eduction Defense Hudget-and we are paying the price.
We have adopted a conservative Economic

We have anopted a conservative schooling. Policy, based almost sourcely on high in-terest rates—and we are paying the price.

We haven't closed glaring tax loopholes, which could raise \$20 to \$25 billions and

which could raise \$20 to \$20 billions and provide some tax rollef to low and middle income people, and we are paying the price. And we will continue to pay the price for our failures, until we take a long hard look at our resources and decide how they

This requires the development of some Anis requires the terrolphical of some consensus on where we are going as a nation and how and when we want to get there. We need a system for developing goals and priorities for our nation. They need not be chicated in marble for the adoration of the ages. In fact, if they are, they are doomed to irrelevance. They must be con-stantly evolving as needs and attitudes

change.

But, it is the priority-setting process, a process that provides the basis for public and private resource allocation decision. That is social indication decision where the process in this direction with passage of the Congressional Budget Reform Sill this year, but this is not enough.

We must create the instruments of gov-ernment we sorely need to articulate na-tional goals and priorities. We need a Baianced National Growth and Development Policy and Program, as I have proposed in

We must provide all levels of government with the capacity to plan for meeting these objectives and for anticipating basic changes that will affect them.

And, we must tightly tie together this process, from the local to the national level, in a system of supportive inter-governmental relations—with modern County governments—effectively planning its action and administering its vital programs.

I urge you to join with me in working to this new agenda in policy makingan acenda of vital importance to our coun to creating a strong and stable econom to carrying through the promise of ar life for all the American people.

JUDICIAL RESTRAINT ON SENATE

Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. President, for the first time in over a century, impeachment articles have been voted by the President of the United States, Because of the gravity of this development, pre-liminary plans have begun in the Senat we are prepared in the event the full House of Representatives sends achment articles to the Senate for

Yesterday, I announced a policy of judicial restraint that I will be following in carrying out my own responsibilities under the Constitution in reviewing this grave question. I ask unanimous consent that my statement on my judicial restraint policy be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, AS follows:

STATEMENT OF U.S. SENATOR BICHARD S.

Throughout my Senate term, I have al-Throughout my senate seem a many ways been free to speak out openly on the RECORD.

Kingmon.

Ki

Now, however, the formal votes of the House Judiciary Committee in favor of im-peachment articles transform consideration of Watergate lote a quast-judicial matter with specific Constitutional procedures. It there is a trial each Senator must take a

inere is a Crin, each Schatter Mills take a special oast to "do impartial justice accord-ing to the Constitution and laws." If that happens, I will be one of 100 Sena-tors sitting as a judge in the imponentment trial of the Fresident of the United States. Therefore, I have decided to adopt a policy of "judicial restraint" relating to this grave

question:
(1) I do not feel it will be appropriate for me to comment on any substantive matter relating to imposemment charges until the verdict has been reached; and

(2) I will not make any judgment on my verdict until the completion of a Senate trial. The actual vote of a United States Senator must be based on the evidence pre-sented at the trial—and mine will be.

onice at the state-and mine will be.

I am adopting this policy of "judicial re-straint" so that I can properly fulfill my responsibilities as a United States Sensor to be a fair and impartial judge in these awesome proceedings.

CIA TESTIMONY ON SOVIET PRES-ENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. SYMINITION, Mr. President, ear-Her this month, the Subcommittee on Military Construction, which I have the honor to chair, held hearings on the question of the Navy's request for funds to expand U.S. facilities at Diego Garcis and the effect such a program might have on the future status of the Indian Ocean

Testimony on this subject was taken in open session from Rear Admiral Grojean, Director, Politico Military Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Senator Clamonne Pell, and Rear Adm. Gene R. LaRocque, U.S. Navy retired. Director of the Center for De-

recired, interest of the Center for De-fense Information.

In addition, the subcommittee met in executive session to hear testimony from Mr. William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, on Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

In that one of the reasons given by Navy for expansion of our facilities at Diego Garcia is to respond to Soviet activities in that part of the world, we believed it important to obtain an assessment of those activities from that avency of the Government assigned the prime responsibility of gathering intelligence data on the Soviet Union.

