

STATE/USIA AUTHORIZATIONS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 3117

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

S. 3118

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

AND

S. 3119

TO AMEND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE APPROPRIATIONS
AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1973 AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE
BUILDINGS ACT, 1926

MARCH 11 AND 12, 1974



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matter entirely within the discretion of the Congress, and as such the Department of State neither advocates nor opposes such action upon it as Congress may take.

In the Department of State's view the Cuban Resolution of 1962 continues to reflect United States policy toward Cuba. However, the Cuban Resolution also as a statement of policy is unlike other legislation affecting Cuba in that it has no substantive effect upon the powers of the Legislative and Executive Branches with respect to matters involving relations between Cuba and the United States. The Executive Branch has not depended upon Public Law 87-733 as its legal or constitutional authority for measures that have been taken in this regard.

I hope the foregoing statement will be useful to you in the Committee's consideration of action with respect to S. 2802. If you should have any further questions, please do not hesitate to let me know.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely yours,

LINWOOD HOLTON,

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Senator PELL. I would say this bill is preparatory to any further action in this regard. I think I was the last Member of Congress to go to Cuba. I went just prior to being sworn in in 1961.

I have come to the conclusion we really ought to normalize our relations there. The amazing thing is that while the magazine, "Human Events" criticized me, I received favorable response from some of the Cuban refugees, the nonprofessional Cubans, the Cubans who are living in New York and the Cubans in Florida who want to see resumption of normal relations so they can get back in touch with their families. I would hope we could move quickly ahead on this.

STATE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO S. RES. 71

My next question concerns weather modification, and in this regard, as you know, we have also sent up some months ago a copy of S. Res. 71, which was a resolution that was passed by an 82 to 10 vote in the Senate.

I have a covering letter from the Secretary of the Senate to the White House asking for the State Department's reaction for this proposal calling for the nonuse or abrogation of use of weather or geophysical means as weapons of warfare. So far we have not been able to get a reply.

When can we hope for a reply?

Mr. SISCO. Senator, having been in this job of Under Secretary for Political Affairs for 2 weeks I don't want to make a rash promise and say to you—

Senator PELL. You have been in the Department for 30 years.

Mr. SISCO. I hope that our responses will be more expeditious than that, but let me look into that one as well.

[The information referred to follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE REACTION TO S. RES. 71

[Supplied by Department of State]

Mr. Sisco notes that the Secretary wrote to Senator Pell about this subject on November 5, 1973. In his letter the Secretary assured Senator Pell that Senate Resolution 71 must be taken very seriously. The Secretary also said that although his letter was not a coordinated Executive Branch reply to Senator Fulbright's letter of March 21, 1973, he would look closely into the matter to determine how we might be responsive to the Resolution's recommendations. Herman Pollack, Director of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technical Affairs, testified on the Resolution on January 25 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Oceans and the International

Senator PELL. Are you aware at all of any dragging of the feet by any other Government department in trying to secure a reaction in this regard?

Mr. Sisco. I am not.

Senator PELL. As soon as you look into it, I am sure you will become aware of that.

NAVAL FACILITY ON DIEGO GARCIA

In connection with Diego Garcia, I have introduced an amendment seeking to knock that ill-considered proposal, in my view, out of the Defense Department budget.

I would like to ask you several questions in greater detail than the Chairman asked you earlier.

At what stage are the negotiations with Great Britain in this regard? In other words, has the agreement been signed for the enlargement or is it still under negotiation?

Mr. Sisco. It has been agreed to on an ad referendum basis; in other words, the negotiators have achieved an agreement subject to the approval of their respective governments.

Senator PELL. Does that mean approval by the executive branch or will it be referred to the Senate?

Mr. Sisco. I think I will have Mr. Weiss address himself to this because he has been dealing with this over the past months.

Mr. Weiss. If I might just add, the executive branch has, of course, conducted some consultations with the Congress. I think you are familiar with those. The Congress in addition will have four cracks at the program. It will be submitted first as it is now, the authorization bill of the Department of Defense, be voted on by both Houses, then it will be subsequently resubmitted, of course, for the appropriation stage, and that is what the current plans of the administration are for achieving congressional approval.

Senator PELL. What about the executive agreement itself? Will that be sent up to us for approval?

Mr. Weiss. Not as such, no.

