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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR  
FISCAL YEAR 1975

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE A  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS,

SECOND SESSION

ON

H.R. \_\_\_\_\_

AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT  
OF DEFENSE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1975,  
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

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PART 1

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lower capability can be acquired for the same cost as a smaller number of high capability forces. Thus the planned overall force mix takes into account the different threat levels, enabling us to buy both sophisticated multi-purpose aircraft carriers and smaller, less sophisticated and less costly Sea Control Ships; nuclear-powered guided missile frigates as well as smaller patrol frigates; and so forth.

These planned modernization programs, together with continuing research and development leading toward advanced weapons and sensor systems, give us confidence that we and our allies can maintain an adequate naval balance with respect to the USSR into the early 1980s. Planned maritime forces, sea and air, will be capable in general of defending essential worldwide sea lanes, providing a strong capability to project power ashore in selected areas, and sustaining current levels of forward deployments.

#### MIDDLE EAST LESSONS

Soviet actions during the October 1973 Middle East War show that detente is not the only, and in certain circumstances not the primary, policy interest of the USSR. The immediate Soviet arms shipments to Egypt and Syria at the outset of hostilities, the deployment of nuclear-capable SCUD missile launchers, the peremptory Soviet note to the United States Government implying the possibility of direct Soviet military intervention with ground and air forces, and the forward deployment of sizeable Soviet naval forces—over 90 Soviet ships in the Mediterranean at the height of the hostilities and smaller naval forces in the Indian Ocean—provided another lesson in Soviet willingness to take risks with world peace.

We also learned useful military lessons from the October hostilities. For example, the value of United States military capabilities—our capacity to airlift and sealift needed munitions and equipment over long distances, and the deterring presence of the Sixth Fleet—was proved. Our quick logistical response capabilities and large naval presence had much to do with moderating the effects of the war.

We learned both from our last campaigns in Vietnam and the ensuing force reductions after Vietnam, as well from the Middle East crisis, that the readiness and level of modernization of our forces were not wholly adequate. With the support of the Congress, we are taking steps to correct this. Also, while our Middle East airlift effort was splendidly executed, we found our dependence on airlift highlighted. We need to increase that capability.

Given the present situation in the Middle East and the growth in the Soviet naval capabilities and deployments worldwide, we have decided also that United States interests would be served by our presence in the Indian Ocean on a more regular basis, i.e., by making more frequent deployments in that area in the coming year. In consonance with that decision, we are recommending to the Congress a budget supplement for \$29 million for the expansion of our support facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. This will limit the costs of Indian Ocean deployments and provide greater flexibility in the types of forces we would have available in that area of the world.

#### DIEGO GARCIA

Chairman McCLELLAN. What is the present US force on Diego Garcia? How much have we spent there? What is the US force objective there, and what will the cost be?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. At the present time, we have a total of 157 US personnel on Diego Garcia to operate the communications facility there, with a programmed force objective of 500 communications and support personnel. There are also 800 Naval Construction Battalion (SEABEE) personnel who are temporarily on Diego Garcia for the purpose of completing previously scheduled construction. Operating and equipment costs associated with these construction personnel have amounted to \$42.1 million to date. In addition to these regular and recurring expenses in support of active duty construction units, appropriations of \$20.4 million for military construction and \$2.8 million for communications equipment have been required, for a combined total of approximately \$65.3 million.

The FY 1974 supplemental and FY 1975 budget for expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia total \$32.3 million, to include an enlarged anchorage, a lengthened runway, pier construction, enlarged POL storage capacity, a modest maintenance capability, and increased quarters and other structures related to the support of

an increased number of personnel. Operating and equipment expenses for the SEABEE forces to carry out this construction work will approximate \$63 million for the follow-on efforts in FY 1974-75, in addition to about \$1 million for miscellaneous operating and equipment costs apart from SEABEE operations.

We now anticipate some \$5 to \$6 million in FY 1976 future appropriations requests for the improvement of personnel support facilities. When this program is completed, these facilities will provide the barebones support to permit us to operate military forces in the third largest ocean of the world from time to time without being forced to rely on a lengthy logistical "tail". Specifically, they would be sufficient to support a carrier task force for a period of about 30 days. The location of this installation on a small British island with no native population at a distance of nearly a thousand miles from the nearest land insures a considerable measure of security and reduces the likelihood that we would have to turn to the littoral nations for assistance.

Chairman McCLELLAN. Proceed.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. In addition, the Middle East war confirmed prior judgments about various aspects of modern warfare. The principal points are:

The importance of advanced warning and its assessment, and the ready forces available to take advantage of it.

The heavy attrition of equipment and supplies than can result from modern, intense conventional conflict.