Director Colby's presentation placed the Diego Garcia request in a much broader context than that of a simple military construction project; and because his was the only testimony pre-sented in closed session, we asked that he declassify as much of his presentation as possible.

That testimony has now been santtired; and because I believe it important that all Senators have an opportunity to read this assessment before a final dacision is made on a project which can have far-reaching military, political and economic consequences, I ask unanimous consent that the relatively brief testimony in question be printed in the Becoup.

PROPOSED EXPANSION OF NAVAL PACILITIES ON THE ISLAND OF DIREC GARCIA US SEMATE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY
CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMITTEE
ON ALMOT SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to no-

tion, at 2:10 o'clock p.m., in Room 213, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Stuart Symington (Chairman of the Sub-committee) presiding, Present: Senatora Symington (presiding),

Dominick and Taft.

Dominick and Taft.

Also present: Gordon A. Nesse, Professional Staff Member; Joyce T. Campbell,
Clerical Assistant; and Kathy Smith, Assistant to Senator Symington.

Sanator Symmoron, The hearing will come

Mr. Colby, we welcome you.

1 see you have a statement. You may rooted. STATEMENT OF W. E. COLEY, DIRECTOR OF CEN-

TRAL INTELLEGENCE AGRECY; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN B. CHOMEAU, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC RESEARCH; WILLIAM B. MEWTON, OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIBRACE: AND RECAGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL.

Mr. Count. Mr. Chairman, 14 is a pleasure

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet naval negative in the Indian Ocean began in March 1968, when four shipe from Vindivostok made a "good will" visit to most of the littoral countries. In the little over six years since those visits, the Russians have maintained a nearly continuous presence in the Indian Ocean.

area.

The Soviet naval presence has grown slowly but steadily during these pears, and has helped Moscow Increase its influence in that part of the world.

The free the Saviets have dealored in the Indian Ocean, however, have been relatively small and inactive.

The vessels have spont 30 percent of their

The wessels have spont 30 percent of their time at anchor or in port wists, mostly in the anothwestern portion of the ocean. Although the number of countries visited annually has decreased since 1999, the general expansion of the neval force and the increased use of ports on a routine basis have resulted in an overall increase in the

have resulted in an overall increase in the number of port calls. Put in terms of naval ahly days in the Indian Ocean the Service presence increased from about 1,000 in 1568 to 5,000 in 1973, escluding harbor clearing operations in Bangiadean. By mid-1973, the typical Servist Indian Ocean force included five surface werehips—one gua-ammed cruber or missile-equipped one gua-ammed cruber or missile-equipped one sun-ammed erroles or missile-equipped mineweeper and an amphibious ahip. There was also usually a dieset submarine, and six was also usually a dieset submarine, and six auxiliary support ships, one of which was

a merchant canser.

Mr. Chairman, today there are six surface combatants, one submarine, nine minesweepers and 11 support ships in the Indian Ocean, not substantially different from that typical showing, except for the increase in mine-sweepers, as I will expinin later. Recently, a Soviet intelligence collection

ship has been deployed to the Indian Ocean for the first time since the India-Pakistan War, and is apparently monitoring develop-ments in the Persian Gulf area. It will probably also conduct surveillance

It will probably also conduct surveillance of any major Western naval movements in the Indian Ocean.

In addition, a group of Soviet minesweep ers has recently served from the Pacific conduct mine-clearing operations in the Gulf of Suer-in the sress shown on this map at the hottom. The ones at the top you will note are being cleared by the U.S. and the United

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August 1, 1974

group. This is by far the farthest from home

group. This is by for the lattings from both waters that oither the Leningrad, or its sister ship the Mook's, has over rentured. The Soviet warships and submarines sent The Soviet warships and submarines scatt to the Indian Ocean normally come from the Tadific Fleet, which is also the primary source for legistic support. Combatants from the weekern deets, however, have operated in the Indian Ocean, but only while transferation to the Paris.

for the Indian Ocean has become, in affect, a feering to the Pacille.