Senator PELL. But it will be sent up to us in accordance with the present procedure. We will be notified of it?

Mr. Weiss. Absolutely. It will be essentially an amendment. As you know, the original agreement was signed in 1966 with the British General Covering Agreement which, of course, was discussed with the Congress at that time.

Then I believe it was in 1972 there was an agreement to establish the communication facilities. This will be basically a further agreement along those lines to provide for the naval facility.

Senator PELL. Getting into the specifics of the proposal, the Navy says they need to beef up the Diego Garcia as an answer to the Soviet's move in Somalia, but the Soviet position is that they had to go in Somalia as perhaps an offset to some of our efforts in Ethiopia, and other efforts we have made.

If we move ahead with this project, how many Navy personnel do you see permanently stationed at Diego Garcia?

Mr. Sisco. There are no plans at present for any permanent stationing of naval personnel.

(?) No

Mr. WEISS. Of combat personnel that is right.

Right now there is something like 275 men there who are basically technicians, mechanics, and so forth. That will be raised to approximately 475, sir.

U.S. MAJOR AND MINOR OVERSEAS BASES

Senator PELL. There used to be a differentiation between those American overseas bases which had more than 500 and less than 500 American people at them. Those with more than 500 were called major; those with less than 500 were called minor. My recollection is we have something like 1,800 bases, 300 of which have over 500 people.

Is there any reason why you could not furnish for the record an unclassified map showing those bases and the differentiation between the two types?

Mr. SISCO. We will certainly try to provide a map in the classified or unclassified category. We will do our best in this regard. Whatever is available we will put it together.

Senator PELL. I think it would be interesting because I have never seen a map of that sort and it would illustrate some of the concerns that we have.

Why would it be classified?

Mr. SISCO. I doubt that it would be, but in any event I am not aware we have such a map and we will try to put one together.

Senator PELL. I would like to formally request on behalf of the committee that your geographer or somebody in the Department prepare for inclusion in this record such a chart. If you have to omit any bases for military security reasons, at least let us know, if necessary on a classified basis, the numbers and sites of those you have not been able to include.

I think this would be a service to the committee and to the public. [The information referred to is in the Committee files.]

EXTENSION OF FACILITY ON DIEGO GARCIA

Senator PELL. Going back to Diego Garcia, is the Air Force involved in these plans or is this mainly a Navy base?

Mr. SISCO. There is planned in this extension of the facility, the expansion of, extension of a runway to something like 12,000 feet, and then there is expansion of air field parking areas, and so that the Air Force is involved. Aircraft maintenance facilities as well.

I think what they have got in mind, if I recall, that the Secretary of Defense testified something like one air transport hangar and that kind of thing.

COST OF MAINTAINING PRESENT CUBA POLICY

Senator PELL. Returning for a second to Cuba.

Could you furnish us now or for the record the present expenses involved in maintaining our Cuban policy, the cost of administering the quarantine regulations, the refugee and exile programs.

Mr. SISCO. I will put that in the record.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

direct attack say by the Soviet Union on the United States, there are now options under this new conception which would give pause to any potential aggressor; he would have to take the prospect of feasible responses into account. That is the basic premise under which it is formulated.

ADDITIONAL FUNDING, DECLARATORY POLICY AND EXISTING CAPACITY

Senator PERL. To bore right into that point, is it not correct that right now we have the ability to conduct such a limited operation without talking about it in advance or without any additional funding or additional weaponry?

Mr. WEISS. I think you raised several very good points and, if I may just sort of break them down, one has to do, for example, with, do we need additional funding of newer weapons and so forth?

The second is, do we need to talk about it; that is, have a declaratory policy?

And third, do we have the capacity within our existing weaponry? And I think those are all very relevant questions.

Let me try to briefly address each of them.

We have always had within our strategic planning the targeting of noncities, the so-called counterforce targets, and I am not just now talking about missile sites; I am talking about the range of targets which it would be logical, if indeed there is any logic to a nuclear engagement, to target.

I think the difficulty with previous plans of this sort, Senator, was that they were massive. Even the smallest option was very, very large indeed, and therein lay a significant problem, the question of whether that could be distinguished by an adversary as being a limited response more appropriate to the nature of the transgression that they might have committed.

So in the first instance our new planning is designed to give ourselves additional flexibility, have more options, not having the smallest option being a very, very massive one.

