

# MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1975

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## HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

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### SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS

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### PART 1 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FAMILY HOUSING OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1974

36-880 O

Admiral MARSCHALL. Are we speaking now specifically of the Mayport facility?

Mr. DAVIS. I think San Diego is relevant to this question too.

Mr. MURPHY. Sir, our sea-control ship program, as the Navy sees it, it is an eight-ship program over the long term. We are asking in the ship construction Navy budget, in 1975, for the funds for construction of the first ship. That would commission in fiscal year 1978. We then would follow on through following years leading up to having by fiscal year 1981 all eight ships in commission and they would be positioned — in the Atlantic — in the Pacific. Each of these ships embarks 14 helicopters and 3 vertical takeoff and landing aircraft.

Our plan is to have the homeports in Norfolk and at North Island. Essentially, waterfront facility that exist now and those approved through Cold Iron projects in recent years will accommodate the ships. The draft, length, Cold Iron demand, is no problem.

As far as the helicopters squadrons ashore at Norfolk and North Island, as I say, the first squadron, we will have to phase-in is the squadron — at Norfolk. Looking at that right now, we may indeed require some hangar facilities at Norfolk in the heliport area. But in any event, if we do, we will have time to program them next year or the year after. For the ships out in the 1980 and 1981 timeframe, we feel that we have several years of military construction programs before we request things for specific facilities for the 14 times 4 helicopters that go into North Island for these ships.

Mr. DAVIS. There is nothing in the 1975 program that has any relevance to the sea control ships; is that correct?

Mr. MURPHY. In one minor way. At Norfolk we are asking for a heliport runway control tower. That runway and tower may, some day, in 1978, 1979, be controlling helos off the sea control ships. It will do that along with all the other helicopters at Norfolk, of which there are some 85 or 90 right now.

Admiral MARSCHALL. The need is there now for the control tower. It has been justified on its own merits and not by the future sea control ship squadrons. I have been told that the existing tower is in deplorable condition.

Mr. MURPHY. Similarly, the helicopter runway we are asking for in this year's program would some day serve the sea control ships helos at Norfolk. Also it is justified by today's requirement at Norfolk fully. As I say, 90 helicopters there now, none of them related to a sea control ship.

#### SAN DIEGO PIER

Mr. DAVIS. This may or may not be related to what we have been talking about here, but what is the status of that new pier at San Diego that was funded?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We have not quite completed the design of that pier. Also, there is an environmental impact statement being filed for the dredging. I think our design is about 85 to 90 percent complete. We can check that for the record.

Mr. DAVIS. We have some information on that from our staff.

#### NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION, DIEGO GARCIA, INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. PATTEN. If everyone is willing and it is convenient for you men, I would like to ask about 10 questions about the Indian Ocean.

What is the status of the Navy's request for \$29,000,000 for expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, the request was originally contained in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental request and it was carried over by the work of the authorization conference committee to the fiscal year 1975 program. We are considering it to be in our 1975 program and letters from the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, have been submitted to the Appropriations Committees, indicating our intention to pursue the project in the 1975 program.

#### STATUS OF AGREEMENT WITH UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. PATTEN. What is the status of the agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom on the expansion you propose at Diego Garcia?

Captain GIOVANETTI. Mr. Chairman, the British Government has indicated to us that they have delayed a decision until such time as they complete an overall defense study.

#### REACTIONS OF LITTORAL NATIONS

Mr. PATTEN. Can you bring us up to date on the reactions of littoral nations to the proposal to expand this facility? Provide details for the record.

[NOTE.—The information was classified and has been retained in committee files.]

Captain GIOVANETTI. It has been reasonably quiet in the last 2 months. The exception has been the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean Peace Zone, where a paper was published, which is now "anti" almost every country associated with it—the French, United States, England. As a result, even the PRC, Republic of China has gotten into the act.

We are checking it out in the U.N. As far as general publicity goes, of the type we had back 3 months ago, there has been practically nothing heard. It has been quite quiet.

Mr. PATTEN. Has there been any noticeable change in the position of littoral nations toward our proposal after the Indian test of an atomic bomb?

Captain GIOVANETTI. We have noted no change in the attitude of any littoral state toward our Indian Ocean presence as a result of India's detonation of a nuclear device. The Indian Government, for its part, maintains that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful in nature and that the experiment was conducted for purposes unrelated to the power balance in the area.

Mr. PATTEN. What is the status of various propositions at the United Nations to keep the Indian Ocean a nuclear-free zone, to prohibit great power expansion in the area, and, specifically, anything involving this construction at Diego Garcia?

Captain GIOVANETTI. The U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution (2832) on December 16, 1971 which declared the Indian Ocean to be a "zone of peace," and which called for further investigation into how such a concept might be implemented. As a result of this and subsequent resolutions, the Secretary General is to prepare "a factual statement of the great powers' military presence in all its aspects, in

the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great power rivalry", and such a report is presently under preparation for submission to a U.N. ad hoc group. The Secretary of State can provide greater detail.

It should be noted that there is no United Nations action of record which prohibits expansion of forces or construction of facilities at Diego Garcia, and the modest attention given to Indian Ocean military matters at the United Nations is entirely directed for the present at a compilation of factual information from the public record.

It can be reasonably postulated that a balanced and factual examination of Indian Ocean political-military affairs, under U.N. sponsorship or otherwise, is not likely to lead to any restriction on the legitimate military and commercial uses of this maritime area.

#### MISSIONS AT DIEGO GARCIA

Mr. PATTEN. I note that the classified justification sheet which was provided earlier states, "A new mission is being assigned to this station to support an Indian Ocean carrier task group ———."

What exactly does this mean?

Admiral MARSCHALL. "On an occasional basis," sir. Those words should have been included. As you are aware, in the last 4 years we have sent a carrier task force into the Indian Ocean on two separate occasions, the most recent one being the October war. The purpose of the facilities there is to provide, as Admiral Grojean described to this committee in the supplemental hearings, a good filling station for our occasional forces in that area.

