

MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUPPLEMENTAL—
FISCAL YEAR 1974

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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2999

A BILL TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING THE
FISCAL YEAR 1974 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MIS-
SILES, NAVAL VESSELS, TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND
OTHER WEAPONS AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST
AND EVALUATION FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND TO
AUTHORIZE CONSTRUCTION AT CERTAIN INSTALLATIONS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

MARCH 12 AND 19, 1974

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

81-367

WASHINGTON : 1974

MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUPPLEMENTAL—FISCAL YEAR 1974

TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 1224, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington (presiding). Present: Senators Symington, Stennis, Cannon, McIntyre, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Hughes, Nunn, Thurmond, Tower, and Taft.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Charles J. Conneely, Hyman Fine, George H. Foster, Jr., John A. Goldsmith, Edward B. Kenney, Don L. Lynch, Gordon A. Nease, Robert Q. Old, and Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members; Christine E. Cowart, clerical assistant; Katherine Nelson, assistant to Senator Symington.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Senator SYMINGTON. The hearing will come to order.

I know how valuable time is to our two distinguished witnesses and we will not wait for other members.

OPENING STATEMENT

The committee meets today to receive testimony from Deputy Secretary Clements and Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on S. 2999, a bill to authorize supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 1974.

Senator Stennis, last January 25, requested that I conduct hearings on this supplemental authorization so as to decide the extent to which the items should be either deleted, recommended as a supplemental, or deferred for the regular 1975 program.

We would observe that the total fiscal year 1974 supplemental appropriations requested by the Department of Defense is \$6,233 million, only a portion of which requires authorization.

S. 2999 is a request for supplemental authorization which includes \$1,225 million for procurement and research and development, \$20 million for construction at the Diego Garcia, \$3,866 million for increased operation and maintenance expenses for military family housing, and an increase in the fiscal year 1974 ceiling on obligational authority for the Military Assistance Service Funded program for South Vietnam and Laos from \$1,126 million to \$1,600 million.

This bill is a significant legislative item involving a number of policy decisions. But the failure of the Defense Department to provide backup material in a timely manner has prevented the committee from making an earlier start on the bill.

I have already written Secretary Schlesinger about this aspect.

I would also note for the benefit of the committee, and frankly of the staff, that Deputy Secretary Clements' statement was made available only this morning so there has been no opportunity for review. The burden of proof both as to urgency and the requirement rests with the Department of Defense. I do not believe the committee should take any action until satisfied that all questions have been completely and satisfactorily answered.

[A copy of S. 2999 follows.]

[S. 2999, 93d Cong., 2d sess.]

A BILL To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1974 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize construction at certain installations, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. In addition to the funds authorized to be appropriated under Public Law 93-155 there is hereby authorized to be appropriated during fiscal year 1974 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

AIRCRAFT

For aircraft: for the Army, \$22,000,000; for the Navy, \$219,200,000; for the Air Force, \$45,000,000.

MISSILES

For missiles: for the Army, \$84,400,000; for the Navy, \$28,600,000; for the Marine Corps, \$22,300,000; for the Air Force, \$39,000,000.

NAVAL VESSELS

For naval vessels: for the Navy, \$24,800,000.

TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES

For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, \$113,600,000.

OTHER WEAPONS

For other weapons: for the Army, \$8,200,000.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION

SEC. 201. In addition to the funds authorized to be appropriated under Public Law 93-155, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1974, for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

For the Army, \$55,043,000;
For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), \$67,828,000;
For the Air Force, \$83,766,000; and
For the Defense Agencies, \$10,852,000.

TITLE III—MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

SEC. 301. (a) The Secretary of the Navy may establish or develop classified military installations and facilities by acquiring, constructing, converting, rehabilitating, or installing permanent or temporary public works, including land

acquisition, site preparation, appurtenances, utilities, and equipment in the total amount of \$29,000,000.

(b) There are authorized to be appropriated for the purpose of this section not to exceed \$29,000,000.

SEC. 302. In addition to the funds authorized to be appropriated under Public Law 93-166, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1974, for use by the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, for military family housing, for operating expenses and maintenance of real property in support of military family housing, an amount not to exceed \$3,866,000.

SEC. 303. Authorizations contained in this title shall be subject to the authorizations and limitations of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1974 (Public Law 93-166), in the same manner as in such authorizations as if they had been included in the Act.

TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. Subsection (a) (1) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367, approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended by deleting "\$1,126,000,000" and inserting "\$1,600,000,000" in lieu thereof, and (b) section 737(a) of Public Law 93-238 (87 Stat. 1044) is amended by deleting "\$1,126,000,000" and inserting "\$1,600,000,000" in lieu thereof.

This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974".

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Moorer, we welcome you here. Do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCCOMPANIED BY ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; TERENCE McCLARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); L. F. KEENAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMY, BUDGET; REAR ADM. EDWARD W. COOKE, DIRECTOR, NAVY, BUDGET; MAJ. GEN. HOWARD M. FISH, DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE, BUDGET; REAR ADM. THOMAS J. BIGLEY, REGIONAL DIRECTOR (EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC), ISA; AND ARTHUR I. MENDOLIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)

Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you read it?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to be with you today to explain the compelling reasons why we believe the additional funds we have requested for fiscal year 1974 are required. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer, has accompanied me today, and in addition, I have asked each of the services to provide whatever details you might require beyond what we discuss here.

Mr. Chairman, we have need for supplemental funds in fiscal year 1974 principally for these reasons: First, to meet the additional cost we are incurring as a result of pay and rate increases; and second, to overcome a number of expenses incurred during the October 1973, Middle East war, and to rectify a number of deficiencies in the readiness of our forces made apparent by the war. With these two categories in mind we have requested supplemental appropriations as follows:

	Millions
TOA and budget authority:	
Pay and rate changes	\$3,415
Force readiness	2,818
Total fiscal year 1974 supplemental request	<u>\$6,233</u>

Of this amount, new authorization legislation of \$1,007 million is required for Procurement; \$217 million for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; \$29 million for Military Construction; and \$4 million for Family Housing.

PAY AND RATE CHANGES

The need for additional funds for pay and rate increases, while unwelcome, ought not to surprise anyone. I want to mention all these increases to your Committee, Mr. Chairman, even though only a minor portion—in the R.D.T. & E. accounts—is subject to authorization action by your committee. In considerable measure these were anticipated long ago, and were included in the original Defense budget presentation last year. Due to a change in procedures, it is now necessary to resubmit them to the appropriations committees. For several reasons, however, the actual costs we are incurring are higher than what we had anticipated in the original budget submission. For example, pay raises occurred in October 1973, rather than—as we earlier expected—in January 1974; the cost-of-living increases for retired people are three times what we had expected them to be; and subsistence costs are 38 percent above our original estimates, while other costs have grown in the past year by an average 7 percent rather than by the 3 percent we had originally forecast. The additional funds required are as follows:

	TOA and budget authority	Millions
Pay and rate changes:		
Military and civilian pay increases	\$2,555	
Military retired pay increases	469	
Wage board pay increases	236	
Increased subsistence costs	107	
Postal costs	48	
Total, pay and rate changes	<u>\$3,415</u>	

FORCE READINESS

The recent Middle East war affected the United States in a variety of ways. We learned a number of military lessons. One lesson was that the Soviet Union is still willing to take risks—considerable risks—in the pursuit of its global interests, and that the Armed Forces of the United States continue to be a vital element in assuring a necessary measure of peace and stability in the world. In this respect, we were reminded that it is not only essential to have forces of adequate size, but also forces that are adequately ready.

Readiness is a composite of many things. It includes, for example, training of people and units, maintenance of such things as ships and aircraft, having adequate stocks of ammunition and other supplies, and having the ability to deploy men and equipment rapidly wherever needed.

It is the fate of these often unglamorous readiness items that, except in time of war, they are the least visible and the least appreciated, and therefore the most easily deferred when there is a general budget squeeze or when a seemingly higher priority requirement appears.

But when a war occurs, we realize the value of readiness. The Middle East war brought home to us once again the importance of the readiness of our forces, and the need to begin to overcome the significant deficiencies in readiness made apparent in the course of the war.

Moreover, we have increasingly come to recognize the greater contribution of ready forces to deterrence in this era of approximate nuclear parity. If our forces have the capacity to deploy rapidly in a crisis situation, not only can we assure ourselves of a more stalwart defense and raise the nuclear threshold, but—if we use our warning time wisely and deploy our forces in advance of hostilities—the early deployment of ready forces might itself help to deter the initiation of hostilities.

The additional readiness requirements we have identified as being of high priority, and for which we strongly recommend funding in fiscal year 1974, are:

	TOA and budget authority	Millions
Force readiness:		
Fuel price increase	\$480	
Middle East payback	231	
Augmented force readiness	1,397	
Accelerated modernization	516	
Increased airlift capability	169	
Strategic program changes	25	
Total, force readiness	<u>\$2,818</u>	

FUEL PRICE INCREASE AND MIDDLE EAST PAYBACK

Two immediate consequences of the Middle East war were: (1) the increase in the costs of fuel for U.S. Forces; and (2) the increased tempo of U.S. operations and the drawdown in U.S. military stocks required to resupply Israel. Based on fuel costs as of 1 February 1974, we will require an additional \$480 million in this fiscal year for fuel alone.

During the Middle East crisis the pace of our operations increased significantly, well beyond the rate originally planned and budgeted for fiscal year 1974, leaving us short of operating funds for the remainder of the year. There were, for example, additional deployments and higher-than-planned activity rates for U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean, the deployment of a carrier task force to the Indian Ocean, an airlift for United Nations peacekeeping forces, and a worldwide alert of U.S. Forces when there loomed the possibility of Soviet military intervention.

There are also inevitable costs associated with the transfer of equipment to Israel. Additional funds are required to replace equipment taken from our units and sent to Israel during her time of urgent need. These additional funds are to cover the difference between the price Israel paid for the equipment and the price of replacement equipment on today's market.

Thus we require \$231 million to cover the higher operations costs incurred in fiscal year 1974, and to replace the tanks, planes, and ammunition sent to Israel.

AUGMENTED FORCE READINESS AND ACCELERATED MODERNIZATION

The recognized importance of ready forces and the practical experience of the Middle East war has led us to scrutinize carefully our forces and programs and, as a result, to propose in this supplemental request new or accelerated programs to enhance readiness in areas where significant deficiencies were discovered. These programs, together comprising \$1,913.5 million, concentrate on high priority items to counter the capabilities of Soviet weapon systems observed in the war, reducing the substantial maintenance backlog, particularly in ships and aircraft, improving our ammunition stock position, accelerating the purchase of items important to overall readiness and which we now have in insufficient quantities, time-sensitive R. & D. associated with the Middle East war, a variety of other programs, some quite small, which will help quickly to improve our readiness posture.

Let me give you some examples:

As a result of the Middle East war, we now have a much better understanding of the effectiveness of the Soviet SA-6 SAM air defenses, and the sophistication, and intense and accurate fire, of the Soviet ZSU-23/4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun. Accordingly, we are recommending to the Congress a substantial investment in systems designed to protect our forces in this kind of air defense environment. And we think it important, given this better understanding of the capabilities of the Soviet weapons, to go ahead with these systems now, in fiscal year 1974, and not delay another year. We are therefore proposing, for example, additional ECM systems, accelerated procurement of air-to-ground missiles and bombs such as the Shrike and Rockeye, the purchase of more tactical drones, and certain improvements to aircraft now in inventory to help them to cope offensively and defensively with the advanced Soviet air defense weapons.

It was also apparent during the conflict that modern antitank missiles are especially accurate and cost effective. While this was not a surprise to us, it did underline the wisdom of our on-going antitank programs and, in the process, made it abundantly clear that we had inadequate quantities of antitank missiles, particularly the TOW missile. We are proposing here to increase our procurement of the TOW.

We were surprised by the amount of night vision equipment in Soviet ground weapon systems, suggesting that Soviet doctrine might call for more night operations than we had earlier supposed. We need to improve our vision capability and are proposing modest efforts to this end.

We are also proposing to make inroads into our backlog of deferred maintenance. Because of the tempo of military operations, first in Vietnam and then in connection with the Middle East, and because of the overall budget limitations as we reordered our national priorities away from Defense and toward domestic programs, many maintenance programs have been postponed year after year. There is now a very long queue of ships awaiting overhaul; in 1970 there were less than 20 ships overdue for overhaul; this year there are twice that many, and the number is rising. This is not sound economy in the long run, and certainly doesn't make for a strong Navy. We must start to work on this backlog as soon as possible. The slip overhauls we are recom-

mending in this supplemental, and the expansion of our overhaul programs for additional ships, will allow us to make a reasonable start, and permit us to take full advantage of our available physical shipyard capacity.

Similarly, we have seen a steady increase in recent years in the numbers of aircraft not operationally ready. In 1970, 74 percent of all squadron aircraft were ready to fly; in 1974, only 65 percent are similarly ready. We are proposing in this supplemental therefore to finance the aircraft maintenance required and to build more adequate stocks of spare parts and components necessary to reverse this dangerous and unacceptable downward trend.

