

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1975

HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
H.R.

AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY CON-
STRUCTION FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1975, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

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Senator PROXMIRE. You mean it should be simplified much more than that.

Mr. PACKARD. Simplify it much more.

If you look at lightweight aircraft, you should not have gone into the other programs 5 or 6 years ago, no way. If we bought them on total package procurement, it would have been an absolute savings.

You would not have had those costs.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you, sir, and thank you very, very much. Thank you, Dr. Curreri.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

The subcommittee will stand in recess until 2 p.m. and will reconvene in this room.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee was recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

[AFTERNOON SESSION, 2 O'CLOCK, TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 1974]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

FISCAL YEAR 1975 DIEGO GARCIA MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. C. D. GROJEAN, U.S. NAVY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (PLANS AND POLICY), POLITICO MILITARY POLICY DIVISION

ACCOMPANIED BY ADM. VINCENT P. De POIX, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTRODUCTION OF ASSOCIATES

Senator BELLMON [presiding]. Admiral, I believe you may begin your testimony if you like and introduce those with you.

Admiral MARSCHALL. This is Admiral Grojean from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Commander Kirkpatrick, my strong left arm.

We appreciate your continued consideration of this project in the fiscal year 1975 program, sir, and at this time, I would like to ask Admiral Grojean to make his statement which will reiterate our strong feelings of necessity regarding this project.

NEED FOR SUPPORT FACILITY

Admiral GROJEAN. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you this afternoon on the subject of Diego Garcia, for it is a subject with which I have been closely associated for over 3 years now.

As you are aware, the present facility on Diego Garcia was established to provide an important link in our worldwide communications system. It was not designed to provide sustained logistic support either to fleet units or aircraft staging through the Indian Ocean.

The need for such a support facility, however, became clearly evident during the October war—the need for a support facility free of the uncertainties associated with the reliance on littoral nations for assistance or upon an extended logistics train stretched from Subic Bay to the prime operating area.

The difficulties involved in supporting our carrier task group operating in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea last fall seriously taxed our mobile logistic support units of the 7th Fleet to the point that had there been another crisis requiring a 7th Fleet response, our capability to support such a second requirement would have been in severe jeopardy.

The policy decision made at the highest levels within the Departments of State and Defense calls for us to continue periodic deploy-

ments of major fleet units into the Indian Ocean in support of our national policy and as a clear signal of our willingness to protect our national interests in the region.

We must not fail to provide adequate and sustained logistic support for these forces. Diego Garcia will provide us with the requisite flexibility to conduct contingency operations in the Indian Ocean, free of political vagaries or extended and vulnerable supply lines.

SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

With the impending reopening of the Suez Canal, the Soviets will have the capability to surge naval forces of their Black Sea Fleet through the canal and into the proximity of areas of political crisis in the Indian Ocean.

Their willingness to move naval forces to a crisis area became quite clear during the October war. With the canal open, the rapidity with which the Soviets could reach a potential hotspot in the region of the Persian Gulf could well be a deciding factor should the outcome of such a crisis be influenced by the presence of a major naval force standing offshore.

In other words, without enhancing our own capabilities, we could find ourselves outflanked not only by increased Soviet naval presence and influence but also by our own leadtime requirements to provide for contingency operations support.

The Soviets have, by and large, proven themselves to be logically self-sufficient, carrying their packs on their backs in most instances. Yet, they have taken the time and exerted their influence to develop a land-based support capability in Somalia, in Iraq, and in South Yemen.

Soviet influence in India and in neighboring Bangladesh has grown considerably over the past 2 years, and there are some who believe that there is a special relationship between the U.S.S.R. and India which would permit the former extraordinary use of India's port facilities.

It has, therefore, become increasingly apparent that by developing shore logistic support capabilities and by extending its influence throughout the Littoral region, the Soviet Union recognizes full well the importance of the Indian Ocean and is capable of and willing to reinforce the strategic advantage it now possesses in landmass proximity by increased naval presence.

DIEGO GARCIA NOT A COMBAT BASE

In asking for \$29 million for the upgrade of Diego Garcia, we are not seeking to build a naval base on the island. One look at the size of the island and its virtual isolation in the center of the Indian Ocean would more than substantiate that statement.

We have no plans to base operating forces or units at Diego Garcia. We have no plans to build family housing, or commissaries, or schools which are essential to family living on the island.

What we are seeking is basically a filling station in the middle of the Indian Ocean which will be guaranteed to us should the need arise.

Our ability to respond effectively and credibly to our own national policy requirements and our ability to sustain that response could well depend on the support available to us on that Indian Ocean island.

That concludes my statement, sir.

Senator BELLMON. Admiral, there are a couple of questions I wanted to ask earlier to get them on the record and, if I may, I will ask those and, then come back to these I have here.

One question has to do with the reported Soviet buildup of the military capability of the countries around the Indian Ocean and the reason for these countries possessing this more or less sophisticated military gear and what they are likely to do with it?

LITTORAL NATIONS

Admiral GROJEAN. Most of these countries which are lesser developed countries and developing countries, fear their neighbors and they are all oriented toward a boundary problem and most of them are invariably, with the encouragement of the Soviets, trying to build up their armed forces such that they will be able to either initiate a war or to protect their boundaries.

In the case of some countries such as Somalia and others such as Tanzania, there is no doubt but that those countries have designs on extending their boundaries and in trying to influence the undisciplined elements of their neighboring countries.

Senator BELLMON. The United States is not engaged in supplying military hardware to the same countries?

Admiral GROJEAN. The United States is engaged in supplying military hardware primarily to Iran and Saudi Arabia but to the nations such as Somalia and Tanzania and some of the others that apparently have designs I just covered, no, sir.

Senator BELLMON. What does the Soviet Union have to gain from being the supplier of this material to those countries?

Admiral GROJEAN. The principal thing they have to gain is an increase in their political influence in these countries all throughout the Indian Ocean littoral.

Senator BELLMON. That gets to the point.

The British had had virtually free reign in this area for several decades.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes.

Senator BELLMON. They finally threw up their hands and pulled out.

How long will it take the Soviets to realize they can't gain much in this area?

Admiral GROJEAN. Mr. Chairman, it is a difficult question to answer.

The Soviets have experienced some success in their influencing of countries such as Somalia and Iraq and as long as they have a taste of success, I doubt very seriously that they will stop their program.

Senator BELLMON. But what is in Somalia and Iraq that is different as far as the British and Soviets?

Admiral DE POIX. May I help?

I think the situation is different, from what the Soviets are after and what the British were after.

The British, as you know better than I, had a large colonial empire and were extracting resource and manpower and so forth.

I think the Soviets are after something else. The Soviets are not looking at it from colonial empire point of view so much as the fact they need more sympathetic waters of the world to operate in.

They have some of the toughest places to operate their navy in that you can imagine, the Murmansk area, which is cold, is ice locked a good part of the year, dark at least half of the year and the Vladivostok area, in other words, their operating base in Siberia and in the Pacific are not particularly good places to operate ships. For a long time, they have been looking toward and very anxious to get an access to the warmer water areas of the Indian Ocean just from the pure viewpoint of being able to operate in a more sympathetic environment.

It turns out that this is also a very important part of the world in which to be able to exert naval influence because it is through this area that the bulk of the oil traffic operates, whether it is going one way or the other.

So, the Soviets, I think, are not intrinsically interested so much in improving the lot of these countries to which they are contributing or into which the Soviet weaponry or advisers are going, as they are in trying to form a groundwork which will allow them to put Soviet bases and military facilities, such as the communications station at Berbera in Somalia.

So, they are gradually moving in on the base proposition. Chittagong, in Bangladesh where they have now been conducting presumably a mine-sweeping operation which has gone on since the Indo-Pakistani War; they are looking for bases in India, naval bases to start with, and so far, have not been successful but they have a persistent push to get bases in that area for what I think are two reasons:

One is just so they will have a better environment in which to operate their navy and the other, the ability to operate to exert their influence.

So that, to sum up, I would say the Soviets would not come and leave. They would come to stay.

Senator BELLMON. You are convinced their interest, then, is to be in a position to interdict the petroleum supply of Japan and perhaps Western Europe?

Admiral DE POIX. I think it is certainly one of their interests, to be in a position to be able to do that. I think they also, as I say, they want to establish a presence which is in a good operating area or a good environment which is a much easier one for them to operate in.

You know, when they are up at Murmansk, where are they? They are in a very tough part of the world to operate in and cannot really use their navy up there.

Senator BELLMON. They won't be able to get their carriers and perhaps their battleships through the Suez?

Admiral DE POIX. They can get everything but the carriers which are not yet, in fact, operating. Of course, they don't have battleships, as we do, but they do have cruisers. There are a large number of smaller ships, you know, like destroyers and auxiliaries, submarines and they can get them through the Suez if it is restored to the condition it was in in 1967 and we believe it will be restored at least to that in terms of water depth.

In fact, it will be deepened not so much for naval ship passage but because the oil tankers are much more greater in draft than they were, so it would be advantageous to deepen it.

Senator BELLMON. Now then, the key question comes to be whether or not Diego Garcia developed as you propose to develop it would really have any effect in keeping the sea-lanes open for the Japanese or others?

Admiral DE POIX. From my intelligence, let me answer part of this, if I can.

From the intelligence point of view, I would say we will have a very tough time, tougher than we would like to have in keeping track of the Soviet activities as well as the respective activities of some of the other countries in the Indian Ocean areas.

With respect to providing a presence, naval presence, in the Indian Ocean for purpose of carrying out national policy, I think that will be a good thing.

Senator BELLMON. Before you answer, could you go back over the same ground as earlier about the extent of our presence in this area prior to the present state?

You mentioned we kept one AP, I think you said and two DE's. Admiral GROJEAN. You mean in the Mideast force?

Senator BELLMON. Yes.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, we have for many years now maintained a noncombatant flagship for our Commander Middle East Force, home-ported in Bahrain and two rotating destroyers which deploy for 6-month periods into the Indian Ocean and, then, return home.

They are not home-ported there. They rotate.

In addition to that, on two occasions, we have in the last few years, sent, Carrier Task Group into the region, first of all, in the Indo-Pak war and, then, again during the October war. Since the October war, we have had either a Carrier Task Group or Surface Task Group in the area until the middle of April of this year.

Senator BELLMON. With Diego Garcia, this will increase our presence?

Admiral GROJEAN. Sir, Diego Garcia will in itself not necessarily increase our presence. The primary reason for Diego Garcia is to provide a filling station there and in the event we need to increase our presence for national purpose, that filling station is there to facilitate what we must do.

With or without Diego, the Navy job, of course, will be to support national policy in the Indian Ocean, but the presence of this filling station, as I referred to it, will make our job in the Navy much easier in supporting those naval units which will be in the Indian Ocean.

Senator BELLMON. Mr. Chairman, I will ask some more questions if you are not ready.

Senator MANSFIELD. Go ahead.

U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

Senator BELLMON. Let me try to point down the statement you make on page 2 when you say "to protect our national interests," I am still not clear as to what the interests are.

Is it surveillance to see what is going on?

Insofar as I am concerned, we can never depend upon oil from the Middle East for our national needs. We found out in recent months they could cut it off for political reasons even if it were possible militarily to get it out of there.

Politically, we are pretty sure we had better develop our own resources.

Admiral GROJEAN. Our national interest in the Indian Ocean is primarily to protect our sealanes of communications and our economic interests.

Senator BELLMON. What do we get from there that we really need in oil?

Admiral GROJEAN. We get some oil, about 15 percent.

Senator BELLMON. We can't depend on it?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, but Japan gets nearly all of their oil.

Senator BELLMON. That is Japanese?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, but Japanese interests and our interests are closely tied together.

We know that our European NATO allies get 85 to 90 percent of their fuel from that part of the world. Once again, I think our interests are tied there.

In addition to that, by 1980, it looks as if we may be importing up to 50 percent of our fuel requirements.

Senator BELLMON. It would be awfully stupid if it happens. It does not need to happen.

Admiral GROJEAN. That is out of my area, sir. But those are the projected values that we have seen as to what the United States will be needing.

Senator BELLMON. If we don't accept the values, do we need Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, we need Diego because if the United States does not exert its presence with those countries with whom we find ourselves allied or friendly, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, then sooner or later the Soviets will drive those countries away from us and toward Soviet interests.

Senator BELLMON. I think perhaps we are getting to the nub of it. We need to be there in order to continue this friendly relationship with the Saudis and others.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, this is another reason we need to be there as well as Diego.

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, what countries around the littoral, well, of the Indian Ocean, oppose the extension into Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address that in this way: There are some countries which have said in the press, one thing, and which very privately said other things.

There are about six countries which we can say have come out and said that they are very much opposed to us and that is, India, they said Indonesia has said that, Tanzania has said that.

Senator MANSFIELD. Australia? New Zealand?

Admiral GROJEAN. Sir, we get to the point where we need to almost go into closed session because at this time, we know what has been said by certain people of a government, which sometimes does not always agree with what they have said officially.

Senator MANSFIELD. Let me put it this way.

How many nations around the littoral are in favor of the United States moving into Diego Garcia on an expanded basis?

Admiral GROJEAN. Starting with the southern tip of Africa, South Africa, and Mozambique are of course in favor. We can say that Kenya has not said it was in favor but has said that it feels it would not like to see the Soviets there alone.

We find that Iran has come out very strongly in favor of our presence there.

Ethiopia, which of course, is up in the Red Sea, has expressed favoritism toward our being there.

Pakistan has expressed that they would like to have us there.

Senator BELLMON. Iran?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, Iran.

Senator MANSFIELD. Senator, you had that in executive session.

If any questions are raised which are considered as executive, I would hope that as a matter of course, the answer can not be given, but in secret, given on the basis of the session previously held.

Admiral, has the Navy ever opposed, or would the Navy oppose, negotiations limiting Soviet forces and U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. The Navy has taken no official stand on opposing or favoring negotiations on limiting forces in the Indian Ocean. As Admiral Zumwalt said in his testimony, I believe that he said that he personally felt this would not be in the best interest of the United States primarily because of the proximity that the Soviets have to entering the Indian Ocean in the event of heightening tensions.

They have a shorter distance to get there as opposed to our longer distance.

Senator MANSFIELD. It would not be in the best interests of the United States to consider greater Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. We feel it would not be to our advantage.

Senator MANSFIELD. How did the Navy pick Diego Garcia as a support facility?

Admiral GROJEAN. Diego is very unique, in, first of all, it belongs to our closest ally, the United Kingdom; second, there are no indigenous people on the island; third, it is centrally located in the Indian Ocean, and fourth, of course, at this point, we can say that we already have a communication station there and a start.

Senator MANSFIELD. When did the Navy first become interested in the island?

Admiral GROJEAN. About 1960.

UNITED KINGDOM APPROVAL

Senator MANSFIELD. What needs to be negotiated with the British as far as the base rights are concerned? How is the relationship sensitive and if so, why?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, I can give an answer. The negotiations are ad referendum and have been completed with the British. At this time, the British Government stated that the agreement will be reviewed in the review of the defense posture of the United Kingdom.

Senator MANSFIELD. We're not the English negotiating with its previous government?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes.

Senator BELLMON. And the separate labor government is reviewing it?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, but there were members of the labor government who did, in fact, monitor and take part, to a degree, in the agreements.

Senator MANSFIELD. Who carried on the negotiations, the Navy or the State Department?

Admiral GROJEAN. The State Department.

Senator MANSFIELD. What is the purpose of our present facility on Diego Garcia and what are the changes and ramifications involved with renaming it an operational logistic support facility?

Admiral GROJEAN. As you know, at the present time, it is primarily an austere communications station. The changes that we wish to make are to increase its logistic capability in the area of providing fuel, a haven, so to speak, we wish to dredge the lagoon so we can put our ships into a sheltered anchorage and do the minor repairs that people can do on board their own ship and to increase the length of the runway about 4,000 feet in order to permit a better aircraft logistic support there, as well as an emergency field for carrier aircraft.

Senator MANSFIELD. At the present time, can the KC-135 land at Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. I believe they can, sir.

Admiral MARSCHALL. No; the 141's and the C-5's can but I don't believe the KC-135 can land at 8,000 feet.

Admiral DE POIX. No; I don't know.

Admiral MARSCHALL. They cannot; except in emergencies, of course.

Admiral GROJEAN. KC-135, loaded cannot; that is right.

Senator MANSFIELD. But you are going to expand the airfield by 4,000 feet.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. And you will have no trouble with that KC-135 then?

Admiral GROJEAN. That is right.

Senator MANSFIELD. You will have no trouble with B-52's?

Admiral GROJEAN. We would have trouble.

Senator MANSFIELD. Could they squeeze in?

Admiral GROJEAN. On an emergency basis, but it was not designed for B-52's to operate.

Admiral MARSCHALL. A keel would have to be laid down the center of the runway to support the weight, and the width of the airfield would have to be expanded by 100 feet, as I understand it.

It is a 150-foot-wide strip and it would have to go to 250 feet to accommodate B-52's.

Senator MANSFIELD. You don't intend to widen the runways?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We have no intention.

Senator MANSFIELD. How many ships and aircraft will be stationed on the island?

Admiral GROJEAN. None.

ANCHORAGE

Senator MANSFIELD. What will be its capacity with respect to ship types?

Admiral GROJEAN. Excuse me?

Senator MANSFIELD. What will be its capacity with respect to ship types?

Admiral GROJEAN. The lagoon will be able to handle any U.S. ship in terms of the ship anchoring in the lagoon. There is no intention at all for the United States to station ships or aircraft at Diego Garcia.

Senator MANSFIELD. Not even patrol aircraft?

Admiral GROJEAN. Patrol aircraft will operate out of there but will not be stationed there. We might send aircraft down there and they will operate out of there for 2 or 3 months as we have been, but they would not be home ported or stationed there.

Senator MANSFIELD. There would be no ships permanently stationed there?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Will it be able to support submarine activity?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, inasmuch as a submarine could go in and anchor there. That would be a possibility; yes, inasmuch as it could go in and anchor there; yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. How frequently do you visualize the U.S. force would use Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. Mr. Chairman, of course this would depend entirely upon what is happening in the world and what is happening in that part of the ocean.

The United States currently plans to keep ships, I might call it a task group, three or four ships, in the Indian Ocean roughly 50 percent of the time.

Senator MANSFIELD. And when you speak of a task group, what do you encompass?

Admiral GROJEAN. This would be an aircraft carrier with three or four destroyers or possibly a cruiser with two, three, or four destroyers, something of that nature.

Senator MANSFIELD. In the recent speech Senator Kennedy—

Admiral GROJEAN. Excuse me, sir, may I check on that?

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes.

Admiral GROJEAN. May I supply the last bit of that information about our future plans for executive session, I am not sure but that might be classified information.

Senator MANSFIELD. In a recent speech, Senator Kennedy proposed we seek direct negotiations with the Soviets on rules of behavior for naval armament in the Indian Ocean.

In the current atmosphere of détente, wouldn't it be realistic both politically and economically to pursue this idea with the Soviets on limiting big power naval presence in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. The problem with such an arrangement is that it puts the United States at a disadvantage.

If the Soviets currently are all ready in the Indian Ocean as we saw in executive session today and in addition to that, even if you could convince the Soviets to pull out from these places, which I seriously doubt, it is much easier for the Soviets to deploy their naval units into the Indian Ocean from the Black Sea once the Suez has been opened, as we saw it is only about 3,000 miles, than it is for the United States to bring its unit from the Pacific.

Now the logical follow-on question is, could we not also do it from the 6th Fleet and in anticipation of that, I would say whenever there is a period of heightened tension, we find it almost invariably affects us in the 6th Fleet as well as the Indian Ocean, so we cannot deplete our requirements for naval presence in the 6th Fleet and send them to the Indian Ocean because it would leave us short in the Mediterranean. For that reason we find our ships that augment and that go into the Indian Ocean almost invariably have to come from our 7th Fleet.

OPENING OF SUEZ CANAL

Senator MANSFIELD. How much money are we spending or have we spent on Admiral McCauley and units of the British Fleet plus private contractors or to reopen the Suez Canal, roughly?

Admiral GROJEAN. Sir, I don't have even a rough estimate. I would have to provide that for you later.

[The information follows:]

Costs to be incurred by the Department of Defense during FY 1974 in connection with the reopening of the Suez Canal have been limited to \$8.7 million. Of that amount, \$7.0 million is associated with mine sweeping and explosive ordnance clearance and \$1.7 million is associated with salvage operations, including DOD funding of private contractors. FY 1975 cost estimates have not been finalized but preliminary estimates show the requirement to be within the \$20 million State/AID funds requested for this purpose. No funds have been provided for the support of Royal Navy units in connection with this operation.

