

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1972

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FIRST SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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PART 1

Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Overall Financial Statements
Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff

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volvement of Americans in the fighting in Indochina. I am confident that the combination of successful Vietnamization, continued security assistance programs and increasing regional cooperation in that area of the world will result in the termination of American combat involvement in that conflict.

Mr. SIKES. How far are we willing to go to prevent the fall of Phnom Penh?

Secretary LAIRD. My answer to your previous question would apply to this question as well.

Mr. SIKES. How effective are the various forces in Laos? Is there any imminent danger that any major portion of these forces may collapse?

Secretary LAIRD. Off the record. (Off the record discussion.)

Mr. SIKES. Do you feel that a concerted Communist drive to take over Laos militarily or to force a major change in position of the Laos government is a threat in the next year or two?

Secretary LAIRD. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. What would be the options open to the United States to counteract such developments?

Secretary LAIRD. The U.S. reaction to a major deterioration in the military situation in Laos would, of course, depend on developments elsewhere in Indochina. Obviously, since such developments are not predictable, I do not believe it would serve any purpose to specify what our options would be at any given time in the future.

THE INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. SIKES. I have some questions about naval bases in the Indian Ocean and other areas of the world. What, if anything, is the United States doing to get ports reopened to our fleets which have been closed in recent years in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean areas?

(The information follows:)

SHIP VISITS

Most of the governments in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean area do or would permit U.S. Navy ships to visit their ports. Seven governments of the area—the U.A.R., Algeria, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, South Yemen, and Iraq—have no formal diplomatic relations with the United States and hence, allow no U.S. Navy ship visits. — The United States has not made any recent ship visits to Tanzania, Libya, or Somalia because of the sensitivities of these governments to United States —. Burma appears to want no U.S. ship visits or visits by any major power. A change in governmental policy by the above states and a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would probably be prerequisites to formal or operational U.S. ship visits to their ports.

Mr. SIKES. What is the extent of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and what base rights do the Soviets have? What are the conditions imposed on the use of these rights? Can the Soviets refuel, repair, and provision their ships at these bases? Are Russian support people stationed at these bases? Which nations have granted the Soviets these base rights in the Indian Ocean area? Which nations have granted the United States similar base rights?

Secretary LAIRD. The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean consists of fishing and oceanographic survey ships, space support ships, and naval ships.

As far as we know, the Soviets do not have any base rights in any of the countries of the Indian Ocean area. Soviet naval ships rely

primarily on their own auxiliaries for fuel, provisions, and repairs, and only occasionally obtain fuel and provisions from Indian Ocean ports. Soviet naval ships, like U.S. naval ships, make port visits to friendly states of the area.

The United States has rights for facilities in the Seychelles (United Kingdom), Ethiopia, Diego Garcia (United Kingdom), Bahrain (United Kingdom), South Africa, Iran, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand.

Mr. SIKES. What is the policy of the British with regard to the policing of the Indian Ocean area? What effect will this policy have on U.S. policy with regard to the area?

Secretary LAIRD. The emergence of most of Britain's former dominions into full independence and the withdrawal of the bulk of her military forces from East of the Suez in favor of the defense of Western Europe has meant virtually the end of Britain's so-called policing role in the Indian Ocean area. However, the British Government regards the growth of Soviet power with concern. The decision of the British to continue to deploy some British naval forces and reconnaissance aircraft in the Far East is a contribution to Britain's ability to maintain vigilance in the Indian Ocean.

Moreover, the United Nations embargo on the importation of oil to Rhodesia through Beira has been enforced by the Beira patrol which is composed of British naval and air units.

The United States does not regard Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean area as an immediate threat to our vital security interests, but we are watching the situation closely.

Mr. SIKES. What strategic and political interests does the United States have in the Indian Ocean?

