

U. S. CONGRESS. SENATE.

BRIEFINGS ON DIEGO GARCIA AND PATROL FRIGATE

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

WITH

**ADM. ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR., U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS**

[Executive hearings held on April 11, 1974; made public
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[NOTE.—Sections of these hearings were deleted in the interests of national security. Deleted portions are indicated by the notation [Deleted].]

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(III)

BRIEFING ON DIEGO GARCIA

THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1974

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol Building. Senator John Sparkman, presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Pell, Muskie, McGovern, Humphrey, and Javits.

Also present: Ned C. Wolfe, State Department representative (PM/ISO); Dr. Robert K. Wolthuis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

OPENING STATEMENT

We have asked Admiral Zumwalt to come up here today to review with us the matter of Diego Garcia. Let me say I am going to have to leave at 3:30, so if I have to go, Admiral, you will understand.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sorry Senator Case is not here. Admiral, you know that Senator Case has an amendment regarding this, which would require that before we took over or arranged to take over any installation from another country, there would have to be worked out a definite agreement. I presume he means a treaty. I do not know that he does, but he limits it to those facilities with over 500 in personnel. He says he is not opposed to having a station there, where ships could refuel and reconnoiter and observe and things of that kind. If he comes in, I am sure he will tell you just what he thinks. So I thought it would be well for you to come up here and give us some information about just what this is, and what the proposal is.

April 17, 1974.

[Editor's note: Senator Case expressed his regret that a previously scheduled meeting of the Transportation Subcommittee, of which he is ranking member, required his presence there. He expressed also appreciation to Admiral Zumwalt for having previously briefed him on Diego Garcia in the Senator's office. Having read this transcript, Senator Case expresses his appreciation to Senator Javits, Senator Humphrey, and Senator Muskie for having emphasized, and agreed with, Senator Case's position that an agreement for the establishment of the new facility at Diego Garcia should be presented to the Congress for approval pursuant to the amendment Senator Case has offered to the Department authorization bill for fiscal year 1975, now pending before the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Case underscored that support for such congressional participation in no way indicated disapproval of the proposed installation.]

STATEMENT OF ADM. ELMO ZUMWALT, JR., U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. EDWIN K. SNYDER, CAPT. JAMES J. McHUGH, CAPT. HAROLD L. TERRY, CAPT. WILLIAM A. COCKELL, JR., AND COMDR. JOHN C. WINSLETT, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Admiral ZUMWALT. All right, sir. I have a written statement, if you think it would be helpful.

Senator SPARKMAN. Fine; you use it as you see fit. We will put the whole statement in the record. Will you identify those who accompany you?

PERSONS ACCOMPANYING ADMIRAL ZUMWALT

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; I am accompanied by Rear Admiral Snyder, our Director of Legislative Affairs, and Captain McHugh, Captain Cockell, and Captain Terry, Commander Winslett in the rear. The other two gentlemen—

Mr. WOLFE. I have been asked to come from the State Department. I understand I was cleared, sir. Ned Wolfe.

Dr. WOLTHUIS. Bob Wolhuis from DOD Legislative Affairs.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate very much this opportunity to discuss with you the Navy's plans for Diego Garcia. In earlier hearings before other congressional committees, witnesses from the Departments of State and Defense have described in some detail the range and history of U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean and the general strategic rationale for our military presence there.

U.S. INTERESTS IN INDIAN OCEAN

Those interests relate mainly to the area's key resources, and to the transportation routes which carry them to the United States, its friends and its allies. My remarks today will focus not only on those interests but also on the need to provide ourselves an adequate capability to respond to military contingencies affecting our interests and the significant, increasing ability of the Soviet Union to threaten those interests.

Recent events such as the Arab-Israeli war, the oil embargo, and the worldwide economic dislocations which flowed from that embargo and ensuing price rises, have served to focus attention on the Indian Ocean area. The impacts of these events have brought home clearly the interrelationship between what goes on in the Indian Ocean area and the well-being of the rest of the world.

I think it is evident, as a result of that experience, that our interests in the Indian Ocean are directly linked with our interests in Europe and Asia; and, more broadly, with our fundamental interest in maintaining a stable worldwide balance of power. In this interdependent world, events in the Indian Ocean cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be assessed in terms of their impact in other areas of key importance to the United States. Our traditional, strategic view of the Indian Ocean necessarily has been changed.

In the judgment of many observers, the Indian Ocean has become an area with the potential to influence major shifts in the global power balance. It follows from that, that we must have

the ability to influence events in that area; and the capability to deploy our military power in the region is an essential element of such influence. That in my judgment, is the crux of the rationale for what we are planning to do at Diego Garcia.

NECESSITY OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES

For the United States, the projection of military power into the Indian Ocean necessarily implies naval forces, and that is one of the keys to understanding the nature of our proposal for Diego Garcia. In assessing this proposal, a principal point I think we should keep in mind is that the Diego Garcia facilities are intended to support naval forces. This is understandable, given the geographic realities of the situation. Other major powers of the Eurasian land mass, in much closer proximity to the Indian Ocean, can reach it via relatively short air or land routes and so are well situated to influence events along the littoral. For the United States, with no land bridge and only the longest and most tenuous of air routes, the most efficient means of reaching the countries of the region directly is by sea—our only direct link to the area.

U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

As you are aware, the Navy has been in the Indian Ocean area for many years. Since the late 1940's we have maintained a small naval presence based in the Persian Gulf, called the Mideast Force. This force consists of a flagship stationed in Bahrain and two destroyers or destroyer escorts on rotational assignments from other areas.

It is too small to give us any significant military capability, but it has served an important diplomatic purpose by providing a tangible symbol of United States interest in the area. From time to time, we have sailed additional ships into the Indian Ocean for training or port visits. The Secretary of Defense recently indicated that this pattern of regular visits will be restored.

BURDEN OF SUPPORTING CARRIER TASK FORCES

In addition to these visits, the United States twice in the past 3 years has sent carrier task forces into the Indian Ocean for extended operations. These deployments were not occasioned by or aimed at any other naval forces in the area, but were designed to support American foreign policy, express our determination to preserve a stable power balance in the region, and backstop United States diplomatic initiatives.

Yet, both these carrier deployments imposed a severe strain on our support capabilities. In order to maintain the task forces, we had to draw upon a substantial portion of the oilers and other support ships available to the Seventh Fleet, thus seriously impairing our ability to support forces in the Western Pacific or elsewhere. Since we were not actually engaged in hostilities, the pace of operations was comparatively slow and there was no threat to our vulnerable, 4,000-mile supply line from Subic Bay in the Philippines. But even in these favorable circumstances the requirements for operating these modest forces

constituted a heavy burden on our scarce mobile logistics support ships. In a combat environment, the burden would have been far heavier, and the demands on our resources would have reduced our ability to act in other areas even further.

NECESSITY OF MINIMAL SUPPORT FACILITY

Consequently, we believe the experience of last fall and of 1971 provided a rather blunt warning that if we are to have an effective, reliable and economic capability to deploy naval forces in times of crisis, we must provide ourselves with a minimal support facility in the area. Without it, we would soon find that we had stripped ourselves of the potential for bringing to bear in the Indian Ocean that part of our military forces which would be most effective and hence, most credible: our naval power.

Diego Garcia is ideal for supporting such deployments in a number of respects. It is centrally located, uninhabited, and politically accessible under our existing agreements with the British; yet it is far enough from the Asian land mass so as not to threaten, or even give the appearance of threatening, any country. As a result, it would satisfy our operational needs without encountering the political liabilities which would be associated with operations from or over some of the littoral states. This, we believe, makes our plans for it consistent with the Nixon doctrine since construction of these facilities will not involve us in the affairs of littoral nations.

PROPOSED FACILITIES ON DIEGO GARCIA

We propose to build facilities on Diego Garcia which would provide limited support for a flexible range of activities including aircraft maintenance, bunkering, aircraft staging, and improved communications. It would also provide for the operation of ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare] aircraft in support of naval forces. I would like to emphasize the modest character of the facilities which would be derived from the \$29 million supplemental request:

The fuel storage capability would be approximately equal to that provided by three Navy oilers:

There would be no ship-maintenance facility, but ships would be able to tie up to perform their own repairs:

Personnel quarters would accommodate approximately 600 men.

The aircraft maintenance facility would consist of a single, air-transportable hangar, and would make possible such repairs as an emergency change of engines:

The existing 8,000-foot runway would be lengthened and the aircraft parking area expanded, permitting it to service ASW flights in support of naval forces.

There has been some speculation about the use of Diego Garcia for use by strategic aircraft. I should emphasize that we are not designing this facility for support of B-52 operations. Were this our intent, we would be asking the Congress for a substantially greater expansion of the airstrip and associated parking and maintenance areas. The important point, however, is that even the theoretical capability to do

so would be so severely limited as to be militarily inconsequential under the plans we have submitted to Congress for approval.

We believe that if we are to have an assured capability to deploy and support U.S. forces into the Indian Ocean area without seriously reducing the logistics readiness of our deployed forces in other parts of the world, the facilities we now propose at Diego Garcia are essential.

I think it is important to keep in mind that the upgrading of Diego Garcia does not in itself postulate any given deployment of forces, but will significantly enhance our capability to operate naval forces in the Indian Ocean to the extent such deployments are required by national policy.

SOVIET BUILDUP IN INDIAN OCEAN AREA

The Soviets recognized the growing importance of the Indian Ocean area some time ago. Indeed, I would say their perceptions of this antedated our own. Since 1968 we have seen a pattern of steady buildup in the Soviet naval presence, in Soviet military assistance to some of the littoral states, and in the Soviet infrastructure for support of military operations in the Indian Ocean.

It is reasonable to conclude that the Soviets' plans for the expansion of these capabilities are based on perceptions of their own interests and objectives in the region and are not driven predominantly by U.S. activity in the area. This is borne out by the fact that the rate of Soviet buildup has increased steadily throughout the period while our own activity has remained at a relatively low level.

As a result of this buildup, the Soviets possess a support system in the area that greatly surpasses that of the United States. Let me provide some examples.

The Soviets have established fleet anchorages in several locations north and south of the Island of Socotra, where an airfield provides a potential Soviet base for reconnaissance or other aircraft. They have been improving this airfield.

