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at reasonable rates—and we are paying the price.

We have concentrated our resources in a non-production Defense Budget—and we are paying the price.

We have adopted a conservative Economic Policy, based almost entirely on high interest rates—and we are paying the price. We haven't closed glaring tax loopholes, which could raise \$20 to \$30 billions and provide some tax relief to low and middle income people, and we are paying the price.

And we will continue to pay the price for our failures, until we take a long hard look at our resources and decide how they will be allocated.

This requires the development of some consensus on where we are going as a nation and how and when we want to get there. We need a system for developing goals and priorities for our nation. They need not be chiseled in marble for the adoration of the ages. In fact, if they are, they are doomed to irrelevance. They must be constantly evolving as needs and attitudes change.

But, it is the priority-setting process, a process that provides the basis for public and private resource allocation decisions, that is sorely lacking today. We have made some progress in this direction with passage of the Congressional Budget Reform Bill this year, but this is not enough.

We must create the instruments of government we sorely need to articulate national goals and priorities. We need a Balanced National Growth and Development Policy and Program, as I have proposed in Congress.

We must provide all levels of government with the capacity to plan meeting these objectives and for anticipating basic changes that will affect them.

And, we must tightly tie together this process, from the local to the national level, in a system of supportive inter-governmental relations—with modern County governments—effectively planning its actions and administering its vital programs.

I urge you to join with me in working to establish this new agenda in policy making—an agenda of vital importance to our country, to creating a strong and stable economy, and to carrying through the promise of a better life for all the American people.

#### JUDICIAL RESTRAINT ON SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL

Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. President, for the first time in over a century, impeachment articles have been voted by the House Judiciary Committee against a President of the United States. Because of the gravity of this development, preliminary plans have begun in the Senate, so that we are prepared in the event the full House of Representatives sends impeachment articles to the Senate for a trial.

Yesterday, I announced a policy of judicial restraint that I will be following in carrying out my own responsibilities under the Constitution in reviewing this grave question. I ask unanimous consent that my statement on my judicial restraint policy be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT OF U.S. SENATOR RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER

Throughout my Senate term, I have always been free to speak out openly on the issues. I have publicly criticized policies and actions with which I have not concurred, including Watergate.

Now, however, the formal votes of the House Judiciary Committee in favor of impeachment articles transform consideration of Watergate into a quasi-judicial matter with specific Constitutional procedures. If there is a trial, each Senator must take a special oath to "do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws."

If that happens, I will be one of 100 Senators sitting as a judge in the impeachment trial of the President of the United States. Therefore, I have decided to adopt a policy of "judicial restraint" relating to this grave question:

(1) I do not feel it will be appropriate for me to comment on any substantive matter relating to impeachment charges until the verdict has been reached; and

(2) I will not make any judgment on my verdict until the completion of a Senate trial. The actual vote of a United States Senator must be based on the evidence presented at the trial—and mine will be. I am adopting this policy of "judicial restraint" so that I can properly fulfill my responsibilities as a United States Senator to be a fair and impartial judge in these awesome proceedings.

#### CIA TESTIMONY ON SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, earlier this month, the Subcommittee on Military Construction, which I have the honor to chair, held hearings on the question of the Navy's request for funds to expand U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia and the effect such a program might have on the future status of the Indian Ocean.

Testimony on this subject was taken in open session from Rear Admiral Grojean, Director, Politico Military Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Senator CLARKSON, Penn., and Rear Adm. Gene R. LaRoque, U.S. Navy retired, Director of the Center for Defense Information.

In addition, the subcommittee met in executive session to hear testimony from Mr. William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, on Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

In that one of the reasons given by Navy for expansion of our facilities at Diego Garcia is to respond to Soviet activities in that part of the world, we believed it important to obtain an assessment of those activities from that agency of the Government assigned the prime responsibility of gathering intelligence data on the Soviet Union.

Director Colby's presentation placed the Diego Garcia request in a much broader context than that of a simple military construction project; and because his was the only testimony presented in closed session, we asked that he declassify as much of his presentation as possible.

That testimony has now been sanitized; and because I believe it important that all Senators have an opportunity to read this assessment before a final decision is made on a project which can have far-reaching military, political and economic consequences, I ask unanimous consent that the relatively brief testimony in question be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### PROPOSED EXPANSION OF NAVAL FACILITIES ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMS AND SERVICES, Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 o'clock p.m., in Room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Stuart Symington (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Dominick and Taft.

Also present: Gordon A. Nease, Professional Staff Member; Joyce T. Campbell, Clerical Assistant; and Kathy Smith, Assistant to Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Colby, we welcome you.

