DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1975

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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PART 2

Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations
Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff
Marine Corps and Navy Reprogramings

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Exercise	Dates	Description	Curtailment
(b) Atlantic:			
Springboard 74	Jan. 21–Mar. 1, 1974	Basic type training	Reduced from 53 to 32 ships.
Lantreadex	Apr. 29–May 14, 1974	Fleet readiness training exercise	25 percent reduction.
Minex 1–74	3d quarter, fiscal year 1974.	Fleet mining exercise	Cancel.
Solid Shield 74	4th quarter, fiscal year 1974.	Joint readiness exercise	FLT commander cannot support.
Sharem	do	Ship antisubmarine readiness exercise.	Do.

Mr. SIKES. What kind of timeframe are you talking about?

I hope there will not be delays in getting the supplemental through. But you know the delays we can encounter in Congress. What is the time element that is involved?

Secretary WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I can say that on April 1 we run out of fuel money. Is that not correct, Admiral?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We will have to begin to use the special provision of law after that time.

Secretary WARNER. That is the old foraging statute, designed for horses, you know, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIKES. General Cushman?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, we are beginning to run into trouble with exercises which consume aircraft fuel to get the troops to the exercise. We have had to curtail those flights, as well as those exercises involving extensive Navy ship steaming hours. We have had to cut out one exercise at Camp Drum, east coast winter training, because of the fuel shortage. So we are being pinched now.

As I look into the future, I think this is going to affect the combat readiness of our forces. On the aviation side things become even more difficult because curtailment of petroleum begins to affect pilot flying skill and therefore safety. With less flight time available for training exercises in close air support and so forth, our air-ground coordination suffers. So, if we do not get the money we need and if we are——

Mr. SIKES. Does that mean the money that is budgeted in the supplemental and the regular budget or additional money?

General CUSHMAN. It is in the supplemental, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Yes.

General CUSHMAN. Our immediate needs are in the supplemental budget.

Mr. SIKES. Are you saying that there is enough money if the present requested supplemental and regular budget are voted by Congress, that you will be able to continue training exercises but at a minimal level?

General CUSHMAN.. Yes, sir; that is a very good way to put it. It would be a minimal level just to maintain adequacy.

Admiral ZUMWALT. It is not adequate——

Admiral COOKE. There has been one price rise in fuel since we submitted the supplemental. That price rise would make the Navy Department at least $27 million short, if we continued our scheduled, budgeted operations. If there are no more increases between now and the 1st of July, we would still end up with a $27 million deficiency. So we will have to accommodate that somehow by reduced operations or by some other funding means.

General CUSHMAN. I was going to add, assuming the price stays the same, which, of course, is not a certainty.

Mr. SIKES. The committee wants to be kept advised of this particular feature, because we recognize the necessity for adequate training exercises.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

Mr. SIKES. We were talking this morning about changes in the budget, in the organization of forces, as a result of lessons learned in the war in the Middle East.

Mr. Secretary, do you believe you are prepared to discuss that at this time?

Secretary WARNER. Yes, and I would like to discuss it in the context of the supplemental. If I may, I prefer to follow pretty close to some notes I have before me.

Mr. SIKES. Surely.

Secretary WARNER. The Department of the Navy fiscal year 1974 supplemental budget request of about $1.9 billion meets two essential needs. The first is to provide for the cost increases we have experienced. The second, basically stemming from the recent Mideast conflict, is to improve our readiness and to continue the modernization of our forces.

With respect to cost increases, approximately $829 million is for the military and civilian pay raises which have been approved. The postal rate and usage increases require $18.9 million. Subsistence rates for our military personnel have gone up from $1.65 to $2.28 per day and $26.9 million is needed. Almost $136 million is related to fuel price increases, primarily in aviation jet fuel, Navy special and Navy distillate.

In the readiness area, $125.4 million is a pay back for out-of-pocket costs incurred during the Mideast conflict. Of this amount $61.8 million is in operating costs and $63.6 million is to replace aircraft assets which were provided to the Israelis. We intend to procure 24 A–4M and 5 F–5E aircraft.

Some $705 million is to provide a higher level of readiness and modernization. Funds are requested for ship and aircraft maintenance, procurement of P–3C and KC–130 aircraft, missiles, air-launched ordnance and gun ammunition, and various support equipment. Also included is $29 million for expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia.

The final item, $24.8 million, is requested for advance procurement to allow for a two Trident ship procurement in fiscal year 1975.

Mr. SIKES. Does this fully reimburse the Navy for, and permit requisition by the Navy of all the items provided to Israel or programed for Israel?

Admiral ZUMWALT. This supplemental plus the reimbursement from the Israelis through the recent Foreign Military Assistance Act will permit replacement of all items. What it does not do, of course, is give us the equipment back in a timely way. It will take a long time to get it.