The need for balanced, mutually supporting forces, i.e., not just tanks and aircraft, but infantry, antitank weapons, artillery and ground air defenses as well.

The new importance of modern antitank and air defense weapons.

The importance of defense suppression weapons, equipment and tactics.

The importance of a warm production base, and sufficient reserve stocks of ammunition, spare parts and equipment.

The importance of trained manpower.

None of these lessons is surprising. The Department has been working for some time to improve our capabilities in each of these areas.

#### PRIOR JUDGMENTS AND PROGRAMS

Chairman McCLELLAN. You indicate that the recent conflict in the Middle East confirmed prior judgments about seven aspects of modern warfare and furthermore that the Department has been working for some time to improve our capabilities in each of these areas. Please explain specifically how these seven capabilities have been improved by FY 1973 and FY 1974 programs. Also, indicate where those FY 1973 and FY 1974 programs were insufficient, thereby necessitating the need for a sizeable FY 1974 force readiness supplemental request.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. It should be recognized that the seven aspects of modern warfare cited in the Annual Defense Department Report (pp. 14-15), plus the lessons for airlift and for readiness, encompass a large part of the activity related to our general purpose forces. The supplemental request in fact covers only a small part of this activity, especially in the areas of Middle East payback for equipment sold to Israel, for readiness, and for accelerating the filling of inventory objectives for certain ammunition stocks. These will be highlighted in the discussion that follows.

#### ADVANCED WARNING

1. *The importance of advanced warning and its assessments, and the ready forces to take advantage of it.* Advanced warning is obtained from a great variety of intelligence and surveillance sources. Examples of significant programs in the FY 1973-FY 1975 programs include the continued development of the OTH-B radar, development and acquisition of the SLBM phased array radar warning system, continued procurement of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, acquisition of the AN/BQQ-5 sonar system, and development and deployment of SOSUS and improved SOSUS and of TASS undersea surveillance systems. There are also the acquisition of the Navy's E-2C fleet early warning aircraft, and the development and procurement of the AWACS (E-3A). Of these programs, only the procurement of six additional P-3C aircraft has been proposed in the supplemental request for FY-1974. This is in response to greatly expanded Soviet naval activities, including those in the Indian Ocean. It is also timely to go ahead with this additional P-3C purchase now because additional production in FY 1974 will lower the overall unit cost of these aircraft. On warning, one of the lessons of



period until more lasting peace arrangements are achieved. The stronger our Allies, the greater is the incentive for North Vietnam and North Korea to seek negotiated solutions, thus enhancing the possibility for peace in this troubled part of the world.

#### MARITIME MISSIONS

##### (1) ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

Although we would have to depend primarily on active forces and airlift for a quick NATO mobilization and the early stages of a war in Central Europe, there are obvious risks in placing such heavy reliance on only one form of mobility. Moreover, we should be able to start delivering very large tonnages by sea within a relatively short time after having established our sea lines of communication (SLOC). These tonnages could be of great value in a prolonged mobilization; they might contribute to the initial stages of a large-scale defense, and they would be essential to a more protracted conflict. For all these reasons we maintain some sealift, would charter more in an emergency, and would deploy substantial antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces—principally in the form of attack submarines, patrol aircraft, carrier air, and escorts—for protection of the sea lanes.

The precise justification for the size and composition of our ASW forces is quite complex and I do not propose to discuss it in detail. It should be evident, however, that the main threat to our Atlantic (and Pacific) shipping comes from the large Soviet attack and cruise missile submarine force. Our most effective strategy against this threat is a defense in depth, based on a series of barriers—manned primarily by submarines and aircraft—between the enemy threat and allied shipping. In addition, we would want to provide close-in protection for our merchant marine (particularly in convoy) with surface escorts and carrier-based aircraft.

These functions permit calculations of kill probabilities for various types and numbers of ASW systems against the threat, and thus lead to the establishment of force requirements. Our current estimates are that with existing and planned U.S. and Allied ASW forces, we could eventually turn back the enemy submarine threat without an unacceptable loss of our merchant shipping or to our naval forces.

##### (2) SEA CONTROL

While I have placed primary emphasis on the submarine threat, I do not wish to underestimate the emergence of the Soviet surface fleet and land-based naval aircraft as factors of increasing weight in the maritime balance of power. We have estimated in the past that most of these ocean-going vessels, the long-range aircraft, and portions of the attack and cruise missile submarine forces were intended to counter our carrier task forces.