All obligations for FY 1974 incremental costs for U.S. military operations in the Suez Canal are being reimbursed from State Department (AID) funds. It is planned that FY 1975 funding will be managed in the same manner.

VALUE TO SOVIETS OF OPENING CANAL

Senator MANSFIELD. Are we doing it to make it easier for the Soviet fleet to go from the Black Sea down to the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir. That is not the reason that we are doing it.

Senator MANSFIELD. But that would be the effect, wouldn't it?

Admiral GROJEAN. It would be an effect. I would like to elaborate upon that, if I may.

Senator MANSFIELD. Go ahead.

Admiral GROJEAN. There is not any doubt that the opening of the Suez will present a bigger problem for the U.S. Navy strategically.

On the other hand, to be opposed to opening the Canal would be sort of like being opposed to motherhood. Opening of the Canal opens up lines of communications for all of the nations of the world, including our NATO allies, even including the United States in its passage of ships from Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Indian Ocean up to the Mediterranean and into the Atlantic.

So, for this reason and not just as a naval strategist but as a person who looks at the overall benefit to the world, there is no doubt but what all of us, including the United States, will benefit with the opening of the Suez Canal. We do, however, present ourselves with a problem, you are right, in that the Soviets—can come into the Indian Ocean more easily.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you feel as I that military and especially naval issues in the Indian Ocean should be subordinated to foreign policy considerations?

Admiral GROJEAN. Absolutely.

Senator MANSFIELD. Isn't it a fact that by increasing our own naval deployments in the Indian Ocean we can anticipate a response-type increase in Soviet deployment?

Admiral GROJEAN. I cannot necessarily agree with that. It looks to me as if the Soviets have already a presence in the Indian Ocean significantly greater than ours.

In the past when we look at those instances where we have found both the United States and the Soviets responding to crisis in geographic areas, geographical areas where there are hot spots so to speak,

it is not necessarily a fact that one goes there because the other one goes there; it is more a matter of each one going there for his own national interests.

Senator MANSFIELD. You are not surprised, then, from the reaction we had to it?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS

Senator MANSFIELD. Would it not be to our advantage to negotiate with the Russians in order to seek limitations on naval and other military force in the Indian Ocean area?

Admiral GROJEAN. As I have said before, such a negotiation, in my opinion, could put the United States at a disadvantage.

Senator MANSFIELD. The answer would be in the negative?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. You say the purpose of extending the runway from 8,000 to 12,000 feet is to take care of bigger planes, but it will exclude B-52's?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. What kind of bigger planes?

Admiral GROJEAN. KC-135's with fuel, principally.

Senator MANSFIELD. Are those tankers?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. No other types?

Admiral GROJEAN. I am sorry, sir; I don't really know the answer to that question. It is beyond my area.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think the lengthening of the strip, Mr. Chairman, would make it possible for our carrier-based aircraft, which might be in some jeopardy because of a malfunction, to land successfully on that island.

Senator MANSFIELD. They couldn't land on an 8,000-foot runway?

Admiral MARSCHALL. They might very well, yes sir, and they can when they are all right, but I am just saying in case there is some malfunction of some sort, they may not be able to.

Senator MANSFIELD. Does it add that degree of safety?

Admiral MARSCHALL. It adds that degree of safety which we now do not have.

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, do you know of any matters that fall within the proper purview of the Navy, which would, in your opinion, outweigh geopolitical considerations in the Indian Ocean area?

Admiral GROJEAN. Sir, you will have to give it to me again.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you know of any matters which fall within the proper purview of the Navy which would, in your opinion, outweigh geopolitical considerations in the Indian Ocean area?

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TOWARD NAVAL NEEDS

In other words, do you know of any political considerations which might outweigh what you consider as naval strategy or naval needs?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. I wish you would pay a little more attention to that answer, Admiral, and when you go back, go over it with your staff and answer it in some detail and be very specific.

Admiral GROJEAN. All right, sir.

[The information follows:]

No. Naval strategy in a given world region complements U.S. policy for that particular area. Among the Indian Ocean littoral nations there are several that oppose U.S. policy toward the region and our naval presence. However Navy feels that U.S. interests and the need for naval presence there far outweigh this opposition.

DELAY IN DEVELOPMENT OF DIEGO GARCIA

Senator MANSFIELD. Would it not be better to wait to develop Diego Garcia until after the Suez Canal reopens and see what the Soviets will do?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir. I don't believe so. The need for Diego Garcia was very pointedly brought to our attention during the October war before the Suez Canal was being considered to be opened. If we need to go into the Indian Ocean as a matter of national policy, then we need Diego Garcia there to support us.

Senator MANSFIELD. What you are saying, then, is that if their presence increases significantly, we would then not respond, we could not then respond to their initiative and at the same time demonstrate as a result our peaceful intentions in the area?

Admiral GROJEAN. You mean by "their" the Soviets, sir?

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral GROJEAN. Would you state the question again?

Senator MANSFIELD. It is tied with the first part of a two-part question. Would it not be better to wait to develop Diego Garcia until after the Suez Canal reopens and see what the Soviets would do?

The answer was negative. The next question is this: If their presence increases significantly, if the answer had been affirmative, we could respond to their initiative while at the same time respond to the nations around the littoral, as to our peaceful intentions.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, I understand, but my answer is still in the negative for the reasons I gave you.

Senator BELLMON. Admiral, doesn't the request for funds for expanding Diego Garcia mean that your Indian Ocean commitments will require an increase in the carrier force level?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir, they will not. We feel that Diego Garcia will not be a cause or reason for our deployments into the Indian Ocean.

Our deployments to the Indian Ocean means that we need Diego Garcia. In other words, it is the "chicken and the egg" here. We are going to be in the Indian Ocean to support national policy. Therefore, it is in our national interests that we have Diego Garcia.

Our commitments to the Indian Ocean will undoubtedly draw down our assets in the Pacific Fleet, but it does not mean we have to increase the projected number of aircraft carriers.

Senator BELLMON. I understand there is a projected reduction in number of carriers down to 12, and will this reduction still occur?

Admiral GROJEAN. This reduction will still occur unless there is a good reason for doing otherwise. If there is not a reduction, it will not hinge on Diego Garcia or our Indian Ocean commitment. If there is no reduction, it is because of something that is not known at this time.

Senator BELLMON. How does the Navy reach the conclusion that it is in our national interest to have the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean? How is this kind of decision made? Is it made by the Security Council or the State Department or is it strictly a military decision?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir. The decision that we need a presence in the Indian Ocean is a matter of national policy, and it comes from the National Security Council, the President, the State Department, the various agencies of the Government working together as to what our national interests are.

Senator BELLMON. There is no direct congressional input into that decision, I take it, such as through the appropriation process?

Admiral GROJEAN. That is right, sir.

Senator BELLMON. It has been claimed when the Suez Canal reopened it will provide far greater access in the Indian Ocean for Soviet ships which must now come from Vladivostock or around Africa. Isn't it also true for the U.S. 6th Fleet units?

Admiral GROJEAN. The U.S. 6th Fleet units will be able to utilize the Suez Canal except for aircraft carriers. However, as I stated earlier, the drawdown of the 6th Fleet units is not the answer to the problem in the Indian Ocean. We cannot afford a drawdown from our presence in the Mediterranean and certainly not in the period of heightened interest when we need to be there.

Admiral DEPOIX. May I say something that might help. If the supply ships from the 6th Fleet were supplying ships then from an entity which it would only reduce if we send them down to the Indian Ocean. The same is not the case with the Soviets because they have a good-sized naval base in the Black Sea and they supply their Soviet Mediterranean Squadron from there, but a short distance away they have a naval base with more ships. So they could send from a base in the Black Sea or the Mediterranean and in an immediate case replenish them.

SOVIET FISHING FLEET

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, the Soviets have an extensive fishing fleet operating in the oceans of the world. This fleet, ostensibly a commercial enterprise, could assume a military role. Would you comment on the Soviet fishing fleet activities in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. I might ask Admiral dePoix, who has I think a greater degree of expertise in this than I have. I will be glad, if he cannot.

Admiral DEPOIX. I would like to ask Captain Twining to provide the answer. He was a briefer for the classified briefing before you came in.

Captain TWINING. Since about 1964, the Soviets have had limited fishing fleet presence in the Indian Ocean.

Senator MANSFIELD. Does it have any military possibilities?

Admiral GROJEAN. It does, sir, as it does elsewhere in the world.

Admiral DEPOIX. Very limited. In general, the ships of their shipping fleet do not have military missions. In some cases they have alternate reconnaissance or surveillance missions, but their by and large fishing fleet is just a fishing fleet.

Senator MANSFIELD. To reiterate, how is the U.S. national interests activity served by expansion of Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. Diego will provide a support facility for the U.S. Navy's presence in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. Navy's presence in the Indian Ocean serves our national policy by, first of all, showing

our will to those countries who are friendly to the United States and to our way of life, our resolve not to turn them over to the Soviets, and so on.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do we have them to turn over?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir, but if we desert them entirely and they feel that we are not willing to show our support, if they feel that we are not willing to be their friends, those countries will be lost to us as friendly nations. If the Soviets are going to be there pushing them, nations such as Iran and Saudi Arabia will eventually be forced to be more friendly to the Soviets in the same way that Finland has been forced to cooperate with the U.S.S.R.

Senator MANSFIELD. Isn't Iran, or doesn't Iran border on the Soviet Union?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, an that is exactly the thing I am saying.

Senator MANSFIELD. But it is a thousand miles or more south of it, in the Persian Gulf or that area?

Admiral GROJEAN. I am sorry, but I don't understand.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, you say that especially with all of these countries, because they are closer to the Soviet power; that is very close to Soviet power.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir. Right now, the United States, or the presence of the U.S. Navy on the southern border of Iran, is an effective counter to the Soviet Army and Air Force presence on the north as well as the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

AUSTRALIAN NAVY

Senator MANSFIELD. What is the capability of the Australian Navy and its projected role in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. The Australian Navy right now is relatively small and limited, and its projected role in the Indian Ocean is very small.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is the Whitlam labor government approving of our desire to expand the facilities at Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. I would like to submit that for the executive session, sir.

[The information follows:]

Prime Minister Whitlam is quoted in a press release as saying, "Any buildup of military facilities or introduction of military forces will not contribute to the achievement of the long-term objectives of the Australian Government and governments of the region." Liberal opposition leader Sneeden subsequently issued a statement strongly supporting the U.S. position.

HOMEPORTING OF L'SALLE

Senator MANSFIELD. That question was not asked in the private briefing. Can you make it a part of that briefing?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. If the Bahrain Government does not rescind its decision to terminate the Middle East Force stationing agreement, is the Navy considering homeporting LaSalle at Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir, it is not considering that at this time.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you think you will really be forced out of Bahrain? You got the orders, I believe, some time last fall or the winter, and you are still there.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir. Things are happening so fast in that area, Mr. Chairman, that it is very difficult to say. If you had asked me 10 days ago, I would have said I feel certain we are going to stay, and now I give our chance of staying just a figure of about 50-50.

Senator MANSFIELD. Why? What has happened in the last 10 days to bring about a change in your thinking? Aren't we friendly or more friendly with those countries in that part of the Arabic world at the present time?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir. It is not that. I think I would rather go into executive session to provide that.

Senator MANSFIELD. Will you be sure to furnish a reply for the meeting that was held before I came down here to that question?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

[The classified information was furnished to the committee staff.]

Senator MANSFIELD. The KC-135 aircraft which will be able to operate from Diego Garcia when the runway is extended by 4,000 feet, do you have the capacity to refuel B-52's in flight, do they not?

Admiral GROJEAN. They do, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thus from Diego Garcia, the reach of the American B-52 capacity in the Western Pacific will be extended to the Indian Ocean and all of its littoral states. Do you not agree that such is a significant escalation of the potential use of power by the United States in that area of the world?

Admiral GROJEAN. As a potential user of power, yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. You have B-52's stationed in Thailand at the present time even though the number is being gradually reduced?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, I believe we are pulling out. I don't know if they are all out or not yet, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. I don't believe so, but they are being reduced.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

NIXON DOCTRINE

Senator BELLMON. Is the plan to develop Diego Garcia inconsistent with the Nixon doctrine?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir, it is not. It is very much in keeping with the Nixon doctrine. We feel that Diego Garcia, inasmuch as it is an uninhabited island and one which is under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, it permits us to exercise the complete flexibility and mobility of our Navy without becoming involved with other countries.

Senator BELLMON. Now, we have operated to some extent in the Indian Ocean for many, many years without Diego and why the sudden need for this expanded base?

Admiral GROJEAN. For about three reasons. First of all, in the October war, when it became very clear to us that we were sorely pushed to support our forces in the Indian Ocean and when we did do it, it was at the depletion of our units in the 7th Fleet.

Had there been another area of the world in which we had a crisis, particularly the Pacific, it would have been very, very difficult to respond to it.

Second of all, we realized very much now in the last 10 years that the Soviets have, in fact, increased their presence and their influence in the Indian Ocean significantly.

Third, the opening of the Suez Canal, which will give the Soviets the ability to deploy in that part of the world more rapidly and that gives us more cause for concern.

Senator BELLMON. So, partially what we are doing is a reaction to the Soviets' increased presence in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. To a degree, yes; however, Diego Garcia should be increased as a logistics facility even if the Soviets weren't there.

And we saw in the October war, if the hotspot happens to be in the Persian Gulf or Red Sea or in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets can get there very rapidly and if the United States needs to be there for its national interest, as it was determined to be in October, then Diego Garcia then becomes very important to us at that period of time.

We never know but what there may be another occasion for the United States to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean in support of our national policy and for that reason we need the Diego Garcia facility as a contingency and as a filling station.

Senator BELLMON. Now, filling stations are served by refineries—as just a delivery point. Where will the basic support for our Indian Ocean operation come from, not from Diego but from what base?

Admiral GROJEAN. Subic, which is about 3,100 miles away.

Senator BELLMON. The British apparently found their Indian Ocean operation to be unproductive or counterproductive over the long haul. Isn't it fairly likely after a few years' experience, the Russians may also decide that the Indian Ocean cost is more than the value they get from it?

Admiral GROJEAN. I don't believe so, sir. As Admiral De Poix said, there are many reasons for the Soviets being in the Indian Ocean—strategically it gives them capability of virtually surrounding China. Second of all, by exerting their political influence into these various developing countries, it gives them the contingency potential to develop better and more strategic bases from which to operate to their advantage in the Indian Ocean.

They do not need any of the oil that is coming out of the gulf. It appears to us that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean is definitely not the same as the United States, and where we are trying to insure that the flow of oil is unimpeded to our allies, the Soviets are there in the negative sense, to prevent it.

Senator BELLMON. Our growing relationship with China is not one of the reasons for our desire to develop Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. No.

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, earlier this year, Admiral Zumwalt, in testifying before the Appropriations Committee on the supplemental appropriation when funds were then requested for the port facilities on Diego Garcia, Admiral Zumwalt stated that commencement of this logistic support facility was necessary if the United States were to have any reasonable contingency capability for deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean. That is, in effect, what you already said, Admiral.

Upon reflection, Admiral, Admiral Zumwalt's statement reminded me of a comment by one of the great men of the U.S. Senate, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia. The Navy had before Senator Russell and his committee a proposal to build large ships that would bring more men, more equipment in the fastest way to any trouble spot in the world. I believe they were called FDL's. The efficiency of that particular system, the FDL, really bothered Senator Russell and prompted

his strong opposition to the commencement of that construction program. With the great commonsense he so often demonstrated, he said, "If we make it easy for the military to go places and do things, we will always find them going places and doing things." This would not apply to the military overall.

I think, Admiral, the wisdom of Senator Russell might very well apply to Diego Garcia. Are we not planting here a small seed from which an immense capacity to express military power in the Indian Ocean will develop?

Admiral GROJEAN. Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Navy will not go into the Indian Ocean because it is easier to go into the Indian Ocean, but will go into the Indian Ocean when it is necessary to support national policy.

Senator MANSFIELD. And who will determine national policy?

Admiral GROJEAN. Well, I believe that national policy is determined by the National Security Council, by the President, by the State Department.

Senator MANSFIELD. And by the Defense Department?

Admiral GROJEAN. The Defense Department has an input into it; yes, sir, certainly. It would obviously be foolish not to have an input from the Defense Department in determining national policy.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you think this will grow up from a seed?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir. I do not believe that this will grow from the seed. The purpose of our requesting that Diego Garcia be improved as a logistic facility is primarily to facilitate our operations there when they are necessary.

We won't go in there just because we have a filling station in Diego Garcia, but the filling station will certainly make it easier and will make our security situation much better when we do have to be there.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, Admiral, you will recall the Navy tried for about 10 years to get an austere communications station on Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Before it finally achieved it and then only because of the fact that CAGNEW in Ethiopia was going out of operation. We found out earlier this year that the Army, I believe, which had occupied CAGNEW, had been displaced, and the Navy, in effect, was ordered to go in.

Now, we contacted the Defense Department and told them that if they were going to keep CAGNEW, that they were going to force the Navy to take it over, which I don't think it wanted to do, that they might just as well forget about Diego Garcia.

So I think the evacuation of CAGNEW is in its terminal stage at the present time.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. So you have this austere communications station, and now because of the changed situation they are asking \$29 million to amplify, expand the lagoon, the airfield and other aspects of Diego Garcia, and if my figures serve me correctly, I think that you have planned over the next several years \$185 million for expenditures to maintain this austere communications system.

NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES

Admiral MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I can answer that question. For the Navy total cost from the beginning through fiscal year 1970 is ---

program should go through, would amount to \$173.2 million. This would include the military construction cost, the Seabee cost, and the "Operation and maintenance" and "Other procurement, Navy" costs associated with the construction.

What I am telling you, sir, is that the MILCON appropriation would be supplemented by Seabee labor, and we have attempted to include the Seabee's cost as part of this total package to show the true cost of the operation.

Senator MANSFIELD. And you would have the Seabees there and other Naval personnel and Air Force personnel for 3 months or 6 months at a time?

Admiral MARSHALL. At the present time, Mr. Chairman, the Seabees deploy for 8 months.

Senator MANSFIELD. I see. Admiral MARSHALL. And return to their homeport. We now have Seabees there, approximately one naval mobile construction battalion, and the work which is underway now should be completed by about the beginning of the next fiscal year.

In other words, we are about a year away from completing the facilities which the Congress has authorized.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is the austere communications facility?

Admiral MARSHALL. Yes sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. I mentioned the Air Force because I believe they have a request for \$3 million or \$3.3 million, I am informed, for the airfield, and I would assume they would have some personal interest there, too.

Do you think it will stop at \$170-odd million, that is the development of Diego Garcia?

Admiral MARSHALL. That is my personal feeling, yes, based on my knowledge of the island and what we want in there.

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, one of the great failures of American foreign policy is that it is determined by events like the appropriation of these moneys would set in motion. The simple request for a relatively small \$29 million expenditure in a faraway place. That simple expenditure determines our capability which in turn determines the foreign policy of this Nation. In fact, it was under circumstances like this that many of the 437,000 U.S. military personnel stationed on foreign lands first got there. Their stationing on these foreign lands, in effect, determined American foreign policy, which is usual under the old "cause and effect" thesis. I would hope that we could learn the lesson of the past two decades and make determinations of what the foreign policy interests are, and then, and only then, take the necessary steps to implement that foreign policy with arms or other military needs.

Don't you think, Admiral, that it would be wiser to make the foreign policy determination on the Indian Ocean openly and expressly, and then take the necessary steps to expand our operations there as the building of the facilities at Diego Garcia would do?

Admiral GROJEAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the request of the Navy to expand its facilities in the Diego Garcia area is a perfect example of the correct way in which foreign military policy should be determined by the United States.

Our foreign military policy has dictated the requirement for the United States to go into the Indian Ocean with its naval forces. The request for Diego Garcia to be improved as a logistics facility is in support of that foreign policy and will not dictate the foreign policy in any way, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Now you state that this agreement as to Diego Garcia was carried on by personnel from the State Department.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, personnel of the State Department and with the assistance of naval personnel.

Senator MANSFIELD. What sort of agreement resulted from these conversations, conferences, meetings, and what not? Was it an executive agreement, a treaty?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir, an executive agreement, which was ad referendum, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And it was not referred to the Congress for its approval or disapproval except through the appropriations process?

Admiral GROJEAN. That is correct, thus far, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. The negotiations you are appearing on now with Mr. Wilson in the Labor government in England—is that in the form of an executive agreement previously agreed to by the Heath government and now being reviewed by the Labor government?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir. There are no negotiations going on right now between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Senator MANSFIELD. But there were when Mr. Heath was in?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And now a review of those negotiations?

Admiral GROJEAN. Is being conducted by the Labor government; yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And what do you anticipate will be the reaction of the Labor government to the Heath government, the Tory Childreth government undertook to do?

