

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION
FISCAL YEAR 1975

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3471

BILL TO AUTHORIZE CERTAIN CONSTRUCTION AT MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

JULY 10, 11, 12, 18, 1974

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1974

87-3480

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you submit a list of those leases and explain why it is necessary to have such high cost leases, the same question?

Mr. FLIAKAS. I will, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What would be the effect if we should see fit to reduce the number of excepted leases by about one-half? Would that assist your office in getting a better handle on the matter?

Mr. FLIAKAS. This would be punitive, I believe, sir, in the sense that would probably have to cancel existing leases, and it would take away any flexibility that we have to deal with in this matter. What we are trying to do is to develop a criteria and a standard that could be applied. As I indicated, it is very difficult, because it comes under the heading of really subjective judgments on the part of both the occupant and the sponsor, in this case the State Department.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have had trouble like this before. When I was in the Pentagon we found some incredible situations where somebody just went off on their own and built things for which everybody got into trouble as a result, from the standpoint of wasting the taxpayers' money. That is a high figure for rent in any land that I know, with the possible exception of one or two. I think it should be given further explanation.

Would you give us a brief explanation of the need for an additional five million dollars for homeowner assistance this year?

Mr. FLIAKAS. Yes, sir. This is required to take care of the applications of those individuals who were affected by the base closure announcement of April 17, 1973. It is a residual of those plus the additional base closure announcements of this year, in February and March, particularly for Air Defense Commands of both the Army and the Air Force. We feel that this is the minimum requirement in this program to sustain its operation, and to provide relief to the homeowners that were affected.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much for your testimony.

And thank you, Mr. Harrington.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, July 11, 1974.]

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FISCAL YEAR 1975

THURSDAY, JULY 11, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room 212, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington (chairman).

Present. Senators Symington (presiding), Dominick, and Taft.

Also present: Gordon A. Nease, professional staff member; Joyce T. Campbell, clerical assistant, and Kathy Smith, assistant to Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. The hearing will come to order.

Today, as a part of the military construction authorization bill for fiscal year 1975, we will take up the proposal of the Navy to expand their communication facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean to a support facility to accommodate a carrier task force.

It is to be recalled that this proposal was a part of the supplemental authorization bill for fiscal year 1974, but was deferred by the committee without prejudice for consideration in the fiscal year 1975 military construction bill.

The Navy has asked \$29 million for this purpose, and will request an additional \$5 million in a subsequent fiscal year. The Air Force is also requesting \$3.2 million in the current military construction bill for facilities they feel might be useful to them in the future.

During the hearings on the supplemental bill, this matter was gone into to a certain extent, and we heard testimony from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William P. Clements, and from Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, who was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their testimony is of course available in the printed hearings.

We will hear from Rear Adm. Charles D. Grojean, Director, Politico-Military Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, who is most familiar with the Navy's position in this matter. This afternoon, in executive session, we will hear from a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency on the intelligence aspects of the situation.

Admiral, will you proceed.

**STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. CHARLES D. GROJEAN, USN, DIRECTOR,
POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ACCCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. A. E.
MARSCHALL, CEC, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL FACILITIES ENGI-
NEERING COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; CAPT. W. C.
GIOVANETTI, USN, AND LT. COL. DAVID J. CADE, USAF**

Admiral GROJEAN. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the U.S. Navy to respond to your questions of the Defense Department's proposal for expenditure of \$29 million to improve Navy's support facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia.

I do not intend to read a long statement today. I do wish to say a very few words for the purpose of focusing attention upon the central issues with regard to the Navy's request.

In recent months, the Navy has been deploying units of the 7th Fleet into the Indian Ocean more frequently. Prior to that, there were occasional deployments into that ocean, and in the future there undoubtedly will be more deployments. These cruises by U.S. Navy ships, representing an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, are made when it is determined that to do so is in the best national interest of our country. Our deployments are not made for the purpose of matching any specific level of the Soviet Union's naval presence and the size of our deployments vary greatly, depending upon the availability of units and the national interests to be served by our presence.

What are these national interests?

First of all, we do have a broad interest in not ceding a preponderant military position to the Soviets in the Indian Ocean. During normal times, our naval forces can serve a number of purposes by helping to maintain the stability and security of the region. The very presence of our forces will help to forestall a threatening situation and, hopefully, avoid military confrontations which could be costly and dangerous.

They will also provide tangible evidence of American determination to protect our legitimate interests in the area, thereby guaranteeing that those interests continue to be factored into the regional political equation. Otherwise, we could find that we had been excluded from the region by default.

Maintaining periodic forces in the Indian Ocean is not without difficulty. To date, we have been successful with temporary arrangements for bunkering and limited facility support from friendly countries in the area. However, in looking ahead, if we wish to have the capability to move or maintain our ships in the area without seriously degrading our posture in the Western Pacific, development of more practical yet limited support facilities seems essential. It does not serve the best interests of the United States to deploy ships into the Indian Ocean without improving facilities that are already there for proper and economic logistical support of the U.S. Navy. We believe that Diego Garcia is an obvious solution.

Our modest improvement of existing facilities does not make it an operational base. There will be no capability to repair ships on the

island. There will be no homeporting of ships or planes on the island. There will be no dependents on the island.

We do hope to store more fuel for our ships and planes, and we hope to have greater flexibility for aircraft handling, but this does not include B-52 aircraft. We hope to be able to improve the anchorage in the lagoon.

What I am saying is that the character of Diego Garcia as a limited support facility will not be changed.

In conclusion, gentlemen, I wish to reemphasize that the U.S. deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean stems from longstanding national policy. A limited support facility in the Indian Ocean is in response to our actual foreign policy needs, and we consider the improvements to Diego Garcia economically commensurate with political alternatives.

That completes my statement, Mr. Chairman; I would be happy to answer any questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. I appreciate your statement.

I believe it would be well at this time to insert in the record a letter from the former Chief of Naval Operations on this matter, dated June 13, 1974. I will read the first sentence:

I want to take this opportunity to reaffirm my conviction for the necessity of developing Diego Garcia into a capable yet relatively modest facility which would provide support to our naval and air forces operating in the Indian Ocean.

The letter follows:]

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
June 13, 1974.

STUART SYMINGTON, Chairman,
Senate Armed Services Committee on Armed Services
Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I want to take this opportunity to reaffirm my conviction for the necessity of developing Diego Garcia into a capable yet relatively modest facility which would provide support to our naval and air forces operating in the Indian Ocean. The facility as we envision it would be capable of providing support for a flexible range of activities including maintenance, bunkering, aircraft staging and enhanced communications. If we fail to develop this capability, we run the risk of being unable to respond to a threat to national interests in the region because of our inability to support and sustain effectively our forces deployed there. The alternatives are reliance on certain assistance from littoral nations, or upon an extended logistics train extending 4000 miles to Subic Bay. The difficulties involved in this latter alternative were made clear during the October War when extreme requirements placed upon our logistic forces supporting our carrier task group operating in the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean region to carry out national policy. Had an additional demand been placed upon Seventh Fleet assets to respond to another crisis situation, adequate and effective mobile logistic support for either both forces simply would not have been available.

A second lesson learned from the October War was that of Soviet willingness and ability to surge its naval forces into an area of crisis and potential conflict. With the expected reopening of the Suez Canal in the near future, the Soviets will have the capability of surging such forces into the Indian Ocean from their Black Sea Fleet with far greater rapidity than was possible in the recent past. Should we not have a contingency capability in the Indian Ocean to support our own forces, we could find ourselves outflanked not only by increased Soviet presence and influence, but also by our own lead-time requirements to provide for contingency operation support.

In closing, I want to reaffirm for the record that we intend to base no operating forces at Diego Garcia. Instead, Diego Garcia is intended to provide

support in contingency situations as well as serve as tangible evidence of our interest in the overall security and stability of the Indian Ocean.

I urge your strong support in gaining approval to upgrade our facilities on Diego Garcia.

Warm regards,

E. R. ZUMWALT, JR.,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Senator SYMINGTON. To be honest about it, I do not know quite how I feel toward this development, speaking only personally for myself.

Five years ago, or maybe longer, when Admiral Moorer was Chief of Naval Operations, he talked about it on a totally different basis than the one we are discussing now from the standpoint of what could we do there. At that time we were heavily involved in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and so forth, and he thought that there might be some kind of a switch that could be made that would not be detrimental to the overall activities. Since that time, the desire for Diego Garcia has increased.

What worries me, just for the record, is the question of where it is best to put your increasingly limited resources. It seems to me that things have sort of gone what you might call the Navy way in the last couple of decades, in my opinion primarily because of the development of submarines. Yet we are running into some very serious economic trouble.

The head of one of the three or four largest banking houses in the country said 3 or 4 days ago that things were beginning to look very serious, and if everything collapses, then you have lost at least part of your national security.

So any questions that we ask I think have to be asked on the basis of considering what is relatively important.

Those are some of the thoughts that run through my mind as we ask some questions here on this issue, which is unquestionably going to become a major issue not only militarily, but I am certain from a political standpoint also.

I will now proceed to some questions?

What, if any, specific efforts did the United States make to achieve some kind of arms limitations in the Indian Ocean area prior to our present source of establishing some kind of Navy base in the Indian Ocean.

Admiral GROJEAN. There have been various iterations both by the Soviets and by the United States along these lines. The State Department of the United States has looked into the seriousness with which the Soviets have followed up their statements, and have found that those statements were not serious in their minds.

There has been no effort on the part of the Soviets to follow up their statements by seriously working with us or making any further overtures toward us along these lines, Mr. Chairman.

The facts are—and in this area I must be very candid and honest—in my opinion as a naval officer, it is not to our advantage to have an agreement with the Soviets with regard to the Indian Ocean in trying to set up some sort of a limitation. I say this for this reason: If you look at the charts, you can see that the Soviets are nextdoor

neighbors to Iran and to India and to those countries which form the northern coast of the Indian Ocean. They therefore exert a great deal of political and psychological pressure upon those countries at all times.

In order for the United States to exert any pressure, we have to do so mostly through our naval presence and through our foreign policy and financial means.

Then to carry it a little bit further, and into the future, with the opening of the Suez Canal, were the Indian Ocean to become an area in which suddenly the two super powers find themselves, not shooting at each other but confronting each other in a period of heightened tensions, we would find that the Soviets could reach the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal in a period of about 4 days, whereas in our case it would take us closer to 10 days.

In other words, they are a lot closer to home base than we are, and we would find ourselves, in my opinion, operating at a disadvantage, unless we had some means of logically supporting ourselves when we get there, and unless we were poised and in a position where we could get there rapidly, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. For many years—certainly for 20 years—I think I was the leading advocate in the Senate, certainly one of the leading advocates, of the nuclear missile-throwing submarine.

Can a Polaris or Poseidon submarine go through the Suez Canal?

Admiral GROJEAN. When the canal is opened, yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you check that for the record?

[The information follows:]

The Suez Canal could accommodate ships of up to 38 feet draft prior to its closing. It is understood that the canal is being dredged to permit passage of vessels of at least that draft upon its reopening. The draft of surfaced Polaris and Poseidon submarines is such that they will be physically able to transit the canal when it is reopened.

Admiral GROJEAN. As you probably know, I have been commanding officer of a couple of Polaris submarines.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am talking about how much water it draws, and so forth.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Has the Soviet Union at any time given any indication that they are interested in limiting naval deployment in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. No serious indication, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I mention the influence that the proximity of the Soviet Union to Iran has, a very good friend of this country. I think you mentioned another country, India.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have problems that we have not yet solved with countries that are very close to us too, do we not, like Cuba, for example?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the United States interest, relatively speaking, and the Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean?

Does either nation have a strategic mission there?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir. It would be difficult to say that either country had a well laid out strategic mission that specifically was directed toward the Indian Ocean.

On the other hand, each country has a wide-ranging, broad national interest in insuring that the other does not become the dominant force in any particular geographic location of the world.

For this reason, you could say that both the Soviets and the United States have an interest in the Indian Ocean and seeing to it that the other does not completely dominate that area.

Senator SYMINGTON. What countries in the littoral area have supported our expansion of the base at Diego Garcia and what countries are opposed to it?

Admiral GROJEAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, sir, I would like to provide that for the record, and the classified portion of it, because the answer to the question becomes rather complicated. Let me speak about it in generalities and then provide the specifics, because many of the countries have said one thing publicly, and then privately, to various officials in the United States, have expressed a different feeling. For that reason, I think it should remain classified.

But generally speaking, with the exception of countries such as India, and Tanzania, most of the countries have either stated that they have—they come out sort of laissez-faire, or they have stated that they would not like to see one super power come into the area without the other being there.

[The classified information was furnished to the Staff of the Committee.]

Senator SYMINGTON. I know the Soviet Union has publicly opposed it. India has publicly opposed it. Australia has opposed it. And some other countries have opposed it.

At one point the only country that was on record as being for it—and this may well have changed, and we will be interested in an off-the-record check of—is Singapore. So I think it is a fair question to ask. You may handle the answer in any way you see fit.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you consider the establishment of a base at Diego Garcia as consistent with the Nixon doctrine to have a lower profile abroad and to rely more heavily on regional states and regional defense?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, without any doubt.

Diego Garcia is a very small island in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Its sovereignty belongs to our closest ally. It will have a very low profile. There are no indigenous people on the island. The entire facility—and I would like to emphasize this, sir, because it becomes a matter of semantics—as I said in my statement, it really is not a base; it is more a support facility, and the support facility would have an extremely low profile.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have we signed an agreement with the British and the details of all this?

Admiral GROJEAN. The State Department and the Department of Defense have worked out the details of an arrangement of an agreement with the United Kingdom, with the previous administration or the previous government of the United Kingdom, Conservative Gov-

ernment, and they are in agreement with what the new agreement should be.

It of course has not yet been signed formally by either government, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. When is it expected that that will be done?

Admiral GROJEAN. I would have to defer to the State Department to answer that question accurately. I can give an indication, however.

The Labor Government of the United Kingdom is currently reviewing the proposed agreement, and indications are very strong that they will approve of it. Of course, the U.S. approval of the facility will have to wait until after money has been appropriated and the due process of making it legal within our country is done.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would it not be of concern to the United States if we found the Soviets ready to spend several billion dollars to expand a base in the Indian Ocean area?

Admiral GROJEAN. Would it not be of concern to the United States?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, it would be of concern to the United States, and it is of concern to the United States because in fact the Soviets are doing that.

Senator SYMINGTON. In what way?

Admiral GROJEAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I believe that the following testimony given by the CIA will be the best vehicle for answering that question, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. In your judgment, is the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean today a threat to the U.S. interest?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, it is a threat to the U.S. interest, if the United States does not continue to oppose the threat.

Up until this time the United States has effectively maintained its forces in the Indian Ocean in such a fashion that we have countered the strategic value, the political value of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you consider the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to be more than the normal growth pattern as compared to their activities elsewhere?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir; I believe that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean is commensurate with their overall growth pattern all over the world.

To enlarge upon that a bit more, if I may, sir, the Soviet naval presence has continually grown in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean for the past several years. The growth pattern in the Indian Ocean is typical of that which has existed through the world.

Senator SYMINGTON. We were told earlier that there has been a dramatic rise in the number of ship days spent in the Indian Ocean by the Soviets since 1968 as compared to the United States. What really are we talking about in the way of tonnage, combat ships, auxiliaries, or oceanographic vessels? Could you supply for the record the details of that?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

UNITED STATES/SOVIET NAVY PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN (IN SHIP DAYS)


	1968		1969		1970		1971		1972		1973	
	US	USSR										
Carriers	6	0	0	0	5	0	6	0	23	0	80	0
Surface combatants ¹	1,380	405	1,010	640	870	790	670	1,030	940	2,380	1,310	2,840
Amphibious	0	0	0	110	0	300	185	290	25	275	20	265
Auxiliaries	210	445	280	875	220	1,080	340	1,245	425	2,780	670	4,350
MSC auxiliaries/USSR Naval Assoc.												
Merships	190	(2)	30	(2)	155	(2)	145	400	25	780	70	455
AGS/AGOR	0	815	0	640	0	415	0	100	0	490	0	115
AGI	0	100	0	10	0	20	0	10	0	30	0	0
Subtotal	1,786	0	1,765	0	1,320	2,275	1,250	2,605	1,346	3,075	1,438	6,735
SESS/SVRS ²												
Total	1,786	1,765	1,320	3,666	1,250	3,577	1,346	3,847	1,438	8,003	1,550	8,544

¹ Cruiser, destroyers, destroyer escorts, and minesweepers.² No record.³ Space event support ships/space vehicle recovery ships.

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 SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
 Date 11 July 1974 Page 113 Following line 19

U.S. NAVY AND SOVIET NAVY SHIP-DAYS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

22 May 1974



Admiral GROJEAN. As a matter of fact, as the saying goes, I am glad you asked that question. It just so happens that currently in the Indian Ocean the Soviets have a helicopter aircraft carrier, a DLG, a cruiser, a destroyer, a DE, and numerous other support and auxiliary types of naval ships.

It would be unfair for me to say that without also telling you what the United States has there at the present time. We have one cruiser and two destroyers which have entered the Indian Ocean in the last week or so from the 7th Fleet. Then of course we have our Mid-East force, which is comprised of two DE's and a Command Support ship.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do we not have access to more ports in the Indian Ocean than the Soviets?

Admiral GROJEAN. No, sir, we do not have access to more ports. I will check that for the record, Mr. Chairman. But, given the various constraints, some of which we place upon ourselves, I would say that probably we come off about even.

[The information follows:]

The following chart shows those countries which have ports normally accessible to visits by US and Soviet navy ships in the Indian Ocean at the present time. It must be recognized, however, that this list is only indicative of current circumstances and is subject to change with political conditions.

ACCESS TO INDIAN OCEAN COUNTRIES BY UNITED STATES/SOVIET NAVY UNITS

Country	United States	U.S.S.R.	Country	United States	U.S.S.R.
Afars & Issas.....	X	-----	Oman.....	X	-----
Bahrain.....	X	-----	Pakistan.....	X	-----
Bangladesh.....	-----	X	Qatar.....	-----	-----
Ethiopia.....	X	X	Reunion Islands.....	X	-----
India.....	-----	X	Saudi Arabia.....	X	-----
Iran.....	X	-----	Seychelles.....	X	X
Iraq.....	-----	X	Somalia.....	-----	X
Kenya.....	X	X	Sri Lanka.....	X	X
Kuwait.....	-----	X	UAE.....	-----	-----
Maldives Islands.....	X	X	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.....	X	X
Mauritius.....	-----	X	Yemen Arab Republic.....	X	X
Mozambique.....	X	-----			

The following nations are not presently visited by navy ships of either the US or USSR: Burma, Malagasy Republic, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me say to my colleagues, these are staff questions that have been drawn up, and I have 25 of them, and I have completed 10. I would be glad to yield.

Senator DOMINICK?

Senator DOMINICK. I think it might be good at this point, Mr. Chairman, to ask the admiral how many bases as big or larger—how many supply positions as big or larger than Diego Garcia do the Soviets have in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. Senator Dominick, I believe that that question will be very thoroughly answered by the CIA briefing, sir. But I am sure that you will see from that briefing that the Soviet facilities at Berbera are significantly greater than the support facility we would have at Diego Garcia.

Senator DOMINICK. Would Aden come into that?

Admiral GROJEAN. Aden would come into that. I did not mention it because the Soviets probably do not use Aden all that much. However, they have it available to them to use if they wish.

Senator DOMINICK. What about India?

Admiral GROJEAN. India is used by the Soviets more for port visits than as support bases, sir. It would not be fair nor correct for us to say that the Soviets have based in India, because that really is not a fact.

Senator DOMINICK. Would they be able to resupply or POL in India?

Admiral GROJEAN. They possibly could. However, they generally do not, or they have not to our knowledge, sir. To say that they could or could not would just be a supposition on my part.

Senator DOMINICK. The other bases, Berbera and Mogadiscio, are larger than Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir. When we say larger, we have to be careful. Of course they are larger geographically, but, more than that, the support facilities in those areas are greater also.

Senator DOMINICK. Do they have shipbuilding and repairs in those?

Admiral GROJEAN. I believe in one of the ports they have a tender which is capable of repairs, and I will check that.

At Berbera they keep a repair type ship constantly.

Senator DOMINICK. How much will the mileage from the Black Sea be to the Indian Ocean be cut off if the Suez Canal should be opened?

Admiral GROJEAN. It is reduced to one-third, I believe, sir. The exact figure is 2,500 miles from the Black Sea, and then if they come all the way around—generally, they come from the Pacific—if they come all the way around it is 7,100 miles.

Senator DOMINICK. So there would be a substantial advantage insofar as their presence in the Indian Ocean is concerned to have the Suez opened?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator DOMINICK. I saw Admiral Zumwalt testify on TV—and that is about all you could say he was doing—in connection with the relative strength of the Soviet fleet and our own in that area, and in the Mediterranean. What comment do you have to make on it?

Admiral GROJEAN. My comment is that Admiral Zumwalt is very knowledgeable, and in my opinion has made a correct analysis of the situation.

Senator DOMINICK. He testified before this committee at one point that the Soviets had, I believe it was a three-ocean—

Admiral GROJEAN. Capability?

Senator DOMINICK. No, a three-ocean alertness test at one point. If there was any one thing that showed, it showed that they were capable of going forward on all three oceans at the same time, and that their communication was extraordinarily good.

Admiral GROJEAN. That is right, sir.

Senator DOMINICK. Probably better than ours would.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator DOMINICK. What comment would you have on that?

Admiral GROJEAN. His statement was exactly correct.

It is a matter of concern to the United States Navy and it would only be fair to say that this concern was manifested in our desire, our tremendous desire to have Diego Garcia available to support us.

If I may go a little bit further on that, Senator Dominick, you see, when the going gets tough in the Indian Ocean today, the Soviets and the United States both have a long haul to get into that part of the world. However, when the Suez is opened, if the situation became very tense down there, the Soviets have the capability from their Black Sea fleet to not only supplement and to put adequate naval forces into the Mediterranean, but also to put them into the Indian Ocean.

We saw in the October war, when we built up in the Mediterranean, or when both of us built up in the Mediterranean, that there were still enough ships in the Black Sea that, had the Suez been opened, the Soviets could easily have brought those ships down and put them into position strategically in the Indian Ocean, whereas the United States had to draw down from its 7th Fleet assets. That is a fact of life.

As the chairman said earlier, we only have so much money and we have to decide where we are going to put it. We have to balance this out with what we can do with the money for the resources we have.

Senator DOMINICK. I am sure this has been gone into, but for my own knowledge, because I got here a little later, could you tell me how much money we are proposing to spend on Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir; in fiscal 1975 we are asking for \$29 million, and I believe that our plans are to go to \$5 million next year. This \$29 million, or 29 this year and five next year, would tremendously enhance the U.S. capability to remain on station and be properly supported without having to draw down from our logistical ship inventory in the 7th Fleet. We will then have our bunkering station, and stores on Diego Garcia, which means that we will not have to rely on a long logistic tail from Subic, which draws down on our tankers and other ships.

For that reason, it enhances our capability to respond to a heightened, tense situation in the Indian Ocean and still retain some preparedness or adequate preparedness in the 7th Fleet.

Senator DOMINICK. Are there any other ports outside perhaps Singapore where we could get POL or a communications system in that area?

Admiral GROJEAN. I will have to check that part of the world. I am not sure about Indonesia.

Do you know?