The Indian Ocean has become, in affect, a "southern sea route" for the interfact transfer of maral units.

About one-fourth of the Soviet warships about one-fourth of the Soviet warships.

and submarines that have operated there have been units transferring to the Pacific

om the western feets. The Pacific Piect naval forces are now be-The results rises have a textual to the most ing modernized. As part of this effort, since early 1974 the Soviet force in the Indian Ocean has included more modern auti-oxyler and auti-submarine units, transferring from Soviet western fierts. These units have provided the Russians a more impressive naval presence than could have been drawn

In addition to this de facto impr the quality of the Indian Ocean force, th tune on station for the individual length of time on salation to warships sooms to be increasing. Some of the ships that have just left the area, for instance, were there for a year, as compared to five to six months for previous rotational. This added time on station is at least partly owing to improved Soviet support fa-cilities in the arm.

Until 1973, the Bussians relied almost ex-

the tipe. Also Bussians relied almost exclustrely on "floating bases"—collections of
auxiliary ships streetly factored in intermational waters—to provide support to their
Indian Ocean naval forces.

The quant frequently used anchorages were
man the island a should be anchorage with
man the island a should be anchorage with
man the island a should be a should be a
centile of India, where the Soviets have implanted mooring buys, You will notice that
DEGO Orders to in the Chagos Archivelago.
Contrary to numerous reports about 50
cotts, the burges and its abstract place
world war if gravel into a should be a
world war if gravel intown. The only milimay installation on the island is a small

world War II gravel runway. The only mili-tary installation on the island is a small South Yemeness (PDRY) Garrison. A major construction effort would have to precede any significant Sowiet use of Socotra, other

han as an anchorage. In early 1973, the Soviete acquired use of facilities at the small Port of Berbers, nalla. These have now been expanded in Somalia. These have now been expaniet, and the Soviets are now using the harbor for routine ship maintenance and crew rest. There are no repair facilities sahors, but

there are no repair families ashore, but lenders now provide the same services in port as they previously did at anchor. The Soviets have set up naval communi-cations facility near Herbera, and also appear to be building an airfield although they have made little progress [deleted].
The Soviets have use of a POL storage area

The Soviets have use of a rob storage area there, and have constructed a barracks area for their technicisms. Soviet naval ships also have some access.

Sories have ships also have some to to the trace port of Umm Qaor, in the Per-sian Gulf, where Soviet technicians have

star Gulf, where Soviet technicians have been autisting in minor port development. Hopair facilities at the former British naval base at Aden have not been used by Soviet warmhips, although support altips and, occasionally, small warships stop there for refueling and replenishment, Soviet transperiodically land at an ex-RAP air-now Aden's International Airport.

Moscow's prospects for naval facilities in fure from one to four. other littoral countries are not very bright. [Deieted.]

The Seviets helped build India's naval hase at Vizakhapatnam, and have equipped the Indian Navy with minor warships and

diesel submarines.

Mevertheless, New Delhi has not granted the Sovieta free access to Indian ports, nor in it likely to do so in the forescendie future,

cloted. | The USSR is trying in some other cour The USSR is Bying in some clark con-tries, too, although prospects are equally dim beyond receiving bunkers. Moscow has apparently made overtures to Sri Lanka for access to the Fort of Colombo, and has some in research ships, support ships, and an canional warship—probably trying to ac-stom the Ceylonese to a Soviet naval pros-

Similar calls have been made to Port Louis,

Senator Symmeton, Where is Sri Lanks

Mr. Court. To people of our age, it was

Ceylon. Senator Symmetor. We had an open hear-Senator Symmetros. We had an open hearing him numing and a closed hearing this
afternoon, but so far it does not seem to me
that there is anything that you have said
here that aboutd be classified up to IV in
your statement, all that information, as I see
it, is something that overybody would know
that wanted to know it.