In addition, they have established anchorages in the Chagos Archipelago, including the installation of permanent mooring buoys. (They have done this in other areas around the Indian Ocean littoral, as well.)

They have built a communications station near the Somali port of Berbera to provide support for their fleet. At the same time, they have increased their use of, and are expanding naval facilities at Berbera, which currently include a restricted area under Soviet control, a combined barracks and repair ship and housing for Soviet military dependents.

We believe they may have over 2,000 personnel ashore there in Somalia, and up to 250 dependents.

In addition, they are engaged in building a new military airfield near Mogadiscio, which could be used for a variety of missions.

Soviet naval combatants and support ships have had access to the expanded Iraqi naval port of Umm Qasr, where facilities are being built with the assistance of Soviet technicians. In my personal opinion, these facilities are considerably more extensive than any which would be required for Iraqi needs alone.

The Soviets have been extended the use of port facilities at the former British base at Aden, and air facilities at the former Royal Air Force field nearby. They maintain personnel ashore in both locations. In addition, they use the Port of Aden for refueling, replenishment, and minor repairs.

Since 1971, Soviet naval units have been engaged in harbor clearance operations at Chittagong, Bangladesh.

SOVIET WORLDWIDE EXPANSION PROGRAM

In addition to their regional support facilities in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets are embarked on a worldwide program to expand bunkering and visit rights for their naval, merchant, and fishing fleets.

Since Soviet merchant vessels are frequently employed for logistics support of Soviet naval forces, the establishment of merchant bunkering facilities expands the Soviet Navy's logistics infrastructure. The Soviets have recently secured bunkering rights in Mauritius and Singapore and have made approaches to other western-oriented and non-aligned countries.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

In summary, Soviet support initiatives and the tempo of their naval activity in the Indian Ocean since 1968 have expanded at a deliberate pace which cannot be related, either in time or in scope, to any comparable expansion of the U.S. activity. The Soviets' logistics arrangements are designed to support their own strategic objectives in the area.

In my judgment, those objectives relate primarily to the expansion of Soviet influence with the countries of the region; the enhancement of the Soviet image as a great power; and the checking of Chinese political influence through the expansion of Soviet power to China's southern flank.

But most significant, from our point of view, is what appears to be the Soviet awareness that the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf, and the sea lanes over which they must pass to the economies of the world, are of absolutely vital importance to our most important allies, and are of growing importance to us. Japan depends on the gulf for 85 percent of its oil; Europe for well over one-half; and it is estimated that by 1980, we could be importing up to 50 percent of our oil from the region unless policies we are just now setting in motion can substantially reduce that dependency. In contrast, the Soviet Union is virtually self-sufficient in oil, and the Indian Ocean littoral consequently is of considerably less economic importance to Moscow than to the non-Communist industrialized societies.

It cannot have escaped the Soviets' attention that in these circumstances, any nation which is able to project significant naval power into the Indian Ocean automatically acquires considerable influence with the littoral countries as well as with those countries elsewhere which depend on its oil resources and ocean trade routes. It is in this context that I note that the U.S.S.R.'s military logistics infrastructure already is capable of supporting a much greater presence than now exists, and I expect their presence to keep growing regardless of

what we do at Diego Garcia. When their transit routes are considerably shortened by the opening of the Suez Canal, and considering their existing shore facilities and growing capabilities for mobile logistics support, I would expect them to be able to support an extensive force in the basin.

OBJECTIVE OF U.S. PLANS FOR AREA

In a similar fashion, our own plans for the area are a product of our interests, and our perception of the growing strategic significance of the Indian Ocean area. This, coupled with the importance of our interests in the area, has led us to the conclusion that we must have at least the rudiments of a shore-based capability to support U.S. naval forces in that part of the world. A stable U.S. naval presence and a credible contingency support capability would provide us flexible means with which to express our support for friendly governments along the littoral, underline the importance we attach to uninterrupted movement of oil and other commodities on the high seas, provide deterrence against harassment of sealanes and international straits, insure the continued free movement of U.S. ships and aircraft into and out of the area, and help to preserve a stable balance of power in the region. Rather than waiting until a threatening situation develops and then reacting, we believe that the minimum of prudent action now can help forestall such situations and thus avoid the need for military situations which could be costly and dangerous. Otherwise, we fear that a substantial Soviet presence in an area of great importance to us would come to be regarded as a normal and acceptable part of the political landscape, while any augmentation of our forces from their present levels might be regarded as unacceptable if not provocative. We might then find ourselves being squeezed out of the Indian Ocean area as a consequence of a lack of forethought on our part, while Soviet influence would grow over those nations which heretofore have been important and friendly to us.

SUMMARY

In summary, gentlemen, what we are proposing for Diego Garcia is primarily a capability for limited logistics support of forces that may be sent into the Indian Ocean in contingencies, or for periodic deployments. In this sense, it represents a prudent precautionary move to insure that we have the capability to operate our forces effectively in an area of increasing strategic importance to the United States and its allies.

Second, as I pointed out earlier, while Soviet activity adds to the rationale for Diego Garcia, that rationale would exist independently of anything the Soviets are doing. We have very important interests in the area. It has become a focal point of our foreign and economic policies and has a growing impact on our security.

Prudence would suggest that we provide support for our diplomacy by having a credible capability to deploy military power into the area. Such capability should contribute to the stability of the region over the long run.

Finally, the geopolitical asymmetries between the United States and the Soviet Union must be kept in mind in assessing the relative importance to the two countries of the capability to operate naval forces in the region.

This is the most important military fact. Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Union dominates the Eurasian land mass. It has borders with some key Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. Its land-based forces can already be brought to bear in the region.

The United States, on the other hand, can project its military power into the area only by sea and air, and over great distances.

The Soviet Union, in sum, has the geographical proximity necessary to influence events in the Indian Ocean littoral, without the employment of naval forces, if necessary. We do not. The interdependent free world must increasingly depend on the resources of the Indian Ocean area. The Soviets need not. Limiting our capabilities to operate naval forces effectively in the region would not, in my judgment, be in the U.S. interest, and would clearly put us at a disadvantage in the region.

In my view, the Diego Garcia plans now before the Congress represent the most reasonable, economical, and prudent solution to the problem of supporting our naval operations in the Indian Ocean on such occasions as we may be required to deploy our forces into that area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Admiral, for a very clear statement.

PROPOSED IMPROVEMENT

Can you give us some idea as to what is going to be done on this island?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. It is an important point, Mr. Chairman, because we already have there a facility.

Senator SPARKMAN. What does that consist of?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We have a communications station which is supported by an 8,000-foot airfield, with some other minor facilities, including a very small dredged area. We also have under construction a very small fuel storage capability which will give us, when it is completed, a capacity of roughly 60,000 barrels. What we are proposing is that with the \$29 million in this supplemental, plus \$3.3 million in the 1975 budget and a plan for only \$5.3 million more in 1976, that we would extend the present 8,000 foot strip by another 4,000 feet. We would add to the fuel storage sufficiently to have the equivalent of about three tanker loads of fuel there, an additional 460,000 barrels. We would increase the dredged area by an amount indicated by the flip, you can see that deep blue would be enlarged by the amount encompassed in the dotted blue inside the lagoon so instead of that very small turning basin we would have sufficient room to anchor the ship of a carrier task force, for example.

So that this is an incremental improvement to an existing facility making it possible, therefore, to better support ships which may have to be sent in from time to time in response to foreign policy.

NUMBER OF MEN INVOLVED

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you know now how many men would be involved in the setup?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. There are at the present time about 274 there, and we are asking for facilities that would make it possible to increase the number to house about 600. Probably about 570 would be stationed there under present plans.

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to say this so far as I am concerned. I have felt ever since the British pulled out of that area of the world that we ought to go in. I do not mean by that we should build a mighty fortress out there, but at least we ought to have a presence in the Indian Ocean. It seems to me that this, while modest, is a very good location for it.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. As the Admiral knows, I have the highest regard and respect for him, but in this issue I do not agree with him.

[A recess was taken.]

SUMMARY OF ADMIRAL ZUMWALT'S PRESENTATION

Senator MUSKIE. While the others are coming in, I wonder if you could summarize briefly what you told the committee because I missed part of your presentation.

Admiral ZUMWALT. The essence of my brief was to mention what our very small presence has been over the years in the Indian Ocean going back to the forties, a very small presence, in the face of Soviet presence which has increased gradually since 1968.

I cited the need for an occasional presence in there, the fact that the Secretary of Defense has now asked us to resume the visits that have been interrupted because of the South Vietnam War. I discussed the two occasions when naval forces were sent down there during periods of crisis management to show general support and to demonstrate interest from a foreign policy standpoint, and then the fact that Diego Garcia which already has existing facilities, if we can add this relatively small increment to them, will make it possible to sustain better those forces.

We found in the recent Mideast crisis that to keep our forces there required that we draw down on the logistics ships that would normally be employed supporting the ships in the western Pacific and we were fairly exposed over very long supply lines going back 4,000 miles back to the Subic Bay in the Philippines and would not have been able to have reacted from a logistics support standpoint in the event of another crisis in the western Pacific as we were drawn down to such an extent to support these Indian Ocean forces.

The statement demonstrates that there is an asymmetry between the Soviets and ourselves. Their capability to deploy armies and air forces north of the littoral nations gives them a presence there whether or not they put their Navy in and that in spite of that asymmetrical advantage, they have had this impressive increase in their naval presence.

We, on the other hand, can only demonstrate a presence by naval forces because we have no place from which we can get there otherwise. It is on the other side of the world to us.

So that looking at it in a "Navy to Navy" lineup is really overlooking the advantage the Soviets have from their land presence.

Senator MUSKIE. Thank you. I did not want to intrude on Senator Pell's questions. I wanted while we were waiting to have this summary.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

ZONE OF PEACE CONCEPT

Senator PELL. I guess the best way to try to find out the cause of the division of viewpoint between us, Admiral, is to inquire why is it that you believe, as you say, that the Indian concept primarily, but other nations in the area too, of a zone of peace in the area is a very dangerous concept. Why do you believe to have the Indian Ocean area basically peaceful, relatively weapon free, is not a good thing or is dangerous?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The concept of abandoning an area of international ocean we think can play into the asymmetry of power that favors the Soviets with their land and air forces north of those littoral nations. If I were the Soviets I would think that that would be a very wonderful deal.