WAR RESERVES

Mr. SIKES. Now, the other services found that our war reserves are, in themselves, minimal, so much so that we were very short in a number of key items as a result of supplies provided to Israel during

Admiral COOKE. I do not know that I have that figure. I have only the differences here. I would have to get that for you.

[The information follows:]

There was $2.5 million last year in the program.

Admiral ZUMWALT. It was $81 million last year, and only $57 million last year, according to my figures.

Mr. SIKES. Cruise missile?

Admiral ZUMWALT. For the Harpoon.

Admiral COOKE. No, sir; I am talking about the——

Admiral ZUMWALT. Are you talking about the new tactical cruise missile?

Admiral COOKE. It is called the strategic cruise missile. In CH53, we have $17 million extra; there is $16 million for an improved SSBN: $34 million for a new fighter prototype, lightweight fighter; there were some significant transfers from other accounts because of direction both by the Congress and by OSD. We moved some things from other accounts into R. & D. to fund them there. That amounts to $84 million. Those are really the high points. I could pick out some others.

What disturbs me is that constantly we are buying fewer weapons with the defense dollar and that gives the Soviets an edge in number of weapons that is going to be more and more dangerous as time goes on.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I guess, sir, that the first point I would like to make is that you get a better bargain for your money when you buy Navy, only 43 percent roughly of our budget is manpower. This is of course partly the result of a fact that we are a capital intensive service, but we are also——

Mr. SIKES. Are you including support of people, housing, pay, allowances?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. For the Navy, the percentage includes pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel, travel, training, and personnel and medical support costs.

Mr. SIKES. Is that not in addition to the 43 percent?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. The 43 percent, actually, 43.8 percent, includes it all. We are continuing to try to drive that down.

Mr. SIKES. That is what I am asking about, what are you doing,

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Mr. SIKES. I would like to have you prepare for the record a statement showing the reason for the change in emphasis and what you expect to gain by it.

Secretary WARNER. We will, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

There is an increase of $518.5 million between 1974 and 1975. This increase consists of three major parts, two of which are real additions and will provide stronger research and development programs in vital areas.

The first of these is in missiles and realted equipment, which carries an increase of $160.4 million with almost the entire increase going into two strategic programs; that is, Trident and the submarine launched cruise missile. As you are aware, the submarine launched cruise missile is being developed in a strategic and tactical version. The tactical derivative will materially augment the offensive capability of the attack submarines.

The second major area of increase is in the development of our platforms and related equipment. That is, aircraft, ships, small craft and so on. This increase of approximately $170 million is intended to provide better platforms for future naval weapons systems.

The third increase of $127 million in "Programwide management and support" is largely due to the new program element for test and evaluation support (P.E. 65864N). In fiscal year 1974, this T. & E. support was funded in other budget activities and in other appropriations, and as such, is not an increase in the usual sense.

It should be noted that we in the Navy feel so strongly about pressing forward with advanced platforms and with strategic programs that we have elected to hold our expenditures for research at essentially the same value as last year. The level of funding of the research portion of the program really means a decrease in direct labor which we will attempt to overcome by increased efficiency.

MANPOWER

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Secretary, what can be done to improve manpower use and efficiency and hopefully to reduce the percentage of cost of people in the defense budget?

You know why I ask this question. We are getting close to the point where two-thirds of our defense dollar goes to pay people. That does not leave very much for weapons and equipment. It is almost the reverse from the situation that the Soviets are able to enjoy.

What disturbs me is that constantly we are buying fewer weapons with the defense dollar and that gives the Soviets an edge in number of weapons that is going to be more and more dangerous as time goes on.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I guess, sir, that the first point I would like to make is that you get a better bargain for your money when you buy Navy, only 43 percent roughly of our budget is manpower. This is of course partly the result of a fact that we are a capital intensive service, but we are also——

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Mr. SIKES. Is that not in addition to the 43 percent?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. The 43 percent, actually, 43.8 percent, includes it all. We are continuing to try to drive that down.

Mr. SIKES. That is what I am asking about, what are you doing, what can you project?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. We are continuing to try to drive it down by our automation of the engineering plants as we shift from steam to gas turbines; the new series of patrol frigates, 963's; the sea control ship, for example, will be much lower manpower "eaters" than would the nuclear ships or the steam-propelled ships.

We are working hard to reduce the manning of our bridges and to automate our fire control systems. Those savings come very slowly over time but they will be coming along.

Mr. SIKES. Do you want to add anything?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir, except you have spotlighted one of the most difficult problems, particularly for the Marine Corps, which is a manpower intensive force. It is difficult to determine just how we can do this.

The present pay scales are set and, as we discussed this morning, this is necessary to get voluntary enlistments. So it is very difficult to drive manpower costs down and retain the force structure and strength.

WORLDWIDE LOGISTICS

Mr. SIKES. I would like to have some discussion, and it need not be detailed, about worldwide logistic problems, again in comparison with the Soviets.

