

FISCAL YEAR 1977 AUTHORIZATION FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT, AND ACTIVE
DUTY, SELECTED RESERVE AND CIVIL-
IAN PERSONNEL STRENGTHS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2965

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING THE FISCAL
YEAR 1977 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES,
NAVAL VESSELS, TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, TOR-
PEDOES, AND OTHER WEAPONS, AND RESEARCH, DEVEL-
OPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION FOR THE ARMED
FORCES, AND TO PRESCRIBE THE AUTHORIZED PER-
SONNEL STRENGTH FOR EACH ACTIVE DUTY COMPONENT
AND OF THE SELECTED RESERVE OF EACH RESERVE COM-
PONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES AND OF CIVILIAN PER-
SONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND TO AU-
THORIZE THE MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 7
MANPOWER

FEBRUARY 24, MARCH 1, 8, 12, 19, 1976



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STATEMENT OF ADM. NOEL GAYLER, USN, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC, ACCCOMPANIED BY COL. MAURY EDMONDS, U.S. ARMY, ADMIRAL GAYLER'S EXECUTIVE; AND MR. ALFRED LYNN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO ADMIRAL GAYLER

Admiral GAYLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am extremely happy to be here and to have this opportunity to discuss the Pacific Command.

On my left is Col. Maury Edmonds, U.S. Army, my Military Assistant and Executive, and Mr. Al Lynn, my Special Assistant.

The Pacific Command is a unified command. The staff is composed of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, and civilians, including Foreign Service officers.

MILITARY PRESENCE IN PACIFIC—POLICY AND DESTINY

I take this to be an opportunity to help define for this subcommittee our military presence in the Pacific, what it is, and what, in my view, it ought to be in terms of our future policy, and our destiny.

The Pacific is a vast and complex area. There are problems and there are opportunities. I hope to be accurate in describing things as they are and useful in describing things as they might be to better our understanding of the area. I will have to do this, necessarily, in sort of cartoon form because of the size and complexity of the Pacific area. Anything of special interest to you or the other Senators can be developed by questioning.

I want to make clear that what I am saying is a working hypothesis subject to correction and evolution as events take shape. In the Pacific and Asian areas they do, indeed, take shape with relentless force and rapid change, regardless of our American preoccupations.

I understand your familiarity with the area and the subject, so this is going to be a very brief situation report and military appraisal. I will suggest some considerations to keep in mind and some way to go.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Gayler, we have Senator Hart here and also Senator Cranston. Senator Cranston is not a member of the committee, but I have asked him, because of his great interest in this area, to join us this afternoon and I wanted you to know who they were.

Admiral GAYLER. I am very pleased. Yes, I know, I am a constituent of yours; I go skiing in Colorado occasionally.

Senator HART. That makes for a full-time constituent.

Admiral GAYLER. The area we are talking about is generally from the west coast of the Americas to the east coast of Africa. Our responsibilities extend only to the American Forces there. I think it is convenient to consider six great regions. America, which is, a Pacific power, as the President reaffirmed the other day in Hawaii; Oceania in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean, that enormous area of the globe with relatively small islands scattered throughout. Here we should note the very great asset that our 50th State poses. Hawaii is in itself an ocean archipelago with a unique history, is an extraordinary bridge to our understanding of the ocean and the Asian peoples we cooperate and compete with in the Pacific. We are

conscious of that. I think most Hawaiian people want very much to be helpful in that connection.

The next great region is Australasia—Australia and New Zealand, relatively isolated geographically, have continued to be steadfast allies. This was recently reaffirmed by the new governments, but was a basic policy even under the preceding governments.

In Asia, that enormous part of the world, I will talk about North Asia, China, Korea, Japan, and quite briefly about Southeast Asia. Then I would like to discuss the Indian Ocean, including a brief discussion of South Asia, the Middle East, and east Africa.

ASIA—AREA OF RAPID AND GREAT CHANGES

The first thing to emphasize is the importance of all this. The Asian scene is the one where change and rate of change is probably greatest in all the world. It is a profoundly revolutionary area. The communications revolution is in full swing. Television, transistor radios and aircraft have accelerated change. Little communities which for centuries had never known anything going on more than 20 miles away are now tied into the world. The Asian sees the rest of the world, what the other fellows have, and he wants some of it. Asia is going through what you might call the third industrial revolution. Industrial technology, high technology, and production capability is found more and more in many Asian countries other than Japan, where we are sort of used to the idea. I think we are going to see more of that. We will see more Asian countries joining the industrial and financial world and assuming even greater importance as trading partners rather than as competitors.

UNCHECKED POPULATION GROWTH

We see in Asia as yet unchecked population growth. The exponential growth of that means that, sooner or later they are going to come up against the limits of their environment. It has, among other things, swelled the migration from country to city in every great Asian city. They are all bursting at the seams with people, with the possible exception of Phnom Penh which was abolished when the Communists took over. We see the gap between rich and poor increasing, both as between individuals and as between countries. We see political consciousness at an unparalleled level in all of Asia. That is good in some ways, but has manifested in somewhat unchecked nationalism, even along ethnic grounds. This also manifested itself as fertile soil for a whole variety of leftist parties which have been very effective in gaining political and military control of large parts of the region.

PEACEFUL EVOLUTION ALTERNATE TO MILITARY SOLUTIONS

Without careful attention, both on the Asians part and on ours, to the alternative of military solutions, solutions by force rather than peaceful evolution, we can expect strife. It is very important to be helpful in trying to avert it.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASPECTS ALL WORK TOGETHER

In talking about the military forces, our military forces out there I want to make it plain that you really have to talk about military, political, economic, and even sociological and cultural aspects as being inseparable.

It makes no sense to talk about them separately anymore. Since the end of World War II, there have really no purely military actions or purely military options available to the United States. There have always been political constraints. Considering the capabilities of modern weapons, that is a good thing, but it does mean that we all have to operate in a very complex environment where the political, economic, and the military aspects are all worked together.

WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

In that connection, I am very proud of CINPAC's working relationship with the State Department. One of my principal advisers in the Pacific Command is a senior Foreign Service officer. We meet and confer frequently with all of our American Ambassadors and work closely with them in each and every country out there. We have, I think, a good working relationship with the State Department and I believe have a unified Defense/State approach to our problem.

FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY FORCES

The functions of the military forces as we see them are first, the protection of the United States; and second, the maintenance of a stable and secure system in that part of the world allowing the free commerce of nations and for the advancement of American policy. Of particular importance to me, is the maintenance of the open sea air lines of communication that are absolutely vital to so many countries and of enormous importance to the United States.

In fact, in this 200th year of our existence as a country, there have been only a few months where between the British and ourselves we did not exercise control of the sea and in later times control of the air. We are rather used to the idea. I do not think we have thought through the consequences of—

Senator BARTLETT. Good morning.

Admiral GAYLER [continuing]. Senator—the loss of that capability would be major. We did lose that control for a few months after Pearl Harbor. We lost effective influence on a third of the globe almost that fast, and we did not get it back until our control of the sea and air was restored.

AMERICAN PRESENCE A NECESSITY

The military component of our American presence is very important, but it is not the total thing. America, as the President said, is a Pacific power. The American presence in Asia is, in my judgment, a necessity. I am talking about political presence, economic presence, a sociological presence, with a military presence as an indispensable component. An American presence is a good thing because it biases toward a peaceful

rather than warlike or enforced evolution of affairs in that part of the world. I talk about evolution rather than stability because stability implies the status quo. In many parts of the world the status quo is not necessarily a good thing, but there can be no question that a political and peaceful evolution is better than warlike evolution.

The American presence also provides an umbrella over the developing nations and their associations under which they can get on with their nation building and pursue their own regional interests. The question arises often as to whether they want such an umbrella and, on the basis of my conversations with leaders in all of the countries that I have been talking about, the answer is an unqualified yes. They do not always feel able to say so publicly, but they never fail to tell me so privately. It is in our interest, as well as in theirs.

PERCEPTION OF POWER

The military component of this presence is important because of the perception of power. The perception of power, the enormous political and real world importance of an understanding of where the horse-power is. It is extraordinarily important, for example, that the Indian Ocean should not be considered to be a Russian lake and that the western Pacific should not be considered to be a Western lake, or that either should come under the domination of any single power. If it were so perceived, then that would be a political fact of the first magnitude and it would be adverse to us.

The Chairman has already discussed the cutbacks in our military forces in the Pacific. They concern me. I think we are stretched pretty thin. I am particularly concerned that we do not cut back any further our forward deployments which have a special capability with respect to the perception of our presence, and with respect to their effectiveness. This is particularly important when working in a short range scale and with respect to cost avoidance. Forward presence is a desirable cost avoidance.

NUCLEAR AND TACTICAL DETERRENCE

My principal military concerns are for maintenance of the sea and lines of communication and for our presence. That means local air superiority. It means capability to deal with threats on the sea, principally submarines. We must maintain the nuclear deterrence, as a part of our total global picture, and the tactical deterrence which in my judgment is adequate as we now stand in the Pacific Command, against deterrence with the nations in the area, and against resumption of such thing as ground action in Korea.

LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS

One of our principal problems is logistics. The provision of beans, people, everything, including transport, is very much dependent on our forward presence and our forward bases. The area is vast. Sometimes in talking about the Indian Ocean to visitors at my quarters I place a map of the United States on the Indian Ocean, scale. It touches no significant land anywhere. The geographical

location of forward bases is very important to our supply routes, both by ship and by aircraft. I think it is worth pointing out that, while the classic way to get to the Middle East with supplies is through the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, if the Suez Canal were closed there is another route not much longer which is far more secure, both militarily and politically, and provides another string to our bow.

NAVY AND AIR FORCE ROLES

The Navy has been at full strain for a long time, engaged in a lot of operations. There is a deferred backlog of ship repair and spare parts which gives us great concern. The principal jobs are antisubmarine warfare, ocean surveillance, local tactical air, and sealift. The Air Forces in the Pacific are my major concern. My principal problem is that there are not enough of them. I think that we should keep more of our tactical air forward and that we should make a larger provision for our air logistics, which we may need on short notice in time of emergency.

ARMY AND MARINES MAINTAIN FORWARDING BASING

So far as Army and Marines are concerned, if I can lump them together for a minute, I think we should maintain our forward basing. We must, as all of the commanders involved are doing, do our very best to maintain their readiness, both in a tactical sense and in the sense of strategic mobility, the capability to move rapidly from one part of the theater to another in case of need.

TOTAL GROUND FORCES IN THEATER

I want to call attention to the size of the total ground forces in the theater. It aggregates two and two-thirds divisions, in a theater where countries of middle size, like Korea, dispose 20-odd divisions on either side, and where the Chinese have armies in excess of 100 divisions, and the Russians some 44 divisions. Our ground forces are not very big. It is very necessary we keep what we have and that we keep them forward.

As to the men and women of the Armed Services, in character and in capability we are seeing people at least as good, and I believe better than any we have ever had. The All-Volunteer Force has, on balance, been a great success so far as morale and fighting capability of the troops are concerned. I think they are good and I think they are in the upgrade. It is particularly important in terms of morale, and I think I understand something about the morale of young men and young women in the Armed Services, that two things happen. One is that the individual should perceive himself to be doing an important job, one that makes a difference to his outfit and to his country. The other is that he be recognized in doing that job at every level, by his company officers, his senior officers, the Department of Defense, the Congress, and by the people of America. That support, understanding, and recognition of worth are the important ingredients to morale.

FORWARD BASES FOR POLITICAL REASONS

I would like to talk very briefly about bases. I have touched on reasons why they should be forward. Those are strategic military reasons, but are also political reasons. The distances are vast, the time required to move forces across those distances is long. There are major cost avoidances in repair stations that are forward as in the Philippines. For example, without access to certain strategic areas that are given to us, by the bases in Japan and the Philippines, we would have far less capability to win a Pacific campaign and, therefore, far less capability to deter potential aggressors.

HIGH COST OF ARMED FORCES

Our principal military problem in the Pacific is that of cost. We suffer from a triple inflation in the Armed Forces. There is the general inflation of the economy, the base of everything that we do. On top of that, there are the front end costs, of the All-Volunteer Forces and the incentives to have good people keep to a military career at a time when there is no draft. As I indicated, I think we get those costs back many times in increased efficiency, better morale, avoidance of training costs, and a host of other things. At the same time the front end costs are large. Finally, there are the tremendous costs of military hardware due to its complexity and its high technology. I think we have to do our very best to balance out as best we can between quality, quantity, and economic considerations. That is something we have to work on continuously.

There is a limit, however, below which we cannot let quality and, in some cases, complexity go.

We are making determined efforts at cost avoidance, through efficiency, through cross-servicing and through attention to the teeth-to-tail ratio of our forces. Adverse effects of costs are possible. These are in the force levels that we can have and completely deploy, the degree to which we can modernize, and the effects on our people.

REAL CAPABILITY

Our capability has got to be real if it is going to have the effect that we want.

They say that, in the old days in imperial China, they used to rate gunboats by the number of smokestacks they had and somebody showed one day with a gunboat with seven smokestacks. He was king of all he surveyed.

Those days do not exist anymore. There are smart, capable, sophisticated, military planners in Asia. They understand what is real and what is not real. It is very important that our capability be real. In regard there are some very important intangibles.

COMMAND LEADERSHIP IN DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

I think that we have to face up to the fact that in all probability we cannot count on a preponderance of numbers in future conflicts. Therefore, we have to be smarter than the other fellow and an im-

portant part of that is technology. Maybe an even more important part is bringing that technology into being in doctrine and tactics and in usefulness to our Armed Forces. That is very strongly influenced by our admirals, our generals, and our commanders at all levels. In fact, if I were asked what single element made more difference in our capability versus some antagonists, I would say it would be in how smart our admirals, generals, and commanders are.

The kind of smartness I am talking about is the kind that you can identify and the kind that you can train through tactical exercises. I am frankly envious of the tactical exercises that I see the Russians carrying out in the Pacific compared to those that we can carry out.

REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

Finally, in perhaps one of the most important aspects of the squeeze, it has led to redeployment of the forces in the theater beyond that which is demanded by political and other considerations. It has thus given a signal of withdrawal which is an object of concern to many of the people in Asia I have talked to.