Mr. PATTEN. Do you expect that these task groups will be assigned more or less permanently to the Indian Ocean?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No. The SECDEF has stated that we would deploy major naval units into the Indian Ocean to augment the Mid-east force (MED) on a more regular basis, thereby conveying the concept of flexible deployments, that is, random and not continuous. ———. It appears that this occasional random presence will be the policy for the foreseeable future. ———.

Mr. PATTEN. Has it been determined just how much time such task groups would be deployed to the Indian Ocean?

Captain GIOVANETTI. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLAS. What type of forces we can station there and how long?

Captain GIOVANETTI. Yes, sir. The general discussions that took place there with the U.K. and here in Washington covered how the facilities would be used for operational use. This is what we are waiting for, the British to inform us on ———.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Did they indicate whether they intend to have any restrictions?

Captain GIOVANETTI. ———.

Mr. PATTEN. Do you anticipate any restrictions on our use of Diego Garcia to be included in the final agreement with the United Kingdom? Will you keep the committee informed on this in a timely manner?

Captain GIOVANETTI. ———.

Mr. PATTEN. Keep the committee informed on this on a timely basis.

What facilities are being provided to support a marine air unit/battalion landing team?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We are providing limited support facilities consisting of a vehicle repair hardstand and a small arms range.

Mr. PATTEN. To what extent are the missions of the Air Force and the Navy at Diego Garcia to be integrated? For example, will both the Navy and the Air Force conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the Indian Ocean? Will they both conduct interdiction missions?

Captain GIOVANETTI. It is very difficult to answer that question because the Air Force portion of Diego Garcia is lumped behind the Navy. The Air Force has a program where they are looking at reconnaissance for the B-52 aircraft. I have no information on the JCS concerning reaction. I will get something for the record.

[The information follows:]

The Navy's mission at Diego Garcia is to provide support for U.S. Forces in that region. Toward that end, the Navy operates the communication station and the small airfield. The Air Force provides regular logistic flights to Diego Garcia as a part of this support mission. The Navy does conduct long-range sea surveillance patrols in the Indian Ocean. The Air Force does not and there are no approved plans for them to do so. Long-range air reconnaissance and interdiction missions are not planned by either the Navy or the Air Force. They could be conducted anywhere, of course, as a contingency reaction.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I might add, Mr. Chairman, there could be very little use of this airfield by B-52's. First of all it is too narrow, and second, it is not structurally strong enough to hold B-52's. We could probably take care of a sick bird but that is about the extent of it. If we were to accommodate B-52's we would have to lay a keel down the center of the airstrip which is much stronger than anything we have now, and increase the width by about 100 feet. There are no plans to do this.

Mr. NICHOLAS. The type of support for B-52's might be the stationing of refueling aircraft so B-52's could be flown in from other places?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Should they do that; yes.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Will they both conduct interdiction missions, Air Force and Navy?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I don't think there is any intention of interdiction missions from this airfield. This airfield is merely a logistics support-type airfield to support our maritime patrol planes on one end of a swing and occasional visits by carrier-type aircraft. It is capable of handling the C-5 and the C-141, both of which have been in there.

Mr. NICHOLAS. As I am sure you are aware, there is provision for ammunition storage at Diego Garcia?

Admiral MARSCHALL. There is. Again, this is for carrier forces which would be occasionally in and out. When we have sent these task forces into the Indian Ocean we have had to have behind them a rather large supply train.

Mr. NICHOLAS. You say that the ammunition storage requested by the Air Force in the 1975 program, some 30,000 square yards, is to support the Navy?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No; I didn't say that at all. I am saying the Navy ammunition storage would be for our fleet.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Ammunition storage put in place on the ground at Diego Garcia? Answer that for the record.



Admiral MARSCHALL. The ready issue ammunition magazine to be provided by the Navy will be a standard above-ground reinforced concrete building. The Air Force storage will be ammunition storage space with revetments.

Admiral MARSCHALL. We have P-3 operations there.

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We have a small ready issue magazine in our program. The Air Force has a relatively small protected ammo storage area, 6,000 square yards, as we understand it. We don't have good information on that. We are not sure how they plan to use theirs.

#### RUSSIAN SHIPS IN INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. PATTEN. I note that although there has been a marked increase in Russian combatant-ship days in the Indian Ocean in recent years, almost all of this increase is made up of destroyer escorts and mine craft.

What conclusions would you draw from this?

Mr. OBEY. I would like to hear the answer to that.

Mr. PATTEN. What conclusions would you draw from this?

Captain GIOVANETTI. The Soviet buildup started in 1968 when they first brought their ships in. It has rapidly increased over the last 5 years. The Soviets normally have \_\_\_\_\_. Normally there will be two minesweepers and one LST. They do general types of exercise work. They hang around the islands of Socotra, east of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. They do make port calls throughout the littoral area as far south as the island of Mauritius and they do go into India, Persian Gulf, and into Iraq. They have been in Iran two or three times. Generally they are showing the flag. They are using their force for political reasons. They generally do this throughout the world as they expand their navy.

Mr. LONG. Would the gentleman yield?

#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN INDIAN OCEAN

Mrs. Gandhi, I am told, has made campaign speeches to leftist groups in India in which she accused the United States of projecting a nuclear attack capability of some kind from Diego Garcia. That would be absurd, I suppose, from the standpoint of anything the Air Force could do, or missiles, but what about submarines? \_\_\_\_\_. Is there antisubmarine warfare directed toward that type of threat? If so, that would be much more political.

Captain GIOVANETTI. \_\_\_\_\_. I could provide something for the record.

Mr. LONG. That is not what we have been told.

Mr. NICHOLAS. That has not come out from any reliable sources.

Mr. LONG. This is purely rumor and not substantiated?

Captain GIOVANETTI. The Indian press has frequently, and over a period of several years, indicated the United States \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. NICHOLAS. \_\_\_\_\_.