Mr. Court. There may be a few phrases in
there, Mr. Chairmon, that would reveal how
we learned certain items. But in essence, I
agree with you.

agree with you.
Sanator Symmuton, Would you please declassify as much as possible of your state-

ment.
Mr. Count. I would be delighted to go
through this and pull out these few things
that have to remain classified and declassify the remainder, Mr. Chairman.

So far, Mr. Chairman, I have been talking shout the more or less continuous Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Another aspect of the problem has been the Soviet surge deployments to the area-and these have been highly responsive to U.S. naval BCTIVITIES.

Moscoy apparently prefers to keep a min-tral furer in the ocean that can be quickly effectively force in the ocean that can be quickly effectively force in the provides a "signaling" expanding during crists periods, will eavoid right pelutical and economic costs of main-taining a larger continuous pressuce.

There have been two occasions when the Soviets have clearly made use of this "sig-

Pollowing the Indo-Pakistant War of Noremoving the into-resistant war of the venter 1971, and almost three weeks after the deployment of the USS Entseprise, they brought their force level up to six aurface combitants, six submarines and nine audicials. This represents a doubling of surface combitants, and a significant increase in

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Senator Dominica. Mr. Chairman, would Senator LOSSINGE. See Calculate Mr. Colby field at that point?
When you are talking about the Soviets, are you talking about missile firing submarines or attack submarines?

Mr. CoLer. We are talking about attack

Senator Dearway. Thank you.

Senator Dearway. Thank you.

Mr. Coust. The iming of Seviel ship movements into the area, both during the initial-paints in the series of the

Similar calls have been made to Port Louis, in Mauritius.

The Soylets may also hope to use the facilities in Chittagong, now that they have finished the harbor clearing operation there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Chittagong?

Mr. Ocurr. Chittagong is in Bangindeah.
You will recall that the Soylets were saked to help in some survage and minure weight of the last of the soylets were saked to help in some survage and minure weight of the control would form the control of the control would form the control of the control would form the control of the control of the control would give the USSR easter and more timely naval access, particulative or the control of the control of the control of the control would give the USSR easter and more timely naval access, particulative or the control of th

It also would incline and open and re-port of ships in the Indian Ocean and re-duce Boylet dependence on littoral countries. A reopened canal would expedite inter-facet transfers and deliveries of military skil. A few warships from the Mediterrancan

A few warships from the Mediterranean squadern probably would be sent to the latina Ocean once the causal opens. But because of the higher priority of So-vict navel operations in the Mediterranean, and the maintenance of a strategic preserve in the Black Sen, the Sovict Pacific Fleet-would still be the chief source for surface would still be the chief source for surface combatants—and all of the submarines— for the Indian Ocean. Support submarines be drawn from the Black Sea and the Pacific

on a nearly equal basis.

The Soviet Union is likely to increase its

on a certify set. Thom is likely to increase its continuous deployments there whether or unit the Suser Chank is reopened.

Moreover, the USSB probably recognizes that the canal is subject to closure in a crisis. The Soviets would not wish to be caught with a substantial portion of available units on the evong end of a blocked canal, and in considering this continguer, they almost certainly would give priority to their Mediterruncab unit movement in US.

Inval forces in the arms, we believe the Soviet increase will be gradual, say, one to two nurface combinators per pent.

two surface combatants per year. Mr. Colar. (Deleted.)

Mr. Court. [Detected.]
Should the U.S. make a substantial increase in its net british feater and larger
from the property of the property of the court of the c

not be able to sustain an Indian Ocean force significantly larger than that presently deand shifting paval forces from other

Let me now put the Soviet naval activity I have been discussing into the centext of overall Soviet objectives in the Indian Ocean

sren.
Viscost from a riobal perspective, the Inone Aden's International Airport, and the Commensus and the Commen

Toward these goals, the Soviets use their

particularly naval forces, have been second-ary to diplomatic efforts and aid programs in promoting Soviet interests in the Indian

The principal objective of the naval force is to maintain an adoquate military strength to counter—or at least provide a political counterweight to—moves made by western mayal forces there, particularly those of the

Boviet leaders have shown that they will maintain a naval presence in the ocean at least equal to, if not greater than, that of the U.S. Navy.