Secretary LAIRD. The strategic and political interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean are, over the next 5 years at least, of a substantially lower order than those in either of the other great ocean basins—the Atlantic and Pacific—both because we border on these and because the states along their shores are for the most part economically, politically, and militarily more important than those of the Indian Ocean. Nonetheless, we do have real concerns in the region. The continued uninterrupted flow of oil to our allies in Western Europe and Japan is very important to our interests. Free passage for U.S. commercial and military traffic and normal access to the littoral states are desirable for a variety of political, economic, military (including communications) and technical (e.g., space related) reasons. In general, our interests are served by normal commercial, political, and military access and presence at a fairly low level. Nevertheless, were control of territory, population or resources of the area to pass to any power or combination of powers able to threaten the United States, the costs could be substantial. United States political interests in the area are best served by cooperation of friendly and neutral states in U.S. security, economic, and humanitarian efforts in the area, and in support of U.S. positions in the U.N. and other international forums.

Mr. SIKES. How can those interests be furthered by the base at Diego Garcia? What will be the likely reaction of our allies, as well as the Russians and Chinese to our increased presence in the Indian Ocean?

Secretary LAIRD. The austere communication station on Diego Garcia is intended to further U.S. security interests in the Indian Ocean area by serving as a link in our worldwide strategic communications

communication facility on Diego Garcia. The Soviet reaction to the Diego Garcia announcement and to the prospect of an increased U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean has been sharply negative. As could be expected, the Chinese Communist reaction to our Diego announcement has also been unfavorable.

Mr. SIKES. What is the military strength of our allies in the Indian Ocean area?

Secretary LAIRD. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. How stable is the Indian Ocean area?

Secretary LAIRD. Political stability among the Indian Ocean littoral states varies widely. Some are threatened by internal insurgencies of varying degrees, and others are troubled with disputes with neighbor states. In other states, such as Australia and Iran, a high degree of political stability has been experienced for several years.

(Off the record.)

SOVIET STRENGTH IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. SIKES. What is the military strength of the Soviets in the Indian Ocean area? What are they doing to broaden their base of support?

Secretary LAIRD. The Soviets maintain a permanent naval squadron in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviets have been augmenting the Pacific fleet, the main contributor to their Indian Ocean force ———. They have surveyed and established various anchorages in the western portion of the Indian Ocean. Mooring buoys for use by Soviet naval ships have been laid in the Seychelles and Chagos Archipelago. ———

SINGAPORE

Mr. SIKES. With regard to Singapore, how active are the Soviets in using this area for support and what types of support?

Secretary LAIRD. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. What is the status of the plan to use Singapore as a U.S. base in conjunction with Australia? What dangers do you see in the use of Singapore by the United States? What advantages do you see by such use?

Secretary LAIRD. The United States has no current plans to develop a U.S. base in Singapore in conjunction with Australia or anyone else. U.S. Navy ships do put in at Singapore periodically and purchase some logistical support services from the commercial shipyard and naval facilities on an "as needed" basis.

It appears at this time that the Singapore naval and other military facilities will be maintained by members of the Five Power arrangement which includes the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, and Singapore. Since the United States has no basing plans for Singapore, any discussion of the advantages and/or dangers involved in such basing could only be in the area of theoretical speculation.

THE SUEZ CANAL

Mr. SIKES. In the Middle East, what would be the effect of the reopening of the Suez Canal, particularly with regard to its use by the Soviets?

Secretary LAIRD. The reopening of the Suez Canal would bring significant benefits to the U.S.S.R. It would reduce Soviet transportation costs for crude oil and bulk commodities, ease its shipping problem with respect to supplying such important aid recipients as Iraq, India, and North Vietnam, and possibly increase the volume of Soviet trade with countries east of Suez. The main benefit to the Soviet Navy would be to provide a shorter passage for its ships between Black Sea and Mediterranean waters, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific—the passage between the Soviet Baltic and Northern fleets and the Pacific fleet would not be appreciably shortened. This shorter route would facilitate interfleet transfers between the Soviet Black Sea and Pacific fleets and enable the U.S.S.R. to more readily augment and support its Indian Ocean naval squadron from the Black Sea and Mediterranean.

Mr. SIKES. Is there any information you can give with regard to what has been the impact of the closing of the Suez Canal with regard to the mobility of the Russian fleet?

Secretary LAIRD. The impact of a closed Suez Canal on Soviet fleet mobility can best be described by discussing the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area. Prior to 1967 Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean was negligible thus the closing of the canal in June 1967 had little effect on Soviet naval mobility at that time. In the spring of 1967 Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean area was inaugurated with the deployment of ships with military and civilian crews for oceanographic, hydrographic, and space event support operations.