Now, what is the situation of the principal military powers there? Let me take Russia first.

RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES IN THE EASTERN THEATER

We must remember that Russia has two ends and one of them is in the Pacific. It is very natural to focus on the NATO-Warsaw Pact in Europe but the fact is about a third of all Russian military forces are deployed to or earmarked for the eastern theater. They have some 40-odd division organizations with a strong integral air force deployed against China. They have a strong fleet based in Vladivostok. They have considerable long-range maritime air. The Pacific is the scene for the impacts of their long-range ballistic missiles as much of their missile and space activity. All of this activity, however, is not peculiar to the Pacific. It is part of the general Russian military expansion that the Secretary of Defense and many others have commented on. The Russians have no fewer than four kinds of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles recently developed and being deployed. There is a strong tie between the highest space technology and the operating forces in being. They have three kinds of high-performance bombers and three kinds of high-performance fighters. A week goes by, it seems, that I am not briefed on some new kind of fighting vehicle deployed to well-equipped armies around the continent of Eurasia.

SOVIET NAVY

Of particular concern to me is the development of the Soviet Navy which is largely the story of one very gifted and forceful admiral, Adm. Sergei Gorskikh, who has led the Soviet Navy for 19 years. He is an effective executive. He maintains political power in his own right in the Soviet system. He is a leader, a commander, and is also an able thinker and writer of considerable power and personality. He has had a blueprint for the Soviet Navy and he has brought it from a second-class coastal defense force to a first-

ocean navy, operationally capable, technically capable, and clearly designed to dispute control or effective use of the seas with the United States and its Allies. I think he understands sea power, its political implications as well as its military, and he wants it for his homeland. We see that in modern Soviet vessels, including submarines, missile-firing ships, and even the beginning of a true aircraft carrier fleet.

CHINA AS A MILITARY FORCE

The People's Republic of China is a country certainly in political terms I think we have had this illustrated again in the last couple of years. We know very little fundamentally about her political leadership. We can say a few things with confidence about her military organization. She has the world's largest land armies, numerically. They are not as great in firepower as the Russians, perhaps not as good in other ways, but they are immense in their size and capability. They are disposed to trade space for distance in the classic way, in case of an attack. They are also disposed for internal security. She has a not inconsiderable air force, mostly fighter aircraft with bombers. She has been a very large producer of fighter aircraft. She has built indigenous aircraft which, apparently, are quite good. She has a navy that is a bit of a puzzle. It is big; it has over 60 submarine, a great many smaller craft, destroyer-sized vessels that have been built, some armed with missiles. The puzzle is that they do not operate very much. It is very difficult to get any authoritative information on the Chinese naval doctrine. I do not think we have any. Operations, or relatively lack of operations, are a puzzle. There is a very large investment in that navy, and I think we will see more before we see less.

CHINESE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POSITION

Finally, the Chinese strategic nuclear position appears to be one moving slowly but steadily toward attaining a secure, second-strike capability. I see no reason why they should not be able to do this by the mid-1980's. It will be, I think, based primarily on intercontinental-range ballistic missiles after they are successfully developed. A rocket which can fly from China to Moscow can also fly to other areas. However, I am confident that Russia is their prime

I will turn to countries of very close, direct interest to us.

JAPANESE AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

Japan is our most important ally in the Pacific because of its economic weight and growing political clout, because Japanese and American interests are parallel, and because these are based in a security relationship with Japan. I think that relationship is good and improving, and based on the common interests of both countries. It is a complementary relationship in which each contributes that which it best can. We contribute the capability to deal with long-range problems, such as sea and air lines of communication, certain access to military technology, and the nuclear

umbrella. Incidentally, it makes it unnecessary for the Japanese to develop any such thing of their own.

The Japanese contributions, in my order of importance, are access to their bases which are indispensable to our strategic position, the implied access to the great Japanese industrial economy which transforms our supply situation, and the small but by no means negligible contribution of the Japanese self-defense forces. They are evolving by Japanese decision in a way totally consistent with their constitution and nonthreatening to any other nation in the area. Their very useful defense effort is toward the air defense and the antisubmarine and sea defense of the Japanese archipelago.

I think our security relationship is going very well.

NORTH KOREAN CAPABILITY

One paradoxical outcome of the end of the Vietnamese war was heightened realization in Japan of their own security problem and therefore willingness and heightened political support in that country for the security relationship I have described. In Korea, we share a great deal of history and a considerable responsibility. We see an implacable North, newly rearmed with accessions of tanks, artillery, field mobility, high performance airplanes, and other things. They are still capable of a surprise attack on the South, either across the DMZ or in some other area which they might perceive to be soft. South Korea which is some twice the size and population, has 2.4 times higher gross national product with a preponderance of heavy industry over the North. South Korea is winning the economic competition hands down but is still very much concerned by the well-equipped able forces poised so very close to their capital city of Seoul. I believe that the South Koreans are in reasonably good shape. They have some military shortcomings, particularly in the air and sea and some aspects of their ground capability. They intend to spend a considerable amount of money in force improvement. Almost entirely their own money but with our advice and help, in hopes that this will place them in a self-sufficient position.

SOUTH KOREAN AND AMERICAN CAPABILITY

The American forces there, a small Air Force contingent, the Second U.S. Division, and relatively small Army antiaircraft missile defense contingent are an additional important deterrent against any adventurism from the North. I would certainly advocate that, if and when the time comes for withdrawal of some or all of those forces, withdrawal be conditioned on a South Korean capability which is clearly adequate to defense that there cannot be any temptation to the North. We should not attempt to set a date certain for that withdrawal but make it a withdrawal when and if that condition obtain.

The Philippines are extraordinarily important to us. We have a special responsibility and association with the Philippines which still endures. Their strategic position and the bases are indispensable. The bases are literally irreplaceable from the standpoint of geographic location and investment. We could not possibly afford to replace them even if there were a place to do that.

AMERICAN BASES IN PHILIPPINES

The question about the American bases in the Philippines is related to the question of a remaining special relationship versus a dependent relationship on their part. The Philippines are determined the latter must come to a close. We have no objection whatever but, in my judgment, there is no intention on their part to force a withdrawal from our bases or to make our use of them difficult or to compromise in any way.

As you know, negotiations toward a new arrangement are in their early stages now. I see no reason why they will not be successful. I think it is in the Filipino interest and in our own. It's certainly very important to our capability and a very important cost avoidance. I necessarily cannot go about the whole theater and discuss each country in the Pacific.

There are countries of enormous potential importance, like Indonesia, that should be discussed. I will not, because we have no direct military relationship with them, although they maintain a very friendly stance.

INDIAN OCEAN

The only other area I think I should discuss is the Indian Ocean. This has recently come into prominence because of the extraordinary importance of the sea lines of communication that come out into the Indian Ocean from the Suez Canal and from the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf carries 80 percent of the oil that goes to Europe, America, Japan, and other Asian countries from the Middle East. That tremendous sea traffic goes around Africa to Western Europe, the eastern United States and to South America. It also goes through the Malacca Straits to Japan, other Asian countries and importantly, to the West coast of the United States.

RUSSIAN BASES IN EAST AFRICA

That traffic is—I think it is no exaggeration to say, in our present energy situation—vital to us. In the Horn of Africa and Somalia the Soviets are establishing major bases. The story of Berbera is well known: a missile facility, harbor, new drydock and a big 13,000-foot pier with very strong foundations to support the heaviest Soviet aircraft.

RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

We see the beginning of similar things at a place called Chisimao, and there is an established Russian presence in Mogadiscio. The meaning of this is clear. We can expect to see a Soviet military presence, perhaps including heavily armed aircraft over the northwest corner of the Indian Ocean and toward those trade routes.

PERCEPTION OF POWER AND COUNTERMEASURES

Again it is the perception of power that is important. To counter we periodically deploy task forces into the Indian Ocean. We do attempt to keep them there in a steady state. We cannot afford it,

and it probably is not necessary. We should continue to go in there in some force occasionally to demonstrate that it is not a Russian lake. We also have a very small base at Diego Garcia. This is a fleet anchorage. It has a long runway for logistics and patrol airplanes. It is a fuel storage depot. It is a communication center and a place from which you can find direction and locate ships. It is not much more than that and can never be because it is a small atoll and the land there is very limited. It is a cost avoidance. It is a convenience. It is not a vital necessity; but it makes sense in light of the situation we see in the Indian Ocean.

Having talked about these areas and their military potential in cartoon form, I would like to touch on several other important points.

First, the perception of where the horsepower is. Second, for the deterrent to warlike solutions to be effective, it has got to include the worldwide strategic nuclear level, and even more importantly in the Pacific theater the conventional level as regards who command the sea and air routes and who is in a position to exercise a capability.

RELIABILITY OF ALLIES

We have to consider, in our dealings with the countries we wish to have as our allies, the question of our freedom of action. First the question of our reliability as an ally. In my judgment, it is very important that, in this time of change and this time of question of means and will be perceived to be reliable. There are complex problems other than those of the burgeoning Russian military capability. There is in fact an East versus West problem. There is also a North versus South problem which finds its expression in Asia, much as it does in many other underdeveloped parts of the world.

The non-Communist Asian countries are generally very self conscious of themselves as Asians and very desirous of making their own arrangements. They are aware, at least on the private level, of the facts of power, and certainly are not basically anti-American. The most important thing to remember is the importance of consultation with those countries, the importance of keeping them in mind.

Events will not stop in Asia while we preoccupy ourselves with our own affairs. They go on with accelerating change and it is very important that we understand that change and that we are supporting it. I think our presence is important; and our fleets and air forces are uniformly good emissaries.

MORALITY IN OUR MILITARY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

To summarize this view of the Pacific world, I think we ought to take into account some of our own American vulnerabilities. This is in fact a tough world. The slaughter of the innocents is almost accepted as a legitimate means of political expression. There are great countries that talk openly about going to war to meet their political ends.

I think it would be pretty handy to keep our powder dry and to keep our reserves of untapped strength pretty visible. Some restoration

American unity is extraordinarily necessary, particularly in foreign affairs. I think that morality has a real place in our military and foreign affairs, and if it is not all, it is certainly a very good posture from which to begin.

AMERICAN OBJECTIVES

I believe our objectives can be quite clear. We should maintain our presence in the world and specifically our forward presence in the Pacific. We should maintain the bilateral understandings at all levels, both formal and informal, which collectively mean peace and stability. We should maintain a no-nonsense stand with the major military powers and a supportive stance toward the lesser and nonaligned nations; and most importantly, maintain a reliable stance toward our allies. We should keep up our military strength while working to the best of our ability toward peace and the rule of law in the world.

INCREASE CONVENTIONAL FORCES

The things that I advocate as a way to go are: to reverse the trend of slipping military capability compared to the U.S.S.R., to emphasize selected conventional forces, and to support the worth and the contribution of the military career, both for officers and enlisted persons.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Admiral Gayler. On that last note, emphasizing conventional forces, I would assume you mean, among other things, the Navy and also to support the worth and contribution of military career officers and enlisted men. I certainly, for one, support both of those goals.

I believe I heard you say in the past that perhaps the question is not resources allocation but the way resources are used. Now, you implied through your statement about morale that there would be no real substantial cuts in pay and fringe benefits, and so forth. Implied in your statement about conventional forces was there would be increased emphasis in the budget in that area.

Well, my question to you is, with 60 percent of the budget going to manpower, if we are not going to do any cutting in that area and are going to increase conventional capability—assuming that the share of the military budget stays about the same, for a moment—where do we cut? And if we cannot cut, then are you advocating a larger number of resources to the overall defense effort?

Admiral GAYLER. I think there are really three areas that you have addressed, Mr. Chairman, so I will take them in order.

NAVY ROLE IN PACIFIC THEATER

First is whether I intend to zero in primarily on the Navy as the service to support most. That is not what I intended. In fact, the Pacific theater is clearly an all-service theater, in spite of the fact that it is dominantly an oceanic area. By that I mean that I cannot conceive any operation out there that would not be joint, requiring sea forces, air forces, and a ground component. When I say selected services, I am talking about using the forces most appropriate to our

capability to deter and to be seen to be capable of deterring adventurism in that part of the world.

I would place high importance on the Navy's antisubmarine warfare, local air and sea control, and its ability to control our sea lines of communication. The Air Force should emphasize local air superiority and air transport, which is becoming more and more important in its usefulness in both large and small conflicts, as has recently been demonstrated. It is essential and basic to support these. Ground forces should have the capability to garrison ports and air heads, and potentially in relatively small numbers, reinforce or maintain a presence with strategic mobility throughout the area. That is sealift, airlift, and logistic support, among other things. It is a total package, as I see it.

MORALE

Now, the question of morale. Morale, by its nature, is a psychological state. I think that the morale of troops has less to do with beer and baseball and that sort of thing than it has to do with that feeling of worth, that feeling of making a contribution, that is sometimes associated with the outfit they are in and sometimes associated with the job that they are doing. That is an essential part of any human being working effectively. He has to believe that what he is doing is good and worthwhile.

Now, a part of that is what he sees from his own officers and the military administration above him. An important part, however, is what he sees from the country and here is where the psychological part of this comes in. I do not think we can afford or that we should let the enlisted man or woman or junior officer, or for that matter the senior officer, believe that the Defense Department or the Congress is an adversary with respect to his worthwhile career or his support. There is an important sensitivity there. If you list all of the rather small actions impinging on personnel privileges and support, it is quite easy for young enlisted people to gain the impression that they are being nibbled to death by ducks.

ALLOCATING FUNDS

How to allocate the dollars available between that kind of consideration and the brute facts, how to allocate between quality and quantity in the Armed Forces is something that takes a great deal of judgment. I am not going to say that there is any single program which is untouched or that there is any single program in which an available defense dollar does more for people than some other program. It is not the sort of thing that we can make those judgments on. I am saying that it should be done in such a way so as not to let anybody perceive that he has some antagonists in Washington who are waiting for a chance to take a chunk out of him. I think it is a very important element.

Now, as for where you might find compensating cuts, I would like to observe that I think we all understand the climate and needs of the country for the Federal budget. I think we all understand that the proportion allocated to defense by every measure is less than it has been and by a considerable amount. In fact, it is at a rather low e-

I think we all understand by now that in contrast to this loss in real purchasing power for defense, there is no question that our principal military concern, Russia, has had a corresponding and consistent increase and that by any measure her military expenditures considerably exceed ours.