It is important for the readiness of our forces that we have adequate stocks of critical supplies, particularly munitions. "We would have won, but we ran out of ammunition" would not be a satisfying explanation; we do not want another Bunker Hill in our history books. The Middle East war demonstrated how intense the combat between modern forces can be, and how quickly stocks of munitions can be consumed. We found that reasonable prudence requires a more sizeable reserve of munitions, especially if other nations can be expected, in emergencies, to draw on our stocks, and therefore we are recommending in this supplemental increased munitions purchases in critical areas of all services.

Among the items important for readiness but in short supply that we have included in the supplemental are the previously mentioned TOW missile and air munitions, M-60 tanks, armored personnel carriers (APC), KC-130 tanker aircraft, and P-3C antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft.

The inventory of modern Soviet equipment seen in the Middle East and the very large Soviet advantage in armor in Europe (15,500 Warsaw Pact to 6,000 NATO tanks in central Europe, for example) have caused us to press ahead more rapidly with both the antitank weapons and the M-60 tank programs. Similarly, in order to maintain an adequate deterrent and stalwart defense force against the heavy, modern Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, the mobility of our forces—the ability to move them swiftly as needed—is crucial. This places a premium on vehicles such as the APC.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you describe the APC?

Mr. CLEMENTS. The Armored Personnel Carrier.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. CLEMENTS. We also saw, during the Middle East war, how the Soviet Union could now concentrate very sizable naval forces in one area (the Mediterranean) while also increasing its deployments worldwide—in the Indian Ocean, for example. We are proposing in the supplemental to purchase six additional P-3C aircraft, which is many times more effective than old patrol aircraft now in inventory, and which will help overcome the overall naval patrol and ASW deficiencies. It is also timely to go ahead with this additional P-3C purchase now because the P-3 production capacity available is such that additional production in fiscal year 1974 will lower the overall unit cost of these aircraft.

A critical portion of the funds requested in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental will provide for research, development, test, and evaluation to analyze the performance and effectiveness of equipments

involved in the Middle East hostilities and to accelerate research and development of equipments for defense suppression, the need for which was underlined by that conflict. This acceleration, if followed up by adequate funds as proposed in the fiscal year 1975 request, will lead to deployment of useful capabilities in our forces much earlier in time than would otherwise be the case.

Also included as an augmentation to readiness is a request for \$29 million to finance part of the cost of upgrading the support facilities on Diego Garcia. Since we intend to continue a pattern of regular naval visits to the Indian Ocean on a periodic basic, it is particularly important to have assured support facilities closer than the western Pacific. The island of Diego Garcia is well located to provide useful if limited support.

We are recommending, therefore, an expansion of the support facilities at Diego Garcia to provide an outpost where ships may perform limited in-port upkeep, receive periodic repair services from a tender and receive critical supplies. Diego Garcia will also serve as a base for patrol aircraft providing air surveillance support.

INCREASED AIRLIFT CAPABILITY

An expansion of our strategic airlift capability deserves a very high priority as a deterrent to Warsaw Pact attack on NATO. The fiscal year 1974 supplemental requests funds for actions that will begin to increase significantly strategic airlift capability within the next few years. These actions are (1) to begin to buy spare parts to increase planned C-5 and C-141 wartime utilization rates, (2) the preparation of engineering drawings, tooling, and testing for a stretched version of the C-141 aircraft, and (3) the design of modification and tooling for a wide body Cargo-Convertible Aircraft in the civil reserve fleet.

Improvements to our airlift capacity over the next 5 years can, for example, reduce the time it takes to deploy a division and its initial support to Europe from the present 19 days to approximately 7 days. This is a very substantial improvement, and will add measurably to our deterrent posture.

STRATEGIC PROGRAM CHANGES

We have, as you know, decided upon a 10-boat Trident program. Our initial decision was to phase the funding of the Trident over 4 years—a 1,3,3,3 program.

Taking into account congressional action on the fiscal year 1974 budget, we examined various phasing alternatives. We concluded that a stretched program of 1,2,2,2,2,1 would be best. This strikes the right balance in my judgment, between the various factors. It will still provide the option for an orderly phaseout of the older Polaris boats when they reach, on average, 20 years of age. It will still provide us with a significant, operable Pacific-based Trident force in a timely manner. This new schedule is within our shipbuilding capability, and will still maintain a reasonable annual funding level and unit cost.

The relatively small amount of money we seek in the fiscal year 1974 Supplemental for Trident is for the long leadtime, non-nuclear hull mechanical and electrical components needed to support the proposed

fiscal year 1975 procurement of two submarines. That is to say, the \$25 million is for certain long leadtime items for the third boat, which will permit us to maintain the schedule described above.

THE FISCAL YEAR 1974 MASF CEILING REQUIREMENT

I would like to end my formal statement with a strong plea on behalf of our request to raise the MASF ceiling from the current \$1,126 million to \$1,600 million. We do not require additional funds; what we require is the authorization to spend up to the requested level.

There are very critical military reasons for this request, affecting the safety and future of the people of South Vietnam. The present ceiling is insufficient to keep up with inflation and price rises, which are driving up the cost of the items we purchase in Vietnam for the South Vietnamese forces. The cost of POL, essential for mobility, has increased dramatically, as we all know. Sufficient spare and replacement parts for vitally needed equipment are not able to be delivered under the present ceiling restrictions. And ammunition consumption, in the face of considerable North Vietnamese military pressure, is drawing down the available stocks. We need to restore the stock levels that existed at the time of the cease-fire.

It is not only for these military reasons that we seek to provide adequate supplies to the South Vietnamese—although the military reasons are sufficiently compelling in their own right. It is also because it is the essence of the Nixon Doctrine—and, indeed, of American policy for the last quarter-century—to help our friends and Allies to defend themselves. The situation now in South Vietnam is better since the cease-fire, even though the cease-fire is not working as well as we would like. There is a rough if tenuous balance of forces in Vietnam, and if we continue to be interested in achieving a greater peace and stability there, then we must help to insure that the balance is not destroyed. We have invested heavily, in lives and treasure, in Southeast Asia. The results could be tragic if we should fail to give this modest additional support, which is but a fraction—a sorely needed fraction—of our prior efforts.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Chairman Moorer also has a statement dealing with Diego Garcia.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Senator SYMINGTON. Your statement is confined to Diego Garcia?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. It will be a briefing with slides.

Senator SYMINGTON. We appreciate that and I think we will continue at this time with the Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, let me respectfully commend you for a strong and effective statement.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I have with me two of the Assistant Secretaries. I would like to introduce to the members of the committee Mr. McClary, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, and Mr. Mendolia, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics. In addition, we have the supporting people on the financial side that will assist in any questions you and the committee may have.

How is it you need the large amount of money so urgently when nearly all of the divisions are fully operational and ready for combat?

Admiral MOORER. I am sure, sir, if you ask the Secretary of the Army, he will say he was referring to the recovery that the Army has made from the personnel turbulence incident to the war in Vietnam. You recall last year I testified to the effect that the Army was lower in readiness, but we expected them to come up, which they did. As a result of some of the supplies which we have described and the materiel that was given to Israel, the Army does have materiel shortages now, particularly with respect to expendables such as TOW's, antitank launchers and ammunition. This readiness supplemental will raise these stockages so that these readiness personnel will then have them to use in combat.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you mention this to him, and we will, so he can answer it also?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; I will be happy to.

[The information has been submitted separately to the committee.]


Senator SYMINGTON. Admiral, how long will your presentation take?

Admiral MOORER. Very short. Then I would hope that we would round it out with questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, I do have some questions on Diego Garcia.

STATEMENT OF DIEGO GARCIA

Admiral MOORER. First, I would point out the geographical location of Diego Garcia, which is essentially in the center of the Indian Ocean.



I also would emphasize the fact as of this moment, the United States has no base or airfield in the entire littoral of the Indian Ocean which we can use without making prior arrangements on a case-by-case basis.

This means, then, that if we are in the process of transiting the Indian Ocean with aircraft or ships, or choose to operate ships and aircraft in the Indian Ocean, we have to support such operations from a base in the Philippines, which, is as you know, some 3,500 miles away, and, as a matter of fact, for operations in the Arabian Sea would be almost 5,000 miles away.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, I should point out, currently has access to several ports and airfields in this area—the most important, of course, being Berbera in Somalia.

It also operates from the island of Socotra near Aden and frequently visits Iraq in the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union has, in recent years increased its presence in the Indian Ocean.

Now, this overall situation, I think, has received more focus following the recent difficulties between Israel and Syria and Egypt and the strategic importance of this entire area, particularly with respect to energy is obvious to everyone.

The opening of the Suez Canal, of course, will change the situation somewhat in the sense that the Soviet forces in the Black Sea will be able to move quickly into the Indian Ocean rather than having to come, as they do at the moment, all the way from their Pacific fleet base in Vladivostock or perhaps from either the northern fleet or the Black Sea fleet areas, all the way around the cape.

On top of this, we have the fact that today many of the tankers that are used for transport of fuel are very large and will not be able to transit the Suez Canal even after it is opened. Consequently, this LOC around Africa, as well as the LOC through the Malacca Strait up to Japan, will continue to be very active.

So our objective here, Mr. Chairman, is simply to acquire this limited facility which will permit some support on an interim basis of naval and air forces if we choose to transit the area or operate there. We do not consider this as a threat to any country. We do not consider it as a first step in a tremendous buildup. We feel that it is in the interest of the United States for us to have the flexibility to be able to operate in this area. Secondly, it will be much cheaper from a dollars-and-cents standpoint to have an opportunity to use this particular area.

Let me show you the physical characteristics of the area because it is simply an atoll similar to those we used quite frequently in World War II.


Here north is to your left, Mr. Chairman, and you can see the configuration of the island. It is about 14 miles from north to south and perhaps 5 miles or so from east to west. The rim of land which constitutes the island varies in width from some 7,000 feet or so down to about 300 feet.


This chart shows the current installations on the island which we have constructed as a result of our agreement with our British allies.

Note the small turning basin that is in the process of being dredged. The airfield is currently 8,000 feet.

The communication is on the southern side.

We have at the moment, I believe, about a 125,000-barrel capacity or at least are building about a 125,000-barrel capacity for storage of various types of POL for surface ships as well as for aircraft.





What we are asking for in this supplemental, which we are now addressing, is shown on the next slide. You can see the difference between the current facilities and the augmented plan which we are going forward with today.

It includes, as is obvious to you, sir, more dredging so that we could use a tender for support of forces that may be operating in the area and make minor repairs and adjustments.

It has a pier which can be used by a tanker to pump oil into the oil storage.

The oil capacity will be increased by about 480,000 barrels according to the plan. We will give you the specifics on each item. There will be an increase in the length of the runway and an increase in the parking area. There will be a portable hangar put in. Some augmentation to the living quarters will be required because we will need space for more people when we station additional aircraft. Also, we would hope to have generator service for ships so that, if required, a ship could be placed in what we call a cold iron state; that is, all of the boilers and generators on the ship shut down in the event that we had to make some repair which otherwise probably would require the ship to go all the way back to the Philippine Islands.

That in essence shows you, Mr. Chairman, what this supplemental will do with respect to augmenting these very limited facilities we already have underway by virtue of the agreement with our British allies.

I am happy now to answer any questions you might have.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Admiral. I have some questions here including the problem of ownership by the British and the lack of a signed agreement.

What you now propose is approximately the same thing the Department proposed back in 1969, and which was denied by the Congress. It was agreed at that time to provide only an austere communication station in the Indian Ocean.

What new factors now bring this proposal forward again? You covered that in your explanation.

Admiral MOORER. I did, sir. I will repeat it if you like.

NEED FOR UPGRADING NOW

Senator SYMINGTON. That is all right.

Why is it necessary to proceed now with the upgrading of Diego Garcia based on what you think the Soviets will do with the opening of the Suez Canal? In other words, why can we not wait until the Soviet action confirm their intentions?

Admiral MOORER. Mr. Chairman, I do not think that the sole purpose of this facility is to anticipate what the Soviet Union might do. In light of the fact that subsequent to October 6, we have been intermittently operating forces in the Indian Ocean, we would like, as quickly as possible, to provide this facility so that we could relieve ourselves of the extra cost, extra time, and extra ships required to operate from so far a base as Subic Bay. So we think it is cost effective, in other words, to get this operating as soon as possible.

SOVIET GROWTH IN MEDITERRANEAN

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you consider the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to be more than a normal growth pattern as compared to their activities elsewhere?

Admiral MOORER. Well, sir, in recent years they have enhanced their base availability, airfields, and communications stations; they have deployed more modern submarines in the area. I think that, overall, they certainly are well aware of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. I will be very much surprised if they do not augment their forces when the canal is opened, at least on an intermittent basis. It certainly will give them much greater flexibility.

We are not asking for this facility solely for that reason. We do think that we need to have the capability to establish a presence and operate in this very important area.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. Chairman, I think you asked, "Has their presence been accelerated beyond what would be normal in some other areas?" The answer is "Yes; in our opinion, they have."