Senator PELL. How can we abandon an area where we never have been?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We have, sir, operated there since the 1940's with our Mideast force.

Senator PELL. Right.

Admiral ZUMWALT. And have reinforced in crisis periods and, I think, have had an effective impact on the foreign policy outcome.

Senator PELL. How can we be abandoning an area if we just keep the present facility which we have at Diego Garcia in being and have the movement of our ships in and out? What you are suggesting is expanding?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. I guess I made the point with regard to the abandonment. With regard to the expansion the Soviets have already built infrastructure in three nations, Somalia, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and in Iraq, which is superior in each nation to what we are now asking to do at Diego Garcia so they already have the capability to serve and support large naval forces and we do not, and this would mean that in any kind of a crisis we would be much more severely constrained than they in regard to supporting operations.

Senator PELL. Right.

SOVIET PERSONNEL IN SOMALIA

Keeping the questioning if I can, as factual as possible, which is sometimes difficult, these areas you are talking about, Somalia—Berbera—

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. Can you say how many people are there now?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We say that we believe there are at least 2,000 Soviet personnel in Somalia. The intelligence estimate that I saw was 2,600 and there are at least 150 families ashore.

Senator PELL. Which intelligence estimate did you see?

Admiral ZUMWALT. This was, I believe, a Defense Intelligence Agency estimate.

Senator PELL. There are other intelligence agencies. Is this the combined estimate of the intelligence community?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, I believe there is no disagreement of that number [deleted]. The Soviet acquisition of presence in Somalia over time is a most impressive example of the use of military-political techniques on their part to change Somalia from a nonaligned state and to bring her into the status of a client nation.

Senator PELL. Right. Specifically talking about Berbera, I too have had the benefit of some intelligence briefings which present a different picture, about [deleted] somewhat smaller establishment than your briefing gave you. So I guess part of the problem is we are going from different sets of facts.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator, I think we can establish that it is an actual fact that the intelligence community of the United States agrees that there are at least 2,000 Soviets ashore in Somalia.

Senator PELL. Excuse me, in Berbera or Somalia overall?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The total number in-country may now, according to my latest report, exceed 2,500. My recollection is that many of those are in Berbera. [Deleted] technicians and construction workers have been reported to be involved with construction of a new air base near Mogadiscio.

SOVIET PERSONNEL IN BERBERA

Senator PELL. I am talking about Berbera.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will you excuse me a minute? I have to go; it is past time for me to leave. If you will carry right on, I would appreciate it.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

Senator PELL. I am talking about Berbera.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. And your recollection is there are how many on Berbera?

Admiral ZUMWALT. [Deleted.]

Senator PELL. What are these [deleted] people doing?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I will have to provide that for the record. [The information referred to follows:]

SOVIET PROJECTS IN BERBERA AREA

[Supplied by Department of Navy]

There are a number of Soviet aid projects in the area as well as the facilities they operate for their own use. They are [deleted] continuing to expand the port facilities, building a culinary water system and family housing ashore, and continuing some minor construction at the airfield. These projects are in addition to manning the naval communications facilities and providing support to the Soviet ships and submarines which visit regularly. The combined barracks and repair ship they maintain in Berbera can house 200 to 300 personnel, and reports that

they are building housing ashore may indicate that personnel, present or planned, exceed that number.

Senator PELL. Again, their communication facilities, as you people should know, consists of [deleted] and then some distance apart, a couple of miles apart, [deleted].

Admiral ZUMWALT. Similar to the ones we have at Diego Garcia. Senator PELL. Each of them [deleted] approximately basing out in the bay living on the barracks boat.

Something is confusing here. I had the privilege of debating with Congressman Stratton yesterday and his figures showed 2,500 people in Berbera. There is an awful difference between 2,500 and [deleted] and I really wish you would go back to the intelligence community and submit to the record for us whether it is the honest estimate of the whole intelligence community that it is [deleted] or 2,500.

[The information referred to follows.]

BREAKOUT OF SOVIET PERSONNEL IN SOMALIA

[Supplied by Department of Navy]

We have no current reports from Somalia which break out personnel in Berbera separately; however, we believe it numbers in the hundreds.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Let me state now there can be no doubt [deleted] that the Soviets have naval facilities in Berbera superior to what we have today in Diego Garcia and that they have communications facilities at least the equal of ours capable of communicating with all of their fleet throughout the Indian Ocean and they are [deleted] constructing an airfield which will be the full equivalent of what we will have if we got the money to complete ours at Diego Garcia, and this is just one-third of their infrastructure, if you look at the other two countries.

Senator PELL. How long have they been constructing that?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The construction, as I recall, began in early 1973.

Senator PELL. We began ours 2 years ago and it has gone very slowly. I really think we ought to get our sources together on this.

SOVIET FACILITIES IN YEMEN

Where was the other, the second country? Socotra, is that Yemen? Admiral ZUMWALT. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen includes both the Port of Aden and the island of Socotra. There in Aden they had the old British naval facility already constructed and the old Royal Air Force field already constructed. They have been using that and they have small numbers of Soviet personnel ashore there. In addition, they have been anchoring both north and south of the island of Socotra and there is evidence they are improving but have not yet used the airfield on Socotra.

Senator PELL. How many buildings are there on Socotra?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I do not believe there is any significant building of any type.

Senator PELL. Exactly.

Admiral ZUMWALT. It will be the kind of airfield in which they could move quickly with mobile capability.

Senator PELL. It has the potential but not actual use.

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is right.

Senator PELL. It is mainly used as an anchorage, as you suggested earlier. How many people are there living in Socotra?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I cannot—there are no permanent personnel on the island.

SOVIET FACILITIES IN IRAQ

Senator PELL. Where is the other facility that you were talking about?

Admiral ZUMWALT. In the country of Iraq, the Soviets have participated in the construction of several airfields and have improved the Port of Umm Qasr. They have operated out of the Port of Umm Qasr and they have advisers there.

Senator PELL. Do you believe there are any Soviet personnel stationed there?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, I believe there are Soviet personnel ashore.

Senator PELL. How many are there?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think it is a very small number.

Senator PELL. How many?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I have no idea, but I would guess it is less than [deleted]. You see, there they have the advantage in both Iraq and Berbera in that the ports are operating ports. They do not need the labor support that we would need in Diego Garcia. It is an unpopulated island.

Senator PELL. When the Soviets go there, do they ask permission to go or go there as a matter of right?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We do not know the answer to that with regard to Berbera. I believe they have unimpeded access because I cannot imagine the Soviets doing all the work they have done there without having negotiated that.

Senator PELL. What kind of Soviet installations, buildings, are there in Umm Qasr?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I will have to provide it for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

SOVIET FACILITIES IN UMM QASR

[Supplied by Department of Navy]

We have no information on separate facilities for exclusive Soviet use. We believe they use Iraqi facilities, but they probably have some provisions for administrative privacy from the Iraqis.

Senator PELL. Originally, I believe, it was built at Soviet initiative and used primarily for the Iraqi patrol boats. Is that not correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I do not recall that, but that would be the usual Soviet system. They start out with that kind and then enlarge it. They did enlarge it when Iraq bit off a piece of Kuwait a year or so ago by having naval ships arrive concomitant or shortly thereafter, and Grechko showed up shortly thereafter to demonstrate to Kuwait that the Soviets were supporting the Iraqis in that.

SOVIET PERSONNEL IN ADEN

Senator PELL. Where was the third facility we are talking about?

Admiral ZUMWALT. At Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Senator PELL. Right. Yemen also owns Socotra?

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is right.

Senator PELL. There are how many people ashore in Aden?

Admiral ZUMWALT. There again, I think the number is called a small number of Soviet personnel and I do not think we have a number on it.

Senator PELL. But you believe there are Soviets permanently stationed there?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. Dozens or hundreds?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I will have to again say [deleted]. Some at the airfield and some at the port.

Senator PELL. [Deleted] is a kind of loose term. Would you say more than how many?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes. I would guess [deleted].

Senator PELL. [Deleted].

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Again, remember they have available to them the labor force of the local population so it takes just a very small number of military personnel to operate.

SOVIET PERSONNEL AT UMM QASR

Senator PELL. Would you also say they have a small number at Umm Qasr?

Admiral ZUMWALT. My guess would be between [deleted].

SOVIET FACILITIES AT MAURITIUS

Senator PELL. Is there a Soviet facility at Mauritius?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The Soviets have access to Mauritius for landing field rights for exchange of fishing crews. They have made ship visits there. My impression is they have a bunkering arrangement at Mauritius.

Senator PELL. Will the Prime Minister of Mauritius, Mr. Ramgoolam, be visiting you or talking to you shortly?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; I think I am scheduled to see him next week.

RUMOR OF BETTER SUGAR DEAL

Senator PELL. As you know, there have been nations that have protested, or have not been enthusiastic about our moving in and enlarging our facility in the Indian Ocean. Is there any truth in the rumor or story to the effect that if they modify their attitude they might get a better sugar deal?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I know of no Government position to that effect, no, sir. I know they were given an increased sugar quota the last time legislation was enacted, and I consider it an important measure from a foreign policy standpoint that they be treated favorably with regard to the sugar quota.

Senator PELL. There is a rumor around Washington to the effect that there might be a further enlargement of their quota if they modified their views with regard to Diego Garcia, but you have no grounds to be familiar with this?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, I would be very much surprised if that kind of an offer were made because it is too susceptible of being misused.

Senator HUMPHREY. Not only that but some of us in the sugar beet country are not interested in enlarging those quotas.

SOVIET FACILITY IN INDIA

Senator PELL. Would you touch on the facility in India?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, what I said about that was the Soviets built for the Indians this large naval base called Vishakhapatnam on the east coast of India [deleted].

Senator PELL. Would that apply to any similar help we have given countries around the world?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. I think that we do not operate along such venal lines in our foreign policy.

Senator PELL. I am delighted to hear that.