I am thinking about the Indian Ocean where we have a very small presence, where the Russians have base rights in a number of countries, the Mediterranean, other parts of the world, where we have very long supply lines.

You might touch on how serious is the fact that the Russians are in close proximity to the major sealanes of the world. They are in a position where they could—they must be able, effectively, to bottle up many important channels of the world.

Will you talk about that picture generally?

Secretary WARNER. Mr. Chairman, that indeed brings out the focus we have to put on our Navy today; namely, we operate at great dis-

tances from our principal logistics base, which of course is the United States. In the design of our ships, for example, we have almost always incorporated the requirement to handle the requisite fuel to carry our ships great distances. The Soviet Union, in sharp contrast, not only to protect their own motherland, but to support their allies, need only operate over much shorter distances, save their interest in Cuba.

When you address the question of bottling up straits, indeed that potential rests in varying degree with any naval power.

With reference to the current request on Diego Garcia, our intent is to provide a logistics depot which will enable us to resupply our forward advanced units with greater facility in that area.

Mr. SIKES. Do you want to add anything to that, Admiral?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

The Russians are moving in a most impressive way to increase their capabilities to support their naval forces overseas; their tentacles are going out like an octopus into the Indian Ocean. They have improved and operated out of the Port of Vm Quast in Iraq; they have improved and operated out of Berbera in Somalia and built airfields there; they have improved the airfield at Socotra and use Socotra as a naval anchorage; they are operating in and out of the Port of Chittagong in Bangladesh: they have built a very large naval base for the Indians called Vishakhapatnam on the east coast of India. They have a whole range of facilities along the Indian Ocean, against which we have for logistics purposes, only Diego Garcia, if the money is approved in this year's budget.

In addition, enroute to the Indian Ocean the Russians have begun the use of facilities in Guinea. They have operated ships out of there for a number of years and within the last year have begun to operate Bear aircraft out of there. This gives them a chance to ride astride the central part of our energy jugular down to the Persian Gulf.

Mr. MCFALL. What would the opening of the Suez Canal be on the ability of the Russians in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral ZUMWALT. It will greatly enhance their capability. The distance from the Black Sea via the Cape of Good Hope to the Persian Gulf is about 11,000 miles. It is about a quarter of that going through the Suez Canal. So it reduces greatly the number of ships they must have in transit, gives them the capability to surge much more rapidly in a crisis.

It is a significant shift in military potential insofar as the Indian Ocean is concerned.

Mr. MCFALL. What about India; does India allow the Russians to use their ports?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They have, sir, no base rights that we know of. But they do operate in and out of Indian naval ports for visit purposes.

Mr. MCFALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CRUISE MISSILE

Mr. SIKES. This committee has been very disappointed at what appears to be poor progress in developing an effective, economic cruise missile and a satisfactory defense against it. It has been about 10 years since this problem first was called to our attention.

The Navy is not going to agree to my analysis, but a lot of other people will. Could you tell us what you think about the present program?

Secretary WARNER. Mr. Chairman, we agree with you to the extent that we both wish we were further along than we are now. But I think we are developing sound capabilities through the Harpoon, through the Phoenix system, through the CIWS system, through the various point defense systems, and finally through the Aegis that is coming on. Potentially I think we will be able to deal both offensively and defensively with the criuse missile development in naval warfare.

I would like to defer to the admiral for the specifics.

Admiral ZUMWALT. We are about 17 or 18 years behind the Russians with regard to cruise missiles. They got a major strategic headstart over us. I do not think anybody can pretend that we, in retrospect, should not have done better.

I think the judgment back at that time was that our aircraft, being able to operate off of aircraft carriers and to outrange the cruise missile, could deal with it. The problem that was not foreseen at that time is that we will not be able, given the present austerity of budgets, to retain the number of carriers we need, and we therefore must accelerate our progress with regard to acquisition of the Harpoon missile. There is a procurement in this budget which will begin to make it possible to install the first true cruise missile, the Harpoon, on our ships.

Mr. SIKES. This year?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, in fiscal 1975.

Mr. SIKES. Fiscal 1975.

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is a good missile. And we think it important to fund it fully; indeed, if the Congress were going to ask me for areas in which money ought to be added, that would be one of the first that I would recommend.

Mr. SIKES. How much, for what?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would like to provide an answer for the record, sir.

Mr. SIKES. When I say for what, it means what additional numbers.

Admiral ZUMWALT. For additional numbers, yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The present Harpoon program as submitted in the President's budget calls for a pilot line missile quantity of 150 missiles of which at least 58 will be required for operational evaluation and the residual for fleet inventory and deployment. Procurement of Harpoon shipboard and aircraft modification equipment is planned for ——— destroyer escorts (DE) class ships and ——— new production P–3C aircraft. If additional money were added to the Harpoon program, I would propose increasing the pilot line production quantity to a total of 300 missiles, and increasing shipboard modification kit procurement to support a total of ——— ships, and retrofit Harpoon into an additional four P–3C squadrons. To accomplish the expanded program, the additional funds required in the fiscal year 1975 budget would be $76.8 million.