(Additional information follows:)

Soviet combatant deployments in the Indian Ocean were initiated in March 1968. (After the Suez Canal was closed.)

Between November 1968 and April 1969 the Soviet Navy deployed a combined western and Pacific fleet force of ——— combatants and auxiliaries in the Indian Ocean. ——— This second deployment was characterized by numerous port visits.

In September 1969, a Black Sea Fleet augmentation group ——— operated in the Indian Ocean. With the Suez Canal closed it was necessary for these ships to proceed around the Cape of Good Hope. By proceeding via this route these ships steamed for approximately 19 days to an area in the vicinity of the Seychelles Archipelago. If the Suez Canal had been open these ships would have had to steam for approximately 8 days to arrive at the same destination.

The fourth Soviet naval deployment to the area came from the Soviet Pacific fleet. This force transited the Strait of Malacca on April 6, 1970. ——— Many of these units conducted port calls at Samolia and Mauritius.

It takes Soviet naval units from the Pacific fleet approximately 17 days to reach the Seychelles from their closest Pacific home port of Vladivostok.

In January of this year a four-ship Soviet task unit visited Iraq and on January 15, 1971, a Soviet task force steamed into the Indian Ocean from the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

The presence of the Soviet naval squadron in the Indian Ocean indicates that the U.S.S.R. intends to use its fleet for political as well as potential military purposes.

For the present, the Soviets appear to be relying on accompanying auxiliaries to provide the necessary fuel and dry and refrigerated stores to maintain their naval presence. The Soviets have, however, made considerable progress in obtain-

Russia has a very strong influence on Egypt. Egypt will control the canal. They can use that control to harass shipping or to impose restrictions. The opening of the Suez would give the Russians easier accessibility to the eastern Mediterranean, greater influence in the eastern Mediterranean, and ready access to the approaches to the Indian Ocean. This latter is indeed important.

Am I overpessimistic on this matter?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think from the military and strategic standpoint, there is no doubt that opening the Suez Canal would be a greater advantage for the Soviet Union than for the United States. It considerably shortens the distance the Soviet men-of-war would have to travel to deploy to the Indian Ocean and elsewhere.

So, in a narrow military and strategic sense, we would be much better off with the Suez Canal closed.

On the other hand, the exacerbation of the difficulties between the Arabs and the Israelis is the device that the Soviet Union has used to maintain her presence in Egypt and Syria, with which she has penetrated the Arab nations in general. Therefore, if it becomes feasible to work out a solution which eliminates or dampens down these difficulties between the Arabs and Israelis as a result of which the Arabs are able to persuade the Soviets to leave, this would be a significant plus for us in a military and strategic sense in the Mediterranean.

So, there are tradeoffs involved in a settlement which might be worked out if the Soviet presence is reduced in these countries.

Mr. SIKES. Are you optimistic about a reduction of the Soviet presence in that area?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, but not pessimistic. I am just guarded.

INDIAN OCEAN SEALANES

Mr. SIKES. How vital is control or the capability to control Indian Ocean sealanes to the United States, our European allies, and Japan in terms of raw materials, trade, and military support and resupply?

Secretary CHAFEE. Oil is by far the most important raw material dependent on free access to the Indian Ocean sea lines of communication. Japan is dependent on Persian Gulf oil for 90 percent of her requirements. Japan has no viable alternative for her oil requirements.

Western European countries receive nearly 50 percent of their oil requirements from the Persian Gulf. Although a small percentage of this oil could be transported to the eastern Mediterranean in pipelines, the majority must rely on free access to the Indian Ocean sealanes. No currently available alternative sources of supply could meet the Western European demands for oil.

The United States currently relies on the Persian Gulf for more than three-fourths of the oil consumed by our forces in Southeast Asia. The United States could utilize alternate oil sources to meet our overseas requirement at a greater cost.

Although there are indications that new oil reserves will be discovered/developed, these new sources will not significantly mitigate the vital needs of our European allies and the Japanese for uninterrupted access to oil from the Persian Gulf area.