AVAILABILITY OF INDIAN FACILITIES TO SOVIETS AND UNITED STATES

I had the opportunity of talking with the Indian Ambassador on the subject and his views are very emphatic, speaking officially for his government, not only in opposition to this enlargement of Diego Garcia but also he avers very vigorously that the facilities available to both countries are the same. We do not take advantage of them, as you say, because we do not like to say whether our vessels have nuclear weapons or not. The Soviets, we feel, are more loose with the truth and say they do not have them on board and use the facility there. But the present facilities are available to both nations' vessels on an equal basis. Is that not correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe, sir, the Indian Ambassador has said that, but [deleted].

Senator PELL. Right. You see, it is a very difficult dialog in which we are engaged because we have different facts as to the extent of the threat, different assessments, [deleted] but I tend to think that these public and private statements might be correct.

If you operate on the basis that your facts are right and other facts are wrong, [deleted] it is very hard for us to form an opinion.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Well, Senator, my opinion here is based on the data that it has been so extremely difficult for us to bring off naval visits. [Deleted.] It is an asymmetrical proposition and it seems to me it is designed to favor the Soviets, and it seems to me that it is consistent with what they ought to be doing in exchange for the tremendous amount of support they are getting from the Soviet Union.

Senator PELL. Of course, they receive more support from us than any other nation.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes; and they know they do not have to give us anything for it and in the case of the Soviets they know they have to give something for it.

NATIONS WHICH HAVE PROTESTED OR CRITICIZED EXPANSION

Senator PELL. It is very hard when we have to discount the views of a nation [deleted]. I would like to insert in the record at this point the nations that have officially protested. They are Australia, India, Madagascar and Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon. Then, the governments of 10 other states which have publicly criticized this expansion in the press are Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Iran, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Thailand, Malaya, and New Zealand. They have not sent us official notes, but they have all officially in some public way questioned this route. The only country which has given us support so far is Singapore.

Admiral ZUMWALT. If I could, Senator Pell, I would like to go into that for a moment because as Senator Humphrey will recall from his days in the executive branch the picture that nations give you through the public channels are really so very often different from the picture that one gets privately.

Now, this is my own matrix developed from reading the messages available and should not be considered official because the State Department should be the official source of this information but for this informal briefing, it seems to me appropriate.

Senator PELL. I will ask this table be put in the record.

[The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.]

Admiral ZUMWALT. All right, sir. This shows you that if you look down the left hand side of the column marked against, there are 10 who have given official views as against, but we think that [deleted] of them really have backed that up privately.

If you look down the neutral or ambivalent column there are 19 who have come in with official comments [deleted]. And over on the column of those who are for it, although only three are officially for it, we show [deleted] that we think are unofficially for it. This is kind of a typical situation in any foreign policy case where there is a tendency to say publicly the things that will help with domestic politics and privately the things which will help with international politics.

Senator PELL. Right. I realize that. Naturally, any country is going to try to be on both sides of an issue if it can because they do not want to alienate us. So they have to take a public position and then say, "We did not really mean it," or as happened in Australia, some of the former government took a different line from the present government. When you go to a convention you try to have lines out on both sides, but we have to take what the public record shows as being reflective of the positions. Would you not agree with that, Admiral?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, I would think that for foreign policy decisions we should take into account all the data available to us including private comments and should learn to disregard what people are saying for domestic consumption if there are indications through private sources that they do not really mean it.

Senator PELL. Again, this is a difference of view. I think the public statements of a nation should in general be accepted as being the attitude of that nation. But here we differ.

STATUS OF AGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN

Is it not a fact that the agreement that was initialed in Britain was a referendum and that Ivar Richardson, the British Ambassador to the United Nations, has said it is presently under reconsideration.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, but there has been a later development than that. I defer to the State Department for detailed and authoritative answer but I understand on April 3 the Labor Government gave a publication of its likely policy toward Diego Garcia expansion.

In response to a parliamentary inquiry as to whether there would be any problem as to extension of Holy Loch and extension of Diego Garcia, Foreign Secretary Callaghan replied, "There would be no problem." There is no indication that Her Majesty's Government has taken a final decision in this area, but Callaghan's statement in the House of Commons goes beyond the earlier public position that he cited.

Senator PELL. Until that agreement is actually signed obviously, there is no way to go ahead.

COMPARATIVE U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

Going to the broader picture that you opened up in your statement, there was a small Soviet fleet there in the late sixties. We all know of its size. You probably have some charts showing what it consisted of. But that remained at a stable level for several years. Then my recollection is that in December or November of 1971, we sent the *Enterprise* in after the Pakistan-Indian hostilities. After we had sent the *Enterprise* in, the Soviets immediately enlarged their fleet by some extent. In that correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I will show you a chart of the presence of the two navies in a moment and comment, if I may.

Senator PELL. Not a comment. If I am incorrect, I wish you would tell me I am incorrect or if I am correct tell me I am correct. One or the other, please, sir.

Admiral ZUMWALT. It may be a matter of interpretation. I will provide the figures for the record.

This is a picture of the Soviet presence over the years. You can see they overtook us in 1968 in terms of ship-days and let me agree that you can argue about whether ship-days is the right figure of merit, but it is one of maybe a hundred different figures of merit that ought to be looked at and you can see that the Soviet presence had increased to where it is now fourfold more than our own.


Now, it is true, Senator Pell, that the Soviets and the United States both sent ships to the Indian Ocean during our subcontinent crises. We got ours there first, as I recall, because we were closer.

It is true the United States and Soviets have tended to react with their fleet in whatever crises arose. For example, in the Yom Kippur war at the same time these buildups were going on in the Indian Ocean the Soviets managed to bring 96 ships to bear in the Eastern Mediterranean as compared to our 65. They had a 50 percent plus advantage, plus their and UAR/Syria land-based airfields so they demonstrated their capability to get more there in both the Eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean simultaneously, as a land power than we who were formerly the world's greatest naval power.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. NAVY AND SOVIET NAVY SHIP-DAYS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

[Supplied by Department of Navy]



SOVIET PORT CALLS IN LAST 5 YEARS

Senator PELL. Following up this line of questioning for a moment, it is correct, I think, to say that in the last 5 years the Soviet port calls have gone up substantially from 42, I think it was in 1968, up to more than 150 last year. But is it not correct also that the number of countries they visited has gone down just as steadily from 12 in 1968 to 9 in 1973? It certainly declined in the number of countries affected.

Admiral ZUMWALT. My numbers indicate that the Soviets visited 11 different countries in 1971 and 9 different countries in 1973, so that the number stays relatively the same.

Senator PELL. How many in 1968 and 1969?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I will have to have that counted out for you, sir, and give it to you in just a moment. The United States dropped from 25 in 1971 to 17 in 1973, so that we are approaching them, although slightly ahead in terms of total numbers of countries. However,

they are far ahead of us with regard to total number of days spent in port, at least 1,234 last year excluding ships involved in port clearing operations in Chitagong, Bangladesh, to 579 for the U.S. Navy.

Senator PELL. Right, although the number of port calls the Soviets have made in these years shows supposedly increasing interest in the area the number of countries has actually declined in this 5-year period. Is that not correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is correct from 12 in 1968 to 9 in 1973, and I think the primary reason for that is they have gained a client relationship with Somalia and have access as easily practically, as to their own homeland there.

U.S./SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

Senator PELL. In connection with the vessels that are involved, maybe you can submit for the record a table showing the Soviet and American ships. Do you have one of those tables here with you showing the kind of ships, how many are combatants?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I have a sheet here—

Senator PELL. Which you can put in the record?

Admiral ZUMWALT [continuing]. Which I can submit for the record which shows that the Soviets, of course, had no carriers out because they have just begun the construction of their carrier force. In terms of surface combatants the Soviets have outnumbered us. However, I have it again in ship-days rather than in number of ships here.

[The information referred to follows:]

UNITED STATES/SOVIET NAVY PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN—SUPPLIED BY DEPARTMENT OF NAVY
[In ship days]

	1968		1969		1970		1971		1972		1973	
	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.
Carriers	6	0	0	0	5	0	6	0	23	0	80	28
Surface combatants ¹	1,382	403	1,006	644	867	788	669	1,028	944	2,381	1,312	2
Amphibious	0	0	0	106	0	302	183	291	23	273	18	43
Auxiliaries	210	445	281	877	219	1,070	329	1,245	424	2,784	672	4
MSC Auxiliaries/USSR Naval Assoc.	190	(?)	28	(?)	155	(?)	146	404	23	780	72	11
merchants	0	814	0	642	0	417	0	102	0	490	0	4
AGS/AGOR	0	98	0	8	0	21	0	12	0	31	0	4
AGI	0		0		0		14	[deleted]	8	[deleted]	79	[deleted]
Submarines:	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]
Torpedo attack	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]
Cruise missile attack	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]
Sub-total	1,788	[deleted]	1,315	[deleted]	1,246	[deleted]	1,357	[deleted]	1,445	[deleted]	2,233	[deleted]
SESS/SVRS	0	(?)	0	1,391	0	972	0	772	0	1,268	0	5
Totals	1,788	[deleted]	1,315	[deleted]	1,246	[deleted]	1,357	[deleted]	1,445	[deleted]	2,233	[deleted]

¹ Cruiser, destroyers, destroyer escorts, and minesweepers.
² No record.

Senator PERL. May I ask you if these figures are roughly correct? We have an aircraft carrier and six destroyers, an amphibious assault ship and nuclear attack submarine and naval patrol aircraft out at Diego Garcia as opposed to their having a cruiser, eight destroyers, five minesweepers, 16 assorted oilers and noncombatant ships and [deleted] nuclear attack submarines; in other words, reasonable equality.

Admiral ZUCKERMAN. Sir, I need to check those numbers. My figures for April 11, for example, indicate that the Soviets have [deleted] ships there and the Soviet ships include [deleted] submarines, four surface combatants, two minesweepers, one amphibious ship, two space support ships, one research ship, and 14 auxiliary; and on the same day the United States had the Mid-east force flagship and her two escorts plus the one carrier, and seven other ships at least two of which were auxiliaries; so the Soviets had a greater number than we did on the most recent date.

One of the points we are making, Senator, is that it is not really a valid comparison because the Soviets again are able to bring their land-based air power to bear to support those ships and to attack ours so in terms of overall power they have superiority.