Mr. SIKES. What about defense?

Admiral ZUMWALT. With regard to defense, again we are behind the Russians. With their SA–4 point defense missile system and ——— close in antimissile gun system, they can defend much better against cruise missiles than we can. We are putting our hopes on a combination of electronics capabilities and hard kill systems such as the

Division on Okinawa as ———. With respect to Okinawa the advantages are that:

One. This provides an ideal forward basing posture in a central location in the Western Pacific. This locale permits a rapid response to contingency requirements and their support operation.

Two. The proximity of Marine air and ground combat, combat support and combat service support components enhances the combat readiness/responsiveness of the division.

Three. Adequate facilities to support the 3d Marine Division are in being, including a valuable though limited training and staging area.

The disadvantages associated with Okinawa are that: ———.

Camp Butler Complex

Mr. Giaimo. Camp Butler is a Marine Corps complex of seven locations in Okinawa and one in Japan proper. Its job is to provide training facilities, limited logistics support and limited administrative support for Fleet Marine Force, Pacific units consisting of more than 20,000 troops.

It covers 79.845 acres, is valued at $155 million, and cost the Marine Corps $18 million to operate and maintain in fiscal year 1973. The fiscal year 1974 budget is about $15 million.

Camp Butler is commanded by a brigadier general who is also Deputy Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Pacific (Forward).

The Marine Corps Camp Butler complex in Okinawa and in Japan proper has an authorized base operating strength of more than 3,000 individuals. Approximately half of these are U.S. Marine Corps and Navy military personnel, some provided by tactical units of the Fleet Marine Force. I would like to know why it is necessary to have so many military personnel, including hundreds from tactical units, assigned to operate this base complex, which, as I understand it, provides only limited logistical and administrative support to Fleet Marine Force Units—especially in view of the fact that the principal tactical unit, the 3rd Marine Division, itself has a fairly extensive capability for self-sufficiency in garrison as well as in the field. I would also like you to comment on the total requirement for more than 3,000 individuals to staff the Camp Butler complex.

Are any base consolidations or operating force reductions in prospect for Camp Butler?

General Cushman. I will be glad to provide the information for the record.

[The information follows:]

The word "limited" applies only to administrative support; logistical support provided is essentially the same as that required for a CONUS-based division and the resources devoted to that support are proportionate to those at, say, Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton.

In addtion to real-property maintenance which accounts for over 22 percent of base operating support manpower, major logistical support functions, such as general supply, transportation, and consolidated food and postal services account for 1,059 billets or over one-third of the 3,151 spaces authorized. Military police functions, including the operation of the correctional facility, require 517 billets. The provost marshal has islandwide responsibilities.

The fleet assistance program—FAP—accounts for 754 manpower spaces furnished by tenant commands. The Marine Corps' position regarding base operating support encompasses the view that permanent fixed-site services are base functions while those functions which exist solely because of, or are expanded by, the presence of the tenant command should be provided by, and deploy with, the tenant command. FAP assistance, then, is provided by all fleet marine force units when they are aboard their home bases whether in CONUS or overseas.

When the Marine Corps began moving its forces out of Vietnam, a comprehensive study of manpower requirements for the Camp Butler complex was conducted. As a result, functions such as provost marshal activities, and food and postal services were consolidated at the base level. Although our manpower requirements are continually under review with an eye toward more effective utilization of manpower, the Marine Corps anticipates no further base consolidations or operating force reductions in the western Pacific.

Mr. Sikes. Proceed, Admiral Zumwalt.

Statement of Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Zumwalt. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee.

I. INTRODUCTION

As a basis for my posture statement this year, I have prepared a comprehensive net assessment of U.S. Navy capabilities relative to those of the Soviet Navy. I will present, within this context, the Navy's programs as contained in this year's budget. I will show how these programs have been structured to correct, insofar as possible, the relative weaknesses in our own forces.

This net assessment compares our two navies over a 10-year period—the past 5 and next 5. I will not add here to the testimony that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given to support the requirement for naval power for deterrence to general nuclear war, conventional war, or war limited to conflict at sea. But I feel that this comparison of our relative naval capabilities is particularly appropriate at this time:

(1) Three years ago, I pointed out that this country was—and would be—highly dependent upon petroleum imports. We are witnessing today just how dependent on them we really are.

(2) The industrialized world faces a similar producer consumer imbalance in many raw materials. The United States consumes over a third of the aluminum produced in the world; Western Europe and Japan slightly under a third. Three countries, Australia, Jamaica, and Surinam, produce two-thirds of the non-Communist world's aluminum ore. The United States, Western Europe, and Japan have negligible tin resources, yet these three regions consume over three-fourths of the tin produced in the world.