Now, however, Soviet objectives may be more ambitious. With the launching of one 40,000-ton carrier (comparable in size but not in mission to our Essex class) and the construction of another underway, with continuing efforts to establish overseas bases on the coasts of Africa, in the Indian Ocean, and in Cuba, and with a gradual growth in open-ocean operations, the Soviet leaders are clearly intent on making their naval presence felt on a worldwide basis. With the reopening of the Suez Canal, this objective will become more easily attainable.

These expanded forces and operations may be primarily designed to establish a political presence, but for the first time they put the Soviet Union in a position to challenge the United States and its allies for control of the seas. Certainly that has already been the effect of their naval deployments in the Mediterranean.

Whichever may be the correct interpretation, we are determined to maintain our own sea lines of communication on a worldwide basis and to ensure that the naval balance of power does not tilt against us. In the long run, we anticipate that, with homeporting, 12 carrier task forces—five in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and seven in the eastern and western Pacific—are adequate to any challenge from the Soviet surface navy and long-range aircraft in regions of interest to the U.S.

#### HOMEPORTING

Chairman McCLELLAN. At what geographical locations will the 12 carrier task forces be homeported? Which are now in being and what is the plan for completing the program?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. It is expected that the carriers will be homeported at the following locations: San Diego, California—2; Alameda, California—4; Yokosuka, Japan—1; Norfolk, Virginia—3; Mayport, Florida—1; Athens, Greece—1. At the present time, carriers are homeported in all the locations indicated, except Athens, Greece.

Chairman McCLELLAN. Proceed.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Qualitative improvement in those task forces and in our other surface combatants, will be necessary in order to upgrade their defense against antiship missiles and to improve the range and accuracy of our own attack ordnance. I shall discuss these improvements when I come to the specific programs for the Navy general purpose forces.

As part of the effort to ensure a naval balance, we plan to expand our facilities at Diego Garcia and maintain a more frequent presence in the Indian Ocean. We may also wish to consider the use of long-range land-based aircraft for patrol in that general area.

#### OTHER PLANNING FACTORS

##### STRATEGIC MOBILITY

I do not propose here to review what constitutes the preferred choice among such options as deployed forces, prepositioned equipment, and various types of strategic mobility (airlift and sealift). As a result of previous decisions and because we support the strategy of forward defense, we are committed to a mix of deployed forces, prepositioned equipment, and heavy dependence on strategic airlift in the form of C-141's and C-5A's. An earlier deployment concept designed to deliver the required number of divisions within a relatively short time called for a larger number of C-5A's than we have procured, plus a fleet of Fast Deployment Logistic Ships that we have not acquired at all. As a consequence, while we have adequate forces to reinforce the Center Region, we do not have sufficient lift to get them all there as rapidly as we would like.

We may be designing to a scenario that is excessively demanding. If it were to take the Pact longer than we assume to deploy its 80-90 divisions, the timetable for our own deployments could be relaxed somewhat. Furthermore, if the European allies continue to improve their reserve forces, as the Federal Republic of Germany is doing with its Territorial Army, the pressure to deploy all the U.S. reinforcements by a very early date may decline. In either of these circumstances, a late arriving division may be more valuable to the defense of the Center Region than we currently assess it to be. I should add that even under the current scenario, forces deploying after D-day may still have an important role to play in strengthening NATO's defenses.

I do not consider it wise, however, to bank on all the uncertainties turning out in our favor. In any event, our strategic airlift demonstrated its worth during the recent war in the Middle East, and other occasions may arise when we will want to exploit its capability on an even larger scale. Accordingly, I believe that we should expand our airlift so as to enhance our NATO reinforcement capability. That, in turn, should give us ample capacity for Pacific contingencies and the "off-design" cases that I have mentioned earlier.

If we are to increase our strategic airlift to handle the requisite amount of tonnage for the NATO contingency, we should also improve the readiness of our ground forces to exploit it. It is not efficient to have a large and costly capacity for long-range mobility if equipment and men are not ready for loading as it becomes available. Nor will the lift have been fully utilized if units, having debarked from their aerial ports, cannot move to their combat positions in a timely fashion. Therefore, I shall also propose specific measures to accelerate the deployability of our forces.

#### NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

As should be evident, our contingency planning depends heavily on the National Guard and Reserve as well as on our active forces. This means that to be useful, they should have a high standard of readiness. Whether, in fact, they do, and whether they are worth their costs, is a recurrent question. It is perhaps most relevant to the Army ground forces.

During the past decade, the costs of the Army Reserve and National Guard forces have nearly tripled, and they now have received substantial quantities of modern equipment. Yet despite repeated efforts to increase their readiness, even



The Soviet Union has access to Berbera which is a port in Somalia right here which has very up-to-date communications systems in constant communication with Moscow. It is building a new air field near there. It has improved the airport. Its ships have access to Aden which was the old British area in South Yemen. They go right up and dock quite often, and on occasion, they visit India and ports along the east coast of Africa.