RESPONSE BY SOVIETS OR UNITED STATES

Senator PERL. Now, I would like to return to the question of who is responding to whom. We have already seen discussed the 1971 incursion into the Indian Ocean. In October of 1973 at the time of the Israeli flareup we sent the *Hancock* in and my recollection is that the Soviets followed 2 weeks later maybe because they were a little further away, but they followed us. Is that not correct?

Admiral ZUCKERMAN. Yes, sir. Although in other crises they have gotten there the "fastest with the mostest," and so did they in the eastern Mediterranean in this crisis.

Senator PERL. Forgive me, we have a rollcall vote.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator PERL. The hearing will come back to order.

We were just saying the Soviet ships followed us by a short period of time after we moved into the Indian Ocean at the time of the Israeli flareup.

Admiral ZUCKERMAN. Yes, sir, my response was that it is correct: the Soviets got there a little later and built up to large numbers but, on the other hand, in the eastern Mediterranean which was closer to their home base they built up more rapidly than we did, and we never were able to match them because of inadequate numbers of ships.

Senator PERL. You mentioned three facilities and you touched on two of them. I do not think you touched on the third.

Admiral ZUCKERMAN. I think so, we talked about Somalia. (Berbera) and we talked about Aden and Socatra in Yemen, and then we talked about Iraq, the airfield and the port.

Senator PERL. That is right. There was no other.

EFFECT OF STATUTE QTO

What is your view with regard to the idea of conducting some kind of arms control talks in order to try to keep the Pacific Ocean at its

present level, keeping Diego Garcia serving its present very useful purpose as a communications relay station and emergency spot of sustenance, succor, and leaving things as they are? What do you think would be the effect of a status quo?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe, sir, it would be to the significant advantage of the Soviets to accept that and to the significant disadvantage of us since they have their infrastructure in place in three countries and could merely arrive and start operating. We, on the other hand, would have failed to do what we were planning to do in Diego Garcia and could not surge forces as well as the Soviets could.

USE OF WORD INFRASTRUCTURE TO DESCRIBE FACILITIES

Senator PELL. Do you not think the word infrastructure, which is a rather frightening and massive word, is a little bit exaggerated for the actual facilities, with the exception of Berbera. Do you believe really the word infrastructure should define the tin shacks and basically very small POL [Petrol, Oil and Lubricants] supplies in the others?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I used the word infrastructure for both their facilities and ours.

Senator PELL. No; I was taking you up on your word infrastructure. "They have their infrastructure—." That provides a real sense—

Admiral ZUMWALT. I meant it also in the next sentence in regard to Diego Garcia. I think the key point is that their facilities are superior to ours. The word infrastructure has a special connotation to me in navalese, but I think the significant point is that they have a superior labor force and at least equal facilities in each of three countries while what we are asking for in this unpopulated atoll is less capability than the Soviets will have in each of three Indian Ocean countries.

Senator PELL. I think I have had more than my share of questions. I may get back to you.

Senator Muskies.

CAUSE OF ADMIRAL ZUMWALT'S RECOMMENDATION

Senator MUSKIE. I have been listening and I am very interested in this question, Admiral. I have no prejudgment about it at all because I have had no exposure to it in any formal way. This briefing this afternoon is my first exposure, so I have listened with interest to the discussion of the details.

I wonder if you would discuss the growth of Soviet involvement in this area and the movement that has taken place that arouses concern, and your projection of the potential for destabilizing developments in the near future that causes you to make this recommendation.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. Could you do that without bogging down in the details of your proposals?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

I think this problem, Senator Muskies, has to be viewed as a subset of a larger problem which is that the Soviet Union is in process of developing a capability, maritime capability, superior to our own.

For example, General Steinhoff, who has been Chief of Staff of the Air Force in Germany and then has been a senior NATO military man, has just recently said Soviet naval rearming is the most important military development in the second half of the century, and could help to achieve political goals without the use of force by demonstrations of strength and presence. Here is an air force general oriented on the land center of Europe recognizing this fact.

This is happening to us all around the world. The Soviets have built three and a half times more ships than we have in the last 10 years. We, in order to begin long delayed modernization, have reduced our Navy ship numbers by 47 percent in the last 5 years, by 22 percent the number of naval aircraft so our capability curves are dramatically down and theirs are up in my judgment. I testified before four congressional committees that the odds are that we could not control all of the seas in a conventional war with the Soviet Union today.

Now, the way in which they are using that Navy in peacetime is to gain the capability in the classic maritime tradition to operate in all the oceans in the world, including facilities similar to what the British acquired during their heyday when they took Gibraltar, Singapore and all the rest of the key places. The Soviets are doing the same job and they are developing the capability for their navy to surge with four times as many ships as we have and to support it better in each of the oceans of the world than we do ours.

This MILCON [Military Construction] request for Diego Garcia gives us, for \$29 million, the capability to improve modestly our presence in one of the oceans, one of the key oceans, of the world, or to buy back cheaply some of the very major losses we have taken in the last 5 years.

Senator MUSKIE. The second half of my question was directed at the recent movement in this area, the Soviets and our own, which focuses our attention on this particular problem area.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, we have had three lessons learned as a result of the recent Yom Kippur War that make this of greater importance. First, we learned we cannot count on bringing [deleted].

Second, we have learned we had a very difficult time supporting logistically ships in the Indian Ocean in the last crisis and need to react, we think, quickly as a result of that.

And, third, we have learned that in this key area of importance to the Soviets (as evidenced by their rapid surge) that the prospective opening of the Suez Canal dramatically shortens their lines of redeployment. We have learned the canal is going to be opened as a result of this crisis. This furthermore makes us want to try to cut down as much time as we can at Diego Garcia in acquiring the facilities.

NEGATIVE REACTIONS OF LITTORAL COUNTRIES

Senator MUSKIE. Recalling the chart you put up a moment ago about the reaction of the littoral countries, what are the reasons for the negative reactions? I would be interested to know why there is a negative reaction, the magnitude of that negative reaction, and so on.

Admiral ZUMWALT. All right, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. Maybe we ought to go. This is final passage, and if we go up and vote quickly, we could have this discussion without interruption.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator MUSKIE. Why don't you go ahead? I asked what the reasons were for opposition in the littoral countries.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator, maybe it would be better to take two or three important examples. Australia, we show Prime Minister Whitlam as critical. He is quoted in a press release as saying any buildup of military facilities or introduction of military forces will not contribute to the achievement of the long-term objective of the Australian Government and governments of the region. The comment was reiterated by Minister of Foreign Affairs Willesee. Liberal opposition leader Snedden subsequently issued a statement strongly supporting U.S. position. In a March 20 press conference, Prime Minister Whitlam stated he would support any diplomatic move to oppose U.S. buildup of Diego Garcia. [Deleted.]

Senator MUSKIE. [Deleted.]

Admiral ZUMWALT. Well, sir, I am not enough of a politician to know.

Senator MUSKIE. I find it hard to conceive of there being a very visible or widespread grassroots reaction to this. That is what I am trying to get at.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think—

Senator MUSKIE. Is it simply political in the sense of the politicians?

Admiral ZUMWALT. [Deleted.] I believe the majority of the Australians welcome the U.S. defense measures and [deleted].

Senator MUSKIE. Is the same explanation applicable to New Zealand?

Admiral ZUMWALT. New Zealand has been more favorable than Australia. On February 12, Prime Minister Kirk made a statement against the buildup of any nation's military or naval presence in the Indian Ocean and emphasized his support for the Indian Ocean peace zone, but [deleted] the remark was not in the local papers, indicating a low level of concern for the issue.

Senator MUSKIE. This does not exactly give the image of a widespread surge of opposition to this.

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, I think it has been greatly overstated in our own councils here. I do not think it is of major concern to the masses of people of the area at all, and further, I am confident that those who are aware of it in the majority recognize that the U.S. presence has tended to be stabilizing.

POSSIBILITY OF GREATLY EXPANDED U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Senator MUSKIE. I gather those who have made up their minds to oppose this are concerned that this might simply be a first step in a greatly expanded U.S. involvement. I am not sure whether that is an accurate description of that base, but what would your answer be to that? I have my own impression, but do you see it as that? Do you have something further in mind down the road?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir; I think your articulation of what some people see in this is an accurate one. But I think it is a misconception.

The Presidents over the years, as Senator Humphrey knows, have in crises sent naval forces there and will continue to do so when foreign policy requires it.

Now, what Diego Garcia permits us to do is more efficiently and cheaply to support the diminishing number of ships that we have in a time when we have been overtaken by the Soviet Union. In terms of cost-effectiveness, and analysts can make all kinds of heyday on this particular kind of a calculation, we think we can demonstrate cost avoidance over a period of years of anywhere from \$400 million to a billion dollars in the additional numbers of ships that it would take to support by replenishing from Subic Bay 4,000 miles away to Diego Garcia.

DIEGO GARCIA'S POTENTIALS FOR EXPANSION BEYOND PROPOSAL

Senator MUSKIE. Looking at Diego Garcia itself, what are the potentials for expansion beyond what you propose?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The facilities that we are asking for and planning for limit our capability to expand further. The airfield is being built sufficiently narrow and sufficiently shallow in depth that it cannot support B-52 operations except for an "emergency landing" kind of thing. They would tear up the airfield were they to use it routinely. It is designed to be an austere support facility in which no operating forces would be permanently stationed. It would be just the house-keeping people that would stay there, and they would give us a capability to move ships into the Indian Ocean which could then be supported out of this base by tankers running in and out of here instead of an additional 3,000 miles back to Subic. You would also in crisis situations probably station temporarily some P-3 antisubmarine aircraft there to help escort and protect the ships.

REASON FOR PROPOSED EXPANSION

Senator MUSKIE. I gather from what you have said that this proposed expansion of our use of the facilities is not related at all to the possibility of conventional war with the Soviet Union, but to make possible the maintaining of a presence for diplomatic and policy reasons rather than war?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would say that is the primary reason, yes, sir. I would say that in the tragic event that hostilities eventuated we would, by a considerable amount, be able better to prevail with Diego Garcia than without it.

Senator MUSKIE. But it is not in preparation for that eventuality that you are moving to do this?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir; it is hopeful to increase our capability to deter it.