I see you have a statement. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF W. E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN R. CHOMIAK, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC RESEARCH; WILLIAM A. HEWTON, OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE; AND GEORGE L. CAHY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean began in 1962, when four ships from Vladivostok made a "good will" visit to most of the littoral countries. In the little over six years since those visits, the Russians have maintained a nearly continuous presence in the Indian Ocean area.

The Soviet naval presence has grown slowly but steadily during these years and has helped Moscow increase its influence in that part of the world.

The forces the Soviets have deployed in the Indian Ocean, however, have been relatively small and inactive.

The vessels have spent 90 percent of their time at anchor or in port visits, mostly in the northwestern portion of the ocean.

Although the number of countries visited annually has decreased since 1969, the general expansion of the naval force and the increased use of ports on a routine basis have resulted in an overall increase in the number of port calls. Put in terms of naval ship days in the Indian Ocean the Soviet presence increased from about 1,000 in 1962 to 5,000 in 1973, including harbor clearing operations in Bangladesh.

By mid-1973, the typical Soviet Indian Ocean force included five surface warships—one gun-armed cruiser or missile-equipped ship, two destroyers or destroyer escorts, a minesweeper and an amphibious ship. There was also usually a diesel submarine, and six auxiliary support ships, one of which was a merchant tanker.

Mr. Chairman, today there are six surface combatants, one submarine, nine minesweepers and 11 support ships in the Indian Ocean, not substantially different from that typical showing, except for the increase in minesweepers, as I will explain later.

Recently, a Soviet intelligence collection ship has been deployed to the Indian Ocean for the first time since the India-Pakistan War, and is apparently monitoring developments in the Persian Gulf area.

It will probably also conduct surveillance of any major Western naval movements in the Indian Ocean.

In addition, a group of Soviet minesweepers has recently arrived from the Pacific to conduct mine-clearing operations in the Gulf of Suez—in the area shown on this map at the bottom. The ones at the top you will note are being cleared by the U.S. and the United Kingdom.

Last weekend the helicopter carrier Leningrad was ordered to be positioned near the Cape of Good Hope and may join this

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#### CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

group. This is by far the farthest from home waters that either the Leningrad, or its sister ship the Moskva, has ever ventured.

The Soviet warships and submarines sent to the Indian Ocean normally come from the Pacific Fleet, which is also the primary source for logistic support. Combatants from the western fleet, however, have operated in the Indian Ocean, but only while transferring to the Pacific.

The Indian Ocean has become, in effect, a "southern sea route" for the interfleet transfer of naval units.

About one-fourth of the Soviet warships and submarines that have operated there have been units transferring to the Pacific from the western fleet.

The Pacific Fleet naval forces are now being modernized. As part of this effort, since early 1974 the Soviet force in the Indian Ocean has included more modern anti-air and anti-submarine units, transferring from Soviet western fleets. These units have provided the Russians a more impressive naval presence than could have been drawn from their Pacific Fleet a year ago.

In addition to this de facto improvement in the quality of the Indian Ocean force, the Indian Ocean has included more modern anti-air and anti-submarine units, transferring from Soviet western fleets. These units have provided the Russians a more impressive naval presence than could have been drawn from their Pacific Fleet a year ago.

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Toward these goals, the Soviets use their naval presence as one element in a combined approach, that utilizes political, economic, subversive, and military aid activity.

We believe that the role of military, and particularly naval forces, have been secondary to diplomatic efforts and aid programs in promoting Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean area.

The principal objective of the naval force is to maintain an adequate military strength to counter—or at least provide a political counterweight to—moves made by western naval forces there, particularly those of the U.S.

Soviet leaders have shown that they will maintain a naval presence in the ocean as least equal to, if not greater than, that of the U.S. Navy.

Soviet writings have reflected concern over the possibility of the U.S. sending nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to the Indian Ocean, but so far the activities of Soviet naval units there have not indicated an anti-Persian mission.

The Soviets recognize the importance to the west of Persian Gulf oil, and the sea lanes between the Gulf and Europe or Japan. Moscow perceives a causal relationship between the oil question and recent increases in the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Nevertheless, the normal composition of the Soviet fleet—particularly the lack of a significant submarine capability—suggests that interdiction of western commerce, particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been a major objective.

At present, about 50 percent of the industrialized countries' oil imports come from the Persian Gulf. This share may decline somewhat in coming years, as alternative sources are developed.

Judging from the size and composition of the Soviet Indian Ocean force, direct military intervention does not appear to figure prominently in Soviet plans.

As for future Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, we believe that growth will be steady over the long term, if there is no permanent increase in U.S. naval forces in the area.