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Inasmuch as most of your presentation had to do with the Soviet Union, I thought these questions were pertinent; naturally, there are other reasons you would like to be there also.

ACTIVITIES IN INDIAN OCEAN

What strategic use do the Soviets have for the Indian Ocean? Is it more important to them from a strategic standpoint than to the United States?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir; I would not say that it is more important to them, but I would say that they have certainly an interest in the area overall. They already have manifested that to some degree by agreements with India and Afghanistan. They have, as I said, established a base in Somalia. They have been working, of course, in the Persian Gulf with the Iraqis and they do have an interest in connection with their overall worldwide interests in establishing a presence where they can.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have a worldwide interest, too, do we not?

Admiral MOORER. We certainly do.

Senator SYMINGTON. In the Indian Ocean area, have not the Soviets reacted after the United States has acted? For instance, in the Indian-Pakistan war and Mideast war?

Admiral MOORER. I do not think this is a necessary action and reaction. I think that it is simply a matter of a world power such as the United States and a world power such as the Soviet Union not overlooking this very important area in the world.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do not the U.S. ships have access to as many or more ports in the littoral area than do the Soviets?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir; that is not correct because the Soviet Union has free access to some ports and I am not aware of any port that we can enter without making arrangements on a case-by-case basis except Bahrain. Our agreement there may be terminated effective the fall of 1974.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why are we sure the Soviet presence will increase in the Indian Ocean if the Suez Canal is opened up?

Admiral MOORER. I think it is highly likely. I would not guarantee it, but at the same time, you cannot discount the importance of the sea lines of supply that flow from the general area around Africa and through the Malacca Strait regardless of whether the Soviet Union augments its forces or not.

Senator SYMINGTON. What repair and bunkering capability does the Soviet fleet now have in the area?

Admiral MOORER. They usually bring tenders, sir. They do not have large facilities in some of these ports. I imagine they would have access to anything that Iraq can produce if they chose to visit in the Persian Gulf. Of course, they go into Aden. I believe they also have a contract with a Singapore shipbuilding company. They, of course, have been operating out of Bangladesh. They have been assisting in some of the minesweeping there since the Indian-Pakistan war. They do have access to more facilities than we do at the moment.

BERBERA, SOMALIA

Senator SYMINGTON. Is the capability offered at Berbera, Somalia, considered marginal?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir, I would not consider it marginal. It is backed up by a sophisticated communications station and it constitutes a harbor that they use.

Mr. CLEMENTS. That program has been underway for a number of years and it is our opinion that they will continue to enhance their installation there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, when you wrote me about this, you mentioned the fact there were some countries that were supporting this. You did say one country had supported this and that was Singapore. Singapore's population is about 2 million. There are three countries that we know—two and certainly probably three—would oppose it and their population totals about 1,700 million; namely, the People's Republic, the Soviet Union, and India. I think we have to consider the effect of these matters from a political standpoint as well as a military.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Of course, Mr. Chairman. In that same respect, however, I think that we need to take into consideration the support that would be behind us that relates to the economy and well-being of the area. Countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Ethiopia all feel a sense of security by our additional presence in the area.

Senator SYMINGTON. Some of them are quite a distance from what we are talking about.

In any case, does the United States have any mutual defense agreements with any of the countries in the littoral area?

Mr. CLEMENTS. No, sir, not except in the spirit of the SEATO Agreement, which I am sure that you appreciate and understand.

Senator SYMINGTON. To what extent do the British and French operate in the area and what port facilities do they have?

Admiral MOORER. The French have a commander in chief of a naval force in the area, sir. They operate in and around some of the islands and ports. I will provide a full reply for the record.

[The information follows:]

The United Kingdom deploys the following forces:

	British	Gurkhas
Ground forces:		
Oman (advisors).....		
Brunei (Gurkha Bn).....		
India/Nepal.....		
ANZUK forces Singapore.....		
Thailand.....		
Gan Island (RAF support).....		
Total.....	[Deleted]	[Deleted]
Air force (RAF):		
Oman (staging base).....		
Gan Island.....		
Navy		
Naval ships in area.....		1 guided missile frigate, 6 helicopter destroyer escorts, and 1 oceanographic research ship.

Additionally, there are five Royal Fleet Auxiliaries in the area, maintained for logistic support of the fleet, manned by [deleted] merchant marine personnel under the operational control of the Admiralty Board.

French Forces in the area are under a joint command, the French Forces Indian Ocean Zone. This command headquartered on La Reunion Island has a strength of [deleted] shore based personnel. [Deleted.]

NAVAL FORCES

The naval element of the French Forces Indian Ocean Zone has been an afloat command since 1 September 1973 when the French Naval Base at Diego Suarez passed under control of the Malagasy Republic; [deleted].

Naval units currently present in the area include three destroyers, two mine-warfare ships, one amphibious, and one auxiliary under the flagship La Chareute, a former oiler. This force is occasionally augmented by ships from the Pacific or from metropolitan France. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.] Naval vessels assigned to Subzone 51 include two coastal mine sweepers, one light guided missile boat, and seven mechanized landing craft.

FRENCH ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there any substance to recent press reports that the French may increase their activities in the Indian Ocean with the opening of the Suez Canal?

Admiral MOORER. I would think that they would have this interest certainly because, as I said in my presentation, there is no question about the fact that there is a new focus on the strategic importance of this area.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have there been any talks between the United States and Soviets regarding the limiting of the scope of naval activities in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral MOORER. Not recently that I am aware of.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Not to my knowledge.

AIR FORCE CONSTRUCTION AT DIEGO GARCIA

Senator SYMINGTON. It is understood that the Air Force will request funds in their fiscal 1975 construction program to provide for fuel storage, parking aprons, and to help defray the cost of lengthening the runway to 12,000 feet in order to accommodate aircraft tankers, B-52 bombers, and other heavy cargo aircraft, is that correct?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes, sir.

[Information relative to inability to support B-52 operations was provided at the outset of the afternoon session.]

Senator SYMINGTON. I might add in your letter you mentioned 8,000 feet, the runway, and in replying to those questions, but in another hearing yesterday, the statement was made by the State Department that the runways would be 12,000 feet.

Admiral MOORER. It is 8,000 feet.

Senator SYMINGTON. They said 12,000, so we will straighten that out. It is understood that some consideration has been given to either stationing or providing a refueling capability to the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft at Diego Garcia. Would you comment on that?

Admiral MOORER. I am not aware of that.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I am not either.

Senator SYMINGTON. I believe the current plan calls for eventual phasing down the active force to 12 Navy attack carriers.

With 12 carriers, can you maintain your existing commitments and also maintain a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean for 6 months out of the year?

Admiral MOORER. Sir, I would say that we do not look at this as a force building exercise at all. We would send ships in intermittently depending on the requirement. Also, by that time, we will have more nuclear-powered ships, including carriers, giving us more flexibility.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the requirement for a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean for 6 months every year require any increase in currently approved naval forces?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir, we would draw down probably from the Pacific Fleet for that purpose.

SOVIET REACTION TO ACTIVITY AT DIEGO GARCIA

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it not logical to assume if the United States proceeded to upgrade facilities at Diego Garcia that the Soviets will react accordingly?

Admiral MOORER. That is a question that comes up frequently—action and reaction. I would only point out that the Soviet Union is already there.

Mr. CLEMENTS. They have had extensive building programs, as Admiral Moorer pointed out, at several places in this general region. They are already there and have already made their presence felt with these permanent installations. These are ongoing installations and I would look for them to continue to expand them. So it is not a question of reaction, they are already there.

AGREEMENT WITH GREAT BRITAIN

Senator SYMINGTON. What sort of agreement have we arrived at with the United Kingdom concerning the proposed expanded facility?

We are told the latest agreement arrived at in 1972 provided only for a communication facility and I have asked and find that there was no signed agreement on anything else.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. Chairman, that issue is being negotiated right now. No final agreement has been negotiated to this point. Is that not right?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. We expect a reply from the new government. That is what —

Senator SYMINGTON. Perhaps we should consider postponing the supplemental request until we get the reply.

Admiral MOORER. I think we will have it in ample time, sir.

LITTORAL AREA

Senator SYMINGTON. There are several things I would like to have submitted for the record for further study: The ports in the Indian Ocean that are available for the Soviets to operate from and those available to the United States, whether we use them or not. A country-by-country analysis of the littoral nations as to their relationship to the Soviets and the United States and their reaction to a substantial increase in United States and/or Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

Will you supply that for the record?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

To date there has been very little reaction to the Soviet Indian Ocean presence by any of the littoral states—either publicly or privately. One of the effects of recent U.S. activity in the area has been to draw attention of the littoral nations to the considerable Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, and the realization that the United States was not the only major power whose interests are reflected in the form of military deployments, has served in a number of cases to temper the nature of the littoral response. The regional nations which care deeply about the issue are those most committed to the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal. Otherwise, the reactions of the littoral states have been relatively mild. Many nations have remained essentially mute on the issue, either because they do not consider their own interests engaged or because they side strongly with one side or the other but wish to avoid antagonizing their World neighbors. The following country-by-country analysis was prepared by the Department of State and reflects as accurately as possible for the purposes of an open hearing the position each littoral nation has taken in response to U.S. naval deployments and the proposal to expand the facility at Diego Garcia.

SURVEY OF OPINION IN LITTORAL STATE TOWARD DIEGO GARCIA PROPOSAL

South Africa.—Balanced reporting in the press, occasional editorials welcoming the decision of the U.S. to maintain a presence there as long as the Soviet Union has decided to do so. Official reaction "welcomed the [U.S. decision] with satisfaction."

Malawi.—No significant press reports or editorials, official reaction was highly favorable.

Malagasy.—Press reporting has been on the whole negative, but has noted that it was the U.S. which moved after the Soviet presence became apparent. Officially, Diego Garcia was described as "purely a US/UK affair", but Malagasy felt it had to protest; it has "tried to be even-handed."

Tanzania.—Press reporting has been a bit negative, although mentioning Soviet presence. The GOT seeks an Indian Ocean "free of great power rivalry", but the highest level has told us privately it "understands" the U.S. position and implied sympathetic understanding.

Kenya.—Editorials have called for an Indian Ocean free from great power arms races. The press has deplored expansion of the Diego Garcia facilities, but there has been no significant official reaction.

Somalia.—Press reporting has been critical, but restrained. Government reaction has been official silence.

Ethiopia.—No editorials, and very little press reporting, mostly of a factual, non-polemical quality. No official Ethiopian comment, but we have been told by a high official that the IEG shares our concern over Soviet expansion in the area.

Zambia.—No reactions, press or official.

Uganda.—No reaction, press or official.

Sudan.—No reaction, press or official.

Egypt.—No reaction, press or official.

Saudi Arabia.—No press reaction, comment from Embassy was that there was not likely to be any official reaction.

Yemen.—No press reaction; mid-level government reaction was confined to the one word "good."

Aden.—No press or official reaction.

Oman.—No public or official comment in Oman.

Abu Dhabi.—No public or private comment, but our Embassy reports that local attitudes were "relaxed and probably favorable."

Kuwait.—No public or private reaction to our Diego Garcia proposals.

Iran.—Press reaction has been balanced, but expressed the desire that a great power arms race in the area be avoided. There has been no official Iranian position, but our Embassy believes the GOI would not object unless pressed for a public position; if it were, it might have to express public regrets.

Pakistan.—Press reporting has been balanced. The GOP has supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone, but is worried about Soviet intentions, and taken no public position. Privately, it has welcomed our proposed presence.

Nepal.—No significant press reporting; a high Nepalese official described Diego Garcia as "not a live issue" to our Ambassador.

India.—Prime Minister Gandhi and Foreign Minister Singh have been critical of the US Diego Garcia proposals, both publicly and privately. They have called for restraint by both the Soviet Union and the US, and strongly supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone. Press coverage has been more or less uniformly critical.

Bangladesh.—Press reaction has been critical, and Mujib has referred to Diego Garcia as "a threat to peace. Those who speak of world peace now build military bases in an area which should be a zone of peace." Our Embassy considered his and other official reaction to have been relatively mild and intended for public consumption, and said the GOBD has taken our Diego Garcia proposals in stride.

Burma.—There has been no significant press commentary, and given general Burmese reticence to discuss Indian Ocean matters, the Embassy does not expect any official position to emerge.

Ceylon.—Press reporting has been balanced, remarking on the Soviet presence, but has still been largely opposed. The GSL has told our Embassy they did not want to take a public stand, but have backed the Indian Ocean Peace Zone and feel committed to it. There has been an exchange of correspondence between the two governments in which Sri Lanka called for restraint and an avoidance of an arms race in the Indian Ocean.

Maldives.—Press and political reaction has been critical. Prime Minister Ramgoolam has spoken out against the Diego Garcia proposals, saying Mauritius did not wish "nuclear warfare introduced into what should be a zone of peace."