Denial of the Indian Ocean sealanes to our European allies would leave them with no practical alternate means of trading with Asian

countries. The reverse is true for Japan; she would have no practical access to her European markets. Although both Europe and Japan would be economically restricted, they would both be able to survive without the sealanes of the Indian Ocean by developing other markets.

For the United States, the effect of denial of access to the Indian Ocean sea lines of communication for purposes of trade would be only an inconvenience. We could reach all of our major markets and suppliers by alternate sea routes. Further, U.S. trade with Indian Ocean countries represents only a minor percentage of our total trade.

Denial of the Indian Ocean sealanes to those European countries with interests in the Indian Ocean area would drastically restrict their abilities to resupply and support military operations. Great Britain, France, and Portugal would find themselves faced with impossible support problems in the Indian Ocean area without free access to sea lines of communication.

For the United States to continue to develop the communications facility at Diego Garcia free access by Indian Ocean sealanes is essential. Freedom to transit the Indian Ocean is a requirement for support and resupply of any military operation that might be conducted in littoral countries.

Mr. SIKES. What would be the effects of the loss of the use of these sealanes during a contingency on the ability of ourselves and our allies to obtain critical supplies and our ability to conduct military operations in support of our treaty commitments?

Secretary CHAFEE. The loss of the use of Indian Ocean sealanes during a contingency would have a severe adverse effect on our allies from the standpoint of curtailed delivery of Middle East Oil. Further, our allies would only have a marginal capability to resupply their interests in the Indian Ocean and on its littoral. In that the United States is not completely dependent on the Indian Ocean area for any critical supplies, the loss of these sealanes would have a less major direct effect on us. _____

COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AT DIEGO GARCIA

Mr. SIKES. In your opinion, is it still vital to construct a naval communications station in the area of Diego Garcia in order to insure adequate communications for U.S. naval forces transiting or operating in the Indian Ocean?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The austere communications facility being constructed at Diego Garcia remains a _____ requirement. A _____. The facility will become part of the worldwide command and control networks for normal and contingency operations in support of the national and naval operating requirements.

Mr. McFALL. What is the situation now with Diego Garcia? Do you have this worked out with the other body?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. The fiscal year 1971 budget as finally passed did provide funds for the first increment of construction of an austere communications facility in Diego Garcia, and we are proceeding with that.

(Off the record.)

SOVIET PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. SIKES. The Indian Ocean is, of course, a very important part of the world. Shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean are vital to the free world, yet our presence there historically has been very limited and continues to be very limited.

The British have been withdrawing at a rather rapid rate from the area, and apparently that is to continue.

Are you in a position to discuss the extent of U.S.S.R. presence in the Indian Ocean, the areas where they have port agreements, and the extent of those port agreements?

(Off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. I appreciate your frankness in discussing this matter. It is a serious matter, one that I fear is all too often overlooked in this country.

The Soviets have made considerable penetration throughout most of the Indian Ocean area. This is certainly a matter which could result in increasing problems for us in the years ahead.

It is strange to me that the protests which always seem to be provoked in foreign countries when the United States seeks to establish base rights or otherwise to conduct essential operations for our security and that of the free world never seem to accompany penetration by the Soviets. Were there any objections by the Indian Government and the press of India, or other countries, about Soviet intrusions into the Indian Ocean areas comparable to the objections raised to our very limited operation on Diego Garcia?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I am unaware of any, sir.

I would be able to discuss it in general terms, and would like to provide a more detailed answer for the record.

Mr. SIKES. Provide the detail for the record, if you will.

(The information follows:)

In response to your questions on the extent of the U.S.S.R. presence in the Indian Ocean, I shall preface my answer with a general comment in order that you may appreciate how the Soviets view that region.

Since 1954, the U.S.S.R. has offered some—in economic and military aid to 15 Indian Ocean littoral countries. This is approximately 65 percent of the Soviet Union's total aid to free world nations.