(3) That same fraction of the world's tin is produced by four other countries: Malaysia, Bolivia, Thailand, and Indonesia.

(4) A third critical resource worthy of our careful consideration is food. Of the five major food producing regions on Earth, only two have any long term exportable food potential—the Soviet Union and North America. If current history is any indicator of future events, then the United States may expect to play a leading role in the world's food supply.

The oil-producing countries have shown the way in taking advantage of a near-monopoly position in a key world industrial resource for greater profits and political gains. The recent meeting of bauxite producers and further activity by the world tin cartel can lead in the same

direction. Condition are also ripe for similar activity by producers of copper, natural rubber, and timber.

I have singled out these three critical resources because they all have two elements in common:

(1) They are primarily transported in ships. Clearly, if we cannot insure the safety and freedom of our sea lines of communication, we must be prepared, in any future conflict, to pay a very heavy price—or to negotiate on terms most favorable to our adversary.

(2) Maritime power is a relevant power factor in the mosaic of political, economical, psychological, and other factors necessary to assure our continued access to seaborne resources in a successful foreign policy.

II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Before I proceed with the net assessment and present the Navy's planned programs, I would like to review with you the history of the change in relative capabilities. I do this so that I might better portray the rationale for my decision to accept near term risk and reduce force levels to fund necessary modernization.

The development of the United States and the U.S.S.R. as super powers has been marked by their differences rather than by their similarities. The United States has always been an island nation dependent on its maritime assets for political influence. Americans have grown up with such a natural dependence on the sea that the majority of our industries and institutions can trace some portions of their origins or development to maritime influences. Our capabilities in the exercise of seapower have paralleled our development as a world power.

Russia has evolved through history as a continental nation, endowed with a great wealth of natural resources and largely independent of sea lines of communications. As a land-oriented people, the Soviets, in their quest for a dominant position in the world order very naturally developed the capabilities of their land forces as a matter of first priority. They then turned logically to the development of their air forces as the necessary complement to their ground force capability. Their navy, on the other hand, was developed as an adjunct to their land forces. It was a force which served to secure the seaward flank of their armies and to protect their limited coastal areas from frontal assault. As Soviet power and influence developed in the international arena and as they acquired offsetting strategic capabilities that would permit them to move into new and more distant spheres of influence, they perceived the need to redress the military balance at sea.

Two unrelated events, which occurred essentially during the same period, gave the Soviet planners the examples they needed to convince their political leaders of the necessity for a reordering of their priorities. In Lebanon in 1958, the U.S. 6th Fleet was able to move our marines ashore with almost complete impunity in an area that is virtually the Soviet backyard. In 1962, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet was able to enforce a turn around of their ships which were transporting land based missiles enroute to Cuba, by demonstrating under the U.S. strategic nuclear superiority, an overwhelming capability to control the sea.

The lesson was learned. The Soviets initiated the most impressive maritime program in history—with the single exception of our own WW II expansion. In the ensuing 10 years they produced a Navy with worldwide competitive capability (Slide No. 1). They have outbuilt us 3½ times.

From their position at the end of World War II, their forces developed a logical sequence. First, they modernized and expanded their naval protective forces and offshore capabilities. Their small, high-speed missile-equipped patrol units became their insurance that we could never again operate at will within range of their continental bases. They rapidly produced a huge attack submarine fleet. To supplement the capability of their submarine forces in the sea denial role, they developed a land based maritime air capability and a family of missile equipped major and minor surface combatants.

Mr. FLOOD. What is the range of that boat?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They vary, sir. The smaller ones, the Osas have a maximum range of ——— nautical miles and Komars are limited to ——— miles, both have a Styx missile which has a 25-mile range.

Mr. SIKES. Before you leave chart 1, this chart shows that the U.S.S.R. and the United States constructed 911 and 263 ships, respectively, from 1962 to 1972. In the areas of major surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, and auxiliaries, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have about the same strength. The major difference is that the U.S.S.R. has 420 minor combatants and 140 mine warfare ships. Would you describe the 420 U.S.S.R. minor combatants? Mr. Flood has touched on that. Tell us more about them. Are these minor combatants generally Osa and Komar coastal missile ships with little or no seagoing potential?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They do include that category of ships, yes, sir. I think the net assessment, as I get into it, will demonstrate that we do not credit those ships with very much capability.

Mr. SIKES. Are they more useful to the Russians than to us?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, they are, because the Russians have merely to cut our sealines, being essentially a land power. We have to be able to get overseas and reinforce our allies and our own forces and bring in our forces.

Mr. FLOOD. Here is something I do not understand. You are always talking about the Russian fleet. During the Romanovs, it was a defensive mechanism. Now they are worldwide. We have to build up the U.S. fleet because the Russians are all over the place. Their allies are in Eastern Europe. What kind of fleet does Yugoslavia or Poland or the others have? We have France. What is the matter—have the British quit? What about all these guys?

