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SENATE  
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portions of loans in excess of that amount, the interest rate will be that prevailing in the private market for similar loans, as determined by the Secretary. All such loans shall be repayable at such times as the Secretary may determine, taking into account the purposes of the loan and the nature and effect of the disaster, but not later than provided for loans for similar purposes under subtitles A and B of this title, and upon the full personal liability of the borrower and upon the best security available, as the Secretary may prescribe: *Provided*, That the security is adequate to assure repayment of the loan; except that if such security is not available because of the disaster, the Secretary shall (1) accept as security such collateral as is available, a portion or all of which may have depreciated in value due to the disaster and which in the opinion of the lender, together with his confidence in the repayment ability of the applicant, is adequate security for the loan, or if no collateral is available because of the disaster, the loan shall be made if in the opinion of the lender he has sufficient confidence in the repayment ability of the applicant to assure repayment of the loan, and (11) make such loans repayable at such times as he may determine, not later than that provided under subtitles A and B of this title, as justified by the needs of the applicant: *Provided further*, That for any disaster occurring after January 1, 1975, the Secretary, if the loan is for a purpose described in subtitle B of this title, may make the loan repayable at the end of a period of more than seven years, but not more than twenty years, if the Secretary determines that the need of the loan applicant justifies such a longer repayment period: *Provided further*, That notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any loan made by the Small Business Administration in connection with a disaster occurring on or after the date of enactment of this Act under sections 7(b) (1), (2), or (4) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 636(b) (1), (2), or (4)) shall bear interest at the rate determined in section 7(a) (4) (B) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 636(a) (4) (b)) .".

Sec. 6. Section 325 of the Act is amended to read as follows: "The Secretary may delegate authority to any State director of the Farmers Home Administration to make emergency loans in any area within a State of the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands on the same terms and conditions set out in section 321(a) without any formal area designation being made: *Provided*, That the State director finds that a natural disaster has substantially affected twenty-five or less farming, ranching, or aquaculture operations in the area."

Sec. 7. At the end of subtitle C of the Act, add a new section 329 stating: "An applicant seeking financial assistance based on production losses must show that a single enterprise which constitutes a basic part of his farming, ranching, or aquaculture operation has sustained at least a 20 per centum loss of normal per acre or per animal production as a result of the disaster."

Sec. 8. At the end of subtitle C of the Act, add a new section 330 stating: "Subsequent loans, to continue the farming, ranching, or aquaculture operation may be made under this subtitle on an annual basis, for not to exceed five additional years, to eligible borrowers, at the prevailing rate of interest in the private market for similar loans as determined by the Secretary, when the financial situation of the farming, ranching, or aquaculture operation has not improved sufficiently to permit the borrower to obtain such financing from other sources."

Sec. 9. Section 338 of the Act is amended by striking the period at the end of subsection (a) and adding the following: ": *Provided*, That the amounts authorized to be

appropriated for the purposes of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act for each fiscal year ending after September 30, 1976, shall be the sums provided by law."

Sec. 10. At the end of subtitle D of the Act, add a new section 345 to read as follows: "The Secretary may utilize the Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund and the Rural Development Insurance Fund during each fiscal year ending after September 30, 1976, in such amounts as may be authorized annually by law."

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I move that the Senate disagree to the amendment of the House of Representatives and request a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. TALMADGE, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. DOLE, Mr. CURTIS, and Mr. BELLMON conferees on the part of the Senate.

#### TIME LIMITATION ON SPEECHES DURING MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a limitation of 15 minutes be placed on speeches during morning business for the remainder of the day and that there be a time limit of 15 minutes for the transaction of morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### DIEGO GARCIA—IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S. FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, I shall speak on the subject of Diego Garcia, in the context of U.S. foreign and defense policy. I ask unanimous consent that upon the completion of this statement, the minority views of Senators McIntyre, Culver, Gary W. Hart, and Leahy on this subject, from the report of the Committee on Armed Services, be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, the Berbera issue does not hinge on whether or not there has been military-related Soviet activity in Somalia. We have known this for some time.