Boviet writings have reflected concern over

the possibility of the U.S. sending nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to the Indian Ocean, but so far the activities of Soviet naval units there have not indicated

sovies nava units there have not indicated an anti-Polaris mission.

The Soviets recognize the importance to the west of Persian Gilf oil, and the sea lance between the Gulf and Surope or Japan. Moccow perceives a causal relationship be-tween the oil question and recent increases ta the U.S. naval presence in the Indian

Nevertheless, the normal composition of the Soviet force there—particularly the lack of a significant submarine capability—sug-gests that interdiction of western commerce, particularly oil elipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been a major objective.

At present, about 50 percent of the indus-trialized countries oil imports come from the Perceian Gulf. This share may decline some-what in coming years, as alternative sources are developed.

Judging from the sise and composition of the Bovist Indian Ocean force, direct military intervention does not appear to figure prominently in Soviet plans.

As for future Soviet maval activity in the Indian Ocean, we bollove that growth will be steady over the long term, if there is no permanent increase in U.S. naval forces in the area.

ow would probably consider such a measured approach as consistent with a gen-erally growing—and accepted—Seviet presence in the Indian Ocean countries

Boylet capabilities to project and support larger mays forced in the Ending Ocean are constrained by a variety of factors. Picel, is the distance and steaming time

from the various Soviet fleets. Those in the arcm any various Soviet Rests, Those, in the western USER now have to go around Africa, and are twice as far from the Arabian Soa as is the Pacific Fleet, If the Succ Canal were open, the steaming time for the facts in the western USSR would be significantly reduced. se shown on this map. You can see that the red line south of India, Mr. Chairman, shows the point from which you have approximately an equal steaming time from either the Black Sea or the Pacific Ocean florts.

Other restraints include the moutement to maintain a strategic reserve in home first areas, a large deployed force in the Meditorranean, plus the sconomic and political costs of operating a strable naval force in the Ingian Ocean

Moreover, the Soviets are not likely to acquire substantially better naval support fa-cilities for their ships in the Indian Ocean arm, at least in the samp in the indian Ocean arm, at least in the near future. There seems to be little prospect for routine access to large shore facilities—such as those in Singapore, India, Sri Lanka, or Aden—for major repair and overhaul of warships.

The limited facilities that the Soviets use now, such as those in Berbers or Umm Oser, would require complete complete the state of the state of

hope to increase their cambilities for air re-connaissance in the Indian Ocean. Their prospects are best in Somalia, where Russian technicians are helping to construct airfields at Berbern and pear Mogadisci-

neios at Berbera and near Mognaliscio.

Somalia is unitiely to give Moscow permament basing right, but would probably aliow occanional flights.

TU-96 naval reconnaissance aircraft singfig tum Somalia could conduct surveillance
from the Cape of Good Hope to the Malacca Atrast.

Strait.

Visits by TU-96's most likely would be on a periodic basis, as in Cuba and Guinea, but might increase in frequency during times of orisis, major wetsern deployments or exer-cises, or Soviet naval space support activity. Anti-submarine wariare alreadt, such as the IL-62 May, operating from Somalia could provide surface reconnaissance and anti-submarine warrare overrage of the Arabian Sea.
Those abruraft, as well as TU-16 medium
bombers, were based in Egypt until July 1972,
and closely monitored U.S. and NATO ships

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared statement. I would be very happy to answer any additional questions you might like to

Senator Symmetow. Thank you, Mr. Colby. The first request would be that you declar-sify as much of this as possible. Mr. Cotar. I will, Mr. Chairman.

and exercises in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Collet. The other matters I will do it as been as I . . Senator Symmeton. The more information

we can get out in order to help us make the right decision the better.

Mr. Colst. I understand, Mr. Chairman. In our country our decision-making has to In our country our necession-making these to be public as opposed to some countries where it is to be socret, and consequently, we have to make as much of our input public as

Senator Symmorow. Do you consider the Indian Ocean area to be of stratigic import-ance to either the Soviets or the U.S.?