Since October 6, when we had the Israeli-Arab war, we have deployed intermittently some forces from the Pacific Fleet into the Indian Ocean. Normally the United States maintains three ships—we call it the Middle East Force—that has up until now been based in Bahrain. As you know, sir, the agreement with respect to Bahrain was terminated. The terms of the agreement are that we have 1 year to respond to the termination. We hope that they will remove that termination as these things tend to cool down in that particular area.

Senator SYMINGTON. What kinds of ships are those ships?

Admiral MOORER. One LPD type amphibious ship configured as the force flagship and two destroyer type ships.

#### DIEGO GARCIA

Of course, as of now we have no facility where we can fuel or land aircraft in this entire area that does not require a case by case arrangement. We are asking the Congress to permit us to establish a facility at Diego Garcia.

Senator CASE. At Diego Garcia?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, Diego Garcia. It is just about as dead center of the Indian Ocean as one can get.

Senator YOUNG. What do you want to put on the island?

Admiral MOORER. We already have an austere communications facility and a harbor has been dredged, sir. We want to add to the runway. We want to improve the harbor. We want to increase the aircraft parking area, and in particular we want to increase the fuel storage capacity there in Diego Garcia at the moment.

Chairman McCLELLAN. That would be about a \$35-million project?

Admiral MOORER. Well, \$29 million for military construction initially, sir. The current facility has cost us about \$70 million. We would expect the total costs for the current facilities and the new requested ones to be less than \$200 million. For instance, from the Atlantic Ocean through the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean the only place we could fuel would be at this particular island. If we wanted to fly in this particular area, the only place we could land an aircraft without problem would be there.

Chairman McCLELLAN. That might be a provocation to Russia or at least prompt Russia to increase her influence in this area and provide military strength in this area. That would be an irritation to her and cause her to expand in that area, would it not?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir, because they have already made movements in this direction with their agreements with India and with their presence in other areas. I am confident that when the Suez Canal is open that you will see deployments from the Black Sea Fleet down through the canal into this general area. The flexibility of the Soviet Union's deployments will be greatly increased. This is not really what we are concerned about although that is part of it.

I think that the recent focus on the energy problem, and so on, certainly highlights the fact that the lines of communication through

the Indian Ocean are becoming of increasing importance because the facts are that, in my view, if war were to start in Europe, you would have to have access to the Middle East area. Of course, the canal would be vulnerable in wartime; it would not stay open very long in wartime. So if you are going to have access to this area, you would have sea lines of communication coming around this way instead of trying to get through the canal. So I think it is important that at least we have a facility to refuel and to operate a minimum number of aircraft in this general area without having to arrange on a case-by-case basis.

We selected Diego Garcia and as you recall, Senator Symington, you assisted me on that. It is an island which has no industry, it has no population, and so far as the Secretary of Defense is concerned, they have no rare birds on there, either.

Chairman McCLELLAN. No what?

Admiral MOORER. Rare birds.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wanted to go there but you told me it would take 3 days and you could not land by air.

Admiral MOORER. You can now, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Soviets and the People's Republic of China get into a war, using the word that came up quite often, which side do you think we would tilt toward?

Admiral MOORER. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, in your opinion—and this is not facetious, I am being very serious about it[deleted].

Admiral MOORER. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Chairman McCLELLAN. We are going to have to suspend again for a few moments.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Chairman McCLELLAN. Admiral, I will let you proceed. We will move along.

#### NEW PROGRAMS

Admiral MOORER. Here, sir, I just wanted to highlight some of the new programs that are in this particular budget.

Chairman McCLELLAN. They are all new?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir, they are not all new. I marked the ones that currently are being deployed but these are new systems which I lifted in order to compare to the new Soviet system. Note that most of their systems have been deployed already whereas we only have two deployed but these are either under development or new production in this current budget.

First, so far as the ground forces are concerned, here are the new programs for the Army which include the new tank and the SAM-D missile, the antitank weapons, and the heavy Helo. These are the aircraft that currently are being deployed for purposes of enhancing the conventional capability. So far as the Navy is concerned, we have here the attack submarine, the amphibious assault ships, the sea control ship, and the 688-class submarine. The Harpoon missile also has air-to-ground capability, surface-to-surface capability, and a submarine-to-surface capability.

Here you see what the Soviet Union is doing in terms of its ground forces and new aircraft. Of interest is the fact that, so far as the aircraft are concerned, it is concentrating now on ground attack which it has not paid too much attention to in years gone by. However, now