Senator MUSKIE. I will yield.

Senator PELL. Senator Humphrey said he would yield.

IS UNITED STATES ACTUALLY LEAVING BAHRAIN?

I had a couple more queries. One is in connection with Bahrain. Are you sure that we are actually leaving or are arrangements being made so that we may be able to stay?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I hope we will be able to stay, sir. At the present time we have a still extant eviction notice which began the countdown last October to be completed next October, but we hope that the Mid-east crisis works out to a permanent solution and that the eviction notice will be withdrawn.

Senator PELL. If by any chance we are permitted to stay, and I understand from diplomatic sources it is quite conceivable, then what we would be doing is not only maintaining our presence in the Indian Ocean but expanding our presence and capacity there. Would that not be correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is correct. But it also is important, I think, to note that having a facility at Diego Garcia makes us less subject to pressure another time than we have been this time.

BRITISH FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN INDIAN OCEAN AREA

Senator PELL. What facilities do the British still have available that would be available to us in that Indian Ocean area?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The British have no facilities of their own except an island off the coast of Oman which is, belongs to Oman in which they have an airfield. Misirah is the name of it, and they have been quite clear that we could not use it in any crisis of this kind because it is Oman territory.

The only other facility, I believe, is the facility of independent Singapore to which they have access, but, again, it depends on the politics of the specific situation.

UNITED STATES FACILITY ON WEST COAST OF AUSTRALIA

Senator PELL. The facility we have in the west coast of Australia, what size is that?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We have there a communications station which makes it possible to better communicate with our ballistic missile submarines. I will have to provide for the record the number of personnel we have there. It is only a communications facility and there is no port available for ships there.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. PERSONNEL AT U.S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION, HAROLD E. HOLT, NORTHWEST CAPE, AUSTRALIA

[Supplied by Department of Navy]

At present there are 26 officers, 388 enlisted persons, and 284 civilians, for a total of 698 persons, attached to the U.S. Naval Communications Station, Harold E. Holt, at Northwest Cape, Australia.

POSSIBILITY OF GOING BACK TO 15 CARRIER FLEET

Senator PELL. If the stationing in the Indian Ocean of a carrier becomes a matter of policy, will not this mean that we will go back to our 5 carrier on station or 15 carrier fleet as opposed to the present thought of the 12 carrier fleet?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I see no way, Senator Pell, that we can over time maintain 15 carriers. The nakedness that we all felt in this last crisis

resulted in a decision to keep the two aged carriers for an additional year, but by the next 2 or 3 years at the outside we have just got to wrap up those ships because they are in very, very bad state, beyond 30 years of life. The carriers that have been authorized will be coming off the hopper, the last one, by 1980 and 12 is the maximum that we conceive we can retain even with those off the hopper.

STATIONING OF CARRIERS

Senator PELL. But even with those 12, would we be able to maintain half of them on station or would there still be a third of them on station?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The device we have resorted to is to do with mirrors what we cannot do with numbers, to station one carrier with families permanently in Yokosuka so we can get by with only seven carriers in the Pacific and still rotate two forward on a one and three watch and by that device have three in the Western Pacific. One of those would occasionally go into the Indian Ocean. There would additionally be two in the Mediterranean, if it were possible to bring off forward deployment for the families of one carrier in Athens, and if it is not in my judgment, we will have to go down to one carrier in the Mediterranean and this will be a significant setback for our foreign policy.

CREATION OF MIDDLE EAST INDIAN OCEAN COMMAND

Senator PELL. Has any thought been given by the Joint Chiefs to the creation of a new command, perhaps called the Middle East Indian Ocean command?

Admiral ZUMWALT. There are all kinds of pieces of paper floating around at any given time on any issue. I would want to provide for the record the status of any such. I do not believe that there is going to be an Indian Ocean command set up as a separate command. At the present time the Indian Ocean is divided with the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf belonging to U.S. CINCEUR [Commander in Chief in Europe], and with the Indian Ocean belonging roughly two-thirds to CINPAC [Commander in Chief in Pacific] and one-third to CINCLANT [Commander in Chief in Atlantic]. There may be a shift in that latter line of responsibility but I do not believe you will see a separate Indian Ocean command.

Senator PELL. Speaking for myself, I thank you very much for the extent and courtesy of your replies.

I conclude with the thought we will just have to agree to disagree here. Basically, my original question to you is, why you consider zone of peace concept for the Indian Ocean a dangerous one. You believe it is dangerous. I believe it is desirable. We will just have to argue this out and perhaps try to arrive at more similar views as to the extent of the danger.

SANITIZING AND RELEASE OF HEARING

In connection with your presentation which is unclassified, I would hope that the dialog in this committee could also be sanitized and released as soon as possible so that both view-points are presented because you have had the good foresight to have your view presented

here and I think there should be some statement of the battle on the other side as well. I would hope that this hearing could be sanitized as soon as possible.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Thank you, Senator.
Senator PELL. Thank you.

USE OF COCKBURN SOUND AS HOMEPORT

Senator MUSKIE. Could I ask a technical question. Is the Navy still considering using Cockburn Sound on the west side of Australia as a homeport?

Admiral ZUMWALT. At the present time, the plan, I would describe as dead. At one time—

Senator HUMPHREY. Where is that located?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Perth-Fremantle. The Australians are building a roadstead by constructing a breakwater between the island and the land, and at one time we had under consideration stationing one destroyer escort there with their families to give us some capability to cover the eastern part of the Indian Ocean. The new government has indicated no desire to go forward with that and has further so delayed the construction of Cockburn Sound that it will not be completed until 1978.

Senator MUSKIE. Thank you.

Senator HUMPHREY.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. Most of the questions I would like to have propounded have been asked, I think better than I would have been able to do it, and the answers have been forthcoming.

REASONS WHY DIEGO GARCIA BASE IS NEEDED

You said that there were three basic reasons why we needed this base. Let me see now if I have them correctly. One was that we learned from the October war the difficulties we had in deployment of forces. Is that correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Secondly, the possible opening of Suez Canal.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. And thirdly—

Admiral ZUMWALT. [Deleted.]

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

To expound on that for a moment or two to extend your commentary, what will this do for [deleted] that you can indicate to us that it would be more [deleted], let us say, [deleted]?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, with the extension of the runway logistic aircraft can use that airfield and make a flight from Diego Garcia [deleted].

Senator HUMPHREY. How do you get the planes into Diego Garcia?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They can get to Diego Garcia as long as we have access to Thailand. If we have to leave Thailand, directly from Subar Bay.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is quite a distance.

Admiral ZUMWALT. About 3,200 miles.

Senator HUMPHREY. About 3,200 miles.

Admiral ZUMWALT. This would be one of the virtues of having increased the POL storage at Diego Garcia because you could station aircraft tankers temporarily at Diego Garcia and they could refuel in flight the airlift aircraft.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are talking about C-5A's?

Admiral ZUMWALT. And C-141's.

Senator HUMPHREY. C-141's. What is their range?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I will have to provide that for the record, Senator Humphrey.

[The information referred to follows:]

PLANNING RANGE USED FOR C-141's

[Supplied by Department of the Navy]

The planning range used for C-141's is a little over 3,000 miles.

Senator HUMPHREY. What I was getting at, it seems to me you have a refueling job even enroute to Diego Garcia.

Admiral ZUMWALT. You would for the 141 but I believe the C-5A's would make it, but certainly they would have to refuel at Diego Garcia with any kind of load, [deleted].

Senator HUMPHREY. So that one of your main reasons as you indicated, now, and I think it would be well if you would even spell that out more precisely, is the possibility of conducting an airlift?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. In an area where we did not have to bargain.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. It is one of three sort of urgent reasons that I gave.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, sir.

U.S. ASSISTANCE IN OPENING SUEZ CANAL

I notice the reports of late have indicated that we are going to help open the Suez Canal.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. One of the reasons we need the base is because of the opening of the Suez Canal. I am sure there is a reason for this, but I would like to hear it.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; it is a fair question but I think there is a fair answer to it.

The opening of the Suez Canal clearly enhances Soviet military capability in the Indian Ocean and we feel we need to react to it but we also need the base for other reasons.

Now, with regard to the assistance we are giving in opening the Suez Canal, in view of the military disadvantage in the Indian Ocean our assistance only made sense if it were part of a solution which would help us to reduce the Soviet presence in Egypt and Syria and to reduce the risks of confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Part of the way in which we can convert this beginning of satisfactory relations with the United Arab Republic to a permanent happy relation is to be very forthcoming in the assistance we give

them and in a military sense we will be better off in the eastern Mediterranean with the Soviets not having access to Egyptian airfields and ports as they do today.

Senator HUMPHREY. Will they lose that access?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I cannot state that at the present time, Senator, but I think we are on the way to having a kind of relationship with them that could lead to that.

SOVIET EQUIPPING OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY

Senator HUMPHREY. I did not get a chance yesterday when I was speaking with the Secretary of State to ask a question I wanted to because he had to leave at 6 o'clock, understandably. I am pleased that relations with Egypt have decidedly improved, but one of the things that has concerned me is that all of the Egyptian military are equipped by Soviet equipment from the rifle to the artillery to the half tracks to the tanks, to everything that they have.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Certainly.

Senator HUMPHREY. And we are constantly telling ourselves today that the Soviet presence is going to be limited or at least even hopefully removed from Egypt. But I remember earlier days around here when we used to justify military assistance to countries by saying they would be dependent upon us for parts and replacements. I wondered how you are ever going to get the Soviet Union out of Egypt when their huge military establishment is loaded with Soviet equipment. It is a nightmare to think about it, but I can envision the day when somebody comes over here to say we ought to reequip the Egyptian Army, which I hope and pray does not happen. What are your views on that?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator Humphrey, I think you have cited one of the reasons that work against us with regard to our efforts to bring the Egyptians into closer alliance with us and into less close relationship with the Russians, and it is one of the things we have to work against both by virtue of what Secretary Kissinger is doing and with regard to the assistance we are giving them.

