










ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. Jonathan Stoddart Director, PM/ISO Department of State Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Jock:

In addition to participating in the recent US-UK Indian Ocean Conference, both OASD(ISA) and OJCS prepared many of the papers used in the discussions. As a result, we were told that we would be offered an opportunity to comment on the minutes before they were promulgated. This did not occur.

Had we been able to review the draft we would have made a number of suggestions which would have made the final product a more accurate document. For example:

- Relative to the paragraph on page 4 dealing with the JCS presentation, specifically that dealing with the availability of Trincomalee, the text of the formal presentation stated, "... It should be emphasized in advance that political constraints currently, and in the future, preclude the use of many of these facilities..." point was reemphasized during the discussion period that followed. Thus, I do not believe that the UK delegates felt that we were under the impression that Trincomalee might be made available to us as a base in the foreseeable future.
- It is not true that our MAAGs and training teams were not included in the paper we prepared for the talks. The ISA submission contained a list of countries to which the U.S. sends military advisors and their numbers.
- None of the following major points made by Admiral Doyle were included in the Indian Ocean Arms Control Section:

CLASSIFIED BY CHIEF, FE/SA Div. 3-5 SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1980.

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- -- Both countries should be very careful in any bilateral discussions involving arms limitations. It is not realistic to restrict such discussions in the Indian Ocean area to naval forces only. To be balanced and effective, the discussions would have to include the land-based forces in the surrounding littoral and hinterland nations.
- A firm stand should be taken with developing countries to prevent the freedom of the seas from being imperiled through law of the sea negotiations. It is apparent from the wide open list of issues that the developing countries are interested in restricting the rights of developed countries wherever possible.
- -- The basic concept of peace zones should be opposed as being directly contrary to our law of the sea position, which is based on the freedom to navigate and operate on, under and over the high seas. If carried through to fruition such concepts could deny access to vital areas, could restrict freedom of the seas and could set up special regimes for high seas areas.
- -- No version of a peace zone concept is acceptable (including a watered down version which the UK noted we may be confronted with). Any concept should be opposed even to the extent of voting against it in the UNGA in isolation.
- The last sentence of the second paragraph of the Indian Ocean Arms Control Section on page 12 is not a USG position. The background paper submitted for the meeting made it quite clear that the Department of Defense would oppose entering into any arms control arrangements in the Indian Ocean (page 2) and would not commit itself now on the question of a positive response to future Soviet approaches on arms control (page 4).

As a matter of principle, I am concerned that we were not given an opportunity to review a document to which we had contributed, in which we had such obvious and considerable interest, and which was widely distributed to, among others, a large number of military addressees.

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JAMES H. NOYES

Deputy Assistant Secretary Near Eastern, African & South Asian Affairs

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SECRET (X)

Mr. James H. Noyes
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Near Eastern, African & South Asian Affairs
International Security Affairs
Department of Defense

Dear Jim:

I appreciate your letter of November 27, 1972 commenting on the minutes for the recent US-UK Indian Ocean talks. As you know, the talks were merely intended to be an informal exchange of views between the two principal officers responsible for politico-military affairs in the Department of State and the FCO. It was, from the beginning, intended to keep these talks as low key as possible with no official record except as informally desired by either side. As a courtesy, representatives of Defense and the Department's Regional Bureaus were invited to attend and in certain cases to prepare papers in their respective areas of expertise. The minutes were primarily designed to complement the papers prepared for the conference. Therefore we did not see any particular benefit in repeating the contents of the papers in the minutes themselves. The comments made by the British as recorded by the note-takers are certainly subject to interpretation. They do, however, in our visco reflect accurately the exchange which took place.

We do not regard the minutes as a policy document nor are they intended to be a verbatim record of the proceedings.

They merely record as accurately as possible the essense of what was actually said by the participants in amplification of their prepared papers.



SECRET 2

We originally considered producing as fully cleared, elaborate and complete set of minutes for the conference. To have done so, however, would have been in conflict with my own desire to keep the minutes general and uncomplicated. Therefore I decided against seeking a Defense clearance for the minutes of the meeting.


Sincerely,

JDStoddart

PM/ISO:JEKelley/ds

12/12/72

Clearance: PM/ISO - Captain Dewenter PM - Mr. Pickering (info)



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