Admiral GROJEAN. My personal estimate is the Labor government will eventually approve it, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. What is the quid pro quo given to the Labor government for the use of its ocean territories by this country? What do they get in return?

Admiral GROJEAN. As quid pro quo, there is none, sir. We are not paying for the use of Diego Garcia and we have no agreement to make an exchange of anything.

In fact, the United Kingdom is very happy to see the United States build up a port facility there because they also would use the same facility.

Senator MANSFIELD. How many ships does the United Kingdom have in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. Sir?

Senator MANSFIELD. How many ships does the United Kingdom have in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. About five, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And the French, too?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, three to five, sir.

AUSTRALIAN FLEET IN INDIAN OCEAN

Senator MANSFIELD. And the Australians?

Admiral GROJEAN. I have to provide that answer for you, sir. I am not sure.

[The information follows:]

Australia maintains no naval forces in the Indian Ocean. During 1970 the Royal Australian Navy, joined by ships from the UK and New Zealand, conducted a major exercise in the Indian Ocean off the western coast of Australia and in 1973 they sent a group of three ships on a cruise to a number of African and Middle Eastern countries. Their normal activities in the Indian Ocean are primarily regionally oriented with most operations outside their own coastal waters involved with visits to Indonesia and Malaysia and small scale operations in conjunction with the navies of these countries.

POSITION OF AUSTRALIAN FLEET

When you say "Australians," you mean Australians in the Indian Ocean?

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes, sir, after all, it does border on the Indian Ocean.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes; but most of their Navy is on the east coast.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is right. Now the Soviet Union, I understand, has fort rights at Dacca in Bangladesh granted to them at the time Bangladesh, or shortly after Bangladesh achieved independence and that is used primarily for the purpose of getting rid of mines and bringing assistance to the people of that nation.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And a good part of their landings or whatever you call them when you try to enumerate numerically the difference between the Soviet Force and the U.S. Force in the Indian Ocean, have been in Bangladesh, isn't that correct?

Admiral GROJEAN. I believe that what you are saying, sir, is the number of ship days in the Indian Ocean.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir. Most of our figures have included the harbor clearing at Bangladesh. However, sir, I would like to go on to say that even without or if you were to extract those figures, the Soviets should remain significantly higher than the United States. I think we have provided both.

Senator MANSFIELD. They are superior to us at the present time in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. We have two destroyers or tenders at Bahrain?

Admiral GROJEAN. We have a command ship and two destroyers, yes, sir. I use the word command ship. It is, an amphibious ship, but it acts as a command ship.

Senator MANSFIELD. Those are the only ships we have around the littoral?

Admiral GROJEAN. At any given time, Mr. Chairman, it will vary. As I said earlier, we will sometimes have ships from the 7th Fleet in the Indian Ocean and at other times we will not have them in there.

CARRIER TASK GROUP

It would be difficult to say what it is all of the time. Since the October war, we have had a task group in there about—I would like to provide that figure.

[The information follows:]

Since the October War to the end of April of this year the U.S. Navy has had a Carrier Task Group in the Indian Ocean approximately one half of the time and a Guided Missile Destroyer, the USS BAINBRIDGE plus one escort the remainder of the time. From 1 May 1974 until 29 June 1974 there are no U.S. Navy ships scheduled to be in the Indian Ocean.

AVAILABILITY OF OIL AND PETROLEUM

Senator MANSFIELD. All right. Did the Navy have any trouble getting oil and petroleum during the October war?

Admiral GROJEAN. The Navy had a great deal of trouble supplying its ships with fuel during the October war. That was primarily because we had to take the fuel from Subic in our tankers and replenish our task group in the Indian Ocean.

Senator MANSFIELD. Had American-controlled oil companies refused petroleum to the U.S. fleet?

Admiral GROJEAN. I am a little bit out of my area of expertise, but having reading Admiral Zumwalt's testimony, I believe there was one at any rate and maybe more and I am not sure.

Senator MANSFIELD. And they did so under direct pressure from the Saudi Government and perhaps others in the area?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, thank you, Admiral, and gentlemen.

UNITED STATES/SOVIET DOLLAR COMPARISONS TO INDIAN OCEAN

Admiral, can you compare for the record, the total U.S. military deliveries to the Indian Ocean region with the Soviet deliveries in dollars for the past 10 years?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

A comparison of U.S. and Soviet aid in millions of dollars from 1962 to 1972 is as follows:

	Millions
United States:	
Economic	\$13,000
Military	2,000
Soviet:	
Economic	3,200
Military	3,900

EXPANSION OF LOGISTIC FACILITIES

Senator MANSFIELD. Can you please put in the record at this point a list of the facilities the \$29 million will construct with a description of each and the cost of each?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

EXPANSION OF LOGISTICS FACILITIES

The development proposed for Diego Garcia is designed to provide minimal support to task groups that would operate in the Indian Ocean, on an occasional basis.

Logistically, Diego Garcia would serve as an outpost base where ships may perform limited in port upkeep, receive periodic repair services from a tender and receive critical supplies via the MAC airlift. Diego Garcia will also serve as a base for patrol aircraft providing air surveillance support to the ships in the Indian Ocean.

The major improvements planned are:

(1) An anchorage which is capable of mooring a six ship carrier task group. The lagoon dredging will also provide an explosive anchorage for ship to ship transfer of ordnance.

(2) A fuel and general purpose pier is planned which will be capable of loading and unloading a 180,000 barrel tanker in a 24 hour period. This rapid loading capability increases the fuel endurance of the task group during critical operations when tanker assets are limited.

(3) The POL storage capacity on the island must be increased by (480,000) barrels. This POL storage represents that necessary to: support short notice deployment of designated forces to the Indian Ocean until a POL tanker pipeline independent of Middle East sources can be established; or support deployment of reinforcements in the event of hostilities until pipelines can be increased; and provide accessible POL support to combat forces to accommodate temporary area POL fluctuation in the area due to varying consumption rates or attrition of pipeline assets. The Diego Garcia supply would sustain a typical Indian Ocean task group for approximately 28 days.

(4) Airfield improvements will permit aerial resupply for the task group, basing of patrol aircraft and recovery of tactical jet aircraft in emergencies. A 4,000 foot runway extension will provide for the safe recovery of tactical jet aircraft under a range of adverse conditions associated with the conduct of air training exercises by a carrier task group within the vicinity of Diego Garcia. The runway will also accommodate KC-135 aircraft. A standard high capacity runway arresting gear installation will also be provided to permit safe landing of aircraft with hydraulic or other landing gear failures.

(5) Aircraft maintenance, a hangar, a maintenance van hardstand and an aircraft wash rack will provide necessary maintenance support for the patrol (VP/-VQ) aircraft that might be required to operate from Diego Garcia. A ready issue magazine for temporary storage of ASW and other aircraft ordnance will be constructed in the airfield area.

(6) A parking apron extension to accommodate an additional C141, four P-3, one carrier on board delivery (COD) and twenty divert aircraft from a carrier is planned.

(7) Other airfield improvements, which include an operations building extension for the patrol operations, an air cargo transit shed and a crash fire station.

(8) Additions to the personnel support complex are required to support the personnel to be assigned to both the communications mission and the fleet support mission. A BEQ extension for 277 men and a BOQ extension for 32 officers are planned. The combined subsistence facility will be expanded to serve the added men.

(9) Other storage and additional cold storage: general and other specialized storage facilities will be constructed in a new warehouse complex north of the airfield complex.

(10) Power Plant, two 1,200 KW diesel units will be added to the existing 5 units to support the increased power demands of the additional island population and the POL storage and pumping system.

(11) Fleet Recreation. An outdoor recreation area suitable for ship's company sporting and recreational events will be constructed. With ports of call in the Indian Ocean limited, this facility is important for support of task group personnel.

The entire development plan outlined is estimated to cost approximately \$34 million for construction. A detailed listing of the FY 1975 program facilities totalling \$29 million follows:

Diego Garcia fiscal year 1975 projects

	Thousands
POL facilities	11,934
POL storage	6,834
Pier (POL/supply)	<u>5,100</u>
Airfield	5,820
Aircraft parking apron	2,279
Runway extension	2,264
Airfield transit storage	140
Aircraft arresting gear	215
Air transportable hangar	440
Operations building addition	232
Overhaul paving train	<u>250</u>
Personnel support	5,731
Subsistence building addition	393
Bachelor enlisted quarters	3,882
Bachelor officers quarters	1,360
Armed Force radio and television station	<u>96</u>
Supply	1,937
Ready issue ammunition magazine	220
Cold storage	<u>466</u>
General warehouse	1,251
Communication facility: Receiver building addition	131
Small arms range/vehicle repair hardstand	40
Utilities	<u>3,407</u>
Powerplant expansion	2,265
Substation	252
Utilities distribution system	813
NMCB camp (part)	<u>77</u>
Total	29,000

TESTIMONY FROM ADMIRAL ZUMWALT FISCAL YEAR 1974 TESTIMONY

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral Grojean would you please provide for the record the testimony before this committee during the fiscal year 1974 supplemental budget hearings.

[The information follows:]

**U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
Washington, D.C.**

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room S-126, the Capitol, Hon. Mike Mansfield (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Mansfield, Schweiker, and Bellmon.

Also present: Senator Tower.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

DIEGO GARCIA

STATEMENT OF ADM. E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator MANSFIELD. The meeting will come to order.

Before Admiral Zumwalt makes a statement, I would like to make a few remarks.

Admiral Zumwalt and General Loving and members of the Air Force staff, I welcome you to our hearing this morning on Diego Garcia.

Before we take up the questioning of the Navy, I will make a brief statement for the record, setting forth some past history and the appropriation request presently pending before this committee.

Before I go into that, may I say that it was with deep regret that I read in the newspapers that you were retiring from the Navy. Not only will it be the Navy's loss, but the Nation's, as well.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REQUEST OF NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR DIEGO GARCIA

Senator MANSFIELD. In calendar year 1969, for fiscal year 1970, the Navy requested new obligational authority of \$9,556,000 for the first increment of a naval facility on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. At the time, the Navy estimated that the total cost of this facility would be approximately \$26 million.

DESCRIPTION OF DIEGO GARCIA

Diego Garcia is an atoll located within the Chagos Archipelago in the middle of the Indian Ocean, approximately 1,000 miles due south

of the tip of India. The heavily vegetated island consists of 6,700 acres with average elevations of 3 to 7 feet. It is horseshoe shaped with a 40-mile perimeter.

The enclosed lagoon is 5½ miles wide by 13 miles long with an average depth of 30 to 100 feet. The annual rainfall is approximately 100 inches.

The U.S. Government became interested in Diego Garcia in the early 1960's when the British Government stated it intended to greatly reduce its presence west of Singapore.

In 1965, the British Government formed the British Indian Ocean Territory which comprises the Chagos Archipelago which, of course, includes Diego Garcia.

The U.S. Government, sometime in calendar year 1966, began negotiating with the British Government for a lease to establish a communications station and a naval operational base on Diego Garcia. This base was to be an austere logistic support facility which was mainly a refueling stop for naval units operating in the Indian Ocean.

In December 1966, a bilateral agreement was signed by the British Government and the U.S. Government which granted base rights for a period of 50 years to the U.S. Government to the Indian Ocean territory; namely, Diego Garcia. I would like to point out that this agreement was never submitted to the Congress and, to my knowledge, neither the Foreign Relations Committee nor the Senate was ever consulted, until after the fact, about this important policy matter of committing the U.S. Navy to permanent operations in a new quadrant of the world.

NAVY'S FISCAL YEAR 1970 APPROPRIATION JUSTIFICATION

I might point out further that when the U.S. Navy committed two destroyers and a tender to Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, to my knowledge the Senate was not consulted, until after the fact. The Navy justification in the fiscal year 1970 appropriation reads as follows, and I quote:

An austere logistic support activity has become necessary to insure Navy readiness in the South Atlantic, Indian and Western Pacific Oceans. Access to ports for bunkering and resupply has diminished. . . . Communications in the Indian Ocean are tenuous without satisfactory coverage of the Mid-Indian Ocean area. Lack of fueling facilities and immediately responsive communications, while not prohibiting naval operations, limits operational flexibility. No military facilities of any nature exist in this area and a new facility is required for ship refueling, limited aviation, and communications.

The fiscal year 1970 submission by the Navy for Diego Garcia was approved by both Armed Services Committees of the Congress and by the House Appropriations Committee. When presented to the Senate, there was strong opposition from within the Senate Appropriations Committee to the United States becoming committed to another naval base in the Indian Ocean.

Senator Russell, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, was very much opposed to the United States committing the U.S. Navy to sustained operations within the Indian Ocean, and so stated on a number of occasions.

The Military Construction Subcommittee and the full committee deleted the Diego Garcia project completely from the fiscal year 1970 Military Construction Appropriations bill.

This matter was taken to conference with the House and the Sen-

Finally, an oral agreement was reached wherein the Navy was instructed to come back in fiscal year 1971 for a new appropriation which would support only a communications station.

The rationale at the time for the communications station was that the United States would probably have to withdraw from the main continent of Africa the large communications facility that the United States maintained at Asmara, Ethiopia (Kagnew Station).

In calendar year 1970, fiscal year 1971, the Navy came back with a communications package and it was approved by the Congress.

JUSTIFICATION

I will place in the record at this point the Navy's justification for the amount of \$29,000,000 requested for the expansion of facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia.

[The justification follows:]

FISCAL YEAR 1974 SUPPLEMENTAL PROJECT

Mission and project: The Naval Communication Station provides Fleet broadcasts, tactical ship to shore and point to point communications, and is a critical link in the Defense Communications System. A new mission is being assigned to this Station to support periodic presence of an Indian Ocean Task Group. This project provides facilities to improve Diego Garcia for logically supporting the Task Group.

Requirement: Recent events in the Middle East, the energy crisis, and the potential for hostilities in an area subject to chronic instability has necessitated a reevaluation of US national interests in the Indian Ocean Area, problems that may affect those interests, and the adequacy of the means now available for their protection. These national interests which could require an occasional increased Navy presence are: (1) free access to and transit in the Indian Ocean, (2) protection of US nationals, and (3) protection of sea lines of communication. These events and interests are the basis of a requirement to provide logistic support facilities to support a task force operating in the Indian Ocean Area. Facilities to be provided are the minimum required to support surface and air operations. The additions to present facilities are a fuel farm on fill land adjacent to the present fuel facility causeway, expansion of the aircraft parking apron, a maintenance van hardstand, aircraft arresting gear installation, a ready issue ammunition magazine, an airfield transit building adjacent to the apron, a hangar, a 4,000' runway extension, a POL/general purpose pier, and an expansion of the power plant to meet the electrical requirement of the POL facilities.

Current situation: Facilities constructed and currently programmed for Diego Garcia have been closely tailored to the requirements of the communications mission. With the exception of the C141-capable runway, all other facilities have negligible capacity available to logically support a task force in the Indian Ocean.

Impact if not provided: If this project is not provided, there will be no fixed site to support carrier task force operations in the Indian Ocean Area.

Additional: Construction will be accomplished by the Naval Construction Force.

ADMIRAL HOLLOWAY TO SUCCEED

Senator MANSFIELD. Proceed, Admiral.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to express my appreciation to you for your kind words.

I am coming to the end of my 4-year statutory term. I am immensely proud of the man who has been nominated to be my successor, Admiral Holloway.

U.S. STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR DIEGO GARCIA PRESENCE

Previous testimony from various witnesses from the Departments of State and Defense before various other committees has described in

Those interests relate mainly to the area's key resources, and to the transportation routes which carry them to the United States, its friends and its allies.

While I do not want to be unduly repetitive, I would like to stress the growing importance of this area to the United States.

Recent events such as the Arab-Israeli war, the oil embargo, and the worldwide economic dislocations which flowed from that embargo and ensuing price rises, have served to focus attention on the Indian Ocean area. The impacts of these events have brought home clearly the interrelationship between what goes on in the Indian Ocean area and the well-being of the rest of the world.

I think it is evident, as a result of that experience, that our interests in the Indian Ocean are directly linked with our interests in Europe and Asia, and more broadly, with our fundamental interest in maintaining a stable, worldwide balance of power.

In this interdependent world, events in the Indian Ocean cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be assessed in terms of their impact in other areas of key importance to the United States.

In the judgment of many observers, the Indian Ocean has become the area with the potential to produce major shifts in the global power balance over the next decade. It follows that we must have the ability to influence events in that area, and the capability to deploy our military power in the region is an essential element of such influence. That, in my judgment, is the crux of the rationale for what we are planning to do at Diego Garcia.

The second main point I think we should keep in mind is that the Diego Garcia facilities are intended to support naval forces. This is understandable, given the geographic realities of the situation.

We have no land bridge to the critical Indian Ocean littoral areas, as do the other great powers of the Eurasian landmass. We cannot fly to these countries except over the territory of others or along lengthy air routes over water. The most efficient way we have of reaching them directly is by sea. When other great powers look on the Indian Ocean area, they find ways of projecting their influence by their geographical proximity, over relatively short air and ground routes. The United States, by contrast, must rely almost exclusively on the sea.

The Navy has been in the Indian Ocean area for many years, as you are aware. Since the 1940's, we have maintained a small naval presence based in the Persian Gulf, called the Mideast force. This force consists of a flagship stationed in Bahrain, and two destroyers or destroyer escorts are on rotational assignments from other units.

It is too small to give us any significant military capability, but it has served an important diplomatic purpose by providing a tangible symbol of U.S. interest in the area.

We periodically sail additional ships into the area for training and port visits. The frequency of these visits was reduced during the Vietnam war. As you know, the Secretary of Defense recently indicated that we intend to reestablish the pattern of regular visits to this area.

In addition to these visits, the United States on two occasions in the past 3 years has operated carrier task forces for extended periods in the Indian Ocean. In neither of these cases were our deployments occasions by, or directed against, other naval forces in the area. On

both occasions, their presence supported U.S. foreign policy, evidenced our deep interest in events in the region, and lent weight to our diplomatic initiatives.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

I would hasten to point out that on both occasions these deployments also taxed our logistics support capabilities to the absolute limit, requiring a significant reduction in our ability to support our forces in other key areas, such as the Western Pacific. And this was in an environment when the pace of operations was relatively slow, and the logistics support requirements correspondingly low.

It was also in a situation where our extended and highly vulnerable supply lines were not subjected to any hostile threat.

In short, it was an artificial situation, far more advantageous than that which we could expect in a combatant environment; yet, our ability to operate a modest force even under these favorable circumstances was marginal.

The lesson of these two experiences is clear. If we are to have any reasonable contingency capability for the deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean area, we must have the rudiments of a logistics support facility in the area.

As you know, we currently maintain a communications facility on Diego Garcia, which is located in the center of the Indian Ocean. This facility was not designed to provide a capability for sustained logistics support of U.S. forces operating in the region.

What we propose to do now is to take advantage of its central location, and its political accessibility under our existing agreement with the British Government, to provide the essential elements of a naval support facility in the Indian Ocean.

The facility will be capable of providing limited support for a flexible range of activities including ship and aircraft maintenance, bunkering, aircraft staging, and improved communications. It will also provide for the operation of ASW aircraft in support of naval forces.

The current supplemental military appropriation recently presented to Congress contains a request for \$29 million to improve the facilities on Diego Garcia. Specific projects include increased fuel storage capacity, deepening of the lagoon to provide an anchorage which will accommodate an aircraft carrier and its escorts, lengthening the existing 8,000-foot runway and expanding the airfield parking area, in addition to certain improvements to our existing communications facility and the construction of additional personnel quarters, to accommodate a total of 609 people.

We believe that if we are to have an assured capability to deploy and support U.S. forces into the Indian Ocean area, the facilities we now propose at Diego Garcia are essential.

As mentioned by previous witnesses, the upgrading of Diego Garcia does not in itself postulate any given deployment of forces, but will significantly enhance our capability to operate naval forces in the Indian Ocean, to the extent such deployments are required by national policy.

The Soviets recognized the growing importance of the Indian Ocean area some time ago. Indeed, I would say their perceptions of this antedated our own. Since 1968, we have seen a pattern of steady build-up both in the Soviet naval presence, and in Soviet capabilities for the support of military operations in the Indian Ocean.

We must presume that the Soviets' plans for the expansion of these capabilities are based on perceptions of their own interests and objectives in the region, and are not driven predominantly by U.S. activity in the area. This is borne out by the fact that the rate of Soviet build-up has increased steadily throughout the period, while our own activity has remained at a relatively low level.

SOVIET SUPPORT SYSTEM

As a result of this Soviet build-up, the Soviets possess a support system in the area that is substantially more extensive than that of the United States.

Let me provide some examples.