It is true that they remain dependent on the Soviets for spare parts, and this is one of the pluses that the Soviets have gotten. If we accomplish only the tamping down of the risk of confrontation and the additional standing apart of the Soviets and the Egyptians from a close relationship they had before the war began. I would say that the minesweeping assistance we are giving them is worth it.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes; I agree with that. But I put the broader question because I do not think it has been talked about publicly.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I do not believe it has been given enough attention. In fact, I think that in a sense we have not wanted to really face the continuity of Soviet presence in Egypt no matter what our relationships are because of the fact that the Egyptian military has been totally equipped with the latest Soviet armor, the latest Soviet weaponry, missiles, artillery, tanks, trucks, whatever it is. I cannot imagine the Egyptians turning away from that; nor can I imagine

that we would like to pick up the tab of reequipping them. I will not bear down on it. This is really the wrong place for it, I think the men in the State Department one of these days have to level with us what they are going to do about it.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, I can truthfully state I know of no plans at the present time to equip them.

I might also add, Senator Humphrey, that our rear admiral who will do the minesweeping operation and who has been there and back to brief us all stated if there was ever a case where the Soviets have outgilded the Ugly American the relationship they left with the Egyptians shows that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, I understand that.

SOVIET ACCESS TO ALEXANDRIA AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY AIRFIELDS

Do the Soviets still have access to Alexandria?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, they do.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do they have access to certain military airfields in Egypt?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We believe they do, although I have not seen any recent information. [Deleted.]

EFFECT OF OPENING SUEZ CANAL ON U.S. AND SOVIET ACCESS

Senator HUMPHREY. Does not the opening of the Suez Canal improve our access to the Indian Ocean and eastern Mediterranean just as it does the Soviet access?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; it does in theory, but there are a couple of reasons why it is an asymmetrical situation. We have no carriers stationed in the Atlantic which can use the Suez Canal when it is opened, with the present dimensions. If it is enlarged for supertankers and that will be several years in coming, then carriers will be able to use it.

Second—

Senator HUMPHREY. The Soviets do not have any carriers that they can run through there either, do they?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They do have two half-deck carriers which can get through.

Senator HUMPHREY. Those are helicopters.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; and they just launched their new carrier which can also fit.

Senator HUMPHREY. Smaller carrier?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; in the kind of situation where we would be interested in reinforcing the Indian Ocean we would also want to rapidly reinforce the eastern Mediterranean so the ships we would bring into the Indian Ocean would more logically come from the western Pacific or Norfolk in a crisis like that.

I would also be nervous about sending American ships through the Suez Canal in an Arab-Israeli kind of confrontation.

Senator HUMPHREY. I imagine the canal would be closed if that happened again.

DIEGO GARCIA'S PART IN BACKUP SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL

Therefore, do you see Diego Garcia as a vital part of the backup support for American policy toward Israel?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; I certainly do, both by virtue of what it commences to do [deleted] by having naval forces in the Indian Ocean to stabilize the area south of Israel while naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean were stabilizing it there.

NEGATIVE REACTION TO U.S. PRESENCE

Senator HUMPHREY. This negative reaction has been alluded to here in the discussion today. Did you have Iran listed as negative? No; I think it was ambivalent.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. It is listed as neutral. Frankly, I think we shorted ourselves a bit there. I believe it was much closer to for.

Senator HUMPHREY. You mentioned my name here and I appreciate that, but in reference to some of the experiences I had when I was asked by President Johnson to go to that area, I must say for the record that I found several countries there that publicly denounced us and privately told me, "Be sure you keep those forces in Vietnam." I have never forgotten this because I was not only upset, I was angry about it because, on the one hand, I would come home and read in the press that these countries were assailing us for being there and, without mentioning too many names, I can tell you that two or three very important countries would tell me, "If you are not there the Chinese will run over us."

Admiral ZUMWALT. Exactly.

Senator HUMPHREY. How does Indonesia react to this presence?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They are shown here as having publicly come out against [deleted].

Senator HUMPHREY. I found that one of the reasons.

Senator MUSKIE. They have not changed.

Senator HUMPHREY. The public denunciation sometimes or protests are related to their political left.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. The Labor Party in Australia was vigorously opposed to our policy in Vietnam. Gorton, I think was his name at the time.

Senator MUSKIE. He married a Maine girl.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is one of the assets he had; so it is part of the domestic political scene.

LACK OF PROTEST CONCERNING SOVIET BASE IN SOMALIA

I am always interested when these countries protest. I do not recall any of them protesting the Soviet base in Somalia, do you?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir; and this is one of the things that I think we may have missed a bet on. I am not sure that we have done as good a job as we should have in making sure they were aware just what the Soviets are up to. The Soviets, of course, do not have to debate, their

presence is not carried in the news so they can slip in very quietly over a period of time.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is my judgment that one of the reasons that these things happened is that we have not paid enough attention to some of these countries. I do not mean Australia with which, of course, our basic relations are good, but the African countries. Somalia, while it has had a lot of Communist penetration and leftist political activity, we have from the diplomatic side rather ignored over a period of time.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. And I think that is regrettable.

USE OF U.S. EQUIPMENT BY EGYPT AND SYRIA

I just had a note here. Egypt and Syria used C-130's sold to Saudi Arabia during the October War. As our reports indicate now, we have planned sales to Saudi Arabia and to Kuwait. Does this raise the question whether more U.S. equipment might be used by Egypt and Syria in case of an additional extension or renewal of the October War?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, of course, Dr. Kissinger would be so much more sophisticated in explaining this than I, but part of his delicate problem of beginning to change our relationship with the Arab nations in a way that can continue to give us access to the oil, and part, an overall process, which I believe will result in commitments sufficient to assure Israel's continuing survival.

Senator HUMPHREY. I realize this is very delicate. We have supported aid to Jordan here, for example. Right here in this committee we have given large amounts of military assistance, to Israel and also provided for Jordan simply because King Hussein was looked upon as a moderate or reasonable man.

SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT'S REACTION

Senator HUMPHREY. On Saudi Arabia how does that Government react, Admiral?

Admiral ZUMWALT. With regard to this particular thing we show them as no comment.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is interesting.

Admiral ZUMWALT. And yet we know, Senator Humphrey, that they have a great fear of the Soviets.

Senator HUMPHREY. Oh, yes.

Admiral ZUMWALT. And there is absolutely no doubt in my own mind that they welcome our presence.

SOMALIA HAS NO COMMENT

Senator HUMPHREY. Somalia has no comment?

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is right, sir. Which is interesting the other way.

Senator HUMPHREY. I thought the answers you gave to Senator Muskie were very, very helpful to all of us already and I want to thank you.

BASE'S IMPORTANCE TO U.S. SECURITY AND POLICIES

My present feeling about this is that the question is, whether this base is important to our security or to our national policies. That is the issue as I see it. I am concerned with the feelings of these other countries or how they express themselves, but I think the real issue is what does it mean to us and why is it important. I gather now you have said one of the reasons it is important is that it gives you the capability of better use of existing equipment.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. You look upon it, as I understood you to say—and correct me if I am wrong—as even in a sense in terms of defense procurement and expenditures an economy measure.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you say that? I was interested in that.

Admiral ZUMWALT. To do the same job in the Indian Ocean to support, for example, a deployed carrier task force would cost us over a period of 4 or 5 years in terms of the replenishment ships that we would need extra to operate out of Subic somewhere between \$400 million and \$1 billion, depending on how one does the calculation.

Another way of looking at it is that for any given level of naval forces you can maintain a larger number for a longer period of time in the Indian Ocean if you have this facility.

AGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN

Senator HUMPHREY. The other point that I think needs to be made here since I am sympathetic to this, and I am obviously an advocate at this point, is that we do have an agreement with the British now. The British are our loyal ally. We don't have to go through the hassle and the argument about negotiating with countries that really are less than sympathetic.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, and an unpopulated island.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, I thank you very much.

Senator MUSKIE. I am not clear as to whether there is any difficulty with the British. Is there no agreement yet?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, we have had an executive agreement since 1966 with regard to the existing facility. There is an agreement in principle with regard to the new facilities, but that hasn't yet been signed.

Senator MUSKIE. What has been the holdup, simply the development of the plan?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, just about the time it was completed in principle and initiated there was a change in the Government. The new Government has been in the process of looking at it.

SUBMISSION OF AGREEMENT TO CONGRESS

Senator JAVITS. Admiral, I will take 5 or 6 minutes. I am sorry we have all been so distracted. I won't detain you long, but I am deeply interested in this. I am some ways inclined toward it, but I have very serious disquiets. For one, do you see any reason why an agreement

like this, from your point of view, could not be submitted to the Congress for approval as an executive agreement?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yell, sir, as I understand our present procedure—first, let me say this is a matter for the Department of State.

Senator JAVITS. Of course.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I know you are asking me for my personal opinion.

Senator JAVITS. That is right.

Admiral ZUMWALT. As I understand it we now do routinely provide the Congress within 60 days the details. Any new executive agreement, and this, it seems to me, together with the power that Congress has over the appropriations, gives positive assurance that nothing can be done to the disadvantage of the prevailing view in Congress.

Senator JAVITS. I will state unilaterally that my view is that where you have a rededication even of an existing base to a mission which becomes a substantial mission by virtue of that rededication, the agreement should be submitted to the Congress for approval. I would like to ask you to restate, as briefly as you can, the difference between the mission of this base now and the mission of this base when you have completed the installations which are contemplated in respect of this inquiry which our committee is making.

Senator HUMPHREY. Would you permit just a clarification?

When you said submit the executive agreement, did you mean for approval or just submission?

Senator JAVITS. No, no; I meant for concurrence of the Senate, and the House if it's an executive agreement.

Senator HUMPHREY. Which is the view we have expressed here individually in the committee.

Senator JAVITS. Right.

DIFFERENCE IN MISSION OF BASE

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. I think the simplest statement is that it would change what is now best described as an austere communications facility into one which would be an austere base support facility by adding an additional 4,000 feet to an 8,000-foot airfield and by adding roughly 400,000 additional barrels of oil storage, and by extending a pier sufficient that a destroyer or two could tie up to it and by increasing the dredged area within the lagoon for a larger ship.

COST OF DIEGO GARCIA PROGRAM

Senator JAVITS. What is the price tag for all those operations taking into consideration costs that are likely to be incurred over what period of time this will encompass?

Admiral ZUMWALT. With regard to the military construction costs?