Captain GIOVANETTI. No, sir, they do not have any.

Admiral GROJEAN. Let me say that there are other places where we have gotten POL in periods of stress. But whenever you have to depend on foreign nations for POL supply—you can see what happened during the October war—you just cannot count on them.

Senator DOMINICK. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Taft?

Senator TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not think I have any questions at this time.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will continue to ask these questions. Have the number of port calls by the Soviets in the last couple or 3 years been decreasing or increasing?

Admiral GROJEAN. They have been increasing.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have heard considerable about what facilities are available to the Soviets in the Area. Could you take these facilities one-by-one and give us detail as to just what is available to them?

For example, we have heard of fleet anchorages near the Island of Socotra, where an air force provides a potential base for reconnaissance, and the Port of Berbera, Somalia. Could you give us specifics as to what is available to the Soviets, what airfields can they now use for military purposes?

Admiral GROJEAN. Once again, sir, if I may, I would suggest that during the CIA briefing this afternoon, you will receive not only the unclassified information, which I could provide for you now, but the full range and scope of Soviet capabilities in all of these ports.

Would it be all right, then, to defer that until that time, sir?

Senator SYMINGTON. It is all right, but I think it is on order for me to say to you at this time that some of the CIA testimony did not support previous Navy testimony in this field. So when we give the implication in an open hearing as to what we will hear later in a closed hearing, we may or may not hear it.

I will give you my word that there was quite a difference in some of the presentations in this particular field as against that of the agency.

Admiral GROJEAN. I appreciate that very much, Mr. Chairman.

In that case, let me then—

Senator SYMINGTON. In an effort to be of service to you, see how much you can get unclassified and put in the record at this point.

Admiral GROJEAN. I will put them in the record, yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Also at that time, the type and character of ships that we have that could go through the Canal, just a general picture.

[The information follows:]

The patterns of port calls by the US and USSR navies are quite different, mostly due to fundamental differences between our operations and the Soviets. The U.S. Middle East Force is engaged primarily in a military-diplomatic role which involves a continual round of short port calls, often by a single ship, wherever our ships are welcome. The Soviets, on the other hand, visit fewer ports, concentrating on those where they have personnel ashore; they stay much longer, and their purpose usually is to provide assistance for Soviet programs in those ports or to service their ships. These differences are reflected in port call statistics for 1973. While U.S. Navy ships visited 17 countries in the Indian Ocean, to our knowledge the Soviet Navy visited only 10. Likewise, U.S. Navy ships made 175 port calls (defined as an entry into port by each individual ship) while our information, which probably is somewhat incomplete, indicates that the Soviets made only 150-160 such calls, excluding those in Bangladesh where their ships were engaged all year in harbor clearing operations. On the other hand, days spent in ports in the Indian Ocean by Soviet ships far exceeded those spent in ports by U.S. ships. Our ships spent only about 580 days in foreign ports, including Bahrain where the Middle East Force is homeported. Soviet Navy ships spent over 1,200 days in Indian Ocean ports, exclusive of Bangladesh, and their harbor clearing task force spent well over 3,000 in or near Chittagong, Bangladesh.

Soviet support facilities in the Indian Ocean are listed on the following pages.

Soviet support facilities in the Indian Ocean area

<i>Country/facility</i>	<i>Terms of use</i>
Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen: Port facilities	Soviet Navy has access to Aden for bunkering, minor ship repair, provisioning, and shore leave.
Airfields	Soviet military transport aircraft regularly use Khormaksar airfield near Aden. Soviet personnel assemble aircraft delivered by sea from the USSR, and Soviet pilots test newly assembled aircraft and train Yemeni pilots.
Iraq: Port facilities	Soviets have access to port facilities at Umm Qasr. Facilities are limited, but the Soviets are helping to expand and develop them.
Airfields	Soviet military transport aircraft regularly use Iraqi airfields for delivery of military equipment, support of Soviet advisory effort, and transportation of personnel to and from the USSR.
Mauritius: Port facilities, Port Louis.	The Soviets have recently secured merchant bunkering rights in Mauritius.
India: Naval bases Airfields	Same as for all other countries navies. Flight plans for Soviet military transport aircraft to transit India, including enroute stops, are routinely approved.
Bangladesh: Port facilities	The Soviet Navy had 8-12 ships present in Chittagong involved in port clearing operations since May 1972 until recently. The operations were completed in June 1974 but a Soviet Navy contingent is expected to remain to conduct hydrological survey of coastal and inland waters. Only limited repair is available for Soviet ships, but bunkering, provisions, and shore leave are available.
Air facilities	The Soviets have a MIG-21 assembly and check-out team at Chittagong and Soviet military transport aircraft have been reported at the airfield.
Somalia: Port facilities	The Soviets have increased their use of, and are expanding naval facilities at Berbera which currently include a restricted area under Soviet control, a combined barracks and repair ship, and housing for Soviet military dependents. It is believed the Soviets may have over 2,000 personnel in Somalia and up to 250 dependents. The Soviets are engaged in building a new military airfield near Mogadiscio, which could be used for a variety of missions.
Air facilities	The Soviets have built a communications station near the Somali port of Berbera to provide support for their fleet.
Communication facilities	

Generally speaking, except for our aircraft carriers all of our major surface combatants can transit the Suez Canal. The majority of our Aircraft Carriers are constrained because of length and topside overhang.

Admiral GROJEAN. I would like to discuss the general picture of what ships we have that could go through the canal, if I may, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You can supply that for the record. I do not want to take too much time.

We have heard in previous testimony by the Department of Defense that there were 11 ports that the United States could use in this area, and 4 ports that the Soviets can use in this area. We are getting a little mixed up, because you felt the Soviets had more ports than we did.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir; I am counting Indian ports and others that we use also.

Senator SYMINGTON. The reason I am trying to get all these facts down is that we will have a diplomatic discussion of this as well as a military discussion, and it will all sort of meld at a point in the debate on the authorization and appropriations.

Senator DOMINICK. Would you yield, Mr. Chairman, just for a bit of information.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, indeed.

Senator DOMINICK. Admiral, you mentioned Berbera, and then you mentioned another one, the name of which I did not catch. Where is the second base?

Admiral GROJEAN. Mogadiscio is also in Somalia, sir. It is the capital of Somalia.

Senator DOMINICK. On the coast?

Admiral GROJEAN. On the coast, yes, sir. The Soviets have built up a number of facilities at that port, sir. I think it would probably be incorrect to term it a base, however. But they have used the port facilities and the airfield in Mogadiscio, sir. [Showing chart.]

Senator TAFT. Might I ask just this one question?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, indeed, Senator.

Senator TAFT. Admiral, to your knowledge, can you tell us of any discussions with the Russians about the possible limitations of naval forces in this area, informal or otherwise?

Admiral GROJEAN. That question was asked earlier, sir, and the answer is, there have been no formal discussions. The Soviets have made a couple of statements in the past several years.

Our efforts to see if they were serious about them have proven naught.

Senator TAFT. One other question. What about the Iraqis and the port on the southern tip of Iraq, and the Russian activity there?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir, there is a port, Umm Qasr, which is an Iraqi port, and the Soviets do in fact use that port. They make port calls there. It is available to them to unload and load material.

It would be wrong to say it is a Soviet base, because it is not, but it is one of the several ports that are available to them.

Senator TAFT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. I sometimes wonder why we seem more concerned about activities in the Indian Ocean than what is happening in the Caribbean much closer to home. I wish you could get the Secretary of the Navy—I am asking this for the record—to give us the details of our situation with the Cuban Government.

At times it worries me when various people in the military and legislative branches visit the Soviet Union and the People's Republic and other possible enemies—you never know who your enemy is today; he could be your friend tomorrow. Then in the war perhaps our two greatest enemies were Japan and Germany. So things do shift around.

The Cuban thing has always worried me tremendously, because after experiences like the OSA class or Komar Class missile boat, and the torpedoing that could be done, I am thinking in terms of adequate precautions as to that type and character of attack against the east coast. And the missile picture is getting steadily more sophisticated and more difficult to handle.

Admiral GROJEAN. We will provide that information for you.

[The information follows:]

The policy of the United States of isolating Cuba economically and diplomatically has been responsive to Cuba's own attitude and behavior. Because Cuba persists in its policy of interference in the Internal affairs of other hemisphere nations, United States policy toward Cuba remains consistent with a series of resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS). These resolutions excluded the present government of Cuba from participation in the OAS and other entities of the Inter-American system. They condemned Cuba for acts of intervention and aggression against various countries of the hemisphere and applied sanctions calling for the suspension of trade and shipping as well as diplomatic and consular relations between member countries and Cuba until the OAS decides by a two-thirds vote that Cuba has ceased to be a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

In an era when the United States has actively sought to ameliorate world tensions, Cuban behavior has remained relatively static. Cuba has not abandoned its practice of intervening in the affairs of other nations, nor has it modified its close military ties to the Soviet Union. Cuban leaders continue on numerous occasions to expose their deep hostility to the United States, profound disinterest in normalizing their relations with us, and contempt for the Organization of American States.

U.S. policy toward Cuba was reaffirmed by President Nixon in his reports to the Congress of 25 February 1971 and 3 May 1973 on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's. In the 1971 report the President stated that during 1970:

"Cuba continued to exclude itself from the inter-American system by its encouragement and support of revolution . . ."

We do not seek confrontation with any government. But those which display unremitting hostility cannot expect our assistance. And those which violate the principles of the Inter-American system, by intervening in the affairs of their neighbors or by facilitating the intervention of nonhemispheric powers, cannot expect to share the benefits of Inter-American cooperation. We will work constructively with other members of the community to reduce the disruptive effects of such actions."

In the 1973 report to the Congress, the President reaffirmed past U.S. policy and added that "We have assured fellow members of the OAS that the United States will not act unilaterally in this matter".

Both Cinclantfit and Comseconfit have contingency plans covering a broad range of possible threats (including this one) to the East Coast. Air patrols provide surveillance coverage to detect possible surprise military initiatives from Cuba. Navy air and ship assets at Key West and Mayport are available to counter any immediate threat detected. Additionally, the short cruising radius of the OSA/KOMAR boats keeps the threat localized.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you would do that, I would appreciate it, because we have just had for the first time—one of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee has just come back from an extended visit to Cuba. He is a very able fellow, and in fact he has been for many years a leading expert in the field of Central and South America.

It would be interesting to see how this situation is developing.

What is the status of our Mideast force and Bahrain and the prospect for our tenure there?

Admiral GROJEAN. The Mideast force has been notified—the United States has been notified that the Mideast force should plan on moving. They gave us a year to go from last October. Now, since that time of course, as you know, the world situation—our relationship with the Arab nations has changed significantly, and, as a result of this amelioration in attitude toward the Arab nations, there has been a big change in the Bahraini Government's attitude toward the Mideast force.

If I may, I would like to give a personal prognosis of what will happen. That is, I believe that within the next few months we will find that the Bahraini Government will very likely tell us that we are welcome there. That is not an official statement from the Bahraini Government; I am just giving you—as the director of politico-military policy in the Navy, I read all this information, and it is my prognosis.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is very interesting.

This question has been asked before, No. 14 on the list of 25, it has been repeatedly stated that with the Suez Canal reopened that the Soviets will have the capability of rapid deployment of Navy Forces in the area.

What is meant by this, and what kind of ships are referred to? Do you believe the Soviets would use the canal for combatant ships?

That is a package question which we have already asked, and at this point in the record you could refer back to your answers, or answer in any detail you wish.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir; we will.

[The information follows:]

Classified information has been furnished to the Committee staff.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the proposed expansion of this base is not approved, would you expect our presence in the Indian Ocean to remain about the same, or decrease?

Admiral GROJEAN. I would expect our presence in the Indian Ocean to remain, sir. The U.S. Navy, as I said in my statement, will continue to deploy its units as an instrument of our foreign policy. The existence of a support facility on Diego merely facilitates our deployments into the Indian Ocean, but not require it, nor will it keep us from doing it.

Senator SYMINGTON. If I might deviate, in your statement you say "We do hope to have greater flexibility for aircraft handling, but this does not include B-52 aircraft."

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. The last plans I saw had a 12,000-foot runway, which is adequate for B-52's, and everybody knows that submarines carry megaton missiles at times, and kiloton missiles at all times, and that surface ships carry large, very lethal atomic weapons.

This is not said parochially, but why do you make a point of eliminating—if you are going to have a runway capable of taking

52's, why do you make a point of eliminating the Air Force potential in the Indian Ocean as well?

Admiral MARSCHALL. May I answer that, Mr. Chairman?

To handle B-52's, we would have to widen the strip by another hundred feet. We would also have to lay a keel down that strip which would be necessary to accommodate the much heavier wheel loading of the B-52's. There was a previous question concerning the frequency of B-52 landings. If you lengthen the field to 12,000 feet and have an occasional B-52, you are going to hurt the runway some, but you can handle the bird. But for continued B-52 performance there, no, sir, it is just not feasible without a complete changing of the nature of the air strip.

Senator SYMINGTON. We got into quite a—I think the word "hassle" is a fair word on this—in Taiwan at one point, if you remember. I know that there was not the slightest idea of being able to base a carrier here when this matter was first brought up to the sub-committee by the Navy, I would say, guessing, 5 years ago.

I am just wondering why you made plans—it certainly must cost some money to make it possible to berth a carrier there.

Admiral MARSCHALL. To berth a carrier in Diego?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Sir, we do not intend to berth or base one there but we do hope to be able to accommodate a carrier task force within the lagoon on an occasional basis. As a point of interest, in the fiscal 1973 budget, we were authorized and funded \$6.1 million for deepening and widening of the harbor. Due to a very competitive bidding situation which occurred at the time we bid the job, we think we can do the dredging in that harbor for a little less than \$5 million, which leaves unused some of the previous authorization and appropriation.

We would hope that the committee would look with favor upon the Navy using the previous authorization and appropriation to increase dredged area so as to accommodate the occasional visits of a carrier task force in the lagoon.

The nature of the lagoon is such that with the remaining 1973 authorization and appropriation, we can easily achieve a much larger area, because we only have to remove coral heads and things of that nature. It is a generally good, deep harbor.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you supply for the record the estimated cost, as long as you are going to have a 12,000-foot runway, to make it adequate for strategic bombers to land there of the B-52 class, or perhaps some day the B-1 class.

I mention that because the whole idea of the effort in a strategic war would be a combined effort. Several people have asked the questions. So if you would supply that information for the record, I would appreciate it.

[The information follows:]

The estimated cost to upgrade the runway on Diego Garcia to make it adequate for strategic bombers is approximately \$10.1 million above the costs contained in the project currently before the Congress.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I will do my best to give you an honest estimate of that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sure it will be honest.

Admiral MARSCHALL. It will be honest—but there is a question of how accurate it can be. In my own opinion we would have to accomplish some major surgery on the existing strip.

Senator SYMINGTON. Maybe the Air Force could be of service to you in an estimate. Maybe you could contract there, as you mentioned.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I am proud to say that we do the construction work for the Air Force in that area.

Senatory SYMINGTON. To what extent do the British and French operate in the area, and what port facilities do they have?

Admiral GROJEAN. They each have in the neighborhood of three, four, and sometimes five DE's, or destroyer type ships. It looks as if maybe the United Kingdom will be having less in the future than they have in the past.

Of course the French have a small port called Djibouti where they operate quite a bit. Then they also have an island where they have a communications station and an air strip and a port facility.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was looking over the Indian Ocean, which not many years ago with great pride we called the ocean of peace. A lot of countries have islands there.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, Seychelles and others.

Senator SYMINGTON. With a 12 carrier task force, can the United States maintain existing commitments, and also maintain a task force in the Indian Ocean 6 months out of the year?

Admiral GROJEAN. That is just about the limit, yes, sir, about 6 months of the year, total time, but not continuous. They would have to draw down, of course, from the 7th Fleet, but the answer is yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

As we understand, the present agreement with the United Kingdom provides only for the limited communications facilities, and that they have not yet agreed in writing for a further expansion of the base.

I asked that question before, and you answered it.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir. We will refer to that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you expect the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow regardless of what we do at Diego Garcia?

Admiral GROJEAN. Absolutely, sir.

If I may elaborate on that just a bit, we have seen it in just the last week or so when the *Moskva*, which is their helicopter antisubmarine warfare carrier, entered the Indian Ocean with supporting ships. As yet we have not done anything more in Diego Garcia, and that represents a steady growth.

Senator SYMINGTON. If we want to do it, maybe we ought to take a look and see what they want to do.

I was told by a Soviet visitor here in the last few weeks in the United States, that they hope we do not put a major installation in the Indian Ocean because then, of course, it will force them to counter it, and therefore we will have another big arms development in that particular part of the world.

Admiral GROJEAN. With what they have in Berbera and the facilities that they have available to them in Aden and the various other places around the Indian Ocean, I do not see why they would need any more.

Senator SYMINGTON. You think they are in pretty good shape right now?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. To do what?

Admiral GROJEAN. To support a good sized naval force in the Indian Ocean.

Senator SYMINGTON. Against what adversary?

Admiral GROJEAN. There is only one adversary that I can think of, sir, and that would be the United States.

Senator SYMINGTON. At this time does the United States have naval superiority as opposed to the Soviets in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral GROJEAN. As of today, no, sir. But from time to time we do have.

Senator SYMINGTON. Depending upon whether you have a carrier task force in there?

Admiral GROJEAN. Just depending entirely upon what they have as opposed to what we have. Sometimes we don't have a carrier in there, and they may have a cruiser and three destroyers. So it varies from time to time, sir. Generally speaking, I would say that the U.S. presence in the past several months has been greater than the Soviet.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just as a matter of interest to me—I really am trying to understand these various relationships—do you think that the Navy would be disturbed if the new carrier visited Havana or Cienfuegos.

Admiral GROJEAN. You mean a Soviet—

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, yes, the U.S. Navy would be concerned about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

At this time, what mission does the Air Force have for the use of Diego Garcia? We have been into that in your statement.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there anything you would like to add to that?

Admiral GROJEAN. At the present time we do have an Air Force representative here.

Colonel Cade, would you like to contribute to that question?

Colonel CADE. Yes, sir, I would.

Lieutenant Colonel Cade, Headquarters, Air Force, Plans and Policy.

At the present time the only active mission we have is air resupply of the naval communications facility on the island. Our 3.3 million request, sir, involves contingency-related requirements; that is, there would be no permanent Air Force presence there in any way, shape, or form.

Under various contingency scenarios, we could envision a number of uses for the expanded facility. For instance, tankers operating out of

there could provide in-flight refueling support for an airlift resupply of friendly nations in the Middle East coming westward across the Indian Ocean.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mean KC-135 tankers?

Colonel CADE. KC-135 tankers, yes. Or the base could be used as a staging point for C-141's or C-5's from Southeast Asia or even the Philippines enroute to a friendly country such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, and not just Israel, I might add.

Further, it is conceivable that the base could support some type of a tactical deployment involving fighter aircraft, or perhaps reconnaissance missions.

Senator SYMINGTON. So what you are saying is that even though they are the same size, the KC-135 could use the strip but the B-52's could not?

Colonel CADE. That is correct, sir; the extended runway would support the KC-135, but not B-52 operations.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have felt that way for some time, that what you are really doing is building a new strategic base in a part of the world where we did not have a strategic base, and that if we are going to do it for the potential strategic aspects of the one service, we ought to do it for the other also.

We understand the additional dredging necessary to accommodate a carrier task force is not included in your current request, but can be accomplished within the previous authority and funding granted for dredging, some 6.1 million. Is this correct?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. It would seem to us that the dredging is the key to the further expansion of the facility. With this dredging accomplished, it should be no major job to complete the facility at a later date. Would that be a correct inference?

Admiral MARSCHALL. That is a tough question, Mr. Chairman. As you know, we have built the facilities on Diego Garcia with Seabees. Demobilization, and then remobilization of the Seabees would run pretty high.

At the present time I anticipate that the current work effort by the Seabees will come to a conclusion in roughly 1 year. If we hope to do anything with this particular force without a big set-back both in the tempo of our operations and the great expense of demobilization and remobilization, we would certainly be money ahead to do it in a smooth pattern.

Senator SYMINGTON. What we had in mind in asking is, since nobody really knows what the Soviets will do once the Suez Canal is opened—the premise being that it will be opened—and since the British have not yet signed a new agreement, it might be prudent to complete the dredging but withhold further development at this time.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I certainly subscribe to completing the dredging, Mr. Chairman, and I would urge careful consideration of the interruption of the work effort.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Senator DOMINICK. I had word the other day, Admiral, that the Soviets have deployed one of their submarines with a 4,200-mile mis-

sile on it. I have forgotten, when I should not have, whether this was deployed in the Indian Ocean or whether it was deployed in the Atlantic.

Admiral GROJEAN. I doubt seriously that it would be deployed in the Indian Ocean, sir. It just does not really make that much sense to deploy it in the Indian Ocean. The Atlantic and the Pacific are plenty large, and they are a little closer to their target.

Senator DOMINICK. You do not have to be much closer with 4,200 miles.

Admiral GROJEAN. That is true. But it is closer to their home base.

Senator DOMINICK. Is it not true that at Bahrain our naval presence consisted largely of a broken-down, old-fashioned destroyer and a tender of some kind.

Admiral GROJEAN. Generally speaking, that is right, sir. It is not a tender. It is an ex-amphibious ship, and we have made it into kind of a command support ship for the Command Far East staff.

Senator DOMINICK. And except for Subic Bay, we do not really have any naval presence there?

Admiral GROJEAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator TAFT. Perhaps the admiral has gone into this previously, but I would still like to hear a little more clarification as to what he considers our strategic mission, the Navy's strategic mission, to be in the Indian Ocean, and particularly relating it, if it relates, to the question of keeping POL supply lines open insofar as our allies are concerned.

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Our interests in the Indian Ocean are not difficult to explain or understand, but they have to be understood in the context that the Navy is an instrument of our foreign policy. Whenever there is a vacuum in any geographical area of the world, and that geographical area ends up being significant because of the fact that it provides lines of communications, or it provides raw materials for the peoples of the world, then that geographical location becomes an area into which power moves.

The U.S. national interests primarily are that we do not want the Soviets to move into the Indian Ocean littorals and exert their influence to the extent that we find we no longer have any allies in that part of the world. The Soviets find that they can exert their influence in the north, as they have with India. We find that they are relatively close to other countries such as Iraq, South Yemen, and Somalia. If we are not there to counteract their presence and their pressure and their political influence, then sooner or later the same thing will happen to other countries that happened in 1969 to Somalia.

Somalia at that time was very pro-Western. We pulled out of Somalia, we did not support her. We had an opportunity to give Somalia assistance and we did not do it. As a result, in 1969 we lost Somalia. Somalia today is one of the most pro-Soviet countries in that part of the world, and it has certainly provided them with significant bases.

So that is one of the national interests that the Navy serves in being present there.

Another is that our country has a lot of economic interests in that part of the world and we find that the oil which is necessary for our industry or for the industry of our allies must utilize the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean. For that reason, we want to make sure that our naval presence is there to protect those interests.

I think that the Soviets recognize these national interests of the United States to be, if you flip it over, similar to theirs, because they are there for the same reason, sir.

Senator TAFT. Does this imply, as the chairman has indicated, that this is a strategic base?

Admiral GROJEAN. Would you state that again, sir?

Senator TAFT. Does what you have said imply that the plans here, as the chairman has indicated, really do amount to a strategic base?