The Soviets have established fleet anchorages in several locations north and south of the Island of Socotra, where an airfield provides a potential Soviet base for reconnaissance or other aircraft. They have been improving this airfield.

In addition, they have established anchorages in the Chagos Archipelago, including the installation of permanent mooring buoys. (They have done this in other areas around the Indian Ocean littoral, as well.)

They have built a communications station near the Somali port of Berbera to provide support for their fleet. At the same time, they have increased their use of, and are expanding naval facilities at Berbera, which currently include a restricted area under Soviet control, a combined barracks and repair ship and housing for Soviet military dependents.

We believe they may have as many as 2,600 military personnel ashore there and 150 Soviet families.

In addition, they are engaged in building a new military airfield near Mogadiscio, which could be used for a variety of missions.

Soviet naval combatants and support ships have had access to the expanded Iraqi naval port of Umm Qasr, where facilities are being built with the assistance of Soviet technicians. In my personal opinion, those facilities are considerably more extensive than any which would be required for Iraqi needs alone.

They also have Soviet military personnel ashore there.

The Soviets have been extended the use of port facilities at the former British base at Aden, and air facilities at the former Royal Air Force field nearby. They maintain personnel ashore in both locations. In addition, they use the port of Aden for refueling, replenishment and minor repairs.

Since 1971, Soviet naval units have been engaged in harbor clearance operations at Chittagong, Bangladesh.

In addition to their regional support facilities in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets are embarked on a worldwide program to expand bunkering and visit rights for their naval, merchant and fishing fleets.

Since Soviet merchant vessels are frequently employed for logistics support of Soviet naval forces, the establishment of merchant bunker-

ing facilities expands the Soviet Navy's logistics infrastructure. The Soviets have recently secured bunkering rights in Mauritius and Singapore and have made approaches to other Western-oriented and nonaligned countries.

In summary, Soviet support initiatives and the tempo of their naval activity in the Indian Ocean since 1968 have expanded at a deliberate pace which cannot be related, either in time or in scope, to any comparable expansion of U.S. activity.

The Soviets' logistics arrangements are designed to support their own strategic objectives in the area. In my judgment, those objectives relate primarily to the expansion of Soviet influence with the countries of the region, the enhancement of the Soviet image as a great power, and the neutralization of the PRC's political influence and military power through the expansion of Soviet power on China's southern flank.

Underlying all of this is Soviet recognition of the critical importance to most of the world's economies of the sealanes which pass through the area. As a result of that importance, the Soviets recognize that any nation which has the capability to project substantial naval power into the Indian Ocean automatically acquires significant influence not only with the littoral countries, but with those countries outside the area which are dependent on the free use of its sealanes, as well.

INCREASED SOVIET PRESENCE

The Soviets' logistics infrastructure is already sufficient to support a much greater Soviet presence than the one which now exists in the Indian Ocean. I expect the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow, irrespective of anything we do at Diego Garcia.

With Suez reopened, the Soviets will have a capability for rapid deployment of naval forces into the area. With the facilities they could draw on in a crisis, coupled with their rapidly growing capabilities for mobile logistics support, I do not think they would have great difficulty supporting an extensive force in the Indian Ocean.

In a similar fashion, our plans for the area are a product of our own interests and our perception of the growing strategic significance of the Indian Ocean area. This, coupled with the importance of our interests in the area, has led us to the conclusion that we must have at least the rudiments of a capability to support U.S. military forces in that part of the world.

I would add that the development of such capability provides tangible evidence of our concern for the security and stability of the region.

In summary, gentlemen, what we are proposing for Diego Garcia is primarily a capability for limited logistics support of forces that may be sent into the Indian Ocean in contingencies, or for periodic deployments. In this sense, it is a prudent precautionary move to insure that we have the capability to operate our forces in an area of increasing strategic importance to the United States and its allies.

Second, as I pointed out earlier, while Soviet activity adds to the rationale for Diego Garcia, that rationale would exist independently of anything the Soviets are doing. We have very important interests in the area. It has become a focal point of our foreign and economic policies and has a growing impact on our security.

Prudence would suggest that we provide support for our foreign policy by having a credible capability to deploy military power into the area. Such capability should contribute to the stability of the region over the long run.

Finally, the geopolitical asymmetries between the United States and the Soviet Union must be kept in mind in assessing the relative importance to the two countries of the capability to operate naval forces in the region.

ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET POSITION

The Soviet Union dominates the Eurasian landmass. It has borders with some key Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. Its land-based forces can already be brought to bear in the region.

The United States, on the other hand, can project its military power into the area only by sea and air, and over great distances.

The Soviet Union, in sum, has the geographical proximity necessary to influence events in the Indian Ocean littoral, without the employment of naval forces, if necessary. We do not. Limiting our capabilities to operate naval forces effectively in the region would not be in the United States interest, and would clearly put us at a disadvantage in the region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. SCHWEIKER.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, how much will the present proposal that is now before us ultimately cost when it is completed? I mean the complete package, not just what is earmarked for construction this year, but what is the total commitment that the Navy is suggesting for Diego Garcia?

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDS

Admiral ZUMWALT. In terms of the Naval construction funds required, \$29 million in the fiscal 1974 budget; the Air Force has budgeted in the 1975 budget for \$3.5 million, and we plan, the Navy, to ask for an additional \$5.5 million in fiscal year 1976. That would be the total military construction funds required to complete the facility.

There are, in addition, some minor operating and maintenance expenses that would be applicable to this area.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you envision other Naval support facilities such as a nuclear submarine base or other aircraft facilities being ultimately programmed into Diego Garcia beyond the present plans?

In other words, what potentially might we be talking about beyond the present plan?

CORRESPONDENCE

Admiral ZUMWALT. I have submitted a letter to Senator Stennis, which deals with that problem and which I will be happy to submit for the record of this committee, which states that our plans for the foreseeable future in the absence of any dramatic change in that region of the world would be limited to the plans which I have outlined in the next fiscal years, that is, 1974, 1975, and 1976.

[The letter follows:]

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your request for information on our total facilities plan for Diego Garcia, we propose a three-year program under Fiscal Years 1974 through 1976* to create the logistics support facilities required.

As you know, the FY 1974 Supplemental includes the major features of improving the logistic support facilities which include: 480,000 barrels of POL storage, a 750 foot POL/SUPPLY pier, extension of the runway to 12,000 feet and 65,000 square yards of parking apron. These improvements will be the primary facilities to permit a forward logistic support area for a deployed Naval Task Group in the Indian Ocean. In addition to these major facilities, the Supplemental requests funds for a small hangar, warehouse buildings, bachelor quarters for 32 officers and 277 enlisted men and the attendant expansion of utilities systems.

In support of its logistical requirements to Diego Garcia in FY 1975, USAF is requesting funds for an additional 160,000 barrels of POL storage, a small 25,000 square yard parking apron and open storage area.

Our plans for FY 1976 are to build primarily personnel support projects which are so very important to life on such a remote and isolated island. A list of the projects now being planned to complete the logistics support facilities is attached. Barring any major change in the military-political situation in the Indian Ocean, we do not foresee at this time a requirement for construction beyond these plans.

Sincerely,

Bud Zumwalt

E. R. ZUMWALT
Admiral, U.S. Navy

1976 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
(\$ THOUSANDS)

<u>Project</u>	<u>MILCON Estimate</u>
Corrosion Control Wash Rack	495
Crash Fire Station	422
Structural Fire Station	175
Aircraft Ready Issue Refueler	69
Shed Storage	329
Fleet Recreation Pavilion	363
Outdoor Recreation	218
Public Works Shops	1,209
Flammable Storage	144
Chapel Addition	40
Club Addition	335
Hobby Shop Addition	116
Navy Exchange Warehouse	290
Special Services Issue & Office	116
Theater	367
Library Addition	234
Education Center	310
	5,232

PEACETIME DEPLOYMENT CONSTRAINED

Senator SCHWEIKER. Now, if we do not go ahead with the plan you have proposed and limit it to the present level of operations there, what other arrangements will be made?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The impact would mean that with regard to a peacetime deployment situation we would be considerably constrained as we have found ourselves constrained during the recent Mideast crisis. That is, we were required to support ourselves from the Subic Bay base in the Philippines, a distance of 4,000 miles away, and this required almost all of the logistics replenishment ships available to the Navy in the Western Pacific and meant that we were so constrained that we lacked any real capability to support another contingency should it have come along in the Western Pacific at the same time.

Looked at another way, it means appreciably less time on station in the Indian Ocean during a given period of deployment with a given level of forces.

If one looks at the problem you face in the event of a wartime contingency, you have reduced considerably your ability to defend yourselves at sea by virtue of not being able to operate aircraft out of the airfield in Diego Garcia to protect the naval forces that would be there.

We also would give up some of the peacetime surveillance capability.

CARRIER FORCES

Senator SCHWEIKER. What carrier forces, if any, operate in that area, or have in the past, and how does that relate to the island?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Prior to the war in Southeast Asia, we operated carrier task forces periodically in the area. During the Southeast Asian war, we were not able to do so except that during the subcontinent war between India and Pakistan the President sent the nuclear carrier *Enterprise* and a task force down to show interest and help restore stability in that area.

Then, during this most recent Mideast crisis, again the President sent a carrier task force to the area and either a carrier task force or surface task force has been in the area most of the time since, as a result of that crisis.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Now, Admiral, why can't we continue to use, say, a nuclear carrier task force as opposed to these added facilities?

What differential is there here that is advantageous from the Navy's point of view that can't be covered by a nuclear carrier task force?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We believe we have demonstrated as a result of this crisis, and that is one of the reasons for the urgency in getting this funding, that we have so reduced our logistic replenishment capabilities in the Western Pacific in order to maintain forces in the Indian Ocean, that we have given up any real believable capability to react to another crisis.

Looked at another way, we are going to buy back the capability that it would take to give us equivalent onstation time and be able to support our other forces in the Pacific.

We think it is something on the order of \$400 million to \$1 billion over a period of years that it would take to do that in terms of alternative ship force levels to do the same job.

Looked at in another way, we think we can demonstrate that the money being spent for Diego Garcia is the equivalent of two-tenths of a carrier task force in terms of the addition to the on-station time that one can get. We feel, therefore, that it is important and urgent.

Senator SCHWEIKER. The reason I am asking these questions is that I recall in the Armed Services Committee that some of the justifications for nuclear subs and also for nuclear carriers was that we would have to rely less on overseas bases and that they would give us the modus operandi that we needed and not have to rely on overseas bases.

Having gone in both directions, we are coming back and using the other argument, as well, which seems somewhat contradistinctive.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think we have to go back and look at what we have done to ourselves over the last 5 years, to put this in context.

SHIP REDUCTION

We have given up 47 percent of the ships of the Navy in the last 5 years. We have reduced the number by that amount. We have the smallest number of ships in the Navy since 1939. We have given up something on the order of 22 to 24 percent of our naval aircraft over the last 5 years, in numbers.

Now, faced with those dramatic reductions in strength and in the face of a continuing growth of Soviet capability, it has been necessary for us to do several things. One of them is that the nuclear ships, to the extent we have them, do reduce to some extent the number of tankers one needs. They don't eliminate them completely because you still have aviation gas to provide and the conventional ships to support.

So, nuclear propulsion has helped reduce part of the serious nature of those reductions.

In addition, we have dropped from something on the order of 90 major naval, air and port facilities, to 65 overseas during that some period of time. But, with a very small amount of money invested in improvement of an already existing communications facility, we think it will be possible to regain the equivalent of two-tenths of a carrier task force, as we have dropped from 24 carriers down to 15 and are headed for 12.

I think that is a very cheap and important way to regain some important capability.

Senator SCHWEIKER. What equivalency are you gaining?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Two-tenths of a carrier task force is the value we think in terms of having that base there. That is, it would take an additional two-tenths of a carrier task force because of the extra time you have going all the way back to Subic Bay as opposed to just being able to support yourselves out of Diego Garcia.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Senator MANSFIELD. Senator Bellmon.

Senator BELLMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MAINTENANCE OF FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

Admiral, can you describe for the committee how the development of Diego Garcia is contemplated to maintain the freedom of the seas for our ships in this area?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Well, sir, we have always operated U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean going all the way back to the whaling days. The

Indians primarily, but other nations in that area, too, have talked about having a zone of peace in the area. We think this is a very dangerous concept until one reaches that era where nation states don't have problems with one another. It is the same as the NATO nations getting together and announcing that the North Atlantic is a NATO lake and keeping all other forces out of it.

The ability of the United States to maintain naval vessels in the Indian Ocean we think has demonstrably contributed to stabilizing the world order rather than destabilizing it. I think it shows the oil producing states in the area, the Iranians, Saudi Arabians, et cetera, who have tremendous amounts of oil, and that there is a source of friendly support available to them as they look at the very impressive infrastructure being installed by the Soviets in Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, and more and more around the area, and with the access they are getting to Singapore and other places.

We think that abdication of operations in this area, with or without the Soviet naval presence, with the tremendous capability of the Soviet Army and Air Force along the border of Iran and Afghanistan, would contribute to destabilizing a very important area of the world.

Senator BELLMON. Contribute to destabilization?

U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE ADVANTAGEOUS

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. That is, the nations which are basically friendly to us are likely over time to find themselves under Soviet military pressure just as those nations close to other borders of the Soviet Union today find themselves.

Senator BELLMON. Unless we do what?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Unless we have naval forces in the area capable of demonstrating that the United States is there to serve as a deterrent to more aggressive Soviet initiative.

Senator BELLMON. That is the point I am trying to get at.

How will Diego Garcia contribute to that demonstration?

Admiral ZUMWALT. It will make it possible in peacetime to maintain on the average a larger number of ships in the area and to maintain the surveillance necessary to insure that those ships are aware of what is going on around them by aircraft flying out of Diego Garcia, and it will make it possible to protect the ships better in wartime and to support them more easily in wartime, so that it adds to the total deterrent capability of the United States just as the Soviets have added to their impressive capability in the area by installing air and naval facilities in three nations on the Indian Ocean.

Senator BELLMON. These are nations that want to accord us the same privileges.

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. As a matter of fact, the story of how the Soviets gained influence in Somalia is one of the fascinating military-political stories of all time. It was a brilliant performance on the part of Soviet strategists.

Senator BELLMON. What is the situation in Singapore? How is it they have bunkering rights there and we don't?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We can have them if we can afford them, sir. We would be able to operate out of there in peacetime. The difficulty with Singapore is that, first, it is further away from the area we would

like to be in. The great virtue of Diego Garcia is that it is almost in the center of the Indian Ocean.

Second, we don't think it is wise for us to count on the Indian Ocean nations for support. Indeed, this movement into Diego Garcia, as I see it, is part of support of the general trend of the Nixon doctrine which suggests that we should rely less on overseas nations. We are relying on the use, in agreement with our closest allies, the British, of an unpopulated island in the center of the Indian Ocean 1,000 miles away from the nearest country, the lowest possible profile in contradistinction to the alternative of gambling on facilities in populated areas which might not be available to us.

Senator BELLMON. Admiral, without knowing all that is going on over there, the impression a lay person gets is that we are getting pushed out of the Indian Ocean, but we are hanging on by our fingertips by developing Diego Garcia.

DESIRABLE LOCATION

Now, is Diego Garcia really a desirable site for this kind of development, or is it the only available site?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Diego Garcia is a desirable location. It puts our base astern of our offensive power where we can protect the base and be supported by it.

If our bases were up in the nations of the Indian Ocean littoral, in addition to the political disadvantage of which I have spoken, we would have our base in front of our military power, and that is not a very comfortable place to have one based.

Senator BELLMON. Do you feel this base could be held against an adversary?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe, sir, that the power of the U.S. Navy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is in a very grim situation today. I believe, however, that the facilities in Diego Garcia will enhance our power and make us more nearly able to handle an adversary in the Indian Ocean.

I believe that the loss of Diego Garcia in any kind of struggle would be of such minor nature in comparison to the very serious nature of the situation that would have led to that loss; namely, the loss of ships, the overrunning of friendly countries, that it is de minimis in terms of the country's interest.

Senator BELLMON. So, from the strategic standpoint, then, you, representing the Navy, feel that Diego Garcia is something that will serve our purposes well?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, I do. It is buying back very cheaply some of our urgently needed capability.

Senator BELLMON. In your statement on page 8, you refer to your perception of the growing strategic significance of the Indian Ocean area. Could you be more specific? What is the growing strategic significance of this area? It seems to me there is very little of strategic value in that part of the world.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Well, sir, there are two things I will stress: First, the resources. The oil is the primary one, but there are others.

Japan today acquires 90 percent of her oil from the Persian Gulf,

requiring a line of supertankers every 40 miles, 24 hours around the clock, headed for Japan.

For Europe, it is 45 to 50 percent.

At the time of the embargo, we were getting 10 to 15 percent of ours. In the absence of a heroic program domestically in the years ahead, we estimate that by 1980, 50 percent of ours will come from the Persian Gulf.

CRITICALLY IMPORTANT AREA

So, it is an area of critical importance, as much to us from the standpoint of resources as it is to our allies. This is one of the reasons that the British have been working with us on the base of Diego Garcia.

From a political context, there are very important nations in the area and highly populated nations which are going to be subject in the years ahead to Soviet pressures just as other nations have been in the past if they do not see an alternative in terms of U.S. presence there.

It seems to me that is of vital interest to us.

Senator BELLMON. From what you have said, then, the purpose of this base is primarily to help maintain access of the free world to the Persian Gulf oil?

Admiral ZUMWALT. In terms of resources; yes, sir.

In terms of the political situation, I think that protection of U.S. interests and showing the flag in support of our allies, are of equal importance.

Of striking interest to me is that the Soviets have far less interest, far less of a vital requirement for the resources there. They have some fishing, but they can fish in many of the oceans of the world. They don't need the energy; they are self-sufficient. Yet, they have installed an infrastructure around the Indian Ocean that I wouldn't know how to use unless I were planning to make a major surge with the large Soviet fleet and declare war. We couldn't use all the facilities that they have.

Senator BELLMON. It seems to me it is impossible to understand their purpose.

Admiral ZUMWALT. The purpose is very clear, sir. They believe in the use of military power, to convert that to political influence, and to marry a combination of political and military pressures in such a way that they can gradually shift the balance of power, prevail on regimes which are neutral to tilt in their direction, erode them, radicalize them, and change the world to one more nearly in their image, hopefully as peacefully as they can.

Senator BELLMON. I am not sure I understand how Diego Garcia will help avoid that eventuality.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Diego Garcia will make it possible for us to maintain on the average more ships in the area, demonstrating our capability in coming to the assistance of our allies, and it will make it possible for us to show more capability available in the event of war which will therefore contribute, in my judgment, to deterring the

Soviets from the more aggressive actions that they might otherwise be inclined to take.

Senator BELLMON. I can't speak for any other Members of Congress, but I am of the opinion that there may be some concern in the Senate at least that our involvement here may lead to something not too different from what we finally got into in South Vietnam.

POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Do you see the likelihood or any danger that our development of Diego Garcia may lead to other types of military involvement?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. I would think it is more likely to be a situation where, through failure to take action, we will see a situation more similar to what happened in Europe prior to World War II when the free world failed to take action. In other words, there are very important vital interests at stake here to both sides and the failure of the United States to do the minimum necessary will, I think tend to encourage the Soviets to be more aggressive with regard to their foreign policy.

I am not suggesting that they would declare war. I think they can accomplish their ends by just a combination of the carrot and the stick in the absence of our capability in the area.

Senator BELLMON. There are some of us who might feel that it might be a good thing if we let the Soviets worry about some of the problems in the area.

For instance, what will happen this year if there is a major shortfall of food in India? Will it be their problem to deal with or will it be ours?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Of course, you are getting beyond my proper sphere.

I am sure the United States will, in its humanitarian way, be inclined to come to their assistance and the Soviets who are seeking to enhance their presence in India will certainly do so. After all, the Soviets built a huge new naval base on the east coast of the continent for the Indians. They would want to protect that investment.

Senator BELLMON. It seems to me that we recently assumed a \$2 billion debt by the Indians for food that they received under Public Law 480.

I am assuming that we will have trouble again because we seem to be the only place in the world where there is possibility of food reserves.

I have a hard time seeing why we need to continue as their angel when they are in trouble; yet, when our interests are at stake, they seem to have no interest in coming to our support.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator, I have no position to take on that.

I am concerned about the need for Diego Garcia for other reasons, not for Indian policy.

I should mention that in my view it is a very important factor in regard to our ability to stabilize the Middle East insofar as the Arab-Israel confrontation is concerned. That is the reason why a carrier task force was sent to that area.

Senator BELLMON. One final question.

EXPANDED CAPABILITY

In your final paragraph you say limiting our capability to operate naval forces in the region will not be in the U.S. interest.