Mr. Color. I would rather answer from the arr. Octov. I would rather answer from the Soviet side, Mr. Chairman, I think the Soviets are interested in the Indian Ocean as an area of expanding their influence, primarily through their political relationships with some of the countries in the area, with the Indians, especially, and some of the other countries in that general area. I think they would obviously be concerned if thore were some major threat to Soviet security posed from the Indian Ocean. I think there is a certain interest in posing a possible counterthreat to American or western pressure on the Soviet Union by posing a threat to the oil sources of Western Europe. But it is cer-tainly not in priority anything like their relationships with the U.S. Western Europe

Senator Systemator. The Navy spokesmen Senator Systemator. The Navy spokesmen have indicated that the Soyleta have use of Incilities in several locations in the littoral real I would like to like them one by one and have your comments. I have already heard them in another committee, but I would like to beer them now

The Island of Scootra. Mr. Cousy. The Island of Socotra, Mr. AIT. COLST. The ISHAND OF SOCOTA, MT. Chairman, is a bare island. Thore is simost nothing there except for a small garrison from South Yeman. The Sovicts have used Socotra as they have used many other areas around the world as an anchoring place for their ships. The Soviets spend a considerable perion of their time at anchor. They do
their provisioning frequently at anchor. They
are anchored there off Secotra in protected
waters in order to conduct this kind of reprovisioning and just plain atting.
Senator Symmeton. How about an air

olicins—to provide major services.

On the other hand, the Soviets probably not feasible for modern operations.

Senator STMINGTON. We were told of anchorages and permanent mooring in the Chagos Archinelago.

For Ocar Times are anchorages in that Archinelago, digits, some of this water be-tween the different islands is international water, and Soviet ships are inclined to anchor there. They have set up some mear-ing buoys there in international waters so that they can just come on and hock onto

Sonator STMINGTON. That is very close to

Diego Garcia.
Mr. Goust. It is not far from there. Senator Symmetron, On Berbera, Somalia, ommunications station, barracks, repair hips and other facilities, including air

arripe. What are the facts on that?

Mr. Coler. Let me give you an overall picture of the port at Berbera, Mr. Chairman. It is a small installation which will handle two or three ships. And there is an air strip under construction outside of Berbera. They have been building an air strip there

for about a year, but have not gotte

Senator Symmeton, Mogadiscio. Senator Symmetron, Mogazine.

Mr. Colar. Mogazine is the Capital of Somalia. Mr. Chairman. It is a big town there. They have an embassy, and they have properly the senate of the senate people there, advisors.

people there, advaces.
The port has fairly big port.
But the zrea within the breakwater is
somewhat shallow water, and you would
have to anchor a little offshore and bring

lave to annoine a little offshore and bring lighters in if you use the port as all. In. There is an affeld about 50 or 40 miles northwest of Mognatice which they have been gradually building up a little bit. But there is not much progress on that either. Schafer Syminusov. The Iraqi Port of Umm Care

Umm Qasr.

Mr. Colly. Umm Qast, you will notice there up at the head of the Pensian Guil.

The sea is down here. You come up a river, kind of a delta area. This particular island is claimed by the Kuwaitte as well as the Iraqis. The facility here, the so-called port, is about four, five or six buildings here, a place where you can anchor. It is a little complicated to get through the delta down to the Gulf. The Iraqis appear to be a little but restrictive as to the degree to which they will allow the Seviets free use of this particular port. [Deleted.] Senator Symmetrow. The former British bees at Aden and the former Royal Air Porce

Mr. Cousy, The former British base at art. Colsy, The former British base at Aden is a good base. It is a good base. There is an airfield in that town. That is the Capital of South Yemen. And there is an airfield that is an effective airfield and could be used.

The Soviets have not used it very much.

They have not done much more than port visits there. But the Government of South Yemen of course, is a Communist govern-ment. The Soviets have been assisting thom. So they have a pretty active presence there. But they have not actually used the port facility to that degree.