Focusing now on Soviet naval operations; they began in earnest in March 1968 shortly after the United Kingdom announcement of its planned withdrawal from East of Suez. Since then the Soviet navy has maintained an almost continuous presence in the Indian Ocean with an average of 3-4 naval combatants deployed at any given time. Soviet ships have made about 150 visits to 26 ports in 16 bordering countries including Ceylon, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Maldives, Mauritius, Pakistan, Somalia, South Yemen Sudan, Tanzania, UAR, and Yemen. Soviet naval ship operating days in the Indian Ocean have risen from approximately 1,900 in 1968 to about 3,400 in 1970.

The Soviets have not yet secured base rights in the area, but make extensive use of anchorages—The U.S.S.R. has assisted in the development of port facilities—. The present Soviet Indian Ocean fleet consists of a cruiser, destroyer, mine sweeper, an LST with naval infantry, a repair ship and several other auxiliaries.

Mr. SIKES. I find it difficult to understand that, but it is a fact of life.

Mr. Rhodes, have you a question?

Mr. RHODES. Just a statement, really, along the lines of the chairman's questioning.

I am also a little amazed at some of the people in this country who have protested any move the United States makes which appears to be aimed at projecting our image or influence. Those people did not protest the Soviet entry into the Indian Ocean.

Certainly, there can be no doubt by looking at the record of the last several years that Soviet Russia has become a neocolonial power, and it uses its Navy or any other means that it has at its disposal for projecting its influence into any part of the world that appears to be right for such a projection.

Since politics, both international and domestic, abhor a vacuum, like nature, when a vacuum appears in any section of the world, you find the Soviets rushing in with everything they have.

I think it is time the people of the United States and many of those who put themselves forward as great authorities on international policy should realize these facts.

Mr. SIKES. It was a shocking thing to the members of the Military Construction Subcommittee to hear some of the expressions that were voiced in the other body about the efforts to get a base in Diego Garcia. They were objections to any additional American presence anywhere in the world. To me it is inconceivable to abandon the Indian Ocean area, particularly when the Soviets would be the beneficiary.

Mr. RHODES. If you wanted to put a name on them, you would have to call them neoisolationists.

BRITISH INFLUENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. DAVIS. How do you evaluate the statements of the Heath Government in Britain which would lead us to believe that perhaps the pellmell withdrawal of the British from east of the Suez may not occur?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe, as it has worked out in the implementation of their preelection statements, what they have done is to make the decision to hang on in the Singapore area, but to remove the British presence from the Persian Gulf. So, they would maintain a presence east of Suez, but it would be in the Singapore area.

Mr. DAVIS. That is about the only difference that you have been able to observe so far, as far as their policy of withdrawal?

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is right.

NAVAL BASES AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES IN MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICAN AREA

Mr. DAVIS. What do we have now existent in the Mediterranean in the way of what might be termed permanent bases and ship repair facilities in that area?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We have access to all of the ports of the NATO Nations in the Mediterranean for peacetime uses, and in a NATO war situation. NATO bases may or may not be available to us in a non-NATO crisis.

One of the only ship repair facilities of any substance available to us is the Malta dockyard. We generally keep a destroyer tender in one of the various ports of the Mediterranean to do our own voyage repair work for destroyers and ships smaller than carriers. Carriers

are generally capable of maintaining themselves until time to return to the States.

Mr. DAVIS. Is this a British retained naval facility at Malta that we are permitted to use? Is that about the status of it?

Admiral ZUMWALT. It was originally British which is and is now a Government of Malta owned, civilian operated shipyard. Malta is an independent member of the British Commonwealth, closely linked to the United Kingdom by natural defense and financial agreements which expire in 1974. At the present time the United Kingdom is responsible for Malta's defense, for example.

Mr. DAVIS. So, we are there by sufferance of the British until 1974? Is that our status there?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We are not in Malta per se. We have military personnel at a NATO command headquarters at Malta and utilize Maltese facilities in support of our NATO commitment with both Maltese and British permission.

Mr. DAVIS. Is it Rota over in Spain where we have a naval facility? What do we have there?

Admiral ZUMWALT. On the Spanish Atlantic coast we have the Rota Base, which provides facilities for the basing of our Polaris submarines. There is a tender permanently stationed there. Rota also has a naval air station.

Mr. DAVIS. What accessibility to Gibraltar do we have?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Our ships use the Port of Gibraltar. It is under the British [deleted.]