Captain GIOVANETTI. \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. PATTEN. Are the Russians conducting extensive ASW operations in the Indian Ocean?

Captain GIOVANETTI. I would like to provide that for the record. I would say no. They are not extensive at all. They exercise much as we would do. \_\_\_\_\_.

[The information follows:]

Over the past half dozen years, Soviet propagandists have consistently emphasized what the United States "wants" to do, "plans" to do, "could" do, "will" do, et cetera, strategically in the Indian Ocean, not what it has done or is doing.

Since 1968, the Soviet Navy has conducted extensive oceanographic and hydrographic operations in the Indian Ocean. \_\_\_\_\_.

#### CARRIERS FOR INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. PATTEN. Is the Navy planning to maintain the present number of carriers in the Pacific Fleet in order to provide carrier task forces for the Indian Ocean?

Captain GIOVANETTI. The Indian Ocean will have no impact on the number of carriers that are deployed to the Western Pacific region. Periodically the intent is that either a carrier task force, a small cruiser contingent of one cruiser, a couple destroyers or two or three extra destroyers would be deployed into the Indian Ocean for a short period. They would be part of the 7th Fleet units. There would be a short drawdown of the 7th Fleet assets during that period.

Mr. PATTEN. What other requirements cause you to have a three-carrier deployment in the Pacific and/or Indian Ocean? Is this related to the Southeast Asia conflict?

Captain GIOVANETTI. That would be based upon a contingency. We have been limited to the Pacific.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Let us provide something for the record.

[NOTE. The information was classified and has been retained in committee files.]

Mr. PATTEN. In order to maintain a three-carrier deployment in the Pacific/Indian Oceans, how many carriers would be required in the Pacific Fleet in the Navy's opinion? Check that out and provide it for the record.

[NOTE. The information was classified and has been retained in committee files.]

Mr. PATTEN. Are you requesting an increase in the carrier force levels from 12 to 14 in order to be able to meet these deployments?

Admiral MARSCHALL. In the Indian Ocean, no sir.

Mr. NICHOLAS. No: Pacific or Indian Ocean.

The previous question was in order to maintain a three-carrier deployment in the Pacific/Indian Oceans, how many carriers would be required in the Pacific Fleet in the Navy's opinion?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think we provided that previously.

Mr. NICHOLAS. And the answer is 14?

Mr. MURPHY. In an answer previously provided to questions asked on May 7 we stated that the Navy was requesting a 14-level carrier force level and that is in the stage of final preparation within the Navy and it has to be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

However, that has not happened as yet.

Mr. PATTEN. Are you requesting an increase in the carrier force levels in order to be able to meet these deployments in the Pacific and Indian Oceans?

Mr. NICHOLAS. Do you want to provide it for the record?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

[NOTE. The information was classified and has been retained in committee files.]

#### REDUCTION OF ATLANTIC FLEET CARRIERS

Mr. PATTEN. How many carriers do you now have in the Atlantic Fleet?

Mr. MURPHY. We now have six aircraft carriers, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Does the Navy propose to decrease this number?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir, the Chief of Naval Operations has stated that faced with a reduction to a 12-carrier level he would expect, in order to meet the commitments that have been directed, he will have to drop his Atlantic Fleet force to 5, homeporting one of these somewhere in the Mediterranean, and assign 7 carriers to the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. NICHOLAS. In addition to that, in information previously provided to the committee it is indicated in order to support 3 carriers deployed in the Pacific/Indian Oceans, even with the 14-carrier force level, it would be necessary to have 9 carriers—am I right, 9 carriers?—in the Pacific, 5 in the Atlantic?

Mr. MURPHY. At the 14-carrier level should it be realized, and as I mentioned it is the Navy position is being developed now to be submitted up the line, the factors, to provide a reasonable rotation cycle, would dictate a 9 to 5 split.

Mr. PATTEN. How many carriers would be required in the Atlantic Fleet to guarantee the resupply by sea of our forces in Europe, assuming Norway and Iceland entered a NATO war on our side and that not all Russian submarines were safely in the Atlantic before the start of a general war?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We will have to provide that for the record, sir.

[NOTE. The information was classified and has been retained in committee files.]

#### EFFECT OF OPENING SUEZ CANAL

Mr. PATTEN. With the announced plans to deepen and widen the Suez Canal, is the Navy considering the possibility of utilizing this canal to deploy forces to the Indian Ocean during peacetime?

Captain GIOVANNETTI. The Egyptian plan currently calls for, over a several year period, deepening and widening the canal so 225,000-ton supertankers would be able to pass through the canal. Also 350,000-net tankers partially loaded would be able to go through.

Under this condition all the Navy carriers would be able to transit the Suez Canal. In regard to our plans, what we would do in the future, our commitment to the NATO calls for two carriers to be there on station and this would have to be an exception to what our policies are.

Mr. PATTEN. Would this mean that Atlantic Fleet units might regularly be deployed to the Indian Ocean? Would this shift a greater number of carriers back to the Atlantic Fleet?

Supply that for the record.

[The information follows:]

No. —.

No. —.

Mr. NICHOLAS. There was some discussion in the past of NATO interest in protecting the sealanes in the Indian Ocean, that NATO was thinking of developing or SACLANT was thinking of developing this as a requirement back in 1972, and if that is true, what consideration is being given to the joint basing of NATO forces in the Indian Ocean through joint operations between the various French, British, United States fleets, that type of thing, in order to provide for this type of exigency?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We will provide it for the record, sir.

[The information follows:]

NATO is continually interested in any aspect of sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection. In this context various contingencies relating to SLOC protection are continually under study. At this time there is no serious thought being given to NATO operations in the Indian Ocean area of the type mentioned.

#### RATE OF WORK IN-PLACE BY SEABEES

Mr. PATTEN. What is the present rate of work in-place for the Seabee forces at Diego Garcia?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We don't have that figure at our fingertips. We will provide it for the record, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

#### WORK IN-PLACE FOR SEABEE FORCES AT DIEGO GARCIA

Approximately \$250,000 to \$300,000 per month.