Senstor Symmeton, What kind of a run-

Senator Symmeton, What kind of a runway do they have,
Mr. CHOMESAY, It is short. It is not large enough to handle the extremely large sir-craft. I have forgotten the length.
Mr. CLEET. It is a short runway, not big enough to handle the TU-16's and larger

Senator Dominica. It is big enough, Mr. Chairman, to handle the B-24, because have landed one there.
Mr. Colsy. You know, then.

Senator DOMINICE. It is a horrible place Senator Symphogon, It is probably pretty

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Colst. Singapore, of course, is a very well equipped port. And the Soviets have

bunkered there. Singapore sells to whoever bubkered there, Singapore senis to whoever happens to go by . They have also used Singapore for some repair, because there are some good shippyards in Singapore, and some of their auxiliary ships, for instance, have been repaired in Singapore.

For thauntitus—Fort Louis on the Island.

August 1, 1974

Fort Mauritius—Fort Louis on the Plaind of Mauritius is a very good port. It is not all that highly developed. It is an independent in the property of the property of the property of the Sovieta. There are lots of other areas. You can stop by and buy fivel of if you want to. Senator Symmotor. Have they a representative in the UN?

Mr. Colly, I would assume so, I am pretty Mr. Colar. I would assume so. I am pretry sure they are UN members. Whether they actually keep a mission there or not, I am not sure. But I know we have an ambassador thero. As a matter of fact, Phil Manhardt is just going there as Ambassador, As you will recall, he was a Foreign Service Officer, and was a prisoner of the North Vietnamese for

was a prisoner to the vicinities for five years. Senator Symmoton, Senator Dominick, Senator Dominica. I think I have only got one question, and that is, what is Mr. Culby's consideration and that is, what is set couly a casessment—if we should pass the Disgo Garcia enlargement, would we by so doing increase the force of the Eustian fleet?

Mr. Court. I think our assessment is that the Soviets would match any increase in our

presence in that area.

resence in that grea. Senator Dominion, That is all I have Senator Symmetries, Senator Taft, Senator Taft, Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, would you consider that en-larging the port and the sirfield as planned

would be such an increase or not?

Mr. Count. I am not all that familiar with
the details of the public impression of what we do would probably be almost as important as what we actually do. In other words, the Soviets would believe that if we were to esof supporting a regular force in that area, they would react in some fashion in

order to establish a counterselling force. That Scuator Tarr. If we have a big debate and Mr. Coley. It will certainly attract their

is more or less at any degree at which

Senator Tarz. If we go ahead and authorine it, and public opinion seems to justify authorizing it, would that have an effect on being able to negotiate limitation on forces in the area?

Senator, is that you will see a gradual increase in Soviet presence in the Indian crease in Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area, that if there is some particular American increase, that the Boviets will in-crease that gradually to match any substanadditional American involvement. So that it would really depend upon the size of the investment and the forces that we ar-ming to be there. If we put in a permanent establishment of some size, why they would currespondingly increase to some sub degree. If we had only sort of tentative con nections there and some improvements, they might just continue their gradual increase.

Senator TAPT. You have not mentioned the British or Franch forces, I do not think, that are in the area. Both of them have permanent

air. Colly. Yes. the French have a naval base up at the north end of Malagany as well as a base at Djrooull. They keep, a per-minent force of two to at a ships. And the British, their only permanent establishment is in Singapore, where they keep a very small lint. [Osleted.]

Senator Symmetron, Thank you, Senator.

IN SUPPORT OF INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PORTUGUESE AFRICAN FOR THE PORTUGUESE AFRICAN THE PORTUGUESE A they are rather targeted, there are only cer-

Senator Symmuron, The number of countries visited have dropped?

Mr. Coust. Yes. It has been more of a focus where they have visited

where they have visited.

Benator Symmeton, As I understand it you expect the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow regardless of what we do but that it will grow faster if we start developing Diego Garcia is that a fair interpretation?