Mr. DAVIS. At Naples, do we have some effective on-shore naval repair facilities?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The Italian Navy has repair facilities that would, presumably, be available to us in a NATO war. We do not as a normal practice make use of them in peacetime.

Mr. DAVIS. With the headquarters of our 6th Fleet there, I am curious as to the limitations on our use of facilities in that area.

Admiral ZUMWALT. In peacetime, there are no limitations imposed on us by Italy. It has been our policy to try to supply through underway replenishment from the continental United States in order to have the greatest operational flexibility. Also, we try to deploy our ships in a high state of material readiness. While deployed ship maintenance is performed by the crews with periodic assistance from our mobile support ships. We seek assistance from repair facilities ashore only when the work required is beyond the capability of our mobile support ships.

Mr. DAVIS. What other onshore facilities do we have in the Mediterranean area? Is there anything in Greece that we can use?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We have the Naval Air Facility at Sigonella in Sicily. We have the fleet anchorage at Soudha Bay, Crete, which is very frequently used. Our ships frequently visit Athens. Naples is the home port for six of our ships, and many of our ships visit there.

We are continuing to visit French ports despite French military withdrawal from NATO. In the last year, for example, there were 92 separate ship visits to French ports.

We have previously mentioned our use of Rota, Spain.

There are other ports in Spain that we visit, such as Barcelona.

In Turkey, we visit both Istanbul, Izmir and Iskenderun in the southern part.

We also have the 6th Fleet flagship home ported at Gaeta, which is just north of Naples.

Mr. DAVIS. On the south shore of the Mediterranean, Port Lyautey is the only American facility, and that has been reduced to just communications headquarters? Is that about the size of it?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. We maintain a naval training command there for the purpose of providing training for the Moroccans. And Naval Communications Station, Morocco, is also located in Kenitra. These are the only facility in an African country bordering on the Mediterranean.

Mr. DAVIS. What about Tangiers? Have we anything there at all any more?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We have nothing in Tangiers. Our ships have occasionally visited there.

Mr. DAVIS. Now let us go around on the east coast of Africa. What do we have available to us there?

Admiral ZUMWALT. On the East Coast of Africa, we have the Naval Communications Station in Asmara, Ethiopia. Then our Mideast force uses the British facilities at Bahrein.

Other than that, I do not know of any facilities on the east coast. If I have missed any, I will provide it for the record.

(The information follows:)

There are no other U.S. Naval facilities on the East Coast of Africa.

Mr. DAVIS. What about around the coast of Africa? Have we any particular arrangements or uses in South Africa, for instance?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir; although the ports of South Africa would be available to us should we ask for them, I am confident.

Mr. SIKES. You mean if it were not State Department policy not to have our fleet visit that country? Isn't that what is happening?

Admiral ZUMWALT. May I provide an answer for the record?

(The information follows:)

At the time of the visit of the U.S. carrier, *F. D. Roosevelt*, to Capetown in February of 1967, concern was expressed in some quarters about the problems that could arise in connection with liberty for crew members in South African ports. Since that time except for emergency cases we have not found it necessary to visit these ports. For the present we are continuing this practice.

Mr. DAVIS. As you come up the west coast, have we any special rights in Liberia, for instance?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir; I know of none. All of those countries are either independent or belong to the Portuguese. There are some Spanish islands off the coast; however we make use of none of them at the present time.

In the Azores, of course, we have facilities.

General CHAPMAN. The Russian flag shows in all of them.

Secretary CHAFEE. I think there is one point we want to make here. We do not have bases, but we have not sought bases in most of these places, nor do we want them. We call at these ports. We call on the east coast of Africa.

Mr. DAVIS. What military rights do we still have in the Azores?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The original base agreements expired at the end of their 5-year period and have not been officially extended. We have been permitted to stay on by the Portuguese Government in the absence of a formal agreement between governments.

Mr. DAVIS. What do we have there now, anything permanent at all?
Admiral ZUMWALT. The Air Force has a field there. The Navy has a very small facility there. I will have to supply the details of that for the record.