Mr. PATTEN. With presently approved work, how long would this rate be continued?

Admiral MARSCHALL. At the present rate of construction, currently approved construction would be completed in July 1975.

Mr. PATTEN. What are your plans if you receive funding for both the Navy's and Air Force's construction program in fiscal year 1975?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We would continue, Mr. Chairman, with the deployment of a battalion at Diego Garcia, and should the work increase, as we hope it will, we will expand upon the size of this battalion so that we can accommodate the work in an orderly fashion.

Up until now, we have had one battalion augmented by a detached unit from another battalion. I think that at present we have only one battalion there without the detached unit from another, but should we get the additional work which we seek, we would flesh out the one battalion and accommodate to the nature of the work.

Mr. PATTEN. What is the cost of long leadtime items that would be required in order that the work at Diego Garcia could be continued at current rates until fiscal year 1976 funding were provided for the actual construction?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Long leadtime items for the \$29 million Diego Garcia program requested by the Navy are estimated to cost \$15 million. However, funding of these items in fiscal year 1975 would not, in itself, maintain the present level of Seabee construction capability on the island. This is because the presently approved construction program will be completed in July 1975, while fiscal year 1976 approval for construction would not be received until January 1976, and most long leadtime materials authorized for fiscal year 1975 procurement would not be available until much later.

Therefore, it would be necessary to demobilize and later remobilize the Seabees at considerable expense.

The present level of construction capability could be maintained, however, if, in addition to fiscal year 1975 funding of long leadtime items, there is also fiscal year 1975 authorization and funding of approximately \$4 million of—horizontal and vertical—construction to provide a balanced workload for all trades when the present construction is completed in July 1975. Funding of the long leadtime items would still be required to insure workload continuity into fiscal year 1976.

#### PROSPECTS FOR ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

Mr. PATTEN. Is there any possibility that a general agreement on naval arms limitations in the Indian Ocean could be worked out at an early date, and would the approval of this facility by the Congress aid in arriving at such an agreement?

Captain GIOVANETTI. That question should be referred to State.

Admiral MARSCHALL. We will consult with the State Department and provide it for the record. I don't know.

[NOTE.—The information was classified and has been retained in committee files.]

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Long.

#### DEPLOYMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES

Mr. LONG. With regard to the question that I posed before having to do with Mrs. Gandhi's statement and the possible substance it might have, —.

Let me read this statement here from the Defense Monitor of the Center for Defense Information. Let me point out I voted for Diego Garcia, but I must say I have some concerns here.

These communications facilities have also fulfilled the function of making possible periodic patrols of Polaris and Poseidon submarines into the Indian Ocean. There has been some controversy about whether the United States stations ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean, but although the United States may not as yet permanently station missile submarines in the Indian Ocean, there can be little doubt that parts of that ocean have been used as patrol areas. For example, the February 1974 issue of *Seapower*, the magazine of the Navy League, in discussing the U.S. communications facility in Australia at North West Cape, stated that: "Classified messages to Polaris/Poseidon submarines deployed in the Indian Ocean are sent from this station."

It is likely that the U.S. Navy intends to deploy strategic submarines in the Indian Ocean more frequently in the future as additional Poseidon submarines with longer range missiles enter the inventory and as the Trident submarine is acquired.

Now, I wonder whether you can comment on that now or perhaps after consulting with your policy people more extensively.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Captain Giovanetti.

Captain GIOVANETTI. —. Diego Garcia was designed as a gap filler in the Indian Ocean. We had nulls in that area. Between Asmara in Ethiopia and North West Cape in the center of the Indian Ocean, there were blank spots. This was the purpose of Diego Garcia communications.

Mr. LONG. Whatever was true in the past, what about the relevance of this to the future once we provide this facility?

Captain GIOVANETTI. I would like the nuclear submariners to provide that for the record. —.

[NOTE.—The information was classified and has been retained in committee files.]

Mr. LONG. Of course, that is always a very ambiguous statement, no plans. That leaves you total freedom. You understand that.

Captain GIOVANETTI. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. —. I never warm up to that type of an answer.

Captain GIOVANETTI. Mrs. Gandhi, of course, has always espoused the nuclear free zone in the Indian Ocean. We find it very interesting that she set off a bomb and she is being put to task by some of the littoral nations with her previous posture on this.

#### DIEGO GARCIA COMPARED TO RUSSIAN PORT FACILITIES

Mr. LONG. Everything you do provides the other side with an excuse, just as everything they do provides us with an excuse. That is what bothers me about all these things. Everything you do will be seized, justifiably or not, as a pretext or a justification for the other side to do what it really wanted to do all along.

Are we doing that here when we develop this base? Maybe they aren't justified in reacting.

Captain GIOVANETTI. —.

Mr. LONG. Can you promise that there will never be any? Is the Navy going to promise?

Captain GIOVANETTI. There is no way I could promise that.

Mr. LONG. Of course not, so you could come in here in a year or two and say, "Technology has changed," and so on and "We have it here. It is great. Let us go ahead with it."

Captain GIOVANETTI. With the range of the ballistic missile submarines and when the Trident comes along we could stick them over on the west or east coast of the United States.

Mr. LONG. Tell me, is this a base?

Captain GIOVANETTI. No, sir; it is a facility.

Mr. LONG. It cannot be recorded as a base?

Captain GIOVANETTI. No, sir.

Mr. LONG. It has been said again and again that the Soviet Union has no base in the Indian Ocean as we define a base.

Captain GIOVANETTI. What the Soviets are putting into Berbera is looking more and more like what we would consider a base. They now have ships. They have now increased the number of barracks available, the number of people that are stationed there. They have communications in there. They have oil storage and they have a repair capability. There is a barracks ship that has a repair capability.

Diego Garcia will have no repair capability.

Mr. LONG. So this would be less of a base than what the Soviet Union has where, did you say?