The second question relates to the additional funding of new systems. It is my understanding, although you will want to go to the expert in the Pentagon, although we worked very closely with them, and I would like to assure the committee that the State Department did have that opportunity right along, it is not the intent, as I now understand it, for the Pentagon to come in for massive new programs. It is basically a reprogramming, as you were implying in your comment, of what is already available to make it more flexibly responsive to the control of the executive in the particular contingency that may arise.

Finally, the question that you asked is, why did we have to talk about it? Well, the general premise, sir, is that if we articulate fairly clearly what we have in mind, if we are careful to do so in a way which does not imply that we suddenly stumbled upon a panacea to heal all of the world's military and political ills, or that we are going to rely readily on nuclear weapons, which is not the message we are trying to get across, our articulation can be useful. Rather, we hope to make clear to all our allies who, if I might digress on this point for just a second, there has been a growing concern expressed by various allies to whom we are committed that our prior strategy of a massive response

might not be applicable to the kind of threats that they face, that we have options more credible for supporting our commitments to them.

Now, you will be interested in knowing that we have had a rather favorable response so far with the articulation of this new strategy. Western Europeans can see more readily how a more limited response to an attack on Western Europe might, in fact, represent a more effective deterrent to that attack occurring.

It is precisely for these sorts of reasons, to make it clear to both allies and potential adversaries, that these kinds of capabilities exist so that they may, in fact, preclude precisely those situations from occurring, that it was felt desirable to have some articulation of the policy.

IS COUNTERFORCE REASSURANCE TO ALLIES?

Senator PELL. Do you believe that this counterforce or the emphasis on counterforce is reassurance to our allies?

Mr. WEISS. I would, if I may, sir, I would rather not—again you really should get some experts from the Pentagon here—but I would rather not typify it solely as a counterforce strategy. It is a strategy that gives a much wider range of options to the national command authorities, by far for limited responses going up the scale, if that is what the situation required. As a matter of fact, the allies, and we have had discussions with them, both private and public, have, in fact, been reassured by this because I think they believe, as we do, and I cannot emphasize this point too much, that this contributes to deterrence, to the prospect that a war is less likely to occur rather than to the contrary.

Senator PELL. I see the point that you are making, and Mr. Schlesinger has made it, very effectively, in private to our committee. Yet I find myself plagued with doubts about it.

I guess this would be a discussion we will be having for many weeks, if not months, as we move along.

STATE DEPARTMENT ROLE IN DIEGO GARCIA DECISION

Let me touch on Diego Garcia for a final question: What was the State Department's role in this decision?

For example, prior to moving ahead, was any thought given to exploring with the Soviet Union the possibility of demilitarizing the Indian Ocean?

Mr. DONALDSON. I did not participate in any discussions of that sort myself.

Senator PELL. I think Mr. Weiss did, though.

Mr. DONALDSON. If I could ask Mr. Weiss.

Mr. WEISS. Yes, sir; I did.

As I know that you are aware, in early 1971 the Soviet Union raised some questions which suggested to us that they may have had in mind the prospect of some degree of arms limitation in that area of the world. We rather rapidly followed that up to see just how deep and extensive this intent was, and to be perfectly candid about it, we did not get a very positive response.

Now, I would like, however, to relate that more directly to your question on Diego Garcia.

As we viewed it, and by "we" I do mean the State Department, working with Defense, the development of the facilities at Diego Garcia is in and of itself in no way inconsistent with developing an arms control arrangement with the Soviets. It is essentially a facility to allow deployment and we believe if there were subsequently to be agreements with the Soviet Union, it would be on the question of the size, the nature and so forth of those deployments.

The facility at Diego Garcia which we do have in mind expanding is designed to give us essentially a capacity roughly comparable to what the Soviets already have.

I believe Secretary Sisco mentioned to you this morning that, by a variety of measures—ship days is one such measure that we utilize—the Soviets have a presence about four times ours. Ship days is not the only or possible reliable measure, but in terms of the composition of the force, the size and so forth, the Soviets' continuous presence in the area has been growing. We have looked rather deeply into all of these. Since 1968 when the Soviet Union first came into the area, its presence has grown very, very substantially while ours has remained essentially unaltered. So what we basically are looking for in the Diego facility, Senator, is the capacity to permit deployment, if decisions are made to deploy forces, so that those forces may be efficiently, economically serviced.