Admiral ZUMWALT. First, with regard to the last two major crises we had, the Jordan crisis and the Yom Kippur war, we did not have a single allied ship with us. It was the United States versus the U.S.S.R.

I think it is very important for us to be able to hack it on our own. Second, if we got involved in a NATO war——

Mr. FLOOD. I know you can have a NATO war.

Admiral ZUMWALT [continuing]. We would have some help, but we also would pick up additional responsibilities and liabilities. We think the two just about wash out. The problem is equally tough with regard to a NATO war.

Mr. FLOOD. The British, French, and Japanese fleets cannot be that bad if Russia moved. We will have all the fleets in the world for all purposes, certainly, on our side if we called them up.

Admiral ZUMWALT. In the Jordan crisis and the Yom Kippur war, they were not.

Mr. FLOOD. Of course. What Yom Kippur war?

Admiral ZUMWALT. My point is that the power balance lining up, was, in my judgment——

Mr. FLOOD. The U.S. fleet and Jordan. Wouldn't that be something? Syria, Israel and the U.S. fleet.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, I am referring to the balance of forces between ourselves and the Soviet Union in those two crises.

Mr. FLOOD. I am, too.

Admiral ZUMWALT. In both of them, in my judgment, it was progressively more unfavorable; that is, it was bad in 1970 and worse in the recent Mideast crisis than it was in 1970.

Mr. SIKES. According to the chart, the United States has built no minor combatants from 1962 to 1972. Was that because we did not have a need for them, or did we need other things more?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think our chart shows we have built 17, sir. We built no mine warfare craft.

Mr. SIKES. The question still holds: Why didn't we build more? Because we did not need them?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. We needed more. We did not have adequate budgets to permit us to do it. The same is true with regard to every other category of ships, sir. In other words, in my judgment, we just haven't done enough in the face of a growing Soviet maritime capability.

Mr. FLOOD. Are you still going to use these moth-eaten scows for minesweepers? Wood is no longer essential. A good, fast, modern minesweeper does not have to have oak sides, does it?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We do have to have nonmagnetic substances.

Mr. FLOOD. I understand that.

Admiral ZUMWALT. We are now largely using helicopters. We do have some of the old wooden craft left.

Mr. FLOOD. I know that, but if you were building new surface minesweepers, you would not build them of wood today?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. I think the odds are we would not if we built any more surface mine craft.

Mr. SIKES. Were there any ships and craft built between 1962 and 1972 excluded from the 263 figure shown in this chart?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Not intentionally, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Are Coast Guard vessels shown here?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. These are just naval forces. They do not show our allies and do not show the Coast Guard, nor do they show these categories for the USSR.

Mr. SIKES. Are there staff questions?

Mr. PRESTON. In time of war, the Coast Guard is in the Navy, and it has a number of ships which could serve as escorts.

Secretary WARNER. The Coast Guard has only built, to my knowledge, one major class of ship in that period, the *Hamilton* class, which is a very fine ship, but it is hardly configured to perform much of a combat role. It is about the configuration of our DE 1052 class destroyer escort. They were built down in the Pascagoula yard. It is a gas turbine vessel.

I would like to be on the record in full support of what the admiral just said with respect to the need to continue to build the U.S. fleet.

In response to your good question, Mr. Flood, about the other fleets of the world, I certainly do not perceive in my studies that there is any impetus in any of these countries to initiate major naval programs.

To the contrary, in my judgment, they are diminishing in size and in importance. The Japanese fleet is negligible.

Mr. FLOOD. That is our fault.

Secretary WARNER. Well, that is a separate question.

The British are doing the best they can with very restricted assets. Their construction programs are projected to fall behind in time now, if I understand the latest forecasts.

Mr. FLOOD. What are the Italians doing down in the Mediterranean?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They have missile cruisers and destroyers. They have a few submarines. In a NATO war, they could be used in the vicinity of Italy to keep that fraction of the sea line open.

Mr. FLOOD. If you have guided missile cruisers and submarines in the Mediterranean, I would settle for that.

Mr. EDWARDS. Are these Italian ships American-made or Italian-made?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They have American missile systems but are Italian-made, as I recall.

Mr. SIKES. Proceed, please.

CONTINUATION OF CNO'S STATEMENT

Admiral ZUMWALT. [Slide No. 2] To make these ships and aircraft a viable threat to our more sophisticated Navy, they expanded and modernized their anti-ship missiles. As you can see, they have progressed from the inventory of [deleted] missiles and they are still growing. They can bring them to bear from submarines, surface ships and aircraft, and can strike targets at ranges anywhere from 30 to 300 miles.

This family of missile systems produced a major strategic shift, making every platform which carries anti-ship missiles into a significant offensive platform.

Their next move was to expand the range of their influence by acquiring base and usage rights in foreign countries to permit the extension of ships and vital land-based naval air power into wider reaches of the world. Their political system has made them much more successful in this acquisition during recent years than we have been. We have witnessed dramatic increases in Soviet access to or control of strategic places overseas. This development is traced in greater detail in addendum II to this statement.