Thailand.—Press reaction has been critical both of US Diego Garcia proposals and of the Thai involvement in them (use of Thai facilities for staging to Diego); official reaction has been ambivalent, with Diego described as "both good and bad." Thailand subscribes to the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposals, but has told us that if the Russians are going to be there, the US should too.

Malaysia.—Press reaction has been unfavorable, GOM government officials have expressed regret at our proposals and reaffirmed that Malaysia subscribes to the Indian Ocean Peace Zone.

Singapore.—Press reaction has been balanced, but the Government of Singapore has expressed approval at the highest level.

Indonesia.—Press editorials have called for an Indian Ocean free from rivalry among the Great Powers, and supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone. The highest levels of government have told us they regretted our proposals to build a facility at Diego, but that as long as the Soviet Union was in the area, the U.S. should be too, and Indonesia had no objections.

Australia.—Press reaction has been largely critical, with some balanced exceptions. The Labor Government has been outspokenly critical, and offered to support any efforts by the new British Labor Government to halt the project. Only the minuscule Liberal Party has publicly supported Diego Garcia.

New Zealand.—Press reaction has been modest and balanced; both Prime Minister Kirk and other officials have told our Embassy they "understand" the U.S. position, and agree that the USSR cannot be left alone in the area, but subscribe to the principles of an Indian Ocean Peace Zone.

Senator SYMINGTON. A comparison of British, French, Soviet and United States ship days in the Indian Ocean for the period 1960 through 1972

Kindly indicate the number of Soviet ship days that are attributable to Bangladesh mine clearing operations. This list thing should differentiate between combatant and noncombatant ships.

Will you supply that for the record?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Kindly provide a chronology of British United States and Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean prior to and during the 1968 India-Pakistan war and the recent Mideast war. [The information follows:]

BRITISH

(Figures are in specific ship inventory totals in the Indian Ocean and Far East areas. Further area breakdown not available. Combatants include all except auxiliary and service ships.)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Combatant.....	98	109	55	61	53	61	54	40	43	33	19	18	12	13
Noncombatant.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)

¹ Data not available.

FRENCH

(Figures are in specific ship inventory totals in the Indian Ocean area. Combatants include all except auxiliary and service ships.)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Combatant.....	2	2	2	4	3	3	4	4	3	4	5	6	8	7
Noncombatant.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)

¹ Data not available.

SOVIET

(Figures are in ship days in the Indian Ocean area. Combatants include all ship types except auxiliary and support ships.)

	1960 through 1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Combatant.....	Nil	529	1,138	1,670	1,480	13,490	13,490
Noncombatant.....	Nil	651	2,928	3,260	2,490	15,350	15,350

¹ Includes mine clearing operations in Bangladesh as follows:

	1972	1973
Combatant.....	1,003	1,447
Noncombatant.....	1,447	1,447

UNITED STATES

(Figures are in ship days in the Indian Ocean area. Combatants include all ship types except auxiliary and support ships.)

	1960-69	1970	1971	1972	1973
Combatant.....	1,800	872	858	990	1,432
Noncombatant.....	1,400	374	479	447	742

¹ Approximate, per year.

Senator SYMINGTON. We now maintain a Mideast force under the command of a flag officer at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. What do we have there?

Admiral MOORER. We have an amphibious ship altered as a command ship for this purpose, plus two destroyer-type escorts.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. My time is up.

I ask unanimous consent of the committee to ask two more questions. Last year the Senate considered, among other matters, a treaty on extradition and cooperation in penal matters between the United States and the oriental Republic of Uruguay, a treaty on extradition between the United States and Italy, a protocol amending the 1928 convention concerning international expositions and the International Coffee Agreement, 1968, as extended.

If Senate approval is required in such instances as those indicated, why does the executive branch not intend to submit for approval a major agreement with Great Britain involving the development of a naval base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean?

Mr. CLEMENTS. We really did not consider that this was that kind of a formal agreement, Mr. Chairman, and neither did we consider it of that magnitude.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

According to a recent news report, the Indians have turned down the Soviet Union in its request for bases.

Has this affected executive branch thinking about Diego Garcia?

Mr. CLEMENTS. No, sir.

Admiral MOORER. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have any of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean raised objections to the U.S. plans for Diego Garcia?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, some of them have voiced their concern.

Senator SYMINGTON. Which ones?

Admiral MOORER. I think India, of course, and I will research that. [The information follows:]

India, Sri Lanka and the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) are the only ones to date that have officially protested the development.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Soviet Union also has, and you might add the rest of them.

Admiral MOORER. I would expect the Soviet Union.

Mr. CLEMENTS. We would not consider them a littoral state.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right, but there has been a lot of talk about what the Soviets may or may not do when this base was presented. To my certain knowledge we have discussed it for the past 5 years.

Mr. CLEMENTS. We have not officially voiced our concern about their presence in Aden and Somalia either, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think it is pretty clear that everybody believes that the Soviet Union can operate on the sea and in the other places and they do their best to get allies.

This base proposal worries me because it would appear that it is a major development. I am not taking a position on it but there is no use having these hearings and commanding the presentation. What we want to do is to be the devil's advocate and ask you the facts with respect to why it is you want the money to develop this major base,

which it would be on the basis of what we have just seen in the Indian Ocean, which is not as far away as Vietnam, but still far away from us. We have quite a few problems right around here at home.

Admiral MOORER. If I may, I respectfully say that I do not look upon it as a major base. It is an operating and support facility at best.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will accept that correction.

Admiral MOORER. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will have some more questions on this. My time is up.

Senator CANNON.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REASON FOR INCLUSION OF DIEGO GARCIA IN SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Mr. Secretary and Admiral Moorer, I listened carefully to this and I can understand your explanation and your reasoning for it, but I fail to tie that into requesting it in the supplemental. We had this issue up before. We settled it at that time at a lesser level than the Department desired. It seems to me that what you are doing here is just coming back to us again with a similar proposal or somewhat similar as to what we had before, and I would like to know specifically what are the reasons that they could not come in in the regular budget next year rather than coming in in the supplemental.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Senator Cannon, we feel that the circumstances that prevailed during the October–November situation in the Middle East between Israel and Egypt-Syria are of sufficient importance to have us restudy this entire situation and bring it to your attention. The Suez Canal will be open shortly, the Soviet presence within this area will be enhanced without any question, and the lines of supply both to ourselves and to our allies in Europe and Japan will certainly be threatened to a degree that they have not been heretofore. Under these circumstances, we feel that this program should be put on a priority basis and that we should move forward with the work that needs to be done on this installation. I would like to emphasize, as Admiral Moorer has, that this is not to be considered as a base—it certainly will not be a base—it will be an operating facility that will be used intermittently.

Senator CANNON. Then, if it is just simply an operating facility, I do not see how it is going to affect our lines of supply that may be endangered, as you indicated a moment ago.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Because as we put our forces into the area on an intermittent basis, this installation will then be in a position to support those forces. It will be very cost-effective from a use of resources standpoint. Subic Bay is a long way away, about 5,000 miles away from the gulf.

Senator CANNON. I am inclined to agree with you on the cost-effective base, but I am trying to find out now precisely where the urgency lies that we have to consider this in this supplemental vis-a-vis the regular defense budget for fiscal year 1975.

It seems to me that cost-effectiveness is going to exist in 1975 as well as it exists now. It does not seem to me that we have any great threat.

You have already pointed out we are not reacting because the Soviets already have bases on the littoral of the ocean there. So what is really the urgency?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Senator Cannon, I think some of this could be explored more fully in executive session this afternoon. As these negotiations in connection with the settlement of the Middle East are furthered, it is possible that they could be a partial consideration.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DEFENSIBILITY OF DIEGO GARCIA

Admiral Moorer, is this a defensible facility in the event of a conflict?

Admiral MOORER. I think it is as defensible as any of the other islands we have operated from in this fashion. As a practical matter, it would have to be defended primarily by forces afloat, including aircraft that might be aboard an aircraft carrier in the area. Finally, it would be defended by the point defenses that were on the island itself. I do not think, to answer your question, that any base is absolutely defensible. I think that vulnerability, of course, is all proportional, but I do think it could be defended, yes, sir.

OTHER NATIONS AS OPERATORS IN DIEGO GARCIA

Senator TAFT. Why should we be the primary operators in the Indian Ocean at all, if there is a free world threat in the Indian Ocean, lines of communication or otherwise, why should that not be a responsibility primarily of Western European nations and of Japan or the principal dependents on the oil supply?

Admiral MOORER. I agree that these other nations as well as the United States have vital national interests associated with the freedom of the seas and the use of these LOC's. We do have national interests in that area and we are taking action to look after the national interests of the United States.

Senator TAFT. Is the decision with regard to Diego Garcia being made in conjunction with discussions with our NATO allies?

Admiral MOORER. It has been done in connection with the British. Of course, other nations have been informed. As you know, Senator Taft, traditionally the NATO nations have viewed the alliance in terms of certain geographical constraints which do not extend into the Indian Ocean. As the name implies, NATO is an Atlantic alliance. The interests that individual nations such as France, the United Kingdom, or Japan might have, as well as the United States of course, are closely associated with their individual national interests.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield? I understand, Mr. Secretary, we will not be able to finish this morning these questions in an open hearing. We would appreciate it if you and the admiral would come back at 2:30. We will continue and when we are through we will go into executive session, if that meets with your approval. So the hearing will continue this afternoon in open session at 2:30.

Senator TAFT. You may have answered this, but do you consider that decision to go ahead and implement this facility would tend to put pressure on the Indian Government to give the Soviets base rights?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir, I do not feel that to be the case. The Soviet

Union has been working with and communicating with the Indians on this issue for a long time. They have a mutual assistance agreement. I think the Soviet Union would get bases when and if the Indians chose to give them. I do not think what we do at Diego Garcia will affect this.

INDIAN GOVERNMENT CLAIMS UPON DIEGO GARCIA

Senator TAFT. Has the Indian Government ever asserted any territorial claims upon Diego Garcia?

Admiral MOORER. Not to my knowledge. In fact, the British have had an unchallenged title to Diego Garcia for over 200 years.

Mr. CLEMENTS. We do not know of any such claims by the Indian Government.

Senator TAFT. Would you comment on the availability and the possible use of the Port of Karachi for our forces?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. I think under some circumstances we might get authority to visit, but here again, as I pointed out in my briefing, what we are looking for is a limited operational facility that we can use without having to deal on a case-by-case basis every time we want to use it. I think in the case of Karachi, we would have to arrange for each successive visit.

Senator TAFT. Under the present situation?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

Senator TAFT. Have you contemplated trying to change that situation any way to make a more definite arrangement with Pakistan?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir, not in the sense of establishing any kind of operating facilities there.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Senator Taft, in the context of the opinions that have been voiced by the committee this morning, I would assume that that would be even less desirable than Diego Garcia.

Senator TAFT. I understand that. From the point of view of its possible effect on India in relationship to the Soviet Union?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes, sir, I would believe so.

Senator TAFT. Thank you very much.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator McIntyre.

Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in view of your feeling the denial of the supplemental would mean the programs would not be supported in 1974, does this mean that DOD would not reprogram any R. & D. funds from now until July 1 of this year?

Mr. CLEMENTS. No, sir, not necessarily, but at this point we have no plan in that direction.

Senator MCINTYRE. I would like the record to show, Mr. Chairman, that DOD has authority to reprogram programs up to \$2 million without notifying Congress, and they also have the authority to reprogram for reprogramming within a program between projects or tasks without limit.

For the record, let me ask this so we will get it on the record and get an answer.

COMPUTATION OF PAY INCREASES

The data submitted in support of the civilian pay increase indicates that Army Wage Board increases approximately 6.5 percent (p. 41); the Navy 7 percent (p. 58); the Air Force does not identify a per-

centile. Instead, the Air Force states on page 70 that it is based on a detailed analysis of each local area Wage Board increase approved by DOD wage-fixing authority up to December 15, 1973.

Why is there not, Mr. Secretary, a uniform approach to these computations? Are the amounts requested valid or should they be computed on a common basis?

That is for the record.

[The information follows:]

Unlike general schedule pay rates, which are based on a uniform salary schedule, wage board pay rates are based on annual surveys of prevailing private industry wage rates for similar occupations in the same geographic area. There are 137 consolidated wage areas in which DOD employs wage board personnel. Since the relative number of employees in the different wage areas varies among services and appropriations, it is normal to have differences in the respective percentage increases. In addition, wage surveys are completed and revised pay rates become effective at various times throughout the fiscal year. Accordingly, a uniform method for computing these costs is not appropriate.

Senator MCINTYRE. For the record, also, the Air Force requests \$4.4 million for program 64602F, armament-ordnance development for five projects. These do not appear in the fiscal year 1974 column or your fiscal 1975 project listing. Therefore, the relationship between the 2 years cannot be understood and requires reconciliation.

Will you please explain this for the record?

[The information has been provided separately to the committee.]

URGENCY OF PROGRAMS

Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Secretary, I have before me a group of papers that I would identify as a detailed program of proposed fiscal year 1974 supplemental estimates. So let me go to this question.