Captain GIOVANETTI. Berbera in Somalia. The way they have been building I would say we could consider that a base, yes, sir.



## DIEGO GARCIA NOT A BASE

Mr. LONG. But we do not consider this a base?

Captain GIOVANETTI. Diego Garcia, of course, has communications only. What we are asking for would give us an oil logistics capability and a reconnaissance capability.

Mr. LONG. Would other nations, for example, the British, French, or the Russians agree with us that this is not a base?

Captain GIOVANETTI. The British along with the United States, during the discussions there was a lot of talk on what shall we call this and "facility" was agreed on.

Mr. LONG. Well, is it propaganda, a play on words, or is it genuine?

Captain GIOVANETTI. The word "base" has connotations and certainly in the Indian Ocean it has large connotations.

Mr. LONG. Exactly.

Captain GIOVANETTI. We would like to stay away from that word when we possibly can.

Mr. LONG. I understand why you would for reasons of delicacy and so on; but for a person who is anxious to make up his mind whether he wants to vote for this, can we honestly say this is not a base?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Dr. Long, I think we can honestly say that this is not an operating base for the Navy or for the Air Force.

Mr. LONG. But you cannot promise that it will not become one?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I would find it very difficult to conceive how we could provide the logistics support to that facility to make it a base.

Mr. NICHOLAS. In effect, if you put in a much larger capability out there you would be compounding your problems, wouldn't you?

Admiral MARSCHALL. That is right.

Mr. LONG. Could you say it is just too vulnerable to make it worth while to ever become a base?

Admiral MARSCHALL. It is certainly completely vulnerable, but I think that even more so the horrible logistic efforts that would be necessary to make it a base might preclude us ever wanting it to be a base.

As a filling station, yes; as a way station, yes; it makes great sense. I think I mentioned in our supplemental hearings that it took me 8 hours to fly to that place from Bangkok and that was the closest place we could leave from. That is a long flight and by ship I don't know how long it would take. It is just way out in the middle of the Indian Ocean and, as you know, it is just a little horseshoe-shaped island which is 38 miles from one end to the other and not very wide at the widest point.

Mr. LONG. I want to support this, as I have. I want to continue to support it, because it has seemed to me up to this time to be not a big thing. It could be called a foot in the door, but it is not a very big foot.

A foot can always be pulled out without great loss or anything. But I don't want to vote for something that is going to be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a great provocation by the Soviet Union, India, and

other countries to launch a whole new stage of escalation. That is where my reservation is.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I certainly don't think that in any way we could ever consider it to be an operating base.

Mr. PATTEN. You know in this war game, my worthy colleague, I often think of the frame of mind we had when the Egyptians and the Israelis were shooting in December. Little did I think that the President would be over there and have a million on the streets shouting and waving American flags for him. What India says and what India means are two different things, and on this I am not relying upon hearsay.

I was in Asia over Easter. I just want to tell you we were told by reliable people that "we don't always mean what we say," and they seem to be intensely interested in our presence in Asia in order to have a balance of power. That also goes for Red China. We had certainly some good information, that, in light of their worries north of them, they are not making any move for us to get out of Asia, but rather, they welcome our presence, regardless of what their propaganda line may take. I heard from their nationals, not from us, not from our people. Now, of course, this isn't my line to run the State Department or the military, but maybe things are not always what they seem. Certainly in the Middle East thing, everything has turned around since last October, oil embargoes, everything else. Here we are being greeted, wined and dined. If that isn't one of the greatest transitions in my experience, I don't know what is. But you may say, "Oh, I knew it all the time."

Admiral MARSCHALL. Not me.

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Obey.

## ACTION-REACTION IN INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. OBEY. Let me just say that, unlike Dr. Long, I was very much against our handling Diego Garcia in the supplemental. I thought it, bottom line, was an insult to the one committee that was conducting very thorough hearings on the matter, namely, Lee Hamilton's Subcommittee on the Middle East of the Foreign Affairs Committee. I don't know whether I am for it in the regular bill or not. At least I think it is legitimate to consider it in this bill rather in the supplemental. I have the same thing that Dr. Long was reading from, this "Defense Monitor," from the Center for Defense Information. The operation, as you know, is headed by Rear Admiral La Rocque. I don't know whether some of his staff people are correct or not but he does raise some series of points which Congressman Hamilton raised in an earlier copy of the Congressional Record. Let me just ask you about a couple of them.

He said on April 4, if I can paraphrase it, if this \$29 million item passed—talking about the supplemental—"we would establish a major military presence in a remote area where heretofore our presence was minimal and our profile low. To seek facilities to support the regular deployment of a carrier in the Indian Ocean represents an important new type of presence and would give the United States new capability in a region halfway around the world where every Soviet military move to date has been in direct response to something we have done previously."

I know you said, and that is what I want to ask you about, that we would not be placing carriers in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis. At least I think you did.

Admiral MARSCHALL. That is correct.

Mr. OBEY. So if you happen to think Chairman Hamilton is wrong, would you tell me why?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I don't know Chairman Hamilton and I never heard that before, but when a statement is made that the only time the Russians have ever done anything in the Indian Ocean has been to react to us, I think it quarrels with history. Certainly the presence in the Indian Ocean of the Russian and the number of ship visits which we have seen increase dramatically over the past few years—

Mr. OBEY. Let us take ships.

Isn't it really unfair and somewhat meaningless to refer to ship days, for instance, as this committee did when they passed this in the supplemental?

Going back, that is really pretty meaningless unless you are talking about the kinds of ships that are plying those waters, isn't it?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think Captain Giovanetti would like to answer some of this. He is much better prepared in this field than I am, Mr. ObeY.

Captain GIOVANETTI. The Soviet presence sort of runs a kind of curve on a yearly basis. If we looked at it we would see for about a half year they would have a cruiser with several destroyers attached to it. They would also have a great number of support ships. They would have their missile tracking ships, et cetera.

