

You know that we are determined to assist India to the fullest in building a free society, a task now rendered more difficult by an obvious external threat. To this end, we have sought to provide India with far more assistance than any other single aid recipient. I might add that I personally intervened with the Germans, Japanese, Italians, and British to get this year's consortium contributions up to the level finally achieved. But the setback to mediation will inevitably have an adverse impact on our efforts to obtain Congressional and popular support for economic and military aid to India and Pakistan. I must tell you quite frankly that it is hard to counter the mounting resistance in the Congress against aid programs which seem destined to aggravate disputes between two nations, both of which we regard as friends. This is not anti-Indian sentiment; it is a 'plague on both your houses' attitude.

The only way we see to counter this resistance, recognizing that Kashmir and other issues are not susceptible of easy and quick solutions, is to demonstrate that sincere and determined efforts are nevertheless underway to solve them. Here is where we had counted heavily on the mediation effort you proposed.

We entirely share your appreciation of Chinese aims vis-à-vis India. We too are also concerned at Pakistan's developing relationship with Communist China, and intend to do what we can to arrest this trend. But we regard it as even more in India's interest than in ours to forestall a Pakistan-China accommodation. However emotionally the Pakistani are behaving, and whatever the temptation to reply, surely a further heating up of the atmosphere between your two countries aggravates rather than diminishes this risk. We do not see a mediatory effort as weakening you against China, but as a move to lessen pressure on your flank, and hopefully to lead toward a reconciliation which will greatly strengthen India's position.

In the last analysis, it must be primarily the task of Indian statesmanship, in seeking to strengthen India against Chinese Communist pressure, to forestall aggravation of this threat via closer Pakistani-Chinese ties. We want to help, but to do so effectively we must know more clearly what you propose to do. As I see it, you do not rule out mediation but suggest the necessary preparatory work be done by quiet diplomacy. An atmosphere must be created, but how is this to be done? We wonder what steps you plan to reestablish communications. Once we know what course you contemplate, we will do what we can to help bring Pakistan to the mediation table, which we still believe is the course best calculated to serve your larger interests and to permit us most effectively to help.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy"

Rusk

CRUS, '61-'63, S. Asia, Smith, Louis J., ed.  
WDC: USC Policy Office, '96

South Asia 641

### 320. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)

Washington, August 16, 1963.

#### SUBJECT

Feasibility of Deployment of a Carrier Task Force in the Indian Ocean

In connection with the discussion at the White House last Monday, concerning measures that might be taken to convince Pakistan of our capacity to respond effectively to an Indian attack (or vice versa if the case should ever arise), the State Department has particularly raised the question of possible deployment of a carrier task force to the Indian Ocean, either as a temporary measure or eventually as a permanent deployment.

I therefore request that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review this question, comparing the feasibility, effectiveness, and comparative costs of deployment of a carrier versus alternative methods of bringing U.S. power to bear in the area. This question may be considered as part of your response to the generalized request for courses of action that would serve to convince Pakistan of our capacity to respond, or you may if desired wish to take it up in a broader framework.<sup>1</sup>

Robert S. McNamara<sup>2</sup>

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, India 381 (10 Jul 63), Indian Ocean Task Force 63. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> In a September 25 memorandum to McNamara, the Joint Chiefs responded that the intermittent deployment of a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean was feasible if politically desirable. (JCSM 735-63; *ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed it.