Of the 59 individual programs—talking about R.D.T. & E. only—of the 59 individual programs and projects, 43 involve items, Mr. Chairman, which are each \$2 million or less in value.

Since this amount can be covered by internal reprogramming within each department without a formal reprogramming action requiring congressional notification or approval, why did not the urgency of these requirements dictate the immediate application of funds if in fact the urgency is real?

If necessary, this could have been done on an interim basis with the funds being restored to their sources at a later time, if in fact that became necessary.

For the remaining 16 items of 59 mentioned, why could not the same have been done up to, say, the \$2 million level to start new programs if in fact the urgency existed?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Senator McIntyre, we, of course, considered that and Dr. Currie and I have discussed that. We felt like that the supplemental could be handled in an expeditious manner rather than disturb those presently existing programs. We wanted to talk to the committee about the supplemental. It could well be that if we are refused consideration for the supplemental, we will do some of the things that you mentioned.

Senator MCINTYRE. I am now just going to run through a few items, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary.

Under a program 65101, under military sciences, they are asking for a supplemental of \$2 million. Currently this program is on the

books for \$6.2 million. That would raise it to \$8.2 million. An ongoing program for next year in the fiscal 1975 request is for \$6.5 million.

I find a program on Advanced Forward Air Defense System, you have \$11.1 million in your budget right now, 1975, and you are asking for a supplemental of \$2.3 million. Actually, this program goes into fiscal 1975 at the rate of \$44.7 million.

I do not want to take too much of your time here. There is a program here of night vision investigation, currently \$3,830,000 budget. You are asking for 500,000, I guess, on this thing, and we have an ongoing program in the fiscal 1975 request of \$4 million. It goes on and on.

Here is a program of manpower human resources, combat support equipment, \$5,973,000. You are asking for a supplemental of \$900,000.

You have an ongoing program of \$5.3 million in your fiscal 1975.

It goes on and on and I think one of the extreme cases, Mr. Chairman, why they are coming over and asking for R.D.T. & E. is embraced in this one.

The Air Force requested a \$1.1 million increase in program 65807-F, test and evaluation support, for which \$266.1 million already is available. This program covers the five major Air Force test and evaluation centers.

This is the most incredible example of brass and sets the tone of the entire R. & D. supplemental, and I would just like to say in fiscal 1975 they are requesting \$254 million.

So, Mr. Secretary, will you explain why \$1.1 million cannot be found within this \$266 million program for work which is of lower priority than this readiness requirement?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Senator McIntyre, I have a different view than you about the interpretation of how these programs have come about. Dr. Currie and his staff have worked extremely hard to scrub down these 50 odd programs to see how we might use these, what you term, "relatively insignificant numbers," to an advantage.

Practically every one of those programs you have mentioned come right out of the Middle East conflict, and we are trying to evaluate what we found there and to translate that into an enhanced program. That is the reason for this.

If you are not inclined to work with us on some of these programs in this supplemental, then we will have to take into consideration whether or not we want to go back and try to reprogram some of the amounts you have mentioned and let some of the rest of the program go by the boards. That is a decision I would hope we do not have to make.

Senator McINTYRE. I think that is a decision that you should make. I think it is ridiculous to come in and ask for research, test, and evaluation in the amount of \$109 million and take up the time of this committee on this particular thing when you have got the authority within your own reprogramming action. The time element involved, you are going beyond anything done before in the area of R. & D. asking for a supplemental. It has not lent itself to that. When I give you the fact that you have \$266 million in a program that you are spending now, you are asking for \$250 million or so in 1975, and you want us now to find \$1.1 million in a supplemental, I think it is asinine. That is what I think.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Needless to say, we are pleased to have your views on this but we just do not agree.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you comment on that in detail, because it is a very pertinent point, it seems to me, that has been raised.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes, sir.

General FISH. The Air Force \$1.1 million is to conduct tests of weapons captured in the Middle East war, and we have an opportunity to exploit that. So in that line item, we do not have the money available specifically, as the Secretary said. That is what we are seeking the money for. It came up subsequent to submission of the budget.

[The information is classified and has been furnished to the committee.]

Senator McINTYRE. I do not need to discuss specifics, I think the thing on its face is ridiculous; \$266 million in the fiscal 1974 budget, \$250 that they are asking for fiscal 1975, and somewhere we have to scrape up \$1.1 million so you can do something or other. I think you can find it if it is urgent enough. And remember I made the preface you are not here on an annual request, you are here on a supplemental where the burden of proof is much stronger upon you to make your case and you do not make it with this Senator on your R.D.T. & E.

Mr. CLEMENTS. We can take each one of these 50-odd programs and discuss them with you in detail. I am confident that, in a large measure, you would agree with us on most of these programs.

Senator McINTYRE. On your reprogramming I probably would.

COMMUNICATIONS STATION IN DIEGO GARCIA

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the status of the construction at the communications station now in Diego Garcia and how much has been authorized and funded for this facility? Would you supply that for the record?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes, sir. I do not have that before me.

[The information follows:]

Construction by the Naval Construction Force has reached the point where the communications station is now operational. However, work continues on personnel and logistics facilities in support of the communications facility. Dredging of the channel and a small turning basin is now under contract and scheduled for completion in late 1974. Completion of the entire currently funded facility is scheduled for July 1975. The total cost of construction funded to date for fiscal years 1971 through 1973 is \$20.45 million.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

While you are requesting \$29 million for upgrading and communication facility support, it is understood there will be a follow-on program, perhaps next year. Do you know or would you file for the record, what will the total program cost be?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes; we have been giving very careful consideration to this. The lowest number that I have seen is about \$65 million total and I would suspect, Mr. Chairman, that it will approach, before we are finished, somewhere in the order of plus or minus \$75 million.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. We do not believe that the \$29 million you are requesting includes the cost of the additional dredging that will be necessary to accommodate a carrier task force. How do you propose to pay for this dredging?

Mr. CLEMENTS. No, sir, it has never been contemplated that that turning basin, as we term it, would accommodate a carrier task force, and I think Admiral Moorer would agree with me on that.

Admiral MOORER. That is right.

Mr. CLEMENTS. That has never been contemplated and certainly is not in the plan now.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would it accommodate a carrier?

Mr. CLEMENTS. I would have to investigate that, but I would doubt it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Admiral.

Admiral MOORER. Yes; I think it would. But we would not, as a normal procedure, go in there with a carrier unless we had some requirement to make a major repair.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you did have to accommodate a carrier, could you at the same time accommodate any other ship?

Admiral MOORER. Yes; we have, as shown on my chart, an ammunition ship anchorage and we have a small pier for a tanker but not an entire task force, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes; so the answer would be you could accommodate part of a carrier task force, including the carriers, but not all of it?

Admiral MOORER. We would only go in there for repair purposes.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I would like to emphasize that with the depth of the channel as now contemplated and the size of the turning basin, putting a carrier in there would not normally be done.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you are going to do it at all, why don't you do it so you could accommodate a carrier if it gets into trouble?

Admiral MOORER. It can, but that would, of course, restrict the capacity for other activity.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. If this upgraded facility is approved by the Congress, how many personnel will be stationed on the Island as compared to the total personnel needed for the operation of the communication facility?

Admiral MOORER. We plan billeting spaces for 274 personnel to operate the current facility. We would add about 300 spaces for the upgraded facility.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is it now?

Admiral MOORER. We presently have about 825 personnel on the island, including 750 Seabees.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could you tell us or submit for the record the estimated total annual cost of upgrading facilities compared to the communication facility?

Mr. CLEMENTS. We will supply that for the record.

[The information follows:]

The total projected costs for the communications facility is \$85.3 million. This includes \$20.45 million for military construction, \$42.1 million for Navy Construction Battalion costs, and \$2.8 million for initial equipment outfitting. The total projected cost for the upgraded facilities is \$117.7 million. This includes \$37.5 million for military construction (\$29.0 million in Supplemental, \$8.3 million in FY 1975, and \$5.2 million in FY 1976), \$78.4 million for Navy Construction Battalion costs, and \$1.8 million for initial equipment outfitting. In both cases, the Naval Construction Battalion costs would be budgeted for employment and training at other locations were they not employed at Diego Garcia.

Senator SYMINGTON. If this request is approved, how long will it take you to complete the construction of the upgraded facility? I am wondering why this request was not made a part of the regular fiscal 1975 construction program.

Admiral MOORER. About 2 to 3 years—1976 to 1977, I think.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you plan to put it in 1975 or add it?

Mr. CLEMENTS. The additional fund will be. But we need, Mr. Chairman, to get the dredge out there, to make these initial contracts and get the runway underway. That is why we are asking for the \$29 million at this time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it contemplated that the British will defray any of the expense involved?

Admiral MOORER. They are providing the island, of course, but they will not pay for the facilities that we are going to use. This agreement extends 50 years with the right to extend it even further.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will they be allowed to use the facility for their ships?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. But all the cost will be borne by us?

Admiral MOORER. They will pay for all material and services that they receive from our facility.

Senator SYMINGTON. I mean in the construction.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. We will pay for the construction except for any specific British facilities which may be constructed on the island.

Senator SYMINGTON. Admiral, I have one more question. Did you really answer my question as to whether with the 12-carrier task force, which we have been told is the future force level, you can maintain your existing commitments and also maintain a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean for 6 months out of the year?

Admiral MOORER. I think I answered that by saying we could by drawing down from the Pacific Fleet, Mr. Chairman. We cannot maintain the current posture as well as add the operation that you mentioned.

Senator SYMINGTON. So you would have to draw down?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. I also point out we have no commitment to do that—to maintain a carrier task force for 6 months of the year. That would be our choice, of course.

Senator SYMINGTON. I thought when we talked about this years ago we were talking about a communication facility, especially in relation to the situation in Ethiopia.

Mr. CLEMENTS. We were, that is right.

Admiral MOORER. Conditions have changed significantly since then.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me express our deep appreciation to you gentlemen for your courtesy and tolerance in answering the questions. We look forward to seeing you at 2:30 this afternoon and we will start out open and go into executive.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., of the same day.]

STUDY OF THE MILITARY

MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUPPLEMENTAL—FISCAL YEAR 1974

TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:30 p.m. in room 1224, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington [presiding].

Present: Senator Symington, Stennis, Cannon, McIntyre, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Hughes, Nunn, Thurmond, Tower, and Taft.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Charles J. Connelley, Hyman Fine, George H. Foster, Jr., John A. Goldsmith, Edward B. Kenney, Don L. Lynch, Gordon A. Nease, Robert Q. Old and Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members; Christine E. Cowart, clerical assistant; and Katherine Nelson, assistant to Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, I will proceed, if I may, with some questions to you, but first is there anything you would like to say for the record?

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, CHAIRMAN, JCS; TERENCE McCLARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), ACCCOMPANIED BY L. F. KEENAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUDGET, ARMY; REAR ADM. EDWARD W. COOKE, DIRECTOR, BUDGET, NAVY; MAJ. GEN. HOWARD M. FISH, DIRECTOR, BUDGET, AIR FORCE; REAR ADM. THOMAS J. BIGLEY, REGIONAL DIRECTOR (EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC), ISA; ARTHUR I. MENDOLIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS), I. & L.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes, sir, there is one thing Admiral Moorer has brought to my attention. We would like to clarify the record with respect to Diego Garcia.

Admiral MOORER. In one of your questions I was advised, although I am afraid I didn't know it at the time and I should have, you mentioned B-52s.

We are not planning to operate B-52s from or station B-52s at this limited support facility. This airfield will be primarily devoted to logistic purposes and perhaps some ASW patrol-type aircraft.

The airfield itself, the parking area and support facilities would not accommodate the scope of operations required by the B-52s. I wanted to make this clear.

RUNWAY CAPACITY

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask this question: If you build a 12,000-foot runway and if there is any strategic importance in having the base there, wouldn't you want to have the runway capable of handling B-52s?

Admiral MOORER. I would certainly like to see that happen. However, the planned runway is not wide enough or strong enough to support the operation of B-52s. KC-130s and perhaps KC-135s could land there, of course.

As you know, it is very hot down there—Diego Garcia is just south of the equator. Consequently, the 12,000-foot runway will give us a degree of safety and degree of flexibility in operation. I think this is useful, particularly in view of the fact that the land area is so narrow.

Senator SYMINGTON. But a B-52 can take off at 12,000 feet?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, but the operation of a loaded B-52 could not be accommodated by that runway as presently constructed or as planned.

Senator SYMINGTON. So your testimony is that this base could handle a carrier, a carrier task force, carrier airplanes, but it could not handle any long range Air Force airplanes; is that correct?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir, that is not my testimony. It could handle the C-5 the C-141 and the KC-135.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could not handle long range strategic planes—

Admiral MOORER. I am only referring to basing B-52s or operating B-52s. It can handle several different types of aircraft. I am making no distinctions between Navy and Air Force.

Senator SYMINGTON. What would be the reason it couldn't handle B-52s, because of the amount of cement you use or because of the narrowness of the base?