Senator JAVITS. The whole business, just one price tag, rough order of magnitude.

Admiral ZUMWALT. The problem with giving you an exact number, Senator, is there are so many different numbers that cost analysts can provide.

Senator JAVITS. I don't expect an exact number. Give the order of magnitude, \$100 to \$150 million?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would say in terms of construction costs and support costs from here through the completion of the program we are talking of less than \$50 million.

Senator JAVITS. What have we invested in it now?

Admiral ZUMWALT. It is about—

Senator JAVITS. For comparison with that \$50 million.

Admiral ZUMWALT. About half of that.

Senator JAVITS. About \$25 million.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. So you are going to add 200 percent.

Senator MUSKIE. Is it \$50 million on top of \$25 million?

Senator JAVITS. We have \$25 million in there now and they have to put in another \$50 million, assuming it is all right with us.

Admiral ZUMWALT. It looks like in terms of the numbers that I have been talking about here for military construction and operating costs we have in addition about \$56 million instead of \$50 million.

Senator JAVITS. In round figures, but in order of magnitude you are going to put in another 200 percent over what it is worth now.

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is right.

Senator JAVITS. That is what one would describe if you were a businessman as your capital investment.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Good.

DIFFERENCE IN BASE'S MISSION

The other thing I would like to ask you is this: Is it fair to characterize the difference in mission by saying that the present mission facilitates by communications in the operation of forces which are in or normally come into the area? The new mission lays a base for introducing forces above what have heretofore been normal: that is, a base for introducing forces other than what has been the pattern of normality up to now.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe, sir, that it permits us to sustain better the forces which we have had to introduce in these surge cases from time to time by relieving the replenishment ships that have been drawn down from the Pacific.

Senator JAVITS. The reason I said what I did is that in your statement you say, "Consequently we believe the experience of last fall and of 1971 provided a rather blunt warning that if we are to have an effective, reliable, and economical capability to deploy naval forces in times of crisis, we must provide ourselves with a minimal support facility in the area."

My question is: Do you have that minimal support facility now at Diego Garcia or will you have it only when you add the \$50 million?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Only with the addition, sir.

Senator JAVITS. All right.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Because what this does is free up those replenishment ships we have had to pull out of the Pacific to keep ships in the Indian Ocean.

Senator JAVITS. Then you say in your statement:

In the judgment of many observers, the Indian Ocean has become an area with the potential to influence major shifts in the global power balance over the next decade. It follows from that, that we must have the ability to influence events in that area; and the capability to deploy our military power in the region is an essential element of such influence.

Question: Do we now, without the new improvement, have the ability to influence events in the area?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, but less than is desirable, and we can't sustain it nearly so well, and in sustaining it at the present time we so reduce our capability in the western Pacific that we couldn't react properly with our forces there.

Senator JAVITS. So, we are paying an unacceptable penalty today, to wit, the necessity for drawdown of excessive forces from the western Pacific.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. But with this facility we will pay a penalty probably, but it will be an acceptable one.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator JAVITS. So it is true, is it not, that you are making a substantive change in this base? It is now a modest communications facility, but it will be a decisive facility with the proposed expansion which changes your ability, as I understand it to "influence major shifts in the global power balance over the next decade."

Admiral ZUMWALT. There is no question, sir, that this does improve our capability.

Senator JAVITS. All right.

ARE WE TAKING ON OBLIGATIONS?

The last question which I would like to ask you is this: In your judgment, as the Chief of Naval Operations, do we undertake expressly or impliedly, No. 1, any of the obligations which the British may have carried in this area up to now or, No. 2, any obligation to assure with our new capability the national integrity or security of any other nation within the compass of the area which will be affected by this event?

You yourself have named in response to Senator Humphrey's questions, possibly the eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean littoral and the east coast of Africa. So expressly or impliedly, are we taking anything over from the British, a responsibility which they have carried up to now, one, or two, are we expressly or impliedly undertaking to insure the national integrity or security of any one of those states in that whole area by this operation.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Sir, I think the fair answer to that is, "No." I believe that the British made this decision back in 1966 to withdraw—1968, and the Soviets moved in in response to that vacuum. We have now had quite a scare. I think as a Government we have come to a full realization of just how powerful the Soviet military capability, particularly at sea, has become, and we are seeking from the standpoint of our own national interests to better, to improve our capability to react in a foreign policy situation.

Senator JAVITS. Admiral, the important answer to my question is the word "No."

Now, do you stand by the word "No"?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, I do.

CONDITIONS DICTATING DECISION

Senator JAVITS. And the only corollary point I would like to add is this: In my judgment, and I believe in the judgment of my colleagues, we don't have to match the Russians ship for ship. They have missile ships and they have carriers and they have lots of other equipment. That is their dynamics; it is not necessarily ours because imitation is often a bad policy.

Is this decision, therefore, dictated by the condition and circumstances and policy of the American defense and are we not just, you know, matching the Russians—they may have ships there so we have to have ships?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. I think it is the former. [Deleted] There are a number of things we are trying to do about it. One very important one is to gain this additional capability in the Indian Ocean.

Senator JAVITS. I thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SUBMISSION OF AGREEMENT TO CONGRESS

Senator HUMPHREY. I would like to say finally that so far as I am concerned, Admiral—and I spoke to you privately about this—it is my judgment if the administration would present these executive agreements for our concurrence after the kind of testimony that we have had here, that you would have no problem. The big argument that we have around here is these agreements are made and then everything goes to the Appropriations Committee where you fight it out there. It isn't jealousy over jurisdiction, but it is a matter that we are concerned about; namely, that we extend our umbrella of protection or defense. Many of us realize that is necessary. But we believe we ought to have a chance to evaluate it and we believe that there ought to be a co-operative relationship between the executive branch and the Congress on these matters where the executive branch explains to us what they are trying to do, asks for our authorization, and really puts some responsibility on us other than just acquiescing. I mean compel us to come to a judgment. I think, as Senator Javits has indicated so well in his questioning, that what we are really interested in is why this is being done, what this does for our national posture, for our national defense, our national security, are we taking over other responsibilities. You said "No." These things need to be answered, as you have. Then we ought to pass on it as a Congress. If you do that you are not going to really run into much difficulty, because most of us here, I think, have been very impressed with what you have had to say today. There are some differences. Senator Pell has some differences here. I had the worry about the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean, frankly, but I also understand the Soviets have already been there. I also understand we have been there and I am interested in seeing to it that we can respond in case of need.

I think the October war caused all of us a lot of concern around here, particularly when we have some commitments we have to fulfill and find out we are in a difficult position to fulfill them.

So as I told you privately I wish you would tell your superiors along the line, just as we are telling the Secretary of State, that the answer to this is not to be fearful of the Congress looking at the executive agreement and resolutions of concurrence. It isn't a two-third's vote like you have to have on a treaty; it is a majority vote. I don't think there is any doubt but what it will go sailing through, but this business of going to the Appropriations Committee after submitting an executive agreement report to the Congress really irritates the Congress. The Appropriations Committee is not the whole body of Congress; they are very responsible and they have some very responsible members, but there are other committees here with, we think, some special knowledge in the field of legislation. That is why I feel, as I have told you before, that we ought to pass on it. I will vote for it. I made up my mind already. I am unhappy about the whole thing, but there are a lot of things I am unhappy about in the world. I hope you will follow the suggestions that were laid by the questioning here.

Senator JAVITS. Would the Senator yield?

NECESSITY OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

I hope very much, too, Mr. Chairman, that this evidence can be sanitized and can be made public insofar as possible. I identify myself with what Senator Humphrey has said about how you should go at this with respect to the Congress. I wish to add this, Admiral, in your interest, and the interests of the security of our country: If you really want to make this "coup," as you say, and there is no use doing it if you are not going to make it. You really have to get the Congress' approval. That is more important than what you are going to do because that will serve notice that this is no sneaked-in executive agreement, some little thing. It would mean that we as a nation mean business here, and are letting the world know it.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I understand.

Senator JAVITS. And the fact we are seeking to harden the position of the United States by cutting down bases, cutting out a lot of deadwood is entirely consistent with hardening by picking a new one that we really want.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Thank you, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. I concur in these observations, Admiral. I think you do need political support from Congress to get maximum benefit from this, and I wouldn't be fearful of coming to the Congress. I appreciate this briefing, Admiral. You have been distracted by votes, but I think that hasn't detracted from the value of the discussion, and I appreciate it myself.

BRIEFING ON PATROL FRIGATE PROGRAM

May I say to my colleagues that if we are through with this subject that I have asked the Admiral and his aides to brief me on the status of the patrol frigate program in which I have a parochial interest.

There is some controversy which has bloomed in the press and it affects the shipyard in my State. Beyond that it affects the national interest; so if you are interested in staying, please do.

Senator HUMPHREY. These are the smaller ships.

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the committee proceeded to hear a briefing on the patrol frigate program.]

BRIEFING ON PATROL FRIGATE

THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1974

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:15 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol Building. Senator Edmund S. Muskie, presiding.
Present: Senator Muskie.

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator MUSKIE. I read the newspaper stories to the effect that Mr. Rule, is it—

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE [continuing]. Has made some derogatory remarks about the patrol frigate [PF] program, particularly as it relates to the communications system. He apparently recommends that the program be slowed down. So really, what I wanted to get at is, precisely what is his position, why he feels as he does, whether or not he reflects the views of the Navy, what your evaluation of the problems may be, and what the prognosis is at this point.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR., CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. EDWIN K. SNYDER, CHIEF, LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Admiral ZUMWALT. All right, sir.

I am not sure I can speak adequately about Mr. Rule's position. He has, to the best of my knowledge and belief, never sought a meeting with me nor ever sought to communicate with me on this issue or, indeed, on any issue in the last 3 years. I believe I had one written communication from him soon after I came to this job on another subject. So I was quite surprised to read his views when I received a copy of the letter he addressed to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

SITUATION IN JULY 1970

My position is as follows: First, I have in the course of today's briefing expressed my very great concern [deleted]. We recognized when I came to this job in July of 1970, that we had a Navy that was, on the average, technologically obsolescent, about 18 years of age on the average. The Southeast Asia war, as our "hidden tax", had cost us a generation of ships, and it was also apparent that the Soviets had