasized that pledge to some NATO countries in an apparent effort to limit INF deployments. The general's statement reflects Moscow's reluctant acceptance of the current Spanish Government's evident desire to remain in NATO and to consider future integration into the military structure. Moscow recognizes that US nuclear weapons are not deployed or permanently stored in Spain at this time. The statement appears tacitly to accept the fact that the US airbases at Zaragoza and Torrejon and the naval base at Rota periodically handle nuclear-armed aircraft and ships.

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Viewpoint

The views expressed in the following article are the author's; they do not necessarily represent a consensus of CIA analysts. ☐

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Soviet Views on Relations With the United States ☐

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Since September 1983 Soviet statements on bilateral relations indicate a period of heightened debate over the prospects for US-Soviet relations under the Reagan administration. Some participants in the discussion argued that no progress is possible so long as the current United States administration remains in office, and others alleged that political and economic forces are influencing the United States toward compromise, despite the administration's anti-Soviet disposition. This discussion appears to have concluded with a policy decision late last year to maintain dialogue on secondary issues and to leave the door open for a new US initiative on arms control, despite pessimism over the prospect of any significant breakthrough. ☐

The Debate

The analysis of US policy in Soviet media is frequently more textured than the official line publicly formulated by the highest Soviet officials would suggest. At times when significant policy decisions need to be made, Soviet discussants often express strikingly different views on how to assess or anticipate US actions. These views are frequently advanced with an eye to influencing particular non-Soviet audiences, but they also suggest policy advocacy and reflect debate that will ultimately result in a policy decision. ☐

In the weeks following the KAL incident, a number of Soviets aired the view that no progress in bilateral relations was possible as long as the current US administration remained in office. General Secretary Andropov expressed a view close to this when he said on 28 September that recent events had dispelled

"once and for all" any "illusions" about the possibility of an evolution for the better in US policy. The influential political commentator Aleksandr Bovin predicted in November that President Reagan's reelection would mean "four more years of nervous tension, conflicts, arms race, and nuclear missile brinksmanship." The newly appointed head of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations went even further, arguing that current US policy was no aberration attributable to the President's personal view, but a reflection of the wishes of the US ruling "oligarchy." ☐

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In contrast, a somewhat less gloomy view held that, while the US administration was disposed to be anti-Soviet, its policies were subject to moderating influences. An article by the prominent political observer Fedor Burlatskiy, published shortly after the KAL incident in *Literary Gazette*, was remarkably upbeat, arguing that pressure from the American public, the Congress, and West European leaders had forced the President to pursue a less rigid course. Burlatskiy cited the resumption of arms control talks and the renunciation of economic sanctions against the USSR as milestones in this development, and he suggested that the forces he had cited, along with electoral considerations, were moving events in a "constructive" direction at Geneva. ☐

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Coinciding with Burlatskiy's article was an interview on Czechoslovak television with the deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Information Department, Vadim Zagladin. Zagladin argued that "objective" factors, including the mounting US deficit and a growing US peace movement, would constrain the US administration from embarking on a new round in the arms race and that public opinion in the United States was forcing the administration to modify its hardline position. The director of the Institute for the USA and Canada, Georgiy Arbatov, also noted the potential influence of public concern on administration policy, although he was less sanguine about its near-term effects. []

Soviet Policy—How Intransigent Is It?

This discussion was apparently the precursor of a major reconsideration of Soviet policy toward the United States that may have taken place around the end of November, when the US Embassy noted the simultaneous absence from public view of a number of key specialists on bilateral relations. Although the Embassy reported initial signs that this review may have resulted in a decision to shut down the US-Soviet dialogue completely, subsequent indications suggest that the resultant policy was based on a synthesis of the two views outlined above, but was somewhat more consistent with the second one. The Soviets now appear to be seeking to maintain a dialogue with the United States on secondary issues and to be leaving the door open for a new US initiative on arms control, while expressing doubt that significant progress is likely. []

Toward the end of December, the Soviets informed the United States that they were prepared to resume the interrupted bilateral talks on improving the direct Moscow-Washington communications link, and bilateral discussions on nonproliferation issues are continuing. Bovin, moderating his earlier position, has affirmed that the Soviets will continue to negotiate with the United States and has even suggested that an agreement on the establishment of additional consulates would be possible. []

On the other hand, the Soviets have maintained a pessimistic line regarding the possibility of any major breakthrough in bilateral relations, particularly on arms control. Immediately after the United States

announced the upcoming meeting in Stockholm between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko, TASS issued a statement clearly intended to throw cold water on any Western hopes that the Soviets had moderated their position. It accused the US Government of "spreading optimistic statements" and went on to assert that neither the Stockholm conference nor "bilateral contacts" could substitute for the Geneva talks. A few days later, Gromyko made a tough speech characterizing US appeals for a resumption of arms talks as "hypocrisy" and "propagandistic dope." He reiterated Andropov's condition of 24 November that the West must display a willingness to return to the situation existing prior to US INF deployment in order for the talks to resume. []

Despite these public rebuffs, the Soviets have given several private hints that they would be prepared to respond to a new US offer at Stockholm. Moreover, a Moscow television commentator on 25 December explicitly denied that the USSR intends to await the outcome of the 1984 election before entering into serious contacts with the United States, and he stated that Moscow is "ready to deal with any US president." He went on to say that the USSR would have no objection to talks aimed at strengthening international security, provided there is an "energetic and clear" demonstration of good will from the United States. Burlatskiy wrote in *Literary Gazette* on 4 January that it would be "premature" to say that hope for an arms agreement has collapsed. []

In summary, after a period of discussion the Soviets appear to have rejected the option of hunkering down and freezing bilateral relations altogether until the 1984 Presidential election. Their gloomy pronouncements are more than just propaganda, but they appear to want to maintain a dialogue in case there may be some movement by the United States on major issues. Their pessimism over the immediate prospects for bilateral relations appears to be coupled with a desire that no further deterioration take place and that nothing be done to jeopardize the possibility of improvement over the longer term. []

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