Do you feel that Diego Garcia, as small as it is and as remote as it is, would materially enhance our capabilities to operate naval forces?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. There is no question that that is technically correct. It is for the same reason that the Soviets have striven so hard to have naval and air facilities in at least three different nations of the Indian Ocean. Their military people feel exactly the same way and they are ahead of us.

Senator BELLMON. You will have available reserves of fuel and you will have the capability to operate aircraft?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator BELLMON. There will be some repair facilities, I take it.

Admiral ZUMWALT. There will be just a shed or two that will permit some very minor repairs for aircraft and an extension of a pier will make it possible to tie up destroyers so that they can do minor self-repairs. There will not be a major repair facility there.

Senator BELLMON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MANSFIELD. Senator Tower?

Senator Tower. Admiral, on page 5 of your testimony you envisage the construction of additional personnel quarters to accommodate a total of 609 people, yet, your authorized base component is 274.

What is the reason for that?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The present base complement is 274 to support the austere communications facility. This total of about 600 would then take care of the addition of about 300 personnel that would be necessary to support the additional facilities that will be installed there, an additional runway, the additional recreational facilities that will be there for the ship personnel; that kind of thing. It is a very modest number.

Senator Tower. You didn't mention Malacca Straits.

Aren't they a vital choke point in the world sea lanes?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; they certainly are.

Senator Tower. That would also be a reason for maintaining our presence there.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. It permits us to operate and be supported on the west side of the Malacca Straits just as does Subic Bay on the east side.

Senator Tower. In the late 1960's, the United Kingdom initiated a policy of withdrawal from that area east to Hong Kong.

REVERSAL OF BRITISH POSITION

In 1970, that position was reversed by the British Government with limited deployment of U.K. vessels in the Indian Ocean. That is the result of recognition by United Kingdom that their best interests in the area and ours would now be somewhat similar.

Admiral ZUMWALT. In our judgment, it is, sir.

The British military with whom I have contact tell me that their political masters have been awakened to the great strategic significance of the Indian Ocean and the oil that is there and that this has contributed to a change in the policy.

Senator TOWER. You see nothing yet to suggest that the current Labor government is going to change that policy which was established by the Conservatives in 1970, 1971?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I have not, sir.

Senator TOWER. Actually, the decision to deploy Naval forces in the Indian Ocean would stem from policy. I would assume that a policy of deployment would result from a finding on our part that it is in the American national interest to maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, regardless of what we do on Diego Garcia, that is not going to alter the fact that it is in our national interest to maintain a presence there and our policy to deploy from time to time there.

It is simply if we should refuse your request on Diego Garcia it would inhibit us in the implementation of policy and make it more costly to make these deployments; is that correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is correct. It would make it most costly and we would be in somewhat more danger.

Senator Tower. From the standpoint of a negotiation position, it has been suggested that we try to negotiate with the Soviets a limitation of naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

If you were called on to be, let us say, the naval adviser to a negotiating team on this matter, would you consider it essential for us to have a strong negotiating position for the bilateral resumption of naval forces in the Indian Ocean that we have such a facility as Diego Garcia and conceive of the Russians even talking to us about it if we didn't have?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir; I don't see them talking to us about it in any serious way.

I can see their giving little tidbits to delay our progress in this area. However, if I were Admiral Gorshkov, I think that what I would say to my civilian masters in the Presidium would be "It is to your advantage if you can negotiate the kind of deal in which the United States removes its Navy and doesn't construct facilities on Diego Garcia while we withdraw our ships for the following reasons: First, we already have facilities in three countries down there. All we have to do is move back in and they won't have theirs."

"Second, if neither Navy is down there, we are better off because we have our Army and Air Force operating north of the borders of these countries and we can really lean on them without any United States countercapabilities." So the answer to your question, Senator, is that even for the negotiations you have suggested, we would be better off to have completed the facilities at Diego Garcia.

Senator Tower. I believe that is all I have, Admiral.
Thank you.

Senator MANSFIELD. Senator McGee.

Senator McGEE. I am here mostly to listen, Mr. Chairman, because I am very much interested in Diego Garcia and the looming developments in the Indian Ocean area.

I am not a member of the subcommittee, only of the full committee, but I do appreciate the courtesy.

CRITICS OF CHANGE

The flak that I get the most, Admiral, from many sources, not only here at home but in that area of the world, as I have visited there, is that if we proceed into the Indian Ocean it will transfer the arena of power politics which has been dominant in Western Europe and in East Asia, Southeast Asia, in the Middle East, into the Indian Ocean where it is asserted the forces and the influences of power politics are currently absent.

What would you say to those critics?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Well, sir, I would say that they are not keeping their eye on the main development which is, and it could not have been articulated better than articulated by General Steinhoff who is a German Air Force General and former German Chief of Air Staff, who has had to worry about the threat in the center of Europe and has been working as the senior military man in NATO for a number of years and who in a major speech recently said that in his judgment, "The Soviet naval rearming is the most important military development in the second half of the century and could help to achieve political goals without the use of force by demonstrating strength and presence."

Here is a man who has had to concentrate on the center all these years who can see what is happening to us.

George Kennan has said in an article a number of months ago that this Soviet effort to overtake the maritime capability of the West strikes him as the most dangerous thing since the Germans sought to do it prior to World War I to the British. That is happening before our eyes.

If present trends continue, it is absolutely inevitable that we will lack the capability to control and use the seas. That perception will be in the eyes of our allies and in the eyes of the Russians, as well as in our own eyes. This is one of a series of fairly low-cost ways of beginning to do something about that trend.

Senator McGEE. It seems to me that that point is the real gut question here, that with all of our concern in those very troubled days after World War II for air power and nuclear strike capability and this sort of thing, that we took for granted the overwhelming preponderance of our naval capability which was a part of that total calculation and that as we have focused on air power and its equivalents and on the balance in Western Europe, we have been present at and witnessing, even though we did precious little about it, a very shrewd, quiet, and effective Soviet expansion of its capabilities.

WORLD IS STILL ROUND

I think we tend to forget that the world is round; it is not flat; you can't cut it in half. There are still those who try to, I must say, or argue that way. They argue one way in Western Europe and something else in eastern Arabia. But it is still a round world. What holds it together is the total, not an obsession in one area.

I think this is one of the most relative and realistic aspects of this whole question because it is so far away from us, because it is not very glamorous we pay so little attention to it.

I am thinking now of the public opinion and people who write letters about it and ask me questions about it and that sort of thing.

Yet, what czar in Russian history couldn't be drooling now at what the commissars have succeeded in achieving? A window on the west, access to the Dardanelles, a naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean that is very real, the Red Sea.

When I was off Cape Horn a couple years ago, there was a Soviet squadron of four vessels. It had nothing to do with my happening to be there but it was impressive to me. Mike Rexroad was there at the time. We weren't looking for Russians. There they were. They were very peaceable then but it was, nonetheless, very impressive.

It is that sort of thing that I think requires us in the Congress to focus some of our attention and priorities. That is why I think these questions are so very relevant.

I wish you could add to your quote from the German General a quote from a German Admiral from World War II whom I used to quote. I haven't been in this for so long that I have forgotten his name now, who made the key point that even as Germany and Japan had hoped to coordinate their efforts in World War II, their fatal error was when they failed to preserve the link between the Pacific and the Atlantic, that that became their ultimate vulnerability in terms of coordination.

That is why it is important that we try to come up with wise answers here.

I think this at least is pointed in that direction. I am not sure that this is all but I am impressed that the chances are this will be cheaper and less risky if it is undertaken without delay than if we were to wait to see for sure that it is going to be serious enough to concern ourselves with. That is one of the mistakes that we often make. Yet, I would not want to be one of those who would be guilty of simply provoking through sheer paranoia some kind of reckless, irresponsible arms race in a new area of the world. You can't resolve that one in very clean-cut terms, as I see it, at any given time when you have to make the decision by Tuesday or by July 1 or by 1974.

I don't see that this does any more than protect our options on a quid pro basis, without aggravating a situation that doesn't already exist, that is not already there, except that it has been largely unilateral.

As I recall it, I have been involved with the African question a good bit on the Foreign Relations Committee and was chairman of

that area for a number of years. We always ran into the fact, whenever we were in Eastern Africa or along the Indian Ocean, the inroads that the Soviets were succeeding in establishing in Somali or getting in the way of ship privileges in Mauritius, 1,500 miles off the coast out in the Indian Ocean. That was always thrown up in our face.

PERPLEXING DILEMMA

When we participated in some of the British Empire conferences on this very question, this was the old static we would get about where you could draw the lines between meddling or throwing your weight around, flaunting power on the one hand and trying on the other hand to make more subtle injections in the way of maintaining a balance of presence that hopefully would keep it all in the lowest key.

This is, very frankly, a perplexing dilemma that we are in. I do think that this is certainly minimal.

Senator TOWER. Would the gentleman yield for a question?

Senator McGEE. Yes.

Senator TOWER. What the Senator is suggesting is that it could not conceivably be considered a provocative act, considering the Soviet posture in that area of the world, for us to maintain our presence in Diego Garcia. We are already there; we are just upgrading slightly what we have.

Senator McGEE. I am sure it will be interpreted as a provocative gesture because I have been listening to it on the floor of the Senate.

I am not sure it will be interpreted a provocative gesture on the part of the nations now in the area. There is no rational way to interpret it that way. That is the way it looks to me. Irrational is anything that disagrees with my position, you see. I don't see that.

In any case, I think it is the kind of low profile calculated risk that we would be unwise to avoid taking on at this time in the light of developments, particularly in the last year, the obvious new presence that will be required whether we like it or not in the Red Sea, in the Persian Gulf, aside from its historical global implications.

I just think there is no other way that we can fit those pieces together. We can't throw it out of the world. It would be nice if we could. We always try it. That is our first step.

We seem to imagine that this can just go away and maybe can be swallole. up. But it is there, I would we have to be realistic about it.

Senator TOWER. I associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Wyoming.

Senator McGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR M'GEE

Senator MANSFIELD. I have received a statement from Senator McGee which I will insert in the record at this point.

[The statement follows:]

Mr. Chairman, I did not intend to make a statement for the record of these hearings. However, as you are well aware, I have been deeply interested in the Indian Ocean area in recent years, not only in my previous role as Chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, but also because of my concern for preserving some reasonable chance for peace in what remains essentially a bipolar world. After listening with great interest to many of the comments made during the course of these deliberations this morning, I decided to submit my views on the Administration request for \$29 million in construction funds to upgrade air and naval facilities at Diego Garcia. I want to thank the members of the Military Construction Subcommittee, and particularly the Chairman, for extending me this courtesy.

During the course of comments this morning, it seems to me there has been a tendency to focus on two aspects of world politics which appear to be off the mark in regard to the present realities in the Indian Ocean. The first is the repeated reference to the SALT talks and the balance of nuclear capability between the Soviets and the United States. Whatever the status of this balance--or imbalance--the discussion misses the point of what is happening in the Indian Ocean. The second focuses on the question of whether the Administration request for funds to expand facilities on Diego Garcia will generate an arms race in the Indian Ocean.

The popular phrase, "balance of terror," has tended to trap--like flies to fly paper--so much of our thinking in the intellectual cement of nuclear capability or balance. Although the balance of terror has been achieved, we have found ourselves ignoring the very significant area of conventional balance.

The increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean demonstrates the reality of the two-tiered nature of balance of power politics in a nuclear age. On the one hand; there is the fact of the nuclear capability of the world's two superpowers. On the other hand, the old-fashioned and out-moded instruments of war have, once again, become instruments of power politics. The presence of a naval squadron of either superpower in what was once a vacuum in international power politics is a reality which cannot be ignored.

As an illustration of my point, I need only remind my colleagues that even as the Soviets were contained after World War II by the NATO pact in Western Europe and the ultimate capability of the United States to develop a nuclear strike

force sufficient to deter Russia from reckless adventures in the West, Moscow proceeded to break through in non-nuclear areas. In the process, the Soviets gained a new posture of strength in the world balance by exploiting the older instruments of war--namely, submarines, surface vessels and the diplomatic clout which flows from this extension of political influence. Having achieved a nuclear balance with the United States, the continued conventional, expansionist policies of the Soviets cannot be ignored.

It is evident there is opposition to the Administration request to counter the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. It is also evident that the preponderant superiority of the U. S. nuclear capability for so many years after World War II has caused us to lose sight of the importance of areas of the globe which did not become the center for possible nuclear confrontations but which, nonetheless, remained a part of the conventional balance which could dramatically influence international stability.

I mention these developments in order to stress there are two levels of power capabilities to which the United States needs to once again address itself. When we discuss the Indian Ocean, we are not talking about nuclear capabilities. We are talking about the conventional facet of power politics and Diego Garcia is a response to this reality.

It must be noted that while the Indian Ocean, since World War II, has been a vacuum in the bipolar relationship between the U. S. and Soviet Russia, it remains one of the vital lifelines of world commerce; and therefore, is a key element in international politics.

Much of the testimony offered this morning contended there was no overriding evidence that the Soviets were attempting to exercise a power role in the Indian Ocean. On the face of it, this would seem a compelling and reasonable argument. However, there also was no overriding evidence the Soviets were attempting to play a power role when they initially sent a handful of ships into the eastern Mediterranean. Today, they have acquired a stance and presence in the Mediterranean beyond the fondest imagination of the Czars. Their presence is felt in the Middle East and they have expanded into the Red Sea. Now, they are moving, unimpeded, into the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia represents a check to this expansion. The history of Soviet conduct, and Russian conduct before the Commissars, indicates such expansionist tendencies can be stopped if checked. However, the Soviets are

also aware that time is on their side--all they have to do is wait for a quiet period when a Senate Committee caves in. Once again, they will be on the move.

It has been asserted in the hearings today that the Administration's request can only promote an arms race in the Indian Ocean. Granted it takes two to make an arms race, but it also takes two to balance the power capabilities of each in order to avoid a serious confrontation in the future if that balance is not struck immediately. We might reflect upon what the course of events prior to World War II would have been, had there been a balance to the military buildup in Hitler's Germany. The consequence of failing to match such a buildup is to submit to the domination of one power in an area of the globe. Surely history has taught us the pitfalls of allowing any one nation to become so dominate.

One would ask how this is applicable to the Indian Ocean. It is applicable because the Soviets are already in the Indian Ocean in a very meaningful way. It falls on our shoulders to neutralize this presence to avoid not only a political domination of the Indian Ocean, but also to avert a weakening of our bargaining position on any number of international issues involving U. S.-Soviet negotiation.

While we are worried about an arms race in the old-fashioned sense, this is not the type of arms race which is threatened in the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia represents a quest for a kind of balance in capabilities which protects the present political atmosphere in the area. Yet, even the threat of a unilateral presence of the Soviets in the Indian Ocean cannot help but have an influence on the direction of governments bordering on that region of the world. A U. S. presence to match a soviet buildup would involve a very small price and marginal risk, compared to the considerable potential risk in not neutralizing this presence.

As to the sentiments of the international community on this matter, I am convinced that most nations would rather both the Soviets and the U. S. stay out of the Indian Ocean. I would agree that this would be the most desirable situation. However, the Soviets demonstrate no inclination to withdraw and it is doubtful they will until checked effectively by a U. S. presence. Therefore, as in the case of NATO, the Truman Doctrine in southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean following World War II, it is important that such a vital area not be abandoned to the sole presence of naval units of one of the two great powers. And that is why, in my judgment, the United States needs to expand air and naval facilities on Diego Garcia.

U.S. VITAL INTERESTS

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, we went into Indo-China to fill a vacuum as the French withdraw and we are evidently going into the Indian Ocean to fill a vacuum because the British have withdrawn.

Is that correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, I see quite a difference in my own mind. I was one of those who did not favor going into Southeast Asia at the time. I didn't see United States vital interests at stake at the time of the original decision.

In regard to the Indian Ocean, I don't see it as related so much to the removal of the British, although the Russians apparently did because they moved in and took advantage of the British withdrawal. But I do see it as a requirement to support our own U.S. vital interests.

Senator MANSFIELD. It is a fact, is it not, that when the British began their withdrawal from Singapore westward that it was primarily a British preserve as far as protection was concerned?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. I assume there were some French there when they had control of the Pondicherry area in India, as well as their holdings in Indo-China.

You mentioned our main interest in going in in addition to showing the flag, protecting our interests, we are tied to the oil in the Midwest, the opening of the Suez Canal.

Is it true that when the embargo was first imposed by the Arab countries the western oil companies, all of which I believe had American interests, that at least one of them was forbidden to sell oil to the Navy?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe that is accurate; yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. I think the oil companies have admitted that. They had no choice and that is understandable.

Now, as far as the Red Sea is concerned, who is willing to open up the Red Sea? Who is going to open up the Red Sea, the Suez Canal?

UNITED STATES AND EGYPT TO OPEN CANAL

Admiral ZUMWALT. The Egyptians, assisted by United States minesweeping. The United States and British personnel are going to train the Egyptians to do the ordnance demolition. An American-owned dredging company probably will salvage the sunken ships there under contract to the Suez authority.

Senator MANSFIELD. The U.S. Navy will play a very prominent part in clearing the canal.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

The mine-sweeping helicopters will be manned by us and the training of the Egyptians will be done by us.

Senator MANSFIELD. How much do you think that is going to cost this country?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The Navy expenses will be on the order of \$8.5 million.

The Army will also have some expenditures of probably somewhat less and the Air Force will have some, I think somewhat less.

Senator MANSFIELD. I would assume that what we are doing in opening up the Suez is probably part of the price that we are paying for bringing a degree of stability to the Middle East.

When the Suez Canal is opened, that will allow for passage of Soviet ships down into the Indian Ocean.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Will it also allow for passage of ships of the 6th Fleet down in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral ZUMWALT. None of the carriers which are assigned to the 6th Fleet can get through the Suez Canal at its present dimension.

Senator MANSFIELD. You have cruisers?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Destroyers?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

I would be reluctant in a Mideast crisis to use the Suez Canal for any of them. I would prefer sending them around.

Senator MANSFIELD. At the present time, the Soviet Union, sends its ships from Vladivostok.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Most of the time from Vladivostok; yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. If the Navy has been reduced as much as you have indicated, why do you want to stretch out what we have left and establish a base of far more importance than a communications center at Diego Garcia?

Admiral ZUMWALT. It relates in part to the questions you have been asking about the Suez.

We have this general problem of a diminishing U.S. Navy facing a rapidly growing, qualitatively improving Soviet Navy and the U.S. Navy having to be available to support U.S. interests in key areas of the world wherever they are.

IMPROVED U.S. POSITION

Now, Soviet military capability in the Indian Ocean will be enhanced by the opening of the Suez Canal. We need to be able to react to it. One could ask why, therefore, are we helping to open the Suez Canal. I think there is an intelligent foreign policy reason for that, as you have suggested, that is, by virtue of cooperation with the Egyptians we may very well see such a diminishment of the Soviet influence that they will no longer have access to the ports and air fields of Egypt. This will improve our position in the Mediterranean.

The Diego Garcia investment helps to deal with the increased capability in the Indian Ocean while the investment for peace with regard to Suez may diminish the threat against us in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Senator MANSFIELD. You don't think that going into Diego Garcia in this new, very substantial basis will tend to bring about a Naval race in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. I think that the Soviet military must have viewed our failure to do so up until now with some contempt and must be urging their masters to exploit opportunities not only in that area but opportunities from a perception they see of unwillingness on the part of the United States to support its vital interests.

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, what Indian Ocean countries support our stepping up our activities at Diego Garcia?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Well, sir, I think the final position on this ought to come from State but I have made my own layman's count of some 30 or so nations in Africa and Asia which have taken a position on this. I can only count about six who in every way seem to be sending vibrations of negativism, publicly and privately. The others include a number who have given no reaction either publicly or privately, or who have publicly remonstrated and privately said "Go to it."

So, I put the number who really have no pain with it much greater than those who do.

ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT BY INDIAN OCEAN NATIONS

Senator MANSFIELD. Could you name the Indian Ocean countries who have stated they publicly favor our moving into Diego Garcia?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, if I could, I would prefer to do that in executive session.

Senator MANSFIELD. I think it is a matter of public record, though, that certain countries have indicated they would not like this zone of peace; among them are allies of Australia, New Zealand. I believe one African country, Madagascar, very close by, has indicated that it did not approve, and I believe India; perhaps there may be others, but we will try to get a list of those both pro and con for the record if they said it publicly.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Abu Dhabi. No public or private comment.

Australia. Press reaction has been largely critical, with some balanced exceptions.

Bangladesh. Press reaction has been critical.

Burma. There has been no significant press commentary.

Ethiopia. No editorials, and very little press reporting, mostly of a factual, non-polemical quality.