The question is: Does that activity pose sufficient threat to our national interest to warrant the risk of precipitating an extension of the arms race into a vast and comparatively tranquil region of the world? I believe the answer to that question is "No."

The corollary question is: Are there other less provocative responses that we can take to counter the Russian initiative and to preserve the strategic balance? I believe the answer to that question is "Yes."

Senator BARTLETT and the House delegation have performed a highly useful service. They have confirmed, at first hand, the nature of the Soviet military-related activity in Somalia—a missile-

handling facility, airfield, and communications facility.

What we do not know—and what we cannot know for sure—is how important this facility will become and how it will be used.

Given that uncertainty, we need a carefully considered policy aimed at protecting our long-term interests. Simple reactions, limited to military measures, are not appropriate.

I want no part of any move that will weaken the strategic position of the United States.

I believe what I am proposing will strengthen our position, not weaken it, in the long range.

In the short range, it simply does not risk that much.

Specifically, I propose these moves:

First. That the expansion of the Diego Garcia base be postponed until the alternatives can be explored.

Second. That the United States initiate negotiations for mutual arms restraints in this region with the Soviet Union.

Third. That Congress immediately explore the possibilities of legislative action to lift present restriction on economic and technical aid to Somalia, restrictions imposed because ships bearing the Somali flag transport goods to Cuba and North Vietnam.

Fourth. That a policy be inaugurated of U.S. ship visits to Somalia leading toward generally improved political relationships.

The proposed \$108 million expansion of the U.S. base on Diego Garcia is a fly speck on the vast chart of the \$100 billion defense budget.

But Diego Garcia has symbolic importance far outweighing its military significance.

In the wake of Vietnam, we have talked about a new era of foreign policy based on the realities of the current world order.

Public leaders of widely varying persuasions have agreed that our defense spending should be more closely geared to our foreign policy objectives.

No more "policeman of the world" fantasy. No more exclusive reliance on gunboat diplomacy and condescending colonialism. More stress on international economic issues. More reliance on peaceful negotiation. More attention and sensitivity to the growing global importance of developing nations.

Now we are clearly at a watershed.

The proposed expansion at Diego Garcia poses the risk of touching off a new phase of the superpower arms race in the Indian Ocean area, a region up to now comparatively stable.

Do we explore the alternatives? Or do we slip back into the straitjacket of the cold war and the ever-escalating arms race?

It is true that Berbera is strategically located, that it commands the Red Sea entrance to the Suez Canal, a fact that nobody can believe has escaped the attention of the Russians.

But whatever the long-range intentions of the Soviets may be, there are substantial reasons to believe that the Somalians do not intend to grant the

Russians unlimited base privileges on their territory.

First. If Somalia intends to permit Russia to make a major military base out of Berbera, why did they invite our delegations to come to inspect the Soviet activities?

Second. There is every reason to believe that the Somalis are interested in diversifying their sources of outside assistance. President Siad himself emphasized to the congressional visitors that the real reason for his invitation was to point out the refugee problem that his country faces, and not the Soviet facilities at Berbera. With one third of its population on the verge of starvation, and drought plaguing large areas of the countryside, Somalia faces an urgent struggle for physical survival.

Third. The Somalis also have an incentive to restrain the Russians in order to obtain assistance from their Arab League allies who are adamantly anti-Soviet.

Fourth. Consistent with their pattern in other developing countries, the Russians, for years, have supplied the Somalis with economic aid and technical assistance, as well as with military weapons. The Somalis have been dependent on Soviet help out of necessity.

Now, if we assume that Somalia is permanently tied to the Soviet Union and proceed with our expansion on Diego Garcia, our action will further isolate the Somali and push them necessarily deeper into dependency on the U.S.S.R.

Fifth. There is ample evidence that Somalia wants better relations with the United States—a fact that hardly squares with the notion that they plan to give the Soviets carte blanche for military expansion in their country.