In addition we carry in the military budget items, particularly personnel items, that are carried elsewhere in the budgets of other countries. This tends to distort what we are, in fact, allocating to defense.

MINIMUM DEFENSE CAPABILITY

The most important thing in this connection is to recognize that defense is in a very real sense directed by forces outside the United States. Defense is not something we would choose to do. Defense is something we must do in order to protect our society and to protect the number one civil right, the right to life, as well as political freedom.

In my judgment there is a minimum imposed from the outside, below which Defense capability cannot go. It is up to the Congress to determine what that minimum is.

JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING

Senator NUNN. Admiral, on the question of Japan, I rejoice that you are optimistic about our relationship with Japan and about their awareness of their own defense needs for self-defense purposes. On the other hand, they are still spending less than 1 percent of their GNP on defense effort, and we have just had a series of revelations about foreign military sales and so forth that have caused an awful lot of speculation that there would be a substantial delay in, particularly, ASW capability by Japan. In other words, I agree with them they were moving, until recently, in the direction of increased—particularly ASW—capabilities in the defense forces. How do you see the situation now in light of the most recent developments concerning the United States-Japanese relationship, but, more particularly, the possible delay in the direction they were moving in regard to ASW capability?

Admiral GAYLER. Senator, I think Japan is pulling its oar and getting a fair share. I think we tend to leave out of the equation the tremendous value of the Japanese bases. They transform the strategic situation out there. I cannot put a dollar value on them, but it would be very high. There is an implicit non-yen, non-dollar contribution by Japan, which is very considerable, and it should be on the balance sheet.

The amount of money the Japanese spend on defense is conditioned by two other things. One is the Japanese constitution and actually the desire of the Japanese people that they are not going to go in for massive weapons systems. That pretty much abridges the area in which they can move effectively. It is a political fact that support for a major force increase in Japan just is not in the cards. I do not think that an unfavorable situation for the United States. I think that is bad. I think that is about the way it ought to be because a major Japanese rearmament would create very considerable problems with our neighboring countries.

IMPACT OF IMPROPER BEHAVIOR BY AMERICAN COMPANIES

You have touched on the effect of revelations about improper behavior, bribery, and so forth, by American companies abroad. I need hardly tell you that I think that is a very bad thing. I think that it is unconscionable that the faith and position of the United States should have been compromised by private companies and by people in critical positions.

What the effect of that will be long term, I cannot tell you. I am optimistic that it will not have a profound, long-range effect. Certainly in the short term it will lead to a delay in consideration of how the Japanese should proceed. I do not think it is going to result in any significant change of heart on the part of the Japanese electorate or the Diet or of their government on the objectives that I have talked about.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, recent press reports indicated that the Chief of Naval Operations said that any operation the United States wanted to conduct in the Sea of Japan—and I quote him—"would be at the sufferance of the Soviet Union." This certainly implies that the United States is second best in the Far East. Could you give us your evaluation of a naval presence versus the Soviet Union. What is the naval balance in your region?

Admiral GAYLER. Yes, I would be glad to do that, Mr. Chairman.

NAVAL BALANCE IN SEA OF JAPAN

I must tell you, I think it is a very complex question that cannot be answered in a simple "go, no-go" fashion. It is highly situational and depends very much on the situation that we are talking about. In cartoon form, for example, if a war were to start with an American carrier and a missile Soviet cruiser 3 miles apart the cruiser presumably would win. If it were to start with the two ships 300 miles apart the American would win because its air forces would sink the Soviet vessel before it came in range.

That is the simplest kind of exposition of the many technical and situational things that you have to consider. There is a geographical consideration, and we can talk about the Sea of Japan close to Japan, close to Russia, near South Korea, or in the area of North Korea. There is a question of the mission that we are talking about. Are we talking about total capability to do everything that we want to, including moving cargo vessels anywhere we want to without loss or threat? or are we talking about the encounter at sea of sea forces in battle arm and who would win a combat under those circumstances?

Senator NUNN. Well, I know you have a lot of different contingencies, but let me ask you this way. Compare our situation versus the Soviet Union in your area, navally speaking, now with 5 years ago. Based on the current trends what do you see 5 years from now? I will not ask you every situation or contingency. I know that varies, but we want an overview.

NAVAL TRENDS

Admiral GAYLER. We are unsymmetrical. The Russians have concentrated on submarines, missile firing ships, and patrol aircraft and sat-

search and coordination. We have concentrated on sea-air power, a smaller number of submarines, albeit I think somewhat better. We have a very different task and a much tougher task to keep open the lines of communication, rather than to interrupt those supply lines. In light of that, I cannot give you the positive answer that you are looking for. It would depend very much on what we are talking about. It would be possible that we could get a real bloody nose. On the other hand, it would be possible that we would be able to achieve our objectives, depending largely on how we went about it.

Related to 5 years ago, we have slipped. Relative to 5 years hence, with current trends we will have slipped even more.

Senator NUNN. Senator Bartlett.

Senator BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, again, asking about Japan, would it be in our interest—and not thinking about their constraints, their constitution or their will—for us to try to have them take on much, much more of the burden in the Far East similar to what Germany has done in Europe?

It seems to me that with some reluctance for the investment in the military that there should be, we would be better off to have other people make more investment in the total capability of the Allied side. So why would it not be in our best interests, regardless of the difficulties, to work very hard, rather than accept your statement that you liked, or that you were satisfied—I am not sure what it was—with their present posture?

JAPAN IN CLEARLY DEFENSIVE POSTURE

Admiral GAYLER. The reason I like their present posture, Senator, is because it is clearly defensive and, with the history of the region, I think you can say with some confidence that major Japanese offensive forces would be a matter of great concern to most of the countries out there.

Senator BARTLETT. Would you name those countries?

Admiral GAYLER. Specifically, I think it would be of concern to the Chinese.

Senator BARTLETT. On that one point, would that be of concern to you that it concerned the Chinese?

Admiral GAYLER. Yes, I think so. If the Chinese or any other country out there were to feel threatened by a Japanese military buildup, they would take countermeasures. Many countries there have already expressed their dissatisfaction with Japanese economic aggression even to violence and rioting in Thailand and Indonesia. I cannot forecast what those would be, but I think they would clearly be adverse to our position, as well as the Japanese.

IMPORTANCE OF JAPANESE BASES

The contribution of the Japanese bases is the major contribution. The access to the Japanese economy is enormously important, and the Japanese self-defense forces could expand over what they are now, without exceeding the requirements for sea and air defense in that part of the world. I would say that we have a long way to go. They have a long way to go in the development of their defensive forces and resources going into them.

U.S. CAPABILITY AND TRENDS IN INDIAN OCEAN

Senator BARTLETT. How would you describe our capability in the Indian Ocean? Now, 5 years ago, and 5 years hence, with the trends vis-a-vis the Soviets?

Senator NUNN. Let me add one amendment to that. I would like for you to consider as part of my question, also, when I say trends—and I think Senator Bartlett would too—we include in that the 5-year Defense budget projections.

Admiral GAYLER. Yes, I understand.

Senator NUNN. And I understand that would be part of your question?

Senator BARTLETT. Yes.

Admiral GAYLER. Well, 5 years ago, the Indian Ocean was nearly a military vacuum. We saw some Soviet ships there. We had a very small presence ourselves. Since that time the Soviets have improved their position, both in the number and in the character of ships that they deploy and in their increasingly warm military relationship with some of the countries including their base structure in the Horn of Africa.

SOVIET CAPABILITY AND TRENDS IN INDIAN OCEAN

The Soviet capability has increased significantly. Ours has improved some, mostly because we have occasionally deployed forces that we already own into the Indian Ocean in a demonstrative way. secondarily, because of the limited development of the Diego Garcia Atoll. On balance, I would say that from 5 years ago, the Soviet position has considerably improved vis-a-vis ours, except at those times when we take the ships which we have elsewhere and send them into the Indian Ocean in force.

As for 5 years from now, my feeling has been that the Soviets are going to continue what they are doing now in spades. They are going to seek more base capabilities, they will deploy more forces, and we will see them more active over the sea and air routes.

Senator BARTLETT. In other words, you see an increase in their strengths, capability, distribution, and presence?

Admiral GAYLER. I think so, Senator.

Senator BARTLETT. Vis-a-vis ours.

Admiral GAYLER. I think so, Senator. It is very difficult to predict what the Soviets are going to do these days. I heard someone likening them to somebody running down a corridor trying every door, and going in every one they found open.

Senator BARTLETT. How valuable to the considerations of the Indian Ocean are the Soviet presence, capabilities, and threats to Africa?

Admiral GAYLER. Do you mean West Africa, Angola, and all that, or do you mean East Africa, the Horn of Africa?

SOVIET POTENTIAL THREATS

Senator BARTLETT. The horn of Africa, as well as Angola, but also mean the threats, the potential threats that exist to other parts of southern Africa.

Admiral GAYLER. I think they are very important. I cannot tell you whether they form a part of the overall Soviet plan, or whether they are simply opportunism or something in between. But I certainly believe that a situation where the Soviets clearly control the supply lines and energy to the West, all the traffic through the Suez Canal, which they can close off at will, is dangerous. That would be a very uncomfortable, if not a disastrous situation for Europe, for ourselves, and for much of East Asia.

SOVIET CAPABILITY IN SOMALIA

Senator BARTLETT. How does the capability of the Soviets in Somalia compare with the capability of the United States?

Admiral GAYLER. The Port of Berbera has an air field which would be comparable to the air field we have in Diego Garcia. It is already comparable to it. As a matter of fact, it is now longer.

Senator BARTLETT. Are there other air fields besides that one in Berbera?

Admiral GAYLER. Yes, the total includes some five Soviet runways in Somalia, as opposed to one in Diego Garcia. Soviet fuel storage is somewhat less now but is projected to be about equal to that in Diego Garcia by 1978. They have a very considerable missile handling capability which we do not have in Diego Garcia.

Senator CULVER. Excuse me, would the Senator yield?

Senator BARTLETT. Of course.

Senator CULVER. Would you be kind enough, Admiral Gayler, to give some specifics? For example, on the length of the runways, the fuel storage and whether or not those several runways are really under Soviet control in terms of our intelligence assessments, but particularly on the POL?

Admiral GAYLER. I am not aware of any problem of Soviet control over the runways that they are building now. If you ask me—

Senator BARTLETT. If the Senator would yield back, the question is not under control, but the capability available.

Admiral GAYLER. The runway at Berbera is 13,000 feet long and a very deep and strong structure designed to handle the biggest planes. The runway at Chisimaio is not complete. It looks like it laid out to be about the same size. The other three range between 10,000 feet and 13,000 feet.

Senator BARTLETT. Does that include the one at Hargeisa?

Admiral GAYLER. I do not think the one in Hargeisa is that long. [The information follows:]

HARGEISA RUNWAY LENGTH

The runway at Hargeisa is 7,500 feet long.

Admiral GAYLER. The projected fuel storage at Diego Garcia is 10 percent larger than the fuel storage projected for the Soviets. The fuel handling facilities—

Admiral GAYLER. Excuse me, am I correct in my numbers—700,000 barrels versus 170,000 barrels, I mean 700,000 Diego?

Admiral GAYLER. 640 is the number I have; 640 Diego, and the projection of 550 by 1978 for Somalia.

Senator CULVER. We were given 700,000 versus 170,000 last fall.
Admiral GAYLER. I do not recognize the 170 figure.

Senator CULVER. Well, that was the basis of our information to this committee.

Admiral GAYLER. I think that we are now getting in an area where it might be a good idea to give you a classified supplement as to what we are doing for the record.

Senator NUNN. Senator Bartlett, Senator Culver, if you would clarify your statements, particularly what you want, we will ask him to submit that for the record, since he is getting into a classified area.

[The information follows:]

DIEGO GARCIA FUEL STORAGE

The Diego Garcia fuel storage capacity is 103,000 barrels. By 1978 the fuel storage capacity is projected to 640,000 barrels.

Admiral GAYLER. I can discuss it in more general terms on the open record.

We see missiles in Somalia and missile facilities. We do not have anything like that on Diego.

Senator CULVER. Mr. Chairman, if I might just say, I would anticipate a rather extended discussion on this subject, and we could either do that all in open session or in closed session. Otherwise, I think we would take a lot of time.

Senator NUNN. It might be better to just wait and let us get into it in more depth in a closed session, rather than having an open session and repeating it.

Admiral GAYLER. I understand.

Senator BARTLETT. Admiral, thank you very much. I wanted to do that before my time is up. I have more questions that I would like to ask in writing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Senator Culver.

Senator CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Gayler, it is a pleasure to welcome you. We appreciate the courtesy you extended to the members of this committee a few months ago on occasion of our visit to your command. I was struck on the occasion with the picture in your office of Admiral Gorschkov and also your references to him in admiration, in admiration of the way he has been particularly responsible for a coherent blueprint and development for the past 20 years of the Soviet Navy, bringing it from a position of a second class coastal defense force to a first-class seven-ocean navy.

NAVY BLUEPRINT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

My first question goes to whether or not you are satisfied that the direction and leadership of the U.S. Naval Forces during the last two years has been characterized by a consistent blueprint in terms of direction, purposes, policies, and doctrines. For example, the U.S. Navy has chosen to reduce the size of our fleet to below 500 ships for the sake of modernization. We pushed first for large, then for small carriers, and now for large carriers again. We have been completely unresolved as to the internal questions on nuclear power, and even

today the Navy wants 600 ships; yet, this new budget will buy only about half as many ships as the same budget was forecast to buy a year ago, and the design features of new ships are not yet set. I just wonder whether or not you feel that the Navy has a blueprint, has had one, has a future blueprint, and can the Navy come up with an affordable and a justifiable program that is consistent, coherent and worthy of taxpayer support in the interest of our national security?