Then at some other stage in time you will see where they will have one destroyer, two or three minesweepers, an LST, and a number of support ships, but they have had logistics problems just as we have had. When they run from Vladivostok, some 10,000 miles away, that is a pretty long way, so this is the reason why they have gone into Berbera, why they are building the facilities, because they need the logistic support.

Of course, they have always had the Port of Aden for repair purposes since the British left a fair-sized facility. They have been able to go to Aden for fuel and certain repair type effort.

Now, if the policy of the United States is, or the Defense Department tells the Navy that, "You are to have periodic deployment in the Indian Ocean," it doesn't matter whether we have support facilities at Diego Garcia or not. This means the Navy will go to the Indian Ocean for periodic periods.

But it will mean we will have an extra problem supporting logistically the ships that we do deploy there for specific periods.

Now, we run into contingencies where the Navy is told, "You will go to the Western Indian Ocean and you will be at a certain point and you will stay there for an indefinite period."

Then because of the cutbacks in the last 5 years, approximately 45 percent, as far as ships, the Navy logistically does not have the capability it had 5 or 6 years ago, just does not have it.

So when we do go to the Indian Ocean it strains us badly. By placing logistic support—

Mr. OBEY. That is not what I am asking. I am asking two specific questions.

No. 1 because I guess you mentioned ship days, I simply asked, isn't it really meaningless to compare ship days unless you also talk about the kinds of ships, and, second, I don't know if you know Lee Hamilton or not. He is certainly no stylish leftist. He is a very moderate guy. He comes from Indiana. He damn well better be moderate or he wouldn't be back here.

I wonder if you could, for the record, just cite me chapter and verse to disprove Congressman Hamilton's assertion that every Soviet military move to date in the Indian Ocean has been directly responsive to something we have done previously.

He also said that we have no known commitment in the area which warrants prompt action and he, therefore, sees no need to hurry with the construction of these facilities.

Is that correct or incorrect?

Captain GIOVANETTI. Since the Navy has been directed to go to the Indian Ocean, delaying the facilities will make it more costly for the Navy to perform this function.

Mr. OBEY. That is not my question.

#### U.S. COMMITMENTS IN INDIAN OCEAN

My question is, is he correct in saying that we have no known commitments in that area that warrant our being able to move into there promptly.

Captain GIOVANETTI. I have to study the question, sir. I am not sure exactly what he is saying.

Mr. OBEY. Why don't you supply that one for the record.

Captain GIOVANETTI. All right, sir.  
[The information follows:]

Navy's presence in the Indian Ocean is directly associated with several important issues relating to our own national interests:

As a maritime Nation we must be assured of freedom of the seas.

We must insure continued access to the resources of the region including its oil reserves for both ourselves and our allies.

We must offer a credible and effective alternative to growing Soviet presence and influence.

The key to Navy's ability to deploy to a given region of the world is logistic support.

In the Indian Ocean the Island of Diego Garcia offers the best alternative for providing that support.

Denying Navy the use of the island as a logistic facility increases the cost of our operations in the region and our ability to respond to future contingencies that may develop in the area.

Mr. OBEY. He says also:

"We now have naval superiority in the Indian Ocean and will have greater Naval capabilities in the immediate future."

Captain GIOVANETTI. As of right now, we have the LaSalle and we have two destroyers attached. Those are the only naval forces in the Indian Ocean. It has been that way for approximately 2 months. It depends upon what time frame you are talking about. We did have a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean which—

Mr. OBEY. April 4.

Captain GIOVANETTI. The task group, the last group left in April, yes, sir. —

At the same time they had a cruiser, they had a couple of guided missile destroyers. I could go on counting ship names. We are talking



upward of 25 or 30 total ships of which probably 10 to 15 were combatants.

Mr. OBEY. He makes this assertion. He says "the Soviets have a numerically larger number of ships there but with even the availability of a carrier from our Pacific Fleet we have definite naval firepower superiority."

I think there is a misprint there some way.

Captain GIOVANETTI. I would like to answer that for the record.

[The information follows:]

— our periodic carrier deployments to the area are not occasioned by or aimed at any other naval force in the region. They are designed to support American foreign policy, express our determination to preserve a stable power balance in the region, and backstop U.S. diplomatic initiatives.

Mr. OBEY. Just a couple of others, getting off Congressman Hamilton's statement.

#### VULNERABILITY DURING WARTIME

It is my understanding that you grant the fact that in wartime this facility will be of not very great usefulness?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think probably that we could defend it only with our ships and aircraft at sea. As far as what there is to defend, the only thing we have to defend there is the communications station and an airfield which helps to provide the support, but no gun emplacements, no squadrons of aircraft based there, or anything of that sort.

Mr. OBEY. So what you really are doing is you are granting the fact that you certainly couldn't count on it to a very great extent during wartime conditions.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I certainly think it could be interdicted, and yet in the Pacific war in World War II we managed to use such places as Kwajalein, Majuro, and other way stops rather successfully by the concentration of the fleet there.

Mr. OBEY. With quite different conditions and quite different weaponry there.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes and no.

Mr. LONG. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OBEY. Sure.

Mr. LONG. That sounds like you are putting the cart before the horse.

It seems the purpose of all such installations would be to help us win a war. If during a war the facilities stopped being a help—in fact had to be protected by the fleet, rather than helping protect power for the fleet—that does seem to be kind of inverted planning.

I find it a little puzzling as to why we should spend a lot of money on something which will not be useful in a war situation.

When the chips are down you really need it in war, but then, it is no good.

Admiral MARSCHALL. First of all, we think that by putting some strength in the Indian Ocean we can help prevent that kind of war there.

Mr. LONG. How does it prevent a war when everybody knows as soon as a war starts this thing goes out of commission?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I don't think it would go out of commission. I don't think that I inferred that. I think the city of Washington

could go out of commission under the right circumstances. We are not at an age where I wouldn't put anything past the power that can be brought to bear. The idea that some little gunboat can come along and put us out of commission I think is probably wrong. I think we would know the threat and be able to meet a threat with naval surface and airpower.