For example, the Somalis have offered to grant refueling facilities to U.S. warships. President Siad has said publicly that he would never grant base rights to any foreign power and that his intention is to turn Berbera into "a free port."

The proposals I am making would not foreclose the requested expansion at Diego Garcia, but would simply postpone it until its need, in terms of our true national security interests, is confirmed. The postponement would give the United States time to try other, less provocative countering measures such as negotiations with the Soviet Union on mutual limitations on military ship days in the region.

Despite U.N. votes each year since 1971 calling for a "Zone of Peace" in the Indian Ocean, the United States has made no approach to the U.S.S.R. on mutual arms restraint since 1971. This continued neglect of diplomatic initiatives is deplorable.

If we are truly serious, as I believe we are, about maintaining friendship and stability among the nations of the Indian Ocean, we should take account of their opinions and concerns. The fact is that none of the 29 littoral nations of the Indian Ocean region, including Australia, supports the proposed U.S. base expansion on Diego Garcia. Reported "private assurances" on this subject by anonymous officials cannot be relied upon, especially not when national lead-

ers pepper their public speeches with anti-American rhetoric.

If we go ahead with our Diego Garcia expansion, we may well worsen our relations with many of these countries and lose access to the ports and other facilities now open to us. As things stand today, we can obtain oil from 36 different Indian Ocean ports. U.S. ships have access to 18 nations of the area while the Soviet Union has access to only 13.

We have yet to have explained to us what vital national interests would be served by the base expansion. We have no treaty commitments in the area that it would help us uphold, except nominally with Pakistan under SEATO. The expanded base would be of no help in case of an oil embargo. Major military operations would require more facilities than the enlarged base would provide.

To maintain current carrier deployments and also have a permanent carrier task group in the Indian Ocean would require three more carriers plus associated ships. It would require \$5 to \$8 billion more in new ship construction, according to Brookings Institution estimates, and \$800 million more each year in operating costs.

I cannot believe that, in terms of our national interest, we are ready to make the huge additional outlays to escalate to a three-ocean navy on the basis of the realities in the Indian Ocean. If this is true, where is the justification for the Diego Garcia expansion?

It is another typical case of U.S. foreign policy running to catchup with defense policy and running to catchup with military spending.

The goal of gearing defense spending to perceived foreign policy objectives would be once again thwarted.

Recently, an official U.S. delegation, of which I was a member, visited Moscow. We were, in the course of that visit, given reason to believe that the U.S.S.R. would be receptive to discussions relative to mutual naval restraint in the Indian Ocean region. At the very minimum, the United States should immediately take such a diplomatic initiative.

To spur such an initiative, Senators GARY HART and PATRICK LEAHY and myself have written to Secretary of State Kissinger, reporting on our conversations and suggesting, as a first step, efforts to achieve limitations on naval ship-day deployments to the Indian Ocean. This, we hope, could lead to broader agreements on measures to forestall a new and dangerous arms race in that area.

Finally, Mr. President, the extent of the Soviet threat in Berbera, in my judgment, has been blown out of proportion. The Soviet missiles reported to be there are of the old Styx type which have been distributed to more than a dozen nations. According to the best available public sources, this antiship missile became operational over 15 years ago, has a limited range of only about 20 nautical miles, and carries nonnuclear warheads. Even if a few have been sent to Berbera, they cannot be used until put aboard patrol boats. In the meantime, our aircraft off ships in the area are armed with more potent antiship missile firepower under their wings than are our naval vessels.

We must also remember that, even today, French naval activity in the Indian Ocean equals or exceeds that of the Soviet Union.

Diego Garcia is a classic example of a situation where the United States should be using its economic power, technical expertise, and diplomatic skill to balance the Russians strategically in preference to provocative military escalation.