Admiral GAYLER. The answer to your last question is yes, I am sure the Navy can do that. You talked about some of the problems of perspective that we have or seem to have. I do not recall that the Navy volunteered to cut the number of ships for modernization. It was a choice imposed by cost. I have explained some of the cost factors. There are some more that I think are very important. If I can get into something that I used to be in professionally, research and development for the Navy, I think that it is a fact that there is an optimum schedule. If you want to plot a very simple graph, if you want to plot dollars and time, you get a curve that looks like that [indicating]. If you do something in a great hurry, it will cost you extra money. If you will have a long plateau of reasonable development time, this is minimum cost and usually best quality. If delays are imposed, and they are usually imposed by unforeseen financial demands which require a stretchout, it begins to cost you more and more money.

That is quite characteristic of development programs in all of the services. The reason for it is the imposed lower rate of expenditure, not the total expenditure, but the rate of expenditure. If, in addition to that, program changes are imposed, each one of those costs a finite amount of money. If at every year you add that on as a step function, then you find that you are operating on a curve which is even higher than the delayed curve. As a consequence something that you could have rationally developed for this many dollars may end up by costing this many dollars.

Senator CULVER. Well, it is part of administration, is it not? It is part of the leadership. It is part of the direction, and a lot of those problems are not all that unique to U.S. military service decisions and procurement judgment in terms of policy and direction.

Admiral GAYLER. The point is, Senator, they are not Service decisions.

Senator CULVER. Well, I would just like to ask you specifically, I would like to see an American admiral have an American naval hero, and it is a little disconcerting to me to go in and have a shrine to a Soviet naval genius, based on the fact that he has had a leadership for 20 years in the Soviet Union that has been of a blueprint and to bring that navy from a second class, in your words, coastal defense force to a first class, seven-ocean navy.

Senator NUNN. Senator Culver, if you would yield just a minute. I think Admiral Gayler has given as his hero, Admiral Mahan. That was back in the 19th century. Maybe, there has been one since then.

Senator CULVER. Well, my point is that blueprint. Are you satisfied we are getting our own house together? Do you know what direction the Navy wants to go, whether we are going to go nuclear, small big ship, big aircraft carrier, small aircraft carrier? You talk of him having some political clout. That may be. We have some political clout, too. They may not always speak with one voice.

What prospects and probabilities are there that the Navy is going to have a consistent blueprint for the future in terms of the direction that we want to go so that the taxpayers' money does not end up falling between the stools all the time, a little bit of everything, and not enough for anything in terms of offsetting capabilities?

Admiral GAYLER. Senator, the Navy in this country does not have the freedom of action that you suggest by implication. I have known personally, every Chief of Naval Operations in my time and I know of none, absolutely none, including Admiral Gorschkov, that were as able and devoted as were, for example, Admiral Arleigh Burke and Admiral Tom Moorer. I am not omitting anybody. They were all good.

Senator CULVER. What about this blueprint?

Admiral GAYLER. We operate in a different kind of system. It is not entirely or even predominantly always a Navy problem. As I have said before, our military objectives have a major component from all of the forces. We do what we can to design those forces so that they will be able to carry out our objectives at the lowest cost. We make mistakes. Mistakes are imposed on us. My picture of Admiral Gorschkov is the recognition of the problem, the recognition of a very able officer and somebody to think about.

Senator CULVER. Is one problem that the other side has a blueprint that they are consistently pursuing, and our policies have been characterized by indecisiveness as to which direction we want to go and it has been on again, off again, zig-zag, and the fact that we cannot resolve those internal differences means that the end product is a kind of asymmetrical situation that you describe here today!

Admiral GAYLER. Indecisiveness is your word, but I think that you can clearly show that the military—

Senator CULVER. Well, consistency, whatever word you want to use.

VARIATIONS IN ALLOCATED MILITARY RESOURCES

Admiral GAYLER. I think you can clearly show that the allocation of military resources has violently fluctuated in recent years from very low amounts before Pearl Harbor and before the Korean War to very large buildups in time of crisis.

Senator CULVER. Well, aside from the resources? Do we have a consistent pattern to what we want to apply those resources to by way of a program, a procurement policy?

PROCUREMENT POLICY

Admiral GAYLER. My answer to that is yes. The U.S. Navy has had a very clear picture of the exercise of sea power, of the necessity to be able to operate at long distances with self-sustaining forces of the importance of the undersea aspects, which we certainly pioneered in and still have a qualitative superiority, in the application of air power to sea, and the operation of aircraft carriers, which we pioneered and did very successfully. We built for carrier use what is acknowledged to be the most successful fighter airplane that the Western World or even the whole world, has seen, the F-4. It

naval aircraft. There are many other comparably good developments.

The Navy has pioneered in science and technology. A little known fact is that in 1946 the Navy had a major active program on earth satellites that was some 10 years before Sputnik, and that fell victim to budget changes.

Senator CULVER. You would agree all the money in the world does not mean much if we cannot make a consensus judgment in terms of force structure and missions and weapon systems. I mean, if we are going to be on again, off again, going six sheets to the wind in different directions, with change in CNO and the internal resolution of political problems and personalities, if we do not have a consistency in that program, all of the money in the world is not going to necessarily result in a meaningful combat readiness posture,

CONSISTENT NAVAL OBJECTIVES

Admiral GAYLER. I do not see the changes in CNO's as having a significant effect on the broad thrust of naval planning the design of naval ships or naval objectives. What has militated against coherence in this is this largely feast and famine approach to resources. It cannot be divorced from the other. It is not useful to state requirements by themselves. They must be related to resources, that you are probably going to have or they become just an intellectual exercise.

I have a requirement for 18 aircraft carriers in the Pacific, I could use them very handily. I am not going to get them. I know that, I do not waste people's time talking about them.

In point of fact, there are many, many instances like that. I think the most useful thing to do, is to establish this sort of servo-loop relationship. We must strike a balance between the requirements on the one hand and the resources and policy on the other hand as represented by you gentlemen, so that we work these problems together.

I think the Navy is very desirous to do that, but I do not think the naval position on requirements has been incoherent, except as it has changed, as events change, and events do sometimes have a profound significance.

Senator CULVER. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

Senator NUNN. Senator Hart.

Senator HART. Thank you. Admiral, some of us have been critical of the fact that in many of the briefings we hear a lot of numbers, as they did not seem to mean a lot in relation to each other. We have been making an effort to get people such as yourselves to fit these things into foreign policy considerations. You agreed that you could and would, and in that respect I think that your statement is very good, and I, for one, want to thank you for that.

Admiral GAYLER. Thank you, sir.

OFFER FROM SOMALIAN GOVERNMENT

Senator HART. We notice that in the posture statement of the Secretary of Defense this year, particularly, as contrasted with last year, Can you give an answer as to why a written offer from the

Somalian Government to open their port facilities to our Navy was never answered or responded to? It was a year or more ago.

Admiral GAYLER. I am not totally familiar with the history of that offer, Senator, but my understanding is that in the judgment of the professionals dealing with them, the offer was not made in good faith. To go further than that I would have to go do some research.

Senator HART. If you have an answer, I would like to have it. The Somalian Government professes to be profoundly confused by our failure to respond. Does the military have information on what is good faith in this regard? I have not seen that evidence.

Admiral GAYLER. I did not mean to suggest that there was any special information in the military or in Defense. I am giving you second-hand what I understand is—

Senator BARTLETT. Will the Senator yield?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Senator BARTLETT. I can throw some light on that. The time that I went to Somalia was July 4, 1975. We were in Berbera, and at that time and immediately after that and immediately prior to that, the invitation for the port call visit had been made, and there was a desire, by the Secretary of the Navy, and by the Under Secretary of Defense to accept it. They both conveyed this to me shortly after I returned. The invitation was rescinded by Somalia, and it is my understanding that it is going to be put back on the front burner right away for March or April, and it is the desire of this country, as it has been in the interim, to have the invitation reactivated and resubmitted to this country, and the full intention of the Navy is to accept it.

Senator HART. That is very good. It is my understanding it sat around on the front burner at the Pentagon for a number of months prior to being rescinded. If we were concerned about the Soviet buildup and the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, why didn't we accept that? The Somalian Ambassador told us before your visit, Senator, that the offer was still outstanding, and his government had heard nothing from the U.S. Government about it. At the same time we were hearing testimony that we were very concerned about the Soviet buildup, did not have any place to fuel our ships, and so on.

I think if the offer comes again, we ought to take it, if the Soviet presence is of concern. As you know, Admiral, it is a chicken-and-egg situation. We could, through our actions, be frightening the Soviets so that they think they have to do something in response to what we are doing. That is the way arms races get started. What a lot of wanted was a good faith effort on the part of this Government to negotiate a nonmilitary ocean. Instead when Styx missiles got put in Somalia we started building up Diego Garcia, or visa versa. Now we have a militarized ocean.

We have not seen much effort on the part of the administration to negotiate. It is probably outside of your concern, but one wonders how many dollars we could have saved the taxpayer. We are going to end up with a couple of carriers in there, and a fleet. How much more could have been saved by at least one attempt to keep that ocean non-military.

I am not sure in every case we are merely responding to the Soviets. We may, in fact, be triggering some response on their part.

Admiral GAYLER. Senator, if I can comment on that, I think that we have to address it, not in the narrow context of that particular country and base, but in the broader context of what Soviet objectives are in connection with their military buildup.

SOVIET NAVAL PREPONDERANCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

I think that the expression "arms race" is a little bit inapplicable, particularly as it comes to the strategic arms I believe that, as Professor Wohlstetter has rather convincingly demonstrated, we are not, and so there cannot be a race. I am not one of the people who believe in Soviets or even Communists under every bed. I do not attribute massive motivation to them. I think it is quite important we make it that we are not going to sit still for an Indian Ocean under Soviet domination.

On the other hand—

Senator HART. You can do that over a bargaining table. That is my point.

Admiral GAYLER. We, on the other hand, Senator, are not desirous to dominate. There are other countries there. The French are there. The Indians are there. They have ambitions to be there. The Iranians have ambitions to be there. The English have a presence. The command of the world runs through there. That is the way we want it, and the way we should talk about it. We often permit people to talk about the rivalry of the two superpowers out there, and I do not think we want to do that, sir.

Russia and ourselves have in common very large land areas, massive industrial economies, very large armed forces, and considerable influence in the world. Other than that, the resemblance ceases. In view of our track record, a Russian military preponderance in the area is a political fact of a quite different order than an American military preponderance. I think that is something that the people here recognize and something that we should take into account also.

Senator HART. I cannot quarrel with any of that. What I am saying is there are different ways to make a point. One is to try to keep up with every ship they build, and the other way is to try to sit down across the table like this, and say, look, if you do this in the Indian Ocean, we are going to do this. As far as I know, that step was never taken. But we will come back to that.

Let me ask you about the Northern Marianas since a number of us have been concerned about that for a number of months. What is our strategic interest in the Marianas?

Admiral GAYLER. As a geographical expression, the Marianas include Guam. We have a very large military establishment on Guam. Senator HART. Well, leave Guam aside. The Northern Marianas.

NORTHERN MARIANAS

Admiral GAYLER. The Northern Marianas by every ordinary test are an entity of peoples, by their location and by everything. We have a history of trusteeship and responsibility. We had at one time a potential project for an overflow base at Tinian. We are going to do that because of the cost and necessity problems. The

requirement under present conditions and present force levels, given the bases that we have forward in Japan and the Philippines, just does not exist.

We have no significant military ambitions there. We do think that it is important, both there and in all of Micronesia, to prevent the de facto occupation by some potentially hostile power. We cannot permit that.

Senator HART. Why is that?

Admiral GAYLER. I think we have a considerable responsibility to those peoples, that we exercise well sometimes and not so well at other times.

Senator HART. Yes; I share that, but I do not think the only response to that is to offer commonwealth status. We will not get into that argument. It seems to me that you have minimized our strategic interest out there, saying that we do not have one except to deny it to someone else. But if you had been here on the day of the vote in the Senate and seen the representatives from the Pentagon here, I won't say the lobbyists, there were quite a number of them, and the pressure put on by the administration on that vote, you might have thought otherwise about what the administration's feeling on that matter was. The debate over the Marianas started out to be an attempt to help the people. After 8 or 9 months it became a matter of very great concern to the administration, and I still do not understand what the concern is. Why did we have to have commonwealth status for the Northern Marianas? The record is replete with statements as you have just made that we really have no military or strategic concern there.

So, something does not fit in this puzzle, and I thought you could give us some information that we have not had so far.

Admiral GAYLER. As far as I know, I have none, Senator. The situation is as I described it. How you work up support for a measure you know better than I do.

Senator HART. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, we all have a good many other questions I know that we have asked some rather broad questions and some rather philosophical ones. I am going to try to make them as pointed as possible, and you can give us brief answers if you can and make sure you treat the subject matter. I know we are going to run into a time problem.

LAND BASED POWER TO COUNTER SOVIET NAVAL THREAT

One thing that is being discussed more and more now relates to the use of land based air power to counter the Soviet naval threat.

Admiral GAYLER. Yes.

Senator NUNN. How far along is that in your area of the world and with that big ocean there how feasible is it in the Pacific?

Admiral GAYLER. I think in concept it is 100 percent along. There is no problem in my mind, or insofar as I know, anybody else's. I intend using Air Force forces and land based naval air forces, such as our patrol aircraft to supplement the naval forces and naval forces in control of the sea and in control of the submarine problem.

SOUTH KOREAN BUILDUP OF MILITARY FORCES

Senator NUNN. Admiral, on the question of Korea, they do have a plan to build up the military forces. The South Koreans are testing more of their own resources to the situation. Assuming the Koreans do not make any kind of quantum leaps in their own capabilities and assuming the South Koreans over the next 5 years achieve that 5-year plan, do you foresee a time where we could remove our ground forces?

Admiral GAYLER. Yes. I think that there certainly will come a date that we project now. There are too many uncertainties, one of which is how long North Korea will continue the strain of maintaining these military forces up against the border.

Senator NUNN. What about the Philippine bases in terms of their distance to this country? What would be our strategic position if we did not have Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base there?

IMPORTANCE OF PHILIPPINE BASES

Admiral GAYLER. I think we would be very severely wounded. Subic is a great operating base for the 7th Fleet, including the air element at Cubi Point. It is also a major ship repair facility and economical one. Because of time and distance factors, a ship of the Fleet repaired there is effectively available for service a very larger percentage of the time than if she had to retire to some place in the eastern Pacific to be worked on.