Admiral GROJEAN. When we talk about a strategic base, we are usually referring to a place where airplanes can homebase or operate from, or have large repair facilities. We usually find that we have dependents located there. To sort of put it financially, we never in the world would be able to build a base for \$29 million, no, sir. It is not a base.

We now have 8,000 feet of runway, and we want to make it 12,000.

We now have some POL storage, and we would like to increase it to better support our ships.

We now have anchored some ships in the lagoon, and we would like to enlarge it to be able to anchor more ships in the lagoon.

We now have a communication facility, and we want to improve upon that to a degree.

So all we are doing is improving what we already have there.

Senator TAFT. What you are saying really is that it is a support facility to carry out a strategic mission?

Admiral GROJEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator TAFT. And that strategic mission is anticipated to be a greater one than it has been in the past?

Admiral GROJEAN. Although it was pretty important in October. We put ships down in the Indian Ocean, and they were there primarily to support our foreign policy at that time. I do not think that one can always tell just where you are going to have to put your naval ships to support foreign policy. But certainly it looks as if the Indian Ocean is becoming more and more important to us in this area.

Senator TAFT. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Any further questions?

Senator DOMINICK. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. Any questions, Mr. Nease?

Mr. NEASE. No, sir. I think you have covered it pretty well.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to thank you very much for your courtesy and for your fine testimony.

Admiral Marschall and I had a discussion before.

Thank you both and the captain for coming up this morning.

Admiral GROJEAN. Thank you very much, sir. It is a pleasure to be here today.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., of the same day.]

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FISCAL YEAR 1975

THURSDAY, JULY 11, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 212, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington (chairman).

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Dominick, and Taft.

Also present: Gordon A. Nease, professional staff member; Joyce T. Campbell, clerical assistant; and Kathy Smith, assistant to Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Colby, we welcome you.

I see you have a statement. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF W. E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCCOMPANIED BY JOHN B. CHOMEAU, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC RESEARCH; WILLIAM B. NEWTON, OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE; AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean began in March 1968, when four ships from Vladivostok made a "good will" visit to most of the littoral countries. In the little over 6 years since those visits, the Russians have maintained a nearly continuous presence in the Indian Ocean area.

The Soviet naval presence has grown slowly but steadily during these years, and has helped Moscow increase its influence in that part of the world.

The forces the Soviets have deployed in the Indian Ocean, however, have been relatively small and inactive.

The vessels have spent 80 percent of their time at anchor or in port visits, mostly in the northwestern portion of the ocean.

Although the number of countries visited annually has decreased since 1969, the general expansion of the naval force and the increased use of ports on a routine basis have resulted in an overall increase in the number of port calls. Put in terms of naval ship days in the Indian Ocean the Soviet presence increased from about 1,000

in 1968 to 5,000 in 1973, excluding harbor clearing operations in Bangladesh.

By mid-1973, the typical Soviet Indian Ocean force included five surface warships—one gun-armed cruiser or missile-equipped ship, two destroyers or destroyer escorts, a minesweeper, and an amphibious ship. There was also usually a diesel submarine, and six auxiliary support ships, one of which was a merchant tanker.

Mr. Chairman, today there are 6 surface combatants, 1 submarine, 9 minesweepers, and 11 support ships in the Indian Ocean, not substantially different from that typical showing, except for the increase in minesweepers, as I will explain later.

Recently, a Soviet intelligence collection ship has been deployed to the Indian Ocean for the first time since the India-Pakistan war and is apparently monitoring developments in the Persian Gulf area.

It will probably also conduct surveillance of any major Western naval movements in the Indian Ocean.

In addition, a group of Soviet minesweepers has recently arrived from the Pacific to conduct mine-clearing operations in the Gulf of Suez—in the areas shown on this map at the bottom. The ones at the top you will note are being cleared by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Last weekend the helicopter carrier Leningrad, on a voyage from the Black Sea, rounded the Cape of Good Hope and may join this group. This is by far the farthest from home waters that either the *Leningrad*, or its sister ship the *Moskva*, has ever ventured.

The Soviet warships and submarines sent to the Indian Ocean normally come from the Pacific Fleet, which is also the primary source for logistic support. Combatants from the Western Fleet, however, have operated in the Indian Ocean, but only while transferring to the Pacific.

The Indian Ocean has become, in effect, a "southern sea route" for the interfleet transfer of naval units.

About one-fourth of the Soviet warships and submarines that have operated there have been units transferring to the Pacific from the Western Fleets.

The Pacific Fleet naval forces are now being modernized. As part of this effort, since early 1974 the Soviet force in the Indian Ocean has included more modern antiaircraft and antisubmarine units transferring from Soviet Western Fleets. These units have provided the Russians a more impressive naval presence than could have been drawn from their Pacific Fleet a year ago.

In addition to this de facto improvement in the quality of the Indian Ocean force, the length of time on station for the individual warships seems to be increasing. Some of the ships that have just left the area, for instance, were there for a year, as compared to 5 to 6 months for previous rotational tours. This added time on station is at least partly owing to improved Soviet support facilities in the area.

Until 1973, the Russians relied almost exclusively on "floating bases"—collections of auxiliary ships usually anchored in international waters—to provide support to their Indian Ocean naval forces.

The most frequently used anchorages were near the Island of Socotra, and in the Chagos Archipelago, about 1,000 nautical miles south of India, where the Soviets have implanted mooring buoys. You will note that Diego Garcia is in the Chagos Archipelago.

Contrary to numerous reports about Socotra, the barren island has no port facilities or fuel storage and its airstrip is a small World War II gravel runway. The only military installation on the island is a small South Yemenese (PDRY) Garrison. A major construction effort would have to precede any significant Soviet use of Socotra, other than as an anchorage.

In early 1973, the Soviets acquired use of some facilities at the small Port of Berbera, in Somalia. These have now been expanded, and the Soviets are now using the harbor for routine ship maintenance and crew rest.

There are no repair facilities ashore, but tenders now provide the same services in port as they previously did at anchor.

The Soviets have set up a naval communications facility near Berbera, and also appear to be building an airfield although they have made little progress. [Deleted.]

The Soviets have use of a POL storage area there, and have constructed a barracks area for their technicians.

Soviet naval ships also have some access to the Iraqi port of Qasr, in the Persian Gulf, where Soviet technicians have been assisting in minor port development.

Repair facilities at the former British Naval Base at Aden have not been used by Soviet warships, although support ships and, occasionally, small warships stop there for refueling and replenishment. Soviet transports periodically land at an ex-RAF airbase—now Aden's International Airport.

Soviet naval auxiliaries regularly call at Singapore as they enter and exit the Indian Ocean. In addition to receiving bunkers, since May 1972, the Soviet support ships have been serviced in the commercial drydock facilities there.

Moscow's prospects for naval facilities in other littoral countries are not very bright.

The Soviets helped build India's naval base at Vizakhapatnam, and have equipped the Indian Navy with minor warships and diesel submarines.

Nevertheless, New Delhi has not granted the Soviets free access to Indian ports, nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future. [Deleted.]

The U.S.S.R. is trying in some other countries, too, although prospects are equally dim beyond receiving bunkers. Moscow has apparently made overtures to Sri Lanka for access to the Port of Colombo, and has sent in research ships, support ships, and an occa-

sional warship—probably trying to accustom the Ceylonese to a Soviet naval presence.

Similar calls have been made to Port Louis, in Mauritius.

The Soviets may also hope to use the facilities in Chittagong, now that they have finished the harbor clearing operation there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Chittagong?

Mr. COLBY. Chittagong is in Bangladesh.

You will recall that the Soviets were asked to help in some salvage and minesweeping efforts there. They finished the salvage very rapidly, but the minesweeping operation was very complicated and difficult. They just finished that a few weeks ago. They have withdrawn from there now.

We have no evidence that the Soviets have made overtures for naval access to Littoral countries other than Somalia, Iraq, Aden, India, Singapore, Mauritius, and possibly Sri Lanka.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Sri Lanka again?

Mr. COLBY. To people of our age, it was Ceylon.

Senator SYMINGTON. We had an open hearing this morning and a closed hearing this afternoon, but so far it does not seem to me that there is anything that you have said here that should be classified up to IV in your statement. All that information, as I see it, is something that everybody would know that wanted to know it.

Mr. COLBY. There may be a few phrases in there, Mr. Chairman, that would reveal how we learned certain items. But in essence, I agree with you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you please declassify, as much as possible of your statement.

Mr. COLBY. I would be delighted to go through this and pull out those few things that have to remain classified and declassify the remainder, Mr. Chairman.

So far, Mr. Chairman, I have been talking about the more or less continuous Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Another aspect of the problem has been the Soviet surge deployments to the area—and these have been highly responsive to U.S. naval activities.

Moscow apparently prefers to keep a minimal force in the ocean that can be quickly strengthened. This provides a "signaling" capability during crisis periods, while avoiding the political and economic costs of maintaining a larger continuous presence.

There have been two occasions when the Soviets have clearly made use of this "signaling" device.

Following the Indo-Pakistani war of November 1971, and almost 3 weeks after the deployment of the USS *Enterprise*, they brought their force level up to six surface combatants, six submarines and nine auxiliaries. This represents a doubling of surface combatants, and a significant increase in submarines, from one to six.

In the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, the Soviets responded to the unanticipated deployment of a U.S. carrier task group to the Indian Ocean by sending additional units into the area—increasing their submarine force from one to four. [Deleted.]

Senator DOMINICK. Mr. Chairman, would Mr. Colby yield at that point?

When you are talking about the Soviets, are you talking about missile firing submarines or attack submarines?

Mr. COLBY. We are talking about attack submarines, Senator.

Senator DOMINICK. Thank you.

Mr. COLBY. The timing of Soviet ship movements into the area, both during the India-Pakistan war and following the Arab-Israeli conflict, is instructive. The Russian units left port only after U.S. or U.K. carrier task groups had departed for, or arrived in, the Indian Ocean. All indications were that Moscow was chiefly responding to deployments by the United States and other Western countries, specifically Britain, rather than initiating a unilateral buildup.

There remains one important consideration concerning Soviet naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean—the forthcoming opening of the Suez Canal. We believe this will increase the overall flexibility of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, but not in itself cause a significant increase in the Soviet presence.

Use of the canal would give the U.S.S.R. easier and more timely naval access, particularly in times of crisis, to the western Indian Ocean—that is, the important Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea area.

It also would facilitate the logistic support of ships in the Indian Ocean and reduce Soviet dependence on littoral countries.

A reopened canal would expedite interfleet transfers and deliveries of military aid.

A few warships from the Mediterranean Squadron probably would be sent to the Indian Ocean once the canal opens.

But because of the higher priority of Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean, and the maintenance of a strategic reserve in the Black Sea, the Soviet Pacific Fleet would still be the chief source for surface combatants—and all of the submarines—for the Indian Ocean. Support ships could be drawn from the Black Sea and the Pacific on a nearly equal basis.

The Soviet Union is likely to increase its continuous deployments there whether or not the Suez Canal is reopened.

Moreover, the U.S.S.R. probably recognizes that the canal is subject to closure in a crisis. The Soviets would not wish to be caught with a substantial portion of available units on the wrong end of a blocked canal, and in considering this contingency they almost certainly would give priority to their Mediterranean squadron.

If there is no substantial increase in U.S. naval forces in the area, we believe the Soviet increase will be gradual, say one to two surface combatants per year.

Mr. COLBY. [Deleted.]

Should the U.S. make a substantial increase in its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, a Soviet buildup faster and larger than I have just described would be likely. If the canal were open and available to Russian ships, the task of responding would be easier.

In any event, the Soviets would probably not be able to sustain an Indian Ocean force significantly larger than that presently deployed

there without reordering their priorities and shifting naval forces from other areas.

Let me now put the Soviet naval activity I have been discussing into the context of overall Soviet objectives in the Indian Ocean area.

Viewed from a global perspective, the Indian Ocean area—as distinct from the Middle East—has a lower priority than the U.S., China, or Europe in the USSR's diplomatic, economic, and military initiatives. Moscow's probable long-range strategic objectives in this area are to win influence at the expense of the west, and to limit the future role of China.

Toward these goals, the Soviets use their naval presence as one element in a combined approach that utilizes political, economic, subversive, and military aid activity.

We believe that the roles of military, and particularly naval forces, have been secondary to diplomatic efforts and aid programs in promoting Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean area.

The principal objective of the naval force is to maintain an adequate military strength to counter—or at least provide a political counterweight to—moves made by western naval forces there, particularly those of the United States.

The Soviet leaders have shown that they will maintain a naval presence in the ocean at least equal to, if not greater than, that of the U.S. Navy.

Soviet writings have reflected concern over the possibility of the United States sending nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to the Indian Ocean, but so far the activities of Soviet naval units there have not indicated an anti-Polaris mission.

The Soviets recognize the importance to the west of Persian Gulf oil, and the sea lanes between the Gulf and Europe or Japan. Moscow also perceives a causal relationship between the oil question and recent increases in the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Nevertheless, the normal composition of the Soviet force there—particularly the lack of a significant submarine capability—suggests that interdiction of western commerce, particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been a major objective.

At present, about 50 percent of the industrialized countries' oil imports come from the Persian Gulf. This share may decline somewhat in coming years, as alternative sources are developed.


Judging from the size and composition of the Soviet Indian Ocean force, direct military intervention does not appear to figure prominently in Soviet plans.

As for future Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, we believe that growth will be steady over the long term, if there is no permanent increase in U.S. naval forces in the area.

Moscow would probably consider such a measured approach as consistent with a generally growing—and accepted—Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean countries.

Soviet capabilities to project and support larger naval forces in the Indian Ocean are constrained by a variety of factors.

Comparative Steaming Times For Soviet Black Sea and Pacific Ocean Fleets With a Reopened Suez Canal*



First, is the distance and steaming time from the various Soviet fleets. Those in the western USSR now have to go around Africa, and are twice as far from the Arabian Sea as is the Pacific Fleet. If the Suez Canal were open, the steaming time for the fleets in the western USSR would be significantly reduced, as shown on this map. You can see that the red line south of Indian, Mr. Chairman, shows the point from which you have approximately an equal steaming time from either the Black Sea or the Pacific Ocean fleets.

Other restraints include the requirement to maintain a strategic reserve in home fleet areas, a large deployed force in the Mediterranean, plus the economic and political costs of operating a sizeable naval force in the Indian Ocean.

Moreover, the Soviets are not likely to acquire substantially better naval support facilities for their ships in the Indian Ocean area, at least in the near future. There seems to be little prospect for routine access to large shore facilities—such as those in Singapore, India, Sri Lanka, or Aden—for major repair and overhaul of warships.

The limited facilities that the Soviets use now, such as those in Berbera or Umm Qasr, would require considerable development—

and probably changes in the host countries' policies—to provide major services.

On the other hand, the Soviets probably hope to increase their capabilities for air reconnaissance in the Indian Ocean. Their prospects are best in Somalia, where Russian technicians are helping to construct airfields at Berbera and near Mogadiscio.

Somalia is unlikely to give Moscow permanent basing rights, but would probably allow occasional flights.

TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft staging from Somalia could conduct surveillance from the Cape of Good Hope to the Malacca Strait.

Visits by TU-95's most likely would be on a periodic basis, as in Cuba and Guinea, but might increase in frequency during times of crisis, major western deployments or exercises, or Soviet naval space support activity.

Antisubmarine warfare aircraft, such as the IL-38 May, operating from Somalia could provide surface reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare coverage of the Arabian Sea. These aircraft, as well as TU-16 medium bombers, were based in Egypt until July 1972, and closely monitored U.S. and NATO ships and exercises in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared statement. I would be very happy to answer any additional questions you might like to ask.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Colby.

The first request would be that you declassify as much of this as possible.

Mr. COLBY. I will, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. It would be your decision.

Mr. COLBY. The other matters I will do it as best as I can.

Senator SYMINGTON. The more information you can get out in order to help us make the right decision, the better.

Mr. COLBY. I understand, Mr. Chairman. In our country our decisionmaking has to be public as opposed to some countries where it is to be secret, and consequently, we have to make as much of our input public as possible.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you consider the Indian Ocean area to be of strategic importance to either the Soviets or the United States?

Mr. COLBY. I would rather answer from the Soviet side, Mr. Chairman. I think the Soviets are interested in the Indian Ocean as an area of expanding their influence, primarily through their political relationships with some of the countries in the area, with the Indians, especially, and some of the other countries in that general area. I think they would obviously be concerned if there were some major threat to Soviet security posed from the Indian Ocean. I think there is a certain interest in posing a possible counterthreat to American or western pressure on the Soviet Union by posing a threat to the oil sources of Western Europe. But it is certainly not in priority anything like their relationships with the United States, Western Europe or China.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Navy spokesmen have indicated that the Soviets have use of facilities in several locations in the littoral area.

I would like to take them one by one and have your comments. I have already heard them in another committee, but I would like to hear them now..

The Island of Socotra.

Mr. COLBY. The Island of Socotra, Mr. Chairman, is a bare island. There is almost nothing there except for a small garrison from South Yemen. The Soviets have used Socotra as they have used many other areas around the world as an anchoring place for their ships. The Soviets spend a considerable portion of their time at anchor. They do their provisioning frequently at anchor. They have anchored there off Socotra in protected waters in order to conduct this kind of reprovisioning and just plain sitting.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about an air strip?

Mr. COLBY. The only air strip on Socotra is an old World War II air strip which is really not feasible for modern operations.

Senator SYMINGTON. We were told of anchorages and permanent mooring in the Chagos Archipelago.

Mr. COLBY. There are anchorages in that Archipelago. Again, some of this water between the different islands is international water, and Soviet ships are inclined to anchor there. They have set up some mooring buoys there in international waters so that they can just come on and hook onto them.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is very close to Diego Garcia.

Mr. COLBY. It is not far from there.

Senator SYMINGTON. On Berbera, Somalia, communications station, barracks, repair ships and other facilities, including air strips. What are the facts on that?

Mr. COLBY. Let me give you an overall picture of the port at Berbera, Mr. Chairman. It is a small installation which will handle two or three ships. And there is an air strip under construction outside of Berbera.

They have been building an air strip there for about a year, but have not gotten very far.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mogadiscio.

Mr. COLBY. Mogadiscio is the Capital of Somalia, Mr. Chairman. It is a big town there. They have an embassy, and they have people there, advisers.

The port is a fairly big port. But the area within the breakwater is somewhat shallow water, and you would have to anchor a little offshore and bring lighters in if you use the port at all.

There is an airfield about 30 or 40 miles north-west of Mogadiscio which they have been gradually building up a little bit. But there is not much progress on that either.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Iraqi Port of Umm Qasr.

Mr. COLBY. Umm Qasi, you will notice there up at the head of the Persian Gulf.

The sea is down here. You come up a river, kind of a delta area. This particular island is claimed by the Kuwaitis as well as the Iraqis. The facility here, the so-called port, is about four, five or six buildings here, a place where you can anchor. It is a little complicated to get through the delta down to the Gulf. The Iraqis appear

to be a little bit restrictive as to the degree to which they will allow the Soviets free use of this particular port. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. The former British base at Aden and the former Royal Air Force Base.

Mr. COLBY. The former British base at Aden is a good base. It is a good harbor. There are facilities in it. There is an airfield in that town. That is the Capital of South Yemen. And there is an airfield that is an effective airfield and could be used.

The Soviets have not used it very much. They have not done much more than port visits there. But the Government of South Yemen, of course, is a Communist government. The Soviets have been assisting them. [Deleted.] So they have a pretty active presence there. But they have not actually used the port facility to that degree.

Senator SYMINGTON. What kind of a runway do they have?

Mr. CHOMEAU. It is short. It is not large enough to handle the extremely large aircraft. I have forgotten the length.

Mr. COLBY. It is a short runway, not big enough to handle the TU-16's and larger aircraft.

Senator DOMINICK. It is big enough, Mr. Chairman, to handle the B-24, because I have landed one there.

Mr. COLBY. You know, then.

Senator DOMINICK. It is a horrible place.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is probably pretty hot, is it not?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Bunkering rights in Mauritius and Singapore.

Mr. COLBY. Singapore, of course, is a very well equipped port. And the Soviets have bunkered there. Singapore sells to whoever happens to go by. They have also used Singapore for some repair, because there are some good shipyards in Singapore, and some of their auxiliary ships, for instance, have been repaired in Singapore.

Port Mauritius—Port Louis on the Island of Mauritius is a very good port. It is not all that highly developed. It is an independent country now, Mauritius. They have sold bunkering to the Soviets.

There are lots of other areas. You can stop by and buy fuel oil if you want to.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have they a representative in the United Nations?

Mr. COLBY. I would assume so. I am pretty sure they are U.N. members. Whether they actually keep a mission there or not, I am not sure. But I know we have an ambassador there. As a matter of fact, Phil Manhardt is just going there as Ambassador. As you will recall, he was a Foreign Service officer, and was a prisoner of the North Vietnamese for 5 years.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Dominick.

Senator DOMINICK. I think I have only got one question, and that is, what is Mr. Colby's assessment—if we should pass the Diego Garcia enlargement, would we by so doing increase the force of the Russian fleet?

Mr. COLBY. I think our assessment is that the Soviets would match any increase in our presence in that area.

Senator DOMINICK. That is all I have.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Colby, would you consider that enlarging the port and the airfield as planned would be such an increase or not?

Mr. COLBY. I am not all that familiar with the details of the plan, Senator Taft. I do think that the public impression of what we do would probably be almost as important as what we actually do. In other words, the Soviets would believe that if we were to establish a permanent establishment capable of supporting a regular force in that area, that they would react in some fashion in order to establish a countervailing force. That is more or less at any degree at which we do it.

Senator TAFT. If we have a big debate and authorize it, is that going to have—

Mr. COLBY. It will certainly attract their attention.

Senator TAFT. If we go ahead and authorize it, and public opinion seems to justify authorizing it, would that have an effect on being able to negotiate limitations on forces in the area?

Mr. COLBY. I think that our assessment, Senator, is that you will see a gradual increase in Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area, that if there is some particular American increase, that the Soviets will increase that gradually to match any substantial additional American involvement. So that it would really depend upon the size of the investment and the forces that we arrange to be there. If we put in a permanent establishment of some size, why they would correspondingly increase to some substantial degree. If we had only sort of tentative connections there and some improvements, they might just continue their gradual increase.

Senator TAFT. You have not mentioned the British or French forces, I do not think, they are in the area. Both of them have permanent naval forces.

Mr. COLBY. Yes. The French have a naval base up at the north end of Madagascar as well as a base at Djibouti. They keep a permanent force of five to six ships. And the British, their only permanent establishment is in Singapore, where they keep a very small fleet. [Deleted.]

Senator TAFT. That is all I have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator.

Have the number of ports visited by the Soviets in the littoral area increased in the last few years?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The number of ports calls in 1973 has gone up particularly because the calls in Somalia have expanded quite a lot. You will notice that they are rather targeted, there are only certain ones.

Senator SYMINGTON. The number of countries visited have dropped?

Mr. COLBY. Yes. It has been more of a focus where they have visited.

Senator SYMINGTON. [Deleted.] As I understand it, you expect the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow regard-

less of what we do, but that it will grow faster if we start developing Diego Garcia, is that a fair interpretation?

Mr. COLBY. I think that is true; yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, our estimate of the gradual growth is a reflection of our estimate of the general Soviet intention to assert itself as a major power, as one of the two superpowers, and to assert itself in a world role, and that consequently, there will be a tendency to gradually expand its presence throughout the world.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who reacted first in the Indian Ocean at the time of the Indian-Pakistan war?