Admiral MOORER. As I understand it, both. In addition to the requirement for about ten more inches of concrete to increase the strength of the runway, the width of the runway would have to be increased some 50 feet to accommodate the outriggers on the wings of the B-52s.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have a classified statement here which doesn't seem to jibe with your statement so I guess we should discuss it in executive session.

Mr. CLEMENTS. It would be better.

Senator SYMINGTON. It doesn't agree with your statement. I will show it to you in executive session.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I understand. I think that may have been an early proposal, sir. I was making the point that the facilities which are requested in this particular supplemental do not provide adequate capability for the purpose.

Senator SYMINGTON. And was that a JCS decision?

Mr. CLEMENTS. We have not made any plans for operation of that type, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will pursue it later.
Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes, sir.

MASF FUNDING

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, in your statement on the fiscal 1974 Military-Assistance Service Funded ceiling requirement, you state you do not require additional funds. The staff has been advised that there are pressing additional requirements of about \$124 million in the Army MASF/O. & M. account and this additional requirement will require reprogramming.

If you reprogram funds to meet the additional requirements, the funds will have to come from money provided for U.S. forces. This is correct, is it not?

Is it your current plan to reprogram funds to meet this pressing additional MASF requirement?

Mr. CLEMENTS. I would like to defer, if you will, to Mr. McClary, our comptroller.

Mr. MCCLARY. We currently are requesting an increase in ceiling to \$1.6 billion although we have MASF obligational authority for only \$1.4 billion. We do have and are preparing plans that would go above the \$1.4 billion. That is why we want the ceiling flexibility.

However, we have not made a final determination on this incremental nor have we determined where such reprogrammed funds would come from. That would be a matter of balancing of priorities.

At the moment we have not identified any lower priority items which could be reprogrammed to meet increased MASF requirements.

Senator SYMINGTON. The first question would be: How can you justify a supplemental request for increased readiness while at the same time you are considering reprogramming of funds already provided for use by the forces?

Mr. MCCLARY. Again we do not have a specific reprogramming proposal to go beyond the \$1.4 billion. We really want that flexibility in case the situation develops to that extent.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just off the top of my head, as I remember it, you originally asked for \$1.6 billion.

Mr. CLEMENTS. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. And it was cut to \$952 million by the Senate and cut to \$1.3 billion by the House.

In the compromise we split the difference or \$1.126 billion. Now you in effect are trying to reclama or reprogram back to the original figure which was cut by both Houses, and it is a half billion dollars more than was agreed on by both Houses.

Mr. CLEMENTS. That is right, Mr. Chairman. One of the problems, Senator Symington, in this regard is that we did not get approval on the final number of \$1.126 billion until late into the year—just before Christmas, as a matter of fact.

In the meantime, these funds were being spent to support the forces in the field at the rate of the original request, but for valid reasons. The hard facts are that the level of combat in Vietnam has never subsided to the level we hoped for under the cease-fire agreement. Simply put, the higher the level of combat, the greater the consumption and the higher the cost. Another reason for our action was our initial under-

Senator SYMINGTON. Our next witness is the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island. Senator Pell, we welcome you. I made a statement already that you are going to testify on the question of Diego Garcia and have a copy of your statement. Would you read it?

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIBORNE PELL, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, sir, and I thought I was in time but I think you were ready ahead of time.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right. You are a little ahead of time.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, sir.

I appreciate your permitting me to appear and present my arguments in support of my amendment to the supplemental authorization bill, and to delete \$29 million for an expansion of what the Defense Department describes as an austere communication facility on the British Island of Diego Garcia. I understand also that DOD has included in its fiscal 1975 authorization request an additional \$3.3 million for the Diego Garcia installations.

As this committee and as the Congress well knows, \$32.3 million is a relatively insignificant part of the total Defense Department budget for either the current fiscal year or fiscal 1975. The budget request nevertheless poses two significant questions. First, is the expenditure necessary in the defense of our national interests? Second, what are the military and foreign policy implications of an expenditure that would establish for the first time, a permanent U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean?

The answer to the first question, I believe, is no, the expenditure has not been shown to be essential to our national defense. The answer to the second question, I believe, is that establishment of this facility has potentially serious and very costly implications for our foreign and military policies.

As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, I am acutely aware of the fact that our military defense policies and our foreign policies are intimately related. The current proposal for a U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean is an excellent example of this interrelationship.

It is because of this relationship between our defense and foreign policies that I joined this morning Senators Kennedy, Cranston and others in introducing a resolution calling for United States-Soviet talks on naval limitations in the Indian Ocean. Such talks, I believe, could provide an alternative to the proposal for a unilateral, permanent U.S. military intrusion into the Indian Ocean. That is really a Pacific Ocean in the true sense of the word Pacific, now that there are no substantial military installations in that part of the world. It is an alternative that should be explored thoroughly before the United States goes forward with development of Diego Garcia, a proposal that could well trigger a United States-Soviet naval arms race costing many times the mere \$29 million requested in this supplemental authorization bill.

Diego Garcia is seen by our Defense Department primarily as a response to a Soviet threat. The Soviets, if they view Diego Garcia as a

U.S. threat, will respond by strengthening their Indian Ocean forces. And 1, 2, or 3 years from now, the American taxpayer, the Congress and this committee could well be considering Defense Department requests for further expansion of our Indian Ocean naval presence to counter a responsive Soviet buildup. That is the anatomy of the arms race. We should avoid it if we can. In this regard I read all the testimony presented on the House side and all the reading I can go through, reading that the staff and the Senators, within the limits of their time have done, too, I would imagine they have come very much to the same conclusion.

The reason for giving priority to negotiations is hard headed, not soft headed. If negotiation fails, I am confident we can outrun the Soviets in naval power. But once an arms race is begun, negotiations to limit the race or end it are extremely difficult, as we have learned through our experience with the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

And if we have learned anything from our cold war encounter with the Soviet Union, it is that an arms race toward dominance is an expensive exercise in futility. Our own defense goals are no longer phrased by the administration in terms of "mutual deterrence," "sufficiency," or other fancy phrases denoting a standoff.

Mr. Chairman, our experience in Vietnam led the current administration to proclaim a new direction in U.S. defense and foreign policy: the Nixon doctrine, under which we would seek to replace confrontation with negotiation, and the Nixon doctrine which I strongly support.

The proposal for Diego Garcia turns that doctrine around toward confrontation before negotiation is attempted.

Less than a year ago, in May 1973, Under Secretary Joseph Sisco of the State Department, applied the Nixon doctrine, right side up, to South Asia. He said:

The subcontinent is very far away. I think our interests are marginal. I think the Nixon Doctrine is quite applicable—namely, we ourselves do not want to become involved.

And he continued by saying:

In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, we think the search for stability in South Asia is primarily a task for the nations of that region.

I fail to see how the Diego Garcia proposal squares with that doctrine.

The view expressed by Secretary Sisco has been, until very recently, the consistent view of the administration in regard to our interests in the Indian Ocean area.

For example, in 1971, several years ago, Ronald Spiers, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, told a congressional subcommittee that:

There appears to be no requirement at this time for us to feel impelled to control, or even decisively influence, any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral given the nature of our interests there and the current level of Soviet and Chinese involvement. We consider, on balance, our present interests are served by normal commercial, political, and military access.

Then a year later, in February 1972, Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had no intention of competing for military installa-

tions in Southern Asia as we had in the Mediterranean. Expanding on this point, Ambassador Johnson said that while the United States would continue to keep its vessels passing through the Indian Ocean regularly as we have in the past, two passages a year, if my recollection is correct, of an aircraft carrier, he said: "We do not plan a regular presence in the Indian Ocean. We have no intention of engaging in competition or maintaining a regular force."

In 1972, Defense Secretary Laird said that "our strength in the Indian Ocean lies not so much in maintaining a large standing force . . . but rather in our ability to move freely in and out of the ocean as the occasion and our interests dictate."

Also, in 1972, Navy Secretary John Chaffe gave similar advice in regard to the Indian Ocean, saying "We ought to go slowly here and not escalate the thing and see what happens."

We might well ask what has happened in the past year to cause such a monumental shift in our Indian Ocean policies? What has happened that the Diego Garcia construction is now considered not only essential but of such priority that it must be included in a supplemental authorization for the current fiscal year?

I would like to examine for a moment that rationale put forward by the Defense Department for this departure from past policy.

On March 12, 1974, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Mr. Noyes testified on behalf of the Diego Garcia proposal and cited three U.S. security objectives:

First, the United States, according to Mr. Noyes who was testifying for the administration, wishes to provide an effective alternative to the growth of Soviet influence in the region;

Second, we wish to have continued access to vital Middle Eastern oil supplies for ourselves and other nations of the free world;

Third, we want to insure the continued free movement of U.S. ships and aircraft into and out of the area.

These are certainly three good objectives, like motherhood, apple pie, and the American flag, nobody can object to it.

But let us examine that in the light of events Mr. Noyes has referred to as affecting our policy in the region.

On the first point, the focus of the administration's argument in favor of expanding Diego Garcia is the necessity of countering an expanded Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, claims that the Russians are moving in a most impressive way to increase their capability to support their naval forces overseas. He dramatically asserts that "their tentacles are going out like an octopus into the Indian Ocean." He states that they have improved facilities and operated out of Ummgata in Iraq, Berbera in Somalia, out of the Island of Socotra and Dacca in Bangladesh. They have built a large naval base for the Indians called Visakhapatnam on the east coast of India. The implication is that the Soviets have special base rights in these places that could not be enjoyed by the United States. These facilities, he asserts, thus give the Russians a position "astride the central part of our energy jugular down to the Persian Gulf."

Other executive branch representatives have testified in a similar vein but when you look at the detail and read the reports and read the evidence, the facts and figures do not add up to an ominous presence.

For example, the Indian Government reportedly has resisted Soviet pressure and refused a request for a base on Indian territory, a position which it would be harder for that Government to maintain if we expand on Diego Garcia. And while the Soviets have assisted in improving facilities in the area, they have no base in the sense that we have in Bahrein, Diego Garcia and also in Australia. In addition, the Soviet anchorage off Socotra is an ocean anchorage that anyone could set up. All told, I believe there is sufficient ambiguity in the circumstances surrounding the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean as to require a great deal more investigation and verification before the United States proceeds further on this course that Defense advocates.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have no lack of hard information and data about these plans. They already know from published U.S. material that the Defense Department received \$6 million in fiscal 1973 for dredging of the Diego Garcia harbor to create a turning basin that will be 2,000 to 6,000 feet, large enough to accommodate not only our larger submarines but our aircraft carriers; that the design vessel is a ship 793 feet long and with a navigational draft of 41 feet; that the existing 8,000-foot runway can take most aircraft, the design aircraft being the C-141 cargo airplane and that the United States will probably soon deploy P-3 naval ASW and reconnaissance aircraft on the island, and the Soviets are aware as we are, of reports that a submarine tender may also be sent there.

Cited by the Defense Department as further evidence that the Soviet presence is ahead of that of the United States in the Indian Ocean is a comparison of "ship days" spent there by the United States and Soviet vessels. The statistics show the Soviets ahead by a substantial margin. These ship day comparisons, however, ignore the actual nature of the kinds of ships and their combat capabilities. Soviet minesweepers sent to help clear ports in Bangladesh count equally with United States aircraft carriers. Most of the Soviet naval ships reportedly are noncombatant support and auxiliaries: oiler, repair ships, space support ships, et cetera. At present, according to Defense Department testimony, the Soviets have only eight or nine surface combat ships of destroyer size and smaller in the Indian Ocean. The United States has been maintaining an aircraft carrier task force in and out of that area for some time. In another index of naval presence involving much greater political impact, the United States leads the Soviet Union by a wide margin in the number of port calls and this is where we are waving the flag, show the flag, visibility, not exploding in the ocean but when they are actually in port.

The point I wish to emphasize is that we really do not know at this hour of important decision exactly what the growth of Soviet influence in the region really amounts to in terms of facts and figures. Let us find out before we move ahead.

Regarding the second objective, surely we agree that there should be continued access to vital Middle Eastern oil supplies for ourselves and other nations of the free world. But we should not automatically assume that a naval base on Diego Garcia would really help in this respect. Is not the threat more a political one on the part of the producing countries rather than a military threat from the Soviets? It was, after all, not the Soviets who recently cut us off from

Mideast oil supplies and in the event of hostilities, it would take very few minutes, not hours, to close off the Suez Canal once more.

Finally, regarding the third objective of insuring the continued free movement of U.S. ships and aircraft into and out of the area, this is something we already enjoy. That free movement could be more effectively guaranteed at no cost by an arms control agreement than by a base at Diego Garcia.

For many years, Mr. Chairman, there have been in the Defense Department advocates of the establishment of a U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean. There is nothing new in this proposal; I remember hearing about it years ago. The only thing that is new is apparently the proposal has now been able to break through the top level of the Defense bureaucracy and surface with this proposal to the Congress.