From a strategic standpoint of having the ships available to move needed, they are much, much further forward operating out of Subic than they would be otherwise. From a cost avoidance standpoint from a standpoint of availability for use, it is a very important

you want to talk in terms of a war campaign, I would say those

together with the bases in Japan would increase our effectiveness many of the problems we have to handle by a factor of two or more.

SOVIET/U.S. NAVAL STRENGTH IN WESTERN PACIFIC

Senator NUNN. Admiral, back to the Soviet presence in the Pacific, we give us a rough idea about the percentage of the Soviet fleet engaged in the Pacific, versus a percentage of our fleet employed in

Admiral GAYLER. I can give you a figure for the percentage of our Armed Forces that are deployed in the western Pacific. It is 7

The Soviet Armed Forces breakdown, I will have to do in closed session.

Senator NUNN. The terms of the fleet is one of the things I wanted, not necessarily the ground forces, but the fleet.

Admiral GAYLER. It is on a rough order of a third.

Senator NUNN. Of ours?

Admiral GAYLER. No, I am sorry; a third of the Soviet's. A comparison with ours is also available.

Senator NUNN. You can supply that for the record.

Admiral GAYLER. The question is the percent of the American fleet compared to the percent of the Soviet fleet.

Senator NUNN. That is right.

Admiral GAYLER. It is about a third of the Soviet fleet, and it is in the western Pacific. It is about 20 percent of our fleet. We have in the eastern Pacific and the western United States another 10 or 15 percent.

Senator NUNN. So it is roughly comparable.

Admiral GAYLER. In the total theater the percentage of each force is about comparable.

Senator NUNN. I have a good many other questions but I know everybody has a time problem, so I will yield at this point; and I will be supplying the remainder of my questions for the record.

Senator Bartlett.

Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

NEED FOR PERSONNEL AT FORWARD BASE

Admiral Gayler, in your opinion, is the United States at or approaching the minimum number of military personnel and naval capability needed at forward bases for all contingencies in the Pacific theater?

Admiral GAYLER. I think we are pretty thin, Senator Bartlett. I think we are pretty thin both in absolute numbers and in places where we are deployed. I would prefer to see more things forward deployed.

Senator BARTLETT. Well, Admiral, I think everyone is aware of the fact that, in recent years, there has been a much more rapid increase in real dollar expenditures, in the transfer payment area and social programs or the nonmilitary programs and the military programs.

Should a lady in my State who might be concerned about this have reason for her concern?

CONCERN FOR TOTAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Admiral GAYLER. Should there be reason for concern that our total military capabilities are, in real terms, going down at least until the President's budget for 1977 as opposed to the Soviet's which has shown a steady growth of about 30 percent a year in real rubles over the past 10 years—should that be a matter of concern for us?

Yes; I think it should.

What I am concerned with, Senator, even more than the financial comparisons which get to be pretty exotic, are the actual weapons deployed forces that I see. Those we can count. Those we can see. Those are the things which give me concern.

Senator BARTLETT. So, when you transmit the dollars into weapons, your concerns are even more vivid than they are when it is on a dollar basis?

Admiral GAYLER. Actually, we have to do it the other way around. We pretty well see what the weapons are. We have to try to figure out what it costs then.

Senator BARTLETT. But, on a strictly weapons basis and on a numbers basis?

Admiral GAYLER. The weapons basis and force basis.

Senator BARTLETT. It seems to me that in most comparisons that are made, there is not much concern expressed about numbers, either numbers of ships or numbers of people. It seems to me any time there is a fight that I have been familiar with, including World War II, numbers are rather important if for no other reason than sometimes they confuse.

Admiral GAYLER. There are exceptions to that, sir. The Germans knocked off France with a small fraction of the French forces arrayed against them.

One cannot leave out the qualitative aspects. In fact, I emphasize I think we Americans must, because I do not think we are going to have preponderant numbers.

Senator BARTLETT. So that is all the more reason that sophisticated weapons systems should be brought into play.

Admiral GAYLER. If you define sophistication in the right way, not mean complication but to mean carefully designed for the task.

Senator BARTLETT. Then, I will use a different word—new general.

Admiral GAYLER. Yes.

FREEDOM OF ACTION VERSUS OUR PERCEIVED RELIABILITY

Senator BARTLETT. You mention, on page 19, the question of freedom of action versus our perceived reliability as its ally, could you expand on that? Your implication is that some of our allies do not think we are too reliable.

Admiral GAYLER. I was trying to say that we must, in our interest and in many others, maintain as many options and as much freedom of action as we can. But at the same time we must consider our reliability and the worth of our commitments. If it were to be perceived that our commitments were not reliable, this would be a political fact very, tough to live with.

Senator BARTLETT. Well, Admiral, did we not have or have we not since World War II a general policy of resisting Soviet expansion and intervention wherever it would take place, either by directance or support of resistance that someone else was putting forth, balancing with a move to respond, as say Diego Garcia somewhat towards to Somalia—was that not the policy until recently when Tunney amendment was passed and changed that?

Admiral GAYLER. That has certainly been our general policy and general desire, to restrain the expansionism. What we can do is though, is a direct function of what kind of shape we are in. can give some historic examples which I think are very instructive. In the Cuban missile crisis, it was widely believed we acted because

we had a strategic nuclear balance, but the action, the potential action lay close to our shores, within our conventional capability. In the end, we had our way. We were tactful enough not to rub their noses in it; but essentially we had our way.

PERCEPTION OF POWER

Quite distinctly, quite differently, where the same situation obtained in Europe twice, and there was still a rough strategic balance, the total conventional tactical control was in favor of Russia. I am speaking about Hungary and then Czechoslovakia. Whatever our policy might have been, we were absolutely powerless to do anything. That is the business of the perception of power that we have been talking about.

If you draw a line of equal Soviet and American capability, it runs through some interesting parts of the world like the Middle East and the Western Pacific.

Senator BARTLETT. Well, does the cutoff of aid to Angola in any way throw a question mark in anybody's mind that you are aware of or in yours, about the current policy of the United States?

Admiral GAYLER. This is not my bailiwick, Senator. I have not had any questions from people in Asia about it yet.

I do not really know how much or what perception was taken that out there.

Senator BARTLETT. Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral GAYLER. Thank you, sir.

Senator NUNN. Senator Culver.

Senator CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

UNITS ORIENTED TOWARD ASIA

I just have a couple of other questions on force deployment.

I wonder whether or not you agree with the recent report the Brookings analysts have done, in terms of the number of units that are oriented toward Asia? Those figures are—and perhaps you can make a mental note of them and see whether or not you agree with them—five active Army divisions, two Marine divisions and air wings, six aircraft carrier task forces, nine Air Force tactical squadrons; was the breakout that their analysts have. Does that comport with your figures?

Admiral GAYLER. Well, what Brookings is apparently doing is lumping in forces in the United States.

Senator CULVER. Yes; that is right. It is a total orientation, for deployment as well as earmarked reserves.

Admiral GAYLER. Here, I just have to emphasize the vast distances that we are talking about and the fact that we really do not have the capability of a lift to make those forces immediately or promptly available in the Western Pacific.

In addition, they do not have the political impact in reassuring allies as do forward deployed forces. I do not track on all the numbers either except perhaps for the Air Force numbers.

Senator CULVER. You do not have any major differences with the Brookings numbers. You tell me about it, what is it? Do not worry about the categories: Active Army divisions oriented to Asia. What is your understanding as the force commander of the forces? What do you have forward deployed? What do you have in reserve?

It seems to me that to be in command of these forces you would have a pretty firm handle on the breakout between forward deployment as well as reserve-support orientation.

Admiral GAYLER. I do not accept this notion of orientation perhaps in the way in which Brookings is talking about it.

As I have said, what we can use are the forces that are available. The forces back in the continental United States have serious limitations on deployability.

Senator CULVER. Yes, but totally independent of their combat readiness posture, the question is, we orient some of these divisions toward Asia, we orient some of them toward Asia, and I just wondered whether or not that breakout of numbers is your paper force.

Admiral GAYLER. I just cannot accept this notion of orientation. I do not know where Brookings gets it.

Senator CULVER. Well, you know, you have two Army divisions forward deployed; is that not right?

Admiral GAYLER. No. I have one Army division forward deployed to Korea. I have two-thirds of a division in the State of Hawaii.

Senator CULVER. In Hawaii. What do you have in reserve, as far as Army divisions that are earmarked for an Asian contingency?

Admiral GAYLER. As you suggest there could be five or there could be depending on the contingency.

COST OF ASIAN FORCE STRUCTURE

Senator CULVER. All right. Well, you may argue about whether or not in terms of perception, in terms of force readiness, in terms of airlift, sealift capability, how realistic those are. The sad fact is regardless of those qualifications, we are at least deceiving ourselves on an annual basis that \$20 billion of this budget goes in these currencies for an Asian contingency and for an Asian force structure.

Admiral GAYLER. Senator, I think we are just too fond of qualifications.

Senator CULVER. Well, you have to start somewhere. You have got to have a number of divisions, you have a number of National Guard, Marine divisions, wings, aircraft carriers, task forces; they have to be assigned some place in rough reference points, is that right?

Their contingency posture is based on their being called to a certain theater of action.

Admiral GAYLER. They are in the U.S. Army force structure.

Senator CULVER. That is right; and they are earmarked for this theater of operation.

Admiral GAYLER. What we are really talking about is the size of the Army force structure.

Senator CULVER. Well, you tell me about it, what is it? Do not worry about the categories: Active Army divisions oriented to Asia. What is your understanding as the force commander of the forces?

Admiral GAYLER. Give you the categories: Active Army divisions oriented to Asia. What is your understanding as the force commander of the forces?

Admiral GAYLER. What do you have forward deployed? What do you have in reserve?

Admiral GAYLER. Senator, I am sorry I do not wish to be obdurate, but I cannot accept the notion of this "oriented toward" that we are talking about.

Senator CULVER. You mean with all of your forces you sit out there in that theater, and you do not know what you have in CONUS? You do not have enough airlifts, sealifts, or forces for combat readiness and all the rest?

Down on paper, what are you supposedly in a position to have first call on? Five Army divisions; are we agreed to that?

Admiral GAYLER. No, sir.

Senator CULVER. Well, I thought I just heard you say you agreed with five active Army divisions.

CONTINGENCY PLANS

Admiral GAYLER. There are contingency plans which involve varying amounts of support from the continental United States to the Western theater. I will have to discuss what they are specifically in closed session; but they are neither guaranteed nor limited to the five divisions that you are talking about.

Senator CULVER. Without getting into the fine and sophisticated contingencies, we are talking about ballpark allocations of available manpower resources.

Now, certainly it is not necessary to get into classified information to get the rough breakout of these forces, what theater of action they are oriented to, and what part of the world they are committed to.

Now, if we cannot get any more rational discussion out of you as to what that is, it is a little hard to be all that sympathetic about whether they are combat ready here, or combat ready there. What are you talking about? What forces? To what contingency? What is the relationship?

You mean Brookings and these other people can go ahead and just invent what direction these forces are oriented to and what kind of rough contingency?

We have nine Army divisions aimed at European theaters. We have five—is that right—toward Asia? Or you do not know? You are in charge of this whole theater and you do not know or will not say.

Admiral GAYLER. I do not know how to say it more plainly, than do not accept the concept of "aimed at" in the way Brookings uses.

Senator CULVER. Well, they are oriented there. You have first call on them and their priority posture is aimed toward the contingencies in the Asian theater of operation in action. Now you do not feel you have that kind of breakout?

Admiral GAYLER. I think that the intent is that the Army forces in CONUS and the other forces should be flexible and available to either theater.

Senator CULVER. Well, they can be flexibly available, but their obligation and requirement for deployment in order of priority, in order of training, in order of readiness, is oriented either toward Asia or European theater, is it not, in a rough way?

Admiral GAYLER. In my judgment, no.

Senator CULVER. It is not?

Admiral GAYLER. No.

This may be a device for estimating force levels.

Senator CULVER. I hope there is some rational process involved in some of the allocation of our forces.

Admiral GAYLER. Of course there is a rational process.

Senator CULVER. Well, give it to me. What is oriented toward Asia?

Admiral GAYLER. The Army forces and the other forces in the United States, our essential reserve, which is intended to be allocable to either theater or to both.

Senator CULVER. All right, in the first threshold situation—just for rough strategic funding purposes, what part of our existing divisions in the Army, out of the total number of divisions that we have, some on paper, are oriented toward an Asian contingency?

Admiral GAYLER. Senator, I am sorry I cannot accept the orientation division that Brookings has suggested to us. I will be glad to—

Senator CULVER. How many Marine division air wings do you have oriented toward Asia?

Admiral GAYLER. We have two.

Senator CULVER. You have two. You are pretty confident about that.

Admiral GAYLER. Yes. The Marines are in a somewhat different position, although they too could go to the other theater.

Senator CULVER. How about aircraft carrier task forces?

Admiral GAYLER. Well, we are able to keep two deployed forward.

Senator CULVER. How many in a backup posture?

Admiral GAYLER. We have a total of 14 carriers in the force structure. We have eight in this theater.

Senator CULVER. How about Air Force tactical squadrons?

Admiral GAYLER. Air Force tactical squadrons will go to nine, under current planning.

Senator CULVER. And how about National Guard divisions?

Admiral GAYLER. We have one brigade of the National Guard, as part of the 25th Division in Hawaii. Other than that, they are all back in the continental United States and subject to the same observation.

Senator CULVER. So you are relatively confident about all of these force elements, except the Army divisions? How many do you have in a reserve situation for an Asian contingency?

Admiral GAYLER. I would not count earmarked for the Pacific forces which are in the continental United States, with the exception of the Marines and the ships.

Senator CULVER. Is it because you do not have enough confidence in their sealift capability and airlift capability to make them relevant in contingency situations?

Admiral GAYLER. Mostly because I do not accept that they are pre-emptively earmarked in the way that we have been discussing.

Senator CULVER. Well, is it not, for purposes of our planning, general at your level? Do you not orient some of those CONUS forces to Europe and some of them for Asia, just as much as you do for tactical squadrons and everything else in the Air Force?

Admiral GAYLER. As I have said—

Senator CULVER. You can make that pool argument about everything that we have, from that lowest widget to the biggest "Nuke."