What early reason is there for détente if we do not make an honest effort to use it in such an obvious and low-risk situation as this one? If we do not make a serious effort at negotiations, what is low risk and low cost today may well become high risk and high cost tomorrow.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

#### EXHIBIT 1

#### MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS MCINTYRE, CULVER, HART OF COLORADO, AND LEAHY

We have heard and reviewed the evidence, but we are not convinced that expansion of base facilities on the island of Diego Garcia is essential to the national interest of the United States at this time. On the contrary, we believe it essential to explore urgently all avenues toward preventing a new superpower arms race in the Indian Ocean.

When the Armed Services Committee last year voted to require Presidential certification of the essential need for these base facilities, the Committee expressed its "hope" that "such an evaluation would include a thorough explanation of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interest in the area of the Indian Ocean."

Despite that Committee guidance, and despite the widespread interest in preserving the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, as urged by the United Nations General Assembly in 1971 and 1973, no approaches to the Soviet Union on this matter have been made since 1971.

Diplomacy has not failed; it has not even been tried. No efforts have been made to extend détente to the Indian Ocean.

Instead, we see, by both the Soviet Union and the United States, a continuation of the military momentum for expansion and involvement in that region.

We will examine the alleged military needs for this base subsequently, but what is of greatest concern to us is that the U.S. Government is rushing headlong into a new arms race, in disregard of the opinions of the nations of the Indian Ocean whom we seek as friends, of the declared wish of the U.N. General Assembly, and of this Committee and the Congress.

Before we can consent to this base expansion, we need clear evidence of a compelling need for this facility as well as proof that mutual restraint cannot be achieved. A year of diplomatic inactivity, followed by a two-sentence Presidential certification, is not sufficient.

A major naval arms race in the Indian Ocean is too frightening a prospect to back into blindly, pushed by ever-present military calls for flexibility.

#### WEAK JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXPANSION

The case for U.S. base expansion is based on a basketful of assumptions about hypothetical contingencies. For Diego Garcia to be useful and essential, we have to assume: (1) that none of the 18 nations of the Indian Ocean littoral which now allow us port visits will permit such visits in the future; (2) that the Suez Canal is open to Soviet warships and not to American ones—and that prudent Soviet planners would rely on that vulnerable, blockable waterway in the event of conflict; (3) that other nations, such as France, which now maintains a siz-

able presence in the Indian Ocean, would refuse to cooperate with the United States in assuring freedom of the seas and a continued flow of petroleum; (4) that the Soviet Union would risk confrontation with the United States in that region, without regard for global consequences; and (5) that this one base, by itself, would be defensible and sufficient to support major military operations in the Indian Ocean area.

Each of these assumptions, by itself, is weak, and the likelihood that all would occur simultaneously is quite remote.

(1) The United States currently has access to 18 nations along the Indian Ocean, while the Soviet Union's ships can call at only 13. According to the Defense Department, U.S. oilers could now obtain fuel from some 36 different Indian Ocean ports. Some of these nations—such as Iran, Pakistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia—have long been friendly to the United States, and reportedly share our concern in limiting Soviet influence in the area. Since many of the Persian Gulf nations have also received substantial amounts of U.S. military equipment in recent years, it is highly unlikely that they would renounce these ties and jeopardize access to spare parts.

(2) Although the opening of the Suez Canal reduces transit time for Soviet ships from the Black Sea, it also permits quick access for all but the largest U.S. carriers from the Mediterranean. In the event of hostilities, the Canal might be expected to be blocked, leaving Soviet sea routes longer and more vulnerable than those of the United States.

(3) France still retains several installations in the Indian Ocean as well as a naval presence comparable to that of the Soviet Union. It is reasonable to assume that France would act in its own interest to assure oil supplies, and such action could be aided by cooperation with other NATO allies in the area.

(4) While the Soviet Union clearly has a capability for trouble-making in the Indian Ocean, the risks of escalation must weigh heavily against any direct military confrontation with the United States, whether or not we have a base at Diego Garcia. Moreover, the United States Navy has numerous tactical advantages over the Soviet Navy, which must operate its ships from fewer ports and at greater distances.