Moscow would probably consider such a measured approach as consistent with a generally growing—and accepted—Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean countries.

Soviet capabilities to project and support large naval forces in the Indian Ocean are constrained by a variety of factors.

First, is the distance and steaming time from the various Soviet fleets. Those in the western USSR now have to go around Africa, and are twice as far from the Arabian Sea as is the Pacific Fleet. If the Suez Canal were open, the steaming time for the fleets in the western USSR would be significantly reduced.

As shown on this map, you can see that the red line south of India, Mr. Chairman, shows the point from which you have approximately an equal steaming time from either the Black Sea or the Pacific Ocean fleets.

Other restraints include the requirement to maintain a strategic reserve in home fleet areas, a large deployed force in the Mediterranean, plus the economic and political costs of operating a stable naval force in the Indian Ocean.

Moreover, the Soviets are not likely to acquire substantially better naval support facilities for their ships in the Indian Ocean area, at least in the near future. There seems to be little prospect for routine access to these facilities—such as those in Singapore, India, Sri Lanka, or Aden—for major repair and overhaul of warships.

The limited facilities that the Soviets use now, such as those in Bebera or Umm Qasr, would require considerable repair and probably change of command to provide major services.

On the other hand, the Soviets probably

hope to increase their capabilities for air reconnaissance in the Indian Ocean. Their prospects are best in Somalia, where Russian technicians are helping to construct airfields at Berbera and near Mogadishu. Somalia is unlikely to give Moscow permanent basing rights, but would probably allow occasional flights.

TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft staging from Somalia could conduct surveillance from the Cape of Good Hope to the Malacca Strait.

Visits by TU-95's most likely would be on a periodic basis, as in Cuba and Guinea, but might increase in frequency during times of crisis, major western deployments or exercises, or Soviet naval space support activity.

Anti-submarine warfare aircraft, such as the IL-38 May, operating from Somalia could provide surface reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare coverage of the Arabian Sea. These aircraft, as well as TU-16 medium bombers, were based in Egypt until July 1972, and closely monitored U.S. and NATO ships and exercises in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared statement. I would be very happy to answer any additional questions you might like to ask.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Colby. The first request would be that you deliver as much of this as possible.

Mr. COLBY. I will, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. It would be your decision.

Mr. COLBY. The other matters I will do it as best as I can.

Senator SYMINGTON. The more information we can get out in order to help us make the right decision the better.

Mr. COLBY. I understand, Mr. Chairman.

In our country our decision-making has to be public as opposed to some countries where it is to be secret, and consequently, we have to make as much of our input public as possible.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you consider the Indian Ocean area to be of strategic importance to either the Soviets or the U.S.?

Mr. COLBY. I would rather answer from the Soviet side, Mr. Chairman. I think the Soviets are interested in the Indian Ocean as an area of expanding their influence, primarily through their political relationships with some of the countries in the area, with the Indians, especially, and some of the other countries in that general area. I think they would obviously be concerned if there were some major threat to Soviet security posed from the Indian Ocean. I think there is a certain interest in posing a possible counter-threat to American or western pressure on the Soviet Union by posing a threat to the oil sources of Western Europe. But it is certainly not in priority anything like their relationships with the U.S. Western Europe or China.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Navy spokesman have indicated that the Soviets have use of facilities in several locations in the littoral. I would like to take them one by one and have your comments. I have already heard them in another committee, but I would like to hear them now.

The Island of Socotra.

Mr. COLBY. The Island of Socotra, Mr. Chairman, is a bare island. There is almost nothing there except for a small garrison from South Yemen. The Soviets have used Socotra as they have used many other areas around the world as an anchoring place for their ships. The Soviets spend a considerable portion of their time at anchor. They do their provisioning frequently at anchor. They have anchored there off Socotra in protected waters in order to conduct this kind of re-provisioning and just plain sitting.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about an air strip on old World War II air strip which is really not feasible for modern operations.

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Senator SYMINGTON. We were told of anchorages and permanent mooring in the Chagos Archipelago.

Mr. COLBY. There are anchorages in that Archipelago. Again, some of this water between the different islands is international water, and Soviet ships are inclined to anchor there. They have set up some mooring buoys there in international waters so that they can just come on and hook onto them.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is very close to Diego Garcia.

Mr. COLBY. It is not far from there.

Senator SYMINGTON. On Berbera, Somalia, communications station, barracks, repair ships, and other facilities, including air strips. What are the facts on that?

Mr. COLBY. Let me give you an overall picture of the port at Berbera. Mr. Chairman, it is a small installation which will handle two or three ships. And there is an air strip under construction outside of Berbera.