Mr. Court. I think that le true yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, our estimate of the gradual growth is a reflection of our estimate of the general Soviet intention to assert itself as a major power, as one of the two superpowers, and to assert liself in a world role, and that consequently, there will be a tendency to gradually expand its presence throughout the

Senator Symington. Who reacted first in the Indian Ocean at the time of the Indian-Pakistan Wa-2

Mr. Cour. In the Indian-Pakistan War, Mr. ART. COLUMN. THE DESIGNATION WAS AN ADDRESS OF THE STREET AS A CHART TAKE FOUR THE STREET AND THE STREET AND THE STREET AND THE STREET AND THE ABOVE THE STREET AND THE STR

Senator Sympson, How about in the re-

cent Middle East War?

Mr. Coter. In the Middle East War the
movement of American carrier task group
was followed by a Soviet increase in pressince, particularly in submarines.

Senator Symmetron: Who has access to the most ports in the littoral area, the U.S. or

Would that be up for grahs?
Mr. Colpy. Even would not be far off, I

ould say. Mr. Chommau. I do not know what the U.S.

Mr. Court. The U.S., I think, would have

Second to Paristan, Iran, and Saydi Arabia.
Senator Symmeton, Off the record.
(Discussion of the record.)
Senator Symmeton. There was some quesdon as to whether nuclear submarines could

go through the Succ Canal when it is opened. What is the opinion of the CLA on that?

Mr. Gothr. Physically, they could go through it, there is no question about it, after it is opened, physically you can send them through. Whether the Soviets would send them through to something class. Senator Symmeton. Is there enough

. Coner. You mean without being seen? I mean on the surface, obviously, just going through, I do not think them would be much

problem Senator Symmetron. There would not be? Mr. Chomman, They have enough depth, but it is risky. You have to be certain that you are not going to run into some place where it is slited. But there is enough depth if it

cleared, yes. Mr. Coner. It depends upon the permission of the Egyptiana, of course.

Senator Symington, Do either of you gen-

Hemen have any further questions? Senator Dominion, No. Mr. Chairman. Senator Tarr. No questions. Senator Sympatom. Thank you very much

ward independence for the Portuguese

African territories of Angela, Mozanbique, and Guinea-Bissu. On July 27, President Spinola an-

nounced: The moment has come for the President of the republic to relterate colemnly the right of all people from the overseas Purtu-

gives territories to self-determination, in-cluding the immediate recognition of their right to independence.

This is a historic moment for which the country, the African territories and the world were waiting: peace in Fortuguese Africa finally attained in justice and freedom.

A law has been promuleated in Portugal opening the way for this promised independence to become a reality.

As a friend and ally of Portugal, we share her great expectations of peace and freedom for both the people of Portugal and the people of the African territories. As a country which is committed to human rights and to the replacement of colonial rule with genuine self-determination, we rejoice that Africans will finally take their rightful place among the independent states of Africa. As a friend of the African nations that have worked and sacrificed to bring about the independence of these territories, we share their commitment to a transfer power that is peaceful, their hope that independence will come without further

I hope it will be made clear that the United States fully supports Portugal's intention to grant independence to Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bisau. We must encourage every effort made by the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement to work out with African leaders in the overseas territories a viable plan for in-dependence. Having joined the rest of the world in condemnation of Portugal's past colonial policies, we must now make it clear that Portugal is not alone in her efforts to bring peace, justice, and free-

dom to the African territories But genuine self-determination will take time to build in Angola, Mozamblque, and Guinea-Bisau, just as it will take time to build in Portugal itself. It is important, therefore, that this country not only give diplomatic support to Portugal's policy of independence, but that we also give substantive support to making this independence viable

I believe that one of the greatest contributions we can make to this effort is to provide educational assistance for the future leaders of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bisan. The new African states will need African administrators. economists, agricultural specialists, engineers, scientists, teachers, doctors, and businessmen if they are to have genuine self-government. But education for Africans in the Portuguese territories has been far from adequate to meet these (Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the hearing was needs, One supporter of the Armed Senator Tarr. That is all I have the property of the Armed Thank you, Mr. Cheepfoved For Release ANA/101719. CLAPROP 758705 ANA/101719.