(5) In the "worst case" scenario, which has been trotted out to justify Diego Garcia, this one base is somehow vital and sufficient for the support of major military operations in the Indian Ocean. Unless we wish to build other bases and substantially increase our Navy so that it can fight a three-ocean war, the present facilities on Diego Garcia should be sufficient. In any event, these questions should be faced squarely and not piecemeal.

#### POTENTIAL UTILITY OF DIEGO GARCIA

Several crucial questions about the planned use of this base have not yet been answered to our satisfaction.

(1) What foreign policy commitments do we have in the area?—We have no formal treaty commitments to any littoral nation west of Thailand except Pakistan, which is still nominally a member of SEATO. We do, of course, seek "stability" in the region, but that policy has been pursued with massive arms sales rather than by new defense commitments. Whatever general interest we have in maintaining freedom of the seas and safe transit for oil supplies can best be served by working in concert with other nations instead of unilateral military adventures. Since there is no obligation to consider deployment of forces into the countries of the region, there is no need to expand the facilities on Diego Garcia. We can and do show the flag now.

(2) How would Diego Garcia be used?—We have reached no final agreement with the British on the usage of this base, and there are no assurances that whatever agreement is reached will be submitted to the Senate as a treaty. Thus, we may never be able to judge whether this executive agreement will indeed protect our interests and permit the various possible operations which have been offered as justification for this base. If the British retain a veto right on special operations, we cannot be sure that this base could ever be used in extraordinary circumstances.

(3) Can Diego Garcia help protect oil supplies?—Those most likely to interfere with oil supplies are not the Soviets, but the oil-producing nations of the area, which we are arming now through massive foreign military sales. The U.S. Navy can be of little help in ending an embargo unless we are going to contemplate an amphibious invasion—which most U.S. officials have publicly ruled out. Even in that circumstance, with the risk of much wider war, Diego Garcia is probably too vulnerable and too limited to be relied upon. Our Navy still retains a global operating capability and can deploy a "presence" whenever needed.

In short, if our goal is simply to be able to "show the flag," we have that capability now, without Diego Garcia. And if our goal is actually to be able to conduct major military operations, Diego Garcia by itself is probably not sufficient.

#### SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE AREA

We recognize and regret that the Soviet Union is seeking to expand its influence and operating capability in the Indian Ocean area, but we do not believe that Soviet actions thus far, in the absence of serious diplomatic efforts to achieve arms restraint, justify the proposed U.S. base expansion.

Last year the Navy presented a frightening array of possible Soviet bases—on Socotra; at Umm Qasr, Iraq; at Aden; at Berbera; and on Mauritius. CIA Director Colby minimized most of these possibilities. He called Socotra "a bare island . . . no port facilities or fuel storage . . . air strip not feasible for modern operations." He called Umm Qasr a "so-called port" about which the Iraqis has been restrictive of the USSR. At Mauritius the USSR has only bunkering rights. Aden was called "a good base," but "the Soviets have not used it very much"—only port visits. "The limited facilities that the Soviets use now," Mr. Colby testified, "such as those in Berbera or Umm Qasr, would require considerable development—and probably changes in the host countries' policies—to provide major services."

This year the list has dwindled. The only evidence of Soviet base expansion in the past year was at Berbera, in Somalia, where the Soviet Union was said to be expanding POL storage, constructing additional housing, lengthening the airstrip, and building a missile storage and handling facility.

It remains to be seen whether these facilities will become and will be used as a major Soviet base. Crucial questions remain on the extent of Somali control over the facilities, who will control and use the port and airfield, and whether Soviet personnel will be permanently stationed there. The very fact that the Somali Foreign Minister has denied U.S. Government claims about this base and has offered to let foreigners visit Berbera suggests that this base may not be as sensitive and important as Defense Department witnesses have alleged. Until these matters have been investigated further, we remain unconvinced.