They have been building an air strip there for about a year, but have not gotten very far.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mogadishu.

Mr. COLBY. Mogadishu is the Capital of Somalia. Mr. Chairman. It is a big town there. They have an embassy, and they have people there, advisors.

The port is a fairly big port.

But the area within the breakwater is somewhat shallow water, and you would have to anchor a little offshore and bring lights in if you use the port as all.

There is an airfield about 20 or 40 miles away from Mogadishu which they have been gradually building up a little bit. But there is not much progress on that either.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Iraqi Port of Umm Qasr.

Mr. COLBY. Umm Qasr, you will notice there up at the head of the Persian Gulf. The sea is down here. You come up a river, kind of a delta area. This particular island is claimed by the Kurds as well as the Iraqis. The facility here, the so-called port, is about four, five or six buildings here, a place where you can anchor. It is a little complicated to get through the delta down to the Gulf. The Iraqis appear to be a little bit restrictive as to the degree to which they will allow the Soviets free use of this particular port. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. The former British base at Aden and the former Royal Air Force Base.

Mr. COLBY. The former British base at Aden is a good base. It is a good harbor. There are facilities in it. There is an airfield in that town. That is the Capital of South Yemen. And there is an airfield that is an effective airfield and could be used.

The Soviets have not used it very much. They have not done much more than port visits there. But the Government of South Yemen of course, is a Communist government. The Soviets have been assisting them. So they have a pretty active presence there. But they have not actually used the port facility to that degree.

Senator SYMINGTON. What kind of a runway do they have.

Mr. CHOMKOV. It is short. It is not large enough to handle the extremely large aircraft. I have forgotten the length.

Mr. COLBY. It is a short runway, not big enough to handle the TU-16's and larger aircraft.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is a big enough, Mr. Chairman, to handle the B-24, because I have landed one there.

Mr. COLBY. You know, then.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is a horrible place.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is probably pretty hot, is not?

[Discussion of the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Bunkering rights in the Gulf.

Mr. COLBY. Bunkering, of course, is a very well equipped port. And the Soviets have

bunkered there. Singapore sells to whoever happens to go by. They have also used Singapore for some repair, because there are some good shipyards in Singapore, and some of their auxiliary ships, for instance, have been repaired in Singapore.

Port Mauritius—Port Louis on the Island of Mauritius is a very good port. It is not all that highly developed. It is an independent country now, Mauritius. They have sold bunkering to the Soviets.

There are lots of other areas. You can stop by and buy fuel oil if you want to.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have they a representative in the UN?

Mr. COLBY. I would assume so. I am pretty sure they are UN members. Whether they actually keep a mission there or not, I am not sure. But I know we have an ambassador there. As a matter of fact, Phil Manshardt is just going there as Ambassador. As you will recall, he was a Foreign Service Officer, and was a prisoner of the North Vietnamese for five years.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Dominick.

Senator DOMINICK. I think I have only got one question, and that is, what is Mr. Colby's assessment—if we should pass the Diego Garcia enlargement, would we be so doing increase the force of the Russian fleet?

Mr. COLBY. I think our assessment is that the Soviets would reach any increase in our presence in that area.

Senator DOMINICK. That is all I have.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Colby, would you consider that enlarging the port and the airfield as planned would be such an increase or not?

Mr. COLBY. I am not all that familiar with the details of the plan, Senator Taft. I do think that the public impression of what we would probably be almost as important as what we actually do. In other words, the Soviets would believe that if we were to establish a permanent establishment capable of supporting a regular force in that area, that they would react in some fashion in order to establish a countervailing force. That is more or less at any degree at which we do it.

Senator TAFT. If we have a big debate and authorize it, is that going to have—

Mr. COLBY. It will certainly attract their attention.

Senator TAFT. If we go ahead and authorize it, and public opinion seems to justify authorizing it, would that have an effect on being able to negotiate limitation on forces in the area?

Mr. COLBY. I think that our assessment, Senator, is that you will see a gradual increase in Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area, that if there is some particular American increase, that the Soviets will increase that gradually to match any substantial additional American involvement. So that it would really depend upon the size of the investment and the forces that we arrange to be there. If we put in a permanent establishment of some size, why they would correspondingly increase to some substantial degree. If we had only sort of tentative connections there and some improvements, they might just continue their gradual increase.

Senator TAFT. You have not mentioned the British or French forces. I do not think, that in the area. Both of them have permanent naval forces.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, the French have a naval base up at the north end of Malagasy as well as a base at Djibouti. They keep a permanent force of five to six ships. And the British, their only permanent establishment is in Singapore, where they keep a very small fleet. [Deleted.]

Senator TAFT. That is all I have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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