(The information follows:)

Navy facilities in the Azores consist of a small Naval Air Facility which are tenants on the Air Force airfield at Lajes, Terceira Island. The Naval Air Facility provides ground and communications support for a detachment of rotational Maritime Patrol aircraft which conduct antisubmarine warfare/ocean surveillance missions from Lajes Field.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Those Naval facilities in the Azores are of

Mr. DAVIS. Do the British have anything at all substantial in what might be termed permanent naval facilities other than at Gibraltar and at Malta? Do they still keep something substantial over in Cyprus or Rhodes or any of those places?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The British have very small forces at Cyprus. I do not think they maintain any permanent naval forces there.

In Rhodes I know of none.

The British presence in the Mediterranean is very small. Their concept appears to be random visits, rather than permanent presence.

JAPANESE MILITARY BUILDUP

Mr. DAVIS. What about the so-called military buildup in Japan? Is that confined entirely to land forces, or are they beginning to re-establish anything in the way of a navy?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They have a respectable small navy, and they are increasing it. Their plan calls for gradual expansion of their naval forces, which they call their maritime self-defense forces.

GERMAN NAVY

Mr. DAVIS. And Germany?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Germany has a small, efficient navy which they visualize as making its sole contribution in the Baltic. They have some guided missile destroyers, and they have a large number of small craft, torpedo boats and surface-to-surface missile craft.

Mr. DAVIS. At one time I believe we were having a number of smaller naval vessels built for us in Italy. Has that program been entirely terminated?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I know of no current program, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. RHODES. Do I gather from your answer to Mr. Davis' question about the German Navy that the Germans have a cruise missile?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. They have our TARTAR missile which they will use for short ranges in a surface-to-surface mode, and they also are interested in the French for their EXOCET missile.

Mr. RHODES. What sort of craft do they have? Is it similar to the KOMAR?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. I can provide the details for the record. They have 18 destroyer types, 11 submarines, 48 patrols, 79 mine craft, two amphibious, and 139 auxiliary and service craft.

(The information follows:)

Germany plans a new class of fast patrol boats for the EXOCET missile. They will be similar to their Jaguar class PT boats which are about 140 feet long and displace about 185. They will be larger than KOMAR, which is about 85 feet long and displaces less than 100 tons. ———.

BRITISH NAVY

Mr. RHODES. Have the British any cruise missiles on ships?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They are acquiring cruise missiles. I am unable to answer, and will provide for the record whether they have actually installed them at this point. They are also interested in the French for the EXOCET.

Mr. RHODES. Is the EXOCET an efficient missile? How does it compare with the Russian STYX?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We believe it is an effective missile, but it is capable of being jammed, as is any cruise missile. ———.

(The information follows:)

The British plan to purchase the French EXOCET missile for installation on their newer frigates. There are no surface-to-surface missile systems presently operational in the Royal Navy, but some of their surface-to-air missiles may have a very limited antiship capability.

Mr. DAVIS. If I recall your charts correctly, the British have in operation just one carrier and one cruiser.

Admiral ZUMWALT. They have two carriers and two LPH's which are ex-carriers.

Mr. SIKES. What is the function now of the ex-carrier?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The LPH is used as an amphibious ship to base the vertical lift of a landing force.

General CHAPMAN. British commandos.

Mr. SIKES. How many of the submarines of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy are nuclear?

Admiral ZUMWALT. In France and Italy, none, I believe, at the present time. The United Kingdom has some. I do not know how many. The three SSBN's are nuclear propelled. I do not know how many of their attack submarines are. I will provide that for the record.

(The information follows:)

The Royal Navy has four nuclear-powered attack submarines.

NAVAL FACILITIES AT SINGAPORE

Mr. SIKES. On or off the record, what is the status of the plan to use Singapore as a U.S. base in cooperation with the Australians?

Admiral ZUMWALT. There is no plan to use Singapore as a base, Mr. Chairman.

Singapore, as you know, is an independent nation in the British Commonwealth. It permits access to its harbor by U.S. naval ships. Singapore has a civilian-operated repair facility which will be available to us if we need it for repairs.

Mr. SIKES. Run by contract or the local government?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The contractor there is a British contractor. I have forgotten the name of the outfit. It is the same outfit that runs the dockyard at Malta.