Mr. COLBY. In the Indian-Pakistan war, Mr. Chairman, the first thing that happened was that the British sent a carrier task group to help with the possible evacuation of their citizens. The Soviets sent a force very shortly thereafter. And the American force was sent 2 or 3 weeks later, or something like that.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about in the recent Middle East war?

Mr. COLBY. In the Middle East war the movement of American carrier task group was followed by a Soviet increase in presence, particularly in submarines.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who has access to the most ports in the littoral area, the United States or the Soviets?

Would that be up for grabs?

Mr. COLBY. Even would not be far off, I would say.

Mr. CHOMEAU. I do not know what the United States really has.

Mr. COLBY. The United States, I think, would have access to Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Senator SYMINGTON. Off the record:

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. There was some question as to whether nuclear submarines could go through the Suez Canal when it is opened. What is the opinion of the CIA on that?

Mr. COLBY. Physically, they could go through it, there is no question about it, after it is opened, physically you can send them through. Whether the Soviets would send them through is something else.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there enough depth?

Mr. COLBY. You mean without being seen? I mean on the surface, obviously, just going through, I do not think there would be much problem.

Senator SYMINGTON. There would not be?

Mr. CHOMEAU. They have enough depth, but it is risky. You have to be certain that you are not going to run into some place where it is silted. But there is enough depth if it is cleared, yes.

Mr. COLBY. It depends upon the permission of the Egyptians, of course.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do either of you gentlemen have any further questions?

Senator DOMINICK. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator TAFT. No questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, July 12, 1974.]

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FISCAL YEAR 1975

FRIDAY, JULY 12, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:08 a.m., in room 212, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington (chairman).

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Cannon, and Dominick.

Also Present: Gordon A. Nease and Robert Q. Old, professional staff members; and Joyce T. Campbell, clerical assistant.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will continue our hearings this morning on the military construction authorization bill for fiscal year 1975 by taking up the construction requirements of the three military departments, as set forth in titles I, II, and III of the bill. We hope to complete the hearings today, except for nondepartmental witnesses who wish to testify on items of interest in the bill. We will hear from these prospective witnesses beginning at 11 a.m., Thursday, July 18.

We will first take up title I which relates to the Army, and our witness is Maj. Gen. K. B. Cooper, Assistant Chief of Engineers.

You may proceed, General Cooper.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. K. B. COOPER, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ACCCOMPANIED BY COL. J. A. RICHBOURG, PROGRAMMING DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF ENGINEERS; MAJ. R. F. BRAY, PROGRAMMING DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF ENGINEERS; L. F. KEENAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY BUDGET, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY; A. M. CARTON, PROGRAM, PLANNING, AND CIVIL PREPAREDNESS DIVISION, DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS; AND J. MILLER, OFFICE, DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN REGION, ISA

General COOPER. Rather than going through my entire statement, sir, I would like to have it entered in the record and just briefly summarize the key points, if that is all right with you, Mr. Chairman.

board, but it is by the height of the simulator itself, which has six degrees freedom of motion. The simulators are mounted on extended hydraulic legs that set them pretty high in the air; in most cases requiring a building height of some 35 or 36 feet for the simulators in the undergraduate pilot training program. For the operational mission trainers, it depends on the trainer itself. They vary in heights from 18 feet up to roughly 40 feet. We will provide the details for it.

[The information follows:]

We have reviewed all available criteria and reverified the fact that it is the simulator itself, with its 60 inch extendable hydraulic legs, motion platform, cockpit and visual system which determines the height of the UPT flight simulator facilities. The difference in size of terrain model boards will have little impact, if any, on the size and cost of the whole simulator facility.

DIEGO GARCIA

Senator SYMINGTON. Without getting into classified matters, what can you tell us about your request for \$3.2 million for facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia?

General McGARVEY. Sir, our request for the \$3.2 million is primarily for the aircraft operational apron area, some ammunition storage areas, and some fuel storage at Diego Garcia in conjunction with the Navy's development program for that location. The Air Force does not have any plans to permanently base personnel or aircraft at Diego Garcia.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wish you would tell General Jones that it is no skin off my teeth one way or the other, but if you put down a 12,000 foot runway and you are going to be able to berth carriers, it is incredible that you would not have runways that would take B-52's. I am not saying that I am for the idea of this on any basis. It used to be known as the Ocean of Peace a few years ago. And there is a lot of discrepancy in what some of the advocates say the Soviets have done in that field and what some of the intelligence agents say they have done in the field. But it seems to me that if you are going to put a runway in on that size that you should be able to use any kind of aircraft on it. If you could berth a carrier there you could berth any kind of a ship there. Would you tell General Jones that that is the way I feel about it, if you get a chance?

General McGARVEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have had hearings on Diego Garcia, and I do feel it is pretty silly to get that far up the ladder and then just drop a point about the fact that you can land a tanker there, a KC-135, which is very close to the size of a B-52 obviously, and then emphasize that you are not going to put any B-52's in there. I personally do not see any difference in launching from a submarine or a carrier any form of weapon as against from your longest range bomber. So, I do not know what that is all about. But that is your problem. I hope you watch your mission.

Since the bill was submitted to the Congress you have requested substantial deficiency authorizations for at least nine previously authorized projects for a total increase of \$14,959,000.

Would you submit a list as to why this is, for the record?

General McGARVEY. Yes, sir. The deficiency request is based on actual bid openings or bidding experience in the 1974 and prior year

program. We will submit the listing of the individual bases and the projects with the justification.

[The information follows:]

AUTHORIZATION INCREASES REQUIRED, FISCAL YEAR 1974 MCP AUTHORIZATION

[Dollar amounts in thousands]

Base	Fiscal year 1974 MCP authorized amount	New amount required	Increase required
Peterson Field, Colo.	\$7,843	\$9,733	\$1,890
Eglin AFB, Fla.	7,039	8,882	1,843
McAfee AFB, Miss.	8,786	10,733	1,947
Lackland AFB, Tex.	6,509	9,186	2,677
Reserve AFB, Tex.	4,211	6,461	2,250
Tinker AFB, Okla.	371	895	524
Altus AFB, Okla.	1,078	1,440	362
Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyo.	5,834	8,265	2,431
Little Rock AFB, Ark.	1,165	2,200	1,035
Total	42,836	57,795	14,959

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, INCREASE IN PRIOR YEARS' AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL YEAR 1975 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION—PUBLIC LAW 93-166 SUMMARY

Command/installation	Current authorization amount	Amount authorization increase	Revised authorization amount
<i>Inside the United States:</i>			
Air Force Communications Service: Richards-Gebaur AFB, Mo.	\$3,963,000	\$2,167,000	\$6,130,000
	1,020,000	264,000	1,284,000
Aerospace Defense Command: Tyndall AFB, Fla.	8,343,000	3,888,000	12,231,000
Air Force Logistics Command:			
Hill AFB, Utah	2,572,000	1,339,000	3,911,000
McClellan AFB, Calif.	4,128,000	2,696,000	7,324,000
Robins AFB, Ga.			
Air Training Command:			
Laughlin AFB, Tex.	4,635,000	1,653,000	6,288,000
Webb AFB, Tex.	3,154,000	1,153,000	4,307,000
Military Airlift Command: Scott AFB, Ill.	3,092,000	707,000	3,799,000
Strategic Air Command: Kirtland AFB, Mich.	2,430,000	452,000	2,882,000
Tactical Air Command: Nellis AFB, Nev.	2,588,000	1,049,000	3,637,000
Total inside the United States	254,418,000	15,368,000	269,786,000
Total outside the United States	21,302,000	0	21,302,000
Total section 302	1,000,000	0	1,000,000
Total Public Law 93-166	276,720,000	15,368,000	292,088,000

Senator SYMINGTON. We have received a request from Chairman Sikes of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction to include authority in this bill in the amount of \$1.2 million for an assault strip at the Eglin Air Force Auxiliary Field No. 9. Will you comment on the need for this requirement and tell us what are the missions assigned to field No. 9; the equipment used; and the purpose of an assault strip?

General McGARVEY. Yes, sir. The requirement has come about relocation of the C-130 tactical airlift aircraft to auxiliary 9 at Eglin. We moved the C-130's out of Langley Air Force Base in order to accommodate the F-15 plane that is scheduled to move into Langley.

Senator SYMINGTON. From where?

General McGARVEY. There will be a new wing activated, the second operational wing. We have moved two C-130 squadrons to auxiliary 9 at Eglin and a third squadron to Pope Air Force Base. Initial

is to be able to identify the items that are truly attributable, the direct and proximate cause of this operation.

The big problem that we face in local government is first the anticipatory one. They have to start building facilities with a lead time, whether it is schools or projects or what have you, a year or two before the people arrive.

This is a large part of the problem. This means that they have to get the money. The chairman has done so much in the finance area that I hesitate to raise the question. I do not even know whether you can raise money these days to get the bonding funds that you need for some of these projects. It places right now a terrific burden on the local governmental entities that have the responsibility in this area.

But I want to assure the Senator that we will do everything we can to see to it that these requests for impacted funds are directly related—I think that is the question—to the projects.

Senator SYMINGTON. I appreciate that.

Senator JACKSON. I will offer the amendment.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think we ought to have a more detailed authorization before we get to the appropriation.

Senator JACKSON. The amendment is at the end of my remarks, and I ask unanimous consent that it be included.

Senator SYMINGTON. Without objection.

Thank you, Senator,

Senator Pell.

Senator, we welcome you, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIBORNE PELL, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for permitting me to be here with you.

Mr. Chairman and Senator Jackson, at the outset I would like to give my wholehearted endorsement to the testimony of my colleague, Senator Pastore, in support of the three construction projects for the Naval Underwater Systems Center in Rhode Island.

This Center has become one of the most competent and important ones of the Navy's research and development centers, and the requested facilities are very important to the center's mission.

Living as I do in Newport, I am well aware of the high quality and the competence of the people at the Center, and the contributions they have made to ASW, Anti-Submarine Warfare, through the years. I believe that the approval of these projects would add greatly to their ability to carry out their mission and advance the national interest.

On the broader subject on which I was invited to appear before your committee, 4 months ago, I had the privilege of appearing before this committee when the Defense Department's request for funds for the expansion of the Diego Garcia communications facility as part of the fiscal year 1974 Defense Department Supplemental Authorization was being considered.

At the outset of my testimony today, I want to commend the committee for its decision to delete the requested authority from the

supplemental bill and to give the Diego Garcia proposal full study and scrutiny as part of the regular fiscal year 1975 authorization bill.

It was, I believe, a wise decision that has provided the time necessary for a carefully considered decision on the project.

During the past 4 months I have seen no new evidence or argument to change my conviction that the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia would be a major policy error. On the contrary, I am more convinced than ever that it is in our interests not to go ahead with the proposed expansion.

The Defense Department proposal is, in itself, deceptively modest, both in political-military scope and in cost. Yet a closer examination of the long-term implications of the project yields troubling conclusions. The primary argument put forth by the Defense Department is that the Soviet Union, having markedly increased its presence in the Indian Ocean, threatens to dominate the area unless we respond adequately, i.e., build a base at Diego Garcia to support a continuous American presence.

Statistics quoting "port calls" and "ships days" are used to support this contention. Not only do they refer to quantity of ships and not quality, but they also ignore the purposes of their being in the area.

These so-called statistics equate a Soviet minesweeper with an American aircraft carrier, and group supply and auxiliary ships with combat vessels indiscriminately.

Similarly, it is not enough to merely list the existence of Soviet Naval facilities in the area. Yet not one can be accurately defined as a base. And while Admiral Charles D. Grojean, recently described the proposed Diego Garcia as a "limited support facility", the plain truth is that if we go ahead with this project, it will be the U.S. and not the Soviets who introduce the first real base into the Indian Ocean.

Finally, a decision not to go ahead with Diego Garcia is most certainly not tantamount to our abandoning the area. Not only do we have several facilities in the Indian Ocean and nearby, but in times of crisis our Navy has demonstrated exceptional mobility and ability to make its presence felt in the area.

Proponents of the Diego Garcia project also point to the relatively small appropriations request as a factor in their favor. Because we are accustomed to dealing with figures ranging from hundreds of millions to tens of billions in military matters, the \$32.3 million request for fiscal year 1975 sounds relatively insignificant. But Diego Garcia is not just an isolated one-time only item; it represents a commitment to an expanded, ongoing U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean, which is at present the only truly peaceful ocean with limited military presence in the world. Military spending is much harder to limit once it gains momentum. \$30 million in 1975 can all too easily become several billions by 1980.

Nowhere is this economic danger better expounded than in "Setting National Priorities: The 1975 Budget", recently published by the Brookings Institution. In that study, it is conservatively estimated that a continuous American deployment of the probable regional carrier task force in the Indian Ocean would entail acquisi-

tion costs of \$4.8 billion, and involve additional annual operating costs of another \$800 million.

This is on the presumption that rather than keeping it down to the present 12-carrier fleet, that we then move on to the 15-carrier fleet that would be required.

The Defense Department advances several other points in favor of its request. Diego Garcia is seen as necessary to protect our continued access to oil sources in the Eastern Hemisphere.

However, at no time in history has a military situation been the direct reason for the interruption of our oil supply. Instead, as the recent Middle East situation demonstrated, political and economic factors are paramount. It is difficult to see how a military base at Diego Garcia will be an asset in managing our political and economic relationships in the area.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, the entire question of whether military forces can be realistically effective against embargoes or economic sanctions affecting strategic materials, such as petroleum, is very much open to question.

Recently, the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., conducted a conference directly related to this issue. The discussion at that conference was summarized in a perceptive article by Richard J. Levine in an article in the Wall Street Journal of Wednesday, July 17.

I will not take the time of the committee to quote from the article, but I believe it would be a useful addition to the material available to the committee, and with the committee's permission, I will submit it for the hearing record.

Senator SYMINGTON. Without objection.
[The information follows:]

[Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1974]

AHMED FORCE AND SCARCE MATERIALS

(By Richard J. Levine)

NEWPORT, R.I.—Throughout its 90-year history, the U.S. Naval War College here has tried to anticipate events and prepare American officers for

In the years before World War II, the college placed heavy emphasis on the coming conflict with Japan, developing in its "war games" the strategy and tactics that helped win the battle of the Pacific. With the onset of the Cold War, the college started offering students large doses of geopolitics, science, economics and management as well as traditional military subjects.

Now, in the wake of the Arab oil embargo, the war college has begun to grapple with a new subject—the role of military power, especially naval power, in a period of growing U.S. dependency on imported oil and metals.

This is an extremely sensitive issue for a military establishment still scarred by its experience in Vietnam. It raises the specter of military action designed to insure continued American access to raw materials and fears of nuclear confrontations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It is also an extremely complex subject, dividing the experts and producing better questions than answers at this point. But as hopes fade for U.S. energy self-sufficiency by 1980, it looms as a legitimate concern of national security planners, one they can afford to ignore or minimize.

"Can the military contribute anything to the resolution of this largely economic issue?" pondered Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner, the thoughtful president of the war college, in preparation for a recent conference here on "Resource Scarcity as a Possible Source of Future Conflict."

"Can the availability and display of military force prevent other nations from taking actions inimical to our interests, or doesn't this work anymore?

Is military action an acceptable means of forcing the removal of nonbelligerent embargoes or sanctions? Would stockpiling necessary raw materials be preferable to an equivalent investment in military forces?"

Good questions. But later, in summing up the three-day conference, Adm. Turner was forced to concede that there is "uncertainty as to the extent of potential (resource) scarcity" and "uncertainty as to the applicability of military force." While several conference speakers downgraded the value of military power in dealing with resource problems many (though not all) of the students instinctively rejected this view. Yet even the most hawkish officers seemed to lack a clear idea of how such force might be employed in what Henry Kissinger has called an era of "global interdependence."

ADMIRAL ZUMWALT'S WARNING

One American officer who has attempted to define the relationship between military power and energy shortages is Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, the recently retired Chief of Naval Operations. To his credit, Adm. Zumwalt raised the issue publicly in early 1972, when few Washington officials were worrying about U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil. In his budget presentation that year, the controversial CNO cited a "new" and "emerging" role for the Navy—protecting oil tankers en route to the U.S. from Soviet warships.

"During the past year, it has become increasingly clear that by 1985 or so we will have to import perhaps a half of the petroleum we need," Adm. Zumwalt lectured Congress. "This will require from several hundred to over one thousand tankers, each of 70,000 tons, fully committed to deliveries of oil to the U.S. The potential for coercion of the U.S., with or without allies, inherent in this situation is ominous when one considers the measures the Soviets are taking to improve their navy."

Based on this analysis, the admiral concluded that the U.S. Navy needed more and newer escort ships—minicarriers, destroyers, frigates—to meet this threat and keep the sealanes open. Viewed against the past year's events, the Zumwalt statement seems prescient, at least in part. But at the time, it was dismissed by a leading Pentagon critic, Rep. Les Aspin (D., Wis.) as merely "a desperate attempt to justify unnecessary increases in the Navy budget."

In addition to Adm. Zumwalt, two other important government officials have discussed the military implications of growing U.S. reliance on overseas resources—Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.

In a Senate speech in May 1973, the iconoclastic Fulbright speculated about the possibility of U.S. military intervention in Mideast oil-producing states. "Our present policymakers and policy-influencers may come to the conclusion that military action is required to secure the oil resources of the Middle East, to secure our exposed 'jugular,'" the Arkansas Democrat insisted, "There is no question of our ability forcibly to take over the oil-producing states of Middle East. They are militarily insignificant, constituting what the geopoliticians used to call a 'power vacuum.'"

About a half year later, with the Arab oil embargo starting to pinch in the U.S., Mr. Schlesinger spoke out for the first time. "I would not want to completely reject the possibility, but it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which the U.S. would move and employ vigorous physical actions to protect economic interests."

A few weeks later, on Jan. 7, the tough-talking Pentagon boss went further, warning the Arab oil producers against using their economic power "in such a way as would cripple the larger mass of the industrialized world. That is running too high a risk, and it is a source of danger, I think, not only from our standpoint but from the standpoint of the oil-producing nations." Although Mr. Schlesinger added that he thought it "won't come to a show of military force," his statement prompted Arab vows to destroy the oil fields themselves if attacked.

Such bold rhetoric generates headlines, of course, and may even, as some experts suggest, help deter future economic sanctions against the U.S. but it tends to over-simplify dangerously a complex issue on which there has been little serious behind-the-scenes study and even less public discussion. Which is why the work being done here—confined thus far to the pages of the Naval War College Review and last month's conference—is so riveting.

The lead article in the May-June issue of the Review is entitled "Oil and National Security." Its authors are two young civilian defense analysts, Barry M. Blechman (currently with Washington's Brookings Institution and former-

ly with the Center for Naval Analysis) and Arnold M. Kuzmack (a naval analyst at the Defense Department in the late 1960s). Their main conclusion is that creation of a national oil stockpiles is "the only strategy that promises to be effective against peacetime and wartime supply interruptions." Stockpiling oil, they believe, would reduce the vulnerability of U.S. officials to economic pressure to shape foreign policy to Arab whims and also "serve to assure U.S. oil supplies in the event of a major war with the Soviet Union." In the "highly unlikely" event of such a conflict, Messrs. Blechman and Kuzmack argue, it would be "virtually impossible to prevent" the Soviets from successfully disrupting the oil-importation at its weakest link—the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf—by laying mines.

Because tankers would be unable to pass through the strait, the analysts maintain, "it makes little sense to spend substantial sums of money to strengthen other parts" of the oil system from the Gulf to the continental U.S. Thus, they argue, "A program to build destroyed escort ships to convoy tankers from the Gulf to the U.S. would not appear to be an efficient allocation of resources."

Nevertheless, the authors don't lightly dismiss the relevance of military power—and action. "Military force," they write, "can be an effective political weapon in the event of peacetime supply interruptions, despite the recent trend to downgrade the utility of military force as a means for superpowers to secure their objectives vis-a-vis the smaller nations."

Then, in words reminiscent of Sen. Fulbright's, they declare: "A military intervention to terminate an oil boycott could well appear to be a viable option if the boycotting states controlled a sufficient portion of world production and were willing to maintain the boycott long enough to seriously impair the functioning of the U.S. and the West European economies. . . . A U.S. administration faced with an oil-related economic slump as well as consumer (that is, electorate) pressure to 'do something' might well feel compelled to exercise this option."

That is strong stuff. And the authors admit there are risks—the difficulty of running Arab oil fields "in the face of sabotage or other opposition" and, even more dangerous, the possibility of Soviet counteraction. But from the safety of their typewriters, Messrs. Blechman and Kuzmack forecast little likelihood of "Soviet involvement."

A NUCLEAR CRISIS?

Perhaps. But other experts aren't so sure. They predict that any U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf states could quickly lead to a nuclear crisis between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, retired Vice Adm. John M. Lee told the conference that as the military forces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union come into essential balance, "military operations are of declining utility" in achieving national purposes: "The truly vital problems of the human race, the gut problems, aren't susceptible to military solutions," he said.

That kind of talk from an admiral left a number of military men muttering that his perceptions had been distorted by long years of working on arms control problems. But it did gain support from several other conference speakers—Robert E. Hunter, foreign policy adviser to Sen. Edward Kennedy, and Karl E. Birnbaum of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

As Professor Birnbaum sees it, the fact that the Arabs were able to impose their embargo, production cutbacks and price increases on the U.S., Western Europe and Japan demonstrates that military solutions to energy problems are no longer possible in today's world. "It's inconceivable that 10 to 15 years ago, (small) nations could have gotten away with what they did," he said, implying that at that time the Arabs surely would have faced military action.

But even this analysis is disputed by some experts. One school holds that the only reason the industrialized democracies didn't resort to force was that the Arab actions weren't so severe or so prolonged as to endanger their survival. In the future, the results could be different.

Confronted with sharply conflicting expert testimony, it is difficult for the layman to draw firm conclusions about the value of military force in dealing with potential future raw materials problems. However, it seems clear that constraints on the use of military power are much greater than in the past. What is required is sober study of the whole issue rather than brash statements from high-ranking officials. For "gunboat diplomacy" in a world of proliferating nuclear weapons and shrinking resources is potentially suicidal.

Mr. Levine, a member of the Journal's Washington bureau, specializes in military affairs.

Senator PELL. The proposed opening of the Suez Canal has also become a factor mentioned by the Diego Garcia advocates. It is true that the canal will reduce the distance and time for Soviet ships attempting to reach the Indian Ocean in a crisis. Yet, it is also true that in a crisis the vulnerable Suez Canal can be closed quickly by any one of a number of nations with any one well placed conventional bomb. Even more seriously, the Diego Garcia proposal would commit us to a policy that contradicts our professed foreign policy guideline and alienates our allies.

At a time when the Nixon doctrine has directed us toward supporting the efforts of nations in their own regions, the Diego Garcia proposal provides for a major, direct U.S. interventionist role in the Indian Ocean.

We already lack the resources for many of our present positions; why assume the new ones where no necessity exists?

Parallel to this inconsistency with the Nixon doctrine is the overwhelming opposition of the Indian Ocean littoral states to the Diego Garcia proposal. A large number, including India, Australia, New Zealand, and Sri Lanka, are on public record against the project.