Mr. OBEY. I thought you said a few moments ago that it would be extremely vulnerable?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir. I think that just about anything in this world is extremely vulnerable with current weaponry.

Mr. PATTEN. They would stand 1,300 miles off with a submarine and throw missiles at us, couldn't they?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Right, in the sense that we would be vulnerable to a surprise attack. Were there anything but a surprise attack, we could muster our forces to defend the island.

Mr. OBEY. It was my impression that this thing was being requested by the Navy not because you thought it was so valuable in wartime but it would facilitate your use of the Indian Ocean now and show the flag; am I correct?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The basis of our request is to provide a filling station in the Indian Ocean. I think—and I am only projecting my thoughts here, not necessarily the Navy's—I think that if a war were to come along under certain condition, it would be a valuable asset. Under certain other conditions it could be clobbered.

In modern warfare, I think Hawaii is a vulnerable place, an island surrounded by water, a group of islands. How do we protect them? By planes and ships?

#### ABILITY OF NAVIES TO OPERATE AT LONG DISTANCES

Mr. OBEY. This quotes Secretary Schlesinger as saying, "The ability of the U.S. Fleet to operate at long distances is greater than that of the Soviet Navy." Is that an accurate statement or not?

Admiral MARSCHALL. My compatriot says he thinks so.

Captain GIOVANETTI. I am not sure if I would. That is a tough question.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I will say this: For many years the U.S. Navy has operated far from its bases rather successfully. In the last several years the Russian Navy has exhibited a greater and greater ability to operate far away from bases. I don't know where we stand now and I would like to provide for the record some expert opinion on this.

[The information follows:]

The ability of a fleet to operate at long distances from its home base is dependent, in general, on three major factors:

The unrefueled cruising radius of its ships;

The underway refueling capacity of its replenishment ships;

The foreign logistic base structure available to the fleet.

At this point in time, the U.S. Navy has a greater number of ships which are capable of long-range operations than the Soviet Navy. In addition, our force of dedicated underway replenishment ships is capable of providing a greater quantity of fuel than those of the Soviet Navy. Backing up this logistic capacity, we have a substantial foreign base structure.

However, if we project force levels and capabilities forward for as little as three to five years—which is clearly possible within acceptable limits of uncertainty—a different picture emerges. The structure of the Soviet Navy is, and has been, undergoing major changes in regard to ship size and cruising radius.

fleet of the late 1970's will be comprised of a large number of major combatant ships which are capable of distant operations. These warships will be supported by a force of dedicated underway replenishment ships whose fuel delivery capacity will be, in the aggregate, virtually on a par with ours. Furthermore, their foreign logistic base structure will continue to grow while ours continues to absorb the impact of a foreign policy which favors a reduction of foreign bases.

Thus, while our Navy currently enjoys a lead in the capability to deploy large numbers of ships on a global basis, the Soviet Navy is developing a similar capability and, indeed, has sustained great momentum in this direction. Barring major changes in those trends which are now apparent, the Soviet Navy should make substantial progress in closing the existing gap by the end of the decade.

Mr. OBEY. Provide it for the record, when and where the Secretary said that.

[The information follows:]

The office of the Secretary of Defense cannot find any record of Secretary Schlesinger having made this statement.

#### NECESSITY FOR DIEGO GARCIA

Mr. OBEY. This defense monitor sheet states, "A support base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean makes reasonable sense only if significantly increased on-station deployments of the Indian Ocean are made."

Do you agree with that?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I would say—and I would like to amplify for the record—I would say probably the more deployments in the Indian Ocean, the more cost-effective it would become. I think that the fundamental premise is that for the foreseen deployments into the Indian Ocean, the faculty will eventually save not only money but many, many deployments of ships. In other words, if you took the fuel into Diego Garcia, put it in there from a tanker, it would not necessarily be required for a fleet oiler to accompany the task group when it went in and out.

Mr. OBEY. My concern on this question is this: I do believe that there are much more important questions involved than the military question. I don't mean that in the sense that our military posture is not important. I mean if, in fact, the Navy's principal use of this operation is to provide additional convenience during normal peacetime operations, then I think that simply has to be balanced against initial pressure which the Russians might bring upon India to give them greater use of this area for whatever facilities the Russians might want.

I tend to agree somewhat with Congressman Hamilton when he indicates there are political questions and questions involving the response of the Russians—or the feeling that the Russians may gather from our moving in there—that ought to receive more consideration than they have up to now. If you do have any specific information which you think we ought to know about, talk to me about that. I am not specifically committed to one side or the other. I am in doubt. I think at this time I would lean against it because of the political considerations involved in that area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### USE BY COMMERCIAL SHIPPING

Mr. PATTEN. What always impressed me from the beginning is that there may be a day-to-day need for this facility for our commercial

ships, maritime people, day in and day out, weather reports, communications, things of that type.

Admiral MARSCHALL. It is a basic communications facility and therefore I think probably serves only the fleet. We have nothing to do with—

Mr. PATTEN. More so than the Navy in the past 10 years, I think our ships at sea, free nations of the world plying the high seas could use it. It would be handy, as if I went 100 miles before I saw a gasoline station. With the boats we have, it strikes me that day in and day out this would be given some use.

I know if you pick up a paper, the Filipinos have 8 or 10 ships coming and going, heading for London, 10 pages of ship news. The same is true with Hong Kong and other places. Day in and day out if you are going to give them the weather reports, it is a considerable help.

#### FORTS AND BASES

Mr. NICHOLAS. Following the series of answers the Navy gave on the carrier deployments, I personally had some concern about the Navy weakening the Atlantic Fleet. Intrinsically the provisions of this additional facility does not represent a commitment to deploy a carrier task force?

Admiral MARSCHALL. That is correct.

Mr. NICHOLAS. It does not mean the Navy is going to increase its carrier task forces to a level which would not otherwise be required?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No way.