But for force planning purposes, do you not have a breakout. You said you have it for everything here but Army divisions.

Admiral GAYLER. Well, let us take the biggest nuke, as you put it. That is clearly allocable on short notice to either theater.

Senator CULVER. Well, you are coming here as a commander of all of our forces in the CINCPAC; and you cannot tell us how many Army divisions are oriented toward your theater of operation in our overall force planning?

Admiral GAYLER. I am not prepared to classify them in the way that Brookings has suggested, sir.

Senator CULVER. Which is oriented toward Asia as versus oriented toward Europe or uncommitted, or unallocated force planning? You do not think that there is a breakout like that that has a familiar ring to you?

Admiral GAYLER. I would say that the CONUS forces are, for practical purposes, allocated between either theater. It is an important point, Senator.

Senator CULVER. Well, they are allocated toward either theater. They have supposedly nine toward Europe, five toward Asia, and two unallocated. You do not seem to think you have any, or you do not have any prior claim on any?

Admiral GAYLER. I am trying to make a point; and the point is that the outfits in the United States can be sent to one theater or to the other.

Senator CULVER. Well, I appreciate that; and if I could ever get to that that would be the subject matter of some additional question of you, sir. We have an awful time getting to that point if you will not even concede that there is some earmarking at all, as far as Army divisions now currently in our present plans for Asia.

Admiral GAYLER. I have said to you, sir, that I would be happy to testify in closed session about our current plans and that each one of them is different.

Senator CULVER. Yes; but we are just talking about these divisions that are earmarked. There is nothing highly secret about that. That is just replete in all of the published literature. There is nothing secret about that. They are for purposes of tentative planning.

You have these forces earmarked for this theater or that theater. That is testified to in public hearings.

Admiral GAYLER. I am not withholding any information from you, Senator. I just cannot accept that classification.

Senator CULVER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions that really go to this whole issue of the question of the adequacy in terms of political perception of the forward deployment reserve situation—how feasible those force postures are, and the extent to which the current forces have a capability to respond to the European theater, whether or not these units can be put into a different relative situation, whether or not they are needed or could be demobilized in some areas without affecting deterrent capability in Asia.

I find it awfully hard to even get into this subject on a rational basis, in view of the hearing record today.

Senator NUNN. I think we ought to go into closed session. Then we will see what basic premises can be answered, so that your other question can be answered. We can also talk about the details of Diego Garcia.

I have some particular questions along the same line that you are thinking about, regarding our sealift and airlift capabilities.

Senator CULVER. Mr. Chairman, I really think that if this kind of discussion cannot take place on a public record, it is impossible to believe that these decisions are being made on a rational basis, and to respond to certain particular contingencies and everything else.

The Admiral made some very impressive mood music statements at the relationship to force level and foreign policy interests, and so forth. If we cannot get down to a little specificity as to what exactly our interests are and what mix of force structure weapons systems, mission is necessary to really meet those obligations—and that should be a public record—then I do not see much rationality to this process.

To buy a pig in a poke is just what my constituents are no longer prepared to do. And I am not prepared to do it either.

If we cannot give a greater clarity and precision to this, I am just going to accept this procedure of a secret session. If we cannot talk in these ballpark terms about this matter, with an agreedensus that is replete in the public literature on this subject, there is no way we can really help you get these things or get up to a genuine notion of combat readiness.

Admiral GAYLER. I do not think the difficulty is a great as you suggest.

Senator CULVER. Well, I am afraid I am the one in the best position to make that judgment.

Admiral GAYLER. The problem about an open hearing is that in order to discuss in discreet terms, and in full knowledge, all of the things that you are concerned with—

Senator CULVER. I have been around here, Admiral, long enough to know how these discreet things are discussed; and privately I do not have a lot of respect for that process.

Senator NUNN. Well, let's let him finish. We have laid the ground-work for closing the session.

Admiral GAYLER. I am not saying, discreet, in the sense of secret, specific.

Senator CULVER. If we cannot defend what we are doing along the lines that I am talking about, on the basis of public record, this is a Senator that is not going to be supporting it.

Admiral GAYLER. Senator, the problem is intimately related to contingency plans and I cannot discuss those on the public record.

Senator CULVER. Well, there is nothing discreet and sophisticated relative of the importance of maintaining security and classification and not giving our enemy a hot tip. When we talk about having five or nine divisions in CONUS earmarked even roughly for Europe or somewhere else, and there is no way that we, on this side of the Atlantic, can make informed judgments, in terms of whether or not we have the sealift and the airlift capability to do what is needed, whether or not, the kind of contingencies that we are imposed

ing on you as a military commander, the kind of contingencies civilian authorities are going to impose on you are such that they require this or that particular force level and mix. Now there is no way that we could have a rational discussion on that, if we cannot get down to more specifics about just some of these rough considerations and calculations that are no secret to our enemies.

They may be unrealistic, but they are no secret.

Admiral GAYLER. The point that I am concerned with is that in order to give you the rationale which you properly demand, I have to talk in terms of plans. I cannot do that in open session.

Senator CULVER. You can do it without me in private session, because so long as you can sit here and you can talk with confidence about how many Air Force tactical squadrons are earmarked to your theater, forward-deployed, and in the Continental United States, and you can talk about carrier task forces out of our total fleet, those are earmarked for the Atlantic, for the Pacific, and you can talk about National Guard divisions, and you can talk about Marine air wings and divisions, but you cannot talk about Active Army divisions.

Admiral GAYLER. The difference is in the physical world. The carriers are out here. It is very difficult to get them back in the other theater. The Army divisions we are talking about—

Senator CULVER. You can just give them an order, can you not, to get them back?

Admiral GAYLER. They have to go around Cape Horn.

Senator CULVER. Well, I must say it is a lot easier to get a carrier back than it is to reorient Army divisions. Assuming that orientation means anything, in terms of training, in terms of mission, in terms of capability, in terms of weapons mix or anything else?

Senator NUNN. Well, at this point, I think we have reached a situation where the Admiral is not willing to accept the Brookings definition, and he has said that he will discuss it out of public record, and in terms of contingency plans. The question now is: Do you, Senator Culver, want to go into closed session on this point or on Diego Garcia?

Senator CULVER. No; I do not. I do not care to, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions to ask based on what information I have been able to listen to on the public record.

Senator NUNN. Well, Admiral, I have some other questions.

Admiral GAYLER. Fine, sir.

SEA AND AIRLIFT DEFICIENCIES

Senator NUNN. Admiral, on the point Senator Culver is making— sealift and airlift, one of the things that is of great concern to me and to many other people is the question of our real capability to use the forces we already have.

I think you have already noted sealift and airlift deficient in many respects. There was a recent study that was put out that noted that we had the capability for sealift of only one Marine division. Now if you did have a contingency in your area that called for the use of, say, two Marine divisions on an emergency basis, how would you go about getting them there?

IMPROVISE

Admiral GAYLER. I think we have to improvise. I think we would have to commandeer ships and aircraft, and exercise the option to mobilize the civil air fleet in some part. We would have an enormous storage problem and an enormous problem of delay. It would also be conditioned quite a lot by the distance that we were going, depending on whether we were taking forces from the west coast or Hawaii, or Okinawa. All of those things would come into play. You have to answer the question of how much you would want to put ashore in response, and how much in administration landing. Miscellaneous shipping might suffice in the latter case. You could not get away with it in the former.

Senator NUNN. Well, the point is we are woefully short in sealift, are we not?

Admiral GAYLER. That is my opinion, yes.

Senator NUNN. Is that one of your top priorities in terms of conventional capability?

Admiral GAYLER. That is one of the top priorities, yes.

Senator NUNN. Well, in the meantime, do we need to keep the large structure that we have? I say, large, it is not large compared to our adversary, but if we cannot, in a very short fashion, utilize all three divisions of the Marine Corps, if we cannot use all 16 divisions of the Army, in any kind of short situation, what is the need to maintain that many people? Should we get rid of those people and put that money in a sealift and airlift until we have enough lift and airlift to utilize the people properly?

Admiral GAYLER. It is a good question. The question of how you balance out these things is pretty important.

Senator NUNN. I am not suggesting we have too many people. What I am suggesting is we are using a lot of resources on them if we cannot get them there, should we shift resources and get a whole lot more in terms of airlift and sealift?

Admiral GAYLER. It is a problem of balance. You would like to have forces in the lift, in the air support, and in the logistics, and all in balance. I do not think one should jump to the conclusion that one leg of the stool is a little bit shorter than the others at the moment, we should saw off all of the other legs until they match. The stool would be sitting on the ground pretty fast.

IMPROVE SEALIFT

I think that, in sort of general terms, the ground forces of the country are pretty small. I would not cut them any further. I would like to see, as you suggest, the lift improve. I think as far as the air is concerned, it is coming along pretty well. We could do better with the sealift. I think there the best thing to do would be to make arrangements for mobilizing a lot of lifts in a hurry.

Senator NUNN. What about shifting one of the Marine divisions to another area, where they would be oriented to more use by air rather than by amphibious?

Admiral GAYLER. There are some situations in which airlift is the way to insert troops. There are some situations in which am-

amphibious is the right way to insert troops. The Marines have the capability because of their training and their equipment, of being spearhead of an amphibious operation. Other units, both Marine and Army, can follow.

Senator NUNN. Yes; but we cannot use but 1½ at most of the Marine divisions and for the next 5 years that capability is not going to change in the amphibious method in any kind of short situation. In a long-term situation, I guess that is a value judgment of whether you want to send a ship back to get the other one. However, in your area of the world you would be talking about literally months before you could get the second one in there, would you not?

Admiral GAYLER. It would be a long time if they have to come from the continental United States.

Senator NUNN. Well, does this suggest that there is another role that they could play in the meantime without disbanding the Marine Corps?

JUSTIFICATION TO KEEP FORCES FORWARD

Admiral GAYLER. No, it suggests to me that it is a good idea to keep the forces forward as much as possible.

Senator NUNN. Do you mean we need another Marine division in your area of the world?

Admiral GAYLER. It would be handy. I concede I know of no place that we could put them. We are in about the best situation that could be.

Senator NUNN. Well, even when they are forward deployed you have to figure out a way to get them from Okinawa to Korea, for instance?

Admiral GAYLER. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And that capability does not exist now on a short-term basis, does it?

Admiral GAYLER. It depends on to what extent they go in administratively and to what extent they go in combat.

Senator NUNN. Well, let us just assume the most reasonable scenario.

Admiral GAYLER. In that case, I think they could be introduced administratively. We could handle it.

COMBAT FORCES OUT OF THAILAND

Senator NUNN. On another subject, what about the combat forces in Thailand? Are we going to have all combat forces out of Thailand by the end of this fiscal year?

Admiral GAYLER. Yes. We have agreed with the Thai government that we will have them out before that.

Senator NUNN. It would be before the end of the fiscal year 1976?

Admiral GAYLER. Yes.

Senator NUNN. What about the military and civilian personnel assignments?

Admiral GAYLER. The current planning is about 3,000.

Senator NUNN. What capacity will these people serve in?

Admiral GAYLER. They will be there for military assistance, supporting a logistic activity and for radio support.

Senator NUNN. How much combat equipment, how much combat capability will there be there when we are down to 3,000 people?

Admiral GAYLER. There will be no tactical aircraft. There will be no tactical combat capability of any kind.

Senator NUNN. Will we have any capability to combat insurrection threatened by Communist neighbors if Thailand is under siege?

Admiral GAYLER. We Americans?

Senator NUNN. Yes.

Admiral GAYLER. Not without moving forces back there.

Senator NUNN. There is no plan then to have a contingency force for that purpose?

Admiral GAYLER. No.

Senator NUNN. There was recently a Cambodian charge that American aircraft, including an F-111, made a bombing attack on the provincial capital of Siem Reap. What is your view on the accuracy of that charge?

Admiral GAYLER. The preponderance of the evidence is that it did not happen. They probably had an explosion there of some stored munition and the local governor was trying to put the best face on it that he could.

Senator NUNN. You could say unequivocally it was not under your command, any attack?

Admiral GAYLER. I can say that unequivocably.

Senator NUNN. You are positive of that?

Admiral GAYLER. I am positive of that.

Senator NUNN. Is it possible that one of the planes left in Vietnam by the Americans participated in a raid from North Vietnam?

Admiral GAYLER. From South Vietnam?

Senator NUNN. That is possible.

Admiral GAYLER. No, there were F-111s lost.

Senator NUNN. There were no F-111s? I understand that charge was on the basis of F-111s, was it not?

Admiral GAYLER. Well, he changed his story several times. He ended up with F-111s.

Senator NUNN. How do you see the situation evolving between Cambodia and Vietnam?

Admiral GAYLER. Let me make my previous point clear. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the bombing incident never happened.

Senator NUNN. It never happened.

Admiral GAYLER. Excuse me?

Senator NUNN. How do you see the situation evolving now between Cambodia and Vietnam?

Admiral GAYLER. They have an uneasy peace and still have border disputes which they have not really settled. The Vietnamese are in terrible possession of some of the offshore islands that the Cambodians had as theirs. The Cambodians have made it clear by action that

SITUATION BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM

they do not intend to be run by the Vietnamese. On the other hand, they have had several meetings to make peace and lower the level of hostilities.

The Cambodians remain oriented toward China, the Vietnamese toward Russia for their military support.

Senator Nunn. Again, if we get into classified information, you will defer this question, but are there any signs that there will be any kind of Russian bases in Vietnam?

Admiral Gayler. I see no sign of it.

Senator Nunn. How about Chinese bases in Cambodia?

Admiral Gayler. No sign of that either.

Senator Nunn. You do not see any sign of foreign military presence in any of the Southeast Asian countries then?

Admiral Gayler. No, I did not generalize that far. There are certainly both military and political advisers; as a matter of fact, they tend to combine them.

Senator Nunn. But not bases?

Admiral Gayler. But not bases.

Senator Nunn. What about Cuban presence in any of the countries that are affected by your command?

Admiral Gayler. None, that I know of.

Senator Nunn. Even on an advisory basis?

Admiral Gayler. No, none that I know of.

Senator Nunn. Admiral, I want to go into some questions in closed session here that we have touched on and some others that we have not touched on. Do you have any other statement for the record, any other response to any of the questions that have been asked?