In addition, according to recent press reports, the United States has agreed to a request by the Government of Thailand that U.S. military flying out of Thailand will no longer be used for operations in the Indian Ocean. All those nations share a distaste for the great powers moving into a hitherto peaceful area, in fact, an actual power vacuum, and fear the possibility of an arms race. Their point of view has been strongly expressed by the United Nations as well, which in 1971 and 1973 passed resolutions declaring the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace."

In this connection a report was prepared at the direction of the General Assembly by Dr. Frank Branby, Admiral Safavi, a retired Iranian admiral, and Mr. Subrahmanyam, director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. And Dr. Branby is director of the International Peace Institute in Stockholm. They prepared a report on this subject which proved objectionable to us, to the Russians, to the Chinese. And as a result of this they were told to tone it down. So in the final report as it emerged it was toned down. But the initial report did point out that our moving ahead in Diego Garcia would be a threat in exacerbation of the situation there, and recommended against it.

[The article in the New York Times of July 16, 1974, follows:]

U.N. TONES DOWN REPORT ON INDIAN OCEAN BASES

(By Kathleen Teltsch)

STUDY BY OUTSIDE EXPERTS IS REVISED AFTER PROTESTS BY SEVERAL MEMBER NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., July 15—A corrected United Nations report showed today that the Soviet Union and the United States had stepped up their military rivalry in the Indian Ocean, that Britain's presence there had declined, and that no evidence had been found of Chinese bases or of the deployment of Chinese naval units there.

The earlier version, by three outside consultants, brought protests from all of the big powers and some of the smaller powers mentioned as having provided bases on their territories. Almost all complained that the report, made public May 10, was inaccurate and that, instead of factual data, it resorted to interpretation based on heresy.

Secretary General Waldheim said he had asked the authors to review and correct the study.

Dropped from the revised report was a warning that if the British island of Diego Garcia was turned into an American air and naval base, the Russians could be expected to search for similar facilities and this would trigger a new arms race.

Instead it reported that the proposal to expand facilities on Diego Garcia was "still being considered." The proposed alterations would include a longer airfield runway, but not one equipped for B-52 bombers, as the earlier document had said.

The study on big power involvement in the Indian Ocean was ordered by the General Assembly last year and prepared by Dr. Frank Barnby, director of the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm; Shams Safavi, a retired Iranian admiral, and K. Subrahmanyam, director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi.

United States authorities were incensed by what they felt was exaggerated emphasis on American installations and comparatively lighter handling of the Soviet military role. Peking protested the authors' suggestion that China had a base on the island of Zanzibar. Somalia denied the existence of a Soviet communications station at Berbera in Somalia, capable of communicating with "submerged hunter-killer submarines."

The report was revised by William Epstein, a Canadian who was head of the United Nations Disarmament Division, with three experts, and was cut from 39 pages of text, annexes and a map to 13 pages. In the process, the authors' controversial opinions as to the dangers of increased big power rivalries were removed.

Senator PELL. Most significantly, the possibilities of arms limitation have not been sufficiently explored. It was for this reason that I joined Senator Kennedy in introducing Senate Concurrent Resolution 76 in March of this year encouraging arms limitation efforts in the Indian Ocean. I was discouraged that the recent Moscow summit seemed to ignore this opportunity. While it is understandable that the administration is preoccupied with the arms races that already exist, it in no way lessens the need to prevent new ones from developing.

The expansion of Diego Garcia, characterized by Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, while he was Chief of Naval Operations, as a "prudent precautionary move", would undermine the possibility of naval arms limit agreements in the Indian Ocean.

What we might consider as prudent or precautionary would surely be seen by the Soviets as provocative and even aggressive. The Soviets might well feel compelled to respond in kind, and the costly and dangerous cycle of a naval arms race would have been set in motion.

Our primary concern in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere is safeguarding our national security. Ironically, if we develop Diego Garcia in the name of security, we shall create a naval confrontation with the Soviet Union that would do nothing to enhance our national security. It is in not developing the island that our Nation's and the area's interests lie.

As I stated earlier, the question of Diego Garcia is in reality part of the larger question of future American policy in the Indian Ocean. A decision not to go ahead with the expansion would be a

clear sign to the Soviet Union and the world that we are serious in our desire to avoid an arms race in this context. The potential benefits of avoiding such an arms race are too great to be jeopardized by a decision to develop Diego Garcia at this time.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize a point that the Case amendment requires Senate ratification of any American-British agreement in regard to Diego Garcia. So even moving ahead at this time, unless the agreement is ratified by the Senate, might be premature.

I would be glad to answer any questions.

I would also ask permission to put in the record a somewhat longer statement I have on this subject with some arguments in it as well that I made to your subcommittee some 4 or 5 minutes ago.

Senator SYMINGTON. Without objection.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT BY CLAIBORNE PELL, A U.S. SENATOR

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for this opportunity to appear before your Committee in support of my Amendment 973 to delete \$29 million for naval and air base construction on Diego Garcia from the Supplemental Military Authorization Bill, S. 2999. I understand, too, that the Navy will request an additional \$3.3 million in the fiscal 1975 budget for a total of \$32.3 million of new funds for expanding our present "austere" communication facilities on the island.

I also have an important corollary interest in this matter. Today, Senators Kennedy, Mathias, Cranston, and myself have introduced a concurrent resolution calling for United States-Soviet talks on naval limitations in the Indian Ocean. Such talks could provide an alternative to a unilateral permanent United States military intrusion into the Indian Ocean triggering a costly United States-Soviet naval race. Certainly, hasty, ill-considered, base construction on Diego Garcia would close off the avenue of negotiation and open up the road to military-confrontation in a vast area of 28 million square miles. Under this approach, the Nixon Doctrine and policy of replacing confrontation by negotiation would look like something viewed from the wrong end of a telescope. Viewed from the right end of the telescope, this is what Undersecretary Joseph Sisco of the State Department saw in May, 1973, less than a year ago. "The subcontinent is very far away. I think our interests are marginal. I think the Nixon Doctrine is quite applicable—namely, we ourselves don't want to become involved." Mr. Sisco continued by saying, "In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, we think the search for stability in Southeast Asia is primarily a task for the nations of the region." What an extraordinary change of perspective has occurred in so short a time.

I would like briefly to discuss the reasons why Amendment 973 is necessary and should be adopted unless, of course, the Committee itself decides to delete the proposed authorization for Diego Garcia before S. 2999 is reported out. I would applaud such action.

Basically, my position is that the evidence produced far does not justify a supplemental authorization on a crash basis of funds for the creation of a permanent United States air and naval base on Diego Garcia. I do not think that a major switch of policy from a low visibility United States presence in the Indian Ocean to a publicized military entrenchment should be made in a supplemental military authorization bill and on such ambiguous evidence of the Soviet threat.

If the Administration persists in pursuing this policy, it would be preferable to request the full \$32.3 million in the regular fiscal year 1975 Authorization Bill.

This scheduling would:

Give time for an examination of more exact and detailed information regarding the situation in the Indian Ocean.

Permit the exploration of other alternatives, including United States-Soviet talks on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.

Enable the Administration to formalize "the agreement in principle" with the British and transmit the document to the Congress for study.

Allow the Congress more time to fulfill its responsibilities under the war powers it shares with the Executive Branch.

I would like to enlarge a little on this last point.

We became involved in Indochina in the wrong way through the back door. This happened, in part at least, because the Congress in the crucial initial stages abdicated its role in the decision-making process to the Executive Branch, more specifically to the Presidency egged on by our overweening Pentagon.

Locking the tank before the gasoline was stolen, the Congress passed the War Powers Bill last year under the President's veto. Diego Garcia offers the first test case of Congressional determination to exercise the kind of authorization proclaimed it would do under the War Powers Bill.

We are now faced with a situation where the United States Navy in particular would have us establish a permanent United States presence in the Indian Ocean again through the back door, hopefully, from its viewpoint with minimum Congressional notice and interference.

A look at the record from the Sixties on reveals a pattern of determined Navy ambition to add the Indian Ocean to its already too predominant American sea power. As Admiral John McCain once said, "As Malta to the Mediterranean, Diego Garcia is to the Indian Ocean."

For years whatever the Indian Oceans might be, the Navy has interpreted it in support of this ambition. Thus, the Navy claims that...

In the early Sixties before the modernizing and buildup of Soviet sea power and the closing of the Suez Canal, United States Naval presence was needed to fill the vacuum created by the waning British sea power. It was at this time that Admiral McCain was promoting the concept of a Four Ocean Navy to meet a four ocean challenge in what now appears to be part of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

With the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, a United States presence became needed to offset the increased inaccessibility of the Indian Ocean to the United States.

Now with the possibility of the reopening of the Canal, United States presence would be needed to offset an alleged expanded Soviet presence, that the use of the Canal would make possible.

Until recently, neither the Executive Branch nor the Congress would go along, however, with the idea of the kind of United States presence in the Indian Ocean that would realize the Navy's long time, long range ambition.

This restraint, however, did not deter the Navy from employing a nibbling, piece-meal or camel's nose strategy to obtain its ultimate objective. We have seen this strategy unfold and gradually materialize.

The first step was, of course, negotiations that lead to the creation of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) quickly followed by our agreement with the British in December, 1966, that BIOT, including mainly Diego Garcia, would be available to both countries for military use for fifty years.

Following several unsuccessful attempts to put the territory to direct American military use, the Navy succeeded six years later, in 1972, in achieving a supplemental agreement to permit the establishment of "an austere communication facility." The technique used to obtain this objective is being repeated now in the effort to obtain authorization and funds for expanding the communications center into a full naval and air base before a formal agreement has been reached with the British and transmitted to the Congress.

Yet, up to very recently, the Executive Branch, including the Pentagon, has been maintaining that the United States had no intention of taking this latest step toward realizing the Navy's ambition.

In 1971, Ronald Spiers, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs told a Congressional Subcommittee that: "There appears to be no requirement at this time for us to feel impelled to control, or even decisively influence, any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral given the nature of our interests there and the current level of Soviet and Chinese involvement. We consider, on balance, are present interests are served by normal commercial, political, and military access." Despite present Administration claims, has the situation changed all that radically since then from a military viewpoint?

In February, 1972, Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had no intention

of competing over military installations in Southern Asia comparable to what has happened in the Mediterranean. Expanding on this point, Ambassador Johnson said that while the United States would continue to keep its vessels passing through the Indian Ocean regularly, "We do not plan a regular presence in the Indian Ocean... We have no intention of engaging in competition or maintaining a regular force." Since then, what has changed the most radically—the situation or ambitions?

The Defense Department also apparently supported this low-profile approach. Defense Secretary Laird said in 1972 that, "our strength in the Indian Ocean lies not so much in maintaining a large standing force... but rather in our ability to move freely in and out of the Ocean as the occasion and our interests dictate."

Even Navy Secretary John Chafee gave some good advice that same year, which seems equally applicable to the present situation, when he said "we ought to go slowly here and not escalate the thing and see what happens." The main thing for us to do now is to determine very precisely and carefully whether what has happened since then justified the escalation that the Navy is now pushing.

Finally, less than a year ago, Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense, John Noyes, assured Congress that with reference to Diego Garcia, "there are no plans to transform this facility into something from which forces could be projected, or that would provide a location for the basing of ships and aircraft."

Yet, on March 12, 1974, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Mr. Noyes testified on behalf of doing just that on the grounds that a number of important and unforeseen events have occurred relevant to United States policy.

In this connection, Mr. Noyes cited three United States security objectives:

First, we wish to provide an effective alternative to the growth of Soviet influence in the region.

Second, we wish to have continued access to vital Middle Eastern oil supplies for ourselves and other nations of the free world.

Third, we want to insure the continued free movement of United States ships and aircraft into and out of the area.

I would like to examine them in the light of the events Mr. Noyes has referred to as affecting our policy of the region.

Concerning the first point, the thrust of the Administration's argument in favor of expanding Diego Garcia is the necessity of countering an expanded Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Admiral Zumwalt claims that the Russians are moving in a most impressive way to increase their capability to support their naval forces overseas. He dramatically asserts that "their tentacles are going out like an octopus into the Indian Ocean." He states that they have improved facilities and operated out of Ummagats in Iraq, Berbera in Somalia, out of the island of Socotra, Dacca in Bangladesh, Wishakapatam. The implication is that the Soviets have special base rights in these places that could not be enjoyed by the United States. These facilities thus give the Russians the chance to "astride the central part of our energy jugular down to the Persian Gulf."

Other Executive Branch representatives have testified in a similar vein but so far, I have seen little hard evidence in facts and figures to substantiate this alleged ominous Russian presence.

I have heard that the Indian Government has resisted Soviet pressure and refused a request for a base on Indian territory, which would be harder for the Government to do if we expand on Diego Garcia; that while the Soviets have assisted in improving facilities in the area, they have no base in the sense that we have in Bahrain, Diego and Western Australia; that the anchorage off Socotra is an ocean one that anyone could set up. Perhaps my information is wrong, but in any case, I believe there is sufficient ambiguity in the circumstances surrounding the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean as to require a great deal more investigation and verification before the United States proceeds further with its plans for Diego Garcia.

The Russians, on the other hand, have no lack of hard information and data about these plans. They already know from published United States material that the Navy has already received \$6 million in fiscal 1973 for dredging of the Diego Garcia harbor to create a turning basin that will be 2,000 by 6,000 feet and able to accommodate submarines and aircraft carriers; that the design vessel is a ship 793 feet long and with a navigational draft

of 41 feet; that the existing 8,000-foot runway can take most aircraft, the design aircraft being the C-141 cargo airplane; that the United States will probably soon deploy P-3 naval ASW and reconnaissance aircraft on the island there are rumors that a submarine tender may also be sent there.

As further evidence that the Soviet presence is ahead of that of the United States in the Indian Ocean is a comparison of "ship days" spent there by United States and Soviet vessels with the latter ahead by a considerable margin. These "ship day" comparisons, however, ignore the actual nature of the kinds of ships there and their combat capabilities. Soviet minesweepers sent to help clear ports in Bangladesh are equated with United States aircraft carriers. Most of the Soviet naval ships reportedly are non-combatant support and auxiliaries: oilers, repair ships, space support ships, etc. At present, I understand, that the Soviets have only eight surface combat ships of destroyer size and smaller in the Indian Ocean. The United States has been maintaining an aircraft carrier there for some time. But here again, I think there is a necessity for a thorough valuation of the relative strengths of the two navies.

Regarding another index involving much more political impact, the United States leads the Soviet Union by a wide margin in port calls.

I could go on, but the point I wish to emphasize is that we really do not seem to know at this hour of important decision exactly what the growth of Soviet influence in the region really amounts to in terms of facts and figures. We should find out.

I will not dwell too long on the other two security objectives of Mr. Noyes since I consider the first one goes more to the heart of the issue, and I have discussed it at some length.

Regarding the second one, certainly we all agree that there should be continued access to vital Middle Eastern oil supplies for ourselves and other nations of the free world. But would a naval base on Diego Garcia really help in this respect. Is not the threat more a political one on the part of the producing countries rather than a military one from the Soviets? Who recently cut us off from these supplies? Not the Soviets.

But in case of open hostilities, would not submarine protection prove more effective than exposed surface craft? And would we wish to expose those submarines to refueling or maintenance in a base as vulnerable as Diego Garcia to nuclear or conventional attacks? I think these are other questions that must be looked into before going ahead there.

Finally, regarding the third objective of insuring the continued free movement of United States ships and aircraft into and out of the area, this is something we already enjoy and could be more effectively guaranteed at no cost in an arms control agreement than by a base at Diego Garcia.

In short, Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that it would be most ill advised to be rushed into such a crucial decision on Diego Garcia on the inadequate basis of what we know now and without carefully exploring other alternatives.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me ask you, is there a signed agreement with the British yet as to what they do and what we do in this matter?

Senator PELL. As I understand it, there was an initial agreement with the British prior to the change of British Government. That was then subject to reexamination after the government changed, and more recently we have been informed that the British have no objection to our moving ahead in this way. More than that, I have not been informed on.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have different intelligence reports on what the Soviets are doing in the Indian Ocean. Some of the more ardent proponents of this new base in the Indian Ocean have been emphasizing the very large developments of the Soviets in this area, whereas other intelligence people in this Government have said that is not correct. As those people know, I have always been pro-submarine. But as I understand, one of the chief reasons for having nuclear submarines was that they could travel a long way without having to refuel, et cetera.

The Soviets have told us, I understand, that if we do build this base that they intend to make a great naval base for them also in the Indian Ocean. Of course, that simply means that what we used to call but a few years ago the "Ocean of Peace" will become another tremendous build up in the arms race.

So I am very interested in your remarks, because I think that one of the basic aspects of true national security is a sound economy and a sound dollar. The reports that I have been getting from people that I respect, not only in my own State but in New York, are pretty rough from the standpoint of what the condition of the economy is today.

I yield to my colleague Senator Jackson—

Senator PELL. If I could reply to one of your points you mentioned, I, too, was struck by the discrepancy in the reports of the intelligence community in one case.

Without being specific, since this is an open hearing, I noticed the discrepancy was on the order of 10-to-1 with regard to the number of Soviet personnel.

Senator JACKSON. Would the Senator indicate what bases, if any, the Soviets have in the area?

Senator PELL. Certainly.

As the Senator knows, Berbera is basically the biggest. That is in Somalia.

Senator JACKSON. That is the big airbase, and the sea base?

Senator PELL. There is an airfield that is being built there, but if I am correct, it is not yet in usable condition. It has been in the process of being built for about 2 years and it is still not complete.

Senator JACKSON. I understand it might have runways of about 10,000 feet.

Senator PELL. I do not know the length. I am sure you are informed of that. But it is not yet built.

Senator JACKSON. They are building it?

Senator PELL. They are building it, and they have been for 2 years.

Senator JACKSON. What about the Gulf of Aden?

Senator PELL. In the Gulf of Aden—I have a list here.

Senator JACKSON. I do not care about that. Just give numbers.

Senator PELL. I have it here.

They have access to a port, I forget the name of the port, with fueling and supplying privileges. Then you have, as you know, in Iraq, Umm Qasar. They have access to that, but no permanent status.

Senator JACKSON. But they can move in?

Senator PELL. Absolutely.

Also, in India they have access to Vishakhapatnam, but no base privileges. While I realize Admiral Zumwalt does not believe the Indians are telling the truth in this regard, and has said so publicly, the Indians say publicly, and privately to me, that they have no special arrangements with the Russians that are different from those that we have, that whenever the Russians go in to use their ports, they have to ask for permission just as we do.

Senator JACKSON. What about Bangladesh?

Senator PELL. The access to their ports largely involve nonmilitary operations.

Senator JACKSON. What ports do we have access to?

Senator PELL. We have of course the Bahrain base, which is subject to an agreement which has not been extended, but it looks like now it will be.

We have the Thailand base—

Senator JACKSON. We have problems there, as you mentioned.

Senator PELL. We have problems, as I mentioned in my statement. We have farther removed Subic Bay.

We are doing some development, as I understand it, in Australia—you may be informed of that better than I—in Tasmania and on the coast.

In Singapore we have a limited facility.

In Ethiopia we have a limited facility, which I thought was being closed up, but I am not sure of that.

In Iran we have some base fueling rights.

So as of now it is about basically equal, with us having a light edge.

Senator JACKSON. You would say that in the Indian Ocean and area we have an edge on base uses?

Senator PELL. Not on base uses, but on military presence.

Senator JACKSON. I am talking about availability of facilities. We have no access at all, do we, in India?

Senator PELL. No, no more than Russia does. In other words, any country has to ask. We do not have a permanent base.

Senator JACKSON. I understand that. But they can refuel there?

Senator PELL. Right. And so can we if we ask, but we do not like to ask.

Senator JACKSON. I would agree with you that if we could get the demilitarization of this area, including the Suez Canal, we would be better off. But nothing much has been mentioned in your statement about what happens when the Suez Canal is reopened.

I strongly support the demilitarization of the Suez Canal. That is a very complicated, juridical problem in international law. But what in your judgment will be the Soviet capability with the reopening of the canal in comparison with ours as it pertains to our big carriers?

Senator PELL. They only have one or two carriers, as you know. Obviously they will have more immediate access to the Black Sea than we do in the United States.

On the other hand, in the other end of the Pacific Ocean—we will probably keep our fleet in the Western Pacific, and it will have a fairly equivalent potential.

Senator JACKSON. But does it not make a real difference in terms of steaming time and the whole operational capability, the difference from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean as compared with what the Soviets have to do now?

They come, I believe, from Vladivostok, or they go around Africa, those are the options. But their options, once the canal is opened, as I understand it—this is what troubles me, and that is why I support demilitarization right now—against them, this enormous flexibility of being able to move their fleet, should they decide when their interests are predominant in the Persian Gulf, and I think that is where they will maintain their predominant presence.

Senator PELL. But I think, as opposed to the Soviet Union—they do not maintain a fleet off our shores. We do maintain—and I am not saying that we should not—a fleet off their shores in the Western Pacific, which also has pretty quick access via the Malacca Straits to the Indian Ocean.

Senator JACKSON. Historically the disturbing thing about the Soviet Navy is that in the past this Navy was related directly to the defense of their Eurasian land mass. The disturbing thing—I do not know much about this, but from what little I know—is that their fleet has moved away from the Eurasian land mass and out to sea.

I just came back from a visit to China, and it is rather interesting to get the view, you know, of the other sister socialist states for the Soviet Union. It is very fascinating.

I do not want to get into the detail.

Senator PELL. I wonder if perhaps their fleets have not moved out in response to the fact that we consider the world oceans American oceans, and we feel that all oceans should be pretty much dominated by the American flag, which is a very nice thought, but which is proving very expensive and difficult.

Senator JACKSON. I do not buy the idea of the Soviets moving in response mechanism; I think they follow their own basic objectives. It is not just a conditioned response type of thing. That is my own view. It is a matter of personal judgment. But I think historically there is some justification for that.

But you mentioned India was opposed. Tell me, is Pakistan opposed?

Senator PELL. No, Pakistan, as I believe, is not opposed.

Senator JACKSON. What about Iran?

Senator PELL. I think we have mentioned their reactions.

Privately, I think Pakistan is among those that say, do not worry; publicly I believe there have been some expressions of concern.

Senator JACKSON. I would be surprised. I am very serious about it. Are the Pakistanis officially opposed to the base? You see, you are dealing, as you know, with a conflict between the Chinese and the Russians now.

Senator PELL. Right.

Senator JACKSON. The Russian client is India, and Pakistan—the Chinese have a small amount of interest in Pakistan.

Senator PELL. The Government of Pakistan supported the Indian Ocean Peace zone, but it worried about Soviet intentions, and is making no public objection.

Privately it has welcomed our proposed presence.

Senator JACKSON. They have welcomed American presence?

Senator PELL. Yes, not publicly but privately.

Senator JACKSON. I learned a long time ago that there is a difference in what they say publicly—and this applies to democracies, Mr. Chairman—and what they say privately.

Senator SYMINGTON. We do pretty well ourselves these days.

Senator JACKSON. They are two different things.

Senator PELL. Let me read into the record, if I may, those countries that have mixed reactions, like Pakistan, that support this project:

Tanzania, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Somalia—which is odd, because that is where I think they would have opposed it with the Soviets being there—and Malagasy. Those where we have specially strong opposition from are India, Australia, New Zealand, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. I should also add that Singapore supports the Diego Garcia project. It is the only country that has come out publicly and supported it.

Senator JACKSON. I must say that what I would like to see is a demilitarization, Mr. Chairman, of this area, and a demilitarization of the canal. But I am concerned that if that does not happen, that we may be denying ourselves an effective option, not talking about moving a lot of ships out there, but if you have to deal with a problem in the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Oman, you will have that flexibility.