Mr. NICHOLAS. It is not really grabbing the bull by the horns. It is a sort of a side issue in this larger issue of whether we are going to have a major naval race in the Indian Ocean, which is a serious issue. Would you tend to agree with that?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I agree with you wholeheartedly.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Can you see problems on the other side? Do you think it is something that would contribute to the escalation?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No, sir. Here again Captain Giovanetti knows a lot more about the global strategy than I do, inasmuch as I am a civil engineer and don't go down to the sea in ships, but the Russians have Berbera, they have an anchorage at Socotra, they probably have some arrangements to visit India, they have a presence there already. We would not be contributing to escalation, in my opinion.

Mr. OBEY. If I could play the devil's advocate, I think that I know something about Russia. I spent 4 years studying Russian government and foreign policy.

It seems to me that, given the location of the Indian Ocean and the pattern of their trade and pattern of their ship traffic, that on balance you would expect them to have a heavier presence in the Indian Ocean than we would.

Mr. NICHOLAS. What would escalate the arms situation out there—bases, or is it ships that go to bases?

I know one Navy spokesman made the statement that due to a lack of facilities there, you would not like to see limitations on the forces. The Russians could always violate them and the lack of facilities would be a problem. Perhaps the facilities are not the problem.

Admiral MARSCHALL. On two occasions in the last 4 years we have been asked to go in there and it has been at much greater expense in

manpower and money than would have been necessary had we had this super filling station at Diego Garcia. As far as a greater presence is concerned, I find it inconceivable that what we are requesting here will escalate things to any great extent in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Could you provide a clear policy statement on this, what we are talking about, escalating facilities, or are we talking about forces? The arms race is undesirable but facilities are a part of an arms race. Therefore, if the Russians have facilities there, do we have to counter that? Could you provide an answer for the record?

If they deployed forces there, do we have to counter?

What is really the serious problem that we are talking about here in terms of arms race and all the things that worry people?

Captain GIOVANETTI. We would want to be in the Indian Ocean with the Soviets there or not. The Soviets have nothing to do with our presence. I suppose the Soviets can say the same thing about the United States. We have a legitimate interest in that region. Those interests are increasing rapidly.

Mr. OBEY. It is a lot closer to the Soviet Union than the continental United States.

Captain GIOVANETTI. Certainly. That is one of our problems and why Diego Garcia becomes important.

Mr. OBEY. If you look at it from Russian eyes, they see a problem if they see an inkling we are interested in. Because of the proximity of the area, they would be likely to give it more attention than perhaps it would legitimately deserve.

Captain GIOVANETTI. Yes, sir. The Soviet presence in that region, Somalia, and what they have done in the other littoral nations, especially India, since we stopped giving them arms in 1965, India turned to the Soviet Union. In the other region it is creating concern for other littoral countries. The Shah of Iran is an example of that, his reason for coming and buying arms in the United States, and again his reason for wanting the U.S. Navy presence in the Indian Ocean as a counterthreat to the Soviet efforts. The Soviets used their military for political reasons. They started with a fishing agreement and follow with arms. They get their advisers in countries. It is a slow escalation process, and we see this happen over and over again. It will continue. The U.S. Navy presence in the Indian Ocean indicates to the littoral countries our interest in that region as well. Certainly we could not scoff at the amount of oil that is flowing out of that region and what is going to be flowing to the United States or what will flow in the near future unless we change our policies and start burning a lot of coal. We are talking somewhere, depending on whose figures you get, between 40 and 50 percent of our fossil fuels coming from the Persian Gulf region.

Mr. OBEY. Politically, I understand our concern about what happens at the wellhead. I don't think if there were ever a serious problem there is a thing we could do about it.

Captain GIOVANETTI. In that context, I am not saying that we have ships there to protect those ships. That would be a tremendous job. Our ships show our interest in that shipping, our interest to the littoral countries that we are concerned about this.

Mr. PATTEN. What is this effort in comparison with what has been done in the last 25 years or so by the British? I thought the British

had budgetary problems. This is not as much a new thing as we are stating. We didn't make this island. The British used it for something, didn't they?

Captain GIOVANETTI. It was a copra plantation until we started a communications facility. There were some migrant workers from the Seychelles and Mauritius on the island.

Admiral MARSHALL. The British had other bases in the Indian Ocean.

Captain GIOVANETTI. They still do.

Mr. OBEY. Is it true that the Russians had asked the Indians for a base in the Indian Ocean or a base in their territory or some other facility?

Captain GIOVANETTI. Our information tells us that the Soviets over a period of 3 to 4 years have approached several of the countries in the littoral, including India. The Maldives as well. There are several countries. I would have to check back in the records on that.

Mr. OBEY. If they have been turned down given the strange political situation in India, doesn't it in fact give the Russians greater opportunity to put pressure on the Indian Government for additional assets in that area by being able to point to our—

Captain GIOVANETTI. India is at this time the great exponent of the Indian Ocean peace zone. This U.N. bill as passed in 1972, excludes all great powers and warships from the region.

Mr. OBEY. That is right. Our relations with India are not very good. If the leftists in India can point to our action in Diego Garcia, justifiably or not, does not that decrease the likelihood of India being able to continue to resist Russian overtures in that area?

Captain GIOVANETTI. ———.

Mr. OBEY. That is past. What about the future?

Captain GIOVANETTI. I don't see how I could predict the future.

Mr. OBEY. That is the question I am asking. Given the ability of the leftists in India to froth things up, on occasion, don't you make it more difficult for India in the future to resist Russian requests for base rights?

Captain GIOVANETTI. I don't believe so. Possibly you have more information than I ———.

Mr. OBEY. I was not talking of Communists.

Captain GIOVANETTI. Socialist or left wing.

Mr. OBEY. That is all.

Mr. PATTEN. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 1974.

Mr. SIKES. The committee will come to order.

We are discussing the military construction requirements for the Navy outside the United States.

# 10TH NAVAL DISTRICT

Mr. SIKES. Turn to the 10th Naval District. Insert the summary page in the record.

[The summary follows:]