I think it is instructive to consider the proposal in the context of the history of past proposals, and arguments for them by the Defense Department advocates:

In the early 1960's, before the modernizing and buildup of Soviet sea power and the closing of the Suez Canal, it was argued that a U.S. naval presence was needed to fill the vacuum created by waning British sea power. It was at this time that Adm. John McCain, a wonderful, gallant, and fine admiral, was arguing for a four-ocean Navy, summarized the outlook of those seeking a U.S. presence by saying, "As Malta is to the Mediterranean, Diego Garcia is to the Indian Ocean."

With the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, the Indian Ocean advocates argued that a U.S. presence was needed because the Indian Ocean was less accessible to the U.S. forces.

Now with the real opening of the canal, it is now argued that a permanent U.S. presence is needed to offset a potential expansion of Soviet presence made possible by the opening of the canal. Apparently, from the Defense Department viewpoint if the canal is closed that is why we should have a presence there and if it is opened we should have a presence there. Whatever the circumstance, an argument has been found to justify expansion into the Indian Ocean. It is part of a defense outlook that has as its basic objective a dominant American naval presence in every warm ocean of the world, the creation of a "Mare Americanum per Munde."

If we really want to dominate the oceans of the world that follows. But if what we are after is to secure the freedom of passage of the oceans and a limitation of our own commitments around the world and hostages for future hostilities than I would think we would seek fewer, not more bases. I do not mean to imply any criticism of the motives of those in the Defense Department who have sought through the years an expanded U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean. It is the responsibility of the Defense Department to propose military measures and preparations they consider to be necessary. And in recommending such projects as the Diego Garcia base, they are doing their job.

But civilian authorities, including you, Senators Symington and Goldwater and your colleagues, the Congress as a whole, have a broader responsibility. We must weigh these military recommendations in a context of our overall defense and foreign policies. And it is in that broader context that I believe hasty approval of the Diego Garcia

project, as part of a supplemental authorization bill, is both unnecessary and unwise.

I would hope this committee would delete the Diego Garcia funds from this bill. The implications of the project are sufficiently profound that, in the absence of any critical emergency, we should allow time for a more careful and thorough examination of the situation in the Indian Ocean area.

In conclusion, it would take the head of the camel and put it under the tent and let it move much farther in the Indian Ocean. If we go ahead and do this I think we will see an increased level of response from the Soviets and I am sure the Soviet admirals are waiting for us to do this so they themselves can bring pressure on their bosses in the Kremlin.

I will never forget an interview we had, a couple of hours with Mr. Kosygin when Senator Gore and I were in together, and the opening remarks of Kosygin, "How can we civilian leaders try to keep a lid on our respective military people? They are doing their job." They want a bigger military service and I think he faced the same problems as we do, and we have a job to keep the lid on as much as we can. I do hope we will in this case.

I would be glad to answer any questions. Thank you, sir.
[Senator Pell's statement follows:]

STATEMENT BY CLAIBORNE PELL

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much this opportunity to appear before the Armed Services Committee to present the arguments in support of my amendment (No. 973) to the Supplemental Military Authorization Bill (S. 2999).

My amendment would delete from the bill 29 million dollars requested by the Defense Department for expansion of what the Defense Department describes as an "austere" communication facility on the British island of Diego Garcia in the center of the Indian Ocean. I understand that the Defense Department has included in its fiscal 1975 authorization request an additional 3.3 million dollars for the Diego Garcia installations.

As this committee well knows, 32.3 million dollars is a relatively insignificant part of the total Defense Department budget for either the current fiscal year or fiscal 1975. The budget request nevertheless poses two significant questions. First, is the expenditure necessary in the defense of our national interest. Secondly, what are the military and foreign policy implications of an expenditure that would establish for the first time, a permanent United States military presence in the Indian Ocean?

The answer to the first question, I believe, is no, the expenditure has not been shown to be essential to our national defense. The answer to the second question, I believe, is that establishment of this facility has potentially serious and very costly implications for our foreign and military policies.

As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, I am acutely aware of the fact that our military defense policies and our foreign policies are intimately related. The current proposal for a United States military presence in the Indian Ocean is an excellent example of this interrelationship.

It is because of this relationship between our defense and foreign policies that I joined Senators Kennedy and Cranston today in introducing a resolution calling for United States-Soviet talks on naval limitations in the Indian Ocean. Such talks, I believe, could provide an alternative to the proposal for a unilateral, permanent United States military intrusion into the Indian Ocean. It is an alternative that should be explored thoroughly before the United States goes forward with development of Diego Garcia, a proposal that could well trigger a United States-Soviet naval arms race costing many times the 29 million dollars requested in this supplemental authorization bill.

Diego Garcia is seen by our Defense Department primarily as a response to a Soviet threat. The Soviets, if they view Diego Garcia as a United States threat, will respond by strengthening their Indian Ocean forces. And one, two or three

years from now, the American taxpayer, the Congress and this committee could well be considering Defense Department requests for further expansion of our Indian Ocean naval presence to counter a Soviet buildup. That is the anatomy of an arms race. We should avoid it if we can.

Obviously, Mr. Chairman, it takes two to make an arms race. From the evidence available frankly I see no clear indication that the Soviet Union wants an Indian Ocean Naval arms race. And in that circumstance I believe our national interests are best served by being the second to enter an arms race.

The reason, for giving priority to negotiations is hard-headed, not soft-headed. If negotiation fails, I am confident we can outrun the Soviets in naval power. But once an arms race is begun, negotiations to limit the race or end it are extremely difficult, as we have learned through our experience with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT).

And if we have learned anything from our Cold War encounter with the Soviet Union, it is that an arms race toward dominance is an expensive exercise in futility. Our own defense goals are no longer phrased by the Administration in terms of "mutual deterrence," "sufficiency," or other fancy phrases denoting a stand-off.

Mr. Chairman, our experience in Vietnam led the current administration to proclaim a new direction in United States defense and foreign policy: the Nixon Doctrine, under which we would seek to replace confrontation with negotiation.

The proposal for Diego Garcia turns that doctrine on its head—it moves toward confrontation before negotiation is attempted.

Less than a year ago, In May, 1973, Undersecretary Joseph Sisco of the State Department applied the Nixon Doctrine, right side up, to South Asia. He said:

"The subcontinent is very far away, I think our interests are marginal. I think the Nixon Doctrine is quite applicable—namely we ourselves don't want to become involved."

And he continued by saying:

"In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, we think the search for stability in South Asia is primarily a task for the nations of that region." I fail to see how the Diego Garcia proposal squares with that doctrine.

The view expressed by Secretary Sisco has been, until very recently, the consistent view of the Administration in regard to our interests in the Indian Ocean area.

For example:

In 1971, Ronald Spiers, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, told a Congressional Subcommittee that: "There appears to be no requirement at this time for us to feel impelled to control, or even decisively influence, any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral given the nature of our interests there and the current level of Soviet and Chinese involvement. We consider, on balance, our present interests are served by normal commercial, political, and military access."

In February, 1972, Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had no intention of competing for military installations in Southern Asia as we had in the Mediterranean. Expanding on this point, Ambassador Johnson said that while the United States would continue to keep its vessels passing through the Indian Ocean regularly, "We do not plan a regular presence in the Indian Ocean. We have no intention of engaging in competition or maintaining a regular force."

In 1972, Defense Secretary Laird said that "our strength in the Indian Ocean lies not so much in maintaining a large standing force . . . but rather in our ability to move freely in and out of the Ocean as the occasion and our interests dictate."

Also, in 1972, Navy Secretary John Chafee gave similar advise in regard to the Indian Ocean, saying "we ought to go slowly here and not escalate the thing and see what happens."

Finally, less than a year ago, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, John Noyes, assured Congress that with reference to Diego Garcia, "there are no plans to transform this facility into something from which forces could be projected, or that would provide a location for the basing of ships and aircraft."

We might well ask what has happened in the past year to cause such a monumental shift in our Indian Ocean policies. What has happened that the Diego Garcia construction is considered not only essential but of such priority that it must be included in a supplemental authorization for the current fiscal year?

I would like to examine for a moment that rationale put forward by the Defense Department for this departure from past policy.

On March 12, 1974, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Mr. Noyes testified on behalf of the Diego Garcia proposal and cited three United States security objectives:

First, the United States wish to provide an effective alternative to the growth of Soviet influence in the region;

Second, we wish to have continued access to vital Middle Eastern oil supplies for ourselves and other nations of the free world;

Third, we want to insure the continued free movement of United States ships and aircraft into and out of the area.

Let us examine these objectives in the light of events Mr. Noyes has referred to as affecting our policy in the region.

On the first point, the focus of the Administration's argument in favor of expanding Diego Garcia is the necessity of countering an expanded Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, claims that the Russians are moving in a most impressive way to increase their capability to support their naval forces overseas. He dramatically asserts that "their tentacles are going out like an octopus into the Indian Ocean." He states that they have improved facilities and operated out of Ummgata in Iraq, Berbera in Somalia, out of the island of Socotra and Dacca in Bangladesh. They have built a large naval base for the Indians called Vishakhapatnam on the East Coast of India. The implication is that the Soviets have special base rights in these places that could not be enjoyed by the United States. These facilities, he asserts, thus give the Russians a position "astride the central part of our energy jugular down to the Persian Gulf."

Other Executive branch representatives have testified in a similar vein but so far, the facts and figures I have seen do not add up to an ominous presence.

For example, the Indian Government reportedly has resisted Soviet pressure and refused a request for a base on Indian territory a position which it would be harder for that government to maintain if we expand on Diego Garcia. And while the Soviets have assisted in improving facilities in the area, they have no base in the sense that we have in Bahrain, Diego and Western Australia. In addition, the Soviet anchorage off Socotra is an ocean anchorage that anyone could set up. All told, I believe there is sufficient ambiguity in the circumstances surrounding the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean as to require a great deal more investigation and verification before the United States proceeds further with its plans for Diego Garcia.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have no lack of hard information and data about these plans. They already know from published United States material that the Defense Department received \$6 million in fiscal 1973 for dredging of the Diego Garcia harbor to create a turning basin that will be 2,000 to 6,000 feet, large enough to accommodate submarines and aircraft carriers; that the design vessel is a ship 793 feet long and with a navigational draft of 41 feet; that the existing 8,000 foot runway can take most aircraft, the design aircraft being the C-141 cargo airplane and that the United States will probably soon deploy P-3 naval ASW and reconnaissance aircraft on the island, and the Soviets are aware as we are of reports that a submarine tender may also be sent there.

Cited by the Defense Department as further evidence that the Soviet presence is ahead of that of the United States in the Indian Ocean is a comparison of "ship days" spent there by the United States and Soviet vessels. The statistics show the Soviets ahead by a considerable margin. These "ship day" comparisons, however, ignore the actual nature of the kinds of ships and their combat capabilities. Soviet minesweepers sent to help clear ports in Bangladesh count equally with United States aircraft carriers. Most of the Soviet naval ships reportedly are non-combatant support and auxiliaries: oiler, repair ships, space support ships, etc. At present, according to Defense Department testimony, the Soviets have only eight or nine surface combat ships of destroyer size and smaller in the Indian Ocean. The United States has been maintaining an aircraft carrier task force there for some time. In another index of naval presence involving much greater political impact, the United States leads the Soviet Union by a wide margin in the number of port calls.

The point I wish to emphasize is the we really do not seem to know at this hour of important decision exactly what the growth of Soviet influence in the region really amounts to in terms of facts and figures. We should find out.

Regarding the second objective, certainly we all agree that there should be continued access to vital Middle Eastern oil supplies for ourselves and other nations of the free world. But we should not automatically assume that a naval base on Diego Garcia would really help in this respect. Is not the threat more a political

one on the part of the producing countries rather than a military threat from the Soviets? It was after all not the Soviets who recently cut us off from Mid-East oil supplies.

Finally, regarding the third objective of insuring the continued free movement of United States ships and aircraft into and out of the area, this is something we already enjoy. That free movement could be more effectively guaranteed at no cost by an arms control agreement than by a base at Diego Garcia.

For many years, Mr. Chairman, there have been in the Defense Department advocates of the establishment of a United States military presence in the Indian Ocean. I think it is instructive to consider the current proposal in the context of the history of past proposals, and arguments for them by the Defense Department advocates:

In the early 1960's, before the modernizing and buildup of Soviet Sea power and the closing of the Suez Canal, it was argued that a United States naval presence was needed to fill the vacuum created by waning British sea power. It was at this time that Admiral John McCain, arguing for a "four-ocean navy" summarized the outlook of those seeking a United States presence by saying, "As Malta is to the Mediterranean, Diego Garcia is to the Indian Ocean."

With the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, the Indian Ocean advocates argued that a United States presence was needed because the Indian Ocean was less accessible to the United States forces.

Now with the possibility of the reopening of the Canal, it is argued that a permanent United States presence is needed to offset a potential expansion of Soviet presence made possible by the opening of the Canal.

Whatever the circumstances, an argument has been found to justify expansion into the Indian Ocean. It is part of a defense outlook that has as its basic objective a dominant American naval presence in every ocean of the world, the creation of a "Mare Americanum per Munde."