The possibility of antiship missile storage facilities is also not a serious cause for concern, since such missile are most useful when deployed with ships or aircraft. In this re-

spect, the U.S. Navy has a wide array of weapons to defeat enemy ships, and will enhance that capability when the Harpoon missiles now being procured become operational. Carrier-launched aircraft can patrol and operate effectively over broad ocean areas to protect U.S. interests, so we do not need land storage facilities for missiles.

Instead of reacting by expanding our own permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, we should use this opportunity to seek firm limitations on what the superpowers will do in that region. Before we build a checkerboard of bases, we should exhaust diplomatic efforts.

#### OPINIONS OF LITTORAL NATIONS

Despite repeated inquiries, none of the 29 nations on the Indian Ocean littoral has given public support for the proposed U.S. base expansion on Diego Garcia. Although some officials are willing to give private assurances of support for the U.S. plans, we believe that, if public criticism is dismissed as rhetoric, secret words of support have even less value.

If we are to build and maintain good relations with the countries of this region, we cannot disregard their opinions, even if we do not always accept their views. For our presence to have any meaning in the long run, we must have the open, willing support for our efforts.

The real answer is not in ephemeral private opinions but in joint cooperation and regional strength. We believe that most if not all of these nations would prefer and would support mutual restraint by the Soviet Union and the United States.

This goal should be pursued urgently instead of being preoccupied with expanding the base at Diego Garcia.

In recent weeks, there has been extensive discussion in Congress and in the public media about the objectives and administration of our foreign and defensive policies. There has been a general feeling that the end of the Vietnam involvement should mark the beginning of a new era of initiative and precision in adjusting to new realities in the world.

One central point that was repeatedly made stressed the need for closer linkage between our defense outlays and planning with defined foreign policy objectives.

In this context, the proposed base expansion on Diego Garcia assumes a symbolic importance far beyond its military importance. Here is an opportunity to make an informed, realistic decision on the basis of military facts and foreign policy goals measured on a global scale.

For these reasons, we recommend that the Senate approve S. Res. 160.

JOHN CULVER.  
GARY HART.  
PATRICK J. LEAHY.  
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE.

#### ORDER FOR SENATOR TAFT AND SENATOR RANDOLPH TO INTRODUCE NONGERMANE AMENDMENTS TO S. 1849

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. TAFT and Mr. RANDOLPH each be permitted to introduce an amendment to S. 1849, a bill to extend the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, notwithstanding that such amendments may not be germane.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none. It is so ordered.

**REQUEST THAT VOTE ON ISSUE NO. 1, SENATE RESOLUTION 166, OCCUR AT 4:30 P.M. ON MONDAY**

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote which was to occur Tuesday next on issue No. 1 relative to the New Hampshire election dispute, issue No. 1 being lines 7 through 12 of Senate Resolution 166, occur instead at the hour of 4:30 p.m. on Monday next.

Mr. DOMENICI. I suggest the absence of a quorum, Mr. President.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Will the Senator withhold that?

Mr. DOMENICI. Yes.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. All right.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I restate my request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. DOMENICI. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

**LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR JULY**

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, in addition to the New Hampshire election dispute, the workload ahead is a heavy one. For this reason the necessity for Saturday sessions, excluding tomorrow, during this month of July, is becoming increasingly apparent.

An examination of the business to be disposed of during July will indicate the necessity for Saturday sessions increasingly confronts us. In addition to various other measures which may reach the calendar for floor debate, the following measures will be ready for action during the month of July, but they will not necessarily be called up in the order stated:

The New Hampshire dispute which continues before the Senate and on which future cloture votes may be anticipated.

The clean air amendment.

Various appropriation bills, for example, the transportation appropriation bill, the Treasury-Post Office appropriation bill, the HUD appropriation bill, the HEW appropriation bill, the State-Justice-Judiciary appropriation bills.

The Energy Allocation Act extension, S. 1849, on which there is a time agreement.

The fuel efficiency for automobiles measure, S. 1883, on which there is a time agreement.

The Outer Continental Shelf Act.

The Elk Hills measure.

The Coal Leasing and Coal Conservation Act.

ERDA.

