

COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

2025 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 20, 1974

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
[redacted]
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington, D. C.

Dear [redacted]

As we agreed earlier, I am sending over the questions which Professor Lloyd Rudolph would like to explore at his meeting on Friday, September 27, at 2:00 p.m. Both he and I realize that it will not be possible for those he consults to be forthcoming on all of them, but I wanted to be as candid as possible about what he thinks we need in order to make the case studies as accurate and balanced as possible. Professor Rudolph has been told to call your extension when he arrives at the reception area.

The questions are as follows:

1. What position did the CIA take in the national intelligence estimate of April 1971 with respect to the future course of events in East Pakistan? Were there talks in Calcutta prior to December 3, 1971 with representatives of the Awami league, including with the acting Prime Minister Tazuddin, regarded by the CIA as a viable potential political solution to the crises in Pakistan? What reasons were advanced for and against this view? For example, could a political solution be negotiated without the knowledge, agreement, or release of Sheikh Mugib? Were President Yaya Kahn or his immediate advisors able to grasp the need for or requirements of a political settlement? Were the dominant elements in the Army prepared to entertain a political solution involving Awami league domains of the government of Pakistan?
2. What was the CIA's estimate of India's military intention at various points in time: March through November 1971; from December 3 to December 11, 1971; from December 11 to December 15, 1971? What was the CIA's role in the decision of the Enterprise Task Force to the Bay of Bengal? Was it consultative? What did it recommend?



3. What was the CIA's input to preparations for Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington in November 1971? What was its evaluation of that visit with respect to what Mrs. Gandhi understood to be U.S. goals and intentions and what the USG understood of Mrs. Gandhi's goals and intentions?
4. Was the agency given policy guidance with respect to South Asia in the light of the efforts to establish an opening to China and if it was given such guidance, when was it given and what form did it take?
5. Could you characterize CIA's relations to the ambassadors and country teams in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka over the 1975-1974 period by highlighting particular events and relationships?
6. Has anything occurred since the spring of 1974 to modify Director William Colby's testimony on Diego Garcia? How effective has the agency been, apart from participation in preparation of NSSM's, in getting a hearing for its views on the Indian Ocean?
7. What has been the position of the CIA with respect to arms aid to India and Pakistan in the post 1971 period and how effective has the agency been in having its views heard?
8. What sources did the CIA have for information on the JVP? Were they inside or outside of Sri Lanka?
9. What positions did the CIA take on the question of foreign support to the JVP? How sure were they, what was the basis for the belief, and how strongly did the CIA argue for it?
10. Did the CIA help to supply intelligence on non-U.S. military aid to Mrs. Bandaranaike? What type of intelligence, i.e., did it go beyond Russia and China, assuming that the CIA supply such materials?

I will be out of town from mid-afternoon on Tuesday, the 24th, until Thursday, October 3, so if you have any questions perhaps you would want to call me before then. In my absence either Peter Szanton, our research director, or Tom Reckford would be available to discuss any problems or questions with you.


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Once again I thank you for your great assistance in facilitating our work. I hope you enjoyed your respite from the Murphy Commission and that any forthcoming requests will not place such a burden on you!

Cordially,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill Bacchus".

William I. Bacchus
Associate Research Director

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lehman

This concerns Professor Rudolph's interview with your Indian experts on Friday. Some of these questions seem quite far afield and I think we need the Director's guidance. I have sent a copy of this letter to him and to Bill Nelson.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Proctor

This concerns Professor Rudolph's interview with your Indian experts on Friday. Some of these questions seem quite far afield and I think we need the Director's guidance. I have sent a copy of this letter to him and to Bill Nelson.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

This concerns Professor Rudolph's interviews with Agency Indian experts on Friday. The questions are pretty far afield and General Wilson will raise this in the morning meeting for your guidance.

Copies of this letter have been provided to Nelson, Lehman, and Proctor.

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