I do not mean to imply any criticism of the motives of those in the Defense Department who have sought through the years an expanded United States military presence in the Indian Ocean. It is the responsibility of the Defense Department to propose military measures and preparations they consider to be necessary. And in recommending such projects as the Diego Garcia base, they are doing their job.

But civilian authorities, including this Committee and the Congress as a whole, have a broader responsibility. We must weigh these military recommendations in a context of our overall defense and foreign policies. And it is in that broader context that I believe hasty approval of the Diego Garcia project, as part of a supplemental authorization bill, is both unnecessary and unwise.

I urge the Committee, most respectfully, to delete the Diego Garcia funds from this bill. The implications of the project are sufficiently profound that, in the absence of any critical emergency, we should allow time for a more careful and thorough examination of the situation in the Indian Ocean area, and time for the exploration of other alternatives, including United States-Soviet talks on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for this opportunity to appear before this committee.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator, for an interesting and thought-provoking statement. Is this island owned by us or by the British?

Senator PELL. It is presently owned by the British, but it was not, this has not been brought out sufficiently. I think, in the testimony, but apparently there were some conversations in the midsixties when the British changed their governmental structure in that part of the world from the Seychelles Islands carved out for them by the Maldives and created a separate Indian Ocean territory with in mind, in my reading, of the developments of this kind of a military center there.

Senator SYMINGTON. A reporter called up today and said there was a story in the Manchester Guardian yesterday to the effect the British were changing their position on this proposed development. I told him

we did not know anything about that. But in any case, if we are going to make this heavy investment would it not be advisable to have some treaty agreement of some character before we proceeded?

Senator PELL. This is of such far-reaching importance, I would think it should be given the same treatment as a treaty and not just as an executive agreement. In this regard, the British original commitment made in that area was done by a Labor government, if my recollection is correct, and then the Conservatives have come since and now they have gone back to Labor but whatever the arrangement is it should be locked up. The other countries around the area have also expressed their disapproval of our moving ahead, Australia, New Zealand, India, and I forget the new name of Ceylon, Ceylon, those four.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would ask the staff to check that purported story in the Manchester Guardian.

In testimony we heard, the only country that has recommended that we develop this island as a military base is Singapore, with a population of about one-half of 1 percent of the world. Already the Soviets and the Indians have protested it. If the Chinese joined these two, 44 percent of the population of the world would oppose this plan. Originally it came up as a substitute communications center for another base that we had in Ethiopia. That appears to have fallen by the wayside and this is now being developed into far more than a communications base.

One argument put forward by the Defense Department for increased U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean is that it "should assure friendly nations of our continued interest in the area and of our capability to help in crisis situations."

Do you know of any nations in the littoral area that would welcome the upgrading of the U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia?

Senator PELL. No, I think there was some enthusiasm on the part of the Portuguese for hoping this would fail and they could persuade us to use their property. Also, I think the Chinese, I saw in press reports to the effect that they had expressed some support for the idea because, you know, anything that seems to be anti-Soviet, the Chinese seem to be supporting. So these are the only two evidences that I have come across of enthusiasm for the idea.

Senator SYMINGTON. You said, "Less than a year ago Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense John Noyes assured Congress that with reference to Diego Garcia there are no plans to transform this facility into something from which forces could be projected, or that would provide a location for the basing of ships and aircraft."

And then on the next page you quote a Mr. Noyes as stating giving three reasons why we should do this. Is that the same Mr. Noyes?

Senator PELL. It is the same Mr. Noyes, and I guess I felt I did not want to personally embarrass him in reading it but he was taking a converse position. I am not saying he is irrational but his instructions were irrational.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know why he changed his position 180 degrees?

Senator PELL. I would think the reason being that this idea which had good support in the Defense Department for many years finally

prevailed at top levels and he as a good soldier was carrying out the change of instructions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Goldwater.

Senator GOLDWATER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly understand the concern over our desire to improve Diego Garcia, but I would point out that since 1971 there have been some very radical changes in this part of the world. I refer to that particular date because it is a date that you mentioned in your testimony. For all intents and purposes, I think we can scratch South Vietnam. I think it is evident that South Vietnam is going to fall into the hands of North Vietnam. Then I have grave questions about Laos and Cambodia. And then, of course, the \$64 question in that part of the world get to be Thailand, and I have every confidence that the Thais can hold out but if they do not we would use Utapao, which is the only large aircraft facility we have except the one in free China.

Since 1971 we have seen those things happen, and we also see today something that I tried to report 4 or 5 years ago, the encroachment of Communist forces in Burma. I think it has to be accepted that these forces are now forming on the eastern border, in fact, they are well within the eastern border. So what I am trying to get down to is Diego Garcia. In my opinion, Diego Garcia remains the only opportunity we have if we want to take advantage of an opportunity to provide us with a base from which we could operate in case that the Soviets or any other forces ever tried to close the Straits of Malacca. If that ever occurred we could write off Japan as an industrial ally, we could probably write off a large amount of our oil reserves, oil supplies, that would be coming through that route and it is not an easy Strait to defend. So I have to say at this time in spite of your very compelling testimony, that I am inclined to go along with the rather small amount that is being requested.

One other comment, you say you see no clear indication that the Soviet Union wants a blue Indian Ocean in an arms naval race. I think you are right in that statement, if you mean the Indian Ocean itself would generate an arms race. The Soviet Navy is already larger than ours, and we say the only intent of the Soviet Navy is to handle us in the Mediterranean. Believe me, they can already do that, and they will, at the rate they are building I do not see any arms race unless we decide to build up our Navy, which is rapidly disappearing. As you well know, coming from an important naval State.

Senator PELL. Former important naval State.

Senator GOLDWATER. I can understand your feelings on that. [Laughter.]

That you are confident we can outrun the Soviets in naval power. I think we can, too, but not the way we are going. We are going backward, not forward. We will lose 300 ships out of the fleet this year, which will bring the fleet strength down to under 500, and I am not arguing, using that figure and arguing that we should get into the previous expenditure on ships. But the Soviets now dominate us as far as ocean power goes. I do not see the validity of using that kind of an argument. Unless I can see some clear indication on the part of the Soviets that they want to engage in meaningful arms limitation talks, which I have not seen but which I would wholeheartedly support, I am

going to have to go along with this supplemental request. I know I have not asked you many questions, I did not have to because of your statement, but if you want to use it for rebuttal, I would be happy to use it.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much. I am very aware, too, of your own familiarity from World War II in that part of the world and you have had far more experience in the northern Pacific Ocean than I have had in that ocean at all. But if we really mean the Nixon doctrine, which is to pull in our tentacles a little bit, to try to limit our responsibilities a little bit, pull back, in other words, then this would be going directly counter to it. Every point you made is valid except for the fact that do we really want a presence in the Indian Ocean? What are any vital American national interests that we should defend in that part of the world. Will SEATO be as impelling and important 20 years from now as it is today or 10 years from now and what we are doing here is starting the process toward one more hostage for future wars, one more presence that would be very hard for us to ever pull back from.

You see the anomaly of Guantanamo which you know as a military person is not of vital strategic or even of tactical interest, some tactical, but not of strategic interest, and yet the embarrassment of being able to pull out of there is such that we have been hanging onto it for some years at good expense when we all know we would be better off without it, and I can see us moving in this situation here, putting more and more money into it and we really have no interest in the Pacific Ocean, is what I am really saying, except for freedom of transit basically, and making sure the oil comes and so far as that goes, in having freedom of transit in having the vessels there. So the question is really one of philosophies whether we believe we should develop an involvement in the Pacific Ocean and have national interests there of a vital interest, and then we should go ahead. If we do not then we should not, and I think this is the larger question that I would hope would enter into your thinking as you move ahead in discussing this within your committee.

Senator GOLDWATER. It does, definitely. I have thought of the foreign policy of the United States for over 100 years as centralizing on the periphery of the Pacific. I think we see that more today than we ever have. I do not think anyone can argue for the permanency of any base.

I would agree with you that Guantanamo is something we could chuck, if we could do it gracefully. But in the Indian Ocean we see the country of Iran building another naval base east of their present one in the mouth of the Persian Gulf and this is only because of their fear of the encroachment of the Soviet through land lines to the Indian Ocean. They have a very educated fear on this. I can see, on the other hand, no interest to the Soviets in the Indian Ocean except if it ever became necessary to wage an economic war or a political war against us by denying us ocean access to all parts of the world, and this they could do through the control of a very narrow set of straits which, as I say, would be very hard for us to defend. Our mere presence there at the moment, I think, is necessary. I would say if this were involving the total construction of a new base concept, I think I would see it in a different light. But for the amount of money we are talking about and having lived, as you did, through the necessity of

constructing some of these things in a hurry, I think it is best to go ahead with it now and we can always take another look-see.

Senator PELL. I do hope though, that you will bear in mind that while it is a little bit of money involved, it will be really a full-fledged base. It will be able to handle carriers, submarines, it can have, on an emergency basis, handle B-52s and handle any other kind of airplane that we have, and it really will be a solid base.

Also, while Admiral McCain spoke about the four fleet concept of the United States, unfortunately, the Soviets because of their geography, have to have a four-fleet concept, the Barentz Sea—the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean and the Pacific, and they have to have a four-sea fleet. We are doing it apparently as a matter of choice and there is a great difference there.

Senator GOLDWATER. I would not see any necessity for having another fleet just in the Indian Ocean at this time, and I would hope never. I think an extension of the 7th Fleet, such as we witnessed in the use of aircraft carriers that go over there, the last one was in November, a very small carrier, I forget the name of it, on a combined force demonstration of our test with the Iranian Navy. I would never see another Pacific Fleet as long as we can get there and get back, I do not see any reason for it.

Senator PELL. But you had the good fortune to be selected for flag rank and I was not selected for flag rank, both of them our military friends, we know them and I think sitting here in favor 10 years we will have an appeal being made to have more of a military establishment.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Scott.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me commend our colleague for coming here to express his views. I think it is better for those who are in disagreement with the Defense Department proposals to bring their disagreement, when possible, to the committee. In this way we can thrash over it a bit and attempt to arrive at a balanced recommendation to submit to the entire Senate.

I note that our colleague is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and that he has joined with two other Senators in introducing a resolution calling for talks on naval limitations in the Indian Ocean between this country and the Soviet Union. Now, I just wondered if it is feasible to call for limitations within one ocean? Would it not be preferable to have an overall naval limitations talk? If you have so many, a given number of naval vessels you limit to one ocean, you can put it in another.

Senator PELL. It is obviously preferable to have a world ocean limitation, but certainly it is feasible from the viewpoint of fixed establishments ashore, that can be nailed down and also as we have seen in many agreements, we can, each side limit itself to a certain number of vessels, ship days to an ocean perfectly feasible if both sides want to do it. If they do not want to do it, no.

Senator SCOTT. I would think if we had limitations in one ocean, but if the Soviet Union had superiority in naval vessels worldwide, were there any major emergency or if war should occur, they could very quickly move into any place where there was an agreement with regard to restricting the number of ships. I doubt the feasibility of limiting in one ocean alone, but I appreciate the distinguished Sena-

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator.

I would like a couple of observations. If stories are correct about the new smart bombs, based on developments in sea-to-sea missiles and air-to-sea missiles, because of the size of this proposed new base, even without the use of nuclear weapons, it would be relatively simple to knock this base out if we got any real confrontation. That is a military aspect.

The political aspect reminds me of what Lord Palmerston said, "No country has friends, no country has enemies; all a country has are interests." And if we look back a few years, two of our three best friends were the Soviet Union and China and our worst enemies were Japan and Germany. I would hope you would agree that we should go ahead only on the basis of a treaty or signed agreement between the two nations—until it is clear what the position is of those who own it now, namely, the British.

Senator PELL. I would completely agree with you on that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. The next witness is the distinguished Senator from California, Senator Cranston.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN CRANSTON, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am very grateful to you for providing this opportunity for me to be here today. I have asked a number of other Senators to join me either in person or by written statement to testify against raising the authorization ceiling for military aid to South Vietnam in fiscal year 1974 by \$474 million. Senator Howard Metzenbaum accompanied me to this hearing but he was called away and is unable, to testify at this time. He asked me to state for him his concurrence with the view that I am presenting.

My opposition rests on three simple convictions. First, if we grant the Pentagon's request, we would be giving Thieu a clear signal that he can go on behaving exactly as he wishes, regardless of the Paris peace agreements.

Second, we would be giving tacit approval to back-door funding practices designed in part to get around congressional opposition to military aid and to keep Congress in the dark about what is really going on in Southeast Asia.

Third, we would be repeating the pattern of squandering millions of dollars on foreign military actions that are not in our Nation's interest, while the American people lack adequate housing, medical care, and mass transit and much else, and are being squeezed by continuing inflation and rising unemployment.

Last week, 19 Senators joined me in publicly urging this committee to undertake an immediate investigation into the alleged violation of law now underway in Cambodia, where an American military adviser has been identified in the press as giving direct combat advice to Cambodian troops.

I assume that such an investigation will be launched.

Today, I propose that the Pentagon's request for authority to spend an additional \$474 million in military aid to South Vietnam in fiscal