India. Prime Minister Ghandi and Foreign Minister Singh have been critical of the US Diego Garcia proposals, both publicly and privately. They have called for restraint by both the Soviet Union and the US, and strongly supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone. Press coverage has been more or less uniformly critical.

Indonesia. Press editorials have called for an Indian Ocean free from rivalry among the Great Powers, and supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone.

Iran. Press reaction has been balanced, but expressed the desire that a great power arms race in the area be avoided.

Kenya: Editorials have called for an Indian Ocean free from great power arms races. The press has deplored expansion of the Diego Garcia facilities.

Kuwait: No public or private reaction to our Diego Garcia proposals.

Malagasy: Press reporting has been on the whole negative, but has noted that it was the US which moved after the Soviet presence became apparent.

Malaysia: Press reaction has been unfavorable.

Mauritius: Press and political reaction has been critical.

Oman: No public or official comment in Oman.

New Zealand: Press reaction has been modest and balanced.

Pakistan: Press reporting has been balanced.

Pdrly: No press or official reaction.

Saudi Arabia: No press reaction.

Singapore: Press reaction has been balanced.

Somalia: Press reporting has been critical, but restrained.

South Africa: Balanced reporting in the press, occasional editorials welcoming the decision of the US to maintain a presence there as long as the Soviet Union has decided to do so.

Tanzania: Press reporting has been a bit negative, although mentioning Soviet presence.

Thailand: Press reaction has been critical both of US Diego Garcia proposals and of the Thai involvement in them (use of Thai facilities for staging to

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Admiral ZUMWALT. The information that ought to be given in executive session is which ones privately are saying they don't mean it.

Senator MANSFIELD. We will do that in executive session. It is very interesting because it is hard to understand that some country is making public statements and then saying that they are not in favor of what we are doing, privately.

Admiral, in fiscal year 1970, calendar year 1969, the Congress turned down appropriations substantially the same as you are asking now for a U.S. Naval operating base on Diego Garcia. The following year the Congress did approve a communications station with the understanding that an operating or supply base would not be built on Diego Garcia.

What conditions, in addition to those which you have mentioned already, have changed since then that make it imperative that the Congress rush into approving a policy once turned down by the Congress with such haste in this supplemental appropriation bill?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, I think the conditions that have changed are: First, the fact that we now see on the ground Soviet-built real estate and Soviet facilities being used in three countries in the Indian Ocean area; second, we have just had ourselves quite a scare, I will say, as a naval man, with regard to maintaining the forces that we had to deploy in support of foreign policy in the Indian Ocean and have seen how very naked we are in regard to any logistics ship capability in the Western Pacific while doing that; and third, we have learned as a result of the recent crisis that the Suez Canal is going to be opened fairly soon and we need therefore to be able to counterbalance that.

Finally, we found that it was a very near thing as to whether or not we were going to have access to enough facilities through the Mediterranean across the direct route to airlift reinforcements to the Israelis to prevent them from being overrun, and an alternative route may very well be an important contingency capability to have.

So there are several reasons why I think it is properly judged an urgent thing from a military and foreign policy standpoint.

Senator MANSFIELD. The two task forces in the Indian Ocean which you were referring to, I assume one was the task force sent at the time of the Bangladesh-Indian-Pakistan war.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And the second was last fall at the time of the Mideast crisis?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Why was this request of \$29 million placed in the supplemental appropriation bill and not in the fiscal year 1975 appropriation bill?

You have known for a long time that the Navy has wanted to have an operational base Diego Garcia.

NEED FOR SUPPLEMENTAL

Please explain to this committee the national emergency that exists that makes it necessary that the money be appropriated in this sup-

plemental appropriation bill. It is my understanding that the supplemental appropriations are made because the situation cannot wait until the regular appropriation bill is enacted by the Congress.

It is hard to see what the emergency is for appropriating this money for Diego Garcia out of the regular order.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, I think unanimously the Defense Establishment and the executive branch felt that there has been a very clear-cut case for saving the 6 to 8 months that would be saved by going in the 1974 supplemental instead of the 1975 budget.

The urgency of being able to react to the opening of the Suez, the concern generated by virtue of the fact that we had only one airlift route to Israel and ought to have a second, and even more importantly, the fact that we found we were quite naked with regard to logistics support forces when we peeled off what it took to support from Subic Bay, 4,000 miles, to the Indian Ocean task force.

For these three reasons, we felt that urgency was great, and that saving 6 to 8 months would have justified going the supplemental route.

Senator MANSFIELD. Oil, Suez, and a new air route to the Middle East.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Opening of the Suez, alternative airlift route, and the capability to support logistics task forces in the Indian Ocean while having enough to react to any other problem.

In other words, we have learned in this crisis that we have just cut our Navy too deeply to be able to support foreign policy, and this is one way rapidly to recover from that fact in part.

Senator MANSFIELD. Even with the withdrawal of a large element from the South China Seas with the ending of the war in Indo-China?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. Those forces were capable of being supported, with the three-carrier task forces out there. They can be supported with a smaller number of logistics ships when they are in the Western Pacific because they are closer to bases than when we send them 4,000 miles away into the Indian Ocean.

COST TO TAXPAYERS

Senator MANSFIELD. Considering the Navy's future plans to operate a task force in the Indian Ocean, what would be the cost to the American taxpayers to carry out this mission of the Navy's operation in the Indian Ocean?

I would like to have a breakdown of the cost per year; I mean the complete cost, operating ships, communications stations, and so forth. I do not mean the term which I have seen used in a number of hearings before the Congress of so-called "taking it out of the Navy's hide." I mean the actual cost.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, I will provide that.

May I also provide an estimate of the costs to the taxpayer if we lack the deterrence in the area and must recapture, as a result, a war capability?

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed.

One that you can pretty well estimate. The other you would have to guesstimate, I believe.

[The information follows:]

Admiral Zumwalt. First of all Mr. Chairman, in order to respond to your question in terms of the cost to the American taxpayer to carry out the Navy's mission of maintaining a presence in support of allies in the Indian Ocean, I have computed the annual costs for operating the Diego Garcia installation (both communication station and logistic facilities) and the incremental costs that would be associated with operating an Indian Ocean Naval Task Force on a continuous basis. The incremental costs do not include the cost of operating the carrier task group but only the expense of the additional logistics supply ships required to sustain the longer pipeline. Additionally, I have made a comparison of the operating costs that would be experienced without the logistics facility at Diego Garcia.

A key point to bear in mind with Diego Garcia is that as a logistics facility it gives the National Command Authority a surge capacity for up to 30 days of intensive operations by a Carrier Task Group in an Indian Ocean crisis situation without concern for the establishment of an adequate logistic pipeline. This substantial degree of added flexibility should be considered as a primary benefit that accrues from the Diego Garcia expansion.

These operating costs contained in the table below are based on actual experience to date given several key assumptions:

1. The Indian Ocean Force consists of an aircraft carrier with escorts and is provided by the Seventh Fleet.
2. Subic Bay, Philippines is the nearest support base.
3. With a logistic facility at Diego Garcia the task group could sustain operations with the support of one AOE and 3 chartered MSC tankers, plus three stores/ammo ships.
4. Without a logistic facility at Diego Garcia the task group would require nine logistics supply ships to sustain operations.
5. Tempo of operations is maintained at the level currently being experienced by deployed ships.

Based on these assumptions the following table displays the incremental costs involved with and without the logistics facility at Diego Garcia.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Annual Operating Costs (Indian Ocean)</u> (\$ Millions)	
	<u>With Logistics Facility</u>	<u>Without Logistics Facility</u>
DIEGO GARCIA		
Operations	2.53	1.93
Personnel	3.96	3.36
LOGISTIC SUPPORT		
Incremental Transiting Fuel for Logistics Ships	2.46	8.79
Incremental Maintenance for Logistic Ships	2.95	9.43
Incremental Fuel for Additional Logistic Ships Deployed	0.42	1.40
Incremental Maintenance for Additional Logistic Ships Deployed	1.15	6.23
Additional MSC Tanker Charter	<u>11.90</u>	<u>0</u>
	25.37	31.14

I would like to address the second point, the cost if we lack a deterrent in the area, in the context of a crisis situation in the Indian Ocean similar to the October 1973 crisis in the Middle East. If we assume that the Soviets would augment their forces substantially, this could be done quickly through the soon to be reopened Suez Canal, from their Black Sea Fleet. I should think they would send a force comparable to the 96 ships that were assembled in the Med last year drawing reinforcements from the Northern Fleet as well.

Given that the U.S. were denied the use of the Suez, Pacific Fleet units would be required to counter this force. For the United States to respond as we did in the Med we would take about half of the warships in the Pacific Fleet. A commitment of this size while possible would cause a dangerous vacuum in U.S. presence throughout the Western Pacific region.

Thus, in such an extended crisis situation we could see an annual incremental expenditure rate double or triple that given above. The cost of a war time recapture situation brought on by a lack of deterrence is virtually inestimable, not only in terms of dollars but also in terms of lives lost and the crucial strategic setback inflicted thereby upon the Free World.

SOVIET CAPABILITY

Senator MANSFIELD. What is the present capability of the present Soviet Naval base in the Indian Ocean? From what land bases are they operating?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Their capability is right now about 30 naval ships as opposed to our roughly 10. Of those 30, 10 are combatant men of war.

I have on this slide a diagram of the way in which they have used those. You can see that in terms of ship-days per year and I will be the first to concede this is only one very inadequate measure of capability; the United States has remained generally constant at 2,000 ship-days per year level while the Soviets have overtaken us in 1967 and have gone on to a level of nearly four times ours.

They also have overtaken us with regard to the number of ports visited each year.

They are operating out of the very fine naval facility they have helped construct in Berbera, Somali, Aden in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Umm Qasr in Iraq.

In addition, they are supported by bunkering facilities in a host of other places.

They have a most impressive infrastructure—far, far superior to that of the United States.

Senator MANSFIELD. Were a sizable number of those ship-days used in clearing the harbor at Chittagong?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The part from the latter part of 1972 on has some element as a result of the sweeping of Bangladesh.

Incidentally, they have a little private facility they have constructed for themselves there. They have taken 10 times longer to do that job than we did at Haiphong and give every evidence of seeing it as a way of hanging on and having presence in still a fourth country.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Are you including nuclear ships in the ship-days?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That is our subs and their subs?

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is correct; in the Indian Ocean.

Senator MANSFIELD. What would you say is the capability of these bases that the Soviets operate?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would say the facilities in Somali are far superior to Diego Garcia.

The ones in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen are superior.

The ones in Iraq, the airfields are superior; the port is probably about the same, and it is not quite as well located in terms of geopolitical requirement.

Senator MANSFIELD. You mentioned the Republic of Yemen.

That reminds me that during your testimony you mentioned the Soviet movement into the Indian Ocean as a move of sorts against the People's Republic of China. In what respect?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think that the Soviets visualize this encirclement process, giving them the capability to demonstrate that they have a stranglehold on the free world jugular but at the same time

it helps them to complete their encirclement of the Communist Chinese by a string of bases.

Senator McGEE. Would it offset in any way the Chinese presence in East Africa in their calculation, or is that not a factor they are concerned with? They are just building railroads there.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I don't believe they have any military concern about the Chinese presence there. They really want to have a circle of bases around China proper, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. What evidence do you have that the Soviet Union has or is negotiating base rights with the Government of India?

PRIVATE AGREEMENT LIKELY

Admiral ZUMWALT. I have absolutely no information that they are but, in my judgment, there is no doubt that they would have made a private agreement with the Indians to use that facility in wartime.

I can't imagine the Soviets doing anything as altruistic as constructing it without some kind of understanding.

Senator MANSFIELD. Which facilities?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The naval facility of Vishakhapatnam on the east coast of India.

Senator MANSFIELD. How do you spell that?

Admiral ZUMWALT. V-i-s-h-a-k-h-a-p-a-t-n-a-m.

Senator McGEE. That is more than a role in public office ought to require of any admiral to spell that.

Senator MANSFIELD. Or any Senator.

Admiral, what strategic use do the Soviets have for the Indian Ocean? Is it more for the Soviets from the strategic standpoint, let us say, due to their geographic location than it is to the United States.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe, sir, that the Soviets have only negative reasons for the Indian Ocean, whereas we have positive ones for needing our presence there.

In other words, we badly need to insure that not only the United States but the rest of the free world can continue to get oil from that area. The Soviets need zero oil from that area. Yet, they have done more than we have done.

I cannot see any positive value but only value to the Soviets in terms of things they can do to interfere with U.S. interests or with the interests of the People's Republic of China.

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, I note from reports in the press and testimony before various congressional committees that the Navy has used for its justification for placing an operating base on Diego Garcia the reopening of the Suez Canal.

We have gone into, very, very briefly, the fact that once the Suez Canal is opened that it could be used by the Russians to bring ships south and by the 6th Fleet if it was necessary, but you indicate you didn't think it was necessary.

So, just what advantages does the reopening of the Suez Canal give the Soviets that are not available to the United States?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Well, sir, the reopening of the Suez makes it possible for the Soviets to reinforce from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean over a distance of on the order of 3,000 or a little more miles as opposed to the 11,500 miles they would have to go from the

Black Sea around Africa or as opposed to about 6,000 miles they have to go from Vladivostok.

REDUCTION IN TRANSIT TIMES

It is either a 50-percent reduction or a 70-percent reduction in transit times. This means on the average they can keep a larger number in the Indian Ocean and they can surge to very large numbers more quickly in the event of a crisis by use of the Suez Canal.

We would not want to do that, in my judgment, in a crisis, first, because the kind of crisis involving the Indian Ocean normally also involves the Eastern Mediterranean. We would want to reinforce the Indian Ocean from Norfolk or from the Western Pacific while keeping the forces in the Mediterranean as strong as we could.

In the last Mideast crisis, the Russians were able to bring 98 ships to bear in the Eastern Mediterranean as opposed to our 66.

Senator MANSFIELD. But we could use the canal if we wanted to?

Admiral ZUMWALT. For ships smaller than carriers.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would the Soviets reduce their Black Sea fleet in the face of our Mediterranean fleet to get to the Indian Ocean?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe, sir, if I were Gorshkov that I would take those ships that I have been dedicating to the Indian Ocean out of Vladivostok and transfer them to the Black Sea so that I would make the same commitment in the Indian Ocean but have a shorter transit time and keep an additional ship or two in the Indian Ocean.

Senator MANSFIELD. You would transfer from Vladivostok, take the ships across the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal and put them in the Black Sea and use them as a reserve force?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; if it takes four ships in Vladivostok to keep one on station in the Indian Ocean if I transferred those to the Black Sea, I could keep maybe on station in the Indian Ocean. I could get the others there faster in a crisis.

Senator MANSFIELD. In a letter dated February 16, 1974, to Chairman John Stennis, Secretary Schlesinger stated, and I quote:

Inadequate support facilities now limit our ability to demonstrate interest in this area to routine presence in operations.

Secretary Schlesinger went on to say:

We are convinced that it is imperative for the United States to maintain a balance in the Indian Ocean vis-a-vis the Soviets. This balance will, among other things, signal the Soviets of our intention to continue to play a role in the area, stand by our friends, and to deter threats to the shipping lanes over which many of the industrialized world oil flows.

Admiral, does this statement make the assumption that the Soviets will interfere with our shipping in the Indian Ocean or the Soviets will interfere with our shipping any place in the world? Would this create a very grave international situation?

Do you think with all of our worldwide strategic power the Soviets would be so unthinking as to interfere with our shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean?

SOVIET STRATEGY

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would like to demonstrate what the Soviet strategy seems to be in another part of the world to demonstrate how that is applicable to the Indian Ocean.

Many of the Scandinavians, military and some of the policy level people, have told me that they believe what the Soviets are up to with regard to the northern flank is a series of exercises, military exercises, both within Russia and with their fleet off Scandinavia, designed to provide a combination of power and at the same time policy inducements to move Finland from the status she has today to that of Latvia and to move, over time, Sweden into the status of Finland, and to move, over time, Norway into the status of a Sweden.

The fact that they did exercises around Czechoslovakia for weeks and then pounced is convertible into power to threaten as they do similar kinds of things in other areas of the world.

In the Indian Ocean, if we visualize an ocean in which we do not deploy or into which it is very difficult for us to deploy with strength in the absence of Diego Garcia, I can visualize the nations of that area similarly feeling themselves surrounded with Soviet Armies and Air Force maneuvering around the borders to the north and with Soviet naval and amphibious powers maneuvering around water in the south.

Over time, one can see resulting regimes beginning to tilt toward Moscow, then beginning to become client states, then beginning to respond to Moscow's request that oil prices be doubled or tripled or that oil embargoes be set in train and it may never be necessary for them to do anything more aggressive than that.

Senator MANSFIELD. If I recall correctly, elements of the Atlantic Fleet attached to NATO also carry on activities from time to time with Norwegians, have a right to the northern tip; isn't that correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

The dramatic reduction in our Navy, 47 percent of its ships in the last 5 years, has made it impossible for us to continue to compete in regard to number or frequency and the Scandinavians clearly see a reduction in our influence and an increase in Soviet influence.

This is having a political impact within the political structure.

Senator MANSFIELD. It looks as though it is a tit-for-tat procedure which might be carried on into the Indian Ocean but you referred to a 47-percent reduction in U.S. naval facilities.

Hasn't that been compensated in large part by nuclear submarines?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir.

REDUCED CAPABILITY

We have built nuclear submarines and we have replaced diesel submarines. This has given us, ship for ship, additional capability. Nevertheless, the net capability of the Navy, in my judgment, is less today than it was 2 or 3 years ago because we have made dramatic reductions in current capability in order to begin the investment in future capability.

I testified in classified hearings on the details of this before the four cognizant committees, Senator. I believe we have laid it out in incontrovertible detail that we face a grave threat in terms of maritime balance.

Senator MANSFIELD. Wouldn't expanding the facilities of Diego Garcia further increase our vulnerability along the lines you have mentioned, stretching out?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir; I think the \$29 million investment would make it possible for us to keep the naval forces on the line longer and

protect them better with protective aircraft flying out of Diego Garcia than we could possibly do in the absence of the improved facility.

I believe it makes at least an order of magnitude multiplier in our military capability in that area during a crisis.

Senator MANSFIELD. That American Navy presently operates, I understand, a tender and two destroyers from Bahrain in the Persian Gulf.

When was this operation started and what was the rationale by the Navy for placing these forces in the Persian Gulf?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, here I plead ignorance as to the original background. I guess I was about a midshipman at the Naval Academy when it began.

Senator MANSFIELD. That long ago?

Admiral ZUMWALT. In the original incarnation, we were using a British facility at Bahrain of about 100 acres and we have had a flagship stationed there on that location for 20 or so years and have rotated the destroyers. When the British pulled out, we arranged to rent directly from the Bahrain Government 10 percent of their facility. It is only a place to tie up, really. It would not be a safe base in the event of war.

Senator MANSFIELD. Did Bahrain order us out at the time of the Yom Kippur war?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Bahrain served notice within a year we must be out.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do we expect to be out within a year or hopefully back in?

Admiral ZUMWALT. My personal hope would be that we work out our problems so that the ultimatum might be withdrawn.

SOVIET NAVAL REACTION

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral Zumwalt, information in the files of the subcommittee indicates that whenever the U.S. Navy increases its presence in the Indian Ocean the Soviet Navy immediately increases its presence, also.

Do you have any comment on that?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Well, sir, in every crisis management situation both sides have tended to deploy their military power to the area. In the case of the October 1973 Middle East crisis, it is my recollection that the Soviet actually began their deployment of naval power to the Mediterranean before we did.

In the case of the mining of Haiphong, the Soviets sent an impressive task force down there to show their interest and influence in the area.

So, both sides have tended to do it in any given crisis management situation.

Senator MANSFIELD. Haiphong or Chittagong?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. They came down to Haiphong.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; they sent ships down to lie off opposite our task forces as we did that mining operation.

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, do you think that the United States has a responsibility to be the world's policeman?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir; I do not.

I believe we lack the power to do so and have given it up. I believe that we must, however, retain the power to protect our own vital interests and that this requires not only adequate military forces but sufficient facilities in each region of the world to be able to support them.

Senator MANSFIELD. I wonder why France, England, Japan, some of our other friends, could not take on this responsibility in the Indian Ocean. Why does it have to be us all the time?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, you are way ahead of me on world affairs, but my reading of the history is that it has always been the leading nation of the free world that has had to carry the weight. We hid behind the skirts of the British for 100 years. Now, in order to protect our own vital interests, we have to do things even though we might prefer that the British or the French or others would do more. We can't count on them even to be with us in a specific crisis if they don't feel their own vital interests are at stake.

Senator TOWER. The British do maintain a limited number of ships there, frigates?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes; the British do, and the French.

