

While giving Bowles a friendly hearing, I'd urge holding off on any responses just yet till we can talk further with him. However, it would help greatly if you'd tell him you'd see him again before he goes (he'll be here through Thanksgiving).

Bob Komer

338. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, November 14, 1963.

When Chet Bowles saw the President 13 November, the latter was favorably impressed in principle with Chet's pitch that it might be possible to trade off a 5-year US military commitment (at \$65–\$75 million or so) for at least a tacit understanding that the Indians would not exceed certain reasonable force goals, would limit their buys from the Soviets, and would take a more active role in our grand strategy against China. Chet thought that such a force ceiling would make continued MAP for India more palatable to the Paks, and would also limit the amount of free foreign exchange India would divert to defense at the expense of development.

The President's view was that Chet might have an interesting proposition even if it had only a 50–50 chance of success or even if we didn't get full performance. I attach the papers¹ which Chet gave the President and the latter read with interest.

Chet mentioned India's desire for defense production aid (further highlighted in Nehru's recent letter, Delhi 1625).² I suggested, however, that we might not want to build up too much of an indigenous production base at this time, since it made India less dependent on us and was the facet which most worried the Paks.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 10/20/63–11/22/63. Secret.

¹ Not attached. The documents cited are attached to a copy of Komer's memorandum in Department of State files. They include the memorandum cited in footnote 1, Document 337, a chart detailing the estimated cost of U.S. portion of supporting an 18-division Indian Army and a 47-squadron Indian air force for Fiscal Years 1965–1969, and a 2-page memorandum entitled "Proposed Programs for MAP, India." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-INDIA)

² See Document 336.

The President asked that he be given a preliminary Washington view on this in time to discuss it again with Bowles before the latter left. I've also told Phil Talbot about this and suggested a 22 November deadline for a joint State–Defense memo, so we can give it to the President for weekend reading.

While Chet told the President he would really like something on the order of \$75 million annually, he also presented attached estimate that some \$314 million over five years might do the trick. He noted that these figures would need to be carefully reviewed (I pointed out that DOD's current thinking was more on the order of \$50 million a year, and an 18 division and 39 squadron ceiling). Also, a 5-year commitment à la Iran was hard to make at a time when future aid prospects were so uncertain. However, in response to the President, I did hazard, on the basis of previous talks with you, that if necessary DOD could probably find another \$10–\$12 million a year for Indian MAP.

My own reaction is that if in fact we're now involved in a long term MAP relationship (on the order of \$50 million plus annually), why not see how much we can use this leverage to get some things from Delhi that we really want? If Bowles turns out to be over-optimistic, have we really lost very much?

R. W. Komer³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

339. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)

Washington, November 18, 1963.

YOUR REFERENCE

JCSM-735-63¹

SUBJECT

Indian Ocean Carrier Task Force Deployment

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, India 381 (10 July 63), Indian Ocean Task Force 63. Secret. Drafted in OASD/ISA on November 13 by Captain E.L. Schwab.

¹ See footnote 1, Document 320.

In a letter of October 2, 1963² the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in answer to a query by the Secretary of State, conveyed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that intermittent deployment of a carrier task force to the Indian Ocean is feasible, if politically desirable.

In response, in a letter of October 17, 1963,³ the Secretary of State suggests:

a. That the Department of Defense develop detailed proposals for the intermittent deployment of a carrier force for not less than two months out of every six.

b. That State and Defense staffs jointly prepare a paper to identify the problems involved in deployment of a carrier force for about eight months of the year and, also, to examine other actions, including CASF deployment, that would enhance the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean area. The resultant paper could then be used as a basis for further State, Defense and JCS discussion.

The political objectives of the carrier force deployment, as noted in the August 17³ and October 17 letters of the Secretary of State, are to provide a visible U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean area in order to help deter potential aggressors, reassure our allies and stabilize certain intra-regional disputes among our friends, e.g., India and Pakistan.

In addition to the foregoing, the Department of State has provided specific political guidance to be used in developing an initial carrier task force deployment schedule:

a. Unless special circumstances arise which would call for revision, the task force should avoid the East Coast of Africa.

b. No visits should be scheduled for Burma and Ceylon at this time.

c. No visits should be scheduled to any of the Indian Ocean island territories of Great Britain or France.

d. Planned port visits should seek to strike a balance between calls on allied and friendly non-allied countries.

e. Port calls and other activities during the first deployment should be within the general framework of informal visits and good will missions.

Consistent with the foregoing, I request that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide, at an early date, a proposed schedule for an initial carrier task deployment in the Indian Ocean for two months out of six. If feasible, the first six months period should begin with December 1963. This proposed schedule will be used as the basis for final political clearances prior to the first deployment.

The second suggestion of the Secretary of State, to study an eight months per year deployment, will be undertaken in the near future. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) will coordinate Defense action in this matter.

Robert S. McNamara⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

340. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 30, 1963, 11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President, in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately 1-1/2 hours

[Here follows discussion unrelated to South Asia.]

6. The President then brought up the question of Pakistan and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India. He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to South Asia.]

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80 B 01285A, Box 6, McCone Files, DCI Meetings with President Johnson, 23 November-31 December 1963. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone on December 2

² See footnote 1, Document 333.

³ Not found.