Admiral Gayler. Well, I do not think so, unless there is something that would want amplification.

Senator Nunn. Do any of you other gentlemen have anything to add?

Without objection, additional questions will be placed in the record at this point, and the department answers will follow the questions.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR NUNN

(Additional questions from Senator Nunn. Answers supplied by Department of the Navy.)

Question. A recent press report indicated that the Chief of Naval Operations said that any operation the United States wanted to conduct in the Sea of Japan "would be at the sufferance of the Soviet Union." That implies that the US Navy is second best in the Far East. What is your evaluation of the Naval balance in the Far East vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?

Answer. CNO statement (follows) very specific in delineating areas in which USN could not control the seas. Sea of Japan is one such area. Obviously, as we get closer to the Soviet bases the problem gets tougher.

The statement below was made by the CNO during budget hearings before the House Armed Services Committee on 2 Feb 76 in response to a question by Congressman Spence:

Mr. Spence—quote: Admiral Holloway . . . you say . . . (in) the broader sense for the foreseeable future we believe that the United States Navy will be able to control any ocean or major connecting sea, unless directly opposed by the Soviet Navy . . . are we in a position where that is true? unquote.

Admiral Holloway—quote: Mr. Spence, I was trying to make the point that very definitely, there are areas of the world on the free seas. . . . that the United States Armed Forces, even in concert with our allies . . . cannot control . . . with the forces we have today. An example would be the Sea of Japan.

There was a time not too long ago, in 1953 for example, that the United States Navy operated Task Forces in the Sea of Japan, conducting combat operations against North Korea. We did it without fear of interference from the Soviets because in 1953 the Soviets' maritime capability was not strong enough to prevent us from conducting those operations as we chose. I would have to say that today, any similar operations that we would want to conduct in the Sea of Japan would be with the sufferance of the Soviets. There are other areas where we do not pretend to have the ability to control, such as the Barents Sea, or the North-east part of the Norwegian Sea—the areas North of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. I am more concerned with the ability of our forces to even maintain control of the Arabian Sea. I think it is very doubtful under the circumstances of general war that we would be able to prevail against an all-out Soviet effort in that area. unquote.

This does not imply that USN is second best in all circumstances. Superiority is a very complex question involving more than numbers. Leadership, tactics, geography, circumstances initiation, intelligence; any or all may be decisive. Balance of Naval power shifts to US due to availability of shore support facilities as Soviet lines of communication lengthen. Conversely, availability of shore facilities to USSR works to their favor. The point is, the global balance is shifting against us.

- (a) Could you describe the trends in Soviet naval activity in the Pacific?
- (b) Where are they based and in what areas do they mainly operate?
- (c) Where do they get fuel and supplies?
- (d) What are their strengths and weaknesses?

Answer: (a) More significant than the numbers of units that the Soviet Pacific Fleet has added is the qualitative improvement of the fleet. Soviet ships are fast and are equipped with advanced and effective weapon systems, including missiles which can be launched from aircraft, submarines and surface ships at distances. Even small patrol craft can stand off at safe ranges to launch their missiles. In addition to impressive offensive firepower, combatants also possess potent defensive weaponry.

This upgrading of forces is reflected in operations as well as hardware. During recent exercises, SOVPACFLT has demonstrated substantial capabilities in integrated operations ranging from simulated attacks on our forces to amphibious landings.

This qualitative improvement will no doubt continue. The numbers of ships in the fleet will probably stay fairly constant—retiring old units as new ones come into the inventory—but the quality of their platforms, weapon systems, and personnel will improve even further. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is a firstline force—one third of the total Soviet naval forces.

(b) SOVPACFLT forces operate primarily from two main bases in the Far East: Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. Surface combatants operate in the Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Continuous ballistic missile submarine patrols are maintained in the Eastern Pacific and near continuous submarine patrols are maintained in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, routine submarine patrols are conducted in WESTPAC.

Through the use of units such as oilers, stores ships, and repair ships, SOVPACFLT has proven its ability to conduct lengthy deployments to distant waters. The Soviets have obtained bases in the Indian Ocean, particularly Somalia, which potentially dominate the trade and oil routes to the Middle East.

(c) Major strengths of SOVPACFLT include:
 • Weaponry—Particularly advanced missiles (Anti-shipping and Anti-Air).
 • Submarines—Long Range Naval Air.

Advanced Surveillance and Command and Control including integration with satellites.

Major Weaknesses: Lack of forward basing facilities in the Pacific and Eastern Indian Oceans and the related dependence on lengthy logistics pipelines.
 • Shipbased air.

Question. (a) Have Soviet ships visited, and do they use some of the Islands in Micronesia for anchorage and resupply?

(b) In your opinion, would the covenant for the Northern Marianas affect the possibility of Soviet use of other parts of Micronesia?

Answer: (a) Most Soviet maritime activity in Micronesia is routine ocean research and fishing. The Trust Territories Pacific Islands (TTPI) are visited

by USSR passenger ships carrying Japanese tourists. TTPI is not presently used for resupply of Soviet ships, but we have seen them anchoring in the vicinity of Pagan Island in the Marianas.

Some specific visits: April 75 research ship Vityaz called at the Ulithi group. June 75 oceanographic research ship Priboy was seen within 3 miles of Agrihan Island. September 75 Pagan Island territorial waters were entered by three U.S.S.R. ships (2 research, 1 tanker).

(b) Northern Marianas Covenant does not presently relate to Soviet use of other ports of the TTPI. This is a subject of other ongoing negotiations.

It is essential that access to TTPI be denied to potentially hostile powers.

Question. Could you give us your views of the current situation along the Sino-Soviet Border? What do you see as the long term trends in that area?

Answer. The Sino-Soviet Border exists in a state of controlled tension vulnerable to local flare-ups and constituting an unbalancing factor in both Soviet and Chinese planning.

The border clashes of 1969 resulted in institutionalized border negotiations. These talks have produced no solutions; but, as a mechanism for conflict resolution, they seem to have been reasonably successful.

The 4500 mile border separates large forces. The balance is such that neither side feels it can afford to withdraw, even partially.

Actual border control involves regional forces, whose historical and ethnic hostilities probably increase the likelihood of minor incidents.

War is always possible, and the Soviets have a "reasonable" option of biting off a chunk of Manchuria.

Question: (a) Is there a changing consensus developing in Japan regarding the military capabilities of Japan?

(b) Are they increasing their defense budget and defense forces?

(c) What military capabilities are getting the most emphasis?

(d) Is there any possibility of the Japanese turning to nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future?

Answer: (a) Yes. The Japanese are far more serious about their defense than before Vietnam.

(b) Not significantly, but remember that our access to Japanese bases is a considerable contribution in itself.

(c) Emphasis appears to be shifting from ground to local air defense and defense, particularly anti-submarine. Ground forces are oriented toward defense. There are no offensive or long range forces.

(d) In my judgment, the Japanese will not pursue development of a nuclear weapons capability unless and until they lose confidence in the United States.

Question. For the past several years we have received testimony indicating that the South Korean Ground Forces are capable of deterring and defeating a North Korean attack. Your statement tends to confirm that. Although you say US forces are needed for additional deterrence, there is substantial concern in the country that the US Second Division, while not absolutely needed for fighting against a North Korean attack, would be immediately drawn into a conflict by reason of its location, possibly without the approval of the US Government. Would you comment on a plan to remove US Ground Forces from Korea over several years, provided that (1) tactical air forces are improved, (2) South Korean Ground Forces are improved by providing needed modern equipment and supplies, and (3) the South Korean military equipment production capability is increased? Could you comment on the time frame and costs of such a plan?

Answer. The ROK Armed Forces have evolved into an extremely capable professional organization. Our support and assistance have been major factors in that evolution. At the same time, North Korea has developed very strong military forces including superior armor, artillery and air with assistance from the communist world, and has the capability for surprise attack. The US forces remain a critical element in the deterrence of the North. The 2nd Division is not, however, in a "tripwire" position. US Forces can stay in reserve, and with "bugging out," should a conflict begin and they can be withheld or committed as determined by our Constitutional processes.

Ground forces, and, later, air forces can be withdrawn when ROK strength and the external situation are such that risk of attack from the north is small.

We should not attempt to fix a date but bend our efforts toward helping ROK attain self sufficiency.

The general outline of the withdrawal plan is correct, but neither time nor cost can be accurately predicted now. They depend largely on the North Korean

regime. It is clear that South Korea will bear most of the costs. And that several years will be required.

Question. There are those who argue that since we have no military forces in Southeast Asia and it is unlikely that we will reintroduce them there is no need for our bases in the Philippines. Would you give us the reasons for retaining the bases we have in the Philippines, the status of negotiations with the Philippine Government for renewal of those base rights and the importance of the Philippines to any military plans we have?

Answer. We need Philippine bases primarily to support the operation and maintenance of the Seventh Fleet, and to help provide air power and air logistics in the base areas of the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans.

U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia raised grave doubts among Pacific nations as to USG resolve to maintain a strong Pacific presence as a balance to anticipated projection of PRC/USSR power. Point four of President Ford's Pacific Policy emphasized the "United States continuing stake in the stability and security of Southeast Asia," and did much to allay the apprehensions of our friends and allies.

With regard to US-Philippines Base Negotiations, Secretary of State Kissinger is scheduled to meet with Foreign Secretary Romulo in April in Washington to establish the basic ground rules under which the negotiations will proceed. Negotiations on the technical level will take place in Manila shortly thereafter between Ambassador Sullivan and GOP counterparts.

The Philippine bases cannot be replaced; there is no other geography that meets the need, and no prospect of duplicating the very large investment made.

However, I believe that our common security interest is well understood in Manila, and I foresee no fundamental problem in attaining a satisfactory agreement in the clear interest of both countries and the entire area.

Question. The Senate recently approved the Marianas Covenant, which would make the Northern Marianas a Commonwealth of the United States.

(a) If this covenant is approved by both Houses of the Congress, will this impose an additional defense burden on the United States?

(b) Will it provide the US with additional military capabilities it does not now have?

(c) What would be the advantages and disadvantages of moving some of our forward based troops such as those on Okinawa back to Guam?

Answer: (a) No, in a limited way it will facilitate our defense. We have in effect an option which we can exercise in an emergency.

(b) The Northern Marianas could provide limited additional military capabilities such as exercise and training areas, but from a military point of view, its commonwealth status only provides assurance that we can continue to consider an area in close proximity to our base in Guam and that foreign countries would be excluded.

(c) There are some advantages in basing our forces on US territory where they would not be subject to base right negotiations with another country. There are, however, overriding disadvantages vis-a-vis Okinawa: It's too far away from critical strategic points.

(d) It's too small. There is no access to an industrial economy for support. We can't afford to duplicate the major facilities in Okinawa.

(e) It's a very poor place to keep large numbers of troops.

Question: On page 12 of your statement you said that "It would be profoundly destabilizing in all of this vast area," if the present perception of American power should change.

(f) Does this vast area encompass primarily Northeast Asia or does it extend over a greater region?

(g) In your estimate, how large a reduction or how radical a relocation of power would be necessary to change the perception of the American power in Japan?

(h) In the Pacific generally, how would this change in perception alter the threshold in Korea? Japan?

Answer: (a) The area referred to includes all of the Pacific and Indian Ocean

(b) Any substantial and sudden reduction of US air or ground forces, of squadron or battalion size would change the perception of American power in Japan. Small changes, over time, coordinated with the ROK, and matched to ROK improvement should not be destabilizing. Japanese reaction would be similar.

(c) A change in perception of American power could lead to increased Russian adventurism throughout the area. Smaller countries would feel compelled to make their adjustments to Russian power. In addition, North Korea might be encouraged to attack South Korea. The nuclear threshold is directly related to the ability of the South Koreans to defend themselves and the amount of conventional support provided by the U.S. A lower conventional capability creates pressures for a nuclear alternative, and thus lowers the nuclear threshold.

Question: (a) What efforts are being made at present to increase interservice consolidation of Pacific support activities?

(b) In what areas is there room for improvement?

(c) What specific steps would you suggest to increase interservice support activities?

Answer: (a) A formal inter-service support structure exists to expedite consolidation opportunities in PACOM. It has had some success but much more remains to be accomplished. The structure provides for selected study groups and review boards at all levels. Consolidation proposals are audited by DOD Audit Office, Pacific to validate feasibility and savings. Fifty-one potential consolidations of support functions or activities are currently in progress.

(b) Primary areas for improvement are consolidation of real property maintenance, procurement, civilian personnel management and calibration. Secondary areas being reviewed include medical, housing administration, maintenance and storage of equipment and ammunition.

(c) Vest directive authority to resolve differences and expedite actions. Provide flexibility in manpower and fund ceilings to permit easy and rapid transfer between services to compensate for inter-service support. An example of a successful inter-service consolidation is the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC). All of the various services' (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) intelligence assets in PACOM were combined into a single unit to provide intelligence support to CINCPAC, the component commands, operational forces and higher authority. The resulting organization provides vastly improved intelligence and does so with 362 fewer people.

Question: What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of moving the U.S. Second Division away from the DMZ, perhaps south of Seoul? Please explore political, military, and economic advantages and disadvantages.

Answer: The Second Infantry Division is deployed 20 kilometers south of the DMZ in Corps Reserve except for one company at Panmunjon. Relocation of the division south of Seoul is not feasible due to costs (estimated several hundred millions), loss of training and nonavailability of real estate. Relocation is not necessary to keep our options open. The need for a U.S. presence will lessen as ROK forces mature and modernize. However, as long as U.S. forces remain, these forces should be deployed for optimum deterrent effect.

The U.S. Second Infantry Division is a significant deterrent to aggression from the North. Relocation south of Seoul could be perceived by the ROK and North Korea as a lessening of U.S. resolve and could invite attack from North Korea. The presence of the Second Infantry Division is part of the delicate balance which exists in North East Asia.

Question: (a) Could you please tell us what recent changes you can see in the North Korean defense effort?

(b) Has the desire for unification changed?

(c) Has there been any noticeable change in the Soviet Union or People's Republic of China support of North Korea military?