The final step in this sequential development, the one in which they are presently engaged, is the development of a projection capability in the form of both sea-based air and naval infantry with associated amphibious lift.

During this post World War II period of Soviet naval expansion, events conspired to prevent adequate modernization of U.S. naval forces. We ended World War II in a position of overwhelming naval superiority and hence felt no requirement to modernize our fleet then. We fought the Korean war with World War II ships and had inadequate funds during the war to modernize appropriately. In the post-Korean war period, we began the expenditure of vast sums for the urgently needed strategic Polaris submarine fleet. Again, we devoted inadequate sums to modernization of the rest of the fleet. Next began the decade-long period when our forces were heavily engaged in Southeast Asia while we continued to fulfill our commitments in other areas of the world. The result was that with heavy operational expenses, there was again heavy downward pressure on money available for modernization of our fleet.

Mr. FLOOD. Outside of Holy Loch in the Atlantic and Rota in the Mediterranean, is there any place in the world that we can take care of our nuclear subs for any purpose at all?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. We have a tender support facility in La Maddalena where we support SSN's.

Mr. FLOOD. What about the Pacific?

Admiral ZUMWALT. In the Pacific overseas, Yokosuka, and of course, Guam.

Adding to the problem of an already aging fleet, was the need to defer much of our ship and aircraft maintenance because of scheduling and material priority revisions associated with the conflict. And, compounding the problem, was the forced drawdown of our ammunition and supplies.

Mr. SIKES. Chart 2 shows that the U.S.S.R. has about ——— antiship missiles. How many Soviet ships, submarines, and aircraft carry these missiles?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I will have to provide that for the record. Generally, about one-fourth of their general purpose submarines, nearly 30 percent of their major and significant minor surface combatants, and the majority of their naval strike aircraft.

Mr. SIKES. Are these primarily on the coastal-type ships?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. For example, their new *Kara* class cruiser has three different missile systems on it—eight antiship missile rails and eight antiair missile launch rails. As I have just pointed out, a large number of their ocean-going combatants are equipped with antiship missiles.

Mr. FLOOD. Have they any helicopters or any kind of aircraft on the fantail of any ships at all?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. They have two half-deck carriers, *Leningrad* and *Moskva*.

Mr. FLOOD. I do not mean a carrier type. I mean regular ships of the line.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. The *Kara*, the *Kresta I* and *II* classes, the command and control *Sverdlov* class, and the modified *Kashin* class can operate helicopters from their fantail platforms.

Mr. SIKES. Insofar as you can, provide for the record a breakdown showing the approximate number of coastal ships and oceangoing ships that have antiship missiles.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The Soviets have ——— submarines, ——— major surface combatants, and ——— patrol boats which carry antiship missiles. The submarines, major combatants, and ——— patrol boats are oceangoing; the other ——— patrol boats are coastal.

ANTISHIP MISSILES DEPLOYED ON U.S. SHIPS

Mr. SIKES. How many antiship missiles are deployed on U.S. ships, submarines, and aircraft? I am talking about antiship missiles of all kinds that are operational today—Terrier, Tartar, Talos, Standard ARM, and so forth.

Admiral ZUMWALT. We will have to provide that for the record. It is a very modest number that have a surface capability, much less than the Russians.

Mr. SIKES. Offhand, 10 percent, or 20 percent?

Admiral ZUMWALT. None of our submarines. My guess would be about 10 percent of our surface ships and none of our aircraft.

[The information follows:]

All 77 of the Navy's surface missiile ships equipped with the Tartar, Terrier and Talos surface-to-air missile systems have a modest antiship missile capability which is limited to the radar horizon. This can vary from 12 to 19 miles depending on target size. Additioinally, six nonmissile destroyer escorts and two patrol gunboats are equipped with the semiactive Standard medium range missile which limits their capability to the radar horizon. Two other patrol gunboats have been equipped with Standard antiradiation (ARM) missiles which provide an antiship capability extending beyond ——— nautical miles.

No submarines are equipped with antiship missiles at this time.

There are no air launched antiship missiles in the inventory.

Mr. FLOOD. Do any of their subs have deck space for helicopters?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, I do not believe their subs do.

Mr. FLOOD. Have any of ours?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir.

Mr. SIKES. How many antiship missiles would be carried by U.S. ships?

Admiral ZUMWALT. That varies by the type of ship, sir.

Mr. PRESTON. What is the total number which would compare with the ——— figure that you used for the U.S.S.R.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I get into that in subsequent slides, in totals with regard to offensive and defensive. I will have to provide the specific answer to that question for the record.

[The information follows:]

——— Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles are presently planned for use in our surface ships. In addition to Harpoon, ——— Standard antiradiation missiles will be deployed in a limited number of surface ships.