If it should turn out that at some future date the United States and the Soviet Union find it possible to reach an agreement on limiting forces, I would give it as my own personal estimate that it is unlikely such a limitation would go down to zero because we have very important interests which preceded the Soviet Navy in this area. Those interests would continue to exist.

You have had extensive discussions throughout this day on the importance of the oil. Ninety to a hundred percent of the oil going to Japan and to our European allies comes from that area so there are important interests that we have quite independent of the Soviet Union, and I therefore think that the facility, the capacity to deploy comparable to what the Soviets already enjoy in that area of the world is logical and reasonable. I think I could even argue, although I recognize that reasonable difference of view on this would certainly be possible, that it could even facilitate having an arms control agreement.

OBJECTIONS OF BORDERING NATIONS TO DIEGO GARCIA PROPOSAL

Senator PELL. As you suggest, there are grounds for argument here because the riposte can be that we already have certain facilities in that part of the world, in Ethiopia, that we have the size of the vessels that are involved and that you have an aircraft carrier which is probably larger than Soviet vessels. Also, there is the interesting reaction of the bordering nations, because my recollection is that New Zealand which is not bordering, Australia which is, India which is, and there is one other whose name I forget, all objected to our moving ahead with this proposal.

Do you have any views why the people who would be most affected would not share your belief in the advisability of the system?

Mr. WEISS. You are correct.

A significant number of the nations have expressed reservations concerning the wisdom of this action; however in fact, sir, our analysis suggests that it was somewhat milder than we had anticipated before the public announcement was made.

There are a variety of reasons explaining this. I am sure, and I want to be careful not to cast any aspersions upon the motivations, I am sure that they are in many cases idealistic and highly motivated. The fact of the matter is, as you know, for example, Sri Lanka offered a nuclear free zone proposal in the Indian Ocean, a zone of peace, I have forgotten the exact nomenclature. That has come up in the U.N. three times and almost all of the major maritime powers, interestingly enough, including the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and so forth, and ourselves have abstained from such a resolution.

I think, sir, this is simply a reflection of a difference of view about what the practicalities of this world are. It would be very nice if not only the Indian Ocean but other oceans as well could be kept entirely neutralized, entirely free.

I think as long as there are important interests that we have, that others have, there probably will be naval forces in those areas. This has certainly been historically a role which naval force has played. We hope that it can actually contribute to stability. But we certainly have no intention of threatening the littoral states. To the contrary, we hope that our presence there stabilizes it.

Senator PELL. Thank you. This is an area in which you have presented your view very articulately. We will just have to agree to disagree.

It is a basic concept of whether America should be the dominant force in every ocean in the world except the Arctic and the Antarctic. I would think that to be the dominant force in one or two should satisfy us, but this is a question that, as you pointed out, we will not agree on here.

There is a vote going on on the other side so I will have to recess this hearing. I would thank Mr. Donaldson and the State Department witnesses for coming up today.

[Additional questions for the record and State Department responses follow:]

ADDITIONAL QUESTION OF SENATOR GALE MCGEE AND STATE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE

Question No. 1. In studying the Department of State authorization request for fiscal year 1975, I was very disturbed to note that on page 35 of the presentation, only \$110,000,000 had been requested for the United Nations Development Program. It is my understanding that of that total amount requested, \$19.5 million is to be used to "pay back" sums taken from the fiscal 1974 authorization which allowed us to make a \$90 million contribution to UNDP in calendar year 1973.

My concern stems from the fact that our proposed contribution to UNDP in both calendar years 1974 and 1975, reduces the U.S. participation in that program to 20.3 percent of the total contributions.

Last year, the Committee on Foreign Relations noted in its report on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 that:

The Committee is gratified with the resolution of the last General Assembly which endorsed the principle of a 25% ceiling on the U.S. contribution to the United Nations regular budget. However, a reduction in our contribution to UNDP, following the same principle, might cause many governments to reconsider their support for reducing the U.S. contribution when the report of the Committee on Contributions is submitted to the General Assembly for final approval in the fall. To many other governments, our sup-

PUBLIC ATTITUDE POLLS

Picking up one of the points you mentioned, Bangladesh, do we have any means of measuring what public opinion is toward us? Do we still conduct polls?