I am glad you made that point because I should stress that the British have made the contribution of the island, itself, and have made a modest investment in the first increment of acquiring a facility there and do man a fraction of it.

Senator MANSFIELD. What was the agreement by means of which we were able to take over Diego Garcia? Was it an executive agreement? Was it an agreement between the British and the U.S. Navies? Was it in the form of a treaty?

Frankly, I never heard of the words "Diego Garcia" until 3 or 4 or 5 years ago.

I just wondered on what basis we have the right to go in and undertake a 50-year lease without having the Congress of the United States have some knowledge and some say.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

Admiral ZUMWALT. Well, sir, it is an executive agreement.

Senator MANSFIELD. Whom was it signed by?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I do not recall, sir. I believe it was on the State Department to Foreign Ministry level back in 1966, under the earlier Labor Government.

The information in our files indicates that the key Members of Congress were briefed concerning it.

My view would be that it probably was considered to be within that range of things that we have done traditionally with our closest ally, the British, Government to Government, in a whole host of ways.

It would be very difficult for me to see how one could do our business briskly with the British if every step with them had to be the subject of an executive agreement. This one obviously was one that was decided well before my time, and I can't comment on the specific background.

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, I recall that an Air Force general by the name of Berchenal negotiated an agreement with the Spanish Gov-

ernment on the Spanish bases some years ago which, under certain circumstances, would have brought us automatically to the side of Spain in a war. I think that has been rectified since, but there is a danger of carrying out even executive agreements if the Congress is not brought in on some of the most sensitive ones at least because we have to put up the money and sometimes we have to take the heat, and I think the more we know, the better prepared we will be to face up to our responsibilities.

But the idea of just the Senators or a few Members of Congress being told doesn't sit well with me because I have always operated on the basis that if a man is a Senator, he is the equal of the other 99 Senators. If one Senator is entitled to specific information, I think the other 99 are.

So, I think this question of executive agreements has to be looked into.

I am sorry that we know so little about it, but we will find out a good deal more about it before we are through.

Speaking of the executive agreements, what needs to be negotiated with the British insofar as base rights on Diego Garcia are concerned? Is this information sensitive, and if so, why?

I also have here an article from the Washington Post of March 30, 2 days ago.

Excuse me, Henry. Did you want to make a statement?

Senator BELLMON. I don't know if what I have to say belongs here too much.

Apparently we have an agreement with the British. I am curious whether we had an agreement that could have been invoked in the Middle East crisis.

Are we on solid ground here?

DEGREES OF COOPERATION

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, I believe the agreements put us in a much better position than we would have been without them. There was a range of difference among the allies as to how much they were cooperating. Some cooperated fully and some less fully. In every case where it was vital, there was some degree of cooperation.

Senator BELLMON. I understand we didn't have the rights to fly over some of those countries. They would not help us refuel our aircraft.

It seems to me that the reports we have are more generally to the effect that the agreements were not satisfactory.

Admiral ZUMWALT. At the same time, however, Senator, many of the same countries were permitting us to operate our ships in and out, refueling and supporting them. So, there were varying degrees of cooperation.

Senator BELLMON. You think the Navy did better than the Air Force?

Admiral ZUMWALT. What I am saying, sir, is that, depending on his particular political situation, each sovereign had to come down somewhat differently on the extent of cooperation in a matter where his vital interests were at stake, his oil supply.

Senator MANSFIELD. That fits in with my question which I will pursue further shortly, but it fits in with the page listed in the "Wash-

ington Whispers," U.S. News & World Report, under date of February 1, 1974, a very reputable magazine, although I don't think I care too much for the headline. It reads as follows:

Prime Ministers Edward Heath refused to approve expansion of the United States military base on British-owned Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean until he got a written guarantee of consultation before the facilities are used in any crisis situation. Mr. Heath is still resentful because Britain wasn't consulted by President Nixon when a worldwide alert of American forces, including those based on Britain, was ordered during the Mideast War last autumn.

I won't ask for a comment on that but I will refer to this story in the Washington Post 2 days ago:

Britain is re-examining its agreement with the United States for a proposed Anglo-American base on the Indian Ocean Island of Diego Garcia. The new British Ambassador to the United Nations, Ivor Richardson, appointed by the new Labor Government earlier this month, said his country was taking notes of the wishes of nations bordering the Indian Ocean and of a UN resolution favoring preservation of the ocean as a neutral zone. Richardson also said his Government wanted the economic boycott of Rhodesia tightened and intensified.

I won't ask you to comment.

Isn't the plan to develop Diego Garcia, Admiral, inconsistent with the Nixon doctrine?

CONSISTENT WITH NIXON DOCTRINE

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, I believe it is consistent. It makes it possible for us to give up any reliance on the facilities of populated nations and to reduce our profile in a contingency situation by supporting them out of a base which is 1,000 miles away from the nearest nation and unpopulated.

Senator MANSFIELD. The Nixon doctrine, as I recall, was to help other nations help themselves. The nations in the area seem to be doing extremely well and are cornering the market as far as dollars, francs, Deutsche marks, pounds, and the like are concerned, on the basis of the extravagant prices they are getting for oil.

Admiral, you mentioned the Suez Canal as one of the reasons for the stepping up of the facility at Diego Garcia.

What would you think of just waiting to see what the Soviet Navy does once the canal is opened and then making a determination as to what this country should do?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, I believe it would be very dangerous to wait. I believe that the Soviets have already brought to bear in the area an infrastructure that is very impressive, as we have discussed, and it would give them the capability to operate just as quickly as they get ships and aircraft there operating out of naval facilities and supported by airfields.

I believe that they have gained a considerable leg up on us in the Indian Ocean and are already beginning to have a degree of influence that ought to be compensated by a greater presence on our part there and that in the event of a contingency we would be hazarded by having failed to move forward while they were improving still further capability in Iraq.

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, when did the Navy and Department of Defense first develop plans to use Diego Garcia as a fleet operating support base?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think there has been an ebb and flow. I think there was a plan back in the 1960's to have a support facility there which was then changed and the files indicate that there was then a plan to limit it just to an austere communications facility and that plan remained in effect until the recent crisis demonstrated to us that we really had a need for the austere base support facility there and therefore came forward with a new recommendation to add to the existing facilities.

STRATEGIC ISLAND CONCEPT

Senator MANSFIELD. It is my understanding, Admiral, that the Department of Defense and the Navy in 1959 developed a concept within the Navy and Defense Department known as the "strategic island concept."

In 1962, it is alleged, I can't prove this, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Diego Garcia as a naval support base and as a communications base.

So, it has a long history, but that history only seems to be coming to fruition at this time.

Admiral, in your view, why is it necessary that the Air Force also have a presence on Diego Garcia and be able to operate planes from that island? Is it necessary, in other words, to have both the Navy and the Air Force on the island? It is a very restricted area.

Admiral ZUMWALT. If I could make a point on the last question.

I want to make a point that the strategic island concept, as I recall it, was a plan to really retrench and the Pentagon looked at the developing world with the Soviets moving their facilities into populated areas and recognized that it was increasingly less likely that the United States, given its domestic political and foreign policy situation, would be able to hold facilities in the more populated areas, that we ought to aspire to have them in places that are not populated so that we could diminish the friction surrounding them.

It may well be that Diego Garcia is one of those, would have been a very logical one to have included, I think.

With regard to your last question, Senator, the Diego Garcia facility, I think, needs to be viewed as a U.S. facility which would make it possible to do the things necessary in peacetime which, as I see it, would be the support of naval task forces and to have a contingency capability in order to deter, and to do what is necessary in wartime.

That surely, it seems to me, ought to include flying Air Force tactical aircraft or tanker aircraft, as well as Navy aircraft, in order to get the maximum capability.

If we are going to have an airfield there, we ought to be able to use it for Air Force planes, as well as Navy planes, it seems to me.

Senator MANSFIELD. For B-52's?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. This airfield has neither the compaction nor depth or the width necessary to fly B-52's out of there, except for emergency landings.

Senator MANSFIELD. I imagine you would have to use medium-size tankers if you could not use B-52's?

Admiral ZUMWALT. KC-135's can operate off this airfield.

AUSTRALIAN REQUEST

Senator MANSFIELD. In relationship to the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union operating fleet units in the Indian Ocean, I notice that Reuters News Agency reports from Australia on March 25, 1974, that the Australian Government had asked the Soviet Union and the United States to restrain their Naval buildup in the Indian Ocean.

Are you aware of this request and, if so, has the United States done anything about it?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I read the report.

I am not aware of any official request, Mr. Chairman.

I will point out, of course, that the Soviets already have their facility there and there are reasons why they might be very happy to agree to have both sides remove their Naval forces if we didn't put our facility in because they retain their Army and Air Force capability north of these nations and can quickly move their Navies back in, as long as they keep their facilities.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes; that is a fact that is always with them. You can't change it. They obviously are there and they have that location because it is in that part of the world in which they happen to be the heartland.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

I was really referring to the fact they have added to that by installation of a facility south, as well, in three different nations.

Senator MANSFIELD. Of course, as the Senator from Wyoming indicated earlier, the dream of the Soviet Union, the dream of the Russians, has been for warm weather ports in all parts of the world.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Absolutely.

Senator MANSFIELD. I further understand in 1971 there was talk in American governmental circles that negotiations be started with the Soviets to limit the Naval buildup in the Indian Ocean.

Has any action been taken by the American Government toward negotiation with the Soviets and, if negotiations were started, what would be the position of the Navy?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I know of no action which has been taken recently.

There was, apparently, a number of years ago, an informal inquiry on the part of the Soviets and an informal followup on the part of someone in our Government, and that was never replied to.

My own position, if I were asked, would be to make it quite clear that the removal of Naval forces from the Indian Ocean helps the Soviets and hurts the United States with regard to the support of their respective vital interests.

Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, your reaction would be negative?

Admiral ZUMWALT. My reaction would be that we should understand that we have hazarded our ability to support our vital interest; yes, sir.

MUTUAL NAVAL RESTRAINT

Senator MANSFIELD. I would like to insert in the record a statement here concerning possible mutual reduction of naval forces in the Indian Ocean. That comes from Navy reports:

There was no agreement made in 1971 or at any time between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit the size of navies in the Indian Ocean. In March 1971, a Soviet official informally raised the subject of mutual naval restraint in the Indian Ocean. In July of that year, we approached the Soviet Government in response but received no further clarification of Soviet views.

In a post-related development, in June 1971 Secretary-General Brezhnev, in the course of a major speech, alluded to the possibility of limitations in general on the activities of great power navies but this reference has never been followed up by any formal Soviet proposal to the U.S. Government.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. A question has been raised whether a Navy can operate a carrier in the Indian Ocean 6 months of the year if the Navy phases down from 15 to 12 carriers.

Will you explain how the Navy can phase down to 12 carriers, operate in the Indian Ocean 1 carrier for approximately 6 months out of the year and still meet the commitments the Navy has in the Pacific, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean?

Admiral ZUMWALT. It is impossible to do all, sir. We would have to reduce our commitments in one part of the world in order to do more in the other part.

The point with regard to Diego Garcia that needs to be stressed is that that merely gives you the capability to react to crises or to operate from time to time in the Indian Ocean, does not require that we do so, but makes it possible to get by better with inadequate numbers of aircraft carrier.

The present operating technique has been to keep two deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean and three in the Western Pacific and out of the three in the Western Pacific from time to time to put one into the Indian Ocean.

We would get more time on station out of that one in the Indian Ocean with the existence of the facility Diego Garcia and would further have some spare logistic ship capability to support the other carrier task forces.

Senator MANSFIELD. If I recall correctly, Admiral, the carrier you sent to the Mideast at the time of the October war just about made it both ways; is that right? It was an old ship.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, the old carrier was sent into the Indian Ocean. A third carrier, the *JFK*, was sent in to reinforce the two which were already in the eastern Mediterranean. The one sent to the Indian Ocean was an old ship. It should have been replaced by a newer carrier long ago. Nevertheless, we discovered in that Mideast crisis that we were in such trouble with regard to the maritime balance that the decision has been made to keep that old carrier at least another year.

Senator MANSFIELD. I have some more questions, Admiral, but I think I will give them to you at an appropriate time. I would hope that you could answer them as soon as possible.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy.

NAVY'S PLAN FOR DIEGO GARCIA

Senator MANSFIELD. I have received a letter from Admiral Zumwalt elaborating on several questions which I will insert in the record at this point.

[The letter follows:]

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

5 April 1974

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your very thoughtful letter of April 1. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss with the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction the Navy's plans for Diego Garcia; and I am equally grateful for the chance to elaborate on some of my statements.

Your first question asks whether I do not think "it would be wiser to make the foreign policy determination on the Indian Ocean -- openly and expressly -- and then take the necessary steps to expand our operations there as the expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia certainly does?" In reply I would make several points.

First, the expansion of our existing facilities at Diego Garcia (an extension of an 8,000 foot airstrip by 4,000 feet, an increase of POL storage from 60,000 barrels to 640,000 barrels, an increase of dredged area from a turning basin to a carrier task group anchorage) does not, of course, postulate any particular level of operations in the Indian Ocean. We expanded our operations there during the Mideast crisis, as you know, without a logistics support capability at Diego Garcia. The expansion of Diego Garcia facilities will enable us to support our Indian Ocean deployments more economically; but it will not determine the level or frequency of those deployments, any more than the lack of such facilities has done in the past. The Diego Garcia plans are designed to reduce the cost of supporting such operations as we may conduct in the Indian Ocean by shifting to less expensive shore-based facilities a portion of the support burden now borne wholly by our afloat logistics resources.

From the perspective of my current responsibilities, the modest improvement in capability recommended for Diego Garcia is fully justified on the basis of our current and prior level of operations in this area. The utility of these improvements is not dependent upon any revision of our foreign policy.

I think it is important to keep in mind that whether the Diego Garcia plans are implemented or not, we will still have the capability to operate naval forces in the Indian Ocean, if directed. Without Diego Garcia, however, such capability becomes more expensive, and imposes a load on our relatively scarce mobile support resources which seriously reduces the readiness of our deployed naval forces in other parts of the world.

Your second question refers to the fact that the planned facilities at Diego Garcia will be able to operate KC-135 aircraft. You suggest that this will expand B-52 capability to the Indian Ocean and its littoral, and ask if that is not "a most significant escalation of the potential use of power by the United States in that area of the world?"

Implicit in your question are a number of assumptions about the scope and nature of capabilities that will be provided by the planned Diego Garcia improvements.

At the outset I would note that the driving consideration behind the extension of the runway from 8,000 to 12,000 feet is the desire to permit its use by tactical aircraft assigned to a carrier, when one is operating in the Indian Ocean. You correctly observe that the expanded length will also permit utilization of the airstrip by other types of aircraft, including the KC-135, which has the capability to refuel B-52s as well as other types of aircraft. We are not designing a facility for support of B-52 operations, however. Were this our intent, we would be asking the Congress for a substantially greater expansion of the airstrip and associated parking and maintenance areas. I know of no plans to support B-52 operations from Diego Garcia. The important point, however, is that even the theoretical capability to do so would be so severely limited as to be militarily inconsequential under the plans which we have submitted to Congress for approval.

Your third question suggests a similarity between the strategic rationale for Diego Garcia and some of the rationales advanced 10 or 15 years ago, in connection with Southeast Asia. You then ask whether we should not commit ourselves "openly, consciously and deliberately to a particular foreign policy before it is implemented as the expanded facilities at Diego Garcia would do?"

I think the rationale for our Diego Garcia plans must stand on its own merits, independent of the strength or weakness of rationales used at other times and for other places. My personal judgment is that the dissimilarities in the rationales are much greater than any superficial similarities. Whether this is an accurate judgment or not, however, I believe the most important fact to keep in mind is that we have already deployed our military power into the Indian Ocean on a number of occasions in support of our foreign policy objectives. While it would not be appropriate for me to comment on the details of our foreign policy objectives in the area, I am sure that officials of

the Department of State would welcome the opportunity to do so, as they have already done before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Finally, you refer to Senator Russell's statement regarding the FDL concept, in connection with my observation that any reasonable contingency capability for deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean would require the rudiments of a logistics support facility in the area.

While sharing your admiration for Senator Russell's wisdom, I do not think the analogy of the FDLs is apt. There was nothing inherent in the FDL concept that would have constrained the employment of those ships to a specified geographic locality. Once built they could have been employed anywhere. The situation with regard to Diego Garcia is quite different, of course. The Diego Garcia facility represents a capability fixed in locale, and limited to specific capabilities authorized by Congress. I think this fact is equally relevant to your last query, which is: "Are we not planting here a small seed from which an immense capability to express military power in the Indian Ocean will develop?"

The reply to this question rests, of course, entirely within the hands of the Congress. The support capabilities which we are seeking are clearly defined in the budgetary request which is now before the Congress. Any expansion of those capabilities beyond what is presently contemplated would also require authorization and appropriations by the Congress. This fact clearly offers the best safeguard against the hypothetical contingency which you describe.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like once again to express my appreciation for the keen interest which you have shown in our plans for improvement of the Diego Garcia facility; and to reiterate my military judgment that those plans represent the most reasonable, economical and prudent solution to the problem of supporting our naval operations in the Indian Ocean on such future occasions as we may be required to deploy our forces into that area.

Incidentally, we have, at the same time, reduced the number of our forces and personnel in Thailand.

Warm regards,



E. R. ZUMWALT, Jr.
Admiral, U.S. Navy

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIBORNE PELL, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND

Senator MANSFIELD. Is the Air Force here?

I think we will get to you later.

Admiral, if you don't mind, we will excuse you at this time.

Thank you very much.

I would like to have Senator Pell make his presentation and then adjourn.

We will probably meet this afternoon, General, and you can testify then.

IMPORTANCE TO U.S. OF DIEGO GARCIA FACILITY

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee.

As this subcommittee well knows, the amount involved, \$29 million, is a relatively insignificant amount of the total defense budget for either the current fiscal year or fiscal 1975. But the budget request poses two significant questions:

First, is the expenditure necessary in the defense of our national interest; and

Secondly, what are the military and foreign policy implications of an expenditure that would establish for the first time a permanent American military presence in the Indian Ocean?

I believe the answer to the first question, is it necessary to the defense of our national interest, is "No," and there is no overriding evidence that has been presented to show that it is essential to our national defense.

The answer to the second question, I believe, is the establishment of this facility has potentially serious and costly implications for our foreign and military policies.

All of the Senators around this table are members of the Foreign Relations Committee, as well, and are aware that our military defense and our foreign policy decisions are intimately related. The current proposal for an American military presence in the Indian Ocean is a good example of this interrelationship. Some of us have recognized this relationship and have sought to introduce a resolution calling for United States-Soviet talks on naval limitations in the Indian Ocean; Senators Kennedy and Cranston took the lead. That is one alternative and it could be followed.

Diego Garcia is seen by the Defense Department primarily as a response to a Soviet threat. The Soviets, if they view the expansion on Diego Garcia as part of an American fleet buildup in the Indian Ocean, will respond by strengthening their Indian Ocean forces, and in 1, 2, or 3 years from now this subcommittee, the American taxpayer, the Congress, could well be considering Defense Department requests for further expansions of our Indian Ocean Naval presence to counter Soviet buildup.

That is the anatomy of an arms race we should avoid, if we can.

In this regard, I always remember the opening remarks Mr. Kosygin made to Senator Church and myself once in Moscow. He said:

What can I do to control my own military people in Moscow so they don't want to respond to yours?

He seemed to face some of the same natural pressures that we are facing here at home.

If we move with this expansion, I would imagine that the pressures behind the Soviet defense will build up even more and they will want to expand further. Obviously, it takes two to make an arms race.

From the evidence that is being presented and from what I hope to present to you, I see no clear indication that the Soviet Union desires an Indian Ocean naval arms race. I believe our national interests are best served by being second in any case to enter an arms race.

PRIORITY TO NEGOTIATIONS

The reason for giving priority to negotiations is hardheaded, not softheaded. Once an arms race is begun, negotiations to limit the race or end it are difficult. We have learned this through our experience with the SALT talks.

If we have learned anything from our cold war encounter with the Soviet Union, it is that an arms race for dominance is an expensive exercise in futility.

Our own defense goals are not longer phrased by the Administration in terms of "mutual deterrence," "sufficiency," or other phrases denoting standoff.

Our experience in Vietnam did lead the current Administration to proclaim a new direction in United States defense and foreign policy: The Nixon doctrine under which we would seek to replace confrontation with negotiation.

The proposal for Diego Garcia turns that doctrine 180 degrees as it moves toward confrontation before negotiation is attempted.

RECENT STATEMENTS

I think we ought to bear in mind the statements being made by some of our own officials in the last couple years.