Answer: (a) It cannot properly be called a defense effort. Except for the small North Korean forces are designed primarily as offensive. The Army Forces of North Korea have been engaged in a modernization program since about 1970. This program is across-the-board and includes aircraft, artillery, tanks, ships and command and control. A large part of new naval and ground equipment is domestically produced.

(b) Pyongyang retains the goal of unification by force as necessary of the entire Korean peninsula under an independent communist regime. The tunnels under the DMZ are powerful evidence of her aggressive intentions.

(c) We have not detected any change in Soviet or PRC support of NK. Moscow and Peking appear unwilling to support a more aggressive North Korea.

Question: Assess the political and social climate surrounding the stationing of US troops in Japan, particularly in Okinawa. What suggestion—including reduction in force levels—do you have to reduce whatever tensions may exist between the US troops and the Japanese people?

Answer: Japan relies on the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security as a cornerstone of its defense policies. As such, the Government of Japan (GOJ) considers the presence of US forces in Japan as a reasonable price to pay to support the treaty and to demonstrate the viability of the US-Japan security relationship. Opposition political factions continue to use the presence of US forces and attendant fallouts, e.g., base irritants, environmental pollution, and civil crimes committed by US forces personnel, as convenient political issues. Despite this, the GOJ has steadfastly supported the presence of US forces, having declared that current US force levels in Japan are "just right."

There are no indications of tensions existing between US forces and the general Japanese public. Isolated incidents have occurred, usually exacerbated by media coverage and opposition political factions, particularly on Okinawa.

A large reduction in US forces on Okinawa would not eliminate the occasional incidents. Moreover, there is no other suitable forward deployed locations for any forces removed.

Question: (a) What are the advantages and disadvantages to the current US basing posture in Japan?

(b) How would you restructure US forces if you could do it tomorrow?

(c) For the long term?

Answer: (a) The Japanese bases and industrial capability are keys to our military strategy in Northeast Asia. They are essential to the protection of sea lanes needed for the defense of Japan and Korea. Facilities in Japan also provide the hub of an extensive communications network in the East Asia/Western Pacific region and provide a vital link in the US intelligence network. There are military disadvantages to our bases in Japan.

(b) I would continue consolidations of forces and facilities, while maintaining operating bases, cost effective logistic support, and troop beddown.

(c) There are no suitable long term alternatives to our bases in Japan in view of our requirement to be able to deal with sea and air power in the Soviet Far East, maintain our advantageous security and other relationships with Japan, and carry out our commitment to regional security and stability. Replacement of the logistics installations alone, if alternative forward locations were available, would be prohibitive.

Question: (a) What does the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security require of each party to the treaty?

(b) How does this affect our force levels and force structure in Japan and Okinawa?

Answer: (a) Four key requirements in the treaty are: (1) Maintain and develop capabilities to resist armed attack by means of effective and continuous self-help and mutual aid. (4) Consult from time-to-time on implementation of the treaty and whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. (3) Act to meet armed attack against the US or Japan within Japanese administered territories. (4) Japan provides facilities and areas for US forces to contribute to the security of Japan to maintain international peace and security in the Far East.

(b) US force levels and structure in Japan have been determined by the estimated defense needs of the United States and of Japan. There is mutual agreement through continuing consultations. As the Japanese self defense capabilities increased, US combat units were reduced and emphasis was placed on maintaining a logistic base to support US and allied forces. Present US force levels and structure are tailored to maintain credibility of US commitments to allies in Asia and as a deterrent force. Our forward presence is particularly important. We maintain logistic base and combat forces which could be expanded during emergencies.

Question: What percent of Japan's GNP is for national defense?

Answer: Japan's defense FY 76 budget is \$5 billion, 0.9 percent of GNP. The quoted value of the US bases cannot be accurately estimated, but it is large.

Question: Will all US combat forces be out of Thailand by the end of FY 76? How many military and civilian personnel will remain after FY 76? In what capacity will these people serve?

Answer: (8) All US tactical combat forces have been withdrawn from Thailand. [Deleted.] Our presence in Thailand is, of course, subject to ongoing US-Soviet negotiations, and there are strong indications of possible major changes at writing.

Question: How much US combat equipment will remain in Thailand in FY 76? What purpose will it serve?

Answer. All US combat units and unit equipment have been withdrawn from Thailand and none are planned to be there in FY 77. A negligible amount of combat equipment will be left for base security.

Question. You say in your statement that Thailand is plagued with insurgencies and threatened by her communist neighbors. What effect do these problems have on US forces in Thailand?

Answer. To date, the insurgency has been limited to Thailand's border areas and has not had an effect on US forces in Thailand. So far, we have not detected insurgent plans to target US forces.

Question. The 1972 Shanghai communique requires the ultimate withdrawal of US forces in Taiwan. When do you think this withdrawal can best be completed?

Answer. We have substantially reduced our forces on Taiwan from approximately 10,000 in 1972 to under 3,000 today. None are tactical combat forces. The questions of timing and political consequences are for appropriate authority in the executive and the Congress.

Question. Will it be necessary to relocate the forces withdrawn from Taiwan? Where would it be best to relocate them? Where is the planned place for their relocation?

Answer. There are no US combat forces remaining on Taiwan. Remaining personnel, when withdrawn, will be reassigned to other activities as needed.

Question. What is the present feeling among the people of Taiwan about the Shanghai Communique and the subsequent withdrawal of US Forces?

Answer. Following the shock of initial US-PRC contacts, the ROC has shown determination to survive politically, economically, and militarily.

The ROC reaction to President Ford's 1975 visit to PRC was low-key. For defense of Taiwan, Premier Chiang has stated ROC can manage without US troops but will require materiel and spiritual support from the US.

In line with promoting self-reliance, ROC has begun to shift emphasis away from US-supplied arms to Taiwan production of weapons and equipment. The people of Taiwan appear stoic; no visible panic about the future; and appear primarily concerned with routine daily economic, social, and political considerations.

It appears that despite political setbacks remarkable economic progress will sustain Taiwan if it does not suffer major external attack.

Question. What new military facilities can the Northern Marianas provide?

Answer. The Northern Marianas provide land (approximately 17,800 acres on Tinian) which could be used as a training area for amphibious forces and the military exercises. The uninhabited island of Farallon de Medinilla (approximately 206 acres) provides a suitable area for training our air and sea forces in weapons delivery. There are no current plans to build bases or other major military facilities in the Northern Marianas, but the reserved acreage on Tinian is an option for emergency.

Question. You have mentioned the essentiality of bases in the Philippines making specific reference to Clark Air Force Base and the Navy facilities at Subic Bay. (a) Will you please expand on the usefulness of the Bases?

(b) What would happen if, for some reason, they were denied to us?

Answer: (a) US naval and air operations in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean areas are heavily dependent upon the support provided from Philippines bases. The Subic Bay complex is a major ship repair and logistical support facility and conducts the bulk of the ship repairs for our 7th Fleet. The port and aircraft facilities are among the finest in the world. A major consideration is the relative costs of ship repairs at naval facilities in the Pacific. We estimate a reasonable mandatory rate at Subic ship repair facility. Clark Air Base is a highly developed complex of facilities for our forward deployed tactical fighter force and serves as a major hub for airlifted logistic support activities in the Pacific. Clark also provides the only scoreable aircraft firing range in the Southwest Pacific. It is used extensively by Air Force, Navy and Marine aircraft. With Clark as a refueling base, our airlift support aircraft would be severely limited in the capability to provide efficient logistics resupply to forces operating in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.

(b) If they were denied us, our position vis-a-vis Russia would decline. costs would soar, and our ability to influence events would suffer.

In the worst case our ability to link with Allies and even to defend the United States would suffer because of loss of sea control.

Question. What is the status of the insurgency in the Philippines?

Answer. The Philippine's Government is faced with both Communist and Muslim insurrections. Neither seriously threatens the Government at the present time.

The Muslim rebellion, much more serious of the two, draws heavily on the actions' resources. A large share of the Philippine Armed Forces is committed against the rebel bands. Strenuous government efforts to reach political settlement have not yet borne fruit. External support of the insurgency continues to be a problem.

The other insurgency, conducted by the Maoist-Communist New Peoples' Army of the Pacific (Guam and the Marianas), has sometimes been described as a possible "fallback" position if other bases are denied to us. Will you please discuss this concept? What are the plans for Guam and the Marianas?

Answer. We have studied Guam and the Marianas as alternatives to our major denial of foreign bases in the Pacific. The Marianas could provide a limited fallback location for some forces in the Western Pacific. The Marianas could provide a small when compared with the Muslim conflict. Most prevalent in North and South Luzon and the Northern Visayas, this insurgency consists of infrequent raids and ambushes, usually against government forces.

Question. The Senate has recently approved the Marianas Compact. That part of the Pacific (Guam and the Marianas) has sometimes been described as a

possible "fallback" position if other bases are denied to us. Will you please discuss this concept? What are the plans for Guam and the Marianas?

Answer. We have studied Guam and the Marianas as alternatives to our major denial of foreign bases in the Pacific. The Marianas could provide a limited fallback location for some forces in the Western Pacific. Construction and maintenance costs would be high. There is no skilled labor force and construction materials and equipment would have to be imported. More importantly, US Forces would be further removed from potential contingency areas. (A detailed Pacific basing study has been forwarded to the Senate Armed Services Committee by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.)

Question. In your testimony you talked about Diego Garcia and said that it is no way be considered to be a major operating base; will you tell us what sea and air activities are planned from the projected facilities on Diego Garcia?

Answer. The lagoon at Diego Garcia is being dredged to provide an anchorage which could accommodate a carrier task group and logistic support ships. Fuel

storage is being increased to provide an assured supply to our ships on periodic deployments. The airfield at Diego Garcia is being extended to 12,000 feet. The present and projected use of the airfield is to support:

- (1) Logistic flights resupplying the activities on the island.
- (2) Maritime air patrol missions over the Indian Ocean.
- (3) Possible contingency and search and rescue missions, disaster relief efforts, and to accommodate air refueling of transport aircraft.
- (4) Fall-back or alternate heavy airlift to the Middle East in event of denial of the Atlantic-Mediterranean routes.

Question. A year ago it appeared that all US Forces were to be withdrawn from Thailand by Thai Government request. You have testified that the drawdown will be "almost to zero," and press accounts say 3,000 American military personnel will remain. What is the projected force level?

Answer. Under present plans, the US Force level in Thailand at the end of March 1976 is projected to be less than 4,000 personnel. [Deleted.] The specific number is currently being negotiated with the RTG. It may possibly turn out to be much lower. [Deleted.]

Question. What purpose is served by keeping US Military Forces in Thailand, now that the Vietnam War is over and we are no longer engaged there?

Answer. (S) There are several important missions carried out by US Forces in Thailand. They include communications and data collection facilities at Chiang Mai, Ko Kradan and Rama 8; Seato Medical Laboratory, US Defense Attaché, Bangkok area; and limited air operations at U-tapao. [Deleted.] At Rama 8, personnel will provide advice and assistance to Thai personnel in the operations of US provided equipment and assist the RTG in providing rapid and secure communications and research into electronic phenomena. At Bangkok the Seato Medical Laboratory conducts studies and research into the causes, cures and

prevention of tropical diseases. The US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) performed representational functions for DOD and each branch of the Armed Forces and provides Armed Forces Attachés on the Embassy Staff as advisors to the Ambassador and the country team.

The major task of JUSMAG is to supervise Thai end-item utilization of US furnished equipment. JUSMAG personnel review US funded equipment, country requests for purchase of equipment and weapons, and make appropriate recommendations to US State and Defense Agencies. Recent turnover of US bases to Thailand requires JUSMAG elements to monitor distribution and use of transferred material. [Deleted.] U-tapao [deleted] serves as a safehaven for our aircraft evacuated from other PACOM bases because of adverse weather conditions. In addition, the joint casualty resolution center (JCRC) and central identification laboratory (CIL) located at U-tapao assist in resolving the fate of US personnel still missing in Southeast Asia. All US activities in Thailand are subject to ongoing US-RTG negotiations.

Question. Will you comment on the Cambodian Government's charge last week that American aircraft—including a F-111—made a bombing attack on the provincial capital of Siem Riep?

Answer. The Cambodian Government's charge is completely false. We have no F-111 aircraft in the area. We have no fighter/bomber aircraft, of any kind, in the area.

The ammunition explosions at Siem Riep were probably caused by anti-communist insurgents, or accidentally by the Cambodians themselves. Conjecture accusations are a cover up by local communist cadre for their own shortcomings.

Question. What is the status of the insurgency in Thailand?

Answer. There has been no major change recently in the insurgency in Thailand. It grows slowly from year to year.

The falls of Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia have resulted in increased external support to the insurgents. We anticipate a rise in activity level and expect more participation by ethnic Thais, including cadre trained in North Vietnam.

Senator Nunn. We will go into closed session. Anyone other than staff will be asked to leave.

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee went into closed session.]

MILITARY PROCUREMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1977

MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1976

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

MANPOWER

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 4:52 p.m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, the Honorable Sam Nunn [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn and Bartlett.

Also present: Francis Sullivan, Charles Conneely, John Goldsmith, Old, professional staff members; John Ticer, chief clerk; Ujakovich, research assistant; Mary Ketner, clerical assistant; Charlie Stevenson, Senator Culver's staff; Jeff Record, Senator Hart's staff; Ed Miller, Senator Hart's [of Colorado] staff; and Fred Senator Bartlett's staff.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Senator Nunn. The subcommittee will come to order. This will be a closed session, and all persons not associated with this committee or its witnesses today have left the room.

Do we have some people here from the Defense Department. Would you please introduce yourselves for the record and indicate whether or not you are properly cleared to attend this session.

Colonel HARRICK. I am Col. Stephen R. Harrick. I am with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and I certify that the individuals are properly cleared to be here.

Maj. WEBB. Maj. Gerald Webb, W-e-b-b, Plans Office, Office of Legislative Liaison, Department of the Army.

Colonel KOMORNIK. Col. Ronald G. Komornik, with SHAPE Headquarters.

Capt. JOHN McNEARNEY. Capt. John McEneaney, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Lt. Colonel COLONEL ABEL. Lt. Col. Richard Abel, Staff of PAC.

Colonel HARRICK. All are cleared for at least top secret.

Senator Nunn. Would you please check to make sure that the staff are here should be here?