Mr. AUSTIN. No, sir, there is no polling organization in Bangladesh that we can contract with, and they are not interested in having us do it ourselves.

Senator PELL. Doesn't the USIA take polls in any part of the world at this time?

Mr. AUSTIN. Yes, we do in certain countries.

Senator PELL. Which countries?

Mr. AUSTIN. Well, public attitude polls we don't conduct in many of the countries that I represent. We do conduct media product survey research in several countries. For example, our Arabic language magazine has been checked into in Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco to see whether people liked this format and content. Public attitude polls we do not conduct in our countries. There are other polls relating to media which are conducted; VOA for example, to determine listener attitude. These kind of surveys are conducted in several countries.

PERSONNEL WITH LANGUAGE CAPABILITY

Senator PELL. How many of your Foreign Service Information Officers [FSIO's] speak the language of the area to which they are assigned?

Mr. AUSTIN. 54 percent of those assigned to language-essential positions speak those languages. The language-essential positions, represent, however, an ideal that we are working toward and we have people in language training now but, at the present time 54 percent.

Senator PELL. To my mind that is not good because 100 percent of the people in language-essential positions should have language proficiency.

PERCENTAGE OF FSIC'S IN WASHINGTON

How many people do you have in your office?

Mr. AUSTIN. In Washington?

Senator PELL. Yes.

Mr. AUSTIN. We have 18 in the area office in Washington; 11 are officers and six secretaries and one regional secretary.

Senator PELL. Right.

How many in the field?

Mr. AUSTIN. We have 124 officers in the field.

Senator PELL. Obviously that proportion would change though, if you took the full number of people, of FSIO's in Washington, and compared that number with those in the field. It would come out more, I think, 50-50.

Mr. AUSTIN. I can't indicate what the percentage would be but, of course, there are FSIO's in each of the media.

Senator PELL. Right, I realize that so that is why it would not be too indicative.

REACTION TO OPENING OF BASE AT DIEGO GARCIA

One of USIA's announced roles is to identify and also to influence opinion in foreign countries. What has been learned about the re-

action of the foreign countries around the Pacific Ocean or the Indian Ocean basin to the opening of the base at Diego Garcia?

Mr. AUSTIN. The principle concern has come from India, and there have been several representations made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and the press has had some on that. Ambassador Moynihan has responded to that publicly, and we have transmitted the Department of Defense and Department of State statements relating to the proposed improvements in Diego Garcia.

Senator PELL. All right. I thank you very much indeed. I wonder if Mr. Keogh would be kind enough to come back.

Thank you. It is very good indeed to see you and I think you are doing a fine job in a rather difficult slot. Maybe your people would like to stay with you, I don't know but this is up to you.

I had several questions which have come out of my mind in the last little while and also out of the hearings yesterday.

MORALE OF OFFICERS

First, how would you characterize the morale of the officers under you, middle, lower, upper echelon?

Mr. KEOGH. I would characterize the morale as good.

Senator PELL. I don't want to mislead you, but that is not the same flavor that we got from some of the officers concerned. The problem is that the USIA, I think, is still trying to find its mission.

PERCENTAGE OF FSIO'S STATIONED OVERSEAS

In this regard perhaps to illustrate what I am driving at what percentage of your FSIO's are overseas as compared to those stationed in Washington?

Mr. KEOGH. Mr. Chairman, I don't think I can answer that question with specific numbers.

Senator PELL. Roughly, I think it is about half and half.

Mr. KEOGH. Of the total number of Americans—I think maybe I can get you some specific figures here.

Senator PELL. Right.

Mr. KEOGH. Yes, of our total foreign service people, and these are the figures that we have, the way we have these figures, of our total 938 are in Washington of our foreign service officers, and 1,123 are overseas.

Senator PELL. I am looking at something here that has agency positions, USIA, grand total, domestic 3,100, overseas Americans, 1,184.

What does that mean?

Mr. KEOGH. That is total domestic employment and would include the civil service as well. That includes, that number includes 2,060 civil service employees who work in the United States.

Senator PELL. So what you are saying is that there are about 40 percent of your FSIO's are in America and 60 percent are overseas roughly?

Mr. KEOGH. That is roughly the right percentage.

Senator PELL. Right.

[The information referred to follows:]