In May 1973, Undersecretary Joseph Sisco of the State Department applied the Nixon doctrine, right side up, to Southeast Asia. He said:

The subcontinent is very far away. I think our interests are marginal. I think the Nixon doctrine is quite applicable—namely, we, ourselves, don't want to become involved.

He continued by saying:

In accordance with the Nixon doctrine, we think the search for stability in Southeast Asia is a task for the nations of that region.

I fail to see how the Diego Garcia proposal squares with this responsible exposition of the Nixon doctrine.

The view expressed by Mr. Sisco has been, until recently, the consistent view of the administration in regard to our interests in the Indian Ocean area.

In 1971, Mr. Ronald Spiers, the Director of the State Department's Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, told a congressional subcommittee that:

There appears to be no requirement at this time for us to feel impelled to control, or even decisively influence, any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral given the nature of our interests there and the current level of Soviet and Chinese involvement. We consider, on balance, our present interests are served by normal commercial, political and military access.

In February 1972, Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had no intention of competing for military installations in Southern Asia as we had in the Mediterranean.

Expanding on this point, Ambassador Johnson said that while the United States would continue to keep its vessels passing through the Indian Ocean regularly:

"We do not plan a regular presence in the Indian Ocean. We have no intention of engaging in competition or maintaining a regular force."

Just two years ago, in 1972, Defense Secretary Laird said:

Our strength in the Indian Ocean lies not so much in maintaining a large-standing force but, rather, in our ability to move freely in and out of the ocean as the occasion and our interests dictate.

In 1972, the Navy's Secretary, Mr. Chafee, gave similar advice in regard to the Indian Ocean, saying:

"We ought to go slowly here and not escalate the thing and see what happens."

Finally, less than a year ago, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense John Noyes assured Congress with reference to Diego Garcia:

"There are no plans to transform this facility into something from which forces could be projected, or that would provide a location for the basing of ships and aircraft."

This is amazing when you think of the uniformity of these administration viewpoints of 1 and 2 years ago reaffirming the excellent Nixon doctrine.

SHIFT IN POLICY

We might well ask what has happened in this past year to cause such monumental shift 180 degrees in our Indian Ocean policies. What has happened that the Diego Garcia construction is considered not only essential but of such priority it must be included in a supplemental authorization for this fiscal year?

I would like to examine for a moment the rationale put forward by the Defense Department but in so doing to stress my admiration and personal regard for Admiral Zumwalt. I don't wish to be in an adversary relationship with him but we each have to do what we think is right.

On March 12, 1974, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, the same Mr. Noyes, who testified less than a year ago against building up Diego Garcia, testified on behalf of the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia and cited three U.S. objectives.

First, America wishes to provide an effective alternative to the growth of Soviet influence in the region.

Second, we wish to have a continued access to vital Middle-Eastern oil supplies for ourselves and the other nations of the world.

Third, we want to insure the continued free movement of American ships and aircraft into and out of the area.

Let us examine these objectives, all of them completely correct and good objectives, in the light of events Mr. Noyes has referred to as affecting our policy in this region.

In the first place, the focus of the administration's argument in favor of expanding Diego Garcia is the necessity of countering an expanded Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Admiral Zumwalt stressed that the Russians are moving in a most impressive way to increase their capability in support of their naval forces overseas and that, "Their tentacles are going out like an octopus in the Indian Ocean."

He stated they have improved their facilities and operations and have operated out of Umm Qasr in Iraq, Berbera in Somali, the Yemeni Island of Socotra, and Danna in Bangladesh.

They have built a large Indian base for the Indians called Vishakhapatnam on the east coast of India.

The implication is that the Soviets have special base rights in these places that could not be enjoyed by the United States.

These facilities, he states, gave the Russians a position "astride the central part of our energy jugular down to the Persian Gulf."

Other executive branch representatives have testified in a similar vein but, so far, I believe the facts and figures do not add up to an ominous presence.

SOVIET PRESSURE RESISTED

For example, the Indian Government reportedly has resisted Soviet pressure and refused a request for a base on Indian territory, a position which it would be hard for that Government to maintain if we expand on Diego Garcia.

This view of the Indian Government has been reaffirmed at staff level and in other conversations. Apparently they genuinely do not want us to move in this area, where they are the largest great power.

While the Soviets have assisted in improving port facilities in the Indian Ocean, they have no bases in the sense that we have in Bahrain, or our communications facility in Diego Garcia, or our facility at Woomera in western Australia.

In addition, the Soviet anchorage sited off Socotra is an ocean anchorage that anyone can set up.

There is sufficient ambiguity, therefore, to require a great deal more verification and investigation before we proceed with the expansion of Diego Garcia.

If anyone examines the views of the countries around the Indian Ocean, he will find almost without exception, they are opposed, especially Australia, New Zealand, India, Ceylon, and Bangladesh.

You find that the countries who are most concerned in that part of the world seem to believe that it would be best to halt this proposal.

It has already been mentioned that Ivor Richardson, speaking for the British at the U.N., has said they want to reexamine the agreement which was referred without signature ad referendum to the respective governments. As we know, that means that there is no agreement until each of the two governments—American by our due process and the British by theirs—have approved.

By the way it seems to be going in Britain, there is a very real likelihood that the British may not approve, in which case we would be foolish to move ahead until at least that factor was known.

The Soviets have no lack of hard information and data about our plans. They already know from published American material that the Defense Department received \$6 million in 1973 for dredging the Diego Garcia harbor to create a turning basin that will be 2,000 by 6,000 feet, large enough to accommodate submarines and smaller aircraft carriers. They know the exact specification of what is proposed.

In connection with the B-52's, my understanding is that the airfield cannot take them if they are loaded but could take them on an emergency basis if they jettison their fuel and bombs.

Cited by the Defense Department as further evidence that the Soviet presence is ahead of that of the United States in the Indian Ocean is a comparison of ship-days spent there by American and Soviet vessels.

COMPARISON OF VESSELS

I think we should bear in mind that the majority of the Soviet naval vessels are noncombatant support and auxiliary craft; oil ships, repair ships and space support ships, while the majority of our ships are combatant vessels. There is a world of difference between the two.

At present, according to Defense Department testimony, the Soviets have about a dozen or 10 surface combat ships of destroyer size or smaller in the Indian Ocean. We have been maintaining in the area an aircraft carrier task force for some time.

I was very impressed by Admiral Zumwalt's statement of how we want to prevent Sweden moving like Finland and Norway coming under Soviet pressure like Finland as a result of a strong Soviet presence in the area. Naturally we want to avoid this happening in the Indian Ocean.

But in this connection, according to 1971 figures, we made many more port calls in the Indian Ocean area than the Soviets did, and they have more political impact than ship-days. As I understand it and I am citing 1971 statistics, the United States made 157 port call visits to 20 states excluding Bahrain, where we have a permanent presence, and Thailand, versus exactly 33 port call visits to 7 states. In other words, only one-fifth the number of port calls in seven states on the part of the Russians.

If diplomatic presence is what is needed, it seems to me that five times the number of our ship visits would indicate a stronger presence than the Russians.

I think the important point here is not whether the ships are floating out at sea, from the viewpoint of diplomatic pressure, but whether they can be seen by the littoral states in their ports.

I would hope that the Defense Department would be asked for the current 1972 and 1973 figures in this regard.

The point I would like to emphasize is that we do not seem to know at this hour of decision exactly, what the growth of Soviet influence in this region really amounts to in terms of facts and figures.

Furthermore, we should find out before we move ahead whether the British are going to sign the agreement.

Regarding the second objective, the movement of Middle Eastern oil supplies for ourselves and other nations of the free world, we should not automatically assume that a Navy base on Diego Garcia would help.

Is not the threat actually a more political one on the part of the producing countries than a military threat from the Soviets? It was not the Soviets who cut us off from Middle East oil supplies.

In the case of war, I would imagine both the Soviets and Americans have the ability to close the Suez Canal within a very few minutes if that was their desire or wish, to the advantage of either nation.

Finally, regarding the third objective of insuring the continued free movement of American ships and aircraft into and out of the area, this is something we already enjoy. That free movement could be more effectively guaranteed at no cost by an arms control agreement than by a base at Diego Garcia.

CONCERN IN RHODE ISLAND

For some years, there have been in the Defense Department advocates of the establishment of an American military presence in the Indian Ocean. I have followed the building of the Diego Garcia facility because it was constructed by a Seabee unit based in Rhode Island. We have always been concerned with the future of this island in my State.

I think it is instructive to consider the current proposal in the context of the history of past proposals.

In the early 1960's, before the modernizing and buildup of Soviet seapower and closing of the Suez Canal, it was argued that American Naval presence was needed to fill the vacuum created by waning British seapower. It was at this time that a very gallant and fine gentleman, Admiral McCain, argued for a four-ocean Navy, summarizing the outlook of those seeking the United States presence by saying:

"As Malta is to the Mediterranean, Diego Garcia is to the Indian Ocean."

Just as when the British acquired Malta, the Mediterranean really became a British lake. I do not think that we want to see the same extension of responsibility or cost for us in the Indian Ocean.

With the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 the Indian Ocean advocates argued that an American presence was needed because the Indian Ocean was less accessible to the U.S. forces.

Now with the possibility of reopening of the Suez Canal, it is argued that a permanent American presence is needed to offset a potential expansion of Soviet presence made possible by opening of the canal.

Apparently when it is closed that is one reason we should be there. If it is open that is another reason we should be there.

Whatever the circumstances, an argument has always been found to justify an expansion in the Indian Ocean, which really is the last truly pacific only in the technical sense of the word, where there is a minimum of military forces. It is part of a defense outlook that I believe has as a basic objective, a dominant American naval presence in every ocean of the world, an American world ocean, the creation of a "Mare Americanum per Mundum".

I do not mean to imply any criticism of the motives of those in the Defense Department who have sought through the years an expanded U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean. It is their responsibility to propose military measures and preparations they consider necessary, and in recommending such projects as Diego Garcia they are doing their jobs.

But civilian authorities, including this committee and the Congress, have a broader responsibility and must weigh the military recommendations in the context of an overall defense and foreign policy.

DIEGO GARCIA PROJECT UNWISE

In that broader context, I believe that approval of the Diego Garcia project is unnecessary and unwise, and I would hope that the Subcommittee on Appropriations would agree for the various reasons advanced, bearing particularly in mind the wishes of the littoral nations in that area, none of whom has given us encouragement in this project and many of whom have sought to dissuade us from it.

I apologize for the length of my statement, but I feel quite strongly on this issue because I see, looking ahead 5 or 10 years, the development of a situation where we may be a hostage to Diego Garcia, a cause for greater expenditures, and the enlargement of a commitment in another part of the world going in direct violation of the excellent Nixon doctrine.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Senator Pell.

I know of your intense personal interest in this matter. You have spoken on the floor on a number of occasions. You may rest assured that your views will be given every consideration along with those of Admiral Zumwalt and others who will testify.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

Do you know anything about the executive agreement, so-called, which allowed us to become involved on Diego Garcia?

Senator PELL. I have the text here of the agreement of 1972 with the British giving us authorization to construct a communications facility on Diego Garcia. I imagine it should be part of your committee records.

AGREEMENT WITH BRITISH

Senator MANSFIELD. Could you tell us about it in brief?

Senator PELL. Referring to an earlier agreement with the British of 1966, the agreement signed by the American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim and the British Government, provides for a limited communications facility on Diego Garcia spelling out in some detail the conditions and limitations of the project.

Senator MANSFIELD. Who consummated that executive agreement?

Senator PELL. That was consummated by Mr. Earl D. Sohm, American Chargé d'Affaires in London, and for the British Government, British Secretary of State for Foreign Commonwealth Affairs, Anthony Kershaw.

Senator MANSFIELD. What was the Chargé d'Affaires diplomatic rank?

Senator PELL. A Foreign Service officer of class 1 and the Deputy Chief of Mission with rank of Minister.

Senator MANSFIELD. He was empowered by whom to carry on negotiations with the British Foreign Minister?

Senator PELL. He was the Acting Chief of Mission in London at the time in the absence of the Ambassador.

He would have been given this responsibility by Secretary Rogers.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you recall offhand whether there were other executive agreements of this nature reached without the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, which has certain responsibilities in the field of foreign affairs, being notified?

Senator PELL. Many of them.

Senator MANSFIELD. Including the Spanish bases one?

Senator PELL. I believe it went to the hundreds when we made that examination.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you think executive agreements of this kind should be negotiated by higher ranking officials than Minister Counselors on our part?

Senator PELL. I think it would be very difficult because of the number of agreements that are concluded on these subjects of trade, criminal law and a variety of other things.

I would think they have to be actually negotiated by the diplomats on the spot; it is far better to have diplomats on the spot do it than send people out from Washington.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you intend to bring this matter before the Foreign Relations Committee?

Senator PELL. I do intend to press for the resolution that Senator Kennedy and I introduced calling for negotiations on arms control in the Indian Ocean before moving ahead.

EXPANSION QUESTIONABLE

Senator MANSFIELD. I gather from your testimony, Senator, that you think the new Labor Government in London has some questions about the expansion of the base.

Senator PELL. There is every indication from the Richardson statement and from press reports that such is the case. In other areas, the British have turned their ships around from going to Greece to em-

phasize their views with regard to Greece, and they apparently may move in a different direction, just as the Labor Government in Australia has moved in a different direction than the former one.

That is another reason why I think we would be really wasting funds, even if we thought it was a good idea, to move ahead with the Diego Garcia project until we know the British are going to approve it.

When it comes to an argument we are wincing on an agreement or the British are wincing on an agreement, we ought to look to international law. Any agreement referred ad referendum means exactly that; it is to be referred to the governments for approval before it is binding on either party.

So the argument that anyone is wincing should not be advanced. Presently a commitment is not involved—just an intention to move ahead provided the governments approve.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you have any idea how many bases overseas we have at present?

Senator PELL. I do. I asked the Defense Department to prepare a map for me with them.

I think there are 1,800, of which 300 have more than 500 personnel.

Senator MANSFIELD. I understand we have somewhere in the vicinity of 2,000 major and minor bases throughout the world.

Senator PELL. I think 1,800 in toto, of which 300 are considered major bases, the definition being 500 or more American personnel attached to them, all over the world.

Bear in mind, that in the Indian Ocean area those we have that are sited in Bahrein, western Australia and Diego Garcia, where we have ships—and something in Ethiopia.

KAGNEW PULLOUT

Senator MANSFIELD. I think we are pulling out of Kagnew now. That even took a little tooth pulling. The Army got in there and they got out. The Defense Department, I understand, in effect forced the Navy to stay in Kagnew. The Navy didn't want to. They were more interested in Diego Garcia. The latest information is that they are on the way out.

The last figures I saw, and they are about 2 years old, relative to the cost of maintaining these bases overseas were somewhere in the vicinity of \$4.8 billion a year.

Do you have any more up-to-date figures?

Senator PELL. No, but that is what I understand.

A great deal of the cost was incurred by our concern with the well-being of our people. We have units with a huge number of dependents. That is the reason for the homeporting in Athens.

Incidentally, in Greece, we have the Defense Department in a peculiar position of recognizing the political instability of the area and not recommending going ahead with homeporting.

In the State Department, where the hawks seem to have gone to the dove cote, they say we should go ahead with more homeporting.

Many of the expenses are incurred, as you have pointed out, by the tremendous number of dependents and facilities, Coca-Cola, bowling alleys, and everything else that have to go with our installations.

Senator MANSFIELD. We have now no installations in the Indian Ocean, have we?

Senator PELL. That is correct?

Senator MANSFIELD. We have none in the Arctic Ocean?

Senator PELL. That is correct.

Senator MANSFIELD. Or do we?

Senator PELL. We do not. We have one in Greenland.

Senator MANSFIELD. Any in Barrow on the North Slope? We have no installations there?

Senator PELL. We have a Coast Guard. I don't think there is any military.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do we have any installations in the Antarctic?

Senator PELL. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes, we do, but not combatant. I think we work in cooperation with the Soviet Union there on scientific research, but no combatant ships.

STATUS OF COAST GUARD

Senator PELL. I ought to rectify my statement about the Arctic Ocean; the Coast Guard is a military service so we do have military facilities in the Arctic Ocean.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is the Coast Guard still under the Treasury?

Senator PELL. It is under the Department of Transportation, but in time of war it becomes part of the Navy.

Senator MANSFIELD. Of course, we do have installations in the Pacific and in the Atlantic.

Senator PELL. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you very much, Senator Pell. I appreciate your testimony.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GEORGE LOVING, DIRECTOR OF PLANS DIEGO GARCIA PLANS

Senator MANSFIELD. General, it is good to have you here.

Will you proceed in your own fashion?

General LOVING. I have no opening statement.

I am pleased to be here to discuss the planned expansion on Diego Garcia.

I will be happy to answer any questions you have.

Senator MANSFIELD. You were here during the testimony of Admiral Zumwalt?

General LOVING. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. In general, when were the plans of the Air Force made concerning Diego Garcia?

By that, I mean the date that the planning started.

General LOVING. Planning started toward the end of last year and proceeded into January of this year, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. What series of events or developing situations caused these plans to be made?

General LOVING. Events in the Middle East, the oil embargo constituted the principal events that caused us to take a renewed interest in that part of the world. As a consequence, we proceeded to do some planning jointly with the Navy in laying out the expansion program for Diego Garcia.

Senator MANSFIELD. What new routes does the Air Force plan to use on the basis of being stationed at Diego Garcia?

General LOVING. We have no intention of stationing any forces there, sir.

At the present time, we have been providing some six to eight flights per month, cargo flights, by C-141 aircraft into Diego Garcia.

Senator MANSFIELD. The field is big enough to take them?

General LOVING. It is ample to take them. The parking space there is quite restricted, however. It is only sufficient to accommodate about two transport aircraft simultaneously.

OPTIONS AVAILABLE

Senator MANSFIELD. I think Admiral Zumwalt indicated that the purpose of the Air Force going in on the basis of expanded facilities, length of runway, and the like, would be to establish a new route to Israel in the event—

General LOVING. This would be an option to be opened if the facilities there were enlarged, runways lengthened, additional fuel storage,

and it would provide an air route that would be useful in moving through the Pacific area into the Middle East or in any part of the world that we might have an interest in.

Senator MANSFIELD. Are there flights being carried on now from Diego Garcia as a transitory stopoff between it and Utapoa in Thailand?

General LOVING. Some of the supply flights I mentioned in cargo aircraft we are supplying the Navy activities in that part of the world, come through Taipeh from the United States, proceed through, stopping off at way stations en route. One of the places we stop at is Utapoa.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is there a seaport attached to Utapoa?

General LOVING. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. What is its name?

General LOVING. Sattahip.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it a communication, supply and facilities center?

General LOVING. It is, sir. It is a logistical installation.

Senator MANSFIELD. Does it have more capacity than Diego Garcia has at the present time?

General LOVING. I don't have that information to answer that, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. General, does the Air Force presently carry out reconnaissance and patrol flights over the Indian Ocean?

General LOVING. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Senator MANSFIELD. They do not?

General LOVING. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is the \$3.3 million that the Air Force is requesting today the full amount which will be needed or will there be follow-on requests in the future?

General LOVING. The full amount, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. You do not expect any subsequent request for appropriations?

General LOVING. Not unless there is some major change in that part of the world, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. What you are asking for will be enough now to take care of the big tankers?

UNABLE TO ACCOMMODATE B-52'S

Senator MANSFIELD. And B-52's under certain unloaded conditions?

General LOVING. Not B-52's, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. If they unloaded their fuel and unload their bombs, they will still be able to make it.

General LOVING. The runway is 150 feet wide and the outriggers on the landing gear are 145 feet apart. The area is totally inadequate. It would be only an extreme emergency that one would land a B-52 there.

One could not taxi it. The taxiways are only 75 feet wide. We would have great difficulty turning the aircraft around on the runway.

Senator MANSFIELD. That would seem to preclude the B-52's for the time being, at least.

What type of aircraft does the Air Force anticipate using on Diego Garcia?

PLANNED FACILITIES

General LOVING. Facilities that are planned there would provide the option to increase transport activity indicated by providing additional ramp space. The ramp space could accommodate up to a half squadron of tactical aircraft. A tactical squadron could be F-111's. If one wanted to base them temporarily, for example a carrier was not available to deploy in the Indian Ocean and one wanted substitute forces there for a carrier, we could employ a half squadron of F-111's and a very modest number of tanker aircraft.

This is the sum total that could be accommodated at the base, considering the modest ramp space that has been requested.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you plan to store ammunition on the atoll, General?

General LOVING. We have no plans to store ammunition.

We would want to provide an ammunition storage area which could be used in the event of a wartime contingency.

Senator MANSFIELD. So far as you know, barring unusual or extraordinary circumstances, you do not anticipate the Air Force requesting any further funds than the \$3.3 million you are asking here?

General LOVING. That is right.