The Energy Production Board.

Reregulation of natural gas, S. 692.

Extension of the Voting Rights Act, H.R. 6219.

Senate Resolution 160, disapproving construction projects on the island of Diego Garcia.

S. 644, a bill to amend the Consumer Product Safety Act to improve the Consumer Product Safety Commission.

The Appalachian Regional Commission bill.

S. 963, a bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; and various conference reports.

The leadership hopes to have the understanding of all Senators as the Senate tackles this difficult schedule which it is imperative we follow, with early and late sessions expected daily and with rollcall votes to occur daily, including Saturdays.

**ORDER THAT NO ROLLCALL VOTES OCCUR ON MONDAY, JULY 14, 1975, PRIOR TO THE HOUR OF 4:30 P.M.**

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that no rollcall votes occur on next Monday prior to the hour of 4:30 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I think it should be stated at this point that beyond next Monday the same request will not necessarily be repeated for the following Mondays during the remaining weeks in July, because it may be necessary to have votes early in the day on Mondays as we come nearer to the August recess.

Committees should also be reminded that Republicans continue to object to committee meetings during the hours in which the New Hampshire election dispute is being debated on the Senate floor, and committees may want to arrange their schedules accordingly.

**ORDER FOR RECESS UNTIL 11:30 A.M. ON MONDAY, JULY 14, 1975**

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the convening hour be changed to 11:30 a.m. Monday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**PROGRAM**

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, after the two leaders or their designees have been recognized on Monday, Mr. HASKELL will be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes, after which Mr. GARN will be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes. There will then be a period for the transaction of routine morning business of not to exceed 15 minutes, with statements limited therein to 5 minutes each, at the conclusion of which the Senate will resume consideration of Senate Resolution 166, and at least 1 hour of debate will occur on issue No. 1, being lines 7 through 12 of Senate Resolution 166.

At the present time a vote is ordered

to occur on that issue on Tuesday, but at some point during the session on Monday, presumably after the first hour or perhaps after the second hour of debate on the New Hampshire resolution, the Senate will take up S. 1849, a bill to extend the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, on which there is a time agreement, and in connection with which Senators may expect rollcall votes on amendments, and certainly on final passage of the bill.

It is possible that final action could occur on S. 1849 on Monday, but with a time limitation of 8 hours for debate, it is quite likely that the final action will go over until Tuesday, at the earliest.

Rollcall votes can be expected daily next week, and I should think that the necessity for a Saturday session next week would be such as to make it a likelihood rather than a mere possibility.

The Senate will probably come in early and stay in late, at least on some of the days next week.

I also add this caveat. "Holds" on measures cannot be respected in the remaining weeks of July, as might be the normal course otherwise.

The Senate will be in recess for the month of August by law and with the kind of workload that is ahead, the leadership expresses the hope that all Senators will cooperate to the utmost and that the leadership will have the understanding of all Senators when it is necessary to dispose of measures on which "holds" have been placed by Members on both sides of the aisle, such "holds" being respected in normal times, but the remainder of the month of July being other than normal, under the circumstances that confront the Senate.

I think also that the leadership may be constrained to bring up measures and ask for votes without the usual practices that have been resorted to.

Rollcall votes may occur unexpectedly and Senators should arrange their schedules accordingly from here on out until the August recess, including Saturdays.

It should not come with surprise to Senators if measures are called up on which rollcall votes will occur, and there may be measures in which certain Senators may have keen and particular interest.

What I am attempting to say, Mr. President, is that with the legislative problems that confront the Senate and the number of important measures that await action before the August recess, the leadership will need as much flexibility as Senators can possibly afford the leadership in order to consummate the work that remains.

The leadership, of course, will extend every courtesy possible to every Senator, but we have a job to do. If we expect to take off for the month of August—and we can call it a recess, or a holiday, or whatever we will; by whatever name it is the same—we have to act and work accordingly in July. The people of this country are expecting action on energy measures, and on measures affecting the economy, unemployment, recession, et cetera.