I wish that we could get a bilateral agreement with the Russians that their ships will not transit the Suez and we will not transit the Suez, military ships, and have a zone that would be demilitarized.

Senator PELL. We would make the same agreement?

Senator JACKSON. Yes, I said neither. I am for demilitarization of the canal.

I am the one for years that has been warning that the most significant objectives of the Soviets in dealing with the problems in the Mediterranean as distinguished from the Persian Gulf is access to the canal. Our big carriers cannot use the canal for 7 or 8 years, and that presupposes that we are able to get the canal widened and deepened.

The Navy people can answer that question, but I do not think we can use the canal for our big carriers.

Can anyone answer that?

Captain GIOVANETTI. You are correct.

Senator JACKSON. The other point, we cannot run our supertankers through the canal loaded. They can come back and ballast through the canal.

So that the canal poses some new problems. Mr. Chairman, that I am concerned about. It gives them this viability and flexibility in the Mediterranean where the Russians do have, I think, a very powerful presence. I am not wise enough or smart enough to know what it is in comparison with our fleet in the Mediterranean, but they can move freely from the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean and into the Gulf of Arabia, Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea, and so forth. I think that poses a problem. That is all I am saying. My preference is demilitarization on a bilateral arrangement.

I do not think the Chinese are going to have a Navy immediately.

Senator PELL. But the issue in hand is not the demilitarization of the Suez Canal, which would be like motherhood; the issue in hand is the Indian Ocean, which is still pretty much of a power vacuum with a modest American presence and a modest Soviet presence—whether we leave it in that condition or enlarge our presence.

The interesting fact of the matter is—

Senator JACKSON. But I am thinking of it now in the context of a reopened canal.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the senator would yield, the one point that I think the witness has made—and I have been around the canal a good many times—is that of all the targets that I think could be easily taken out, if it was really important on the basis of a modern missile, whether sea-to-sea or air-to-air or land-to-sea, it is the Suez Canal. I have never seen a place that could be more botched up as a result of missile effort than the Canal could be, very quickly, so that it would be impassable for any type and character of ship, except of course very small stuff.

Senator JACKSON. There is no dispute about that. If you use the devices, there are a lot of places around the world—I think one of the things that happens, though, is that—one of the things we have learned in the postwar period which I have tried to follow with some interest is that the things we thought we could do 20 or 25 years ago, it turns out that there are constraints that prohibit us from doing, because it is a different time.

Senator SYMINGTON. I remember one time I asked a representative of a country that is very advanced technically in that part of the world, "Have you made any serious progress in the atomic bomb?"

The answer was, "What do you say we talk about something else?"

I said, "Well, I understand that if the Aswan Dam was knocked out, it would drown 50,000 people."

This fellow said, "100,000."

Senator JACKSON. I appreciate the Senator's comments.

I would like to see demilitarization. But I hate to see ourselves in a situation where, come an emergency, that we do not have adequate refueling facilities—that is all that I am saying—and could be denied the other ports.

I see more and more trouble with India, to be very candid, as long as we are going to maintain a degree of parallelism with the Chinese. I am just a minor philosopher in all of this. But there are some real conflicts here between China and the Soviet Union, is what I am trying to say, that are fascinating, very fascinating, after 20 years of talks with the Chinese.

That is all I am going to say in open session, but I think there are some things that we have to look at.

Senator PELL. There are two thoughts, though, to respond to you, Senator Jackson.

First, as to who follows who—this is sort of like the chicken and the egg. The fact of the matter is that both in the case of the Indian-Pakistan war and the recent Israeli war, our capital ships, bigger ships, were in the Indian Ocean first, and the Soviets followed us in the order of 2 to 3 weeks. When it comes to the number of ships and port calls, these statistics that are so often used, that is correct, the Soviets have more ships in. But the questions again are where the ships are and what kind of ships are they?

When it comes to port calls, I think you will find that the United States has more port calls, which is when the ships are present and visible, than the Soviet Union does in that part of the ocean.

Senator JACKSON. I will accept your figures.

My point is really the reliability of logistical facilities, that is all I am talking about. I think the Soviets' reliability on India is a lot better than ours, and that is one of my main points.

I think that clearly Iraq gives the Soviets an ability to totally neutralize the Shah of Iran. All that the Russians need to do in using that port in Iraq is to send one ship up there, and the Shah of Iran, with the billions that he is spending, is totally neutralized. Yet he is looked upon as the one who can provide protection in that area.

By having that port facility, which they can enlarge at any time—they demonstrated that when the Iraqis moved in and took a big part of Kuwait, and that is a strategic area. It is a new ball-game now, the czars, as the senator knows, have always referred to their interest in the Indian Ocean warm water ports. With Iraq having more oil than any nation in the world in reserve except Saudi Arabia, it means that the Soviets have postured themselves—and I do not think they are going to get out regardless—in a beautiful position to move against the Saudis, to move against the Iranians, to move against the Syrians, to move against the Jordanians and Israel.

What I see—I just want to say this and then I will be finished—what I see is, the Russians are not leaving the Middle East by any means. Now, they are shifting their emphasis to the Gulf, but they are now providing resupply to the Egyptians. They are providing supplies and equipment, as the Senator knows, to Libya. But they are not just going to leave quietly the Mediterranean. But they are going to stay in Iraq, because that is the pivot point against the Iranians, and it gives them the pivot to move in the other areas that I mentioned.

So that these two countries, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, have well over half the known oil reserves of the entire world. This is a whole new addition to the ancient dream of the czars.

I just mention it for what it is worth. My views are shared by some Communist countries that are not Russians.

Senator PELL. I think that the Senator, being on the Armed Services Committee and having been on it a long time, knows that this is going to open a wedge to go back to an increased floating presence in that ocean, and we quickly get back to that 15 carrier concept.

Senator JACKSON. You see, I am with the Senator—we join on a number of things like aid to Greece and some others where I do not like what is going on; I think it brings home the point right now in Cyprus—I agree with the Senator on the demilitarization of the canal, which I have been advocating for a long, long time. But I have not been able to convince the administration on the demilitarization of the area.

Senator PELL. I do not think we ever can.

Senator JACKSON. I think we can be demilitarization of the Russians. I think this is something that they really have considered other than just strategic forces in Moscow by bilateral agreement of the area.

Senator JACKSON. Please don't argue with me, Senator, today.

But I just throw out these views on the table. I would like to see new constraints in the area.

Senator PELL. We have to work from where we are, and the idea of demilitarizing the Suez Canal I think both you and I will agree is not going to happen, as much as we would like it to.

Senator JACKSON. Should we not speak out on this? What is wrong with asking the Soviets about the bilateral bases?

Senator PELL. Nothing. Why should we not demilitarize the Panama Canal, let us say? I do not think we would like that so much.

Senator JACKSON. It is a different history in the Panama Canal.

Senator PELL. I am all for it, I think the more demilitarization, the better.

Senator SYMINGTON. I ask unanimous consent that we put this dialog in the record.

Senator JACKSON. I have just gotten started.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have a roll call vote, and all of us, Senator Jackson, Senator Pell, and myself have to go. I will go over and vote and I will be right back. Then we will hear from you, Admiral La Rocque.

Thank you, Senator.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much indeed for letting me appear.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Senator Pell; I enjoyed the colloquy.

Senator SYMINGTON. Admiral La Rocque, you have been very patient.

Before we start with you, I would like to insert in the record a letter from Senator Nunn of Georgia on Robins Air Force Base, Warner-Robins, Ga.

Without objection, it will be entered into the record.

[The letter follows:]

JULY 17, 1974.

Hon. STUART SYMINGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Construction Authorizations,
Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: It has come to my attention that an important program of renovation and construction at Robins Air Force Base, Warner Robins, Georgia, is likely to be seriously impaired and delayed because construction bids, under the impact of inflation, have substantially exceeded the authorization for construction at Robins approved in the FY 1974 Military Construction Authorization Act.

As this information came to the attention of the Air Force too late to be included in its formal request for a deficiency authorization this year, I would like to request that the Subcommittee amend the FY 1975 Military Construction Authorization Bill to include a deficiency authorization for the additional expenditure required. The amount involved is \$2,606,000. The Air Force has assured me that they will meet the additional expenditures through internal reprogramming and no supplemental appropriation will be required.

Attached is a statement in support of this request. I would appreciate it if you could include the statement as part of the record of the Subcommittee hearings on the FY 1975 bill, and if you would give the request every consideration.

If I can provide any additional information, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Enclosure.

SAM NUNN.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS

I am here today to ask the Subcommittee to amend the FY 1975 Military Construction Authorization Bill to include a deficiency authorization of \$2,696,000 to permit planned construction to be completed at Robins Air Force Base, Warner Robins, Georgia. The text of the amendment I propose is as follows: (see Attachment A).

I recognize that this request is somewhat unusual. However, when the Air Force processed its deficiency request for the present bill to address excess costs not anticipated or authorized in the FY 1974 Military Construction Authorization Act, contractor bids on the work authorized to be done at Robins had not been received. Consequently, the Air Force was not able to include in that request the excess costs at Robins which these bids revealed.

Not enough time remains to enable the Air Force, which I have been informed fully supports this request, to formally process a second, supplemental deficiency request and present it before this Subcommittee. As the House Subcommittee has already begun to mark-up the FY 1975 construction authorization bill, my request is the last practical opportunity available to prevent this construction program from being delayed at least another year.

The construction authorized at Robins Air Force Base under the FY 1974 Act, consisted of a program to renovate and expand maintenance and overhaul facilities of the Air Force Logistics Command. The estimated cost of the work and the amount of the authorization approved was \$4,628,000. The improvements requested are needed for proper performance of essential aircraft maintenance work.

Bids on the several projects at Robins were opened in May, June, and July of this year. The total of the lowest acceptable contract offers exceeded the total authorized by more than 50 percent, despite the fact that the number of qualified bids and the price spread among them clearly indicates that the bidding was responsive and competitive. A detailed itemization of the projects and cost differences involved has been prepared by the Air Force. I ask permission to include that chart in the record as a part of my statement (attachment B).

The reasons for the disparity between anticipated costs and bids received are several:

Alterations estimates are traditionally less certain than new construction.

Inflation has raised material and labor costs and magnified future uncertainties. These factors were reflected in the bids received.

In the case of one major project, alteration of an aircraft protective coating facility, review of the original specifications revealed certain changes were necessary to carry out the objectives effectively. These changes increased costs. The original bids were more than twice the estimated cost of slightly over \$1 million. The project is being redesigned and will be reopened for bids in August.

These serious cost increases necessitate this request for a deficiency authorization of \$2,696,000. Because of the amount of the overage, the reconstruction program planned for Robins will be substantially impaired unless the station authorization for the Base is raised.

The Air Force has assured me that if the requested authorization is obtained, they will be able to meet the expenditures required from internal reprogramming. No supplemental appropriation for the work will be requested.

Mr. Chairman, the Robins Air Force Base construction program is an important element in meeting fundamental support responsibilities of the Air Force Logistics Command. This construction and renovation is required to expand performance and increase effectiveness and to better protect the health and safety of the workers employed at the base. If the work is not carried out this year, it will be more urgently required next. Further delay will only increase costs further. In view of these factors, I urge the Subcommittee to adopt the amendment I am proposing to authorize the Air Force to incur the limited additional costs entailed to carry out the program at Robins Air Force Base as expeditiously as possible.

Sec. 305(a) of Public Law 93-166 is amended under the heading "Inside the United States" as follows:

(1) Under the sub-heading "Air Force Logistics Command" with respect to Robins Air Force Base, Warner Robins, Georgia, strike out "\$4,628,000" and insert in place thereof "\$7,324,000."

(2) Public Law 93-166 is further amended by striking out in clause (3) of section 602 "\$253,398,000" and "\$275,700,000" and inserting in place thereof "\$256,094,000" and "\$278,396,000" respectively.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE FY —	MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM	AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND		REVISED AUTH. REQUESTED
		LOCATION	AUTHORIZATION AUTHORITY	
P.L. 93-166 (FY 1974)	INCREASE IN PRIOR YEARS AUTHORIZATION	ROBINS AIR FORCE BASE, GEORGIA	AUTHORIZATION FOR WHICH INCREASE REQUESTED	\$ 7,324,000
			CURRENT AUTHORIZATION	\$ 4,628,000
			AUTHORIZATION INcrease REQUEST	\$ 2,696,000
BASIS FOR INCREASE		CURRENT AUTH.	REVISED AUTH. REQUESTED	
ITEM	UNITS	COST(\$000)	UNITS	COST(\$000)
UNAWARDED ITEMS: BIDS OPENED				
Add to & Alter Aircraft Protective Coating Facility	51,454 SF	1,047	51,454 SF	2,292
Add to & Alter Aircraft Maintenance Hangars	425,690 SF	886	425,690 SF	1,812
Altair Depot Aircraft Overhaul Facility	306,000 SF	1,352	306,000 SF	1,364
Altair Materials Analysis Facility	30,677 SF	860	30,677 SF	640
SUB TOTAL		4,125		6,608
			LS	716
			4,628	7,324
BIDS NOT YET OPENED				
Advanced Logistic System Utility Support				TOTAL
REMARKS				

Bids were opened on 8 May 1974 for the Aircraft Protective Coating Facility. While bids were considered competitive and responsive (5 bids received), they were rejected due to lack of total station funds. The project is being redesigned in an effort to lower costs and will be readvertised in August 74. The remaining bids are taken of contractors regarding firm delivery dates and material quotations. The range of bid prices on the protective coating facility showed a difference between the two lowest bids of only 5%. The low bid was also only 5% above the government estimate. Three bids were received on the Maintenance Hangar with the low and second low bids being 5% apart. The Overhaul Facility received four bids with the two lowest again being within 5%. Seven bidders responded on the Materials Analysis Facility with an 8% spread between the two lowest bids.

Senator SYMINGTON. Admiral La Rocque, will you come forward, please.

My understanding is that you would like to testify in regard to the proposed expansion of the naval facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia; is that correct?

STATEMENT OF ADM. GENE R. LA ROCQUE, REAR ADMIRAL USN (RETIRED), DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

Admiral LA ROCQUE. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you a statement?

Admiral LA ROCQUE. Yes, I do, and I would like to read portions of it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like you to read it all.

Will you proceed.

Admiral LA ROCQUE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, your invitation to appear here today to discuss the Diego Garcia base expansion proposal and related issues is most appreciated.

You and the chairman of the full committee, Senator Stennis, have been instrumental in assuring that the U.S. Navy's plans for the Indian Ocean receive careful and complete examination by the Congress. Your concern for independent and painstaking evaluation may be contrasted with that of the House Armed Services Committee which, in its report in March on Diego Garcia funding in the 1974 second supplemental bill, simply copied virtually word for word the testimony of Admiral Zumwalt on the subject. Fortunately, the Congress as a whole refused to be stampeded into approving the Navy's plans prior to having a chance to take a harder look at the matter.

In a year when the Defense Department seems to be getting just about everything it wants, and in the wake of the Moscow summit and the accelerating political and constitutional crisis at home, and the rising inflation, it may be difficult to refocus attention on the comparatively minor issue of U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean region. The issue is of great importance and the action that the Congress takes this summer on Diego Garcia may be as important in setting in motion a string of historic events as that taken in approving the Gulf of Tonkin resolution 10 years ago.

In its most obvious and immediate terms, the question that confronts the Congress is whether to approve the \$32.3 million requested by the Navy and the Air Force to expand facilities on the island of Diego Garcia, an expansion that will probably encourage increased U.S. naval deployments in the Indian Ocean.

In the context of the \$90 billion defense budget, \$32.3 million may seem like peanuts, almost too insignificant to merit much study by very busy Members of Congress. Navy representatives have tried to downplay the significance of this proposal and talked about having a little "gas station" over there.

In fact, Diego Garcia would not be just another base—or austere support facility—but an entirely new policy. If the Navy is allowed to have its way with Diego Garcia, the United States will stumble

backwards into a whole new set of complicated problems and responsibilities that it simply does not need.

The Center for Defense Information has carefully evaluated the Navy's proposal and the situation in the Indian Ocean region and published the results of our study in the issue of The Defense Monitor, which is attached to my statement for your examination.

The United States is at a crucial turning point in policy towards the Indian Ocean region. Until very recently the United States followed a sound policy of low profile and minimal military involvement. Now the U.S. Navy plans to establish a naval and air base on the island of Diego Garcia and increase the deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean. These plans require the most rigorous examination to insure that one-sided emphasis on short-term military goals does not result in hasty steps which would stimulate an arms race in the region, exacerbate tensions and undermine U.S. influence.

The basic issue is: Should the U.S. Navy dominate the U.S. foreign policy in the Indian Ocean area, or should the Navy support the traditional restrained U.S. foreign policy in the region?

The present use of the island of Diego Garcia for a communications station is reasonable at this time, but U.S. facilities and usage of the island need not be expanded beyond that which exists today. Even the communications role may become obsolete because of the use of satellites for communications and the improvement of U.S. facilities on the west coast of Australia.

It should be pointed out that, although the U.S. communications facility at Asmara in Ethiopia has been phased down, it has not been terminated as previously indicated. In fact, I have information which was sent to me as a retired officer which indicates that they have increased logistic support at Asmara in some aspects, which I would be glad to explain later.

The new agreement on expansion of the U.S. military base at Diego Garcia now being negotiated between the United States and Great Britain is of sufficient importance to be a formal treaty rather than a simple executive agreement. Certainly, the Congress should approve no additional funding before the agreement is firm.

The United States has not exerted strong efforts to reach agreements with the Soviet Union and other interested countries such as Britain and France to exercise mutual restraint on deployments and bases in the Indian Ocean. This may have been in part because of the adamant opposition of some Navy officials, notably Admiral Zumwalt, to the concept of naval arms limitations.

Nearly all of the countries on the Indian Ocean have supported efforts within the United Nations to have a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean. Even U.S. allies such as Australia and New Zealand take a critical view of expansion of U.S. military presence there.

In addition to the need to pursue the possibilities for Indian Ocean arms limitation, as called for in the Kennedy-Pell resolution, there is an urgent requirement for the United States and the Soviet Union to have overall discussions about the general naval arms race between them (NALT talks). This ongoing naval arms race may be more expensive than the strategic arms race.

"It is certainly more likely to lead to wars. Senator Stennis has indicated his concern about the naval arms race and the need to explore alternatives, particularly in the Indian Ocean, which I share. He says:

If we are going to have a big build-up over there that would call for another fleet, a great augmentation, at least, or what we have, why couldn't that area be the subject of negotiations or agreements of some kind? I am sure that if we go to building, the Soviets are going to go to building.

There is no military threat to the United States in the Indian Ocean. The United States today has naval superiority in the region, particularly when one takes into account the kinds of forces that the United States has in nearby areas that can be brought to bear in a relatively short period of time. Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean have important limitations and weaknesses. Most Soviet ships there are noncombatants,

The Soviet Union, as does the United States, have access to ports in countries on the Indian Ocean, but it does not have any real naval bases of its own. The United States is building its own base at Diego Garcia, an escalation of outside military presence in the area. The U.S. flag flies over our base at Diego Garcia. The flag of the USSR does not fly from an Indian Ocean base, yet.

U.S. military buildup in the Indian Ocean does not contribute to solution of the United States or world energy problems or insure a flow of oil. Oil is much more likely to be turned off "at the well-head" than blockaded by the Soviet Navy. The Soviet Union, with extensive economic and political interests has little to gain by attacks on Western oil tankers. U.S. resources and attention should be concentrated on nonmilitary, more productive means of solving long-term energy needs. Visions of gunboats and convoys should not distract us from more serious, long-term approaches.

In terms of the stability and progress of the region, and assuring supplies of oil and other goods, the U.S. money to be spent on a big U.S. naval establishment in the Indian Ocean could perhaps better be spent on assisting in economic development of countries in the area; both the United States and they would benefit.

There is a lesson that we would do well to learn from the Japanese. They learned the hard way, at great cost in blood and treasure, that there are means for protecting international interests without military force. Because they have lacked substantial military force that they could bring to bear internationally, the Japanese have become most adept at using diplomatic and economic means to protect their interests. We would do well to heed their experience.

You alluded earlier this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, to the opening of the canal. The reopening of the Suez Canal, a symbol of returning stability in the Middle East, has been seized upon by some in the United States as an excuse for the U.S. Navy to rush into the Indian Ocean in fulfillment of long-standing ambitions. A much better step would be to seek limitation on military traffic through the canal, as Senators Stennis and Jackson have already suggested.

In any case, the canal could very easily be closed in a crisis and no country could count on being able to use it for hostile purposes.

The opening of the Suez Canal, depending on what controls are

placed on military traffic, will facilitate deployments of ships from the U.S. 6th Fleet to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The opening of the canal will also put U.S. naval bases in the Mediterranean closer to the Indian Ocean than are Soviet bases in the Black Sea.

In general, occasional patrols from the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets and from the Pacific 7th Fleet into the Indian Ocean would suffice to show the U.S. flag and military presence on those relatively rare occasions when that is warranted. That is, after all, the policy that the United States has followed up until the present.

The actual costs of Diego Garcia are far more than the \$32.3 million that has become the focus of congressional attention and Navy presentations. The complete cost of the construction on Diego Garcia is about \$180 million, including the costs of the SeaBees who are doing the work.

Secondly, the Navy has already postponed the retirement of two aircraft carriers because of increased Indian Ocean deployments. It was probably no accident that these carriers, the *Hancock* and the *Oriskany*, happened to be the first carriers sent to the Indian Ocean at the end of 1973. The annual operations and maintenance costs of those two carriers are \$165.5 million.

This cost also contributes to the inflation that we are experiencing in this country.

Third, it seems clear that the fascination that the Navy has for Diego Garcia has a lot to do with the way in which new commitments in the Indian Ocean can be converted into a force building exercise to justify more ships. Efforts have been made by Senator Symington and others to pin down the Navy about whether a bigger Navy will be needed to assume new responsibilities in the Indian Ocean, but somehow the Navy has not been willing to admit what should be an obvious fact.

It can be predicted with almost certainty that the Navy will, in the future, use commitments in the Indian Ocean to justify new ship construction and more aircraft carriers.

One new carrier with associated ships and aircraft today costs about \$3 billion. To keep one carrier on station, the Navy likes to have two to back it up. Thus, a new commitment to keep one carrier in the Indian Ocean will cost \$9 billion to \$10 billion.

These are the kinds of figures and financial costs that we should have in mind when we think about whether it is in the U.S. interests to build up militarily in the Indian Ocean.

The Defense Marketing Service (DMS), a commercial information service for U.S. defense contractors, has accurately perceived the great costs of moving into the Indian Ocean. I quote from their publication:

An active commitment in Indian Ocean naval operations will require increased resources in the form of men, materials and money. So from a little insignificant spit of land lost in the middle of the ocean is spawned a commitment that may well run into the billions.

These billions also fuel the inflation in this country.

Even on the limited, incomplete basis by which proponents are trying to sell Congress on Diego Garcia, no solid justification has been made for a base in the Indian Ocean.

Can the Navy tell Congress what amount of U.S. naval deployments in the Indian Ocean will make the Diego Garcia support base cost-effective? I am aware of no such detailed presentation.

Presumably, for example, if one carrier task force were to be sent to the region each year, it would be a waste of money to invest in the overhead of a fixed facility, a coaling station if you will, in the middle of the ocean. The United States already has access to numerous ports in the region and the U.S. Navy does have many ships for resupply and refueling.