LIFE EXPECTANCY OF MISSILES

Mr. FLOOD. As against ordinary artillery projectile ammunition for storage on board ship or on land, what is the life expectancy of these fancy new guided cruise missiles?

of those tactical units in Thailand. I merely had operational control of those Thai-based tactical units.

Then when the 7th AF, now called USSAG/7th AF, was moved from Vietnam up to Nakhon Phanom, the 13th ADVON stayed at Udorn and continued that logistics and administrative function, but in a reduced way.

It is a small headquarters, I do not know how many people, maybe 60.

The first headquarters to go out will be that USSAG/7th. It is an operational——

Mr. FLYNT. And the functions of the 7th and 13th will be combined?

General BROWN. Yes, sir, in reality they are now. That outfit at Udorn only concerns itself with the welfare of those tactical unit people.

The outfit in Nakhon Phanom concerns itself with the operations of the units throughout the area. It is a unified headquarters, it is not just an Air Force headquarters as such.

[The information follows:]

There are not really two numbered Air Forces Headquarters. Seventh Air Force is integrated into the joint organization, United States Support Activities Group (USSAG), at Nakhon Phanom AB. Thus, the organization is known as "USSAG/7AF." The mission of this temporary joint command is contingency planning. It has operational control of remaining forces in Thailand. As the situation in Southeast Asia stabilizes, this entire headquarters will be disestablished, and any appropriate remaining Air Force functions will be absorbed by the Air Force command structure which remains.

On the other hand, 13th Air Force Advance Echelon (13AF ADVON) (formerly 7/13AF) is part of Headquarters 13th Air Force at Clark AB, Philippines. which is the permanent Air Force regional headquarters. The ADVON element is small—56 positions are authorized. It is now devoted to those matters which are a unilateral Air Force responsibility: command—less operational control—administration; logistic support; and training for Pacific Air Forces units in Thailand. This organization will have major Air Force management responsilities during the withdrawal of Air Force units from the Royal Thai Air Force bases, both for the movement of the units and for the complex problem of turning over facilities to the Thai Government. When these functions are complete. this headquarters will also phase down or be disestablished, depending on the situation, since it is part of our permanent regional Air Force headquarters.

DEVELOPMENT OF BASES IN THE MARIANAS

Mr. FLYNT. There are indications in the military construction requests that substantial expansion of U.S. Air Force bases on Guam and Tinian and perhaps on other islands in Oceania may be in prospect. Since a major base complex in the Marianas, Marshals, or Carolines would ultimately entail operating costs of considerable magnitude, it is necessary to know what development is envisaged for this region.

Would you please discuss the prospects for base expansion and developments in the Marianas and other island groups in Oceania from the Air Force point of view, with time and cost estimates wherever possible?

General BROWN. I would like to refer that to executive session if I may.

Mr. FLYNT. Fine.

General BROWN. I can respond more fully.

Mr. FLYNT. Also for the record, would you please address such a move from the standpoint of our bases in Japan proper and Okinawa? What plans do you have for closing either or both of these?

General BROWN. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Basing in the Marianas District, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, is currently in the planning stage. Specifically, the Air Force, as Executive Agent for the Department of Defense, has implemented the Defense Department approved programing plan ———.

There are no current plans or intentions to close Air Force bases in Japan proper or Okinawa.

Mr. FLYNT. Do you have any plans underway to make changes in your overseas headquarters structures in addition to those that you have already explained to us.

General BROWN. Yes, we do, but not until we get the unified structure set. When the Secretary of Defense decides on the JCS recommendation, we will reexamine structuring of our headquarters to support that plan. If changes are required we will so recommend to the Secretary of the Air Force for his consideration.

THE 3D AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mr. FLYNT. Would you describe briefly and expand for the record the justification for the 3d Air Force headquarters?

General BROWN. The 3d Air Force in England?

Mr. FLYNT. Yes.

General BROWN. The 3d Air Force Headquarters is at a strength of about 60 people.

It supervises the training and readiness of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) units stationed in the United Kingdom. It is just too far from Ramstein for Headquarters USAFE to supervise the daily training and work which is entailed.

All of the normal administrative staff supervision, chaplain, legal, finance, comptroller, civil engineering and so on is done from USAFE headquarters at Ramstein. 3d Air Force headquarters concentrates on operations and training.

Mr. FLYNT. And you do not feel that communications at this time are sufficient to control the command functions?

General BROWN. We have communications. It is presence of people that we need.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. General Brown, in response to your last answer, I would have to come back with the point that you have an Air Force in Japan which has none of its units in Japan, one of its major units in Korea and the other one I believe on Okinawa. The distances between Tokyo, Japan to Okinawa and Seoul with its units of the 5th Air Force, is greater than the distance between USAFE headquarters and England.

General BROWN. Well, we could probably—I do not know your name—but we could probably call the unit in the 3d Air Force a division or we could call the division in Korea a numbered Air Force if that would make you happier.