Everything that will be on Diego Garcia—all the fuel, equipment, food, supplies, men, et cetera—has to be shipped at great cost from somewhere else, thousands of miles away.

What is the contemplated level of naval activity that makes the great expense of building and supplying a base worthwhile? I have seen no answer to this obvious question.

One also wonders whether the Navy has really carefully thought through the military and logistic benefits of Diego Garcia. If, as the Navy says, no ships will be based at Diego Garcia, Diego Garcia will be of no help in getting U.S. ships into the Indian Ocean faster vis-a-vis the alleged Soviet capability to exploit an opened Suez Canal to send Soviet naval ships more quickly into the Indian Ocean. They say they are not going to base any ships there, so there is no greater speed at which we are going to be able to move ships into the Indian Ocean than we concurrently do.

Our ships will still have to come from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean, just as they do today. When the Navy says that Diego Garcia is essential if the United States is to be able to send ships to the Indian Ocean, it is clear that rhetoric has been substituted for analysis.

It is also worth noting that the Navy has "no specific tasks" for forces in the Indian Ocean. It is obvious to me that the Navy can continue to live without Diego Garcia, just as it and the other services have learned to live without other "nice to have," but far from essential costly items.

Another aspect of the costs of abandoning the low profile military policy in the Indian Ocean that should be considered is the diplomatic and foreign policy costs of pushing through a military buildup in the face of near unanimous opposition from the countries in the Indian Ocean region. Almost all the countries have voted in the United Nations for the zone of peace resolution.

Despite the great power leverage available to the United States some U.S. allies in the region have expressed opposition to the proposed new base. Opposition was detailed in the recent U.N. experts' report on the Indian Ocean, which concluded that U.S. plans to convert Diego Garcia into a naval and air base would spur the Soviets to similar action and accelerate a great power arms race in the region.

In the wake of worldwide concern about U.S. policy in Indochina, it is entirely predictable and understandable that many countries would view with concern and some alarm a U.S. military expansion in another part of Asia. The United States bears a special burden of suspicion and fear in Asia and it will do no good to ignore the

political costs and again exercise the arrogance of power to ride roughshod over the feelings and hopes of the people of the region.

Secretary Kissinger has alluded to how a nuclear numbers game engaged in by the military has undermined the possibilities for reaching strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union. Now a restrained United States/ Indian Ocean policy is falling victim to a naval numbers game employed by the Navy to exaggerate Soviet naval strengths and U.S. naval weaknesses.

In Moscow, Secretary Kissinger said something about the role of the professional military in strategic arms limitations efforts that is just as relevant to what we face today vis-a-vis the Indian Ocean.

Both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint and that is not a thought that comes naturally to military people on either side.

Comparing the Soviet Navy and the U.S. Navy, both worldwide and in the Indian Ocean, is a difficult and complicated problem. Such net assessments are susceptible to the most varied interpretations and possibilities for gamesmanship and manipulation of data.

For example, ship-days, port calls, and port call-days, can be juggled for optimum effect and noncombatants can be confused with combatants. The recently retired Chief of Naval Operations left active duty talking about how the Navy during his tenure has come to the point of greatest weakness. But quoting a summary of a Navy analysis, Senator Stennis recently made it clear that we are in good shape:

While the Soviets have outbuilt us in total numbers of ships, the types of ships involved have been of smaller size. In the types of warships which affect global operations (i.e. major combatants, submarines, large amphibious ships, and replenishment auxiliaries), the United States has outbuilt the Soviets in all categories except submarine and mine warfare; there all but one of our boats have been nuclear, while the Soviets built about (deleted) conventional boats, which brings the total almost to parity. Our future submarine construction program exceeds that of the Soviets.

Senator SYMINGTON. When was the date of the statement of Chairman Stennis?

Admiral LA ROCQUE. I do not have it, sir, but I can provide it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Roughly when was it?

Admiral LA ROCQUE. Sometime in the last year.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you provide that for the record at this point. I think it would be pertinent.

Admiral LA ROCQUE. I would be glad to, sir.

[The information follows:]

The statement referred to was given on February 19, 1974.

Admiral LA ROCQUE. Admiral Rickover, who is renowned for his candor as well as his sagacity, has revealed that, contrary to the common view, the U.S. Navy is now younger on the average than the Soviet Navy.

As of January 1, 1974 the average overall age of major surface combatants is 13.4 years in the case of the Soviet Navy and 12.1 years for the U.S. Navy. The average age of Soviet submarines is 12.6 years, compared with 9.8 years for U.S. submarines.

The Soviet Union now faces a major problem of block obsolescence of many of its naval units.

I know that the subcommittee has been briefed recently by the Central Intelligence Agency on Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean. I can add little to that, of course. Hopefully, the CIA may have thrown some light on the dubious allegations that the Soviets have superior access to land airfields and ports in the Indian Ocean.

My analysis indicates that there are no Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean area. This view is supported by Admiral Grojean USN who has stated candidly that "we have to sort of watch the word 'bases' here because the Russians do not have bases per se."

Here are a few points which I think are pertinent which have not heretofore been brought out:

1. According to the Defense Department, the U.S. Navy has access to Indian Ocean ports in more countries (19) than the Soviet Navy (12 countries).

2. Measured in terms of number of military personnel onboard ships in the Indian Ocean, there has been a sharp increase in U.S. presence during the past 3 calendar years: In 1971, 4,500 personnel; in 1972, 10,800 personnel; and in 1973, 20,300 personnel.

3. Soviet merchant marine activity in the Indian Ocean far exceeds that of the United States. DOD's estimate for 1973 is 850 Soviet merchant ships transiting the Indian Ocean compared with 250 for the United States. This is one indicator of the nonmilitary interests and involvement of the Soviet Union in the area.

4. There are other examples of attempts by some Navy officials to ignore information that is not useful in selling the Congress on the Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean. I submit the following table comparing Soviet and U.S. port calls in the region, taken from an unclassified but restricted circulation memorandum prepared by the director, Joint Staff in March 1974 on "Soviet Naval Activity in the Indian Ocean."

This chart clearly shows that when you talk about Indian Ocean port calls of one to three ships per visit, that the U.S. Navy in 1969 had 15 times as many Indian Ocean port calls as the Soviet Union, it was 152 to 11.

In 1970, U.S. Navy, 135, Soviet Union 18.

In 1971, U.S. Navy, 177, Soviet, 18.

In 1972, U.S. Navy, 161, Soviet, 35.

In 1973, U.S. Navy, 184, Soviet, 100.

The Soviet have increased, no question about that. But the U.S. port visits are still almost twice those of the Soviets.

I have a brief memo from the director of the Joint Staff if the chairman would be interested in that.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will put it in the record at this point without objection.

[The memo follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER,
Message Center.

Subject: Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean.

1. Recent and ongoing adverse reactions to US/UK announced plans for the expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia have emphasized the need for appropriate USG representatives to have available a comprehensive unclassified resume of Soviet Naval activity in the Indian Ocean area over the past 4-5 years. Accordingly, the following data are provided for use at your discretion.

2. Soviet Naval presence in the Indian ocean since the end of the last decade has exceeded that of the United States by a factor of four. The following data are indicative of USSR regional activity and initiatives to extend national influence and to pursue direct Soviet interests in the area.

3. Soviet ship-days in the Indian Ocean area 1970-73 inclusively were as follows:

Type	1970	1971	1972	1973	Total
Warships.....	1,370	1,190	3,220	3,160	8,940
Amphibious.....	300	290	270	320	1,180
Support ¹	3,260	2,490	5,350	5,520	16,620
Total.....	4,930	3,970	8,840	9,000	26,740

¹ Including auxiliary, AGI's, et cetera.

4. USN ship-days in the Indian Ocean for the same timeframe were as follows:

Type	1970	1971	1972	1973	Total
Warships.....	872	675	967	1,392	3,906
Amphibious.....	0	183	23	18	224
Support.....	374	479	447	744	2,044
Total.....	1,246	1,337	1,437	2,154	6,174

5. Soviet units involved in port clearing operations have amassed 4,900 ship-days (included in paragraph 3 above) in Bangladesh since arriving in 1972 through the end CY 1973.

6. From 1968 to the fall of 1971 the Soviet force averaged twelve ships, then increased to a strength of 15 (excluding the Bangladesh units mentioned above) and for the past 2 years has averaged 16 ships. Recent Soviet presence has reached as high as 31 units, including five surface combatants and 4 submarines in January 1974.

7. Continuous and extensive use of the port facilities at Berbera, Somalia, for ship maintenance and logistic support resulted in Soviet commissioning of a communications station and positioning of a barracks/repair ship in this port in 1972. Other major construction in Somalia which appears to exceed the needs of the host country includes expansion of facilities at an airport employing Soviet technicians.

8. Soviet naval units (1-3 ships per visit) have made port calls to Indian Ocean littorals over the past 5 years in the approximate order of frequency indicated, reflecting a significantly increasing trend:

1969	11
1970	18
1971	18
1972	35
1973	100

9. USN visits to Indian Ocean littorals over the same period were as follows:

1969	152
1970	135
1971	177
1972	161
1973	154

Senator SYMINGTON. Why the sudden sharp increase in the Soviet Navy?

Admiral LA ROCQUE. I don't know, sir.

Another point, in terms of capability to support and deploy naval forces overseas without extensive base support, the United States today has a substantial advantage over the Soviet Union.

Secretary Schlesinger has discussed this important advantage which bears directly on the need for Diego Garcia:

I think that the ability of the U. S. fleet to operate at long distances is greater than that of the Soviet Navy, partly because of nuclear power, which makes some contribution, and partly because of our underway replenishment ships, which for the U. S. Navy are far more effective and numerous than they are for the Soviet Navy.

6. In describing relative military capabilities in the Indian Ocean, Navy officials neglected to mention that the U.S. NATO allies Britain and France both have rather substantial naval forces in the Indian Ocean, about 14 British naval ships and 12 French naval ships.

7. Navy spokesmen have said there will be no aircraft based at Diego Garcia. However, plans call for building parking space and other facilities for four patrol aircraft (probably P-3s), three C-141s, one carrier ondeck delivery aircraft, six F-111s, and two KC-135s. Anyone who is familiar with aircraft also knows that the airfield on Diego Garcia will be able to take B-52s, although not on a sustained basis.

In concluding, I would like to make several suggestions concerning what I believe should be done before Congress takes the major step of approving an expansion of the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean.

1. There should be a serious reappraisal of the urgency of expanding facilities on Diego Garcia in light of the marked change in conditions in the Middle East since last fall.

U.S. relations with Egypt have greatly improved and it is probable that United States and Western influence in the region will continue to increase with the opening of the Suez Canal and Soviet influence will continue to decline.

There is no urgent requirement to commence construction on Diego Garcia this year.

2. The State Department should submit to the Senate a formal statement showing the actual foreign policy benefits to the United States which would be derived from the establishment of a naval base at Diego Garcia. The impact on specific countries in the region, both pro and con, should be included.

3. The State Department should hold serious discussions with the Soviet Union on limiting naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Reports of these discussions should be communicated to the Senate.

4. The Navy should submit a detailed costbenefit analysis for the proposed base at Diego Garcia.

I thank you, sir.

That completes my statement.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have a detailed statement about Diego Garcia.

Admiral LA ROCQUE. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Without objection, we will put that in the record.

Admiral LA ROCQUE. Thank you, sir.

[The statement follows:]

THE DEFENSE MONITOR

CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

Volume Three Number Three April 1974

THE INDIAN OCEAN: A NEW NAVAL ARMS RACE?

DEFENSE MONITOR IN BRIEF

- The United States is at a crucial turning point in policy toward the Indian Ocean region. Until very recently, the U.S. followed a sound policy of low-profile and minimal military involvement. Now the U.S. Navy plans to establish a naval and air base on the island of Diego Garcia and increase the deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean. These plans require the most rigorous examination to insure that one-sided emphasis on short-term military goals does not result in hasty steps which would stimulate an arms race in the region, exacerbate tensions and undermine U.S. influence.

- The basic issue is: Should the U.S. Navy dominate U.S. foreign policy in the Indian Ocean area, or should the Navy support the traditional restrained U.S. foreign policy in the region?

- The U.S. has not exerted strong efforts to reach agreements with the Soviet Union and other interested countries such as Britain and France to exercise mutual restraint on deployments and bases in the Indian Ocean. Nearly all the countries on the Indian Ocean have supported efforts within the United Nations to have "a zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean. Even U.S. allies such as Australia and New Zealand take a critical view of expansion of U.S. military presence.

- There is no military threat to the United States in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. today has naval superiority in the region. Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean have important limitations and weaknesses. Most Soviet ships there are non-combatants. The Soviet Union, as does the U.S., has access to ports in countries on the Indian Ocean, but it does not have any real naval bases of its own. The U.S. is building its own base at Diego Garcia, an escalation of outside military presence in the area.

- U.S. military build-up in the Indian Ocean does not contribute to solution of the U.S. or world energy problems or insure a flow of oil. Oil is much more likely to be turned off "at the wellhead" than blockaded by the Soviet Navy. The Soviet Union, with extensive economic and political interests, has little to gain by attacks on Western oil tankers.

- The expected reopening of the Suez Canal, a symbol of returning stability in the Middle East, has been seized upon by some in the U.S. as an excuse for the U.S. Navy to rush into the Indian Ocean in fulfillment of long-standing ambitions. A much better step would be to seek limitation on military traffic through the Canal. In any case, the Canal could very easily be closed in a crisis.

U.S. INDIAN OCEAN POLICY 1973

"The subcontinent is very far away. I think our interests are marginal. I think the Nixon doctrine is quite applicable—namely, we ourselves don't want to become involved."

Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
U.S. Department of State, May 1, 1973

U.S. INDIAN OCEAN POLICY 1974

"The Indians primarily, but other nations in the area, too, have talked about having a zone of peace in the area. We think this is a very dangerous concept."

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
Chief of Naval Operations
April 1, 1974

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THE INDIAN OCEAN BUILD-UP

"We do not believe it helps the Indian Ocean littoral states for there to be a great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. We would hope there would be agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to restrict their buildup."

Gough Whitlam, Prime Minister of Australia
March 19, 1974

"If we are going to have a big buildup over there that would call for another fleet, a great augmentation, at least, of what we have, why couldn't that area be the subject of negotiations or agreements of some kind?"

Senator John Stennis, Chairman,
Senate Armed Services Committee
February 3, 1974

"From time to time opportunities for regional restraint present themselves; and in my judgement the region is the Indian Ocean and the opportunity is now."

Senator Henry Jackson
March 7, 1974

Departure from Sound U.S. Policy

Until very recently, U.S. policy toward the Indian Ocean, with some exceptions such as the dangerous "tilting" exercise in gunboat diplomacy during the India-Pakistan war in 1971, was sound and reasonable, one of restraint and constrained military presence. This was in recognition of the fact that the U.S. has no vital interests at stake in the region and that U.S. security interests there are comparatively limited. Overall U.S. objectives and the well-being and security of the countries of the region was best achieved through non-military, economic and diplomatic means.

The Pacific, Atlantic, and Mediterranean were perceived as areas of much higher priority. U.S. policy makers acknowledged that in the highly improbable event of a conventional conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Indian Ocean was a most unlikely area for confrontation. The State Department and the White House did not believe that a major U.S. security interest would be served by an expansion of U.S. naval presence in the region. In general, the U.S. actions proceeded in a careful and cautious manner, aware that overreaction could be as damaging as underreaction. Congressman Fraser well capitalized the government consensus in rejecting escalation when he observed in March 1972 that "an approach that defines the Indian Ocean as vital to the security of the United States leaves little room for reasonable dialog."

The position of the State Department was stated in 1971 by David Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations: "U.S. security interests in the Indian Ocean region are quite limited and primarily involve Iran, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia. Our interests in Australia can better be viewed in the Pacific context, and those involving Israel and Jordan relate to the Mediterranean Sea." In May 1973, Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, observed that "the subcontinent is very far away, I think our interests are marginal. I think the Nixon doctrine is quite applicable—namely, we ourselves don't want to become involved." Mr. Sisco further stated that "in accordance with

the Nixon doctrine we think the search for stability in South Asia is primarily a task for the nations of the region."

Officials of the Defense Department also at one time seemed to agree with the low-profile policy consensus. Former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird said in 1972 that "our strength in the Indian Ocean lies not so much in maintaining a large standing force...but rather in our ability to move freely in and out of the Ocean as the occasion and our interests dictate." Former Navy Secretary John Chafee stressed in 1972 his view that "we ought to go slowly here and not escalate the thing and see what happens."

CONGRESSIONAL REJECTION OF
DIEGO GARCIA IN 1969

"When presented to the Senate, there was strong opposition from within the Senate Appropriations Committee to the United States becoming committed to another naval base in the Indian Ocean.... The Military Construction Subcommittee and the full committee deleted the Diego Garcia Project completely from the fiscal 1970 Military Construction Appropriation Bill. This matter was taken to conference with the House and the Senate's position prevailed and the project was stricken from the bill. Finally, an oral agreement was reached wherein the Navy was instructed to come back in fiscal year 1971 for a new appropriation which would support only a communications station."

Senator Mike Mansfield, Chairman,
Senate Appropriations-Military Construction Subcommittee
April 1, 1974

U.S. Navy and the Diego Garcia Base

The construction of an austere communications facility at Diego Garcia was approved by Congress because of constant Administration reassurances that only a communications facility, in part as a replacement for one in Ethiopia, and nothing else was intended. In 1973, James Noyes of the Defense Department assured Congress that "there are no plans to transform this facility into something from which forces could be projected, or that would provide a location for the basing of ships and aircraft."

The U.S. Navy, however, has long had different ideas. The Navy dream has been to inherit the British Imperial legacy "East of Suez." Plans for moving into the Indian Ocean date back to the early 1960's and even before. Quiet efforts were undertaken to search for new bases in the Indian Ocean and other areas. Navy plans to establish several new overseas naval bases were kept highly secret in order not to alarm foreign countries or the American people and Congress. Diego Garcia emerged as the ideal location for coverage of the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia was selected because of its central location and potential for a major naval base rather than simply because it could serve as a site for a communications facility. Admiral John McCain, past Pacific Commander-in-Chief, said that "as Malta is to the Mediterranean, Diego Garcia is to the Indian Ocean."

Negotiations between the United States and Great Britain led to the creation of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) and the December 1966 agreement to make the islands comprising the BIOT available to both countries for military purposes for a period of 50 years. The British lent their name to the project as a cover for actual U.S. control and dominance. This was perhaps due to bashfulness on the part of the U.S. about hanging on to some remnants of the crumbled British colonial empire.

MILITARY FACILITIES ON DIEGO GARCIA

The existing naval communications station on Diego Garcia is manned by 275 U.S. military personnel. There is an 8,000-foot runway which is used by cargo aircraft and long-range P-3 naval patrol planes. About \$20 million has already been spent on existing facilities, including dredging of the harbor. The Defense Department wants \$29 million in the fiscal 1974 supplemental bill and \$3.3 million in the fiscal 1975 budget and probably about \$5 million in fiscal 1976 to complete the following projects: (for other costs see box below)

1. Increase the fuel storage capacity to be able to refuel carrier task forces and aircraft.
2. Deepen and widen the harbor to provide an anchorage for a carrier task force (1 carrier, 4 destroyers) and other naval forces.
3. Build a 750-foot pier for berthing of tenders, tankers, or carriers.
4. Lengthen the runway to 12,000 feet to permit large cargo aircraft (C-5s), tankers (KC-135s), and strategic reconnaissance aircraft to operate safely. B-52s will be able to use the airfield on an occasional basis.
5. Expand the airfield facilities (hangar and parking area) to permit expanded aircraft staging.
6. Construct additional personnel quarters to accommodate a total of 600 military personnel.

The base will be used to support and refuel U.S. naval and air forces, including aircraft carriers and submarines, in the Indian Ocean. Long-range aircraft will patrol the Indian Ocean for intelligence and reconnaissance purposes. There will be a capability to permanently station both ships and aircraft.

Functions of Diego Garcia Base

The original U.S. Navy impetus for obtaining base rights on the island of Diego Garcia was to be able eventually to have a permanent naval and air base from which to support operations in the Indian Ocean as the Navy carrier fleet was reduced and other overseas bases became less reliable.

The necessary first prerequisite for the development of an expanded U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean was the existence of a series of radio, navigation, and communications facilities to handle the anticipated increase in naval traffic. Diego Garcia was added to the network extending from Asmara, Ethiopia to the North West Cape of Australia.

These communications facilities have also fulfilled the function of making possible periodic patrols of Polaris and Poseidon submarines into the Indian Ocean. There has been some controversy about whether the United States stations ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean but although the U.S. may not as yet permanently station missile submarines in the Indian Ocean there can be little doubt that parts of that Ocean have been used as patrol areas. For example, the February 1974 issue of *Seapower*, the magazine of the Navy League, in discussing the U.S. communications facility in Australia at North West Cape stated that "classified messages to Polaris/Poseidon submarines

deployed in the Indian Ocean are sent from this station." It is likely that the U.S. Navy intends to deploy strategic submarines in the Indian Ocean more frequently in the future as additional Poseidon submarines with longer-range missiles enter the inventory and as the Trident submarine is acquired.

After the existence of a communication and surveillance network, the next step in the creation of the necessary infrastructure for increased naval deployments is the development of a supply and repair base in the Indian Ocean to make possible more efficient and expanded naval deployments. The first increment of funding for the construction of such a substantial support base is what the Defense Department is asking Congress to approve this year. DOD wants \$29 million in the 1974 supplemental bill and an additional \$3.3 million in the fiscal 1975 budget.

Future improvements to the harbor, runway, and refueling and support facilities will go a long way toward making the base at Diego Garcia comparable in function to that at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Those who may doubt that this is the direction in which the U.S. is moving because of statements by certain officials that they are "not aware of any plans to ask for more money" should examine the record of how, despite assurances to the contrary, year by year the Defense Department's requests and plans have expanded as the camel's nose gets pushed further and further under the tent.

Although sometimes concealed the Navy's intention to create a major support facility in the Indian Ocean is evident. The impetus became accelerated with the winding down of the Vietnam war as the Navy began looking for post-Vietnam missions to occupy itself and to help justify big naval construction programs. The austere communications facility on Diego Garcia was simply a convenient way station on the road to something bigger and better. As Admiral Zumwalt said in 1972, "in order for the United States to maintain a superior position in the Indian Ocean, it needs to have facilities." At a time when Secretary Laird was still downplaying the need for permanent presence, Admiral Zumwalt was stating that "I think a permanent presence is mandatory."

DIEGO GARCIA BASE COSTS

\$10.6 million to build

Through Fiscal 1973:	\$65.3 million
military construction	\$20.4 million
operations & equipment of SEABEES	42.1 million
communications equipment	2.8 million

Fiscal 1974 and 1975:	\$96.3 million
military construction	\$32.3 million
operations & equipment of SEABEES	64.0 million

The planned retirement in fiscal 1975 of the aircraft carrier Hancock has been postponed because of increased Indian Ocean naval deployments. Annual operation and maintenance cost of the Hancock and its aircraft is \$80.6 million. The Navy will probably use commitments in the Indian Ocean to justify new ship construction. One new carrier with associated ships and aircraft costs about \$3 billion. To keep one carrier on station the Navy likes to have two to back it up. A new commitment to keep one carrier in the Indian Ocean will thus cost about \$10 billion. Operational costs are additional.

"The idea that the U.S. must be the world's policeman and preserve stability in every corner of the world permeates the Defense Secretary's budget presentations. It is also characteristic, in imitative fashion perhaps, of official justifications for moving into the Indian Ocean in force and building a base on Diego Garcia."

Navy Finally Gets Its Way

In addition to the long-term and sustained push of the U.S. Navy to build up in the Indian Ocean, some other more immediate factors have played a role in bringing about a departure from the established U.S. policy of maintaining a low-profile in the Indian Ocean. The existence of these other factors has made it possible for the Navy to get its way within the Executive Branch and evidently force through a new policy consensus that inhibits the expression of the dissenting and more restrained viewpoints that probably still exist.

Recent domestic and foreign events have led to a rise of hawkish, military influence and a loosening of restraints imposed by civilian authorities. The White House has been preoccupied with severe domestic political and economic problems. Henry Kissinger has absorbed himself in a back-breaking range of other vital foreign policy issues such as the search for peace in the Middle East, the SALT talks, MBFR, and trying to cement the shaky NATO alliance. Secretary Kissinger has apparently been willing to accede to the Joint Chiefs' desire to move into the Indian Ocean in order to help get their support on other controversial policy matters, notably SALT II.

The Soviet Navy and the Indian Ocean

"It is clear that the U.S. Navy is beginning a naval arms race with the Soviets in the Indian Ocean, and it is necessary to examine whether the threat warrants the steps which are being proposed."

In the Indian Ocean, as related by the U.S. Navy, the name of the story is "The Russians are Coming". As Admiral Zumwalt said recently, "their tentacles are going out like an octopus into the Indian Ocean". It is clear that the U.S. Navy is beginning a naval arms race with the Soviets in the Indian Ocean, and it is necessary to examine whether the threat warrants the steps which are being proposed. The U.S. Navy has resorted to hyperbole in describing the Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean and U.S. weaknesses in the area.

Ship Days and Port Calls

Misleading presentations of comparative Soviet and U.S. naval activity in the Indian Ocean are very common. One of the most misleading is the number of "ship-days" spent by naval vessels of the two countries in the Indian Ocean. Ship-day totals are produced by multiplying the number of ships in the Ocean times the number of days they spend there. In 1971, for example, the Soviet Union is said to have accumulated 3,149 ship-days versus 1,350 for the U.S. Less prominently displayed, however, because they tell a different story, are the data on comparative port calls. Port calls are perhaps a more accurate indication of impact and

A new Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, although in some ways an innovative official, has resurrected the image of a messianic U.S. role in the world in rhetoric that is reminiscent of Kennedy's New Frontier and early involvement in Vietnam. Secretary Schlesinger tells us that "historical necessity has thrust upon us" the role of maintaining worldwide military equilibrium. "The burden of responsibility," he states, "has fallen on the United States, and there is nobody else to pick up the torch if the United States fails to carry it." The idea that the U.S. must be the world's policeman and preserve stability in every corner of the world permeates the Defense Secretary's budget presentations. It is also characteristic, in imitative fashion perhaps, of official justifications for moving into the Indian Ocean in force and building a base on Diego Garcia.

It would seem that Secretary Schlesinger has not absorbed the message of the Nixon doctrine nor the lessons of the Vietnam war that U.S. military power is not and cannot be omnipotent and that the real limitations on our ability to influence events through military force must be recognized if an effective foreign policy is to be carried out. On other occasions, however, Secretary Schlesinger has expressed himself in more reasonable terms, such as at his nomination hearing in June 1973 when he told the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee:

"The underlying premise of the Nixon Doctrine is that we should be encouraging greater self-help on the part of allied friendly countries to build up their forces so that they can defend themselves in the absence of U.S. ground forces, in particular, and hopefully in the absence of U.S. air and naval forces."

influence in the region. In 1971 Soviet naval units (1-3 ships per visit) made 18 port calls to countries in the Indian Ocean region. The U.S. Navy made 177 port calls. Part of the explanation for the discrepancy is that the Soviet naval units tend to spend much of their time at open sea anchorages, out of sight and perhaps out of mind of the people of the region.

The U.S. Navy helps to make up for this lack of publicity by providing the Soviet Navy a lot of free advertising. Defense Secretary Schlesinger has said that perceptions of military capabilities by third parties are as important as actual capabilities. If this is so, the U.S. Navy should cease and desist from trumpeting the Soviet naval threat to the skies and running down U.S. capabilities. Overrating of the Soviet Union's naval strength in the Indian Ocean, or elsewhere, yields the Soviets unnecessary and undeserved political gains, particularly in Third World countries.

INDIAN OCEAN PORT CALLS					
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
U.S. Navy	152	135	177	161	184
Soviet Navy	11	18	18	35	100

Source: DoD

Maritime Interests

The Soviet Union has important non-military maritime interests in the Indian Ocean. Several years ago some 12% of the merchant ships transiting the Indian Ocean were Soviet. With the continued expansion of its merchant fleet, it is likely that the level of Soviet merchant activity in the Indian Ocean has increased. The Soviet Union also has a growing Indian Ocean fishing fleet, which several years ago accounted for almost one-third of the Soviet total annual catch. The Soviets have numerous civilian oceanographic, hydrographic, and space and missile test support ships in the Indian Ocean. In addition to trade with and aid to many of the countries along the Indian Ocean, Soviet merchant ships passing between the eastern and western parts of the Soviet Union frequently transit through the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is a sea lane connecting the vast expanses of eastern Russia with western Russia. From the Soviet point of view, the presence of Soviet naval ships in the Indian Ocean probably has some relationship to the Soviet commercial shipping in the area.

United States, British, French and Soviet Naval Forces in the Indian Ocean (March 1974)

UNITED STATES

- 1 aircraft carrier (90 aircraft)
- 6 destroyers and destroyer escorts
- 1 frigate
- 1 amphibious assault ship (converted from command ship for U.S. Mid-East Force (at Bahrain))
- 1 nuclear attack submarine probably accompanies carrier
- Naval patrol aircraft operate from Diego Garcia and U Tapao (Thailand)

Within the past five months the U.S. has had two other carriers and a nuclear-powered frigate also in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. also operates P-3C/P-3E maritime surveillance aircraft in the area. There may be additional attack submarines.

GREAT BRITAIN

- 1 guided missile destroyer
- 5 destroyer escorts
- 6 support ships (primarily oilers)
- Naval patrol aircraft operate from Singapore and Gao in the Maldives Islands

In September 1973 France created a new Indian Ocean naval command. In March 1974 a small task group, including a helicopter carrier, cruised in the Indian Ocean. There are reports of a French strategic submarine occasionally in the Indian Ocean.

FRANCE

- 1 guided missile patrol ship
- 2 guided missile escorts
- 2 coastal patrol ships
- 1 oiler converted to armed command headquarters
- landing craft
- sea layer
- Naval patrol aircraft operate from Djibouti at the mouth of the Red Sea

In January 1974 there were 5 surface combatants (1 CLCP, 1 DLG, 1 DD, 2 DE) and 4 submarines. Within the U.S. government there are continuing discussions on naval forces. Minesweepers and other ships (about 8) have been involved in harbor clearing in Bangladesh.

SOVIET UNION

- 1 cruiser
- 7 other combatants (destroyers, destroyer escorts, submarines)
- 3 minesweepers
- 1 supply ship
- 15 non-combatant support ships (oilers, supply ships, water carriers, barracks ship, dredgers, tenders, etc.)

Soviet Naval Weaknesses

"In time of war Soviet ships would be isolated from their bases by U.S. and NATO forces and probably quickly sunk."


The Soviet Navy has a number of weaknesses and vulnerabilities that have particular significance in the Indian Ocean. The lack of seaborn fixed-wing aircraft to provide protection and the lack of aircraft for reconnaissance severely constrains the flexibility of Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Navy does not have a significant seabased intervention capability. The Soviets must support four major fleets in widely separated areas (the Black Sea-Mediterranean fleets, the Baltic fleet, the Northern

fleet, and the Pacific fleet.) With Soviet naval resources dispersed over such distant areas, the Indian Ocean is a particularly remote and vulnerable place for Soviet naval ships to be. Western powers control most of the egress and ingress points to the Indian Ocean, and the possibility of wartime reinforcement for Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean seems virtually ruled out. The U.S. 7th fleet dominates the Western Pacific and western approaches to the Indian Ocean and, as Admiral Moorer recently pointed out, "in time of conflict, any waterway such as the Suez Canal is highly vulnerable. Consequently, it would be highly likely that it would be closed by one side or the other." In time of war Soviet ships would be isolated from their bases by U.S. and NATO forces and probably quickly sunk.

(continued on page 8)

MILITARY FACILITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

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DEFENSE MONITOR



The Soviet Navy lacks reliable and secure shore-based support facilities on the Indian Ocean. In fact, Soviet practice has been to rely primarily on its own auxiliaries for fuel, provisions, and repairs. This is one of the reasons the Soviets tend to have more naval ships in the region. The Soviet Union has growing economic and diplomatic relations with local countries but seems to have no secure or formal base rights along the littoral. The Soviet Navy, as does the U.S. Navy, has access to ports and facilities in a number of countries, but the use of these facilities does not confer base rights or convert them into Soviet naval bases. The instability of even existing base utilization arrangements is demonstrated by Soviet experience with Egypt, where the Soviet Union suddenly in 1972 lost most of the military advantages it had previously accumulated. The Soviets have aided in harbor development in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Aden, India, and Bangladesh but this does not seem to have led to special military base rights.

There is much vague and unsupported speculation about what naval bases the Russians may or may not have on the Indian Ocean. One example is Admiral Zumwalt's persistent allegation that the Soviets have acquired privileged usage of Indian ports, despite the fact that there is no supporting evidence to that effect.

In fact, the desire for a stable and secure base of one's

own that can be used without depending on anyone's good will is what has prompted the United States to go after a naval base at Diego Garcia. The United States is building a naval support base, essentially under its own control, in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union is not. In Admiral Moorer's words, the U.S. needs a facility in the Indian Ocean "that can be used by our air and naval forces...without having to make agreements each time on a case-by-case basis as is the situation today."

U.S. Naval Strength

In terms of capability to support and deploy naval forces overseas without extensive base support, the United States today has a substantial advantage over the Soviet Union. Nuclear-powered naval surface ships are especially useful for extended distant deployments. The Soviet Navy has no nuclear-powered combat surface ships. The United States has in operation or funded a total of 14 nuclear-powered surface combatants, including 4 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The United States also has more oilers, repair ships, and underway replenishment ships and can sustain a fleet at sea without shore facilities better than the Soviet Union. As Secretary Schlesinger recently said, "the ability of the United States fleet to operate at long distances is greater than that of the Soviet Navy."

U.S. Has Much Greater Capability for Extended Distant Naval Deployments


	United States	Soviet Union
Aircraft carriers	15	0
Nuclear-powered surface ships	14 operational or funded (including 4 carriers)	0
Underway replenishment ships (for fuel, supplies, etc.)	51 over 10,000 tons	9 over 10,000 tons
Fleet support ships (for repairs)	28 over 10,000 tons	2 over 10,000 tons

Threats to Oil Shipments


By way of explanation for an expanded U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, one of the more prominent fears suggested by proponents is that the Soviet Union would attack U.S. and allied merchant ships and oil tankers in the area. This does not appear to be a plausible action on the part of the Soviet Union when one takes into account such important factors as relative military power, time and distance factors, and the alternative means of exerting influence and power at the disposal of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Navy is ill-prepared to engage the Western powers in a long-range conventional war. The United States has demonstrated it can survive for a long period without Middle East oil. If the Soviets were to seriously attempt to cut off oil shipments to Japan and Western Europe there are areas outside of the Indian Ocean, closer to Soviet home bases, which would be more suitable for that type of warfare. This is especially true with respect to the use of Soviet submarines.¹ Because of its extensive commercial and shipping interests in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union itself would have much to lose in a war at sea or a disruption of shipping. In many ways, the Soviet merchant marine itself serves as a growing hostage to Western military power in the event of a crisis.

There apparently are conflicting assessments within the U.S. government about the ease with which a blockage of oil shipments could be carried out through military means and the probability of that occurring. For example, Admiral Zumwalt and others allege that such so-called choke points as the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf could be blocked with ease. The Central Intelligence Agency, however, in 1973 expressed a different point of view: "It (the Strait of Hormuz) is too deep and wide to be blocked by sunken ships and too wide to be effectively controlled by coast artillery. Naval and air power would be required to close the strait, a serious step since it is considered international waters by the world community."

In general, the Soviet Union has not played a disruptive and threatening role in the Indian Ocean region. One example of a positive Soviet influence is the Soviet effort to bring about an end to the India-Pakistan war in 1965 through the Tashkent Agreement. Those who are prone to believe that



the Russians are always up to no good and constantly trying to damage the United States would do well to note the observation of Defense Secretary Schlesinger that "the Soviet Union has historically been a relatively prudent and sober power." Scenarists of a war on oil shipments should take heed of another remark of Secretary Schlesinger: "One can always design the worst possible case which shows the U.S. military forces at a decided disadvantage. What one must also do is to estimate the probability of that worst possible case occurring."



"It is not too late...to propose and negotiate the demilitarization of the Canal. I believe the Administration should now insist that the Suez Canal be closed to the warships of all outside powers including the naval vessels of the United States and the Soviet Union."

Senator Henry Jackson

March 7, 1974

Reopening of the Suez Canal

The probable reopening of the Suez Canal in the relatively near future has been another stimulus to arguments for a U.S. naval build-up in the Indian Ocean to counter predicted increased Soviet deployments. It remains to be seen whether in fact the Soviets do intend to utilize the Suez Canal to increase significantly the number of naval combatants they have in the Indian Ocean. Because of Soviet needs for naval forces in other higher priority regions, there may be grounds for skepticism that the Soviets have many surplus naval ships lying around that they can spare for the less important Indian Ocean. In any case, efforts should be made to see if agreements or understandings can be reached about controlling military traffic through the Suez Canal. Before setting firmly on the path toward a naval arms race in the region, the U.S. should exhaustively explore alternative methods of coping with possible difficulties.

Too much stress has been put on alleged benefits that the Soviet Union will gain from the reopening of the Suez Canal. It should be obvious that in terms of the stability and economic progress of the Middle East and the Indian Ocean region, the restoration of the Suez link with Europe will be a most beneficial development from the point of view of the West. It is also probable that there will be an increase in Western trade with and influence in countries such as Somalia and Yemen where the Soviets have made gains while the Canal was closed and Israel and the Arabs were so bitterly divided.

Potential Superpower Conflict

In any case, the U.S. Navy has the capability to move into the Indian Ocean in force from the Pacific and Atlantic on any necessary occasion. The fact that there have been three different U.S. aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean in the past five months demonstrates this. A support base at Diego Garcia in the Western Indian Ocean makes reasonable sense only if significantly increased on-station deployments in the Indian Ocean are planned. The need for expanded U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean at this time is very doubtful. The marginal benefit in efficiency that a support base would provide do not compensate for the problems created.

One reason for caution is the risk of a local conflict turning into a confrontation between the two superpowers. Examples would be hostility between India and Pakistan, or between Iran and some of its neighbors such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia. An escalation of naval forces would make greater power involvement more likely. Some local countries fear that they will be dragged into superpower conflicts.

There will also be temptations for friends of the U.S. in the region to try to immerse the U.S. in their local squabbles. The dangers inherent in an abandonment of the low-profile policy by the U.S. in the Indian Ocean are increased because the search for influence can quickly become a matter of defending established positions and privileges, which soon become national security imperatives as commitment and involvement grow.

In 1971, Ronald Spiers, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, cogently summed up a restrained U.S. policy toward the Indian Ocean which is just as sound today as it was then:

"There appears to be no requirement at this time for us to feel impelled to control, or even decisively influence, any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral given the nature of our interests there and the current level of Soviet and Chinese involvement. We consider, on balance, that our present interests are served by normal commercial, political, and military access."

Senate Resolution Seeks Arms Limitation In Indian Ocean

**RE: CONCURRENCE
IN SENATE**
S. CON. RES. 76

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

March 18, 1974
Mr. Eagleton (Mr. President, Mr. Cannon, Mr. Case, Mr. Cranford, Mr. Flanders, Mr. Pack, Mr. Proxmire, and Mr. Tamm) introduced the following concurrent resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress that negotiations be sought with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics relative to naval and military strength in the Indian Ocean and Israeli states;

Whereas the Indian Ocean basin is not yet an arena of serious military or naval competition among the great powers;

Whereas it is in the mutual interest of both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to avoid a competition between themselves in naval and other military forces deployed in the Indian Ocean or Israeli states, since such competition would pose high economic costs, political uncertainties, and grave risks of conflict;

Whereas the prospective reopening of the Suez Canal has increased concern in the United States that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will subsequently increase its naval and other military forces deployed in the Indian Ocean;

Whereas prospects for peace in the Middle East could be impaired by the implanting of an arm race in a contiguous area like the Indian Ocean basin;

Whereas in December 1971 and 1973 the United Nations General Assembly passed resolutions calling for the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace", and has created an ad hoc committee to implement those resolutions;

Whereas the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached agreement on limiting other military weapons and practices, namely the Limited Test-Ban Treaty and the Strategic Arms Treaty and Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972; and

Whereas it may be far more difficult to limit naval forces deployed by outside powers in the Indian Ocean or Israeli states over an area not in the Indian Ocean basin has begun. Now, therefore, be it

1. Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is hereby declared to be the sense of Congress that—
 2. direct negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, designed to achieve agreement on limiting deployments of their respective naval and other military forces in the Indian Ocean and Israeli states;
 3. the President of the United States should seek—
 4. (1) the President should seek direct negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, designed to achieve agreement on limiting deployments of their respective naval and other military forces in the Indian Ocean and Israeli states;
 5. the President should report to the Congress at regular intervals, not less frequently than every six months, on progress made pursuant to this concurrent resolution;
 6. the Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the President of the United States;

Conclusions

DIEGO GARCIA

The present use of the island of Diego Garcia for a communications station is reasonable at this time, but U.S. facilities and usage of the island need not be expanded beyond that which exist today. Careful oversight should be exercised to ensure that the Navy does not surreptitiously upgrade its facilities on Diego Garcia. Even the communications role may become obsolete because of the use of satellites for communications and the improvement of U.S. facilities on the west coast of Australia.

TREATY

The new agreement on expansion of the U.S. military base at Diego Garcia is now being negotiated between the U.S. and Great Britain is of sufficient importance to be a formal treaty rather than a simple executive agreement.

INDIAN OCEAN ARMS LIMITATION

The U.S. government has not exhausted the possibilities for reaching agreements or understandings with the Soviet Union and other involved countries to prevent a naval arms race in the Indian Ocean. Such efforts should be made, perhaps including calling for a special international conference to discuss naval deployments and bases in the Indian Ocean. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, Britain and France also have naval forces in the Indian Ocean and could take part in such a conference. There are precedents in the SALT I agreement and the 1972 U.S.-Soviet agreement on preventing incidents at sea for entering into limitations on naval forces and use of naval forces. Possible avenues of limitation include limits on total tonnage, limits on the size of ships, limits on sea-based aircraft, limits on numbers of surface-to-surface missiles on ships, prohibition of bases under the control of outside powers, and prohibition of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean.

NALT TALKS

There is an urgent requirement for the United States and the Soviet Union to have overall discussions about the general

DO THE RUSSIANS HAVE BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN?

"We have to sort of watch the word 'bases' here because the Russians do not have bases per se."

Rear Admiral Charles D. Grojean, Director,
Politico-Military Policy Division,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy)
March 8, 1974

CONGRESSMAN HAMILTON OPPOSES DIEGO GARCIA BASE EXPANSION

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON
of Illinois
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 4, 1974

Rep. Hamilton is Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia, the only Congressional Committee yet to hold in-depth hearings in 1974 on the Indian Ocean and Diego Garcia.

*** The significance of this request far outweighs the \$29 million in the supplemental bill. If passed, we would be committing ourselves to a major military presence in a remote area of the Indian Ocean where our influence was minimal and our profile low. To seek facilities to support the regular deployment of a carrier in the Indian Ocean would be a major commitment of resources and would give the United States new capabilities in a region half way around the world where every Soviet military move is detectable. In direct response to something we have done previously:

*** Almost overnight our military involvement in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf has increased tenfold. On the one hand, we are seeking a permanent base in the Indian Ocean and on the other, we continue to promote a seemingly unrestricted free trade zone in the Persian Gulf where last year perhaps upward of \$5 billion worth of arms were sold to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Congress urgently needs to consider the long range course of action our Government is taking in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas. ***

Fourth, to decide this request and the other facets of the 1974 Defense

bill is considerably more than a delay of only 8 to 9 months in construction on the part of the Navy.

Fifth, we now have naval superiority

in the Indian Ocean and will have greater naval capabilities for the immediate future; and

Finally, the new British Government is

presently considering the basis of whether

to allow changes in the British-United

States agreement over the use of the

base to assist in the defense of the

area. It would be premature for this body to act before the negotiations with England are finalized. ***

Congressional Record

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Senator SYMINGTON. On point 16 you say, "The State Department should hold serious discussions with the Soviet Union on limiting naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Reports of these discussions should be communicated to the Senate."

Do you know that there have not been any such discussions?

Admiral LA ROCQUE. Everything I have read, and with all my friends in the State Department, in the Navy, there have been no serious discussions, and furthermore, I recently read a statement by Admiral Zumwalt in which he was dead set against any negotiations.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am not asking you that, I am just asking you whether you know that there have been any.

Admiral LA ROCQUE. I don't know.

Senator SYMINGTON. Admiral Zumwalt's position is clear. But it is my impression that there has been some discussion. I just wondered whether you know about that, or whether you knew for sure that it had not happened. You do not know?

Admiral LA ROCQUE. I know of none that have taken place, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Back on page 3 you say:

It should be pointed out that although the U. S. communications facility at Asmara in Ethiopia has been phased down, it has not been terminated as previously indicated.

I know one time we had a good many thousand people there. Do you know how many there are there now roughly?

Admiral LA ROCQUE. No, sir, I don't. But I just got something in the mail about 6 weeks ago that we are going to open up a new facility there to handle matters for the Navy Federal Credit Union. We don't establish those in the Navy until we plan to stay there for a long period of time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Asmara is in Ethiopia, is it not?

Admiral LA ROCQUE. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know that there is a government in absentia in Syria, or was at one time?

One reason I ask these questions is that 6 years ago when the matter was originally taken up with us in this committee it was said that Diego Garcia would be utilized as a substitute—I don't know why, but as far as numbers are concerned—base that we had in Ethiopia—Eritrea, which, as you know, is quite volatile, it is near Aden and Yemen, and so forth.

Admiral LA ROCQUE. I think Diego Garcia would do that very well, Senator, would substitute as a communications base for one in Ethiopia.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was the original concept.

I remember some years ago I wanted to go out there, but they did not even have a strip. I think at that time my good friend, Admiral Moorer, the Chief of Naval Operations, said it would take 9 days to go each way.

You have made an interesting presentation. As you can see, though many people are interested, we have been caucusing all day, and there have been other committee hearings as well, and that is why we have not had a better attendance.

I thank you for your testimony, Admiral La Rocque.

Admiral LA ROCQUE. It is always a pleasure to appear before you, Mr. Chairman, and your committee. I thank you for the opportunity.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to call.]